VINEETA SRINANDANversusHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ON ITS OWN MOTION

               [2025] 12 S.C.R. 426 : 2025 INSC 1408

                     Vineeta Srinandan
                             v.
   High Court of Judicature at Bombay on Its Own Motion
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 2267 of 2025)
                             10 December 2025
              [Vikram Nath* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the challenge preferred by the appellant-contemnor to
       the judgment of the High Court is sustainable in law; whether the
       High Court was justified in declining to accept her apology and
       consequently refusing to remit the sentence imposed.

                                 Headnotes†
       Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – s.12 – Scheme of – One
       Seawoods Estates Ltd. challenged the vires of r.20 of the
       Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 before the High Court –
       Intervention application filed therein that the appellant-
       contemnor, a former Director, Cultural thereof had issued a
       circular as regards the stray dog menace inter alia stating “The
       entire country has a stray dog menace, and most of the urban
       residential societies..are struggling to fight this dog feeder’s
       mafia….there is a big Dog mafia operating in the country, who
       has a list of High Court and Supreme Court judges having
       views similar to the dog feeders.…” – High Court in Suo Motu
       Criminal Contempt Petition held the appellant-contemnor
       guilty of committing the offence of criminal contempt of
       court punishable u/s.12, Contempt Act and sentenced her to
       undergo simple imprisonment for one week and imposed a
       fine of Rs.2,000/- – Challenge to:
       Held: Though, the contemptuous circular does satisfy the essential
       ingredients of criminal contempt, the reasoning adopted by the
       High Court in invoking s.12 to impose punishment upon the
       appellant-contemnor not concurred with – The statutory scheme
       recognises that once a contemnor expresses sincere remorse, even



* Author
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                           427

                         Vineeta Srinandan v.
        High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

     if the apology is not unqualified in form, the Court is competent to
     accept it and, where necessary, discharge the contemnor or remit
     the sentence imposed – On facts, High Court failed to exercise its
     contempt jurisdiction with due circumspection – Once the appellant
     contemnor had, from the very first day of her appearance in the
     suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse and tendered an
     unconditional apology, the High Court was required to examine
     whether such apology satisfied the statutory parameters u/s.12 –
     In the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was
     lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered
     remitting the sentence in accordance with law - Impugned judgment
     set aside – Sentence imposed, remitted. [Paras 8, 9.5-11]
     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – s.12 – Interpretation – Scheme
     of. [Paras 8.2-8.4, 9.5]

     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Power under – Exercise of:
     Held: Power to punish carries within it the concomitant power
     to forgive, where the individual before the Court demonstrates
     genuine remorse and repentance for the act that has brought
     him to this position – In exercise of contempt jurisdiction, Courts
     must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour
     for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism – Mercy must remain
     an integral part of the judicial conscience, to be extended where
     the contemnor sincerely acknowledges his lapse and seeks to
     atone for it. [Para 1]

                              Case Law Cited
     Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association [2005] 3 SCR
     816 : (2005) 6 SCC 109; Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re [1992] Supp. 3
     SCR 257 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446; DC Saxena v. Hon’ble the
     Chief Justice of India [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC
     216; Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
     [1969] 2 SCR 779 : AIR 1971 SC 221 – distinguished.
     Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 390 : (2017)
     16 SCC 605 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023.
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                               List of Keywords
       Section 12, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Dog mafia; Dog feeders;
       Stray dog menace; Suo Motu Criminal Contempt proceedings;
       Criminal contempt of court; Contemptuous circular; Apology
       not accepted; Sentence imposed remitted; Contemnor; Sincere
       remorse; Unconditional apology.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       2267 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 23.04.2025 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Bombay in SMCRCP No. 2 of 2025

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Dama Seshadri Naidu, Sr. Adv., Ms. Dixita Gohil, Pranjal Agarwal,
       Yash S. Vijay, Ms. Anisha Mahajan, Shikhar Aggarwal.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, Ms. S.V. Sonawane, Mosin Naik, Satish
       Muley, Sagar Jain, Shreshth Nanda.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Vikram Nath, J.

1.     The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant
       power to forgive, where the individual before the Court demonstrates
       genuine remorse and repentance for the act that has brought him to
       this position. Therefore, in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, Courts
       must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour for
       Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism. After all, it requires fortitude
       to acknowledge contrition for one’s lapse, and an even greater
       virtue to extend forgiveness to the erring. Mercy, therefore, must
       remain an integral part of the judicial conscience, to be extended
       where the contemnor sincerely acknowledges his lapse and seeks
       to atone for it.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                              429

                            Vineeta Srinandan v.
           High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

      FACTUAL MATRIX
2.    The present appeal is by appellant-contemnor under Section
      19(1)(b) of Contempt of Courts Act, 19711 preferred against judgment
      dated 23rd April, 2025, passed by the Division Bench of High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay (“High Court”) in Suo Motu Criminal
      Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2025, whereby the appellant-contemnor
      was held guilty of committing the offence of criminal contempt of
      court punishable under Section 12 of Contempt Act, sentenced
      her to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one week and
      imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.
3.    Brief facts, germane to the controversy at hand, are narrated
      hereinbelow: -
      3.1. Appellant-contemnor is a former Director, Cultural of Seawoods
           Estates Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Seawoods”). In an
           already pending writ petition2 filed by Seawoods before the High
           Court, laying challenge to the vires of Rule 20 of the Animal
           Birth Control Rules, 2023, one Ms. Leela Verma had moved an
           intervention application3. She filed an affidavit stating that the
           present appellant-contemnor had issued a circular (hereinafter
           “contemptuous circular”) dated 29th January, 2025. The relevant
           portions of the said circular are as follows: -

                                         “SEL/CLR/31 /6558/2025
                                             29th Jan. 2025
                        How Democracy is being crushed by Judicial
                                        System?
                      The entire country has a stray dog menace, and
                      most of the urban residential societies in class A
                      cities are struggling to fight this dog feeder’s mafia
                      spread across the country. This is such a huge well-
                      established network of trained professionals who have
                      a very strong presence in the Judicial system too.
                      So much so that if affected societies want to show
                      videos or photos of the dog attacks, show information


1    Hereinafter, “Contempt Act”.
2    Writ Petition No. 11652 of 2023.
3    Interim Application No. 10251 of 2024
430                                                       [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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                 of fake cases filed by dog feeders, or show videos
                 showing training of feeders where they are training
                 their female members to file fake molestation cases
                 against people who stop their illegal activities of
                 feeding pack of strays in areas close to houses of
                 other people, then Judges don’t want to see them and
                 completely avoid taking cognizance of such material.
                 In one case, where we had shown the video of a
                 Dog attack on a small girl in front of building 11 to
                 the Hon’ble Bombay High Court made fun of it and
                 outrightly rejected it by saying that the dog wanted
                 to play with that girl.
                 Now we are convinced that there is a big Dog mafia
                 operating in the country, who has a list of High Court
                 and Supreme Court judges having views similar to
                 the dog feeders.
                 No matter how many people are dying or attacked
                 in the country every year but most of the high court/
                 supreme court orders will defend dog feeders ignoring
                 the value of human life.
                 …
                 …
                 2. Despite the latest status being on record, the
                 Hon’ble Court insisted on implementing the 20th
                 March 2023 order on us which is meant for community
                 animals (which are born inside) and we do not have
                 any community animals at all. Still Justice wants to
                 impose this illegal order on us by using his power
                 on the NMMC officer and the police.
                 For, SEAWOODS Estates Limited

                 SD/-
                 Vineeta Srinandan
                 Director Cultural.”
       3.2. The High Court, vide order dated 4th February, 2025, observed
            that the said circular was contemptuous in nature and ordered
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                        431

                         Vineeta Srinandan v.
        High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

          that appellant-contemnor be intimated the same. The High
          Court wanted to ascertain whether the statement made in the
          contemptuous circular was passed in private capacity or were
          made on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Seawoods.
     3.3. On 7th February, 2025 the High Court directed that show-cause
          notice be issued to the appellant-contemnor against initiating
          criminal contempt against her. Vide an affidavit submitted by
          Seawoods before the High Court, it was clarified that the Board
          of Directors had no knowledge of the contemptuous circular
          issued by appellant-contemnor, and its contents were never
          discussed, approved or accepted by any Board member.
     3.4. Subsequently thereto, on 18th February, 2025 the appellant-
          contemnor filed a reply affidavit stating, inter alia, the reasons
          why contempt action must not be initiated against her. She
          accepted that a grave error was committed in the issuance of
          the contemptuous circular, which was done by her upon the
          mental pressure exerted by the residents. She further stated
          that in repentance, she had also resigned from the Board of
          Directors of Seawoods.
     3.5. The High Court numbered the suo motu proceedings as Suo
          Motu Criminal Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2025, and directed
          to pronounce a separate order in that petition.
4.   In the subject suo motu petition, the High Court held that the
     contemptuous circular issued by the appellant-contemnor satisfied the
     ingredients of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of Contempt Act.
     By placing reliance on various precedents, the High Court disposed
     of the suo motu petition holding that the act of issuing the circular by
     appellant-contemnor cannot be categorized as fair criticism as the
     same was issued with an intent to scandalize the Court. The High
     Court, therefore, sentenced the appellant-contemnor to undergo simple
     imprisonment for a period of one week with a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.
5.   Aggrieved, the appellant-contemnor is before this Court.

     ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION:
6.   We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
     advanced on behalf of both the parties and have gone through the
     material placed on record.
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7.     The issue that arises for consideration is whether the challenge
       preferred by the appellant–contemnor to the judgment of the High
       Court is sustainable in law, and further, whether the High Court was
       justified in declining to accept her apology and consequently refusing
       to remit the sentence imposed.
       7.1. In returning the finding of guilt qua the appellant-contemnor,
            the High Court gave the following reasons: -
              i.     that the act of publishing the contemptuous circular by the
                     appellant-contemnor satisfied the ingredients of criminal
                     contempt, inasmuch as it scandalized and lowered the
                     authority of the Court.
              ii.    that the fact that the publication of contemptuous circular
                     was made by the appellant-contemnor during the pendency
                     of the writ petition4 filed by Seawoods, it amounted to
                     causing an interference with the due course of judicial
                     proceedings and obstruction with the administration of
                     justice.
              iii.   that it is totally unbelievable that appellant-contemnor
                     while undertaking to write such contumacious writing,
                     was not conscious or was unaware of the consequences
                     of such writing.
              iv.    that the whole act of publishing the contemptuous circular
                     was done with the intention to disrepute and tarnish the
                     judicial system.
              v.     that the decisions of this Court in Rajendra Sail v. M.P.
                     High Court Bar Association,5 and decisions relied upon
                     therein, i.e. Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re,6 DC Saxena v.
                     Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India,7 and Perspective
                     Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,8 has held
                     that a communication imputing improper motives to the
                     Court or its Judges cannot be regarded as fair criticism
                     of the judiciary.


4    Supra note 2.
5    (2005) 6 SCC 109.
6    (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446.
7    (1996) 5 SCC 216.
8    AIR 1971 SC 221.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                             433

                         Vineeta Srinandan v.
        High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

8.   At the outset, while we are satisfied that the contemptuous circular
     does satisfy the essential ingredients of criminal contempt, we find
     ourselves unable to concur with the reasoning adopted by the High
     Court in invoking Section 12 of Contempt Act to impose punishment
     upon the appellant-contemnor. Admittedly, pursuant to the order dated
     7th February, 2025, calling upon the appellant-contemnor to show
     cause as to why proceedings for criminal contempt be not initiated,
     she filed a reply-affidavit. In the said affidavit, the appellant-contemnor
     tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology, which stands
     duly recorded by the High Court.
     8.1. However, the High Court declined to accept the apology,
          observing that, on a holistic reading, the affidavit did not
          reflect any genuine compunction for the acts complained of. It
          concluded that the apology was merely perfunctory, tendered
          for the sake of formality, and that the expression of remorse
          appeared borrowed rather than borne out of sincere repentance.
     8.2. Section 12 of Contempt Act provides for punishment for contempt
          of court. Relevant portion of the said provision reads as follows: -
                “12. Punishment for contempt of court.- (1) Save
                as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any
                other law, a contempt of court may be punished with
                simple imprisonment for a term which may extend
                to six months, or with fine which may extend to two
                thousand rupees, or with both:
                Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
                punishment awarded may be remitted on apology
                being made to the satisfaction of the Court.
                Explanation.- An apology shall not be rejected merely
                on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the
                accused makes it bona fide.
                                                                     . . .”

     8.3. Although Section 12 of the Contempt Act bears the marginal
          note “punishment for contempt of court”, a holistic reading
          of the provision indicates that it contemplates not merely the
          imposition of punishment but also the power to remit the same.
          The proviso and the Explanation to Section 12 recognise that
434                                                          [2025] 12 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


             where the contemnor expresses genuine remorse and tenders an
             apology to the satisfaction of the Court, he may be discharged,
             or the sentence awarded may be remitted. Even after a finding
             of guilt and the imposition of punishment, the Court retains the
             discretion to exercise such power. The statutory scheme is
             thus clear, once repentance is demonstrated, the Court may
             act with magnanimity. However, the apology must be bona fide
             and must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court, which is
             required to exercise this discretion judiciously.
       8.4. The Explanation to Section 12 further provides that an apology
            shall not be rejected merely because it is qualified or conditional,
            if offered bona fide. The scheme of Section 12(1) thus reflects
            a balance, i.e. while the majesty of law must be preserved
            against attempts to malign the institution and those discharging
            judicial functions, the provision also recognises human fallibility.
            It is for this reason that the proviso empowers the Court, upon
            being satisfied of genuine remorse, to accept the apology and
            discharge the contemnor or remit the punishment awarded.
9.     The second ground on which the judgment of the High Court cannot
       be sustained is the erroneous reliance placed on the decisions
       referred to above. This Court has consistently held that the ratio
       decidendi of a judgment must be understood in the context of its
       facts and the issue decided therein. Only where the factual matrix
       is materially similar can the ratio in an earlier decision be applied. In
       this regard, reference may be made to the decision of a three-Judge
       Bench of this Court in Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India9, the
       relevant extract of which is set out hereinbelow: -
             “28. It is well settled in law that the ratio of a decision
             has to be understood regard being had to its context
             and factual exposition. The ratiocination in an authority
             is basically founded on the interpretation of the statutory
             provision. If it is based on a particular fact or the
             decision of the Court is guided by specific nature of the
             case, it will not amount to the ratio of the judgment.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)


9    (2017) 16 SCC 605
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                           435

                         Vineeta Srinandan v.
        High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

     9.1. Further, another three-Judge bench of this Court in Union of
          India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, held that: -
                “9. . . . It is not everything said by a Judge while
                giving judgment that constitutes a precedent.
                The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding
                a party is the principle upon which the case is
                decided and for this reason it is important to
                analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio
                decidendi. . .. A decision is only an authority for
                what it actually decides. What is of the essence in
                a decision is its ratio and not every observation
                found therein nor what logically follows from
                the various observations made in the judgment.
                Every judgment must be read as applicable to
                the particular facts proved, or assumed to be
                proved, since the generality of the expressions
                which may be found there is not intended to be
                exposition of the whole law, but governed and
                qualified by the particular facts of the case in
                which such expressions are to be found. It would,
                therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence
                here and there from the judgment and to build
                upon it because the essence of the decision is
                its ratio and not every observation found therein.
                The enunciation of the reason or principle on which
                a question before a court has been decided is alone
                binding as a precedent. The concrete decision
                alone is binding between the parties to it, but it
                is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a
                consideration of the judgment in relation to the
                subject-matter of the decision, which alone has
                the force of law and which, when it is clear what
                it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in
                the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of
                the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived
                at after hearing an argument on a question which
                arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute
                a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the
                precedent by long recognition may mature into rule
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                 of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the
                 application of law to the facts and circumstances of
                 the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

            Therefore, it is a settled position that where a decision turns upon
            its own facts or is guided by the peculiarities of a particular case,
            it does not constitute the ratio of the judgment. In Dhanwanti
            Devi (supra), this Court cautioned that it is neither profitable
            nor permissible to rely upon isolated lines from a judgment, for
            the binding element lies in the ratio decidendi and not in every
            observation contained therein.
       9.2. In the present case, the High Court placed reliance on the
            decisions referred to earlier and concluded that the appellant-
            contemnor’s act of issuing the contemptuous circular could not
            be regarded as fair criticism, and that the statements therein
            were calculated to ascribe improper motives to the Court and
            its Judges. Proceeding on this basis, the High Court sentenced
            the appellant-contemnor to simple imprisonment for a period
            of one week and imposed a fine of ₹2,000/-.
       9.3. In our considered view, the reliance placed by the High Court on
            the decisions of this Court stands misplaced. The distinguishing
            features of those cases were not duly appreciated. In Dr.
            D.C. Saxena (supra) and Perspective Publications (P) Ltd.
            (supra), the contemnors had not offered any apology. In Roshan
            Lal Ahuja (supra), the apology initially tendered was later
            withdrawn. In Rajendra Sail (supra), though an unconditional
            apology was offered, this Court declined to accept it in view
            of the gravity of the allegations, which included imputations
            made in a public rally that a sitting Judge had been bribed
            and possessed assets disproportionate to income. The factual
            matrix of the present case is materially distinct, and therefore,
            the precedents relied upon could not have been applied as a
            basis to record the conviction or justify the sentence imposed
            upon the appellant-contemnor.
       9.4. In the present case, the appellant-contemnor promptly entered
            appearance and filed her reply-affidavit pursuant to the show-
            cause notice issued by the High Court on 7th February, 2025.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                        437

                            Vineeta Srinandan v.
           High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion

            In the said affidavit, she explained the circumstances leading
            to the issuance of the contemptuous circular and expressed
            unconditional remorse for her conduct, tendering an unqualified
            apology at the earliest opportunity.
     9.5. While an act may amount to contempt, the proviso to Section 12
          of the Contempt Act empowers the Court to discharge the
          contemnor or remit the punishment awarded. The only
          requirement for exercising such power is that the apology must
          be genuine and acceptable to the Court. The Explanation to
          Section 12 further clarifies that an apology shall not be rejected
          merely because it is qualified or conditional, if it is made bona
          fide. The statutory scheme, therefore, recognises that once
          a contemnor expresses sincere remorse, even if the apology
          is not unqualified in form, the Court is competent to accept it
          and, where necessary, discharge the contemnor or remit the
          sentence imposed.
     9.6. Therefore, in our considered view, the High Court failed to
          exercise its contempt jurisdiction with due circumspection. Once
          the appellant-contemnor had, from the very first day of her
          appearance in the suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse
          and tendered an unconditional apology, the High Court was
          required to examine whether such apology satisfied the statutory
          parameters under Section 12 of the Contempt Act. Thus, in
          our opinion, in the absence of any material suggesting that
          the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to
          have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law.
10. In light of the foregoing discussion, we summarise our conclusions
    as under: -
     i.     The reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this
            Court in Dr. DC Saxena (supra), Perspective Publications (P)
            Ltd. (supra), Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re (supra), and Rajendra
            Sail (supra) is misplaced, as the material facts in those cases
            are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present matter.
     ii.    Considering that the appellant-contemnor has, from the very
            outset, expressed genuine remorse and repentance for issuing
            the contemptuous circular, we are satisfied that the ends of
            justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by
            the High Court.
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11. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 23rd April, 2025, passed
    by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Suo Motu Criminal
    Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2025 is hereby set aside to the aforesaid
    extent.
12. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
13. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey