VICTIM ‘X’versusSTATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.

                 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1330 : 2025 INSC 877

                                 Victim ‘X’
                                     v.
                          State of Bihar and Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 3090 of 2025)
                                  21 July 2025
               [Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against the respondent
       no.2-accused. She was granted bail by the High Court. Whether
       the grant of bail to the respondent no.2-accused has resulted into
       travesty of justice.

                                   Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.341, 323, 328, 376, 120-B r/w. s.34 –
       Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – s.3 and s.4 – Scheduled
       Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
       1989 – s.3(1)(w), s.3(2)(va) and s.15A(3) – The prosecution case
       as against respondent no.2 was that she while being posted
       as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih indulged in
       administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the
       appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection
       home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation
       and mental torture – The FIR in the instant case came to be
       based on the intervention of the High Court – The application
       for bail filed by respondent no.2 came to be rejected by the
       Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act) – However, in an appeal
       before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded
       as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent
       no.2) – Correctness:
       Held: The impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary
       ground of non-compliance of s.15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which
       mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail
       is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/
       ST Act have been applied – This Court is of the firm opinion that
       the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail



* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             1331

                    Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar and Anr.


     by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order
     dated 18.01.2024 has resulted into travesty of justice – Grant of
     bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning
     reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an
     adverse impact on the society – The Courts are not powerless and
     are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such
     bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice – In the instant
     case, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact
     the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses
     being threatened and influenced – The conclusions are fortified by
     the fact that respondent no.2-accused has been reinstated to the
     position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks
     volumes about her clout and influence with the administration –
     Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s
     extraordinary jurisdiction u/Art.136 of the Constitution of India so
     as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18.01.2024 which is
     hereby quashed and set aside – The bail granted to respondent
     no.2-accused is hereby cancelled. [Paras 25, 27, 28, 29]

                              Case Law Cited
     Shabeen Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [2025] 3
     SCR 367 : (2025) 4 SCC 172; Ajwar v. Waseem [2024] 5 SCR
     575 : (2024) 10 SCC 768 – relied on.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956;
     Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
     Atrocities) Act, 1989.

                             List of Keywords
     Torture; Sexual exploitation; Bail; Justice; Cancellation of bail;
     Perverse order of bail.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     3090 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2024 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Patna in CRLA(SJ) No. 3765 of 2023
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                                    Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Raunak Parekh, Ms. Minu Kumari,
       Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, Piyush Sardana, Amit Bhardwaj,
       Ms. Priyanka Dubey.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Samir Ali Khan, Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Khan, Neeraj Kumar Gupta,
       Ranjeet Kumar Singh, Akshaya Agrawal.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                                Judgment

       Mehta, J.

1.     Heard.
2.     Leave granted.
3.     This appeal by special leave emanates from the order dated 18th
       January, 2024, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
       of Judicature at Patna1 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent
       No.2-accused2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and
       the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed
       and she was granted bail in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No.
       17 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Sections
       341, 323, 328, 376, 120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
       Code, 18604 and Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
       Act, 19565 and Sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The
       appellant-victim herein is the informant in the said FIR.
4.     The prosecution case as against respondent No.2 is that she while
       being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih,
       Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines
       and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates


1    Hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”.
2    Hereinafter referred to as the “respondent No.2”.
3    Hereinafter referred to as the “SC/ST Act”.
4    Hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”.
5    Hereinafter referred to as the “IT Act”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                                 1333

                            Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar and Anr.


       of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual
       exploitation and mental torture. Grave allegations are attributed to
       the respondent-accused that she used to send the ladies housed
       in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual
       favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be
       based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance
       of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females
       kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored
       by the High Court.
5.     It may be noted that during the course of investigation, few more
       ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture
       and sexual exploitation against respondent No.2.
6.     The application for bail filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected
       by the learned Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order
       dated 10th July, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an appeal under
       Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing
       the order passed by the Special Court.
7.     In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent
       No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences
       punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506
       of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va)
       of the SC/ST Act vide order dated 29th August, 2023.
8.     It may be noted that in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-
       victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the
       accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under
       Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim
       in any prayer for bail essential. The High Court, vide order dated
       18th January, 2024, allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.2 and
       granted her bail with the following reasoning: -
               “7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking
               into consideration that there is no specific allegation against
               the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.
               Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order
               dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside.”



6    Hereinafter referred to as the “Special Court”.
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9.   The appellant-victim is before us through this appeal by special leave
     to assail the order passed by the High Court.
10. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by
    learned counsel for the appellant-victim, learned counsel representing
    respondent No.2-accused and the learned standing counsel
    representing the State of Bihar.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant-victim vehemently and fervently
    contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a
    cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally
    ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent
    of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused
    her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution
    and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various
    influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave
    allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of
    the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those
    who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence
    thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men.
12. It was further contended that unidentified men were allowed access
    into the protection home where they would take advantage of the
    helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours.
13. He further pointed out that pursuant to the release of respondent
    No.2 on bail, she has been reinstated in service, and she is heading
    another protection home within the State of Bihar. As per the learned
    counsel, this approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent
    No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection
    home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate
    sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the
    inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He
    submitted that it is apparent that the concerned authorities of the
    State Government are hands in glove with the accused and have no
    intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct.
    Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical
    protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on
    the female inmates.
14. Learned counsel further submitted that in case, respondent No.2
    is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1335

                    Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar and Anr.


     influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that
     as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to
     the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent
     No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial.
15. On these grounds and looking to the gravity and nature of allegations,
    learned counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its
    extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
    so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.
16. Learned standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of
    Bihar supported the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
    the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation,
    grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless
    and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have
    been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority
    shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there is imminent
    threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 is
    allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However,
    on a pertinent query being posed, learned standing counsel was
    not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in
    reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge
    of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a
    prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working
    in a similar institution.
17. Learned counsel representing respondent No.2-accused strenuously
    tried to justify the impugned order. He urged that the High Court,
    while considering the bail application has taken note of the material
    available on record and rightly found that there are no specific
    allegations against respondent No.2 in the prosecution evidence
    and thereafter, a reasoned order has been passed directing release
    of respondent No.2 on bail. He urged that respondent No.2 being
    a woman had languished in custody for almost 500 days, since
    27th August, 2022 and this was the most vital factor which weighed
    with the High Court in favour of grant of bail. He urged that detailed
    discussion of evidence at the stage of deciding the bail application
    may prejudice the trial and hence, it would not be fair to say that the
    High Court has not adverted to the merits of the case.
18. He urged that respondent No.2 being a woman is entitled to a special
    consideration for grant of bail and as such, this Court should be
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     slow in interfering with the order passed by the High Court directing
     release of respondent No.2 on bail.
19. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
    advanced at the bar and have gone through the impugned order
    and the material placed on record.
20. At the outset, we may like to note that the allegations attributed to
    respondent No.2 shake the conscience of the Court. Respondent
    No.2 being posted as the Officer in-charge of the women’s protection
    home was required to work as a protector of the inmates, but she
    turned rogue and indulged in sexual exploitation of the helpless and
    destitute women who had been placed in the said protection home
    which is an institution created to provide them safety and security.
21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a
    saviour has turned into a devil.
22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused
    are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact
    remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an
    adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility
    of the witnesses being threatened.
23. Recently, this Court in the case of Shabeen Ahmad v. The State
    of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.7 while placing reliance upon the case of
    Ajwar v. Waseem8 cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a
    dowry death case observing as follows:
            “18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only
            undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks
            weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat
            the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception
            of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that
            courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime
            that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These
            observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were
            thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in
            the following paras:



7   (2025) 4 SCC 172.
8   (2024) 10 SCC 768.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1337

                    Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar and Anr.


                “26. While considering as to whether bail ought
                to be granted in a matter involving a serious
                criminal offence, the Court must consider
                relevant factors like the nature of the accusations
                made against the accused, the manner in which
                the crime is alleged to have been committed,
                the gravity of the offence, the role attributed
                to the accused, the criminal antecedents of
                the accused, the probability of tampering of
                the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the
                accused are released on bail, the likelihood
                of the accused being unavailable in the event
                bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the
                proceedings and evading the courts of justice
                and the overall desirability of releasing the
                accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State
                of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7
                SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
                Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State
                of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar
                Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496];
                Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC
                508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)
                [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar
                [(2020) 2 SCC 118].
                27. It is equally well settled that bail once
                granted, ought not to be cancelled in a
                mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned
                or perverse order of bail is always open to
                interference by the superior court. If there are
                serious allegations against the accused, even
                if he has not misused the bail granted to him,
                such an order can be cancelled by the same
                Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also
                be revoked by a superior court if it transpires
                that the courts below have ignored the relevant
                material available on record or not looked into
                the gravity of the offence or the impact on the
                society resulting in such an order. In P v. State
1338                                                  [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                 Supreme Court Reports


        of M.P. [(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-
        Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us
        (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations
        that must weigh with the Court for interfering
        in an order granting bail to an accused under
        Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words :
        (SCC p. 224, para 24)
             “24. As can be discerned from the
             above decisions, for cancelling
             bail once granted, the court must
             consider whether any supervening
             circumstances have arisen or the
             conduct of the accused post grant of
             bail demonstrates that it is no longer
             conducive to a fair trial to permit him
             to retain his freedom by enjoying the
             concession of bail during trial [Dolat
             Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1
             SCC 349] . To put it differently,
             in ordinary circumstances, this
             Court would be loathe to interfere
             with an order passed by the court
             below granting bail but if such
             an order is found to be illegal or
             perverse or premised on material
             that is irrelevant, then such an
             order is susceptible to scrutiny
             and interference by the appellate
             court.”
        Considerations for setting aside bail orders
        28. The considerations that weigh with the
        appellate court for setting aside the bail order
        on an application being moved by the aggrieved
        party include any supervening circumstances
        that may have occurred after granting relief to
        the accused, the conduct of the accused while
        on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused
        to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial,
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1339

                    Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar and Anr.


                any instance of threats being extended to the
                witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part
                of the accused to tamper with the evidence in
                any manner. We may add that this list is only
                illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the
                court must be cautious that at the stage of
                granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to
                be examined and detailed reasons relating to
                the merits of the case that may cause prejudice
                to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it
                is to state that the bail order should reveal
                the factors that have been considered by
                the Court for granting relief to the accused.”
                                               (Emphasis Supplied)

24. It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily,
    but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of
    the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have
    an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and
    are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such
    bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one
    is precisely a case of such nature.
25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on
    the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/
    ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a
    prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s
    under the SC/ST Act have been applied.
26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused
    in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded
    as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of
    right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act.
27. Furthermore, keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in
    Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present
    case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court
    to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January,
    2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person
    accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes
    the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on
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                            Supreme Court Reports


     the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would
     adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the
     material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions
     are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been
     reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection
     home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the
     administration.
28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s
    extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
    India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January,
    2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside.
29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled.
    She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four
    weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail
    bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder
    of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure
    that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the
    case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent
    No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before
    the appropriate forum.
30. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
31. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan