Holding

Article 32 authorises the Supreme Court to reopen the sentencing stage of a capital case that has attained finality when a clear breach of the procedural safeguards mandated in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh violates the accused's fundamental rights, and the death sentence must be set aside and remitted for fresh sentencing in compliance with those safeguards.

Summary

The petitioner, Vasanta Sampat Dupare, was convicted of rape and murder of a four‑year‑old girl and sentenced to death, a sentence that was affirmed on appeal, reviewed, and followed by rejected mercy petitions. He filed a writ petition under Article 32 seeking a fresh sentencing hearing in accordance with the procedural safeguards mandated in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, arguing that the lack of such safeguards violated his rights under Articles 14 and 21. The Court examined whether Article 32 permits reopening a capital sentence that has attained finality solely to cure a procedural lapse identified by the petitioner. Relying on the constitutional mandate to protect fundamental rights, the Court held that the extraordinary jurisdiction of Article 32 can be exercised to ensure compliance with essential procedural safeguards in death‑penalty cases. Consequently, the Court set aside the affirmed death sentence, remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing following the Manoj guidelines, and ordered the Registry to assign the case to an appropriate Bench. The petition was allowed, affirming the Court’s power to intervene even after finality to prevent a breach of fundamental rights.

Issues considered

The scope of Article 32 in allowing the Supreme Court to revisit a death sentence that has attained finality.
Whether the procedural safeguards outlined in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh constitute an indispensable right that must be applied retrospectively.
Whether the denial of the Manoj‑mandated sentencing protocol violates the petitioner's rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Whether the petition can be entertained despite the existence of review and mercy petitions and the absence of a curative petition.

Legislation cited

Constitution of India
Mental Healthcare Act, 2017s. 20
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016s. 12, s. 3, s. 6

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Writ petition filed u/Art.32 challenging the continuing validity of the sentence of death against the petitioner, having been affirmed on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy petitions and seeks its reconsideration in the light in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh; and whether Art.32 authorises this Court to reopen a capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality, solely to cure the procedural lapse the petitioner identifies. Headnotes† Constitution of India –

Subjects

Article 32death sentencecapital punishmentprocedural fairnessmitigating circumstancesManoj guidelinesreopening final sentencefundamental rightsArticle 21individualized sentencing

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2136 : 2025 INSC 1043

Vasanta Sampat Dupare
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 371 of 2023)
25 August 2025
[Vikram Nath,* Sanjay Karol* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Writ petition filed u/Art.32 challenging the continuing validity of the
sentence of death against the petitioner, having been affirmed on
appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy
petitions and seeks its reconsideration in the light of guidelines
laid down in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh; and whether Art.32 authorises this Court to reopen a
capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality,
solely to cure the procedural lapse the petitioner identifies.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.32 – Power of the court to revisit
a sentence that has attained finality – Petitioner convicted
u/ss.363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 IPC for committing rape
and murder of four year old girl and awarded death sentence –
Death sentence attained finality upto this Court – Petitioner
exhausted all judicial remedies, including review and mercy
petitions – Writ petition challenging the continuing validity
of the sentence of death affirmed against him, and sought
its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and
judicial developments-guidelines laid down in the case of
Manoj v. State of M.P. whereby this Court mandated the calling
of reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in
arriving at a just and proper sentence:
Held: [per Vikram Nath, J.] (for himself and Sandeep Mehta, J)
Petitioner’s request for a new sentencing hearing which is compliant
to Manoj’s case falls squarely within Art.32 – Relief sought does
not disturb the conviction or reopen evidentiary findings but merely
insists that the ultimate penalty be imposed, if at all, through
the procedural safeguards now recognised as integral to a fair

* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2137

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

and individualised sentence – Granting this remedy is thus, a
legitimate, and indeed compelling exercise of the Court’s plenary
power u/Art.32 to secure the effective enforcement of fundamental
rights – Contemporary Indian society no longer conceives criminal
punishment purely in retributive terms – It also measures the
quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility
of human reform – Goal of reformation, repeatedly affirmed in our
jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal system will not foreclose
the prospect of moral regeneration unless every procedural
assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been scrupulously
observed – Art.32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but
its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine
pathway for reopening concluded matters – Reopening will be
reserved only for those cases where there is a clear, specific
breach of the new procedural safeguards as these breaches are so
serious that, if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused
person’s basic rights to life, dignity and fair process – Finding of
guilt recorded against the petitioner is left untouched – Sentence
of death affirmed by this Court set aside – Matter remitted to this
Court for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in
conformity with the directions in Manoj’s case – Registry is directed
to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India
for assignment to an appropriate Bench. [Paras 26, 27, 32-35]
Held: [per Sanjay Karol, J.] (Concurring): In Manoj’s case all
that has been done is that a streamlined and time-bound process
has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the Courts
below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation in
Bachan Singh’s case – If the law once declared is not followed
and the same causes a demonstrable detriment to a person, or
a convict, such person will have a legitimate grievance which the
Courts would be then required to remedy – Law declared by the
Constitutional Courts applies retrospectively – Ex-consequenti, the
benefit of Manoj’s case applies to the petitioner retrospectively and
the denial of such benefit, which may eventually have the effect
of saving him from the hangman’s noose, if it is indeed found that
his socio-economic and psychological background as also other
mitigating factors as may be procured, did play a sufficient role
in the petitioner committing the heinous crime that he did, non-
consideration of these factors would constitute a violation of Art.21,
since the effect thereof would be that his life would be eventually
taken away – Nothing whatsoever under the law can cast a shadow
2138 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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or eclipse the fundamental right, whether it be the availability of
a substantive alternate remedy or procedural wrangles – Since
this Court has confirmed the petitioner’s conviction, and review
was also dismissed, he has no other avenue other than this
Court where he may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj’s
case – It is almost impossible to conceive that the remedy under
this Article would be foreclosed to the petitioner when Art.21 is
the only thing that stands between the petitioner and the rope
of death, only in order to underscore and emphasize the finality
of a judicial determination, which in all cases apart from such
exceptional circumstances, is a cardinal principle to be abided
by – Submission that after dismissal of a review petition, the only
available path is that of the curative petition, cannot be accepted
since this jurisdiction is to be exercised only in those cases where
the circumstances permit the finality of a judicial decision to be
altered with – Art.32 is available to even those who are serving
sentences for the most heinous offences – Given that Manoj’s case
was not in operation or did not exist at the time when the petitioner
was sentenced and his review was dismissed, no other recognized
way was available to him to approach this Court seeking benefit
thereof – Judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a
right was conferred upon him to have his sentence re-examined
in the light of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj’s
case, it is to exercise such a right which has a direct impact on his
Art.21 rights that a petition u/Art.32 had to be preferred – Thus,
has to be necessarily held to be maintainable in the specific facts
of this case, where a subsequent development in law granted a
benefit to a convict, and there was no other avenue available to
him. [Paras 54-59]
Sentence/Sentencing – Death sentence – Sentencing guidelines
laid down in Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh’s
case – Elucidated. [Paras 9, 10]

Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Scope of – Principal lines of
enquiry for determination:
Held: Art.32 is the constitutional conduit through which this
Court may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights – It furnishes a direct route for citizen to this
Court whenever a protected Fundamental Right is said to be under
threat – To understand the scope of Art.32, the settled place of Art.32
as a continuing safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2139

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

be carried out, must be considered – This Court’s power and duty
to set aside procedural finality when that course alone can avert a
breach of the guarantees of equality and life, is to be examined –
Whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj’s case has
assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard,
is to be tested – Form and extent of the corrective relief that may
properly be fashioned u/Art.32 be delineated, mindful that any
order is taken must both protect constitutional rights and preserve
the stability of adjudication – Art.32 jurisdiction in capital cases
constitutes a special constitutional continuing safeguard that
survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review and even mercy –
Power to intervene u/Art.32 is meant to prevent the Constitution
from being stymied by formal finality when a human life hangs in
the balance – Procedural finality cannot stand in the way of curing
a constitutional wrong which implicates life or liberty – Procedural
fairness in capital sentencing is an imperative u/Arts.14 and 21 –
Since Manoj’s case, an institutional practice emerged whereby
this Court routinely calls for the mandated reports before deciding
appeals in capital punishment cases – Manoj’ case protocol has
become an indispensable component of a “meaningful, real and
effective” sentencing hearing – There is plenary power to mould
relief u/Arts.32 and 142 – Court’s ability to grant effective relief
is not exhausted by the formal confines of appellate review – In
exceptional situations it empowers this Court to revisit even its own
final orders where doing so is necessary to prevent a continuing
breach of fundamental rights. [Paras 11, 12]

Case Law Cited
In the judgment of Vikram Nath, J.
Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452 :
(2023) 2 SCC 353 – explained and relied on.
Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145
of 2017; Irfan @ Bhayu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021; Harbans Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others [1982] 3 SCR 235 : (1982) 2 SCC 101; Smt.
Triveniben v. State of Gujarat [1989] 1 SCR 509 : (1989) 1 SCC
678; Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [2014] 4
SCR 1138 : (2014) 7 SCC 264; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar,
Supreme Court of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2014)
9 SCC 737; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court
2140 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2019) 9 SCC 404;
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 :
(1988) 2 SCC 602; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka and Another
[1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Rupa Ashok
Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002)
4 SCC 388; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra [2009] 9 SCR 90 : (2009) 6 SCC 498; Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Sanjay
Singh and Another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad
and Another [2007] 1 SCR 235 : (2007) 3 SCC 720; Bilkis Yakub
Rasool v. Union of India and Others [2024] 1 SCR 743 : (2024) 5
SCC 481; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and
Another [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 – referred to.

In the judgment of Sanjay Karol, J.
Manoj v. State of M.P. [2022] 9 SCR 452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353 –
explained and relied on.
Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka [2025] 7 SCR 550 : 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1455; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983]
1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union
of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569; CIT v.
Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 13 SCR 421 : (2008)
14 SCC 171; Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar
Arora, 2025 SCC Online SC 819; Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. State
of West Bengal & Anr. [2025] 2 SCR 1045 : 2025 SCC Online
SC 443; Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India [1981]
2 SCR 52 : (1981) 1 SCC 568; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of
India [1997] 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 3 SCC 261; S.R. Chaudhuri v.
State of Punjab & Ors. [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 621 : (2001) 7 SCC
126; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019)
1 SCC 1; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002]
2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388 – referred to.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S 1 (1986); Graham v. Collins 506, U.S 461
(1993); Tennard v. Dretke, 2004 SCC OnLine US SC 59; Barton
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 2; Attorney
General of Canada v. George Hislop, 2007 SCC OnLine Can SC
10 – referred to.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2141

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

Books and Periodicals Cited
William W. Berry, Individualized Sentencing, 76 Wash.& Lee
L. Rev.13 (2019); Kant, I. (2017). Kant: The Metaphysics of
Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans., L. Denis, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; M.Nussbaum, Human Dignity &
Political entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays
Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 360 (2008).;
M.J.Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the backdrop of
the Eight Amendment, (2016) U.ILL L.REV.2129; 15th Ed. William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England; Constituent
Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948),
at 3–5 (India); Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol.
VII (4 November 1948), at 8–10 (India) – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016;
Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.

List of Keywords
Writ petition filed u/Art.32; Continuing validity of the sentence of
death; Affirmed on appeal; Review; Mercy petitions; Manoj and
others v. State of Madhya Pradesh’s case; Capital sentencing;
Procedural lapse; Power of the court to revisit sentence that has
attained finality; Rape and murder of four year old girl; Death
sentence; Judicial remedies; Subsequent legislative and judicial
developments; Benefit of revisiting sentence.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 371 of 2023
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini,
Shourya Dasgupta, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Pradyut Kashyap, Ms.
Shreya Rastogi, Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Syed Faraz Alam,
Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Aggarwal.
2142 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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Advs. for the Respondents:
K.M.Nataraj, A.S.G., Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav
Singh, Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey, Vatsal Joshi, Sanjay Kr.
tyagi, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Ms. Agrmaa Singh, Raman Yadav,
Arvind Kumar Sharma.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. The majesty of our Constitution lies not in the might of the State but
in its restraint. When the Court contemplates the ultimate punishment,
i.e. the Capital Punishment, it enters a domain where justice must be
tempered by conscience and guided by the unwavering promises of
equality, dignity and fair procedure. A Constitution that proclaims liberty
and dignity as its first commitments cannot permit the State to end
a human life unless every safeguard of fairness has been honoured
and every civilising impulse of the law has been heard. The question
is never only what penalty a crime might merit, it is first whether the
machinery of the Republic has honoured every safeguard that makes
punishment lawful in a constitutional democracy. In the narrow space
between guilt and the gallows, a robust Constitution demands that we
pause, look again, and ask whether the process itself has measured
up to the high bar that humanity and the rule of law together set.
2. The present writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, assails the continuing validity of the sentence of death
affirmed against the Petitioner, and seeks its reconsideration in the
light of subsequent legislative and judicial developments, particularly
with reference to the guidelines laid down in the case of Manoj and
others v. State of Madhya Pradesh1.
3. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are as follows:
3.1 The prosecution case in brief is that on 03.04.2008, the Petitioner
allegedly lured a four-year-old girl away from her home in Wadi,

1 (2023) 2 SCC 353
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2143

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Nagpur, transported her to a secluded spot, thereafter, sexually
assaulted and strangled her to death and then attempted to
conceal the body among nearby shrubs. An FIR (Crime No. 71
of 2008) was registered at Wadi Police Station the same day.
The Petitioner was arrested on 04.04.2008, and a charge-sheet
was filed for offences under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302
and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602.
3.2 On 29.09.2010 the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, in
Sessions Trial No. 252 of 20083 convicted the Petitioner under
Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 of the IPC and, on
the same day, imposed the death sentence on him. During the
original trial, the Petitioner, who was unable to afford private
counsel, was represented by legal-aid counsel whose absence
on crucial dates resulted in four material witnesses remaining
un-cross-examined.
3.3 In confirmation proceedings the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur
Bench4, by judgment dated 24.03.2011, set aside the conviction
and sentence on the ground that the Petitioner had been denied
an effective defence, and remanded the matter for the limited
purpose of cross-examining the said witnesses.
3.4 Upon remand, the same legal-aid counsel represented the
Petitioner. The four witnesses were cross-examined, but
counsel was absent at the hearing on sentence. By judgment
dated 23.02.2012, the Trial Court again convicted the Petitioner
of the aforesaid offences and re-imposed the sentence of
death, recording the Petitioner’s age being around 45 years at
the time of the incident and family dependants as mitigating
circumstances.
3.5 On 27.03.2012, the High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 112
of 2012 and Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2012, affirmed both
conviction and sentence, relying principally on the nature and
manner of the crime and finding no sufficient mitigating factors.

2 IPC
3 Trial Court
4 High Court
2144 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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3.6 This Court, by judgment dated 26.11.2014 in Criminal Appeal
Nos. 2486-2487 of 2014, dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal,
and confirmed the death sentence as the only mitigation
circumstances placed before this Court at that time were
related to the Petitioner’s youth and the probability of
reformation.
3.7 Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of 2015 was thereafter
filed. Pursuant to order dated 31.08.2016, the Petitioner
placed limited additional material regarding his education,
prison activities and disciplinary record. By judgment dated
03.05.2017, this Court upheld the earlier decision, observing
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances adduced.
3.8 A mercy petition under Article 161 of the Constitution of
India was submitted to the Governor of Maharashtra on
26.12.2017 and was rejected on 01.02.2022. The rejection
was communicated to the Petitioner on 30.03.2022.
3.9 It is argued by the Petitioner that while the mercy petition
was pending, this Court, on 06.10.2017, admitted in Rishi
Malhotra v. Union of India5 challenge to hanging as the mode
of execution which matter remains sub judice.
3.10 It is further argued that on 29.03.2022, in Irfan @ Bhayu v.
State of Madhya Pradesh6, this Court highlighted the necessity
of comprehensive mitigation material in death penalty cases
and directed registration of Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
1 of 2022 to frame guidelines for sentencing.
3.11 Meanwhile, it is claimed by the Petitioner that detailed medical
records obtained from Nagpur Central Jail revealed that
the Petitioner was receiving treatment for major depressive
disorder, psychotic features, hypertension, chronic frontal-lobe
infarct and cervical myelopathy, with repeated prescriptions of
antidepressant and antipsychotic medication. It is further stated
that 3 independent psychiatrists, on the basis of interview
transcripts supplied by the Petitioner’s legal team in 2017,

5 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145 of 2017
6 Criminal Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2145

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

gave preliminary opinions indicating intellectual disability,
psychosis and organic brain pathology.
3.12 It is further argued that on 20.05.2022 this Court delivered its
judgment in Manoj (supra), formulating practical, time-bound
guidelines obliging Trial Courts and the State to place extensive
mitigation circumstances on record including psychiatric,
psychological, social-history and jail-conduct reports. Pursuant
to Manoj (supra), this Court and several High Courts have
consistently called for probation-officer reports, psychological
assessments by independent institutions, jail-conduct
certificates and access for defence mitigation investigators
in ongoing death-sentence matters.
3.13 Acting on the Manoj (supra) protocol, it is argued that the
Petitioner’s legal team engaged Mr Swapnil Bhopi, Clinical
Psychologist, who on 17.06.2022, conducted psychometric
testing. The assessment disclosed a Specific Learning
Disability (SLD) and low intellectual functioning, together with
long-standing trauma and organic brain injury. A second mercy
petition under Article 72 of the Constitution of India, enclosing
the new medical records, Mr. Bhopi’s report, and supplementary
submissions referencing Manoj (supra) and Suo Motu W.P.
(Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, was lodged with the President of India
on 01.07.2022, and was rejected on 10.04.2023, and the
intimation reached the Petitioner on 15.06.2023.
3.14 On 19.09.2022, in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, a
Constitution Bench reference was made to evolve a uniform
sentencing framework and to delineate modalities for
psychological evaluation and collection of mitigating material,
the Petitioner’s case was cited as illustrative of inconsistencies
in existing practice.
3.15 On 02.05.2023, in Rishi Malhotra (Supra), the Union of India
informed this Court of its proposal to constitute an expert
committee on alternate modes of execution. The petition
remains pending before this Court.
4. In this backdrop, the Petitioner has approached this Court invoking
the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India seeking reconsideration of the death sentence
affirmed on 03.05.2017.
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5. Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner, has advanced the following submissions:
5.1 It is primarily submitted that the death sentence was affirmed
in 2017 without the benefit of the sentencing protocol
subsequently mandated in Manoj (supra). The judgment in
Manoj (supra) requires Trial Courts and the State to place
before the Judge comprehensive mitigation circumstances,
including family history, socio-economic background, psychiatric
and psychological evaluation, jail-conduct data, and probation
reports and to afford the defence an equal opportunity to
rebut. It is submitted that none of this material was elicited or
considered either by the Trial Court, the High Court, or this
Court in review, and the Petitioner was denied the “principled
and individualised” sentencing required by Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India.
5.2 Furthermore, it is contended that the evolution of sentencing law
in Manoj (supra) and the pending Constitution Bench reference
in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 together constitute a
“substantial change in law”. Applying the settled rule of beneficial
construction, those developments must operate retrospectively
in favour of a condemned prisoner whose sentence is yet to
be executed.
5.3 It is further argued that the prison medical records, 3 independent
psychiatric opinions of 2017, and the detailed psychometric
evaluation of the Petitioner by Clinical Psychologist, Mr. Swapnil
Bhopi, on 17.06.2022, now demonstrate that the Petitioner
suffers from a Specific Learning Disability coupled with low
intellectual functioning; chronic frontal-lobe infarct and cervical
myelopathy; and major depressive disorder with psychotic
features. These conditions attract the protective umbrella of the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20167 and the Mental
Healthcare Act, 2017. However, no reasonable accommodation
or specialised assistance was provided at any stage of trial or
appeal. The absence of such accommodation is claimed to
infringe Sections 3, 6 and 12 of the RPwD Act, 2016 (equality,
dignity and access to justice) and Section 20 of the Mental

7 RPwD Act, 2016
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2147

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Healthcare Act, 2017 (right to equal legal protection). The
Petitioner, therefore, was unrepresented at the sentencing
hearing and was incapable of articulating mitigating material,
with the result that the death sentence was imposed on a
procedurally defective foundation.
5.4 It is lastly submitted that Rishi Malhotra (supra), challenging
hanging as the mode of execution, remains pending before
this Court, and in that matter, the Union has proposed
appointment of an expert committee to explore alternate modes
of execution. Executing the Petitioner before the conclusion of
those proceedings and the Constitution Bench reference would
expose the Petitioner to irreversible prejudice.
6. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the Union of India and Dr. Birendra Saraf, learned Advocate General
for the State of Maharashtra, have rendered the following submissions:
6.1 It is submitted that the present petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India is an impermissible attempt to reopen the
judgment of this Court dated 26.11.2014, which has attained
finality after dismissal of Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of
2015, and later rejection of mercy petitions by both the Governor
and the President of India. Article 32 of the Constitution of
India may be invoked only to redress a subsisting violation of
fundamental rights and a duly pronounced decision of this Court
cannot itself be characterised as such a violation.
6.2 It is contended that all aggravating and mitigating factors were
exhaustively examined at three judicial tiers. All three Courts,
i.e. the Trial Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court,
have found that no mitigating circumstance of weight escaped
scrutiny. Moreover, the Courts have concluded that the Petitioner
being a history-sheeter with multiple pending cases, is devoid
of remorse, and poses a continuing menace to society. Those
findings were reaffirmed in review after considering the additional
material later tendered by the defence.
6.3 It is further submitted that the sentencing guidelines spelt
out in Manoj (supra) are prospective in operation. They are
directed to Trial Courts going ahead as can be deduced from
reading the judgement, and they do not authorise the wholesale
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reopening of cases finally decided years before, especially after
rejection of constitutional clemency. To hold otherwise would
undermine certainty in criminal justice and flood the system
with stale challenges.
6.4 It is argued that the Petitioner seeks to rely on medical records
and psychological opinions generated long after conviction. Even
assuming their correctness (which is denied), such post-hoc
material cannot displace the contemporaneous judicial finding
which were made upon expert evidence then adduced. The
Courts found that the crime was not committed under mental
stress or emotional disturbance and that rehabilitation was
improbable.
6.5 It is submitted that the RPwD Act, 2016 and the Mental
Healthcare Act, 2017 do not confer a right to nullify a sentence
validly imposed and confirmed before their enactment. Nor do
they compel retrospective reopening where, as here, the courts
have already evaluated mental capacity and rejected it as a
mitigating factor.
6.6 It is lastly contended that pendency of Rishi Malhotra (supra) or
of the Constitution Bench reference in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No.
1 of 2022 does not create any legal impediment on execution
of a sentence that has survived every level of scrutiny. Until
those proceedings culminate in a binding change in law, the
existing framework, including hanging as the prescribed mode,
remains operative.
7. Having considered the submissions of both the parties and the material
on record before us, the central question before us is whether, in a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, this Court may
revisit a death sentence that stands concluded, having been affirmed
on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy
petitions, on the strength of the sentencing framework propounded
in Manoj (supra).
8. Before moving ahead, the reason we are primarily focusing on the
threshold issue framed above is that the very maintainability of
the petition hinges on it. Unless the doorway of Article 32 of the
Constitution of India permits reopening a death sentence that has
attained finality, any examination of fresh medical evidence, alleged
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mitigating factors, or the ramifications of the pending references in
Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 and Rishi Malhotra (supra)
would be premature. Those references will be decided on their own
merits in due course and unless and until they culminate in a binding
change of law, they do not alter the jurisdictional bar the State is
pleading before us. Our task, therefore, is confined to determining
whether Article 32 of the Constitution of India itself empowers this
Court to revisit a sentence that has attained finality.
9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce below the pertinent
guidelines laid down in Manoj (supra) which the Petitioner invokes
as the fulcrum of his claim. The relevant paras from Manoj (supra)
are as follows:
“247. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society must
strive towards — there are many references to it peppered
in this Court’s jurisprudence across the decades — but what
is lacking is a concrete framework that can measure and
evaluate it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored by the failure to
implement prison reforms of a meaningful kind, which has
left the process of incarceration and prisons in general, to
be a space of limited potential for systemic reformation.
The goal of reformative punishment requires systems that
actively enable reformation and rehabilitation, as a result
of nuanced policy-making. As a small step to correct these
skewed results and facilitate better evaluation of whether
there is a possibility for the accused to be reformed (beyond
vague references to conduct, family background, etc.), this
Court deems it necessary to frame practical guidelines
for the courts to adopt and implement, till the legislature
and executive, formulate a coherent framework through
legislation. These guidelines may also offer guidance or
ideas, that such a legislative framework could benefit
from, to systematically collect and evaluate information
on mitigating circumstances.
Practical guidelines to collect mitigating circumstances
248. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating
circumstances are considered at the trial stage, to avoid
slipping into a retributive response to the brutality of the
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crime, as is noticeably the situation in a majority of cases
reaching the appellate stage.
249. To do this, the trial court must elicit information from
the accused and the State, both. The State, must—for an
offence carrying capital punishment—at the appropriate
stage, produce material which is preferably collected
beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused.
This will help establish proximity (in terms of timeline), to
the accused person’s frame of mind (or mental illness,
if any) at the time of committing the crime and offer
guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled
out in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] . Even for the
other factors of (3) and (4)—an onus placed squarely
on the State—conducting this form of psychiatric and
psychological evaluation close on the heels of commission
of the offence, will provide a baseline for the appellate
courts to use for comparison i.e. to evaluate the progress
of the accused towards reformation, achieved during the
incarceration period.
250. Next, the State, must in a time-bound manner,
collect additional information pertaining to the accused.
An illustrative, but not exhaustive list is as follows:
(a) Age
(b) Early family background (siblings, protection of parents,
any history of violence or neglect)
(c) Present family background (surviving family members,
whether married, has children, etc.)
(d) Type and level of education
(e) Socio-economic background (including conditions of
poverty or deprivation, if any)
(f) Criminal antecedents (details of offence and whether
convicted, sentence served, if any)
(g) Income and the kind of employment (whether none,
or temporary or permanent, etc.);
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(h) Other factors such as history of unstable social
behaviour, or mental or psychological ailment(s), alienation
of the individual (with reasons, if any), etc.
This information should mandatorily be available to the trial
court, at the sentencing stage. The accused too, should
be given the same opportunity to produce evidence in
rebuttal, towards establishing all mitigating circumstances.
251. Lastly, information regarding the accused’s jail
conduct and behaviour, work done (if any), activities the
accused has involved themselves in, and other related
details should be called for in the form of a report from the
relevant jail authorities (i.e. Probation and Welfare Officer,
Superintendent of Jail, etc.). If the appeal is heard after a
long hiatus from the trial court’s conviction, or High Court’s
confirmation, as the case may be — a fresh report (rather
than the one used by the previous court) from the jail
authorities is recommended, for a more exact and complete
understanding of the contemporaneous progress made by
the accused, in the time elapsed. The jail authorities must
also include a fresh psychiatric and psychological report
which will further evidence the reformative progress, and
reveal post-conviction mental illness, if any.”
10. A bare perusal of these guidelines makes it evident that this Court, in
Manoj (supra), sought to implement the reformative ideal underlying
capital sentencing by replacing ad-hoc impressions of accused
with verifiable data. The directions oblige the State, rather than the
accused, to place before the trial court, at the very sentencing stage,
a structured dossier covering psychiatric assessment proximate
to the offence, socio-economic and family history, educational
attainments, prior conduct, and a contemporaneous report on jail
behaviour. By doing so, this Court intended to prevent sentencing
from defaulting into a purely retributive response to the brutality of the
crime and to supply appellate courts with a baseline against which
genuine progress towards reformation can later be measured. These
guidelines would serve as an interim, judicially crafted framework
pending comprehensive legislative or executive action with respect
to capital sentencing. Whether these guidelines can be enforced to
disturb a sentence that has attained finality, therefore, depends upon
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the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, an issue we shall
now proceed to examine.
11. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is the constitutional conduit
through which this Court may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Described in the Constituent
Assembly as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution, it furnishes a
direct route for citizen to this Court whenever a protected Fundament
Right is said to be under threat. The present petitioner invokes that
power on a narrow but grave premise. Although his conviction has
long since become final, the State now proposes to end his life
through a sentencing process that the Petitioner claims ignored
the safeguards later formalised in Manoj (Supra). According to the
Petitioner, that omission offends the twin guarantees of equality and
due procedure embodied in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. The question that consequently arises, and to which we next
turn, is whether Article 32 authorises this Court to reopen a capital
sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality, solely to
cure the procedural lapse the Petitioner identifies.
12. In order to understand the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, in the present case, we must consider four principal lines of
enquiry to help shape our determination. Firstly, we must consider the
settled place of Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a continuing
safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to be carried out.
Secondly, we will examine this Court’s power and duty to set aside
procedural finality when that course alone can avert a breach of the
guarantees of equality and life. Thirdly, it becomes necessary to test
whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj (supra) has
assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard.
Finally, we must delineate the form and extent of the corrective relief
that may properly be fashioned under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, mindful that any order we make must both protect constitutional
rights and preserve the stability of adjudication.

A. Article 32 jurisdiction in capital cases constitutes a special
constitutional safeguard
13. The irreversible character of capital punishment has always obliged
this Court to scrutinise death-sentence cases through a constitutional
lens more gruelling than that applied to any other category of criminal
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cases. Because an execution, once carried out, forecloses every
possibility of correction, Article 32 has been treated as a continuing
safeguard that survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review
and even mercy.
14. The first clear articulation of this principle is found in Harbans
Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and others8. Therein, this Court
was confronted with a situation in which one co-accused had secured
commutation while another had already been executed. If the
petitioner alone were hanged, the result would have been a blatant
disparity. Declining to allow “manifest injustice” to stand, the Court
invoked its powers under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of
India, and its inherent jurisdiction to commute the sentence, thereby
affirming that constitutional relief remains available even after the
conventional judicial process has concluded. The relevant paras for
the same have been reproduced hereunder:
“21. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court
would have been justified in commuting the death sentence
imposed on the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.
As, however, the case of the petitioner had earlier been
considered by the President of India to whom the petitioner
had presented the petition for mercy, I am of the opinion
that propriety and decorum require that the matter should
be referred back to the President instead of this Court
deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner
to one of life imprisonment.
20. Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court
for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from
the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under
Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion
that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power
and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation
in the larger interests of administration of justice and for
preventing manifest injustice being done. This power
must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional
circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having
regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of

8 (1982) 2 SCC 101
2154 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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the opinion that this is a fit case where this Court should
entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this
Court should interfere.
19. In the circumstances hereinabove stated, I am of the
opinion that it will be manifestly unjust to allow the death
sentence imposed on the petitioner to be executed. The
question that, however, troubles me is whether this Court
retains any power and jurisdiction to entertain and pass any
appropriate orders on the question of sentence imposed
on the petitioner in view of the fact that not only his special
leave petition and review petition have been dismissed
by this Court but also the further fact that his petition for
clemency has also been rejected by the President.”
15. In Smt. Triveniben v State of Gujarat9, a Constitution Bench carried
the doctrine forward by holding that supervening circumstances
occurring after conviction, most notably, inordinate delay in carrying
out the sentence, may so undermine human dignity as to offend
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Bench made it explicit
that such violations are justiciable in an Article 32 petition of the
Constitution of India notwithstanding the finality of the original
judgment in the following terms:
“22. It was contended that the delay in execution of the
sentence will entitle a prisoner to approach this Court as
his right under Article 21 is being infringed. It is well settled
now that a judgment of court can never be challenged
under Article 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of
the court awarding the sentence of death is not open to
challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21 as has been
laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State
of Maharashtra [AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) 3 SCR 744] and
also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 :
1988 SCC (Cri) 372] , the only jurisdiction which could be
sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of
his rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after
the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because
of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a

9 (1989) 1 SCC 678
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condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that
is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it will
not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict
reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing
the condemned prisoner and even while considering
the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to
whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent
circumstances could be held to be sufficient for coming
to a conclusion that execution of the sentence of death
will not be just and proper. The nature of the offence,
circumstances in which the offence was committed will
have to be taken as found by the competent court while
finally passing the verdict. It may also be open to the court
to examine or consider any circumstances after the final
verdict was pronounced if it is considered relevant. The
question of improvement in the conduct of the prisoner
after the final verdict also cannot be considered for coming
to the conclusion whether the sentence could be altered
on that ground also.”
16. In Navneet Kaur v State (NCT of Delhi) and another10, this Court
demonstrated that once a safeguard is recognised as integral to
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, its benefit must be afforded
retrospectively to prisoners whose executions are still pending. This
Court accordingly commuted the sentence of accused Devender
Pal Singh Bhullar who was convicted of a terror offence, on the
combined grounds of inordinate delay and serious mental illness,
notwithstanding an earlier contrary precedent. In Mohd. Arif alias
Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of India and others11, a
Constitution Bench ruled that a death-row convict is entitled, as a
matter of right by virtue of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, to
an oral hearing before a bench of at least three judges at the review
stage, describing capital cases as “a distinct category altogether”.
When a subsequent Constitution Bench revisited the matter in
Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of India and

10 (2014) 7 SCC 264
11 (2014) 9 SCC 737
2156 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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others12, it clarified that this procedural guarantee applies even where
a curative petition has been dismissed, the limited grounds of curative
jurisdiction being insufficient to extinguish so fundamental a right.
17. From this discussion, we can conclude that death-sentence cases
stand apart because the punishment extinguishes the right to life
in an irreversible way, and that singular feature obliges this Court
to keep the door of constitutional review open even after the
ordinary appellate and review avenues have closed. Article 32 of
the Constitution of India, therefore, remains available whenever a
supervening fact, such as inordinate delay, emergent mental illness,
or a parity-based anomaly, or a subsequently recognised procedural
guarantee throws the legitimacy of a capital sentence into doubt.
The power to intervene under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
is meant to prevent the Constitution from being stymied by formal
finality when a human life hangs in the balance.

B. Power to do complete justice notwithstanding procedural
finality
18. The settled law of this Court is that procedural finality cannot stand
in the way of curing a constitutional wrong which implicates life or
liberty. In A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak and another13, a Constitutional
Bench of this Court, speaking through multiple concurring opinions,
held that this Court retains an inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae,
to recall or modify its own orders whenever such intervention is
necessary to prevent the continuing violation of fundamental rights
under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The majority
stressed that no litigant should suffer a deprivation “merely because
of technical objections or irregularities” and that the constitutional
duty to dispense justice must prevail over considerations of formal
finality. The relevant para has been reproduced hereunder:
“83. This passage was quoted in the Gujarat High Court
by D.A. Desai, J., speaking for the Gujarat High Court in
Soni Vrajlal v. Soni Jadavji [AIR 1972 Guj 148 : (1972)
13 Guj LR 555] as mentioned before. It appears that
in giving directions on 16-2-1984, this Court acted per

12 (2019) 9 SCC 404
13 (1988) 2 SCC 602
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incuriam inasmuch it did not bear in mind consciously the
consequences and the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of
the 1952 Act and the binding nature of the larger Bench
decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [(1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR
1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 : 1952 Cri LJ 510] which was
not adverted to by this Court. The basic fundamentals of
the administration of justice are simple. No man should
suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should
suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities.
Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not
the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiac, we must do
justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it
lies within the human machinery of administration of justice
that wrong must be remedied. This is a peculiar fact of
this case which requires emphasis.”
19. That proposition was reiterated in S. Nagaraj v State of Karnataka
and another14, wherein this Court described itself as being under
a “constitutional and legal obligation” to set technical barriers
aside whenever they obstruct the remedy of a palpable injustice.
Subsequent decisions have invoked the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium
to emphasise that the denial of a remedy is itself a denial of the right.
“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers.
Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law
can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not
be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered
for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative
Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice.
Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher
courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds
that the order was passed under a mistake and it would
not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous
assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration
shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any
principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake
is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference
lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification,

14 (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595
2158 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which
the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either
statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the
mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope
is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of
the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation
to set it right by recalling its order. Here as explained, the
Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did
commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in
the scale of First Division Assistants due to State’s failure
to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot
stand in the way of the Court correcting its mistake. Such
inequitable consequences as have surfaced now due to
vague affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to
continue.”
20. Against that backdrop, a curative petition would offer the petitioner no
meaningful recourse. The curative jurisdiction, defined in Rupa Ashok
Hurra v Ashok Hurra and another15, is confined to patent natural-
justice violations apparent on the original record and requires that
the same grounds were urged in review. The Petitioner’s grievance,
namely, the absence of the procedural guarantees subsequently
crystallised in Manoj (supra) and the emergence of new medical
evidence, could not have formed part of the earlier record and
therefore lies outside the curative ambit. It follows that the only
efficacious avenue is the inherent corrective power recognised in
Antulay (Supra), exercised through Article 32 of the Constitution of
India and, where necessary, Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
to fashion relief that vindicates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
of India notwithstanding the formal finality of prior proceedings.

C. Procedural fairness in capital sentencing as an imperative
under Articles 14 and 21
21. The right to be sentenced in a principled and individualized
manner flows directly from Articles 14 and 21. In Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra16, this Court

15 (2002) 4 SCC 388
16 (2009) 6 SCC 498
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underlined that, because death is the “most extreme punishment”,
the sentencing procedure must strictly adhere to constitutional due-
process requirements. This Court further emphasised that in every
capital case “the threshold of the rarest-of-rare test is informed by
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India”, thereby anchoring
the sentencing phase firmly within the fundamental-rights framework
first articulated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab17,. The relevant
paras are hereunder:
“79. Whether primacy should be accorded to aggravating
circumstances or mitigating circumstances is not the
question. Court is duty-bound by virtue of Bachan Singh
[(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] to equally
consider both and then to arrive at a conclusion as to
respective weights to be accorded. We are also bound
by the spirit of Article 14 and Article 21 which forces us to
adopt a principled approach to sentencing. This overarching
policy flowing from Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 580] applies to heinous crimes as much
as it applies to relatively less brutal murders. The Court
in this regard held: (SCC p. 751, para 209)
“209. … Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging
of murderers has never been too good for them. Facts
and figures, albeit incomplete, furnished by the Union
of India, show that in the past, courts have inflicted the
extreme penalty with extreme infrequency—a fact which
attests to the caution and compassion which they have
always brought to bear on the exercise of their sentencing
discretion in so grave a matter. It is, therefore, imperative to
voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative
guidelines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous
function with evermore scrupulous care and humane
concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy
outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for persons convicted
of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence
an exception.”
………………………..

17 (1980) 2 SCC 684
2160 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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138. At this juncture, it is best to point out that the ensuing
discussion, although applicable in constitutionality context,
is carried out in the context of sentencing of death
punishment. In every capital sentence case, it must be
borne in mind that the threshold of the rarest of rare cases
is informed by Articles 14 and 21, owing to the inherent
nature of death penalty. Post-Bachan Singh [(1980) 2
SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , capital sentencing has
come into the folds of constitutional adjudication. This is
by virtue of the safeguards entrenched in Articles 14 and
21 of our Constitution.”
22. Manoj (supra) was delivered against the backdrop of persistent
concerns, catalogued, inter alia, in the 262nd Law Commission
Report, about the inconsistency and inadequacy of death-penalty
sentencing. Taking those concerns seriously, this Court devised a
concrete procedural architecture imposing various obligations on State
to protect the Rights of the accused. These requirements are not
administrative niceties, but they exist to give substantive content to the
constitutional mandate that punishment should be individually tailored
and proportionate. Since Manoj (supra), an institutional practice
has emerged whereby this Court routinely calls for the mandated
reports before deciding appeals in capital punishment cases. As
already noted, this Court has also taken suo-motu cognisance of
the absence of a uniform trial-level framework and has referred the
question to a Constitution Bench in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of
2022. These developments confirm that the Manoj (supra) protocol
has become an indispensable component of a “meaningful, real and
effective” sentencing hearing.
23. The relief sought in the present writ is confined to securing the same
procedural guarantee. The petitioner does not impugn the finding
of guilt recorded in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2486-2487 of 2014 or the
conclusions reached in Review Petition Nos. 637-638 of 2015. The
petitioner is seeking a limited remand so that the sentencing Court
may consider the reports and material envisaged in Manoj (supra).
Any modification of the earlier judgments will be incidental to, and
a necessary consequence of, supplying a constitutionally compliant
procedure. In the present case, where the petitioner seeks only the
enforcement of a procedural safeguard now recognised as integral
to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and where no
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equally efficacious alternative remedy exists, the invocation of our
extraordinary jurisdiction is both appropriate and justified.

D. Plenary power to mould relief under Articles 32 and 142
24. This Court’s ability to grant effective relief is not exhausted by the
formal confines of appellate review. On several occasions after
Rupa Ashok Hurra (Supra), this Court has, in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, revisited and modified its own final orders when the
interests of justice so required. This was apparent in Sanjay Singh
and another v U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and
another18, wherein this Court recalibrated its earlier directions on
evaluation methodology, and Bilkis Yakub Rasool v Union of
India and others19, in which this Court set aside a remission order
by invoking both Articles 32 and 142 to protect fundamental rights
developed after the original conviction. Moreover, in Supreme Court
Bar Association v Union of India and another20, the Constitution
Bench explained that the Court’s plenary powers are inherent and
complementary to those conferred by statute and exist independent
of those statutes with a view to do complete justice between the
parties. The Bench emphasised that these constitutional powers
permit this Court to craft remedies unrestrained by procedural or
statutory limitations whenever necessary to uphold justice.
25. Consequently, it may be concluded that Article 32 of the Constitution
of India is not restricted to reviewing decisions of subordinate courts
or executive authorities. In exceptional situations it empowers this
Court to revisit even its own final orders where doing so is necessary
to prevent a continuing breach of fundamental rights. The controlling
test is whether such intervention is required to avert manifest injustice
under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and technical
rules of procedure cannot be permitted to thwart that constitutional
mission.
26. Viewed through that lens, the Petitioner’s request for a new
sentencing hearing which is compliant to Manoj (supra) falls
squarely within Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The relief

18 (2007) 3 SCC 720
19 (2024) 5 SCC 481
20 (1998) 4 SCC 409
2162 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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sought is narrowly tailored as it does not disturb the conviction
or reopen evidentiary findings but merely insists that the ultimate
penalty be imposed, if at all, through the procedural safeguards
now recognised as integral to a fair and individualised sentence.
We believe that granting this remedy is therefore a legitimate, and
indeed compelling exercise of the Court’s plenary power under Article
32 of the Constitution of India to secure the effective enforcement
of fundamental rights.
27. In the backdrop of the discussion above, we must also recognise
the evolution of our own constitutional culture. Contemporary Indian
society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive
terms. It also measures the quantum of a sentence by its capacity
to preserve the possibility of human reform. The goal of reformation,
repeatedly affirmed in our jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal
system will not foreclose the prospect of moral regeneration unless
every procedural assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been
scrupulously observed.
28. We cannot overlook that the machinery which feeds the death-penalty
system is itself fragile. Investigations often rely on confessions
extracted in opacity, recoveries whose provenance is contested and
forensic material of doubtful rigour. When such evidence is filtered
through an overburdened trial process, the possibility of wrongful
conviction can never be dismissed as a remote abstraction. An
irreversible penalty grafted onto a fallible process endangers the
very core of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture,
we must state that Punishment in a constitutional democracy must
ultimately reflect the moral trajectory of the society it serves. Over
time, this Court has come to believe that every person, even one
who has done great wrong, still carries a basic human dignity. This
belief does not excuse crime but it simply means the State should
keep open, wherever possible, the chance for an offender to change.
It is our belief that moving from pure retribution to genuine reform
is not an act of undue leniency but it is a statement of faith in the
human capacity for improvement.
29. Modern penology reinforces that conviction. Empirical literature has
yet to establish that the spectacle of an execution deters homicide
more effectively than a sentence of incarceration for the natural
span of life. What is clear, however, is that a death sentence
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closes every door as it ends all hope of remorse, of reconciliation
with victims’ families, and of uncovering mistakes that sometimes
emerge only after many years. A just society may protect itself
from serious crime, but it must do so with measures that can be
clearly defended as both necessary and fair. Our Constitution
therefore sets a very high bar before the State can take a life. We
strongly believe that it is not enough to simply point to the horror
of an offence. The process leading to a death sentence must itself
be beyond reproach as it must also be open, thorough and fair.
The safeguards laid down in Manoj (supra) are meant to ensure
exactly that. Until those safeguards are fully applied, carrying out
a death sentence would sit contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India as they promise equality and fair procedure
to every person in our society.
30. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed.
31. We therefore hold that Article 32 of the Constitution of India empowers
this Court in cases related to capital punishment to reopen the
sentencing stage where the accused has been condemned to death
penalty without ensuring that the guidelines mandated in Manoj
(supra) were followed. This corrective power is invoked precisely to
compel rigorous application of the Manoj (supra) safeguards in such
cases, thereby ensuring that the condemned person is not deprived of
the fundamental rights to equal treatment, individualized sentencing,
and fair procedure that Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India
secure to every person.
32. We add, however, a word of caution. Article 32 of the Constitution
of India is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but its exceptional
scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening
concluded matters. Reopening will be reserved only for those
cases where there is a clear, specific breach of the new procedural
safeguards as these breaches are so serious that, if left uncorrected,
they would undermine the accused person’s basic rights to life,
dignity and fair process.
33. Accordingly, we further clarify that the finding of guilt recorded
against the petitioner is left untouched. Nothing in this judgment
shall be read as a comment, direct or implied, on the evidence that
sustained conviction or on any defence that may have been raised
at trial. Our intervention is strictly confined to the issue of sentence.
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34. The sentence of death affirmed by this Court on 03 May 2017 is, for
the present, set aside, and the matter is remitted to this Court for
a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in conformity
with the directions in Manoj (supra).
35. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India for assignment to an appropriate Bench.
36. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Sanjay Karol, J.

37. I have perused the erudite opinion by my esteemed MyLord, Vikram
Nath, J,. The scholarly lucidity with its empathetic and farsighted
understanding of the Constitution and the values it espouses has
prompted my whole-hearted concurrence. However, considering the
peculiarity and the importance of the questions before us, I desire
to pen down a few thoughts of my own.
“For the determination of sentences, justice generally
requires consideration of more than the particular acts by
which the crime was committed, and that there be taken
into account the circumstances of the offense, together with
the character and propensities of the offender. His past may
be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies,
and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the
kind of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.”
Justice Pierce Butler21

38. The crux of the petitioner’s case is that post his conviction and
confirmation thereof, right up to this Court, meaning thereby that
his sentence of being hanged till death was made certain, both
judicially and on the part of the executive (with a Review Petition
and Clemency Petitions both to the Hon’ble Governor and the
Hon’ble President of India, being rejected), there have been judicial

21 Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2165

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

developments by way of a three-Judge Bench decision in Manoj v.
State of M.P.22, whereby this Court mandated the calling of certain
reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in arriving
at a just and proper sentence, of which he claims benefit. In other
words, the petitioner seeks directions from this Court to grant him
the benefit of revisiting his sentence, in light of the procedure laid
down in Manoj (supra).
39. This Court in Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka23 had recently
observed that Manoj (supra) represented a watershed moment in the
Indian sentencing regime. By way of the said judgment, this Court
shone a path for individualised sentencing. Individualised sentencing,
as the name suggests, is a judicial practice where the punishment
awarded to an offender is crafted or moulded, acknowledging not
just the crime but also the criminal. It may be so that an individual
has committed a crime, but in modern penology, the same does
not necessarily mean that a sentence can be imposed upon them
in disregard of the background which may have led the offender
to such a position. This is more so a case where the punishment
to be meted out is afflicted by irreversibility, in other words, the
death sentence. In doing so, this Court considers the offenders’
background – social, economic and psychological; personal history;
character; and rehabilitation potential.
40. While Manoj (supra) is the first time that this Court has mandated
calling of these reports in furtherance of the mitigating factors spelt
out in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab24 the idea of individualised
sentencing took root in Western jurisdictions much earlier. At this
point, it has to be recognized that most Western countries have
outlawed the death penalty, and as one of the, if not the only, notable
exceptions, it shall be useful to notice a few decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States of America.
40.1 In Lockett v. Ohio25, the Court was confronted with a situation
where the getaway driver, who was involved in a robbery

22 (2023) 2 SCC 353
23 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1455
24 (1980) 2 SCC 684
25 438 US 586 (1978)
2166 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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that resulted in a murder, was found guilty and sentenced to
death. The question before the Court was whether the Ohio
statute requiring the death penalty for aggravated murder
was violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution unless anyone of the following three criteria
could be found – (i) that the victim had induced the offence;
(ii) the same had been committed under duress or coercion;
and (iii) the offence was a product of mental deficiencies.
The Court held that restricting the mitigating factors only to
the above three points did indeed violate the Constitution. It
was held as follows :

“There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which
cases Governmental authority should be used to
impose death. But a statute that prevents a sentencer
in all capital punishment from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s
character and record and to circumstances of the
offence proffered in mitigation creates a risk that the
death penalty would be imposed inspite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty. When
the choice is between life and death, the risk is
unacceptable and incompatible...”

40.2 The Lockett doctrine, which is best captured in Penry v.
Lynaugh26 to the effect that punishments must be directly
related to the defendant’s personal culpability and that a
defendant who commits crime(s) attributable to a disadvantaged
background or emotional or mental problems may be less
culpable than the one who has no such excuse, was furthered
in Eddings v. Oklahoma27. The Court held the Trial Court to
be in error for not having considered Eddings’ age (16 years)
as a mitigating factor given his “violent background”. At trial,
a State psychologist had also testified to the effect that he
suffered from a sociopathic and anti-social personality disorder.

26 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
27 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
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The Court found the Trial Court to be in error on this count
as well. The majority held as follows :
“Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been
deprived of the care, concern and parental attention
that children deserve. On the contrary, it is not
disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional
problems and had been raised in a neglectful,
sometimes even violent, family background. In
addition, there was testimony that Eddings’ mental
and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age. All of this does not
suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather,
it is to say that, just as the chronological age of a
minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great
weight, so must the background and mental and
emotional disturbance of a youthful defendant be
duly considered in sentencing.”
40.3 In Skipper v. South Carolina28, the Court heard an appeal
against a concurrently confirmed death sentence, where at
the sentencing hearing, the learned Trial Judge denied the
admission of mitigating evidence in the form of testimony of
the two jailers and a regular visitor - who would have testified
to the effect that he had adjusted well under incarceration
in the seven and a half months that he had spent in prison
between his arrest and trial. Both the Courts below held such
evidence to be inadmissible and irrelevant. Such findings
were vacated and it was held that it was not open for the
sentencer to refuse consideration of any of the “relevant
mitigating evidence.” In the concurring opinion, it was
observed that all relevant factors should be considered at
the stage of the Subordinate Courts themselves, as opposed
to being considered by the Supreme Court, for it has no
special expertise in deciding the appropriateness of factors
to be considered or otherwise.

28 476 U.S 1 (1986)
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40.3 Graham v. Collins29 was a case where the Court was dealing
with a case of first-degree murder. The sentence of death
imposed was confirmed by the Supreme Court, but in doing
so, it was observed that the same could be arrived at, as per
the guidance given by the Texas statute in question, giving
‘constitutionally adequate’ considerations to factors such as
age.
40.4 In Tennard v. Dretke30, the Court rejected two tests applied
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, where they, in order to
consider the factum of his low IQ, applied two tests, i.e., of
‘nexus’ to the crime and a test for ‘uniquely severe permanent
handicap’, observing thus :
“Reasonable jurists could conclude that the low
IQ evidence Tennard presented was relevant
mitigating evidence. Evidence of significantly impaired
intellectual functioning is obviously evidence that
“might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than
death,’” Skipper, 476 U. S., at 5; see also, e.g., Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 535 (2003) (observing, with
respect to individual with IQ of 79, that “Wiggins[‘] …
diminished mental capacitie[s] further augment his
mitigation case”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U. S. 776,
779, 789, n. 7 (1987) (noting that petitioner “had an
IQ of 82 and functioned at the level of a 12-year-old
child,” and later that “[i]n light of petitioner’s youth at
the time of the offense, … testimony that his ‘mental
and emotional development were at a level several
years below his chronological age’ could not have
been excluded by the state court” (quoting Eddings,
455 U. S., at 116)).
Reasonable jurists also could conclude that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of Penry
to the facts of Tennard’s case was unreasonable.

29 506 U.S 461 (1993)
30 2004 SCC OnLine US SC 59
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2169

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The relationship between the special issues and
Tennard’s low IQ evidence has the same essential
features as the relationship between the special
issues and Penry’s mental retardation evidence.
Impaired intellectual functioning has mitigating
dimension beyond the impact it has on the individual’s
ability to act deliberately. See Penry I, 492 U. S.,
at 322. A reasonable jurist could conclude that
the jury might well have given Tennard’s low IQ
evidence aggravating effect in considering his future
dangerousness, not only as a matter of probable
inference from the evidence but also because the
prosecutor told them to do so: “[W]hether he has a
low IQ or not is not really the issue. Because the
legislature, in asking you to address that question,
the reasons why he became a danger are not really
relevant. The fact that he is a danger, that the
evidence shows he’s a danger, is the criteria to use
in answering that question.” App. 60. Indeed, the
prosecutor’s comments pressed exactly the most
problematic interpretation of the special issues,
suggesting that Tennard’s low IQ was irrelevant in
mitigation, but relevant to the question whether he
posed a future danger.”
40.5 The above discussion by no means is meant to be an extensive
deliberation of how the mitigating factors, eventually recognised
by this Court in Manoj (supra), came to be considered in
other jurisdictions. It is only meant to be indicative of the
processes followed in a developed or developing Country that
is retentionist31 qua the death penalty, which in all, are fifty four.

31 Across the world, there are fifty-four countries that still have capital punishment on their statute books. In
Africa- Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Libya,
Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda. In Asia- Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman,
Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates,
Vietnam, Yemen. In Europe- Belarus. In North America- Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America. In South America- Guyana.
[See: Death Penlty Information Center: https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/policy/international/
abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries
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41. It is also to be noted that academic discourse32 argues for principles
of individualised sentencing to be extended to non-capital felony
convictions, i.e., serious crimes for which punishments other than
death have been prescribed. This has been argued, keeping in view
the effect that convictions for such serious offences may have on
the person so convicted, causing “dehumanizing effects” that extend
far beyond release from incarceration, such as the loss of right to
vote, housing and employment and most obviously, social stigma.
This extension would grant three benefits - I. Grant each defendant
an effective opportunity to present circumstances for and against
his case; II. Enhance transparency and further proportionality; and
III. Restore sentencing discretion to neutral Tribunals and respect
for offender dignity.
Academic discourse is the birthplace of nuanced ideas that have
great potential to inform and influence legislative policy and judicial
action. Examples are aplenty of such influence. Even in the United
States, where this discussion is taking shape, concrete steps are
yet to be taken in so far as the extension of consideration of the
mitigating factors in non-capital felony offences. However, as we
have noticed above, the consideration of these factors in offences
with capital punishment is well established. If the boundaries of
theoretical discussions have extended so far ahead, it would only
stand to reason that the judicial fora would at least extend these
benefits to cases where the alternative is the State-sanctioned taking
away of a person’s life. This is more so because the commission of
an offence is not a stand-alone incident, but rather the culmination
of a sum total of circumstances that would have driven the offender
to commit such a crime. For Courts to close their eyes to this
possibility is the gravest form of injustice that can be caused by
the stroke of a pen.
42. In general perception, the image of convicts on death row is most
uncharitable and hostile, and to perceive dignity for them may appear
to some as an unjust concession to the most undeserving. The law,
however, does not permit such perceptions. The rights available to
a free person walking the streets are also to some extent available

32 William W. Berry, Individualized Sentencing, 76 Wash.& Lee L. Rev.13 (2019).
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2171

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to those who are confined behind bars, inasmuch as the same has
been recognized, for instance, in cases where, despite the rejection
of mercy petitions, the executions of these persons remain pending
for years. This, it has been held, is violative of the prisoners’ rights
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21, as we are
well aware, provides that no person will be deprived of their life and
liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law.
When a person has been sentenced to death, and the same has
been confirmed on appeal, the deprivation of liberty is in accordance
with law, but even then, some aspects of Article 21 would still be
with such a prisoner.
43. Dignity, which is essential to the ‘life’ and well-recognised to be
something more than a mere animal existence, is one such right
[See: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India33]. There may be, on
an ideal plane, opposition to this recognition, given that this implies
dignity is inherent in even those who have been convicted of having
committed the most barbaric of acts - but that is true. So long as
a person is living, he is entitled to dignity. Immanuel Kant34, who is
recognized as the modern proponent of the understanding of dignity,
observed thus :
“Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect
from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to
respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a
human being cannot be used merely as a means by any
human being ... but must also be used at the same time
as an end. It is just in this that his dignity ... consists,
by which he raises himself above all other beings in the
world that are not human beings and yet can be used,
and so over all things.”
44. During the Second World War, one of the ghastliest acts against
humanity was perpetrated, where a section of the population was
wiped out merely on account of their ethnicity and religious beliefs in
an attempt to cleanse a particular race. Fresh out of the war when

33 (2018) 10 SCC 1
34 Kant, I. (2017). Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans., L. Denis, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
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the Member States of the United Nations convened to set down the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they were aware of the vast
differences amongst them and yet found common ground on the
idea of dignity35. As a result, the first Article of the Declaration itself
states that all persons are born equal in rights and dignity.
45. One form of dignity is the “non-instrumentalization of persons”, which
means viewing offenders as individual human beings. In the realm of
punishment, this humane view of offenders entails proportionality and
humanness. A detailed exposition is not warranted for the principle of
proportionality, save and except to say that the punishment awarded
to an offender has to be directly related to the offence committed.
The second aspect of humaneness entails that the punishment so
awarded should not be outside the bounds of human decency36. All
these aspects circle back to our constitutional values embodied in
Articles 14 and 21. The words of Ramaswamy, J., in Kartar Singh
v. State of Punjab37, are instructive:
“The foundation of Indian political and social democracy,
as envisioned in the preamble of the Constitution, rests
on justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity in secular and
socialist republic in which every individual has equal
opportunity to strive towards excellence and of his dignity of
person in an integrated egalitarian Bharat. Right to justice
and equality and stated liberties which include freedom
of expression, belief and movement are the means for
excellence. The right to life with human dignity of person is
a fundamental right of every citizen for pursuit of happiness
and excellence. Personal freedom is a basic condition for
full development of human personality. Article 21 of the
Constitution protects right to life which is the most precious
right in a civilised society. The trinity i.e. liberty, equality
and fraternity always blossoms and enlivens the flower
of human dignity.”

35 M.Nussbaum, Human Dignity & Political entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays
Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 360 (2008).
36 M.J.Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the backdrop of the Eight Amendment, (2016) U.ILL
L.REV.2129.
37 (1994) 3 SCC 569
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2173

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The question that is to be considered is whether the rights under
Article 21 of the instant petitioner and the other similarly placed
convicts, who would be benefitted by the retrospective application
of Manoj (supra), would be harmed and their dignity threatened if
this particular aspect is seen only from the angle of a subsequent
development, as it would defeat the noble purpose of individualized
sentencing put forth in Manoj (supra) and the mitigating factors that
could possibly be brought on record by the instant petitioner, will be
left untouched and unexplored. There is no constitutional permissibility
to give a go-by to the sacrosanct right under Article 21, on the basis
that the judgment which benefits the petitioner and other similarly
placed persons was delivered after the finality of conviction and
sentence of the persons was determined.
46. According to Blackstonian theory38, the role of the Court is not to
create new laws but to uphold and explain existing ones. Judges
are seen as discovering or interpreting the correct law rather than
making law themselves; the law is considered to have always existed
as it is. Therefore, if a later judgment departs from an earlier one,
it does not introduce a new law but rather uncovers the true legal
principle, which then applies retrospectively. Salmond echoes this
view, explaining that case law operates on the premise that Judges
merely declare the law. He wrote :
“[T]he theory of case law is that a judge does not make
law; he merely declares it; and the overruling of a previous
decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was
law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the
strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law
established in the overruling decision.”
To put it otherwise, when a previous decision is overruled, it means
the earlier rule was never truly the law, and all actions taken based on
that supposed rule are subject to the new, correct legal determination,
except in cases that are already finally decided (res judicata) or where
accounts have already been settled. Thus, overruling a decision
has a retrospective effect, clarifying what the law always was, with
limited exceptions.

38 15th Ed. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
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47. The Blackstonian theory has found application by this Court on few
occasions. In CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd39, C.K.
Thakker, J. explained the theory in the following terms:
“35. In our judgment, it is also well settled that a judicial
decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian
theory, it is not the function of the court to pronounce a
“new rule” but to maintain and expound the “old one”. In
other words, Judges do not make law, they only discover
or find the correct law. The law has always been the
same. If a subsequent decision alters the earlier one,
it (the later decision) does not make new law. It only
discovers the correct principle of law which has to be
applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an
earlier decision of the court operated for quite some time,
the decision rendered later on would have retrospective
effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not
correctly understood.”
[See also: Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar
Arora40.]
48. Courts in other jurisdictions have also held judgments to have a
retrospective effect. The inimitable Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Barton Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.41, observed :
“ “35. … I know of no authority in this Court to say that,
in general, State decisions shall make law only for the
future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation
for near a thousand years.”
49. The Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Canada v.
George Hislop42, has held that :
“86. However, this acknowledgement does not require
abandoning Blackstone’s declaratory approach altogether.

39 (2008) 14 SCC 171
40 2025 SCC Online SC 819
41 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 2
42 2007 SCC OnLine Can SC 10
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2175

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The critique of the Blackstonian approach applies only to
situations in which judges are fashioning new legal rules or
principles and not when they are applying the existing law.
In instances where courts apply pre-existing legal doctrine
to a new set of facts, Blackstone’s declaratory approach
remains appropriate and remedies are necessarily
retroactive. Because courts are adjudicative bodies that,
in the usual course of things, are called upon to decide
the legal consequences of past happenings, they generally
grant remedies that are retroactive to the extent necessary
to ensure that successful litigants will have the benefit of
the ruling...”
50. Building on the Blackstonian theory and Salmond’s explanation that
the Courts do not create new law but merely declare what the law
has always been, so that any overruling by a subsequent decision
operates retrospectively, this understanding is directly relevant for
the interpretation of Manoj (supra) with regard to its retrospective
or prospective application. The question whether Manoj (supra)
applies prospectively or retrospectively deeply affects the protection
of Article 21 rights. If Courts deny petitioners the benefit of new legal
developments solely because these emerged from later rulings, it
could jeopardize the fundamental rights. In this vein, the decision
in Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. State of West Bengal & Anr.43 affirms
that, while statutes operate prospectively, unless expressly stated,
judgments of constitutional Courts are presumed to be retrospective
unless the Court expressly limits their effect. This alignment of
legal principles bolsters the understanding that judicial declarations
usually operate retrospectively, ensuring that the benefits of such
rulings generally reach past cases unless specifically restricted.
This continuity in judicial philosophy upholds fairness by protecting
individual rights regardless of the timing of the judgment.
51. This case has presented two questions for consideration - one,
regarding the retrospective application of the principles in Manoj
(supra) which stands answered as above; and second, being the
applicability and maintainability of Article 32 of the Constitution of

43 2025 SCC Online SC 443
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India, the thornier of the afore-mentioned issues after the rejection
of the mercy petitions preferred before the Hon’ble President of India
and the Hon’ble Governor of Maharashtra.
52. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides that this Court has
the power to issue prerogative writs in favour of the applicant before
it, should they succeed in establishing a violation of a right under
Part III of the Constitution. The natural corollary that the petitioner
would have to show that some or the other right available to him,
which is enshrined under Part III stands violated. The case of the
petitioner, accordingly, is that the denial of the sentencing procedure
as established in Manoj (supra) violates his rights under Article 21
of the Constitution.
53. What this necessarily implies is that the law declared by this Court
in Manoj (supra) has acquired such a status that the non-availability
thereof to the petitioner prejudices him greatly. This Court has, time
and again in the interpretation of various legislations, national and
international, declared the law as it should be in accordance with
Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, in Manoj (supra),
in my view, all that has been done is that a streamlined and time-
bound process has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the
Courts below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation
in Bachan Singh (supra).
54. If the law once declared is not followed and the same causes a
demonstrable detriment to a person, or in this case, a convict, such
person will have a legitimate grievance which the Courts would
be then required to remedy. As already observed in the preceding
paragraphs, the law declared by the constitutional Courts applies
retrospectively. Ex-consequenti, the benefit of Manoj (supra) applies
to the petitioner retrospectively and the denial of such benefit, which
may eventually have the effect of saving him from the hangman’s
noose, if it is indeed found that his socio-economic and psychological
background as also other mitigating factors as may be procured, did
play a sufficient role in the petitioner committing the heinous crime
that he did, non-consideration of these factors would constitute a
violation of Article 21, since the effect thereof would be that his life
would be eventually taken away.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2177

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55. The substance of the Union’s and the State’s opposition to this writ
petition was that Article 32 cannot be permitted to be invoked post
conclusion of the process as is provided under law, in an effort
to disturb findings already made and confirmed. There is also an
apprehension that if this Court permits the exercise of powers under
Article 32 in this case, it would also give other convicts similarly
condemned an avenue for re-agitation, even after dismissal of
the review petition. While the apprehension of the Union of India
and the State appears somewhat justified, which we will deal with
subsequently, the contention regarding the maintainability of Article
32 does not merit acceptance.
56. This is evident from a bare perusal of Part III of the Constitution. The
framers have consciously placed a pathway to this Court into the
heart and soul of the Constitution, ensuring and guaranteeing that
no person, for whatever reason, can be denied an avenue to have
their grievance redressed, when some action of the State infringes
on the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India. The
guaranteed right to approach this Court was considered, and rightly
so, fundamental to the protection of the fundamental rights by the
framers of the Constitution themselves. Illustratively, certain extracts
of the discussion on draft Article 25 are reproduced herein below :
“G. Durgabai- Sir, the right to move the Supreme Court
by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of a
person’s rights is a very valuable right that is guaranteed
under this Constitution. In my view this is a right which
is fundamental to all the fundamental rights guaranteed
under this Constitution. The main principle of this article
is to secure an effective remedy to the fundamental rights
guaranteed under this Constitution. As we are all aware, a
right without an expeditious and effective remedy serves
no purpose at all, nor is it worth the paper on which it is
written. Therefore, as I have already stated, this article
secures that kind of advantage that it will ensure the
effective enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed
to a person.44

44 Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 3–5 (India).
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Jerome D Souza- Sir, it is because we all believe,–and
that is the implication of this chapter of fundamental
Rights,–that man has certain rights that are inalienable,
that cannot be questioned by any humanly constituted
legislative authority, that these Fundamental Rights are
framed in this manner and a sanction and a protection
given to them by this provision for appeal to the Supreme
Court. Sir, if all our people and their outlook were entirely
materialistic, if right and wrong were to be judged by a
majority vote, then there is no significance in fundamental
rights and the placing of them under the protection of the
High Court. It is because we believe that the fullest and
the most integral definition of democracy includes and
is based upon this sacredness of the individual, of his
personality and the claims of his conscience, that we have
framed these rights.45”
(Emphasis supplied)

The Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar also highlights the high pedestal
upon which this Article rests. This Court in Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar
Union v. Union of India46, speaking through Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI,
noticed this statement as follows :
“A right without a remedy is a legal conundrum of a
most grotesque kind. While the draft Article 25, which
corresponds to Article 32, was being discussed in the
Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar made a meaningful
observation by saying:
“If I was asked to name any particular article in this
Constitution as the most important — an article without
which this Constitution would be a nullity — I could not
refer to any other article except this one. It is the very
soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it and I

45 Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 8–10 (India).
46 (1981) 1 SCC 568
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2179

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

am glad that the House has realised its importance.
[ Constituent Assembly Debates, December 9, 1948,
Vol. VII, p. 953]”
Here itself, to further supplement the indispensability of Article
32, it is reiterated that this Article forms the Basic Structure of the
Constitution of India and as a consequence thereof, its essence
cannot be taken away even by the exercise of the powers of the
Parliament. This Court has also struck down legislation as ultra vires
the Constitution in cases where this power has been sought to be
circumscribed. Paragraph 99 of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of
India47 reads as under :
“The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable
basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction
cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform
a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred
by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The
Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B
of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to
test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and
rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be
subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High
Court ...”
(Emphasis supplied)

As is made evident from the above extract, the framers of the
Constitution held a deeply regarded belief that certain rights are
inalienable and most precious to a person, and for the enforcement
of these rights that the doors of this Court were kept open for all.
It is well-established that reference to the Constitutional Assembly
debates can be made in the interpretation of a constitutional
provision. [See: S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & ors.48; and

47 (1997) 3 SCC 261
48 (2001) 7 SCC 126
2180 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India49.] It becomes but obvious then,
that nothing whatsoever under the law can cast a shadow or eclipse
this right, whether it be the availability of a substantive alternate
remedy or procedural wrangles. In the present case, since this
Court has confirmed the petitioner’s conviction, and review was also
dismissed, he has no other avenue other than this Court where he
may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj (supra). It is almost
impossible to conceive that the remedy under this Article would be
foreclosed to the petitioner when Article 21 is the only thing that
stands between the petitioner and the rope of death, only in order
to underscore and emphasize the finality of a judicial determination,
which in all cases apart from such exceptional circumstances, is a
cardinal principle to be abided by.
57. As for the argument of the learned Advocate General for the State
of Maharashtra that after dismissal of a review petition, the only
available path is that of the curative petition, the same is difficult to
accept for the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra50 itself states that this jurisdiction is to be exercised only in
those cases where the circumstances permit the finality of a judicial
decision to be altered with. Para 42 reads as under :
“42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a
cause is not less important than the principle of finality of
its judgment. We are faced with competing principles —
ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court
of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration
of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in
violation of the principles of natural justice or giving scope
for apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated
in the decision-making process not disclosing his links
with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the
process of the court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring
finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty.
Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice — a
concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of

49 (2019) 1 SCC 1
50 (2002) 4 SCC 388
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2181

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.

the view that though Judges of the highest court do their
best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility,
yet situations may arise, in the rarest of the rare cases,
which would require reconsideration of a final judgment
to set right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such
case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both
legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our
anxious consideration to the question, we are persuaded
to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare
cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of
judgment as though it is essentially in the public interest
that a final judgment of the final court in the country should
not be open to challenge, yet there may be circumstances,
as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the
judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and
would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.”
(Emphasis supplied)

58. The upshot of the above discussion is that Article 32 has pride of
place - a Jewel on the Crown of the Justice Delivery System - in
the Indian Constitutional scheme and is unquestionably available to
even those who are serving sentences for the most heinous offences.
Given that Manoj (supra) was not in operation or did not exist at
the time when the present petitioner was sentenced and his review
was dismissed, no other recognized way was available to him to
approach this Court seeking benefit thereof. It has already been held
that judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a right was
conferred upon him to have his sentence re-examined in the light
of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj (supra), it is to
exercise such a right which has a direct impact on his Article 21 rights
that a petition under Article 32 had to be preferred. It, therefore, has
to be necessarily held to be maintainable.
59. The end result of this petition being held maintainable is not meant to
give a way out to persons convicted under a procedure established
by law to approach this Court seeking to reopen the conclusions
arrived at properly or simply to hide behind ongoing litigation in
order to delay the inevitable carrying out of the sentence. Such a
2182 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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petition has been held to be maintainable in the specific facts of this
case, where a subsequent development in law granted a benefit to
a convict, and there was no other avenue available to him. We are
informed that in all, there are only 7 such convicts, sentenced to be
hanged, seeking the benefit of Manoj (supra).

Result of the case: Writ petition allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain