UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusK. SURI BABU

                [2023] 15 S.C.R. 1046 : 2023 INSC 1033



                           CASE DETAILS

                      UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                                    v.
                            K. SURI BABU
                     (Civil Appeal No. 1320 of 2010)
                         NOVEMBER 29, 2023
       [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, C. T. RAVIKUMAR AND
                SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES
      Issue for consideration: Whether the disciplinary proceedings against
the respondent-workman, could be initiated under the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 or it could be done only
under the Standing Orders certified for the Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad
on 27.08.1973, under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946.
     Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 –
Tribunal upheld the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings by the
Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad, against the respondent under the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965 – Order set aside by High Court – Case of the respondent is that
he being a workman will be covered by the Standing Orders under the
1946 Act which contain provisions to deal with matters, inter alia, of
disciplinary proceedings:
      Held: Standing Orders made under the 1946 Act are Rules specific
to workmen in an industrial establishment – 1946 Act, Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and other such legislations of this period, are worker friendly
legislations, enacted to regulate the working conditions of workmen –
Standing Orders grant a protection to a workman, inter alia, when he
faces a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the employer – Employer is
undoubtedly on a much powerful position than a workman and has much
stronger bargaining power and consequently the statute has been made to

                                  1046
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                       1047


create a balance – The protection of the 1946 Act, cannot be denied to a
workman merely for the reason that the employer grants him other services
benefits such as pension, gratuity etc. under CCA Rules – A standing order
is no ordinary order – It has a statutory mandate – CCA Rules, 1965 are
the general Rules whereas Standing Orders are the Special Rules and will
override any other general Rule including CCA Rules, 1965 – Moreover,
the Standing Orders cover a wide area of activities of a workman and are
workmen specific yet in view of s.13B of 1946 Act, a specific notification
can be made applying CCA Rules, 1965 to that specific aspect – But a
notification is necessary – In the present case, there is nothing on record
to show that after the standing orders, which stood certified in the year
1973 and were in force, any subsequent modification was made or any
order passed curtailing these standing orders, u/s.10 of the 1946 Act – In
the absence of notification u/s.13B of the 1946 Act, there is no fault with
the order of the High Court holding that it will be the standing orders and
not the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable – Service conditions
of respondents will be governed by the Standing Orders as far as the
disciplinary proceedings are concerned – Order passed by the High Court
upheld – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Service Law. [Paras 7, 8, 11, 17,
18, 20 and 21]
      Service Law – Special Rules vis-à-vis General Rules – Standing
Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
vis-à-vis Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965:
      Held: Standing Orders have the nature of Special Rules – Only in
those cases, where the Special Rules fail to lay down provisions for dealing
with certain subjects, can the General Rules be pressed into service – The
CCA Rules are General Rules which apply to all Government Servants – In
the present case, when the Standing Orders for the Department clearly laid
down a procedure to be followed in cases of Disciplinary proceedings under
Order Nos. 38, 39 & 40, there was no reason for the Department to initiate
the said proceedings under the CCA Rules – NFC, Hyderabad failed to
place on record any modification made u/s.10 of the 1946 Act to show that
the Standing Orders certified for NFC-Hyderabad would not be applicable
to the respondent. [Paras 19, 20]
1048          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


     Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 – Objective
and purpose – Discussed.
        LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
     Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. [1984] 3 SCR
325: (1984) 3 SCC 369; U.P. State Electricity Board and Another v. Hari
Shankar Jain and Others, AIR 1979 SC 65 – relied on.
     Salem-Erode Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees’ Union
[1966] 2 SCR 498, Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light
Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union [1969] 2 SCR 131; Agra
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladdin and Others (1969) 2 SCC 598;
Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [1974] 1 SCR 434: (1974) 3 SCC
330; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union
& Ors. [2015] 5 SCR 474 : (2015) 6 SCC 494 – referred to.
       Air India v. Union of India ILR (1991) 1 Del 88 – referred to.
        OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
               ORDER AND APPEARANCES
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.1320 of 2010.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2008 of the High Court of
A.P. at Hyderabad in WP No.9541 of 2008.
       With
       Civil Appeal No.1323 of 2010.
       Appearances:
      Gurmeet Singh Makker, R. Bala, Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, Nachiketa
Joshi, Shubhendu Anand, Arkaj Kumar, Rajat Nair, Anuj Srinivas Udupa,
Aakarsh Mishra, Shivam Shukla, Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Advs. for the
Appellants.
      Anand Padmanabhan R, V. Sridhar Reddy, V. N. Raghupathy, Advs.
for the Respondent.
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                        1049



       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                              JUDGMENT

     SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
      1. These are the two appeals filed by the Union of India; Appeal
No.1320/2010, is against the order dated 14.10.2008 passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
Writ Petition No.9541 of 2008 and Appeal No. 1323/2010 is against the
order dated 22.01.2009, of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature,
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad passed in Writ Petition No.494/2009. The
issue in both the Civil Appeals raised is identical, but for the sake of
convenience, for facts we would be only referring to Civil Appeal No.1320
of 2010.
      2. The High Court in the impugned order dated 14.10.2008 has
allowed the Writ Petition of the respondent by setting aside the order (dated
18.03.2008), passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for
short ‘CAT’) which upheld the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings
by the Nuclear Fuel Complex-Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘NFC’
or ‘Department’), against the respondent under the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short ‘CCA Rules
1965’). The short question which was there before the High Court and
which is now before us, is whether the disciplinary proceedings against
the respondent (who is admittedly a workman), could be initiated under
the CCA Rules 1965 or it could be done only under the Standing Orders
certified for the NFC-Hyderabad on 27.08.1973 (hereinafter referred to as
“Standing Orders”), under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1946 Act’).
      3. NFC was set up in the 1970s, as a constituent unit of the Department
of Atomic Energy, Government of India. The respondent was appointed
as a ‘helper’ w.e.f. 05.05.2001 in NFC. Helper is the class IV post and it
seems that the eligibility requirement for the post was a Class VI certificate
which the respondent had submitted in order to get the appointment. On
23.04.2003 he received a memorandum which said that he had given a
false declaration that he had passed Class VI as the transfer certificate of
1050         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


Class VI submitted by him was found to be fake for which a disciplinary
action was to be initiated against him under CCA Rules 1965. In response,
the respondent denied the allegations and asserted that his certificate is
genuine and further contended that the disciplinary proceedings, if any,
would be governed by the Standing Orders and not under the CCA Rules
1965, and ultimately, he filed an OA before the CAT, Hyderabad, with a
prayer to set aside the proceedings against him, inter alia, on the grounds
that the disciplinary proceedings against him can only be initiated under the
“Standing Orders”, and not under the CCA Rules. The CAT, dismissed his
O.A. vide its order dated 18.03.2008. The CAT relied on his appointment
order, as well as the circular dated 12.05.2005 issued by the Department
to clarify that their employees were governed by the CCA Rules and not
Standing Orders. This order of CAT, was challenged by the respondent in a
writ petition before the High Court which was allowed and the order of the
CAT was set aside and the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent
were quashed.
      4. The case of the respondent is that he being a workman will be covered
by the Standing Orders which contain provisions to deal with matters, inter
alia, of disciplinary proceedings, and therefore the proceedings initiated
against him under the CCA Rules, 1965 are without jurisdiction. On the
other hand, the appellants before this Court would argue that the respondent-
workman is governed by the CCA Rules 1965, being an employee of NFC,
Hyderabad. One of the terms and conditions stated in his appointment order
was that he would be governed under the CCA Rules, even for disciplinary
proceedings. Further, it is under the CCA Rules where a large number of
benefits are liable to be given to the employees of the Department. On the
date, an employee reaches the age of superannuation, he gets his pension
only under the CCA Rules 1965, apart from a large number of other benefits
and therefore it is not open for the employee to say that as long he enjoys
the benefits, the Rules will be applicable, but the same Rules will not be
applicable in the disciplinary proceedings against him. Such an argument
is not tenable under the law, the department would argue.
    5. We have heard Mr. Arkaj Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants
and Mr. Anand Padmanabhan R. learned counsel for the respondent
workman, at length and have perused the material on record.
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                       1051
                [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

      6. Learned counsel appearing for the Department has drawn our
attention to the appointment order dated 05.05.2001, which states that in
matters of disciplinary proceedings the employee will be governed by the
CCA Rules. The relevant provision mentioned in the appointment order is
as under:
     “3. I am to add that other terms and conditions of your service
     including discipline will be governed by the rules as applicable to
     Central Government employees of your status in NFC from time to
     time. Your leave entitlement will be admissible to Industrial employees
     in departmental undertakings under Appendix-XI of CSR Vol. II (8th
     Edition) (Ref. Ministry of finance Memo No. 7(84) E-IV(A)/B1, dt.
     17.11.61 as amended vide Ministry of Finance Memo No. B(1)-E-
     IV(A)/70, dt. 27.03.71). Other conditions of service will be governed
     by the Rules and Orders of the Central Government in force from
     time to time.”
     Since the Rules applicable to Central Government employees are the
CCA Rules 1965, the reference in the appointment order to the applicable
Rules, is of CCA Rules, 1965.
       7. Standing Orders made under the Industrial Establishment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 are however Rules specific to workmen in an industrial
establishment. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946,
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and a number of other legislations of this
period, are worker friendly legislations, which were enacted with a purpose
i.e., to regulate the working conditions of workmen. Standing Orders
grant a protection to a workman, inter alia, when he faces a disciplinary
proceeding initiated by the employer. The employer is undoubtedly on a
much powerful position than a workman and has much stronger bargaining
power and consequently the statute has been made to create a balance.
This position has been held by this Court in a catena of decisions, namely,
Salem-Erode Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees’ Union
(1966) 2 SCR 4981, Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light
Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union (1969) 2 SCR 1312 and


1   Paragraph No. 8
2   Paragraph No. 7
1052          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladdin and Others (1969) 2 SCC
5983 etc.
     8. The protection of the 1946 Act, cannot be denied to a workman
merely for the reason that the employer grants him other services benefits
such as pension, gratuity etc. under CCA Rules. The purpose behind this
worker-friendly legislation was explained by this Court in Sudhir Chandra
Sarkar v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (1984) 3 SCC 369:
       “11. Parliament enacted the Industrial Employment (Standing
       Orders) Act, 1946 (“1946 Act” for short). The long title of the
       Act provides that it was an act to require employers in industrial
       establishments formally to define conditions of employment under
       them. The preamble of the Act provides that it is expedient to require
       employers in industrial establishments to defi ne with sufficient
       precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the
       said conditions known to workmen employed by them. By Section
       3, a duty was cast on the employer governed by the Act to submit
       to the Certifying Officer draft standing orders proposed by him
       for adoption in his industrial establishment. After going through
       the procedure prescribed in the Act, the Certifying Officer has to
       certify the draft standing orders. Section 8 requires the Certifying
       Officer to keep a copy of standing orders as finally certified under
       the Act in a register to be maintained for the purpose. Sub-section
       (2) of Section 13 imposes a penalty on employer who does any act
       in contravention of the standing orders finally certified under the
       Act. The Act was a legislative response to the laissez faire rule of
       hire and fire at sweet will. It was an attempt at imposing a statutory
       contract of service between two parties unequal to negotiate, on the
       footing of equality. This was vividly noticed by this Court in Western
       India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen [(1974) 3 SCC 330 : 1974
       SCC (L&S) 531 : (1974) 1 SCR 434 : (1973) 2 LLJ 403] as under :
       [SCC para 10, p. 334 : SCC (L&S) p. 536]
            “In the sunny days of the market economy theory people
            sincerely believed that the economic law of demand and supply


3   Paragraph No. 5
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                          1053
                [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

           in the labour market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain
           between the employer and the workman. Such a bargain, they
           took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of
           employment to the workman. This law they venerated as natural
           law. They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the
           experience of the working of this law over a long period has
           belied their faith.”
     The intendment underlying the Act and the provisions of the Act
     enacted to give effect to the intendment and the scheme of the Act
     leave no room for doubt that the Standing Orders certified under
     the 1946 Act become part of the statutory terms and conditions of
     service between the employer and his employee and they govern the
     relationship between the parties. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber
     Co [(1973) 1 SCC 813, 832 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341, 360 : (1973)
     3 SCR 587, 612 : (1973) 1 LLJ 278] Workmen v. Buckingham and
     Carnatic Mills [(1970) 1 LLJ 26, 29 (SC)] and Glaxo Laboratories
     v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Meerut [(1984) 1 SCC 1 : 1984
     SCC (L&S) 42]”
      9. The submission made by the learned counsel for the NFC Shri Arkaj
Kumar is that since the appointment order itself provides that disciplinary
issues will be governed by the CCA Rules 1965, there should be no room for
any doubt as to the applicability of the Rules in the disciplinary proceedings.
This may not be always correct. An appointment order cannot lay down
terms of service which are against what is provided in the Standing Orders,
as they are binding on the employer. This Court in the case of Western India
Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1974) 3 SCC 330 had directed reinstatement
of a worker, who had been illegally terminated from service during his
probation period, as this period was wrongly extended beyond what was
permissible in the Standing Orders. This is what was said by this Court in
Paragraph 11:
     “11. The special agreement, in so far as it provides for additional four
     months of probation, is an act in contravention of the Standing Order.
     We have already held that. It plainly follows from Sections 4, 10 and
     13(2) that the inconsistent part of the special agreement cannot prevail
     over the Standing Order. As long as the Standing Order is in force,
1054           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       it is binding on the Company as well as the workmen. To uphold the
       special agreement would mean giving a go-by to the Act’s principle of
       three-party participation in the settlement of terms of employment. So
       we are of the opinion that the inconsistent part of the special agreement
       is ineffective and unenforceable.”
      In Sudhir Chandra Sarkar (supra) it was ultimately held by this Court
that the terms of a statutory contract of service was illegal because it denied
gratuity to an employer which was against the Standing Orders that were
legally binding on the employer.
     10. Standing Orders are defined under Section 2(g) of the 1946 Act
as under:
       “2(g) “standing orders’ means rules relating to matters set out in the
       Schedule”
      In the schedule to the 1946 Act, a whole list of topics is given which
are related to workman, such as classification of workmen, their attendance,
closing and reopening of the industrial establishment to suspension or
dismissal for misconduct and as to what constitutes misconduct, etc.
      The 1946 Act mandates under Section 3 that the employer shall
submit before the certifying officer, draft standing orders proposed by him,
for adoption in his industrial establishment. The draft standing orders after
scrutinization under Section 4 of the 1946 Act are finally certified under
Section 5 of the 1946 Act.
      The standing orders are then notified under Section 7 of the Act, when it
becomes effective. However, before these standing orders are notified under
Section 7, it may go through a quasi-judicial process, as any party aggrieved
by any provisions of the standing orders has a right to appeal under Section
6 of the 1946 Act before the Appellate Authority. The standing orders which
are finally notified are then prominently posted by the employer in English
as well as in the language understood by the majority of the workmen.
Section 10 of the 1946 Act provides that the standing orders shall not be
modified except by agreement between the parties within six months of the
certification or the last modification of the Standing Orders. The Standing
Order which the workman/respondent claims in the present case have gone
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                        1055
                [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

through the above process and there is no order under Section 10 of the 1946
Act which modifies the Standing Order applicable herein.
      11. A standing order is hence no ordinary order. It has a statutory
mandate. The 1946 Act mandates all owners of industrial establishments
which are employing 100 or more workmen to prepare standing orders
which should cover all matters relating to employment of a workman which
have been given in the schedule of the 1946 Act and then these standing
orders further need to be certified by the authority under the 1946 Act. The
objective and purpose of the 1946 Act was to have a certainty in service
conditions of workmen and a responsibility was placed upon the employer
to formulate fair conditions of industrial employment, including in its
disciplinary proceedings against a workman. In other words, standing orders
are a set of Rules which have to be strictly followed and cannot be ignored,
modified or changed, except in accordance with law.
      12. The CCA Rules, 1965 on the other hand were framed under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India which are applicable to
employees of Central Government. The CCA Rules, 1965 are not specific
to workmen as these are general service rules applicable to all employees
who work under the Central Government. These are not workman specific
Rules, unlike the standing orders. Rule 3 of the CCA Rules, 1965 provides
for the applicability of the Rules, which reads as under:
     “3. Application.– (1) These rules shall apply to every government
     servant including every civilian Government servant in the Defence
     Services, but shall not apply to–
     (a) any railway servant, as defined in rule 102 of Volume I of the Indian
     Railway Establishment Code,
     (b) any member of the All India Services.
     (c) any person in casual employment,
     (d) any person subject to discharge from service on less than one
     month’s notice,
     (e) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters
     covered by these rules, by or under any law for the time being in force
     or by or under any agreement entered into by or with the previous
1056           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       approval of the President before or after the commencement of these
       rules, in regard to matters covered by such special provisions.
       (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the President
       may by order exclude any class of Government servants from the
       operation of all or any of these rules.
       (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), or the
       Indian Railway Establishment Code, these rules shall apply to every
       Government servant temporarily transferred to a Service or post
       coming within exception (a) or (e) in sub-rule (1), to whom, but for
       such transfer, these rules would apply.
       (4) If any doubt arises–
       (a) whether these rules or any of them apply to any person, or
       (b) whether any person to whom these rules apply belongs to a
       particular Service.
       the matter shall be referred to the President, who shall decide the same.
      13. The standing orders, on the other hand, as we have seen, cover
a whole range of activities of work related to a workman in an industrial
establishment which not only includes his working hours, the facilities to be
given to a workman, his duties and responsibilities but even minor activities
of a workman in an industrial establishment. There is hardly any area which
is not covered under these standing orders. Another important feature of the
standing orders is that it is totally focused on the activities, nature of work
of a workman and the treatment he deserves vis-a-vis the employer and the
duties towards his employer. All these are comprehensively laid down. The
CCA Rules, 1965 do not comprehensively cover the service conditions of
a workman as a standing order does.
     14. The purpose and the scope of 1946 Act is explained best in the
words of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in U.P. State Electricity Board and
Another v. Hari Shankar Jain and Others, AIR 1979 SC 65, which held
as under:
       “6. Let us now examine the various statutory provisions in their
       proper context with a view to resolve the problem before us. First,
    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                          1057
          [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Before the
passing of the Act, conditions of service of industrial employees were
invariably ill-defined and were hardly ever known with even a slight
degree of precision to the employees. There was no uniformity of
conditions of service for employees discharging identical duties in the
same establishment. Conditions of service were generally ad-hoc and
the result of oral arrangements which left the employees at the mercy
of the employer. With the growth of the trade union movement and the
right of collective bargaining, employees started putting forth their
demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs. Recognising the
rough deal that was being given to workers by employers who would
not define their conditions of service and the inevitability of industrial
strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. It was stated in the
statement of objects and reasons:
     “Experience has shown that ‘Standing Orders’, defining the
     conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action,
     holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards minimising friction
     between the management and workers in industrial undertakings.
     Discussion on the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour
     Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of
     legislation. The Bill accordingly seeks to provide for the framing
     of ‘Standing Orders’ in all industrial establishments employing
     one hundred and more workers.”
It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble “expedient to
require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient
precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the
said conditions known to workmen employed by them”. The scheme
of the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every
employer of an industrial establishment as defined in the Act to submit
to the Certifying Officer draft Standing Orders, that is, “Rules relating
to matters set out in the Schedule”, proposed by him for adoption
in his industrial establishment. This is mandatory. It has to be done
within six months after the commencement of the Act. Failure to do
so is punishable and is further made a continuing offence. The draft
1058           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       Standing Orders are required to cover every matter set out in the
       schedule. The Schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the
       Standing Orders and they include classification of workmen, shift
       working, attendance and late coming, leave and holidays, termination
       of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of
       redress for wronged workmen etc. Item 11 of the Schedule is “Any
       other matter which may be prescribed”. By a notification dated
       November 17, 1959 the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed
       “Age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other
       facility which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon
       between the parties” as a matter requiring to be provided in the
       Standing Orders. On receipt of the draft Standing Orders from the
       employee, the Certifying Officer is required to forward a copy of the
       same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to
       prefer objections, if any. Thereafter the Certifying Officer is required
       to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen
       as the case may be and to decide “whether or not any modification
       of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to
       render the draft Standing Orders certifiable under the Act”. Standing
       Orders are certifiable under the Act only if provision is made therein for
       every matter set out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the
       provisions of the Act and if the Certifying Officer adjudicates them as
       fair and reasonable. The Certifying Officer is invested with the powers
       of a civil court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering
       oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. etc. The order of the
       Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed Appellate
       Authority. The Standing Orders as finally certified are required to be
       entered in a register maintained by the Certifying Officer. The employer
       is required to prominently post the Certified Standing Orders on special
       boards maintained for that purpose. This is the broad scheme of the
       Act. The Act also provides for exemptions. About that, later. The Act, as
       originally enacted, precluded the Certifying Officer from adjudicating
       upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing Orders
       submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now
       casts a duty upon the Certifying Officer to adjudicate upon the fairness
       or reasonableness of the draft Standing Orders. The scheme of the Act
         UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                            1059
               [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

     has been sufficiently explained by this Court in Associated Cement Co.
     Ltd. v. P.D. Vyas [AIR 1960 SC 665 : (1960) 2 SCR 974 : (1960) 1 LLJ
     563 : 20 FJR 59] , Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v.
     State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 1471 : (1966) 2 SCR 863 : (1966) 2 LLJ 330
     : 29 FJR 76] , and Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [(1974) 3
     SCC 330 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 531 : (1974) 1 SCR 434] . The Industrial
     Employment (Standing Orders) Act is thus seen to be an Act specially
     designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial
     establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the
     terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the
     scrutiny of quasi-judicial authorities by the application of the test of
     fairness and reasonableness. It is an Act giving recognition and form
     to hard-won and precious rights of workmen. We have no hesitation
     in saying that it is a special Act expressly and exclusively dealing
     with the schedule-enumerated conditions of service of workmen in
     industrial establishments.”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
      Thus, it was held in Hari Shankar Jain (supra) that the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special act under which Standing
Orders are laid down which deals with specific conditions of a workman in
an “industrial establishment”, and the hard won right of a workman cannot
be taken away by a general enactment such as CCA Rules, 1965.
     “10. We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing
     Orders) Act is a special Act dealing with a specific subject, namely
     the conditions of service, enumerated in the schedule, of workmen in
     industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament
     sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment
     (Standing Orders) Act embodying as they do hard-won and precious
     rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure,
     including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental
     provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. It is obvious
     that Parliament did not have before it the Standing Orders Act when
     it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that
     the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by Section
     79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that
1060          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over Section
       79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the
       Standing Orders Act applies.”
       15. The NFC was established in the 1970s as a unit of department
of Atomic Energy, Government of India. The management of NFC after
its establishment, in the capacity of an employer submitted draft Standing
Orders under Section 3 of the 1946 Act before the certifying officer which
was duly certified on 27th August, 1973, and thereafter notified. These
Standing Orders are applicable to all industrial employees of NFC Hyderabad
who are workmen as defined under the 1946 Act. There is no doubt that the
private respondents come under the definition of workman. Clauses 38 to 44
of the Standing Orders certified for the NCF-Hyderabad in 1973 provided
for misconduct, disciplinary action, penalties, procedure, appeal and review.
      It is, however, true that the Ministry of Labour, Government of India
had issued an OM dated 29th July, 1977 where it had clarified that wherever
Section 13B of the 1946 Act was applicable for the establishments, the
standing orders need not be certified any longer and in case they have
already been certified they would become invalid. All the same, the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in its impugned order correctly makes a distinction
here which is that whereas for the Madras Atomic Power Project (similarly
constituted as NFC-Hyderabad) there is an exclusionary clause in terms
of Section 13B of the 1946 Act in its Standing Orders but in the Standing
Orders certified for NFC-Hyderabad, there is no mention of Section 13-B
of the 1946 Act.
      16. It is also true that in the present case, both the private respondents
when they were given employment, their appointment orders clearly said
that their service conditions, including disciplinary proceedings, if any,
would be governed under the CCA Rules, 1965. Therefore, the case of the
employer is that disciplinary proceedings also have to be initiated under
the CCA Rules, 1965 and the standing orders will have no applicability in
the present case.
     The employer also relies upon Section 13B of the 1946 Act, which
reads as follows:
       “13B. Act not to apply to certain industrial establishments.—Nothing
       in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                            1061
                [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

     workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental
     and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and
     Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, Revised
     Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service
     (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway
     Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations as may be
     notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official
     Gazette, apply.”
      Relying on the above provision, the argument of the employer is that
the 1946 Act will not apply to an industrial establishment, if for the industrial
establishment CCA Rules, 1965 have been made applicable, and since the
CCA Rules, 1965 have been made applicable and it was specifically stated
in the appointment orders of the respondents, the standing orders will have
no application.
      17. Section 13B of the 1946 Act declares that to those workmen in an
industrial establishment to whom the CCA Rules, 1965 are applicable, the
provisions of the 1946 Act will not apply. The question which still remains
is whether in order to oust the 1946 Act a separate notification under Section
13 B would be necessary as Section 13 B speaks of “…as may be notified in
this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply”.
      The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the impugned judgment, though is
of the opinion that there is some ambiguity in Section 13B of the 1946 Act
as to whether a separate notification is required for only unspecified rules
mentioned in Section 13B or will a separate notification also be necessary
for the specified Rules such as CCA Rules, 1965. All the same, this question
has been answered to a large extent by this Court in Hari Shankar Jain
(supra). The question before this Court was whether the standing orders
would be applicable to a workman or will it be the regulations framed under
the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. In the said case, there were standing orders
for the workmen, who were working for the U.P. State Electricity Board (as
it was then), but subsequently a notification was issued by the Government
of India on 28th May, 1970 specifically under Section 13B of the 1946 Act.
The notification read as under:
         “In pursuance of the provision of Section 13-B of the Industrial
     Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Act No. 20 of 1946), the
1062           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       Governor is pleased to notify in the official Gazette that the U.P.
       State Electricity Board has made the following Regulations under
       sub-section (c) of Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act
       No. 54 of 1948):
            Notwithstanding any rule if an order or practice hitherto followed,
       the date of compulsory retirement of an employee of the Board will
       be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that—
             (i) in the case of the inferior servants of the Board, whose
       counterparts under State Government are at present entitled to serve
       up to the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the
       date on which they attain the age of 60 years.
            (ii) the Board or its subordinate appointing authority may require
       an employee to retire after he attains or has attained the age of 55
       years on three months’ notice or three months’ salary in lieu thereof
       without assigning any reason.”
      We have also noticed that in the above case, there was a specific
notification under Section 13B of the 1946 Act, which admittedly is not
there in the case at hand. What is important is that the notification (in the
above case), was not of a general nature but it was specific to “compulsory
retirement”, of employees of the Electricity Board. An employee was to
be compulsory retired after attaining the age of 58 years, subject to certain
provisions. This Court held that essentially the Regulations, made under the
Electricity Supply Act are of a general nature, and the Standing Orders are
the special rules. Therefore, the special rules would override the general.
Nevertheless, since there is also an exclusion clause under Section 13B of
the 1946 Act and there was indeed a notification under the said Act which
we have already referred above, it will be the regulations made under the
1948 Act which will be applicable, but only so far as it relates to compulsory
retirement, since the notification dated, 28th May, 1970 was only limited to
compulsory retirement. It has been held as under:
       “17. … In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put
       upon the language of Section 13-B is that a rule or regulation, if notified
       by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent
       that the rule or regulation covers the field. To that extent and to that
    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                         1063
          [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

extent only ‘nothing in the Act shall apply’. To understand Section 13-B
in any other manner will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results.
For instance, most of the Service Rules and Regulations expressly
mentioned in Section 13-B do not deal with a large number of the
matters enumerated in the schedule such as ‘Manner of intimating
to workmen periods and hour of work, holidays, pay-days and wage
rates’, ‘shift working’, ‘Attendance and late coming”, ‘conditions of,
procedure in applying for, and the authority which may grant leave
and holidays’, ‘Closing and reopening of sections of the industrial
establishments and temporary stoppages of work and the rights and
liabilities of the employer and workmen arising therefrom, etc. To
exclude the applicability of Standing Orders relating to all these
matters became the Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the
Civil Services Control, Classification and Appeal Rules provide for a
few matters like ‘Classification of workmen’ or ‘suspension or dismissal
for misconduct’ would be to reverse the processes of history, apart
from leading to unjust and untoward results. It will place workmen
once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so benign and
it will certainly promote industrial strife. We have indicated what
according to us is the proper construction of Section 13-B. That is
the only construction which gives meaning and sense to Section 13-B
and that is a construction which can legitimately be said to conform
to the Directive Principles of State Policy proclaimed in Articles 42
and 43 of the Constitution.”
It, then, went on to hold as further:
“18. We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in
the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with
respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations
are either notified by the Government under Section 13-B or certified
by the Certifying Officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which
regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor
or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act shall continue to apply.
1064          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to
       age of superannuation having been duly notified by the Government,
       the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact that it is a
       matter which could be the subject-matter of Standing Orders under
       the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.”
     Relying upon the aforesaid decision, the Delhi High Court in Air
India v. Union of India, ILR (1991) 1 Del 88 held that in order to make
the exclusion clause (under Section 13B of the 1946 Act) applicable a
notification is required to be made and that too by none other than the
Government of India.
      The logical conclusion therefore would be that CCA Rules, 1965
are the general Rules whereas Standing Orders are the Special Rules,
and therefore the Standing Orders would override the CCA Rules, 1965.
Moreover, the Standing Orders cover a wide area of activities of a workman
and are workmen specific yet in view of Section 13B of 1946 Act a specific
notification can be made applying CCA Rules, 1965 to that specific aspect.
But a notification is necessary. In view of the Hari Shankar Jain (supra),
this can be the only interpretation of Section 13B of the 1946 Act.
      18. The NFC was established much after the 1946 Act and the CCA
Rules, 1965 had come into force. Yet a conscious decision was taken by
the management of NFC to submit draft Standing Orders under Section 3
of the 1946 Act, which was duly certified by the certifying authority and
then notified which then became applicable since then. Once the standing
orders have been notified and have come into force, there is a procedure
prescribed under the 1946 Act for modifying or withdrawing such a standing
order, which we have stated in the preceding paragraphs. There is nothing
or record to show that after the standing orders, which stood certified in
the year 1973 and were in force, any subsequent modification was made
or any order passed curtailing these standing orders, under Section 10 of
the 1946 Act.
       Nothing has also been placed on record to suggest that a notification
under Section 13B of the 1946 Act was made by Government of India,
making its intentions clear that from henceforth for such and such matters,
it will be the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable and not the standing
orders. In the absence of such notification, we do not find any fault with
          UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. K. SURI BABU                         1065
                [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which has held that it will be
the standing orders and not the CCA Rules, 1965 which will be applicable.
     19. This Court in the case of Hari Shankar Jain (supra)4 held that
Standing Orders have the nature of Special Rules. It is a settled principle
of law that only in those cases, where the Special Rules fail to lay down
provisions for dealing with certain subjects, can the General Rules be
pressed into service. The CCA Rules are General Rules which apply to
all Government Servants. When the Standing Orders for the Department
have clearly laid down a procedure to be followed in cases of Disciplinary
proceedings under Order Nos. 38, 39 & 40, there is no reason for the
Department to initiate the said proceedings under the CCA Rules.
      20. Any modification sought to be made to the service conditions of
the respondent can only be done as per the procedure which is given under
Section 10 of the Standing Orders Act, 1946. This Court in the case of Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Petroleum Coal Labour Union &
Ors. (2015) 6 SCC 494 was deciding the validity of a policy decision taken
by ONGC to appoint CISF personnel to security posts. The temporary
workmen who were appointed on the said posts were opposing this decision
and it was their contention that their services should be regularised instead.
This Court observed that the temporary workmen who had completed 240
days in 12 months had acquired a right to be regularised under Clause 2(ii)
of the ‘Certified Standing Orders for Contingent Employees of the Oil and
Natural Gas Commission’. Further, that any modification to the service
conditions of the temporary workmen could only be done as per Section 10
of the 1946 Act. Replying upon the seminal decision of this Court in Hari
Shankar Jain (supra), it reads as under :-
     “For the Corporation to implement such a provision which affects
     the service conditions of its employees, it is necessary for the
     Corporation to first modify the Certified Standing Orders by following
     the procedure provided under Section 10 of the Industrial Employment
     (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as the same is a special enactment and
     therefore, prevails over the provisions under the ONGC Act and the
     Recruitment Rules. The Corporation undisputedly has not made any


4   Paragraph No. 10
1066           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2023] 15 S.C.R.


       such modification to its Certified Standing Orders by following the
       procedure for modification of conditions of service as per Section 10
       of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.”
     As we have already stated above NFC, Hyderabad has failed to place
on record any modification made under Section 10 of the 1946 Act to
show that the Standing Orders certified for NFC-Hyderabad would not be
applicable to the respondent.
      Service conditions of respondents will be governed by the ‘Standing
Orders’ as far as the disciplinary proceedings are concerned. ‘Standing
Orders’ being in the nature of special Rules will override any other general
Rule including CCA Rules, 1965. Further, in view of the law laid down in
Hari Shankar Jain (supra) the ‘Standing Order’ will in any case prevail
until modified under Section 10 of the 1946 Act, which has not been done.
This position has been reiterated by this Cout in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited (supra) where conditions of appointment were held to
be void and inapplicable to a worker if it makes any other Rule applicable
in suppression of the ‘Standing Orders’ without there being a modification
under Section 10 of the Standing Orders.
     21. In view of our findings given above, we dismiss these appeals and
uphold the order dated 14.10.2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature,
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The order of status quo granted by this Court
on 02.03.2009 is hereby vacated.
       No orders as to cost.


Headnotes prepared by:                                      Appeals dismissed.
Divya Pandey