Holding

The Supreme Court declined to transfer the pending writ petitions, holding that the possibility of divergent views is not a sufficient ground and that the matters should be decided by the respective jurisdictional High Courts.

Summary

The Union of India moved several transfer petitions under Article 139A of the Constitution seeking to shift more than 140 writ petitions, pending in 18 High Courts, that challenge the constitutional validity of the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 2015. The petitions argued that the amendments – which raised salary thresholds and linked bonus calculations to minimum wages – were retrospective and could lead to conflicting decisions across courts. Respondents opposed the transfer, contending that the Supreme Court should not become a forum of first instance and that the appropriate Government's role varies by state, affecting the application of the law. The Court held that there is no hard‑and‑fast rule for such transfers; the mere possibility of divergent judgments is not a sufficient ground, and each High Court should decide the matters in light of its own factual context and the relevant government’s policy. Consequently, the transfer petitions were dismissed and all interim stay orders vacated, with directions for the respective High Courts to dispose of the cases expeditiously.

Issues considered

The appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction under Article 139A to transfer multiple writ petitions challenging the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 2015, from various High Courts to the Supreme Court.
Whether the likelihood of divergent judgments among High Courts constitutes a sufficient ground for transfer.
Whether the petitions should be consolidated and transferred to a single High Court for uniformity.
The impact of the amendments' retrospective effect and the linkage of bonus calculation to minimum wages on the need for a single forum.
The role of the "appropriate Government" under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, in determining the applicability of the amended provisions.

Legislation cited

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017s. Section 16(2)(c)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Minimum Wages Act, 1948s. Section 2(g)
Payment of Bonus Act, 1965s. Section 12, s. Section 2(13), s. Section 36
Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 2015

Subjects

Article 139Atransfer of casesPayment of Bonus Actconstitutional validityjurisdictionHigh Courtretrospective legislationminimum wagesappropriate governmentdivergent judgments

Judgment

[2022] 6 S.C.R. 905 905

UNION OF INDIA ETC. A
v.
THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN
INDIA ETC. & ORS.
(Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 884-895 of 2016) B
JULY 11, 2022
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
Constitution of India: Art. 139A – Transfer of certain matters
– Matters pertaining to challenge to the Payment of Bonus
C
(Amendment) Act, 2015 in different High Courts – Transfer of the
matters sought in this Court or to one High Court – Held: As regards,
the decision to transfer to this Court or to one High Court no hard
and fast rule or any structured formula is provided nor appears
desirable – Comprehensive view of all the facts and relevant
surrounding factors is the best to exercise jurisdiction u/Art. 139A D
– In the scheme of the Act of 1965 and in relation to the questioned
amendments, variance in some of the questions and some of the
factual aspects is likely to occur because of the innate role of the
appropriate Government-Central Government or State Government
– Likelihood of divergence of views, looking to the framework of
E
the statute itself, cannot be a ground for transfer – Equally, there
appears no reason to transfer the matters to any one High Court;
rather it appears just and proper that the petitions in the
jurisdictional High Courts are decided with reference to their own
factual background and the law applicable – Thus, prayer to
transfer the pending writ petitions from the respective High Courts F
not called for, and is rejected and all the interim stay orders are
vacated – Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 – Payment of Bonus
(Amendment) Act, 2015.
Union of India v. M/s Cummins Technologies India Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors. Etc. Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 1481- G
1482 of 2021; Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation
Limited and Anr. (2007) 15 SCC 649; Lunawat
Construction Company v. Union of India & Anr. (2019)
5 SCC 467 – referred to.
H
905
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A Case Law Reference
(2007) 15 SCC 649 referred to Para 7.2
(2019) 5 SCC 467 referred to Para 8
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition (Civil)
B Nos. 884-895 of 2016.
Petition under Article 139A (1) of the Constitution of India, 1950,
read with Rule XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 for transfer of
Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.3025/2016 (C), 5272/2016 (L-MW), 5311/2016,
5944-5945/2016 (L-RES), 6658/2016, 6098/2016, 8995/2016, 3121 (W)/
C 2016, 1765/2016, 2150/2016 and 6958/2016.
With
Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 683 of 2019, 1456-1461, 1473-1531
Of 2016, 590-598, 480-481, 760-789, 599-604, 2127-2135, 1263-1269,
1253-1255, 2425 Of 2017, 659, 856 1237, 1954 Of 2018 and 218 of 2019
D
K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Ms. Vimla Sinha, S. K. Gupta, Shailesh
Madiyal, Saurabh Mishra, Digvijay Dam, Raghav Sharma, Amrish Kumar,
Gurmeet Singh Makker, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the Petitioners.
Abhay Prakash Sahay, AAG, Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, Abhijit
Chatterjee, Gopal Shankaranarayanan, K. Kasturi, Sr. Advs., Anant
E Kumar, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Ms. Sweta Sand, Siddharth Batra,
Ms. Archna Yadav, Ms. Shivani Chawla, Chinmay Dubey, Vipin Kumar
Jai, Rajiv Tyagi, Rohit Gupta, Rahul Tyagi, Gulshan Chawla, Sanjay Yadav,
Lokesh Kumar Tyagi, Ms. Smriti Kumari, Ashiesh Kumar, Pankaj Bhagat,
Dhruv Wahi, Paras Joshi, Manish Kumar Vikkey, Pankaj Kumar Mishra,
F Arun K. Sinha, E. R. Kumar, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Abhiram Naik,
Ms. Tanya Chaudhary, Ms. Disha Sachdeva, Sameer Parekh, M/s Parekh
& Co., S. Sukumaran, Anand Sukumar, Bhupesh Pathak, Ms. Meera
Mathur, Rajesh Kumar Gautam, Anant Gautam, Nipun Sharma, Ravi
Solanki, M/s Mitter & Mitter Co., Arjun Garg, Sarvesh Singh, Samir Ali
Khan, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, Akshay Amritanshu, Kartikey Singh,
G Ashutosh Jain, Ankit Kumar Lal, Sachin Gupta, Mrs. Rachna Gupta,
Sunny Choudhary, Nikhil Jain, Arup Banerjee, Gagan Gupta, Ashok
Kumar Jain, Pankaj Jain, Mrs. Meenakshi Jain, Bijoy Kumar Jain, Rajesh
Kandari, Sachin Daga, Vikrant Singh Bais, Sridhar Potaraju, Ms. Shiwani
Tushir, Aayush, Rajat Jariwal, S. Abhishek Iyer, Ms. Aayushi Khurana,
H M/s Khaitan & Co., Ankit Goel, Vineet Ranjan, Santanam Swaminadhan,
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 907
OF SOUTHERN INDIA

Hirendranath, Prakruti Golechha, Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Mrs. Aarthi A
Rajan, Prakash Ranjan Nayak, K. K. Mani, Ms. T. Archana, R. Anand
Padmanabhan, Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Sohan Singh Rana, Mrs. Bindra
Rana, Nihit Nagpal, Anuj Jhawar, M/s S. S. Rana & Co., Tuhin,
Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. Natasha Sahrawat, Ms. Neha Khandelwal,
Shreyas Maheshwari, M/s Karanjawala & Co., Abhishek Anand Rai,
B
Samar Vijay Singh, Ayush Sharma, Satish Kumar, Kaushik Choudhury,
Gopal Jha, Rohit K. Singh Advs. for the Respondents.
The Order of the Court was passed by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
1. By way of these petitions under Article 139A(1) read with C
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the petitioners, led by the
Union of India, have prayed for transfer of various writ petitions, pending
before different High Courts challenging the constitutional validity of the
Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 2015 [being Act No. 6 of 2016]1,
to this Court. D
2. As per the record, though the first set of transfer petitions in
this batch, being T.P.(C) Nos. 884-895 of 2016, was entertained on
01.07.2016 by issuing notices but, in the next set of petitions, being T.P.(C)
Nos. 1456-1461 of 2016, while issuing notices on 26.09.2016, further
proceedings in the related writ petitions pending before the Allahabad E
High Court were stayed. Thereafter, from time to time and until
06.08.2018, other transfer petitions comprising this batch were entertained
and similar interim orders were passed, staying further proceedings in
the writ petitions pending before the respective High Courts. In the next
two matters, being T.P.(C) No. 1954 of 2018 and T.P.(C) No. 218 of
2019, notices were issued respectively on 26.11.2018 and 08.02.2019 F
but without any specific stay order. Thereafter, on 08.04.2019, T.P.(C)
No. 683 of 2019 was entertained and while issuing notices, again, further
proceedings in the subject writ petition before the High Court concerned
were stayed.
3. It may be noticed that in T.P.(C) Nos. 1490-1491 of 2016, the G
respondent No. 1 Tata Motors Ltd. has stated no objection to the transfer
of its case to this Court, being W.P.(C) Nos. 11112-13 of 2016 pending

1
Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Amendment Act of 2015’. H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A before the High Court of Karnataka. Similarly, in T.P.(C) Nos. 590-598
of 2017, one of the respondents, the State of Madhya Pradesh, has stated
no objection if the subject writ petition pending before the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh is transferred to this Court. Similar has been the stand
of the State of Madhya Pradesh in T.P.(C) Nos. 760-789 of 2017 and of
the State of Bihar in T.P.(C) No. 856 of 2018. The State of Himachal
B
Pradesh has also not stated any specific objection in relation to the prayer
for transfer in T.P.(C) No. 1237 of 2018. Similarly, the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 in T.P.(C) Nos. 885-886 of 2016, being Karnataka Employers
Association and Sai Security Printers Pvt. Ltd., have also stated no
objection if W.P.(C) No. 5311 of 2016 pending before the High Court of
C Karnataka is transferred to this Court. However, several of the other
respondents in this batch of matters have strongly opposed the prayer
for transfer of the respective writ petitions to this Court on various
grounds, as shall be noticed a little later.
4. Shorn of unnecessary details, the aspects relevant for the present
D purpose are as follows:
4.1. By the said Amendment Act of 2015, two major changes
were introduced to the Payment of Bonus Act, 19652: one being the
amendment of clause (13) of Section 2, raising the salary limit from
Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 21,000/- per month for the purpose of coverage
E under the Act; and the other being raising the wage ceiling for calculating
the bonus under Section 12 from Rs. 3,500/- to Rs. 7,000/- per month or
the minimum wages for the scheduled employment as fixed by the
appropriate Government, whichever be the higher. Further, by way of
Explanation to Section 12, it was clarified that the expression “scheduled
F employment” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (g)
of Section 2 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. These amendments
were given retrospective effect in Section 1 of the Amendment Act of
2015 by providing that it shall be deemed to have come into force on
01.04.2014.

G 4.2. The said amended provisions, i.e., clause (13) of Section 2 as
also Section 12 of the Act of 1965, with necessary explanatory notes,
are extracted as under: -

2
H Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act of 1965’ or simply as ‘the Act’.
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 909
OF SOUTHERN INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise A
requires,-
*** *** ***
(13) “employee” means any person (other than an apprentice)
employed on a salary or wage not exceeding [twenty-one thousand
rupees]3 per mensem in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled B
manual, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or
clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment
be express or implied;”
“12. Calculation of bonus with respect to certain
employees.—Where the salary or wage of an employee exceeds C
[seven thousand rupees or the minimum wage for the scheduled
employment, as fixed by the appropriate Government, whichever
is higher]4 per mensem, the bonus payable to such employee under
section 10 or, as the case may be, under section 11, shall be
calculated as if his salary or wage were [seven thousand rupees D
or the minimum wage for the scheduled employment, as fixed by
the appropriate Government, whichever is higher]5 per mensem.
[Explanation. —For the purposes of this section, the expression
“scheduled employment” shall have the same meaning as assigned
to it in clause (g) of section 2 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.]6" E
4.3. The said amendments have been challenged in various writ
petitions pending before different High Courts mainly on two counts:
first, against the requirement of payment of bonus as per the amended
provisions with retrospective effect from the year 2014-15; and secondly,
against the validity of linkage to the minimum wages in regard to the F
calculation of bonus.
4.4. As per the facts projected before us, the petitions filed in
various High Courts in challenge to the aforesaid Amendment Act of
2015 have been entertained with different interim orders in some of the
petitions inasmuch as some of the High Courts have directed that the
G
amendment shall take effect only from the financial year 2015-16
3
Substituted for “ten thousand rupees” by Act 6 of 2016, S. 2 (w.r.e.f. 01.04.2014).
4
Substituted for “three thousand and five hundred rupees” by Act 6 of 2016, S. 3(i)
(w.r.e.f. 01-04-2014).
5
Same as footnote 4 ibid.
6
Inserted by Act 6 of 2016, S. 3(ii) (w.r.e.f. 01-04-2014). H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A whereas one High Court has directed to implement the same from the
financial year 2016-17. Another High Court has directed that no coercive
action shall be taken against the writ petitioners.
4.5. As noticed, in the wake of challenge to the Amendment Act
of 2015 in different High Courts; and the respective High Courts having
B passed different interim orders, the petitioners led by the Union of India
seek transfer of all the pending writ petitions to this Court. Some of the
respondents in these petitions have filed their reply, either opposing or
supporting these petitions, as per their respective stands.
5. Learned counsel for the parties have also filed their respective
C written submissions and the learned Additional Solicitor General has, in
terms of our order dated 22.11.2021, filed a composite convenience
compilation of the respective submissions, projecting divergent viewpoints.
5.1. We have heard Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the petitioners; and Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee, Mr. K. Kasturi,
D Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal and Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior
counsel as also Mr. Rajiv Tyagi and Mr. R. Anand Padmanabhan, learned
counsel for the respective respondents at length.
5.2. Having regard to the short question before us in this batch of
transfer petitions, it does not appear necessary to expand or elongate
E this order with reference to a wide variety of submissions made before
us; suffice it would be to take note of the principal and material submissions
in support of the prayer for transfer of the writ petitions to this Court, or
in opposition thereto, or in support of the alternative proposition of
transferring the writ petitions to one High Court.

F 6. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, the learned ASG has pointed out that the
said issues, relating to the retrospective operation of the amended
provisions and linkage of calculation of bonus with minimum wages for
the scheduled employment, are forming the subject-matter of more than
140 writ petitions filed across the country in as many as 18 High Courts.
The learned ASG would submit that with large number of petitions involving
G similar and akin issues being taken up in different High Courts, there is
every likelihood of conflicting views being expressed by different High
Courts, which may lead to an undesirable situation. In the given
circumstances, according to the learned ASG, withdrawing all such writ
petitions to this Court for analogous hearing would be in the best interest
of the parties as also for maintaining consistency in operation of the
H
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 911
OF SOUTHERN INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

statute. As regards a line of submissions by some of the parties that, if at A
all, the matters may be transferred to one High Court, the learned ASG
has submitted that such a course may not serve the best interest of the
parties; and would cause hardship to the parties whose petitions are
pending before other High Courts and who may not be able to effectively
contest the matter before any High Court other than their jurisdictional
B
High Court.
7. Per contra, the learned senior counsel Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee
appearing for contesting respondents, including in T.P.(C) No. 786 of
2017, has submitted that if the contention regarding the possibility of
conflicting decisions by different High Courts is accepted, it would
practically mean that every challenge to the validity of a central statute C
shall have to be decided by this Court, which is not the mandate and
framework of the constitutional scheme. According to the learned
counsel, mere possibility of divergence of views or interpretations cannot
be a ground for transfer of all the proceedings to this Court. The learned
counsel has strongly relied upon a 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court D
in the case of Union of India v. M/s Cummins Technologies India
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Etc.: Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 1481-1482 of
2021, decided on 20.09.2021, to submit that in the said case, the
prayer for transfer was declined by this Court even though it was argued
on behalf of the petitioner-Union of India that the same issue pending in
various High Courts was having implications on a large number of matters E
and also ramifications of huge amount payable under a central statute.
7.1. It has also been submitted that the Union of India, having a
huge establishment of its law officers and legal advisors will not face
any difficulty in conducting the writ petitions in different High Courts
whereas transfer of writ petitions to this Court may cause difficulties to F
various litigants located at different places.
7.2. The learned senior counsel has also argued that the proposition
of consolidation of all the writ petitions before one High Court also
deserves not to be accepted because no one High Court would be
convenient to the writ petitioners who have filed their respective petitions G
in their jurisdictional High Courts. The learned counsel, however, submitted
in the alternative that if at all the petitions are to be consolidated before
one High Court, the same may be transferred for analogous hearing
before the Calcutta High Court, where the related writ petitions have
already appeared in the cause list for hearing and disposal. The learned H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A counsel has referred to the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants
of India v. Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Limited
and Anr.: (2007) 15 SCC 649 wherein this Court adopted the course
of transferring various writ petitions pending before different High Courts,
and involving similar issues relating to the constitutional validity of Para
33 of Accounting Standards 22 framed by the Institute of Chartered
B
Accountants of India, to the Calcutta High Court, where the petitions
were ready for hearing.
8. Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the contesting respondents in T.P.(C) No. 1954 of 2018 has similarly
opposed the prayer for transfer with the additional submission that in the
C event of transfer of matters to this Court, the parties will lose their right
of appeal against the final judgment of the High Court. Apart from the
decision in M/s Cummins Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the
learned counsel has also referred to the decision of this Court in Lunawat
Construction Company v. Union of India & Anr.: (2019) 5 SCC
D 467.
9. Yet further, similar nature submissions have been made by Mr.
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, the learned senior counsel for the respondent
Nos. 1 and 3, being Bowreah Jute Mills Private Limited and Indian Jute
Mills Association in T.P.(C) No. 892 of 2016. It has additionally been
E submitted that the issues being adjudicated by the Calcutta High Court
in the petition filed by them are not merely confined to the broader issues
mentioned in the transfer petitions but there are other factual issues,
specific and unique to their case, which cannot be clubbed together with
any other case. Further detailed submissions have been made as regards
the status of these contesting respondents and the operation of law as
F regards the jute industry; and the impact of impugned amendments on
this industry has also been highlighted which need not be dilated in this
order. However, the emphasis in these submissions had been that the
writ petition of these respondents, being of its own peculiar nature,
deserves not to be transferred.
G 10. As indicated hereinbefore, more or less similar submissions
have been made by the learned senior counsel Mr. K. Kasturi as also by
the other learned counsel for the respondents, which are not being
repeated for the sake of brevity. We may, however, take note of an
additional viewpoint projected by Mr. Rajiv Tyagi, learned counsel for
H the contesting respondent in T.P.(C) No. 683 of 2019 that with the
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 913
OF SOUTHERN INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

linkage of qualifying wages to minimum wages in terms of the amended A
Section 12, the wages prescribed by different States shall have different
implications and in this view of the matter too, it would be appropriate if
the pending writ petitions are considered by the respective High Courts
in light of the particular provisions operating in each State relating to
minimum wages rather than bringing all such cases before this Court as
B
a Court of first instance.
11. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
and having examined the record, even when we agree with the
submissions that the writ petitions related with this batch of matters
might carry substantially the same questions of law concerning the
constitutional validity of the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 2015 C
but, for a variety of other relevant reasons, we are disinclined to transfer
these matters in this Court or even to one High Court.
12. In the first place, we feel that in the scheme of the Act of
1965 and in relation to the questioned amendments, variance in some of
the questions and some of the factual aspects is likely to occur because D
of the innate role of the appropriate Government in the ultimate calculation
of bonus with respect to certain employees in terms of the amended
Section 12 of the Act of 1965; and such an appropriate Government
may be the Central Government or may be the Government of the
particular State in terms of the definition contained in clause (5) of Section E
2 of the Act of 1965 that reads as under:-
“(5) “appropriate Government” means—
(i) in relation to an establishment in respect of which the
appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (14 of 1947), is the Central Government, the Central F
Government;
(ii) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of
the State in which that other establishment is situate;”
12.1. Thus, when the wage ceiling in terms of the amended Section
G
12 has its correlation also with the minimum wages for the scheduled
employment as fixed by the appropriate Government, the decision on
the questions being raised in the respective writ petitions, may have to
be addressed with reference to the relevant decision of the appropriate
Government, depending on the nature of establishment; and that may
include the particular State Government too. H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A 12.2. Moreover, the role of the appropriate Government even as
regards the power of exemption is seen in Section 36 of the Act of 1965
and in this view of the matter too, in our view, the decision of individual
writ petitions by the jurisdictional High Courts shall be in the best interest
of the respective parties. Section 36 of the Act of 1965 reads as under:-
B “36. Power of exemption. – If the appropriate Government,
having regard to the financial position and other relevant
circumstances of any establishment or class of establishments, is
of opinion that it will not be in public interest to apply all or any of
the provisions of this Act thereto, it may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, exempt for such period as may be specified therein
C and subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, such
establishment or class of establishments from all or any of the
provisions of this Act.”
13. Apart from the above, having regard to the subject-matter
and the variety of questions likely to arise in the matter, it does appear
D appropriate to have the benefit of the views of the jurisdictional High
Courts before the questions of law are taken up for consideration in this
Court, if occasion so arises; and such a course appears better serving
the cause of justice, including protecting the right of seeking judicial
review after the decision of the Court of first instance.
E 13.1. In Lunawat Construction Company (supra), this Court
considered it proper to have the benefit of findings of the High Court in
relation to the subject-matter and hence, conversely sent the writ petitions
pending in this Court to the High Court with other transferred cases
while observing as under:-
F “By filing Writ Petition (C) No. 96 of 2011 under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India, the petitioner therein has challenged the
constitutional validity of the Ancient Monuments and
Archaeological Sites and Remains (Amendment and Validation)
Act, 2010 (Annexure P-15). In connected writ petition and the
G transferred case, the petitioners have claimed similar reliefs, which
are claimed in the lead Writ Petition No. 96 of 2011.
2. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of the record of the case, we deem it just and proper to
send these writ petitions and the transferred case to the High
Court of Bombay for their disposal on merits in accordance with
H
law.
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 915
OF SOUTHERN INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

3. In our view, no prejudice is likely to cause to the parties, if A
these writ petitions and the transferred case are sent to the High
Court for their hearing on merits of the controversy instead of
deciding the issue by this Court in the first instance. On the other
hand, we are of the view that once the High Court renders its
decision, this Court will have the benefit of the findings of the
B
High Court, if occasion arises.
4. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the writ petitions
and the transferred case, WPs (C) Nos. 96 of 2011, 36 of 2012
and TC (C) No. 30 of 2010 are sent to the High Court for their
disposal on merits in accordance with law. We request the High
Court to decide the writ petitions expeditiously.” C

14. Apart from the above, it is noticeable from the latest decision
of the 3-Judge Bench in M/s Cummins Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) that even when the cases were indicated to be pending in
different High Courts involving similar issues concerning constitutional
validity of Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, D
2017 and it was submitted that the issues might have implication on a
number of matters pending across the country with ramification of huge
amount payable under the said Act, this Court expressed disinclination
to entertain the transfer petitions for the reason that various High Courts
were already seized of the matter and it was also noticed that before E
one High Court, the pleadings had been exchanged. Therefore, while
declining the prayer for transfer, this Court expected expeditious disposal
of the pending petitions before the respective High Courts. The order so
passed by this Court on 20.09.2021 reads as under: -
“The Court is convened through Video Conferencing. F
Heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General,
Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for
the Union of India, learned counsel appearing for Respondent
No. 1, who is on caveat, and carefully perused the record.
These transfer petitions have been filed by the Union of G
India under Article 139A read with Article 142 of the Constitution
of India seeking transfer of two Writ Petitions to this Court, i.e.,
(i) Writ Petition No. 9443/2020 titled ‘M/s. Cummins Technologies
vs Union of India’ pending before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Indore and (ii) Writ Petition No. 7767/2020 titled
H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.

A ‘M/s. SPL Infrastructure Private Limited v. Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax, Narasannapeta and Ors.’ pending
before the High Court of Andhra Prdesh at Amaravati. In both
these Writ Petitions, the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c)
of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 has been
challenged.
B
In addition to the aforementioned two Writ Petitions, we
are informed that the constitutional validity of Section 16(2)(c)
of the CGST Act has been challenged in 34 other writ petitions,
which are stated to be pending across nine High Courts in the
country.
C
According to learned Solicitor General, since the issue has
implication on a number of matters pending across the country
and also ramifications of huge amounts payable under the said
Act, it would be appropriate if this Court hears all the matters.

D Even though learned Solicitor General insisted for transfer
of cases pending before various High Courts to this Court, we are
not inclined to entertain these transfer petitions, for the reason
that various High Courts are already seized of the matters. In
particular, in the matter before the High Court of M.P., Indore
Bench, counter affidavit is already stated to have been filed.
E
In view of the above, we request the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench to dispose of the Writ Petition
No.9443/2020, pending adjudication before it, as early as possible
and preferably within a period of two months’ time from the date
of communication of this Order.
F
Parties are at liberty to advance their respective arguments
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench.
So far as other Writ Petitions, which are pending before
various High Courts, it is open for the parties to bring this Order
to the notice of the concerned High Courts and seek expeditious
G
disposal of their cases.
The Transfer Petitions are disposed of in the afore-stated
terms.
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.”
H
UNION OF INDIA v. THE UNITED PLANTERS ASSOCIATION 917
OF SOUTHERN INDIA [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

15. We need not multiply the reference to various other orders A
passed by this Court relating to the prayer for transfer because, ultimately,
the decision to transfer or not, to this Court or to one High Court, has
been taken by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 139A
of the Constitution of India with reference to the given set of facts and
circumstances. No hard and fast rule or any structured formula is
B
provided nor appears desirable; a comprehensive view of all the facts
and relevant surrounding factors is the best guiding light for exercise of
this jurisdiction under Article 139A of the Constitution of India.
16. In the present set of facts and circumstances, for what has
been noticed and discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that
transfer of the pending writ petitions from the respective High Courts is C
not called for. The likelihood of divergence of views, looking to the
framework of the statute itself, cannot be a ground for transfer. Equally,
there appears no reason to transfer the matters to any one High Court;
rather it appears just and proper that the petitions in the jurisdictional
High Courts are decided with reference to their own factual background D
and the law applicable. Hence, we do not consider it necessary to deal
with the cases cited in support of the proposition for transfer of the
matters to any one High Court, like the decision in the case of Institute
of Chartered Accountants of India (supra).
17. Accordingly, the prayer for transfer of the subject petitions is E
declined and all the interim stay orders are vacated while providing that
it shall be permissible for the parties to request the respective High Courts
for expeditious hearing and disposal of the pending writ petitions. For
that matter, we would also request the respective High Courts to proceed
with the matters expeditiously, while assigning them reasonable priority.
F

Nidhi Jain Petitions disposed of.

G

H