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Supreme Court of India

UMASHANKAR YADAV & ANR.versusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY & ANR.

Citation
2025 INSC 653
Decided
8 May 2025
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the charge‑sheet does not disclose the ingredients of offences under Sections 186 and 353 IPC, the FIR was illegally registered, and cognizance was impermissible, warranting quashment of the prosecution.

Summary

The appellants, members of a child‑rights NGO, accompanied labour officials during a raid on a brick kiln to rescue alleged bonded child labourers. A dispute arose over whether the children should be taken to the police station for interrogation or statements recorded on site, leading the officials to lodge an FIR alleging obstruction of public servants (Sec. 186 IPC) and assault on a public servant (Sec. 353 IPC). The High Court refused to quash the charges, holding that the matter involved factual disputes unsuitable for interference under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court examined whether the uncontroverted allegations in the charge‑sheet disclosed the essential ingredients of the two offences and whether the FIR and cognizance were legally valid. It found that no force or criminal intent to obstruct was shown, that the FIR was improperly registered without magistrate’s permission for a non‑cognizable offence, and that cognizance under Section 195 was impermissible. Consequently, the Court quashed the prosecution and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether the allegations in the FIR/charge‑sheet disclose the ingredients of an offence under Section 186 of the IPC.
  • Whether the allegations disclose the ingredients of an offence under Section 353 of the IPC.
  • Whether the FIR was validly registered given that Section 186 IPC is non‑cognizable and requires prior magistrate’s permission under Section 155(2) CrPC.
  • Whether cognizance of an offence under Section 186 IPC can be taken on a police report in violation of Section 195 CrPC.
  • Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the prosecution under Sections 186 and 353 IPC.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred by not quashing the prosecution against the accused under ss.186 and 353 of Indian Penal Code. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – s.186 – Whether the Chargesheet discloses the ingredients of offence was conducted by the labour officers on the tip of social workers(appellants) to verify the allegation that bonded/child labour were employed at the brick kiln, the appellant accompanied the labour officers for the raid – During inspection, a difference of opinion cropped up between the

Subjects

Obstruction of public servantUse of criminal force against public servantIngredients necessary for offenceMalicious animusPersonal vendetta

Judgment

                  [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1306 : 2025 INSC 653

                       Umashankar Yadav & Anr.
                                    v.
                         State of Uttar Pradesh,
                     Through Chief Secretary & Anr.
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 439 of 2018)
                                    08 May 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi,* JJ.]


                             Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court erred by not quashing the prosecution
       against the accused under ss.186 and 353 of Indian Penal Code.

                                     Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.186 – Whether the Chargesheet discloses
       the ingredients of offence under s.186:
       Held: A raid was conducted by the labour officers on the tip of
       social workers(appellants) to verify the allegation that bonded/child
       labour were employed at the brick kiln, the appellant accompanied
       the labour officers for the raid – During inspection, a difference of
       opinion cropped up between the labour officers and the appellants
       as to the manner in which the inspection was to be conducted –
       While the appellants wanted the workmen and children to be brought
       to the Police Station for interrogation, the members of the labour
       officers intended to record their statements at the site – The labour
       officials lodged an FIR against the appellant for obstruction of public
       function – Essential ingredients of offence under Section 186 are
       (i) Obstruction of a public servant in discharge of public functions;
       (ii) Such obstruction is done voluntarily and with the intention to prevent
       discharge of official duties – The issue cropped up due to difference
       of opinion between the appellant and labour officials, Members of the
       social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/
       children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station
       whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site – The
       endeavours of the appellant were not to impede interrogation but to
       ensure it was conducted in a more effective manner, moreover, no
       force was used to take the labourers away as per their statements –
       The FIR was a product of malice and personal vendetta against
       the appellants – Thus, ingredients of offence under Section 186 is
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              1307

                      Umashankar Yadav & Anr. v.
        State of Uttar Pradesh, Through Chief Secretary & Anr.

     not fulfilled, even assuming the ingredients under Section 186 are
     disclosed, prosecution under the said section simplicitor suffers from
     various insurmountable legal hurdles. [Paras 18, 30]

     Penal Code, 1860 – s.353 – Whether the Chargesheet discloses
     the ingredients of offence under s.353:
     Held: Essential ingredients of offence under Section 353 are (i) Use
     of assault or criminal force on a public servant during execution of
     his duty. (ii) With the intention-(a) to prevent or deter discharge of
     such duty; or (b) as a consequence of anything done or attempted
     to be done in the lawful discharge of his duty – Physical movement
     of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal
     force on a public servant. [Paras 19, 24]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.155 and 195 – Whether
     the registration of FIR and subsequent cognizance taken, is
     bad in law:
     Held: Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of
     ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR,
     prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.P.C was
     necessary to register FIR, since no such permission was obtained
     rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in
     law – Moreover, cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC
     was taken on a police report, Section 195, inter alia, provides no
     court shall take cognizance of offence under Section 186 save and
     except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant
     or his superior – Since the cognizance taken of the offence under
     section 186 on a police report/chargesheet thus it is bad in law.
     [Paras 31,32]

                              Case Law Cited
     Ashok Chaturvedi & Ors. v. Shitul H. Chanchani & Anr. (1998) 7
     SCC 698 – referred to.
     State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others [1990]
     Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; B.N. John v. State
     of U.P. & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 – relied upon.

                                 List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
1308                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                               Supreme Court Reports


                                  List of Keywords
      Obstruction of public servant; Use of criminal force against public
      servant; Ingredients necessary for offence; Malicious animus;
      Personal vendetta.

                                 Case Arising From
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
      439 of 2018
      From the Judgment and Order dated 02.07.2015 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMA No. 47278 of 2014

                               Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellants:
      Ms. Aparna Bhat, Sr. Adv. Ms. Rajkumari Banju, Ms. Madhulika
      Mohta, Ms. Karishma Maria, Gopal Krishna.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      Ajay Kumar Mishra, Sr. Adv./AG, Garvesh Kabra, Mrs. Pooja Kabra,
      Amit Singh.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

      Joymalya Bagchi, J.

1.    Appellants have assailed a cryptic order dated 02.07.2015 whereby
      the High Court refused to quash Crime No.93 of 2014 under Sections
      186 and 353 of Indian Penal Code1.
2.    Guria is a well known and reputed organization fighting against
      human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of girls/children
      in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Due to its relentless efforts a number
      of minor girls have been rescued from the clutches of traffickers.
      While the pioneering efforts of the organization received accolades
      at national and international levels, its foot soldiers i.e. the appellants
      have suffered the ignominy of being branded as “criminals” for alleged



1    For short, ‘IPC’
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      1309

                        Umashankar Yadav & Anr. v.
          State of Uttar Pradesh, Through Chief Secretary & Anr.

      overzealousness in course of a raid to rescue bonded labour/minor
      children from a brick kiln at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh.
3.    The unfortunate saga commenced when the first appellant, a Project
      Coordinator at Guria submitted an application before the District
      Magistrate, Varanasi alleging bonded/child labourers were engaged
      in a brick kiln at Varanasi and prayed that the exploited labourers
      including children be rescued. In response to the application, Deputy
      District Magistrate, Varanasi ordered Assistant Labour Commissioner
      to take necessary action.
4.    Pursuant to the directions of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, on
      06.06.2014 at 10 am, one Raja Ram Dubey2, Ram Avatar Sharma
      and Ram Lakhan Swarnkar (Labour Employment Officers), Inspector
      Ajit Kumar Singh of Anti Human Trafficking Force (AHTF) and two
      constables of Lohta Thana Varanasi proceeded to inspect the spot.
      Appellants also accompanied the team.
5.    Appellants contend they found children and labourers at the brick
      kiln who were brought to the Police Station. At that time the owner
      of the brick kiln intervened and took away the labourers. First
      appellant submitted a faxed message disclosing these facts to the
      District Magistrate.
6.    On the other hand, informant lodged a complaint at Lohta Police
      Station though no child was found working at the spot, alleging
      when his team had reached Shakti Mark Brick Kiln, appellants along
      with others forcibly put the labourers and the children in dumpers
      and took them away. Appellants did not obey the instructions of the
      joint team and did not let them record their statements before taking
      away the labourers. Thereby they obstructed and hampered their
      discharge of official duty.
7.    On his complaint, FIR came to be registered under Sections 186,
      353 and 363 IPC.
8.    On further statement of one of the labourers, namely, Om Prakash,
      Section 363 IPC was dropped. Statements of other witnesses were
      recorded and charge sheet under Sections 186 and 353 IPC came
      to be filed. Magistrate took cognizance of the chargesheet which was



2    Informant
1310                                                      [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


     assailed before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned
     order refused to quash the chargesheet holding as follows :-
          “From the perusal of the material on record and looking
          into the facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said
          that no offence is made out against the applicants. All
          the submission made at the bar relates to the disputed
          questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this
          Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. At this stage only a prima
          facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down
          by the Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of
          Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan
          Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P. Sharma,
          1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical
          Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another (Para-10)
          2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused
          cannot be considered at this stage. Moreover, the
          applicants have got a right of discharge under section 239,
          245(2) or 227/228, Cr. P.C. as the case may be through a
          proper application for the said purpose and they are free to
          take all the submissions in the said discharge application
          before the trial Court.”
9.   Above quoted paragraph shows the High Court did not advert either
     to the facts of the case or the contentions raised on behalf of the
     appellants. In a perfunctory manner it observed the issues involved
     disputed questions of fact which could not be adjudicated before
     the court under Section 482 Cr.PC. It also observed the appellants
     have right to seek discharge before the trial court.
10. However, prior to arriving at such finding it is the duty of the High
    Court to ascertain whether the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR/
    Chargesheet constitute an offence, or continuation of the proceeding
    suffers from a legal bar or is wholly vexatious and an abuse of
    process of law.
11. Summoning of an accused is a serious matter which affects liberty
    and dignity of the individual concerned. Judicial intervention under
    Section 482 Cr.PC to weed out vexatious proceedings is of pivotal
    importance in order to protect individuals from untelling harassment
    and misery and to ensure unmerited prosecutions do not crowd
    overflowing dockets of criminal courts and yield space for deserving
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              1311

                        Umashankar Yadav & Anr. v.
          State of Uttar Pradesh, Through Chief Secretary & Anr.

     cases. Faced with the agony of a lame prosecution, it is of little
     solace to a litigant to be told that inherent powers are shut out as
     he is entitled to approach the trial court and pray for discharge.
     The inherent power of the High Court to prevent abuse of process
     of court is much wider in amplitude than the discharge powers and
     cannot be whittled down on the plea of existence of such remedy3.
12. As the High Court had not adverted to the facts of the case at all
    and mechanically recorded a finding that the case did not merit
    intervention at the preliminary stage, we have ourselves undertaken
    such exercise.
13. What emerges from scanning the allegations in the chargesheet and
    statements of witnesses is that the appellants had accompanied a
    team of Labour Enforcement Officers to verify the allegation that
    bonded/child labour were employed at the brick kiln. During inspection,
    a difference of opinion cropped up between the labour officers and
    the appellants as to the manner in which the inspection was to be
    conducted. While the appellants wanted the workmen and children
    to be brought to the Police Station for interrogation, the members
    of the labour officers intended to record their statements at the site
    before taking further action.
14. In this backdrop, the appellants had put the labourers and the
    children in a Dumper and carried them away from the site before
    their statements could be recorded. Thereby, it is alleged they had
    obstructed discharge of official duties.
15. Appellants have a counter version. Even prior to lodging of FIR,
    first appellant through a faxed message had informed the District
    Magistrate that at the intervention of the brick kiln owner the labourers
    and children who had been taken to the Police Station were illegally
    released.
16. We need not detain ourselves with regard to truthfulness of the rival
    versions.
17. The moot issue is do the uncontroverted allegations as narrated in the
    chargesheet disclose the ingredients of offences under Sections 186
    and 353 IPC?



3   Ashok Chaturvedi & Ors. v. Shitul H. Chanchani & Anr. (1998) 7 SCC 698.
1312                                                       [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


18. Essential ingredients of offence under Section186 are as follows:-
     (i)    Obstruction of a public servant in discharge of public functions
     (ii)   Such obstruction is done voluntarily and with the intention to
            prevent discharge of official duties.
19. Section 353 is attracted when the following ingredients are satisfied:-
     (i)    Use of assault or criminal force on a public servant during
            execution of his duty.
     (ii)   With the intention :-
            (a)   to prevent or deter discharge of such duty; or
            (b)   as a consequence of anything done or attempted to be
                  done in the lawful discharge of his duty.
20. The words force and criminal force are defined in Sections 349 and
    356 IPC and ‘assault’ is defined in Section 351 of the said Code.
21. A person is said to use force when :
     (i)    He causes motion, change in motion or cessation of motion of
            another person by :
            (a)   use of bodily power; or
            (b)   using a substance which comes in contact of the body,
                  wearing apparel etc or with anything which affects the
                  other person’s senses; or
            (c)   inducing any animal to move or change its motion or
                  cease to move.
22. Criminal force is defined as use of force by a person in order to
    commit an offence or done with the intention that such force is to
    cause or likely to cause injury, fear and annoyance to other person.
23. Assault involves any gesture or preparation which is done with the
    intention that such gesture or preparation will cause an apprehension
    about use of criminal force. Use of criminal force or assault on a
    public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC.
24. Coming to the facts of the case, uncontroverted allegations in the
    chargesheet do not disclose use of force or holding out threatening
    gestures giving rise to an apprehension of use of force towards public
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                      1313

                      Umashankar Yadav & Anr. v.
        State of Uttar Pradesh, Through Chief Secretary & Anr.

     servant. Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to
     use of force far less criminal force on a public servant.
25. Given this situation, we can safely conclude uncontroverted
    allegations in the chargesheet do not disclose the ingredients of
    offence under Section 353 IPC.
26. This brings us to Section 186 IPC. It would be argued the appellants
    obstructed discharge of official duties by not permitting the statements
    of bonded labourers/children to be recorded before removing them
    from the site. Obstruction to a public servant must be done with
    the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his
    official duty.
27. Statements of labourers unequivocally show that no force was
    used to take them away and they were promptly released. These
    statements do not give an impression that such action was with the
    intention to impede discharge of official duty. It appears there was
    a genuine difference of opinion between the appellants and the
    officials concerned. Members of the social organization were of the
    impression that bonded labourers/children ought to be interrogated
    at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to
    interrogate them at the site.
28. It goes without saying the manner and mode of interrogation was to
    be decided by the labour officers but appellants’ endeavours were
    not to impede interrogation but to ensure it was conducted in a
    more effective manner. Such factual position denudes their action of
    the requisite mens rea, i.e. intention to obstruct official duty. When
    profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the
    case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently
    improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse
    of process of law.
29. Malicious animus of the labour officials towards the appellants is
    evident from the reports annexed to the counter affidavit. Annexure
    CA/2 is a report of the Additional Labour Commissioner, U.P to
    National Commission for Protection of Child Rights regarding the
    incident. In the report, the Additional Commissioner had gone to the
    extent of alleging the appellants had offered bribes to the labourers
    to make false statements. Such insinuations are wholly unfounded
    and not borne out from the statements recorded during investigation.
1314                                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                                Supreme Court Reports


     This hostile stance of the department fortifies our conclusion that
     registration of the criminal case was a product of malice and personal
     vendetta against the appellants.
30. Even assuming the ingredients under Section 186 are disclosed,
    prosecution under the said section simplicitor suffers from various
    insurmountable legal hurdles.
31. Firstly, Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of
    ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the
    FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC
    was necessary to register FIR.4 No such permission was obtained
    rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.
32. Secondly, cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC was taken
    on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC. Section 195, inter
    alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence under Section
    186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public
    servant or his superior. In view of the aforesaid legal bar, cognizance
    taken of the offence under section 186 on a police report/chargesheet
    is impermissible in law.
33. It would be argued as FIR was registered for both cognizable (section
    353 IPC) and non-cognizable offences (section 186), even if Section
    353 IPC is quashed, police report under Section 186 may be treated
    as ‘complaint’ in view of the Explanation to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C.
34. Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. reads as follows:-
            “2(d). complaint” means any allegation made orally or in
            writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action
            under this Code, that some person, whether known or
            unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include
            a police report.”
            Explanation.- A report made by a police officer in a case
            which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a
            non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint;
            and the police officer by whom such report is made shall
            be deemed to be the complainant.”



4   State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 [see Para 102(4)]
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                            1315

                         Umashankar Yadav & Anr. v.
           State of Uttar Pradesh, Through Chief Secretary & Anr.

     As per the explanation appended to the definition clause, a police
     report disclosing a non-cognizable offence (section 186 in the
     present case) shall be deemed to be a complaint and the police
     officer shall be deemed to be the complainant. Even then, the legal
     embargo under section 195 Cr.PC is not dispelled as the legal fiction
     deems the police officer and not the aggrieved public servant as
     the complainant.
35. Similar view has been taken in B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.5
36. For the aforesaid reasons, impugned prosecution is quashed and
    the appeal is allowed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand
    disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Gaurav Upadhyay, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)




5   2025 SCC OnLine SC 7


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