UCO BANK & ANR.versusVIJAY KUMAR HANDA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 442
- Decided
- 2 April 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ABHAY S OKA
Holding
An employee removed from service under Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement is entitled to superannuation benefits if otherwise eligible under the pension regulations, and the appellate order granting such benefits is final and cannot be overridden by the employer's regulations.
Summary
Vijay Kumar Handa, a clerk of UCO Bank, was charged with gross misconduct and dismissed from service in 1999. The appellate authority modified the penalty to removal from service with entitlement to terminal benefits, stating that removal would not disqualify future employment. The bank later challenged the award of the Labour Court and the High Court's direction to grant Handa pension, arguing that Regulation 22 of the Bank's Pension Regulations barred any pension for a removed employee. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between Clause 6(b) of the 1966 Bipartite Settlement, which allows removal with superannuation benefits, and the bank's regulations, relying on its earlier decision in S.K. Kool. It held that the appellate order granting terminal benefits is final and, for employees otherwise eligible under the pension rules, removal does not forfeit pension rights. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bank's appeal, confirming Handa's entitlement to pension.
Issues considered
- Whether an employee removed from service for gross misconduct under the Bipartite Settlement is entitled to superannuation or terminal benefits.
- Whether Regulation 22 of the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995, which provides forfeiture of pension on removal, overrides Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement.
- Whether the appellate authority's order granting terminal benefits attained finality and can be set aside by the employer.
Legislation cited
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11A, s. 18(1), s. 2(p)
- Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957s. Rule 58
- UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The appellant-Bank dismissed the respondent from the services. Whether the respondent was entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered. Headnotes† Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 Clause 19.5(c) – UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 – Respondent was serving as a Clerk in the appellant Bank – Respondent was dismissed from the services on the charges of indulging in riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour within the premises of the Bank
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 389 : 2025 INSC 442
UCO Bank & Anr.
v.
Vijay Kumar Handa
(Civil Appeal No. 5922 of 2024)
03 April 2025
[Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The appellant-Bank dismissed the respondent from the services.
Whether the respondent was entitled to receive the terminal benefits
for the period of service he had rendered.
Headnotes†
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Industrial Disputes (Central)
Rules, 1957 – Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966 – Clause
19.5(c) – UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations,
1995 – Respondent was serving as a Clerk in the appellant
Bank – Respondent was dismissed from the services on
the charges of indulging in riotous, disorderly and indecent
behaviour within the premises of the Bank – Appellate Authority
modified the penalty to the terminal benefits for the period
of service respondent had rendered – However, the Labour
Court directed respondent to be reinstated in service with 75
percent back wages and other benefits – Appellant assailed
the aforesaid award before the High Court which held that
the award passed by the Labour Court was totally unjustified
and could not be sustained – Thereafter, respondent filed writ
petition for the release of retiral benefits – The Single Judge
of the High Court held that the respondent would be entitled
to receive the terminal benefits for the period of service he
had rendered – The same was affirmed by the Division Bench
of the High Court – Correctness:
Held: A Bipartite Settlement was arrived at between the Indian Banks’
Association and the Banks’ Workmen Union on 19.10.1966 – As per
the Clause 6(b) of the said Bipartite Settlement, an employee who
is found guilty of gross misconduct may be removed from service
but would be provided with superannuation benefits which would
otherwise be due to him – Further, the penalty of removal from
* Author
390 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
service would be without disqualification from future employment – In
the instant case, the initial penalty imposed on the respondent by
the appellant was dismissal from service with immediate effect after
having been found guilty of gross misconduct as per Clause 19.5(c)
of the Bipartite Settlement – Appellate authority vide the order dated
16.02.2000 modified the penalty order dated 14.12.1999 passed
by the disciplinary authority by substituting the penalty of dismissal
from service by removal from service with terminal benefits – The
sequence of events demonstrates that the modified penalty as
imposed by the appellate authority attained finality as this appellate
order was not questioned by the appellant – Therefore, objection of
the appellant to the claim of pension by the respondent was without
any basis in as much as the appellate authority had specifically
held that respondent would be entitled to receive terminal benefits
for the period of service he had rendered – Thus, the respondent
was entitled to receive pension in view of the order passed by the
appellate authority. [Paras 17.1, 18, 19, 22]
Case Law Cited
Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool [2013] 12 SCR 783 : (2014) 2 SCC
715 – relied on.
Hardial Singh v. Bank of Baroda, 2012 SCC Online P&H 8059 –
referred to.
List of Acts
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,
1957; UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995.
List of Keywords
Service Law; Dismissal from service; Riotous; Indecent behaviour;
Gross misconduct; Terminal benefits for service rendered;
Reinstatement; Back wages; Retiral benefits; Bipartite Settlement;
Indian Banks’ Association; Banks’ Workmen Union; Superannuation
benefits; Penalty of removal from service; Claim of pension.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5922 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2017 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 1525 of 2016
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 391
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Sarfaraz Khan, Kausar Raza
Faridi, Naved Ahmed, Mirza Amir Beg, Shahbaaz Jameel, Abdul
Wahid.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Tripurari Ray, Balwant Singh Billowria, Anirudh Ray, Vivekanand
Singh, Ms. Shilpa Singh.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and
order dated 11.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) dismissing
Letters Patent Appeal No. 1525 of 2016 preferred by the appellant.
2.1. Appellant herein is the United Commercial Bank (briefly ‘the
Bank’ hereinafter).
3. By the judgment and order dated 11.01.2017, the letters patent
appeal filed by the appellant Bank against the judgment and order
of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench of
the High Court. Learned Single Judge vide the judgment and order
dated 14.03.2016 had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent
being Civil Writ Petition No. 2490 of 2014 by directing the appellant
to process the case of the respondent for pension and to release
the pensionary dues to him expeditiously.
4. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.
5. At the relevant point of time, respondent was serving as a Clerk in
the appellant Bank. A charge memo dated 12.10.1998 issued by
the disciplinary authority was served upon him, charging him with
having indulged in acts of gross misconduct within the premises
of the Gurmandi Branch, Jalandhar of the appellant Bank. As per
the allegations, on 21.09.1998, at around 05:15 PM, respondent
392 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
alongwith another employee of the same branch Shri R.N. Chopra
had assaulted Shri J.B. Bansal, an officer of the appellant Bank posted
at the Raipur-Rasulpur Branch, in the cabin of the senior manager
of the Gurmandi Branch. Officials of the branch had to intervene to
separate Shri Bansal from the respondent and Shri Chopra.
5.1. Before the respondent could file his response to the charge
memo, the disciplinary authority decided to institute an enquiry.
In this connection, Shri H.S. Saini, an officer in Scale III, was
appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Shri R.K. Kakkar, an
officer in Scale II, was appointed as the Presiding Officer vide
the notification dated 18.12.1998.
5.2. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and on conclusion
of the same submitted his enquiry report to the disciplinary
authority alongwith his covering letter dated 09.10.1999. In the
enquiry proceedings, stand of the respondent was that no such
incident of assault had taken place; instead, it was a conspiracy
hatched at the instance of the rival union to falsely implicate
the respondent and Shri Chopra. Enquiry Officer concluded that
the charges against the respondent stood proved.
5.3. On going through the enquiry report, disciplinary authority
passed an order dated 18.10.1999 holding that the charge
against the respondent of indulging in riotous, disorderly and
indecent behaviour within the premises of the Bank was proved.
Therefore, as the disciplinary authority, he proposed to impose
the penalty of dismissal from service. A copy of the enquiry
report was forwarded to the respondent with the intimation
that a personal hearing would be held on 29.10.1999 on the
question of penalty.
5.4. It appears that respondent had appeared before the disciplinary
authority for personal hearing and also filed a written submission.
He reiterated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated.
He submitted he had two small school going children besides
his unemployed wife. Therefore, he pleaded that the penalty
as proposed should not be imposed.
5.5. Disciplinary authority vide his order dated 14.12.1999 agreed
with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held that the charge
levelled against the respondent for having indulged in riotous,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 393
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa
disorderly and indecent behaviour within the premises of the
appellant Bank was proved. Respondent thus committed an
act of gross misconduct within the meaning of Clause 19.5(c)
of the Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966, as amended. He,
therefore, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on the
respondent with immediate effect.
6. Respondent preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order of
dismissal from service before the appellate authority. By order dated
16.02.2000, the appellate authority while concurring with the finding
of the disciplinary authority qua the misconduct, however modified the
penalty to one of removal from service. It was ordered that respondent
be removed from the services of the Bank with immediate effect;
however, he would be entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the
period of service he had rendered. It was clarified that removal from
service would not be a disqualification for the future employment of
the respondent.
7. On an industrial dispute being raised at the instance of the respondent,
the central government referred the same to the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jalandhar (for short ‘Labour
Court’ hereinafter). The question referred was whether the action of
the Bank in dismissing the respondent from service was legal and
just. The supplementary question was as to what relief the concerned
workman (respondent) would be entitled to and from which stage.
Labour Court after hearing the matter passed an award dated
13.02.2004 opining that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to
the gravity of the alleged misconduct by taking into consideration the
involvement of the respondent in the alleged incident. Invoking the
provisions of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (briefly,
‘the Industrial Disputes Act’ hereinafter), the Labour Court substituted
the penalty of dismissal/removal from service with the penalty of
stoppage of four increments for one year. Respondent was directed
to be reinstated in service with 75 percent back wages and other
benefits. The reference was answered accordingly. The aforesaid
award was notified by the central government on 07.03.2004.
8. Appellant assailed the aforesaid award dated 13.02.2004 before the
High Court by filing CWP No. 11806 of 2004. A learned Single Judge
of the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 25.03.2009 was
of the view that the award passed by the Labour Court was totally
394 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
unjustified and could not be sustained. Power under Section 11A of
the Industrial Disputes Act ought not to have been invoked by the
Labour Court. Punishment of removal from service with terminal
benefits as imposed on the respondent by the appellate authority
could not be said to be disproportionate. Therefore, the award dated
13.02.2004 was set aside.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single
Judge dated 25.03.2009, respondent preferred a letters patent appeal
being LPA No. 928 of 2009 before the Division Bench of the High
Court. Vide the judgment and order dated 24.02.2010, the Division
Bench agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that
power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act ought not to
have been invoked by the Labour Court. Consequently, the appeal
was dismissed.
10. Respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India before the High Court seeking a direction to the appellant
to release his retiral benefits. The same was registered as Civil
Writ Petition No. 2490 of 2014. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court vide the judgment and order dated 14.03.2016 referred to the
order of the appellate authority wherein the latter had held that the
respondent would be entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the
period of service he had rendered and thereafter allowed the said
writ petition by directing the appellant Bank to process the case of
the respondent for pension in pursuance of the option exercised by
him and to release the pensionary benefits due to him expeditiously.
11. Appellant preferred LPA No. 1525 of 2016 before the Division Bench
challenging the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge dated
14.03.2016. A Division Bench of the High Court vide the judgment
and order dated 11.01.2017 placed reliance on a decision of this
Court in Bank of Baroda Vs. S.K. Kool1 and another decision of
the High Court in Hardial Singh Vs. Bank of Baroda2 and thereafter
affirmed the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Consequently,
the letters patent appeal of the appellant was dismissed.
12. Hence the present appeal.
1 (2014) 2 SCC 715
2 2012 SCC Online P&H 8059
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 395
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa
13. This Court by order dated 03.07.2017 had issued notice and stayed
the operation and implementation of the impugned judgment and
order dated 11.01.2017. When the matter was heard on 23.04.2024,
leave was granted.
14. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that respondent
was not punished under Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement.
Therefore, the High Court was not justified in applying the case of
S.K. Kool (supra). That apart, the decision in S.K. Kool (supra) was
rendered in a different factual context. The employee in the said case
had opted for pension before the penalty of removal from service
was imposed on him. In the present case, respondent never opted
for pension. Therefore, S.K. Kool (supra) is clearly distinguishable
in so far facts and circumstances of the present case is concerned.
14.1. Learned senior counsel further submits that respondent
was not entitled to pension in as much as he did not fulfil
the requirements of pension in terms of the ninth Bipartite
Settlement dated 27.04.2010. The said settlement did not
include employees who had suffered the penalty of removal
from service as being eligible for pension.
14.2. In any view of the matter, learned senior counsel submits that a
delinquent employee who has been imposed the major penalty
of removal from service is not entitled to pension or other retiral
benefits. The charge against the respondent is very serious
and that was proved in the duly constituted enquiry. Regulation
22 of the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995
(for short ‘Regulations, 1995’ hereinafter) also does not permit
grant of pension to such delinquent employees.
14.3. In such circumstances, learned senior counsel submits that
the High Court fell in error in directing the appellant to grant
pension to the respondent. Therefore, the impugned order
should be set aside.
15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that both the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court had
correctly appreciated the facts and the law and thereafter upheld
the claim of the respondent.
15.1. Learned counsel for the respondent heavily relied upon the
decision of this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) and submits that
396 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
respondent having completed the minimum pensionable years
of service, he is entitled to the pensionary benefits.
15.2. It is further submitted that the appellate authority while
maintaining the finding of the disciplinary authority in so far
the finding of misconduct of the respondent is concerned,
however held that the respondent would be entitled to receive
the terminal benefits for the period of service he had rendered.
Appellant did not challenge this decision. On the contrary,
appellant had challenged the subsequent Labour Court award
substituting the same with a lesser penalty and directing re-
instatement in service. This challenge was sustained by the
Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court,
thus restoring the appellate order. Therefore, the appellate
order had attained finality. On the strength of the appellate
order, respondent is entitled to pension and this is what the
High Court in the subsequent round has held. Learned counsel,
therefore, submits that there is no merit in the appeal and, as
such, the appeal should be dismissed.
16. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received
the due consideration of the Court.
17. A Bipartite Settlement was arrived at between the Indian Banks’
Association and the Banks’ Workmen Union on 19.10.1966. This
settlement was arrived at under Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957. This settlement therefore has a statutory
backing and is binding on the parties. Respondent was charged
with committing an act of gross misconduct as defined in Clause
19.5(c) of the aforesaid Bipartite Settlement which was proved by
the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority. On
10.04.2002, a further settlement was arrived at between the Indian
Banks’ Association, representing the management on the one hand,
and the workmen represented by the All India Bank Employees’
Association, National Confederation of Bank employees and Indian
National Bank Employees’ Federation on the other hand. Pursuant
thereto, Clause 6(b) was inserted in the said Bipartite Settlement
providing for one of the penalties which may be imposed on a
delinquent employee found guilty of gross misconduct. Clause 6(b)
reads as follows:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 397
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa
6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may:
(a) * * * * *
(b) be removed from service with superannuation benefits
i.e. pension and/or provident fund and gratuity as would
be due otherwise under the rules or regulations prevailing
at the relevant time and without disqualification from
future employment; or
17.1. Thus, as per the aforesaid clause, an employee who is found
guilty of gross misconduct may be removed from service but
would be provided with superannuation benefits which would
otherwise be due to him. Further, the penalty of removal
from service would be without disqualification from future
employment.
18. In the instant case, the initial penalty imposed on the respondent by
the appellant was dismissal from service with immediate effect after
having been found guilty of gross misconduct as per Clause 19.5(c)
of the Bipartite Settlement. Appellate authority vide the order dated
16.02.2000 modified the penalty order dated 14.12.1999 passed
by the disciplinary authority by substituting the penalty of dismissal
from service by removal from service with terminal benefits. The
substituted penalty in terms of the appellate order dated 16.02.2000
reads as under:
Shri V.K. Handa (PFM No. 22488) is hereby removed from
the bank’s service with immediate effect. However, he will
be entitled to receive the terminal benefits for the period
of service he has rendered. Removal from service will not
be a disqualification for his future employment.
19. We have already seen that respondent had raised an industrial
dispute which culminated in an award dated 13.02.2004. As per this
award, Labour Court had invoked the provisions of Section 11A of
the Industrial Disputes Act and substituted the penalty of removal
from service with terminal benefits by the penalty of stoppage of
four increments for one year with further direction for reinstatement
in service with 75 percent back wages. This award of the Labour
Court failed to stand judicial scrutiny as learned Single Judge of the
High Court set aside the same which decision was affirmed by the
Division Bench in letters patent appeal. This sequence of events
398 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
demonstrates that the modified penalty as imposed by the appellate
authority attained finality as this appellate order was not questioned
by the appellant.
20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant in the course of her
submissions placed reliance on Regulation 22 of the Regulations,
1995. Regulation 22(1) of the aforesaid regulations reads thus:
22. Forfeiture of service.-(1) Resignation or dismissal or
removal or termination of an employee from the service
of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service
and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.
20.1. According to her, in view of Regulation 22, the respondent
would not be entitled to pension.
21. Interplay of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement and Regulation
22 of the Regulations, 1995 was examined by this Court in S.K.
Kool (supra) and after due consideration answered the same in the
following manner:
13. …….From a plain reading of the aforesaid Regulation,
it is evident that removal of an employee shall entail
forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently such
an employee shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. If we
accept this submission, no employee removed from service
in any event would be entitled for pensionary benefits.
But the fact of the matter is that the Bipartite Settlement
provides for removal from service with pensionary benefits
“as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulations
prevailing at the relevant time”. The consequence of this
construction would be that the words quoted above shall
become a dead letter. Such a construction has to be
avoided.
14. The Regulations do not entitle every employee
to pensionary benefits. Its application and eligibility is
provided under Chapter II of the Regulations whereas
Chapter IV deals with qualifying service. An employee
who has rendered a minimum of ten years of service
and fulfils other conditions only can qualify for pension
in terms of Regulation 14 of the Regulations. Therefore,
the expression “as would be due otherwise” would mean
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 399
UCO Bank & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa
only such employees who are eligible and have put in
minimum number of years of service to qualify for pension.
However, such of the employees who are not eligible and
have not put in required number of years of qualifying
service shall not be entitled to the superannuation benefits
though removed from service in terms of Clause 6(b) of
the Bipartite Settlement. Clause 6(b) came to be inserted
as one of the punishments on account of the Bipartite
Settlement. It provides for payment of superannuation
benefits as would be due otherwise.
15. The Bipartite Settlement tends to provide a punishment
which gives superannuation benefits otherwise due. The
construction canvassed by the employer shall give nothing
to the employees in any event. Will it not be a fraud
Bipartite Settlement? Obviously it would be. From the
conspectus of what we have observed we have no doubt
that such of the employees who are otherwise eligible
for superannuation benefit are removed from service
in terms of Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement shall
be entitled to superannuation benefits. This is the only
construction which would harmonise the two provisions. It
is well-settled rule of construction that in case of apparent
conflict between the two provisions, they should be so
interpreted that the effect is given to both. Hence, we are of
the opinion that such of the employees who are otherwise
entitled to superannuation benefits under the Regulations
if visited with the penalty of removal from service with
superannuation benefits shall be entitled for those benefits
and such of the employees though visited with the same
penalty but are not eligible for superannuation benefits
under the Regulations shall not be entitled to that.
22. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had followed
the aforesaid decision of this Court. Learned Single Judge noted
that respondent had submitted his option for pension on 05.10.2010.
Learned Single Judge also held that objection of the appellant to
the claim of pension by the respondent was without any basis in as
much as the appellate authority had specifically held that respondent
would be entitled to receive terminal benefits for the period of service
he had rendered. This order of the appellate authority has attained
400 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
finality. Therefore, it was held that respondent was entitled to receive
pension in view of the order passed by the appellate authority. This
view of the learned Single Judge has been endorsed by the Division
Bench in the impugned judgment. The decision in S.K. Kool (supra)
is binding on us. Therefore, we do not find any compelling reason
to interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench while exercising our jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.
23. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be
no order as to cost.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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