Supreme Court of India
THE STATE OF HARYANAversusJAI SINGH AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1122
- Decided
- 16 September 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Unutilized land that has not been earmarked for specific common purposes does not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State and must be redistributed among the proprietors in proportion to their contributions.
Summary
The State of Haryana amended the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 by inserting sub‑clause (6) to s.2(g) through Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, which declared that lands reserved for village common purposes under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 would vest in the Gram Panchayat. Proprietors who had contributed land to the "shamilat deh" challenged this amendment, arguing that unutilized (bachat) land should revert to them and not vest in the Panchayat. The High Court’s Full Bench partially allowed the writ petitions, holding that unearmarked land does not vest in the Panchayat and must be redistributed among proprietors, a view supported by over 100 prior decisions. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s reasoning, emphasizing the doctrine of stare decisis and the consistent jurisprudence that such unutilized land remains with the proprietors. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s order restored.
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of sub‑clause (6) to s.2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 inserted by Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
- Whether lands reserved for common purposes but not earmarked (bachat land) vest in the Gram Panchayat or remain with the original proprietors.
- Whether the amendment violates Article 31‑A of the Constitution.
- The applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to the present dispute.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.12, s. Art.14, s. Art.19, s. Art.300‑A, s. Art.31, s. Art.31‑A
- East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948s. s.18, s. s.23‑A
- Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992
- Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961s. s.2(g)(6)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The issue pertains to assail the correctness of the Judgment and Order passed by the Full Bench of High Court wherein the writ petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab Act, 1961, as inserted by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 was partly allowed. Headnotes† Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 – sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) – East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 – Constitution
Subjects
Doctrine of stare decisisShamilat dehConsolidation schemeUnutilized landBachat landRedistribution of landLand earmarked for the common purposesStability and predictability in the legal systemAmendment to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961Insertion of sub‑clause (6) to s.2(g) to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961Common pool of landReview
Judgment
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1016 : 2025 INSC 1122
The State of Haryana
v.
Jai Singh and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014)
16 September 2025
[B.R. Gavai,* CJI, Prashant Kumar Mishra and
K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The issue pertains to assail the correctness of the Judgment and
Order passed by the Full Bench of High Court wherein the writ
petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents
herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 was partly allowed.
Headnotes†
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 –
sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) – East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 – Constitution of
India – Art.31-A – The State of Haryana inserted sub-clause
(6) to s.2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the
said sub-clause – In the said sub-clause, it was laid down that
lands reserved for the common purposes of a village u/s.18
of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, the management and control
whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat u/s.23-A of the aforesaid
Act – Aggrieved by the aforementioned amendment, the
respondent-landowners who held land in various villages and
had contributed a share of their holdings to form a common
pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, which was meant exclusively
for the common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed
Writ Petitions before the High Court – After various rounds
of litigation, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality
of sub-clause (6) of s.2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners – Appellant-State filed
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1017
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
appeal against the same before the Supreme Court – Vide
judgment and order dated 07.04.2022, this Court allowed the
civil appeal – Review petition filed – Allowed – The judgment
and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil Appeal No.
6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to the file:
Held: No error in the impugned judgment and final order of the Full
Bench of the High Court to the extent that it holds that the lands
which have not been earmarked for any specific purpose do not
vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State – It is settled that the land
which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the common
purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme vests with
the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat – The unutilized
land i.e., the bachat land, left after utilizing the land earmarked
for the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the
proprietors according to the share in which they had contributed
the land belonging to them for common purposes – The Full Bench
of the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order in the
alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more
than 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and
applying the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be
upset – The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability
and predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view
consistently upheld by courts over a long period must be followed,
unless it is manifestly erroneous, unjust or mischievous – No error
in the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in applying the
doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case inasmuch
as it followed the law which was consistently applied in more than
100 judgments. [Paras 53, 56, 59, 62]
Case Law Cited
Bhagat Ram and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1967] 2
SCR 165 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 – followed.
Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1965] 1
SCR 82 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 – held inapplicable.
Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Waman Rao v.
Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1981 SC 271 – relied on.
Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [1967] 2 SCR 143 :
1966 SCC OnLine SC 192; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 1998
SCC OnLine SC 8; Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State of
1018 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Orissa and Others [2006] 1 SCR 116 : (2006) 1 SCC 638; Ramesh
Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [2005] 2 SCR 927 : (2005) 4 SCC
772; Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [2001]
3 SCR 344 : (2001) 5 SCC 762; K.T. Plantation Private Limited
and Another v. State of Karnataka [2011] 13 SCR 636 : (2011)
9 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh, Civil Appeal Nos.
5709-5714 of 2001 – referred to.
Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP No.
314 of 2001; Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, CWP No.
5877 of 1992 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation)
Act, 1961; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
List of Keywords
Doctrine of stare decisis; Shamilat deh; Consolidation scheme;
Unutilized land; Bachat land; Redistribution of land; Land earmarked
for the common purposes; Stability and predictability in the
legal system; Amendment to the Punjab Village Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1961; Insertion of sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) to the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; Common
pool of land; Review.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2003 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh in CWP No. 5877 of 1992
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Samar Vijay Singh,
Gautam Sharma, Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Manoj Swarup, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Narender Hooda, Sr.
Advs., Ankit Swarup, Mrs. Anubha Agarwal, Neelmani Pant, Rishi
Bhargava, Yash Singhal, Hamad Tariq, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1019
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
Dahiya, Jatin Hooda, Tarjit Singh Chhikara, Abhaya Nath Das,
N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs.
Mansi Gupta, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda,
Ravindra Bana, Rajesh Kumar, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor,
Shrey Kapoor, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Ashok Kumar Singh,
Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, Manoranjan Paikaray, Aniket Gupta,
A. Venayagam Balan, Gaurav Pal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
INDEX
I. BACKGROUND Paras 1 to 3
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Paras 4 to 23
III. CONSIDERATION Paras 24 to 62
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Para 24 to 53
Judgments of this Court in Ranjit Singh,
Ajit Singh and Bhagat Ram
(b) Consideration of the judgment of the Full Para 54 to 57
Bench of the High Court in impugned
judgment and final order referring its earlier
judgment in Gurjant Singh and several
other judgments
(c) Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis Para 58 to 62
to the facts of the present case.
IV. CONCLUSIONS Para 63 to 64
B.R. Gavai, CJI
I. BACKGROUND
1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and final order passed by
a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh1
1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’.
1020 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992 wherein the High Court partly
allowed the writ petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners,
(Respondents herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 19612, as inserted
by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, published on 11th February 1992
after the assent of the President of India.
2. The facts which give rise to the present proceedings are as follows:
2.1 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette
Notification dated 11th February 1992 inserted sub-clause (6) to
Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the
said sub-clause, which received the assent of the President on
14th January 1992. Sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961
Act reads thus:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
xxx xxx xxx
(g) “shamilat deh” includes-
xxx xxx xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common
purposes of a village under Section 18 of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the
management and control whereof vests in
the Gram Panchayat under section 23-A
of the aforesaid Act.
Explanation - Lands entered in the column
of ownership of record of rights as “Jumla
Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab
Rasad”, “Jumla Malkan” or “Mushtarka
Malkan” shall be shamilat deh within the
meaning of this section.”
2.2 The respondent-landowners along with several other similarly-
situated landowners who held land in various villages and had
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘1961 Act’.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1021
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
contributed a share of their holdings to form a common pool of
land called ‘shamilat deh’, which was meant exclusively for the
common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed Writ Petitions
before the High Court being aggrieved by the aforementioned
amendment.
2.3 When the batch of Writ Petitions first came up before the High
Court, upon considering the important questions of law involved
in the matter, which were likely to arise in a large number of
cases and affect a huge chunk of land, the Division Bench
which was seized of the matter vide order dated 1st June, 1993
directed the papers of the case to be placed before the Hon’ble
Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench of the High Court for
determination of the vires of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
Thereafter, a Full Bench of the High Court heard the matter at
length and vide judgment dated 18th January 1995, reported
as Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana3, allowed the
writ petitions and struck down the amendments carried out by
way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
2.4 The State of Haryana4, Appellant herein, challenged the decision
of the Full Bench of the High Court before this Court vide Civil
Appeal No. 5480 of 1995 titled as State of Haryana v. Jai
Singh5. This Court by order dated 6th August, 1998 held that
certain essentials of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India
had been overlooked and accordingly, the civil appeal came
to be allowed and the matter was remanded to the High Court
for reconsideration of the issues in light of Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.
2.5 Accordingly, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality of
sub-clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners. The Full Bench of the
High Court vide the impugned judgment and final order also
3 CWP No. 5877 of 1992.
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant-State’.
5 1998 SCC OnLine SC 8
1022 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
issued certain consequential directions with regard to certain
mutation entries made by the Revenue Authorities.
2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State filed a Civil Appeal
No. 6990 of 2014 before this Court. Vide judgment and order
dated 7th April 2022, this Court allowed the civil appeal in the
following terms:
“128.Consequently, we hold that Act 9 of 1992, the
amending Act is valid and does not suffer from any
vice of constitutional infirmity. The entire land reserved
for common purposes by applying pro rata cut had
to be utilised by the Gram Panchayat for the present
and future needs of the village community and that
no part of the land can be re-partitioned amongst
the proprietors.
129. With the aforesaid discussion and findings, the
appeals filed by the State and Panchayats are allowed
and those filed by the proprietors are dismissed.
Consequently, the writ petitions filed before the High
Court shall also stand dismissed.”
2.7 Seeking review of the aforementioned judgment of this Court,
one Karnail Singh, being Respondent No. 28 in the present
proceedings, preferred Review Petition (C) No. 526 of 2023
before this Court.
2.8 After a thorough consideration of the issue at hand, this Court
vide order dated 16th May 2024 allowed the Review Petition in
the following terms:
“69. In the result, we pass the following order:
The Review Petition is allowed.
The judgment and order of this Court dated 7th April
2022 in Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled
and the appeal is restored to the file.
The appeal is directed to be listed for hearing
peremptorily on 7th August 2024 at Serial No.1”
2.9 After the review was allowed, we have heard the appeals afresh.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1023
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
3. We have heard Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of the appellant-State as well as Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri
Narender Hooda and Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-landowners.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Shri Navare appearing for the appellant-State submitted that
the impugned judgment and final order of the High Court is self-
contradictory in nature. He submitted that despite holding that
lands reserved for common purposes as per the consolidation
scheme, whether utilized or not, would vest with the State or Gram
Panchayat, the High Court directed cancellation of mutations made
in favour of the appellant-state. He further submitted that in light
of a categorical finding to the effect that the amended provisions
were merely elucidations of the already existing provisions, the High
Court ought not to have cancelled or set aside the mutations which
were a necessary consequence of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 which
amended the 1961 Act.
5. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the liberty granted
by the High Court to the State or Gram Panchayat to file an application
for eviction or title suit for those lands which had been earmarked
for common purposes, would run contrary to the very purpose and
objective of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and would introduce
the same mischief which the said Act sought to do away with. He,
therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and final order
being self-contradictory and erroneous to the above extent deserves
to be set aside and/or modified.
6. Shri Navare further submitted that the lands contributed by the
respondent-landowners on pro-rata basis during consolidation
proceedings as carried out under the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 19486 would
fall within the definition of ‘shamilat deh’ under the Haryana Act No.
9 of 1992. Such lands, he submitted, would vest in the State or
Gram Panchayat, irrespective of whether they have been reserved
for common purposes or not. He submitted that vesting of such
lands in the State or Gram Panchayat is complete as soon as
6 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Consolidation Act of 1948’.
1024 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the consolidation scheme attains finality and once so vested, the
proprietors lose all rights and interests. Shri Navare further submitted
that once the land has been recorded as ‘shamilat deh’, there would
be no need to prove as to whether it had been earmarked or used
for common purposes.
7. Shri Navare submitted that since the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did
not exclude unutilized lands i.e. bachat lands, the said lands could not
be given back to the respondent-landowners. He submitted that before
the High Court, the only claim raised by the respondent-landowners
was qua land reserved for the income of the Gram Panchayat as
well as land which had been reserved for common purposes but
had not been utilized. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that all
such lands which had been reserved for common purposes vested
with the Gram Panchayat and further that, the concomitant Rule
16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules would cover all such lands which
had been taken over for common purposes as per the consolidation
scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. Therefore, Shri Navare
submitted, the High Court had erred in holding that bachat lands
not reserved for common use would remain with the proprietors in
proportion to their contribution.
8. Shri Navare further submitted that Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did
not alter or affect the rights of the respondent-landowners, as their
ownership had already been extinguished under the Consolidation
Act of 1948 and its concomitant Rules upon the finalization of the
consolidation proceedings thereunder. He submitted that the Haryana
Act No. 9 of 1992, enacted as an agrarian reform to strengthen
Gram Panchayat control, is merely clarificatory and does not divest
proprietors of any ownership rights and therefore, it would not be hit
by the rigours of Articles 31-A and 300A of the Constitution of India.
9. With regard to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram and Others
v. State of Punjab and Others7, Shri Navare submitted that the
judgment supports the proprietors only to the extent that land cannot
be reserved solely to generate income for the Gram Panchayat.
However, he submitted that this Court deliberately refrained from
ordering the return of land to proprietors to avoid disrupting the
consolidation scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. He
7 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 : [1967] 2 SCR 165
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1025
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
submitted that returning bachat land to the proprietors would cause
fragmentation and reverse the landholding structure to a pre-1948
scenario, which the Act expressly prohibits. Therefore, he submitted,
what the Supreme Court consciously avoided in Bhagat Ram (supra)
could not have been directed by the High Court. To substantiate
his contention, Shri Navare placed reliance on the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State
of Orissa and Others8, Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari
Bai9 and Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others10
to submit that a judgment cannot be read as a statute and it may be
presumed that the same has been rendered in accordance with law.
10. In the result, Shri Navare submitted that the civil appeals deserve
to be allowed and the High Court’s order ought to be set aside only
to the extent that it directs the cancellation of mutations made in
the appellant’s favour.
11. Per contra, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners submitted that
the concerned land has been in their possession and under their
cultivation from the very inception. As such, he submitted that, the
respondent-landowners are the absolute owners of the land and
they could not have been deprived of their proprietary rights without
acquisition of the land through due process of law.
12. Shri Swarup submitted that the insertion of Clause 2(g)(6) with the
Explanation in the 1961 Act, by way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992,
arbitrarily expanded the definition of ‘shamilat deh’. He submitted
that the land of the respondent-landowners was neither reserved
under the provisions of Section 18 of the Consolidation Act of 1948
for utilization for common purposes nor used for common purposes,
but remained under their cultivation making them the absolute owners
of the land. He, therefore, submitted that the amendment amounts
to compulsory acquisition without compensation, thereby violating
Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
13. He further submitted that the unutilized land i.e. bachat land ought
to be revested with the respondent-landowners as such land does
8 (2006) 1 SCC 638
9 (2005) 4 SCC 772
10 (2001) 5 SCC 762
1026 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not fall within the ambit of ‘shamilat deh’. He submitted that the
management and control of the bachat land would also not vest with
the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of Sections 18 and 23-A
of the Consolidation Act of 1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Concomitant
Consolidation Rules. The learned Senior Counsel further clarified
that before the High Court, the respondent-landowners had only
joined issues with regard to unutilized lands, since after an exchange
of affidavits, the appellant-State had taken a similar stance. He,
therefore, submitted that since the land has neither been utilized
nor reserved for any specific common purpose, it ought to revest
with the proprietors. To bolster his submission, Shri Swarup placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagat Ram
(supra) which has been relied upon by the High Court in the impugned
judgment and final order.
14. Even insofar as the direction of the High Court with regard to vesting
of utilized or unutilized land with the Gram Panchayat is concerned,
Shri Swarup submitted that it has been set aside by a judgment
passed by a 5-Judge Bench of the High Court dated 22nd July 2016
in Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another in
CWP No. 314 of 2001, which has otherwise upheld the judgment of
the Full Bench impugned before us, in toto.
15. Shri Swarup, in the result, submitted that decision of the High Court
be upheld and the civil appeals be dismissed with costs.
16. Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
some of the respondent-landowners submitted that though the right to
property is no more a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right.
It is submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court in the
cases of Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another11 and Bhagat
Ram (supra), the land cannot be acquired where the beneficiary is
the State. He submits that where the reservation of land is for the
purpose of generating revenue for the State, it constitutes taking
away the land for the State and attracts protection granted under the
second proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution mandating payment
of compensation at market value. It is, therefore, submitted that the
High Court has rightly considered this legal position and held that
the lands which are not earmarked for a particular purpose would
revest in the proprietors.
11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 192 : [1967] 2 SCR 143
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1027
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
17. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench of this Court
in the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State
of Karnataka12 has reaffirmed the legal position that even after the
deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India, the
deprivation of a property of a citizen must conform to foundational
constitutional requirements. He submits that the Constitution Bench
of this Court has clearly held that the public purpose is a precondition
for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300-A
and that the State has to justify both - the public purpose as well
as compensation for such deprivation.
18. He submits that the Constitution Bench has further held that the
statutes authorizing deprivation of property are amenable to judicial
review, and must satisfy constitutional standards of non-arbitrariness,
proportionality, and the rule of law.
19. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench held
that though a full market value compensation may be no longer a
constitutional mandate, the obligation to pay compensation - whether
nominal, partial or otherwise - still exists. He further submitted that
such a compensation has to be “just, fair and reasonable” within the
meaning of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Shri Hooda further submitted that this Court in the Constitution Bench
Judgments in the cases of Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of
Punjab and Others13, Ajit Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra)
on an interpretation of the Consolidation Act of 1948, in unequivocal
terms, held that the lands whose possession was never given in
implementation of the Consolidation Scheme do not vest in the Gram
Panchayat but continue to belong to the original proprietors. It has
further been held that such lands which have not been earmarked
for any specific purpose under the Scheme, which are commonly
known as bachat lands, must revert to the proprietors. He submitted
that the doctrine of stare decisis, when the aforesaid legal position
has been in vogue for a long period, would not permit the same to
be reversed.
12 (2011) 9 SCC 1
13 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 : [1965] 1 SCR 82
1028 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
21. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Consolidation proceedings in
the State of Haryana happened in and around 1960. It is submitted
that, over the past 65 years, the possession of the bachat land
remained undisturbed, despite earmarking, with the proprietors. He
submitted that in some instances, the original proprietors remained
in settled occupation. In many cases, bona fide transactions
have taken place through registered sale deeds. In several other
instances, statutory authorities have effected partitions between
joint owners and/or vendees. It is submitted that these persons
have invested labour, capital and generations of time on the footing
that their possession was lawful and secure. He submitted that,
disturbing such long-settled rights would be manifestly unjust.
He, therefore, submits that it would be just and necessary in the
interests of justice that even if such bachat lands are earmarked
for some purposes but their possession has not been taken for
long years, they need to be protected, and such lands need to be
revested in the proprietors.
22. Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of some of the other respondent-proprietors submitted that,
the case of the respondent-proprietors is squarely covered by the
decisions of this Court in the cases of Ajit Singh (supra), Bhagat
Ram (supra) and State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh14.
23. In light of the same, he submitted that the civil appeals be dismissed
and the States of Punjab and Haryana and the UT of Chandigarh
be directed to re-partition the bachat land amongst the respondent-
proprietors in the same proportion in which they had contributed
their land during the consolidation proceedings.
III. CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Judgments of
this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra), Ajit Singh (supra) and
Bhagat Ram (supra)
24. For considering the controversy, a reference to three Constitution
Bench Judgments of this Court would be necessary.
14 Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1029
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
25. The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra). In the said
case, the Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the
consolidation proceedings in which portions of land from those
commonly owned by the appellants therein as proprietors, had been
reserved for the village Panchayat and handed over to it for diverse
purposes; whereas, other portions had been reserved either for non-
proprietors or for the common purposes of the villages. In the said
case, in the village Virk Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been
given to the village Panchayat for management and realization of
income, even though the ownership was still shown in village papers
as ‘shamilat deh’ in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and 3
marlas had been reserved for abadi to be distributed among persons
entitled thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been reserved for
manure pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain lands were set
apart for the village Panchayat for extension of the abadi and to
enable grants of certain land to be made to each family of non-
proprietors and certain lands had been reserved for a primary school
and some more for a phirni. Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had
been reserved for the village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground,
hospital, cremation ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors
were not paid compensation for the lands and as such, taking away
and allotment of the lands was the subject matter of challenge in
those appeals in the said case.
26. The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for judgment
on 27th April 1964. The judgment had to be postponed till after the
vacation. However, before the Court could reassemble after the
vacation on 20th July 1964, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 received the assent of the President i.e. on 20th June,
1964. Vide the said Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2)
of Article 31-A was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso
to clause (1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July
20/23, 1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment,
they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties wished to
argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old arguments, though
it was clear to the Court that the amendment of Article 31-A, which
had a far-reaching effect, and it must have affected one or other of
the parties. The Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High
Court which had held that the transfer of ‘shamilat deh’ owned by the
proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management
1030 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect
of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires of Article 31 inasmuch as,
no compensation was payable.
27. It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was rendered
by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court though called upon
the parties to address the Court on the effect of the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, no arguments were advanced.
As such, in Ranjit Singh (supra), this Court did not have the occasion
to consider the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A
of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra) will
not have a bearing on the present matter.
28. In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was to the
scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation Act of 1948.
One of the grounds raised before the High Court as well as this
Court was that the compensation must be paid to the appellant for
the land reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance
with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) inserted by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
29. It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in Ajit Singh
(supra):
“6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr Iyenger, we
may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR 82] that the Act was
protected from challenge by Article 31-A. It is necessary to
set out the relevant constitutional provisions. The relevant
portion of Article 31-A reads as under:
“31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in Article 13, no law providing for—
(a) the acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of any
such rights……….
shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1031
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14, Article
19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * *
Provided further that where any
law makes any provision for the
acquisition by the State of any estate
and where any land comprised therein
is held by a person under his personal
cultivation, it shall not be lawful for
the State to acquire any portion of
such land as is within the ceiling limit
applicable to him under any law for
the time being in force or any building
or structure standing thereon or
appurtenant thereto, unless the law
relating to the acquisition of such
land, building or structure, provides
for payment of compensation at a
rate which shall not be less than the
market value thereof.
(2)(b) the expression ‘rights’ in relation
to an estate shall include any rights
vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor,
under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,
under-raiyat or other intermediary and
any rights or privileges in respect of
land revenue.”
Relevant portions of Articles 19 and
31 may also be set out because the
learned counsel have laid stress on
the language employed therein.
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of
property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law.
1032 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(2) No property shall be compulsorily
acquired or requisitioned save for
a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for
compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the compensation
or specifies the principles on which,
and the manner in which, the
compensation is to be determined
and given; and no such law shall be
called in question in any court on
the ground that the compensation
provided by that law is not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide
for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property to
the State or to a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, it shall not be
deemed to provide for the compulsory
acquisition or requisitioning of
property, notwithstanding that it
deprives any person of his property.”
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a) mentions
four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate;
second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and,
fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four
categories are mentioned separately and are different.
In the first two categories the State “acquires” either an
estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a
transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the
State. When there is a transference of an estate to the
State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of
the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the
case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the
rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within
the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”.
Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1033
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of
the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the
State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of
that property, and a law provides for the extinguishment
of leases held in an estate. In one sense it would be
an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, but it would
properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State
because the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be
the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A, it
would be noticed that only one category is mentioned in
the proviso, the category being “acquisition by the State of
an estate”. It means that the law must make a provision for
the acquisition by the State of an estate. But what is the
true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State
of an estate”. In the context of Article 31-A, the expression
“acquisition by the State of an estate” in the second proviso
to Article 31-A(1) must have the same meaning as it has
in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is urged on behalf of the
respondents before us that the expression “acquisition
by the State of any estate” in Article 31-A(1)(a) has the
same meaning as it has in Article 31(2-A). In other words,
it is urged that the expression “acquisition by the State
of any estate” means transfer of the ownership or right
to possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on
the other hand urges that the expression “acquisition by
the State” has a very wide meaning and it would bear
the same meaning as was given by this Court in State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964) SCR 587] ,
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707] and
1034 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these cases this Court
had given a wide meaning to the word “acquisition”. In
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning &
Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674]
Mahajan, J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
“The word ‘acquisition’ has quite a wide concept,
meaning the procuring of property or the taking
of it permanently or temporarily. It does not
necessarily imply the acquisition of legal title by
the State in the property taken possession of.”
He further observed at p. 705:
“I prefer to follow the view of the
majority of the Court, because
it seems to me that it is more in
consonance with juridical principle
that possession after all is nine-tenths
of ownership, and once possession
is taken away, practically everything
is taken away, and that in construing
the Constitution it is the substance
and the practical result of the act of
the State that should be considered
rather than its purely legal aspect.”
Bose, J., observed at p. 734 as follows:
“In my opinion, the possession and
acquisition referred to in clause
(2) mean the sort of ‘possession’
and ‘acquisition’ that amounts to
‘deprivation’ within the meaning of
clause (1). No hard and fast rule
can be laid down. Each case must
depend on its own facts. But if there
is substantial deprivation, then clause
(2) is, in my judgment, attracted. By
substantial deprivation I mean the sort
of deprivation that substantially robs a
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1035
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
man of those attributes of enjoyment
which normally accompany rights to,
or an interest in, property. The form is
unessential. It is the substance that
we must seek.”
10. Let us now see whether the other part of the second
proviso throws any light on this question. It would be
noticed that it refers to ceiling limits. It is well known that
under various laws dealing with land reforms, no person
apart from certain exceptions can hold land beyond a
ceiling fixed under the law. Secondly, the proviso says
that not only the land exempted from acquisition should be
within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The underlying idea of this proviso seems to
be that a person who is cultivating land personally, which
is his source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that
land under any law protected by Article 31-A unless at
least compensation at the market rate is given. In various
States most of the persons have already been deprived
of land beyond the ceiling limit on compensation which
was less than the market value. It seems to us that in the
light of all the considerations mentioned above the words
“acquisition by the State” in the second proviso do not have
a technical meaning, as contended by the learned counsel
for the respondent. If the State has in substance acquired
all the rights in the land for its own purposes, even if the
title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is
not acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
11. But the question still remains whether even if a wider
meaning is given to the word “acquisition” what has been
done by the scheme and the Act is acquisition or not
within the meaning of the second proviso. In other words,
does the scheme only modify rights or does it amount to
acquisition of land? The scheme is not part of the record,
but it appears that 89B-18B-11B (Pukhta) of land was
owned by the Gram Panchayat prior to consolidation, which
was used for common purposes. Some further area was
reserved for common purposes as khals, paths, khurrahs,
panchayat ghars and schools etc. after applying cut upon
1036 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It does not appear
that any land, apart from what was already owned by
the Panchayat, was reserved for providing income to the
Panchayat. Therefore, in this case we are not concerned
with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose.”
30. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would reveal that in paragraph
6, this Court reproduced the provisions of Article 31-A, as amended.
31. In paragraph 7, this Court carved out 4 categories covered by Article
31-A as under:
(i) acquisition by the State of an estate;
(ii) acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
(iii) the extinguishment of rights in an estate; and
(iv) the modification of rights in an estate.
32. Analysing the said provision, the Constitution Bench held that, in the
first two categories, the State “acquires” either an estate or rights
in an estate i.e., there is a transference of an estate or the rights
in an estate to the State. The Constitution Bench held that when
there is a transference of an estate to the State, it could be said that
all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished. It
further held that, if the result in the case of the extinguishment is
the transference of all the rights in an estate to the State, it would
properly fall within the expression “acquisition by the State of an
estate”. It further held that, in the case of an acquisition by the
State of a right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of
the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner
has been acquired.
33. In paragraph 8, the Constitution Bench carved out the difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and “modification
or extinguishment of rights” on the other. It held that in the first case,
the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of
the modification or the extinguishment is not the State.
34. In paragraph 9, this Court recorded that in the second proviso to
Article 31-A, only one category is mentioned i.e., “acquisition by the
State of an estate”. It observed that the law must make a provision
for the acquisition by the State of an estate. It went on to analyze
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1037
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
the true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State of
an estate”. It was sought to be urged before this Court, that the
expression “acquisition by the State” has a very wide meaning and
it would bear the same meaning as was given by this Court in a
catena of judgments.
35. In paragraph 10, this Court recorded that the second proviso to
Article 31-A refers to ceiling limits. It was further observed that the
proviso provides that, not only the land exempted from acquisition
should be within the ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The Court held that the underlying idea of this proviso
was that a person who is cultivating land personally, which is his
source of livelihood, should not be deprived of that land under any
law protected by Article 31-A unless at least compensation at the
market rate is given. The Court held that the words “acquisition by
the State” in the second proviso cannot be given a technical meaning,
as was contended on behalf of the State. It held that, if the State has
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own purposes,
even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be said that it is
not acquisition within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
36. In paragraph 11, this Court recorded the facts in the said case. It
recorded that some of the lands were owned by the Gram Panchayat
prior to consolidation, which was used for common purposes. Some
further area was reserved for common purposes as khals, paths,
khurrahs, panchayat ghars and schools etc., after applying a cut upon
the rightholders on pro-rata basis. It observed that apart from what
was already owned by the Panchayat, no other land was reserved
for providing income to the Panchayat. As such, the Court was not
concerned with the validity of acquisition for such a purpose.
37. It will also be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs of the said
judgment in Ajit Singh (supra):
“12. Rule 16 (ii) of the Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949, provides:
“In an estate or estates where during consolidation
proceedings there is no shamlat Deh land or
such land is considered inadequate, land shall
be reserved for the Village panchayat and for
other common purposes, under Section 18(c) of
1038 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the Act, out of the common pool of the village
at a scale prescribed by the Government from
time to time. Proprietary rights in respect of
land so reserved (except the area reserved for
the extension of abadi of proprietors and non-
proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body
of estate or estates concerned and it shall be
entered in the column of ownership of record
of rights as (Jumla Malkan wa Digar Haqdaran
Arazi Hasab Rasad Raqba). The management
of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of
the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the
village proprietary body and the panchayat shall
have the right to utilise the income derived from
the land so reserved for the common needs and
benefits of the estate or estates concerned.”
It will be noticed that the title still vests in the
property body (sic), the management of the land
is done on behalf of the proprietary body, and
the land is used for the common needs and
benefits of the estate or estates concerned. In
other words a fraction of each proprietor’s land
is taken and formed into a common pool so that
the whole may be used for the common needs
and benefits of the estate, mentioned above.
The proprietors naturally would also share in
the benefits along with others.
13. In Attar Singh v. State of U.P. [(1959) Supp 1 SCR
928 at p 938] Wanchoo J., speaking for the Court, said
this of the similar proviso in a similar Act, namely, the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P. Act 5 of 1954)
as amended by the U.P. Act 16 of 1957:
“Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit,
which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything.
These small bits of land are collected from
various tenureholders and consolidated in one
place and added to the land which might be lying
vacant so that it may be used for the purposes
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1039
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
of Section 14(1)(ee). A compact area is thus
created and it is used for the purposes of the
tenure-holders themselves and other villagers.
Form CH-21 framed under Rule 41(a) shows the
purposes to which this land would be applied,
namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture land,
(3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation
ground, (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other
school, (8) playground, (9) Panchayatghar,
and (10) such other objects. These small bits
of land thus acquired from tenure-holders are
consolidated and used for these purposes, which
are directly for the benefit of the tenure-holders.
They are deprived of a small bit and in place of
it they are given advantages in a much larger
area of land made up of these small bits and
also of vacant land.”
In other words, a proprietor gets advantages
which he could never have got apart from the
scheme. For example, if he wanted a threshing
floor, a manure pit, land for pasture, khal etc.
he would not have been able to have them on
the fraction of his land reserved for common
purposes.
14. Does such taking away of property then amount to
acquisition by the State of any land? Who is the real
beneficiary? Is it the Panchayat? It is clear that the title
remains in the proprietary body and in the revenue records
the land would be shown as belonging to “all the owners
and other right holders in proportion to their areas”. The
Panchayat will manage it on behalf of the proprietors and
use it for common purposes; it cannot use it for any other
purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from
the use of land for common purposes. It is true that the
non-proprietors also derive benefit but their satisfaction
and advancement enures in the end to the advantage of
the proprietors in the form of a more efficient agricultural
community. The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any
benefit. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the
1040 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
beneficiary of the modification of rights is not the State,
and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within
the second proviso.
15. In the context of the 2nd proviso, which is trying to
preserve the rights of a person holding land under his
personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive that such
adjustment of the rights of persons holding land under their
personal cultivation in the interest of village economy was
regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.”
38. In paragraph 12, after reproducing Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation
Rules, this Court observed that the title still vests in the proprietary
body. However, the management of the land is done on behalf of
the proprietary body, and the land is used for the common needs
and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. It further held
that a fraction of each proprietor’s land is taken and formed into a
common pool so that the whole area may be used for the common
needs and benefits of the estate, mentioned above. It further held
that the proprietors naturally would also share in the benefits along
with others.
39. In paragraph 14, this Court held that it was clear that the title remains
in the proprietary body and in the revenue records the land would
be shown as belonging to “all the owners and other right holders
in proportion to their areas”. This Court held that the Panchayat
would manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common
purposes and that it cannot use it for any other purpose. This Court
held that the proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use
of land for common purposes. It observed that the non-proprietors
also derive benefit but their satisfaction and advancement enures
in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more
efficient agricultural community. The Panchayat as such does not
enjoy any benefit. This Court held, in light of the facts of the said
case, that the beneficiary of the modification of rights was not the
State, and therefore there was no acquisition by the State within the
meaning of the second proviso.
40. In paragraph 15, this Court, referring to second proviso, held that it is
impossible to conceive that such adjustment of the rights of persons
holding land under their personal cultivation in the interest of village
economy was regarded as something to be compensated for in cash.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1041
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
41. It can thus be seen that in Ajit Singh (supra), this Court was
considering the portion of lands which was taken from the proprietors;
formed into a common pool and used for common needs and benefits
of the estate or estates concerned. It was held that the said land
could not be used for any other purpose. It has further affirmed that
the proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use of land
for common purposes.
42. It is further pertinent to note that in Ajit Singh (supra), this Court
held that the words “acquisition by the State” in the second proviso
cannot be given a technical meaning. It has been held that if the
State has in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own
purposes, even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be said
that it is not acquisition within the ambit of the second proviso to
Article 31-A.
43. Justice M. Hidayatullah (as his Lordship then was) in his minority
judgment disagreed with the majority view. He held that when the
State acquires almost the entire bundle of rights, it is acquisition
within the meaning of the second proviso and compensation at
market rates must be given.
44. The third judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court is in the
case of Bhagat Ram (supra), which would be the most relevant for
the present purpose.
45. It will be relevant to note that judgments in both Ajit Singh (supra)
and Bhagat Ram (supra) were delivered on the very same day.
46. In the said case i.e. Bhagat Ram (supra), the Court was considering
the question, as to whether the reservation of land for income of the
Panchayat is acquisition of land by the State within the ambit of the
second proviso to Article 31-A?
47. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram (supra) in the
judgment delivered by S.M. Sikri, J (as his Lordship then was):
“2. The first question that arises is whether the scheme
insofar as it makes reservations of land for income of the
Panchayat is hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A. The
scheme reserves lands for phirni, paths, agricultural paths,
manure pits, cremation grounds, etc., and also reserves an
1042 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard kanals) for income
of the Panchayat. We have already held in Ajit Singh
case [(1967) 2 SCR 143] that acquisition for the common
purposes such as phirnis, paths, etc., is not acquisition by
the State within the second proviso to Article 31-A. But this
does not dispose of the question whether the reservation
of land for income of the Panchayat is acquisition of land
by the state within the second proviso to Article 31-A. We
held in that case that there was this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other
that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State. Here it seems to us that the
beneficiary is the Panchayat which falls within the definition
of the word “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The
income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose”
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the
village concerned for the benefit of the village
community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit
of the village community. But so is any other income of
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily
defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by
reserving for the income of the Panchayat a major portion
of the land belonging to a person holding land within the
ceiling limit. Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of
100 kanals 2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat in
the scheme is contrary to the second proviso and the
scheme must be modified by the competent authority
accordingly.”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1043
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
48. It can thus be seen that, this Court held that there was an essential
difference between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and
“modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other hand. It was
held that in the first case, the beneficiary was the State while in the
latter case, the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment
was not the State. This Court held that since the Panchayat would
fall within the definition of the word “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes of providing income
to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole object of the second
proviso. This Court held that the Consolidation Officer could easily
defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land belonging
to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
49. The second argument which was advanced before this Court in
Bhagat Ram (supra) was that acquisition had already taken place
before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 came
into force and therefore the scheme was not hit by the second proviso
to Article 31-A. It was sought to be argued that the requirements as
contemplated under Sections 23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation
Act of 1948 were already complete and as such, the acquisition had
already taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964.
50. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court,
in the majority judgment in Bhagat Ram (supra) while rejecting the
aforesaid submissions:
“4. It is clear from this affidavit that possession has not been
transferred in pursuance of the repartition. The learned
Counsel for the petitioners relies on this fact and says that
in view of Section 23-A and Section 24 the “acquisition”
does not take place till all the persons entitled to possession
of holdings under the Act have entered into possession
of the holdings. Sections 23-A and 24 read as follows:
“23-A. As soon as a scheme comes into force, the
management and control of all lands assigned
or reserved for common purposes of the village
under Section 18, shall vest in the Panchayat
of that village which shall also be entitled to
appropriate the income accruing therefrom
1044 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for the benefit of the village community, and
the rights and interest of the owners of such
lands shall stand modified and extinguished
accordingly.
24. (1) As soon as the persons entitled to
possession of holdings under this Act have
entered into possession of the holdings
respectively allotted to them, the scheme shall
be deemed to have come into force and the
possession of the allottees affected by the
scheme of consolidation, or, as the case may
be, by repartition, shall remain undisturbed
until a fresh scheme is brought into force or a
change is ordered in pursuance of provisions of
sub-section (2), (3) and (4) of Section 21 or an
order passed under Section 36 or 42 of this Act.
(2) A Consolidation Officer shall be competent to
exercise all or any of the powers of a Revenue
Officer under the Punjab Land Revenue
Act, 1887 (Act 17 of 1887), for purposes of
compliance with the provisions of sub-section
(1).”
5. It seems to us clear from these provisions that
till possession has changed under Section 24, the
management and control does not vest in the Panchayat
under Section 23-A. Not only does the management and
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified
or extinguished till persons have changed possession and
entered into the possession of the holdings allotted to them
under the scheme. Mr Gossain, the learned Counsel for
the State, tried to meet this point by urging that by virtue
of repartition under Section 21, the rights to possession of
the new holdings were finalised and could be enforced. This
may be so; but this cannot be equivalent to “acquisition”
within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
6. In the result we hold that the scheme is hit by the second
proviso to Article 31 A insofar as it reserves 100 kanals
2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat. We direct the
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1045
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
State to modify the scheme to bring it into accord with the
second proviso as interpreted by us, proceed according
to law. There would be an order as to costs.”
51. It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Bhagat Ram (supra) held that, upon reading of Sections 23-A and
24 of the Consolidation Act of 1948 it was clear that, till possession
has changed under Section 24, the management and control does
not vest in the Panchayat under Section 23-A of the Consolidation
Act of 1948. It further held that not only does the management and
control not vest but the rights of the holders are not modified or
extinguished till persons have changed possession and entered into
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under the scheme.
Though the counsel for the State tried to urge that, by virtue of
repartition under Section 21, the rights to possession of the new
holdings were finalized and could be enforced, this Court held that
this cannot be equivalent to “acquisition” within the second proviso
to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
52. The Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and
final order attempted to draw a distinction between the land reserved
for common purposes under Section 18(c) of the Consolidation Act
of 1948 which might become part and parcel of a Scheme framed
under Section 14, for the areas reserved for common purposes,
though they have actually not been put to any common use and
may be put to common use in a later point of time on one hand and
the lands which might have been contributed by the proprietors on
pro-rata basis but have not been reserved or earmarked for common
purposes in the Scheme. It will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of the Full Bench of the High Court:
“The land reserved for common purposes under Section
18(c), which might become part and parcel of a scheme
framed under Section 14, for the areas reserved for
common purposes, vests with the Government or Gram
Panchayat, as the case may be, and the proprietors
are left with no right or interest in such lands meant for
common purposes under the scheme. There is nothing at
all mentioned either in the Act or the rules or the scheme,
that came to be framed, that the proprietors will lose right
only with regard to land which was actually put to any use
1046 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and not the land which may be put to common use later
in point of time. In none of the sections or Rules, which
have been referred to by us in the earlier part of scheme
envisages only such lands which have been utilized. That
apart, in all the relevant sections and the rules, words
mentioned are ‘reserved or assigned’. Reference in this
connection may be made to sub-section (3) of Section
18 and Section 23-A. The provisions of the statute, as
referred to above, would, thus, further fortify that reference
is to land reserved or assigned for common use, whether
utilized or not.
*** *** ***
The lands which, however, might have been contributed
by the proprietors on pro-rata basis, but have not been
reserved or earmarked for common purposes in a scheme,
known as Bachat land, it is equally true, would not vest
either with the State or the Gram Panchayat and instead
continue to be owned by the proprietors of the village in
the same proportion in which they contribute the land
owned by them. The Bachat land, which is not used for
common purposes under the scheme, in view of provisions
contained in Section 22 of the Act of 1948, is recorded
as Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab
Rasad Arazi Khewat but the significant differences is
that in the column of ownership proprietors are shown in
possession in contrast to the land which vests with the
Gram Panchayat which is shown as being used for some
or the other common purposes as per the scheme.
We might have gone into this issue in all its details but
in as much as the point in issue is not res-integra and in
fact stands clinched by string of judicial pronouncements
of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is
no necessity at all to interpret the provisions of the Act
and the rules any further on this issue.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram and ors. Vs.
State of Punjab and ors. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 927,
dealt with reservation of certain area in the consolidation
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1047
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
scheme for income of the Panchayat. Brief facts of the case
aforesaid would reveal that a scheme made in respect of
consolidation of village Dolike Sunderpur was questioned
on the ground that in as much as it makes reservation
of land for income of the Gram Panchayat, it is hit by
second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
The scheme in question reserved lands for phirni, paths,
agricultural paths, manure pits, cremation grounds etc. and
also reserved an area of 100 kanals 2 marlas (standard
kanals) for income of the Panchayat. It was held as under:
“The income derived by the Panchayat is in no way different
from its any other income. It is true that Section 2(bb) of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common purpose”
to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of the
village concerned for the benefit of the village
community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit
of the village community. But so is any other income of
the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income is the
income of the Panchayat and it would defeat the whole
object of the second proviso if we were to give any other
construction. The Consolidation Officer could easily defeat
the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving
for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of the land
belonging to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100 kanals 2
marlas for the income of the Panchayat in the scheme is
contrary to the second proviso and the scheme must be
modified by the competent authority accordingly.”
The ratio of the judgment aforesaid would clearly suggest
that it is the land reserved for common purposes under the
scheme which would be saved, which, otherwise, would
be hit by second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution
of India. Surely, if the land, which has not been reserved
for common purposes under the scheme and is Bachat
or surplus land, i.e., the one which is still left out after
1048 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
providing the land in scheme for common purposes, if it is
to vest with the State or Gram Panchayat, the same would
be nothing but compulsory acquisition within the ceiling
limit of an individual without payment of compensation
and would offend second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.”
53. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that no error could be
noticed in the impugned judgment and final order of the Full Bench
of the High Court to the extent that it holds that the lands which
have not been earmarked for any specific purpose do not vest in
the Gram Panchayat or the State.
(b) Consideration of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court in the impugned judgment and final order referring
its earlier judgment in Gurjant Singh (supra) and several
other judgments.
54. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Full
Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order:
“Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (V.K.
Bali, J.) was a member, after referring to case law on the
subject from 1967 to 1997 in Bhagat Ram vs. State of
Punjab, (1967) 69, PLR, 287, Des Raj vs. Gram sabha
of Village Ladhot, 1981 PLJ, 300, Chhajju Ram vs. The
Joint Director, Panchayats, (1986-1) 89, PLR, 586, Gram
Panchayat, Gunia Majri vs. Director Consolidation of
Holdings, (1991-1) 99 PLR, 342, Gram Panchayat Sahara
(formerly Dhuma) vs. Baldev Singh, 1977 PLJ, 276, Baj
Singh vs. State of Punjab (1992-1) 101 RLR, 10, Kala
Singh vs. Commissioner, Hisar Division, 1984 PLJ, 169,
Joginder Singh vs. The Director Consolidation of Holdings
(1997-2) 116 PLR 116, Bhagwan Singh vs. The Director
Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, (1997-2) 116 PLR, 472
and Gram Panchayat, Village Bhedpura vs. The Additional
Director, Consolidation, (1997-1) 115 PLR, 391, held that
the Bachat land, i.e., land which remains unutilized after
utilizing the land for the common purposes so provided
under the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors
and not with the Gram Panchayat”. It was further held that
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1049
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
“the unutilized land after utilizing the land earmarked for
the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst
the proprietors according to the share in which they
had contributed the land belonging to them for common
purposes”. There is no need to give facts of the judicial
precedents relied upon in Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) as
the same stand mentioned already therein and reiteration
thereof would necessarily burden this judgment.
The decision of Division Bench of this Court in Gurjant
Singh’s case (supra) was tested, at the instance of the State
of Punjab, in Civil Appeal No. 5709-5714 of 2001. Only,
the general directions given in the judgment recorded in
Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) for distribution of land to the
proprietors were set aside and that too on the concession
of learned counsel, who represented the Respondents in
the case aforesaid. Order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court on August 27, 2001, reads thus:-
“Leave granted.
Mr. Harsh N. Salve, learned Solicitor General,
submitted that the State of Punjab takes objection
only in regard to the following observations made
in the impugned judgment:-
“This exercise, it appears, has not
been done throughout the State of
Punjab and Haryana and villages
forming part of Union Territory,
Chandigarh, even though there is a
specific provision for doing that.
This exercise be done as expeditiously
as possible and preferably within six
months proceedings for repartition
must commence. Liberty to apply
in the event of non-compliance of
directions referred to above.”
Learned counsel for the Respondent submits
that they had no objection in deleting the
aforesaid portions from the impugned judgment.
1050 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
We allow these appeals to be extent of deleting
of the above said passage from the impugned
judgment.
These appeals are disposed of accordingly.”
55. It is thus clear that the Full Bench of the High Court has referred to
the judgment of the Division Bench of the said Court in the case of
Gurjant Singh (supra).
56. It is pertinent to note that in the case of Gurjant Singh (supra), the
Division Bench of the High Court had noted a series of judgments
delivered by the said High Court relying on the law laid down by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram (supra). All
these decisions had held that the land which remains unutilized
after utilizing the land for the common purposes so provided under
the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors and not with the
Gram Panchayat. It was further held that the unutilized land i.e., the
bachat land, left after utilizing the land earmarked for the common
purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the proprietors according
to the share in which they had contributed the land belonging to
them for common purposes.
57. It is to be noted that in Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001, which
was preferred by the State challenging the judgment in the case of
Gurjant Singh (supra), the State had objected only with regard to
the observations wherein the time limit was provided for effecting
redistribution of bachat land amongst the proprietors according to
their share. It would thus be clear that the State itself did not press
the appeals with regard to the directions for redistribution of the
bachat land amongst the proprietors according to their share. It
appears that the only grievance of the State was with regard to the
directions to do it within a specified period of time.
(c) Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts
of the present case.
58. The Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and
final order in the alternative held that, a consistent view has been
taken in more than 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High
Court and applying the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot
be upset.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1051
The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
59. The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability and
predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view consistently
upheld by courts over a long period must be followed, unless it is
manifestly erroneous, unjust or mischievous.
60. In the case of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay15, this Court observed thus:
“A view which has been accepted for a long period of time
should not be disturbed unless the Court can say positively
that it was wrong or unreasonable or that it is productive
of public hardship or inconvenience.”
61. Similarly, in the case of Waman Rao v. Union of India16, this Court
observed thus:
“40. It is also true to say that for the application of the rule
of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision
or decisions of longstanding should have considered and
either accepted or rejected the particular argument which
is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous
decisions could more easily be treated as binding by
applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary to
take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore,
sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain
decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was
argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what
is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose
of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to
enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the
earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.
Therefore, the reason why Article 31-A was upheld in the
earlier decisions, if indeed it was, are not germane for the
purpose of deciding whether this is a fit and proper case
in which to apply that rule.”
62. We find no error in the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court
in applying the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present
case inasmuch as it followed the law which was consistently applied
in more than 100 judgments.
15 (1974) 2 SCC 402
16 AIR 1981 SC 271
1052 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
IV. CONCLUSION
63. In the result we find no merit in the appeal of the State. The same
is accordingly dismissed.
64. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Doctrine of stare decisis"Sign in to search