THE STATE OF GOA & ANR.versusNAMITA TRIPATHI

                 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 341 : 2025 INSC 306

                        The State of Goa & Anr.
                                   v.
                            Namita Tripathi
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1060 of 2025)
                               03 March 2025
              [B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]


                          Issue for Consideration
       The Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) had issued process to
       the respondent pursuant to the complaint filed by the appellants
       alleging violation by the respondent of the provisions of the
       Factories Act, 1948 and thereby committing offences punishable
       u/s.92 thereof. However, the High Court had quashed the said
       order of the JMFC. Was the High Court justified in quashing the
       process issued.

                                 Headnotes†
       Factories Act, 1948 – ss.2(k), 2(m), 92 – Goa Factories Rules,
       1985 – rr.3,4,6 – An inspection was conducted in the premises
       of the respondent wherein the business of Professional
       Laundry Service was carried on, it was found that the
       respondent did not possess factory approved plans – Further,
       the premises were being used as a factory without obtaining
       a valid factory licence – A complaint was filed – The JMFC
       issued summons to respondents – However, the High Court
       by the impugned order quashed the order issuing process –
       Correctness:
       Held: There is no doubt that the business of laundry carried
       on by the respondent involved cleaning and washing of clothes
       including dry cleaning – Admittedly, more than 9 workers were
       employed in the centralized processing unit and also used the
       aid of power – The Act of 1948 defines “manufacturing process”
       and clearly “washing, cleaning” and the activities carried out by
       the respondent with a view to its use, delivery or disposal are
       squarely attracted – The contention of the respondent that dry


* Author
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       cleaning does not make any product usable, saleable or worthy
       of transport, delivery or disposal is rejected – “Manufacturing
       process” has been defined to mean any process for washing
       or cleaning with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or
       disposal – The linen deposited with the launderer is, after washing
       and cleaning, delivered to the customer for use – The ingredients
       of the section are fully satisfied – There is nothing in the Act of
       1948, which is repugnant in the subject or context, constraining
       to jettison the definition – Hence, this Court rejects the findings
       of the High Court and hold that the activity carried out which
       on facts is not disputed is clearly covered by the definition of
       “manufacturing process” u/s.2(k) which, in turn, would bring the
       premises in question of the respondent under the definition of
       “factory” u/s.2(m) – If that were so, the complaint lodged against
       the respondent could not have been quashed – The consequence
       would be that the complaint filed by the appellants along with
       the order issuing process of 04.12.2019 would stand restored.
       [Paras 33, 42, 49]
       Factories Act, 1948 – ss.2(k), 2(m) – Statutory definitions –
       discussed. [Paras 15- 17]
       Factories Act, 1948 – Object and reasons – discussed.
       [Paras 18-20]

                               Case Law Cited
       Balwant Rai Saluja & Anr. v. Air India Ltd. & Ors. [2014] 14 SCR
       1512 : (2014) 9 SCC 407; S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
       [2001] Supp. 2 SCR 140 : (2001) 7 SCC 659; Works Manager,
       Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath & Ors. [1970] 2
       SCR 726 : (1969) 3 SCC 95; Allahabad Bank & Anr. v. All India
       Allahabad Bank Retired Employees Association [2010] 2 SCR
       162 : (2010) 2 SCC 44; Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. v. State of U.P.
       & Ors. [2016] 5 SCR 731 : (2016) 10 SCC 329; Jeewanlal Ltd.
       & Ors. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act
       & Ors. [1985] 1 SCR 664 : (1984) 4 SCC 356; Steel Authority
       of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors.
       [2001] Supp. 2 SCR 343 : (2001) 7 SCC 1 – relied on.
       Crane Betel Nut Powder Works v. Commr. of Customs & Central
       Excise, Tirupathi & Anr. [2007] 4 SCR 109 : (2007) 4 SCC 155;
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             343

                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


     Kores India Ltd., Chennai v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
     Chennai [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 320 : (2005) 1 SCC 385; Independent
     Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors., 2025 SCC
     OnLine SC 181; Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Triplex
     Dry Cleaners and Others (1998) 1 SCC 196; J.P. Lights India v.
     Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation, Bangalore, 2023 SCC OnLine
     SC 1271 – referred to.
     Super Cleaners v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, 2006
     SCC OnLine Bom 1660; Employees’ State Insurance Corporation,
     Jullundur v. Triplex Dry Cleaners and Others (1982) ILR 2P&H
     291 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Factories Act, 1948; Goa Factories Rules, 1985; Shops And
     Establishments Act; Employees State Insurance Act; Factories
     Act of 1934; Central Excise Act of 1944.

                             List of Keywords
     Laundry business; Cleaning and washing of clothes; Dry cleaning;
     Factory; Manufacturing process; Use of premises without factory
     license; Employees State Insurance Corporation; Summons;
     Quashing the process issued; Welfare statute; Beneficial legislation;
     Rule of Plain meaning; Mischief rule.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     1060 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 06.09.2021 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in SNM No. 944 of 2020

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ms. Ruchira Gupta, Shishir Deshpande, Ms. Pooja Tripathi,
     Ms. Harshita Sharma, Amit Kumar, Abhishek Verma.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Shivan Desai, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Ms. Maria Viegas, Ms. Tahira
     Manezes, Ms. Riya Amonkar, Narender Kumar Verma.
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                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The present Appeal calls in question the correctness of the judgment
       dated 06.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in
       Stamp Number Main No. 944 of 2020 (F). By the said judgment,
       the High Court allowed the prayer of the respondent herein and
       quashed the order dated 04.12.2019 passed by the learned
       Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) at Panaji in Criminal Case
       No. LC/19/2019/C. By the said order, the Ld. JMFC had issued
       process to the respondent pursuant to the complaint filed by the
       appellants alleging violation by the respondent of the provisions
       of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of
       1948’) and thereby committing offences punishable under Section
       92 thereof.

       FACTS:-
3.     The facts lie in a narrow compass. Pursuant to the inspection
       conducted on 20.05.2019 in the premises of the respondent wherein
       the business of Professional Laundry Service was carried on, it was
       found that the respondent did not possess factory approved plans as
       required under Rule 3 of the Goa Factories Rules, 1985 (hereinafter
       referred to as the ‘Rules’) read with Section 6 of the Act of 1948; that
       the premises were being used as a factory without obtaining a valid
       factory licence in violation of Rule 4 of the Rules read with Section 6
       of the Act of 1948 and that the respondent had not submitted any
       application for registration and grant of licence in violation of Rule 6
       of the Rules read with Section 6 of the Act of 1948. An inspection
       report was drawn up and the same was furnished by a covering
       letter dated 24.05.2019 with the “occupier of the respondent” to
       report compliance within 15 days.
4.     The inspection report set out that at the time of inspection there
       were more than 9 workers employed; that there was no muster roll
       maintained for the month of May 2019; and that the manufacturing
       process of cleaning and washing of clothes was carried on. The
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                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


     report set out the details of the machinery/equipments and the total
     installed power and set out that the premises amounted to a factory
     within the purview of Section 2(m)(i) of the Act of 1948 and also
     observed about the violation, as set out hereinabove, with regard
     to the absence of registration and licence for use of the premises
     as factory. The occupier was advised to submit an application for
     due compliance of the Act failing which they were warned that it will
     constitute criminal offence punishable under the Act of 1948.
5.   The complaint alleged that by the letter of 30.05.2019 signed by the
     authorized signatory of the respondent a reply was furnished, setting
     out that the respondent who operated under the name and style of
     “White Cloud” is a professionally set up laundry comprising of six
     collection centres around Goa and one central processing unit; that
     it had 58 employees in the collection centres including 10 workers
     at the central processing unit; that a similar inspection had been
     carried out in October 2005 and no further action was taken; that
     under the Act of 1948, washing and dry cleaning would not constitute
     “manufacturing process”; that “laundry business” is a service and
     not a manufacturing activity since the “product” of the business is
     intangible; that what is rendered is a service and that they are duly
     registered under the Shops And Establishments Act.
6.   The letter also annexed certain judgments to contend that the activity
     did not constitute the “manufacturing process”. It was contended
     that in view of the above there is no contravention of any of the
     legal provisions.
7.   It transpires that pursuant to the request of 17.06.2019 by the
     respondent, a personal hearing was also afforded to them and a
     hearing was indeed given by Shri Vivek Marathe, Chief Inspector,
     Inspectorate of Factories and Boilers. The complaint further averred
     that after further correspondence with the respondent since their reply
     was unsatisfactory, the complainant wrote and obtained information
     from the Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation
     (ESIC) that the respondent unit was indeed covered under Section
     2(12) of the Employees State Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to
     as the ‘ESIC Act’) and have ESIC code no. 32000025050000909
     assigned to them. The complaint concluded by stating that since
     no satisfactory reply was forthcoming the respondent was liable for
     offences punishable under Section 92 of the Act of 1948.
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8.     On 04.12.2019, the JMFC Panaji issued summons by recording the
       following :-
            “Criminal Case No. LC/19/2019/C
            Perused.
            The material on record makes out a prima facie case
            against the accused. Hence, issue process.”
9.     Aggrieved, the respondent herein moved the High Court of Bombay
       at Goa seeking to quash and set aside the summons as well as the
       complaint, primarily on two grounds alleged namely, that the order
       issuing summons is unreasoned and suffers grave errors of facts and
       law and it does not reflect application of mind; and that the process
       of “Dry cleaning of clothes” does not constitute “manufacturing
       process” as defined under the Act of 1948. It was also averred that
       business of laundry is in the nature of service and the premises are
       not manufacturing unit for the purpose of the Act of 1948.
10. By the impugned order, the High Court has quashed the order issuing
    process after holding that a perusal of the order issuing process,
    did not reflect any application of mind, and further relying on certain
    precedents, held as under:-
            “22. In view of this position, the definition of manufacturing
            process would show that the washing and cleaning has
            to be with a view to its use, sale, transport delivery or
            disposal. Whenever any washing or cleaning is done of
            any article or substance with a view to its use, that is,
            of use in such a way that a new marketable commodity
            would come into being known commercially for being
            used as such or for selling the same and so on, then
            the process would certainly come within the definition of
            manufacturing process. To constitute or manufacture there
            must be a transformation. Mere labour bestowed on an
            article even if the labour is applied through machinery, will
            not make it a manufacture, unless it has progressed so
            far that transformation ensues and the article becomes
            commercially known as another and different article from
            that as which it begins its existence. Once it is confirmed
            that dry cleaning is not within the definition of manufacturing
            process, Factories Act will not apply.”
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                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


11. Aggrieved, the appellants are before us in Appeal.
12. We have heard Ms. Ruchira Gupta, learned Advocate for the
    appellants and Mr. Shivan Desai, learned counsel for the respondent.
    We have also perused the records including the written submissions
    filed by the parties.
13. In the above factual background, the question that arises for
    consideration is, was the High Court justified in quashing the process
    issued?

     ANALYSIS:-
14. The averments in the complaint allege that the respondent has violated
    the provisions of the Act of 1948 inasmuch as being a factory they
    have not complied with the provisions of the Act of 1948 on matters
    set out hereinabove. This position is disputed by the respondent on
    the ground that their premises do not constitute a factory as defined
    in the Act of 1948. To answer this question, an examination of the
    scheme of the Act of 1948 with particular focus on the definition of
    “factory” under Section 2(m) as well as the definition of “manufacturing
    process” under Section 2(k) is essential.

     STATUTORY DEFINITION:-
15. Sections 2(m) and 2(k) of the Act of 1948 read as under.-
           “2. Interpretation.—In this Act, unless there is anything
           repugnant in the subject or context,-
           (m) “factory” means any premises including the precincts
           thereof—
                (i) whereon ten or more workers are working,
                or were working on any day of the preceding
                twelve months, and in any part of which a
                manufacturing process is being carried on with
                the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or
                (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working,
                or were working on any day of the preceding
                twelve months, and in any part of which a
                manufacturing process is being carried on without
                the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,—
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               but does not include a mine subject to the
               operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952)
               or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces
               of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel,
               restaurant or eating place;
          (k) “manufacturing process” means any process for—
               (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting,
               finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning,
               breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating
               or adapting any article or substance with a view
               to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or
               (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other
               substance; or
               (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting
               power; or
               (iv) composing types for printing, printing by
               letter press, lithography, photogravure or
               other similar process or book binding; or
               (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing,
               refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or
               vessels; or
               (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold
               storage;”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

16. A perusal of the definition of “factory” in the Act of 1948 would
    reveal that any premises including the precincts thereof where ten or
    more workers are working and in any part of which a manufacturing
    process is being carried on with the aid of power would be covered
    therein. The Act of 1948 defines “manufacturing process” to mean
    any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing,
    packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or
    otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view
    to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal.
17. On a plain reading, it is clear that any process involving washing
    or cleaning any article or substance with a view to its use, sale,
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                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


     transport, delivery or disposal would be covered within the meaning of
     manufacturing process. The High Court has, on this issue, after relying
     on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Employees’
     State Insurance Corporation, Jullundur Vs. Triplex Dry Cleaners
     and Others, (1982) ILR 2P&H 291 gone on to conclude that the
     use has to be in such a way that a new marketable commodity
     should come into being and it should be known commercially for
     being used as such or for selling the same. According to the High
     Court, only if these ingredients are fulfilled would the definition of
     manufacturing process be attracted. The High Court has further held
     that mere labour bestowed on an article even if the labour is applied
     through machinery will not make it a manufacturing process unless it
     has progressed so far, that a transformation ensues and the article
     becomes commercially known as another and different article from
     that as which it begins its existence.

     OBJECT AND REASONS OF THE ACT OF 1948:-
18. To appreciate the correctness of this finding, we need to examine the
    object and purpose of the Act of 1948. The Act of 1948 was enacted
    to regulate the labour employed in the factories. Originally, the Act
    that was in vogue was the Factories Act of 1934. However, as the
    Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1948 indicates the
    experience of working of the 1934 Act revealed the number of defects
    and weaknesses. One of the reasons for enactment of the Act of
    1948 was to reinforce the provisions with regard to safety, welfare and
    health of the workers. It was expressly noticed in the Statement of
    Objects and Reasons that under the 1934 Act, several undertakings
    were excluded from its scope and it was felt that provisions relating
    to health, working hours, holidays, lighting and ventilation ought to
    be extended to all workplaces in view of the unsatisfactory state of
    affairs as was then prevailing in unregulated factories.
19. The defects in the 1934 Act were sought to be remedied by laying
    down clearly in the Bill itself the minimum requirements regarding
    health (cleanliness, ventilation and temperature, dangerous dust
    and fumes, lighting and control of glare, etc.) safety (eye protection,
    control of explosive and inflammable dusts, etc.) and general welfare
    of workers (washing facilities, first-aid, canteens, shelter rooms,
    creches, etc.). The Act provided formulation of Rules by the State
    Government to the effect that every factory should be registered
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       and should take license for working, which is to be renewed at
       periodic intervals; approval of plans, designs and specifications of
       the proposed construction of factory and so on. The Act of 1948 was
       further amended in 1976 to strengthen the provisions with regard to
       the safety measures to promote the health and welfare of the workers
       employed in factories. A further amendment was made in 1987 for
       dealing with safeguards to be adopted against use and handling of
       hazardous substances by the occupiers of factories and the laying
       down of emergency standards and measures.
20. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1948 along
    with the amendments are extracted hereinbelow:-
            “Statement of Objects and Reasons.- The existing
            law relating to the regulation of labour employed
            in factories in India is embodied in the Factories
            Act, 1934. Experience of the working of the Act has
            revealed a number of defects and weaknesses which
            hamper effective administration. Although the Act has
            been amended in certain respects in a piecemeal fashion
            whenever some particular aspect of labour safety or welfare
            assumed urgent importance, the general framework has
            remained unchanged. The provisions for the safety, health
            and welfare of workers are generally found to be inadequate
            and unsatisfactory and even such protection as is provided
            does not extend to the large mass of workers employed in
            work places not covered by the Act. In view of the large
            and growing industrial activities in the country, a radical
            overhauling of the Factories law is essentially called for
            and cannot be delayed.
            The proposed legislation differs materially from the existing
            law in several respects. Some of the important features
            are herein mentioned. Under the definition of “Factory”
            in the Act of 1934, several undertakings are excluded
            from its scope but it is essential that important basic
            provisions relating to health, working hours, holidays
            lighting and ventilation, should be extended to all
            workplaces in view of the unsatisfactory state of
            affairs now prevailing in unregulated factories. Further,
            the present distinction between seasonal and perennial
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           factories which has little justification has been done away
           with. The minimum age of employment for children has
           been raised from 12 to 13 and their working hours reduced
           from 5 to 4½ with powers to Provincial Governments to
           prescribe even a higher minimum age for employment in
           hazardous undertakings.
           The present Act is very general in character and leaves
           too much to the rule making powers of the Provincial
           Governments. While some of them do have rules of
           varying stringency, the position on the whole is not
           quite satisfactory. This defect is sought to be remedied
           by laying down clearly in the Bill itself the minimum
           requirements regarding health (cleanliness, ventilation
           and temperature, dangerous dusts and fumes, lighting
           and control of glare, etc.) safety (eye protection, control
           of explosive and inflammable dusts. etc.), and general
           welfare of workers (washing facilities, first-aid, canteens,
           shelter rooms, creches, etc.) amplified where necessary,
           by rules and regulations to be prescribed by Provincial
           Governments.
           Further, the present Act leaves important and complex points
           to the discretion of inspectors placing heavy responsibility
           on them. In view of the specialised, and hazardous nature
           of the processes employed in the factories it is too much
           to expect Inspectors to possess an expert knowledge of
           all these matters. The detailed provisions contained in the
           Bill will go a long way in lightening their burden.
           Some difficulties experienced in the administration of the
           Act, especially relating to hours of employment, holidays
           with pay, etc., have been met by making the provisions
           more definite and clearer. The penalty clauses have also
           been simplified. An important provision has also been made
           in the Bill empowering Provincial Governments to require
           that every factory should be registered and should take a
           license for working to be renewed at periodical intervals.
           Provincial Governments are further being empowered to
           require that before a new factory is constructed or any
           extensions are made to an existing one, the plans designs
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       and specifications of the proposed construction should
       receive their prior approval.
       It is expected that the Bill, when enacted into law, will
       considerably advance the condition of workers in factories.
       The substantial changes made in the existing law are also
       indicated in the Notes on Clauses [omitted] Opportunity
       has also been taken to arrange the existing law and to
       revise expressions, where necessary.
       Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act
       94 of 1976.- The main object of the Factories Act, 1948 is
       to ensure adequate safety measures and to promote the
       health and welfare of the workers employed in factories,
       Government are, therefore, initiating various measures
       from time to time to ensure that adequate standards of
       safety, health and welfare are achieved at all work places.
       In particular, in the context of the need to secure maximum
       production and productivity an appropriate work culture
       conducive to safety, health and happiness of workers has
       to be evolved in the factories.
       To achieve these objectives more effectively it has become
       necessary to amend the Factories Act. The amendments
       proposed to be made in the Act by the Bill mainly relate to
       (1) the modification of the definition of the term “worker”, so
       as to include within its meaning contract labour employed
       in any manufacturing process, (2) improvement of the
       provisions in regard to safety and appointment of safety
       officers, (3) reduction of the minimum number of women
       employees, for the purpose of providing creches by
       employers, from fifty to thirty and (4) provisions for inquiry
       in every case of a fatal accident.
       Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act
       20 of 1987.-The Factories Act, 1948 provides for the
       health, safety, welfare and other aspects of workers in
       factories. The Act is enforced by the State Governments
       through their Factory Inspectorates. The Act also empowers
       the State Governments to frame rules, so that the local
       conditions prevailing in the State are appropriately reflected
       in the enforcement. The Act was last amended in 1976
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           for strengthening the provisions relating to safety and
           health at work, extending the scope of the definition of
           “workers”, providing for statutory health surveys, and
           requiring appointment of safety officers in large factories.
           2. After the last amendment to the Act, there has been
           substantial modernisation and innovation in the industrial
           field. Several chemical industries have come up which deal
           with hazardous and toxic substances. This has brought
           in its train problems of industrial safety and occupational
           health hazards. It is, therefore, considered necessary
           that the Act may be appropriately amended, among other
           things, to provide specially for the safeguards to be adopted
           against use and handling of hazardous substances by the
           occupiers of factories and the laying down of emergency
           standards and measures. The amendments would also
           include procedures for sitting of hazardous industries to
           ensure that hazardous and polluting industries are not
           set up in areas where they can cause adverse effects on
           the general public. Provision has also been made for the
           workers’ participation in safety management.
           3. Opportunity has been availed of to make the punishments
           provided in the Act stricter and certain other amendments
           found necessary in the implementation of the Act
           4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

     THE ACT OF 1948:-
     A STATUTE TO AMELIORATE THE CONDITIONS OF WORKMEN
21. This Court dealing with the legislative intent of the Act of 1948 in
    Balwant Rai Saluja & Anr. v. Air India Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC
    407 held as under:-
           “28. The 1948 Act is a social legislation and it provides
           for the health, safety, welfare, working hours, leave
           and other benefits for workers employed in factories
           and it also provides for the improvement of working
           conditions within the factory premises. Section 2 of the
           1948 Act is the interpretation clause. Apart from others,
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          it provides the definition of “worker” under Section 2(l)
          of the 1948 Act, to mean a person employed, directly or
          through any other agency, whether for wages or not, in
          any manufacturing or cleaning process.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

22. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 659, this
    Court held as under:-
          “19. … The Factories Act, 1948 cannot but be ascribed
          to be a beneficial piece of legislation and the requirement
          of Section 61, in particular, sub-sections (1) and (2) of
          Section 61 can be easily deciphered since the intent stands
          clear enough to indicate that an adult worker must know
          his daily placement and daily workings beforehand — this
          placement beforehand is the requirement of the statute in
          Section 63 and in the event of non-compliance, there is
          a liability for being prosecuted. We have in the complaint
          a statement that Form 14 does not stand completed. We
          have also in the complaint the number of working hours
          on a day but the requirement of Form 14, the Inspector
          alleges does not stand fulfilled. It is too early at this stage,
          however, to contend that the aforesaid statement does not
          stand to reason and the complaint needs to be quashed
          at this stage of the proceeding.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

       SOME RELEVANT PROVISIONS FROM THE ACT OF 1948:-
23. A bare perusal of the Act of 1948 would also reveal that Section
    6 provided for the approval, licensing and registration of factories
    in accordance with the Rules made by the State Government, the
    obligation of the occupier to issue notice was provided under Section
    7; the prescription of general duties of the occupier was provided
    under Section 7A; the general duties of manufacturers were provided
    under Section 7B; the provisions for appointment of inspectors were
    made under Section 8 and their powers specified in Section 9.
24. Chapter III of the Act of 1948 deals with health and obliges the
    factories premises to be kept clean (Section 11), disposal of wastes
    and effluents (Section 12), ventilation and temperature (Section 13),
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     regulation of dust and fume (Section 14), artificial humidification
     (Section 15), regulations of overcrowding in rooms (Section 16),
     provision for lighting (Section 17), provision for drinking water (Section
     18) and provision for latrines and urinals (Section 19).
25. Chapter IV deals with safety aspects, namely, fencing of machinery
    (Section 21), regulation of work on or near machinery in motion
    (Section 22), provision with regard to employment of young persons
    on dangerous machines (Section 23) and so on. Apart from other
    salient features in Chapter IV, precautions in case of fire (Section
    38), safety of buildings and machinery (Section 40), maintenance of
    buildings Section 40A are provided for. An exclusive Chapter IV-A
    deals with provisions relating to hazardous processes.
26. Chapter V deals with welfare measures for workers; Chapter VI deals
    with working hours of adults and provides for weekly hours (Section
    51), weekly holidays (Section 52), daily hours (Section 54) and night
    shifts (Section 57), extra wages for overtime (Section 59) and so
    on. In the same Chapter, Section 62 provides for maintenance of
    register of adult workers.
27. Chapter VII deals with the employment of young persons; Section 67
    proscribes employment of any child under the age of 14 years from
    working in a factory; Section 71 provides working hours for children
    above the age of 14 years and Section 73 provides for maintaining
    a register of child workers. Chapter VIII deals with annual leave
    with wages. Thereafter, in Chapter X dealing with penalties and
    procedure, general penalty for offences is provided in Section 92,
    which reads as under:-
           “92. General penalty for offences.- Save as is otherwise
           expressly provided in this Act and subject to the provisions
           of Section 93, if in, or in respect of, any factory there is
           any contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or
           of any rules made thereunder or of any order in writing
           given thereunder, the occupier and manager of the factory
           shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable with
           imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or
           with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or with both,
           and if the contravention is continued after conviction, with
           a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees
           for each day on which the contravention is so continued:
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          Provided that where contravention of any of the provisions
          of Chapter IV or any rule made thereunder or under
          Section 87 has resulted in an accident causing death or
          serious bodily injury, the fine shall not be less than twenty-
          five thousand rupees in the case of an accident causing
          death, and five thousand rupees in the case of an accident
          causing serious bodily injury.”
28. Section 93 deals with liability of owner of premises in certain
    circumstances provided therein. Section 105 provides for cognizance
    of offences and states that no Court shall take cognizance of any
    offence except on complaint by, or with the previous sanction in
    writing of, an inspector and Section 105(2) provides that no Court
    below that of a Presidency Magistrate or of a Magistrate of the first
    class shall try any offence punishable under this Act.
29. The above conspectus of the legal provisions, discussed
    hereinabove, clearly demonstrate that the Act of 1948 is a welfare
    statute aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the workmen
    employed in factories. It is a beneficial legislation intended to
    protect workers from occupational hazards by seeking to impose
    upon owners and occupiers certain obligations for protecting the
    workers and securing their employment in conditions conducive to
    their health and safety.

       APPLICABLE RULES OF INTERPRETATION: -
30. Acts of this nature which are social welfare legislation and intended
    to benefit the large community of workers ought to be interpreted in a
    manner to give efficacy to legislative intent. This approach has been
    adopted in catena of judgments by this Court. This Court in Works
    Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath &
    Ors., (1969) 3 SCC 95 held as under:-
          “11. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate
          and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is
          probably true that all legislation in a welfare State is
          enacted with the object of promoting general welfare;
          but certain types of enactments are more responsive
          to some urgent social demands and also have more
          immediate and visible impact on social vices by
          operating more directly to achieve social reforms The
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          357

                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


           enactments with which we are concerned, in our view,
           belong to this category and, therefore, demand an
           interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative
           purpose, without doing violence to the language.
           The definition of “worker” in the Factories Act, therefore,
           does not seem to us to exclude those employees who
           are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise
           fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Keeping in
           view the duties and functions of the respondents as found
           by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable
           to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the
           High Court that they fall within the definition of the word
           “worker”. Deletion of the word “whatsoever” on which the
           appellant’s counsel has placed reliance does not seem
           to make much difference because that word was, in our
           view, redundant.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

31. This Court in Allahabad Bank & Anr. v. All India Allahabad Bank
    Retired Employees Association, (2010) 2 SCC 44 held as under:-
           “16. We shall proceed to examine the point urged
           by the learned counsel for the appellant. Remedial
           statutes, in contradistinction to penal statutes, are
           known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented
           legislations. Such welfare statutes always receive
           a liberal construction. They are required to be so
           construed so as to secure the relief contemplated by
           the statute. It is well settled and needs no restatement
           at our hands that labour and welfare legislation have
           to be broadly and liberally construed having due
           regard to the directive principles of State policy. The
           Act with which we are concerned for the present is
           undoubtedly one such welfare oriented legislation
           meant to confer certain benefits upon the employees
           working in various establishments in the country.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

32. In Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2016) 10
    SCC 329, this Court held as under:-
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           “44. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand
           Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61, in
           the following words: (SCC p. 66, para 20)
               “20. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is
               a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of
               the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is
               to provide for certain benefits to employees
               of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and
               employment injury and to make provision for
               certain other matters in relation thereto. The
               Employees’ State Insurance Act is a social
               security legislation and the canons of interpreting
               a social legislation are different from the canons
               of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must
               not countenance any subterfuge which would
               defeat the provisions of social legislation and
               the courts must even, if necessary, strain the
               language of the Act in order to achieve the
               purpose which the legislature had in placing
               this legislation on the statute book. The Act,
               therefore, must receive a liberal construction
               so as to promote its objects.”

       RULE OF ‘PLAIN MEANING’:-
33. Reverting to the statutory provisions, it is clear on a plain reading
    of Section 2(k) of the Act of 1948 that ‘washing or cleaning’ of any
    article or substance with a view to its delivery is clearly covered
    by the phrase “manufacturing process”. Where the words of
    statute are clear, the plain meaning has to be given effect. We
    have no doubt in our mind that the business of laundry carried
    on by the respondent involving cleaning and washing of clothes
    including dry cleaning would be squarely covered by the expression
    “manufacturing process”. Admittedly, they employed more than 9
    workers in the centralized processing unit and also used the aid
    of power.
34. The plain meaning rule was explained by this Court in Jeewanlal
    Ltd. & Ors. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity
    Act & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 356, which reads as under:-
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                            359

                  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


           “11. In construing a social welfare legislation, the court
           should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a
           section is capable of two constructions, that construction
           should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and
           is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the
           Act has been passed. When, however, the language is
           plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect
           to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that
           case, the words of the statute speak the intention
           of the Legislature. When the language is explicit, its
           consequences are for the Legislature and not for the
           courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience
           and hardship is a dangerous one and is only
           admissible in construction where the meaning of
           the statute is obscure and there are two methods of
           construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficent
           purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the
           temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

     APPLICATION OF THE MISCHIEF RULE:-
35. To reinforce our holding, we may usefully refer to the definition of
    “manufacturing process” as was defined in the Factories Act of 1934
    under Section 2(g) thereof which reads as follows.
           “2(g) “manufacturing process” means any process-
           (i)    for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing
                  or packing, or otherwise treating any article or
                  substance with a view to its use, sale, transport,
                  delivery or disposal, or
           (ii)   for pumping oil, water or sewage, or
           (iii) for generating, transforming or transmitting power.”
36. It is very clear that Section 2(g) of the 1934 Act did not have the
    words ‘washing, cleaning’ and they have been specifically brought in
    the Act of 1948 with a clear object of bringing into the fold of the Act
    undertakings excluded from the scope of the 1934 Act as discussed
    in the Statement of Objects and Reasons set out hereinabove.
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37. Dealing with the mischief rule, this Court in Steel Authority of India
    Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors., (2001)
    7 SCC 1 held as under:-
          “66. For a proper examination of these issues, a reference
          to Section 10 which provides for prohibition of employment
          of contract labour and clauses (b), (c), (e), (g) and (i)
          of Section 2(1) of the CLRA Act which define the terms
          “contract labour”, “contractor”, “establishment”, “principal
          employer” and “workman” respectively will be apposite. To
          interpret these and other relevant provisions of the CLRA
          Act, to which reference will be made presently, we may,
          with advantage, refer to Craies on Statute Law [ 6th Edn.,
          by S.G.G. Edgar, p. 96] quoting the following observation
          of Lindley, M.R. in Mayfair Property Co., Re [(1898) 2 Ch
          28, 35 in regard to the rule in Heydon’s case [(1584) 3
          Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] :
          “In order to properly interpret any statute it is as
          necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported
          Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] to
          consider how the law stood when the statute to be
          construed was passed, what the mischief was for which
          the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided
          by the statute to cure that mischief.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)

       ERROR IN EXTRAPOLATING THE MEANING FROM THE
       CENTRAL EXCISE ACT:-
38. The reasoning of the High Court that a transformation has to ensue
    and the new article must come into being and that it should be
    commercially known as another and different article is a totally
    erroneous finding. The High Court has clearly ignored the plain
    language of the Section and has been completely oblivious
    about the welfare nature of the Statute. The High Court has
    extrapolated the definition of “manufacture” as is in vogue in the
    Central Excise Act 1944. Under the Central Excise Act of 1944,
    a statute traceable to the definition of “manufacture” in Section
    2(f) reads as under:
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                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


           “(f) “manufacture” includes any process—
           (i) incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured
           product;
           (ii) which is specified in relation to any goods in the Section
           or Chapter Notes of the Fourth Schedule as amounting
           to manufacture; or
           (iii) which, in relation to the goods specified in the Third
           Schedule, involves packing or repacking of such goods
           in a unit container or labelling or re-labelling of containers
           including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price
           on it or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to
           render the product marketable to the consumer;
           and the word “manufacture” shall be construed accordingly
           and shall include not only a person who employs hired
           labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods,
           but also any person who engages in their production or
           manufacture on his own account;”
     The High Court has been carried away by the interpretation given
     by courts while interpreting the Central Excise Act.
39. Dealing with the features of manufacture under the Central Excise
    Act, 1944, this Court in Crane Betel Nut Powder Works vs. Commr.
    of Customs & Central Excise, Tirupathi & Anr., (2007) 4 SCC
    155 observed as under:-
           “31. In our view, the process of manufacture employed
           by the appellant Company did not change the nature of
           the end product, which in the words of the Tribunal, was
           that in the end product the “betel nut remains a betel nut”.
           The said observation of the Tribunal depicts the status of
           the product prior to manufacture and thereafter. In those
           circumstances, the views expressed in Delhi Cloth &
           General Mills Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 791 and the passage
           from the American judgment (supra) become meaningful.
           The observation that manufacture implies a change, but
           every change is not manufacture and yet every change of
           an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation
           is apposite to the situation at hand. The process involved
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            in the manufacture of sweetened betel nut pieces does
            not result in the manufacture of a new product as the end
            product continues to retain its original character though
            in a modified form.”
       [See also in this Context Kores India Ltd., Chennai v. Commissioner
       of Central Excise, Chennai, (2005) 1 SCC 385 (paras 11 and 12)]
40. However, the above judgments under the Central Excise Act can
    have no application since the Act of 1948 defines the expression
    “manufacturing process” which definition is different from the one
    under the Central Excise Act.
41. Where a statute under consideration itself defines for the purposes
    of the said Act a certain phrase, a court of law is bound to apply
    the term as defined except in exceptional cases where the opening
    part of a definition, ‘anything repugnant in the subject or context’
    applies. Recently, this Court in Independent Sugar Corporation
    Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 181
    held as under:-
            “49. Lord Atkinson in Corp. of the City of Victoria v. Bishop
            of Vancouver Island [1921 SCC OnLine PC 75] observed:
            “In the construction of statutes, their words must be
            interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless
            there be something in the context, or in the object of the
            statute, in which they occur, or in the circumstances in which
            they are used, to show that they were used in a special
            sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.”
            50. That words in the statute are to be understood in
            their natural, ordinary and popular sense. This has been
            underscored by Justice Frankfurter, in the following opinion:
            “After all legislation when not expressed in technical terms
            is addressed to common run of men and is therefore
            to be understood according to sense of the thing, as
            the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words
            addressed [Wilma E. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
            322 US 607 (1944)].”
            51. The above pronouncements make it clear that when the
            words used are clear, plain and unambiguous, the courts
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             363

                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


           are duty-bound to give effect to the meaning emerging out
           of such plain words. The intention of the legislature must
           be gathered from the language used and also, the words
           not used. It becomes imperative to understand those words
           in their natural and ordinary sense, and any interpretation
           requiring for its support addition or substitution or rejection
           of words as meaningless, must ordinarily be avoided.”

     ACTIVITY OF THE RESPONDENT – A MANUFACTURING
     PROCESS:-
42. The Act of 1948 defines “manufacturing process” and we clearly
    find that “washing, cleaning” and the activities carried out by the
    respondent with a view to its use, delivery or disposal are squarely
    attracted. The contention of the respondent that dry cleaning does
    not make any product usable, saleable or worthy of transport, delivery
    or disposal has only to be stated to be rejected. “Manufacturing
    process” has been defined to mean any process for washing or
    cleaning with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal.
    The linen deposited with the launderer is, after washing and cleaning,
    delivered to the customer for use. The ingredients of the section
    are fully satisfied. There is nothing in the Act of 1948, which is
    repugnant in the subject or context, constraining us to jettison the
    definition. Hence, we reject the findings of the High Court and hold
    that the activity carried out which on facts is not disputed is clearly
    covered by the definition of “manufacturing process” under Section
    2(k) which, in turn, would bring the premises in question of the
    respondent under the definition of “factory” under Section 2(m). If
    that were so, the complaint lodged against the respondent could not
    have been quashed.
43. The High Court has been carried away by the holding of the Punjab
    and Haryana High Court in Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra). The said
    case has no application for the following reasons: Firstly, that case
    was under the Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, and
    that too before the definition of “manufacturing process” as defined
    in the Act of 1948 was incorporated in the ESIC Act. The definition
    under the ESIC Act prior to 1989 merely defined a “factory” under
    Section 2(12) in the following terms.
           “(12) “factory” means any premises including the precincts
           thereof-
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          (a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or were
          employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve
          months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process
          is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily
          so carried on, or
          (b) whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were
          employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve
          months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process
          is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily
          so carried on. but does not include a mine subject to the
          operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed”
44. It was only with effect from 20.10.1989, Section 2(14AA) was
    introduced in the ESIC Act which reads as under:-
          “(14AA) “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning
          assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948;”
45. Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra) was decided by a learned Single
    Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Punjab and Haryana on
    22.10.1981 when Section 2(14AA) was not in the statute. This is
    precisely why this Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation
    Vs. Triplex Dry Cleaners and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 196 held as
    under in Para 6 while dismissing the appeal of the Employees’ State
    Insurance Corporation.
          “6. We, however, hasten to point out that we are here
          concerned with the show-cause notice dated 21-1-1978.
          At that point of time, Section 2(14-AA) had not been
          inserted in the Act which defines manufacturing process
          as having the same meaning which is assigned to it under
          the Factories Act, 1948. This provision was inserted
          with effect from 20-10-1989. We, therefore, express no
          opinion with regard to the applicability of the Act to an
          establishment engaged in the business of dry cleaning
          after 20-10-1989 inasmuch as Section 2(14-AA) attracts
          the applicability of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act,
          1948 which defines manufacturing process which may
          conceivably include the process of repairing, washing
          or cleaning of any article with a view to its use. However,
          insofar as this appeal is concerned, inasmuch as it relates
          to a period prior to 20-10-1989 when there was no such
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                           365

                The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi


           definition of manufacturing process applicable to the Act,
           it must fail and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no
           order as to costs.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

     This present case arises squarely under the Act of 1948 and
     hence with the definition of the Statute in the Act of 1948 clearly
     contemplating ‘washing, cleaning’ there is no scope for applying
     Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra). Equally the judgment in Super
     Cleaners Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation, 2006 SCC
     OnLine Bom 1660, will have no application since, it stands similar
     to the situation in Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra).
46. Recently in J.P. Lights India v. Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation,
    Bangalore, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1271, applying the amended
    Section 2(14 AA), this Court, while dealing with servicing of electrical
    goods, had the following to say. This Court, speaking through Hima
    Kohli J, pithily set out the statement of law as under.
           “7. It is apparent from a perusal of the definition of the
           word “Factory”, as used in the ESI Act that it means
           any premises including precincts wherein ten or more
           persons are employed or were employed on any day of
           the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a
           manufacturing process was being carried out or ordinarily
           so carried out, with an exception of a mine or a railway
           running shed.
           8. Section 2(14AA) of the ESI Act defines the expression
           “manufacturing process” as one, defined under the
           Factories Act, 1948. The said Act defines the expression
           “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) that is sub-
           divided into six sub-heads. For the purposes of the present
           case, Section 2(k)(i) is relevant which makes it clear that a
           “manufacturing process” may include ‘any process amongst
           others for altering or repairing or treating/adapting any
           article for its use or disposal’.
           9. In the instant case, the appellant-firm is in the business
           of selling electrical goods in a shop. Admittedly, the shop
           premises is used not only for selling goods, but also to
           service electrical goods. That being the position, it is
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               clear that the appellant-firm falls under the definition of
               a “Factory” and is using a “manufacturing process”, as
               contemplated under both the Statutes.”
47. One additional factor to be noticed in this case is that the respondent
    is registered as a factory under the ESIC Act for the same premises.
    We have, however, not gone by the mere factum of registration but
    have independently arrived at the above conclusion based on the
    interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 1948.
48. The only other argument advanced is that the order issuing process
    is a cryptic order and does not reflect any application of mind. We
    may have been inclined to consider this submission except that in
    view of the categorical findings rendered by us hereinabove any
    exercise of remitting the complaint and asking the Magistrate to
    exercise his powers afresh, would be futile. Hence, we have refrained
    from adopting that course of action.
49. For the reasons set out hereinabove, we allow the appeal and set
    aside the order of the High Court in Stamp Number Main No. 944
    of 2020 (F) dated 06.09.2021. The consequence would be that
    the complaint filed by the appellants along with the order issuing
    process of 04.12.2019 would stand restored to file of the learned
    JMFC, Panaji and shall be proceeded with in accordance with law.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan