Supreme Court of India
ROHAN VIJAY NAHAR & ORS.versusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1296
- Decided
- 7 November 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- VIKRAM NATH
Holding
Vesting of private forests under Section 3(1) of the MPFA requires that a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act be both issued and properly served, and that a final notification and the other statutory steps be completed; absent these, the mutation entries treating the lands as private forests are invalid.
Summary
The appellants, private landowners in Maharashtra, challenged revenue annotations and mutation entries that labelled their lands as private forests and vested in the State, arguing that the statutory requirements for acquisition were not fulfilled. The State contended that notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act in the 1960s, published in the Gazette, sufficed to deem the lands private forests under the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 (MPFA), effecting vesting on the appointed day of 30 August 1975. The Supreme Court examined whether a notice "issued" under Section 35(3) must also be served as required by Section 35(5) and whether a final notification under Section 35(1) and subsequent statutory steps were indispensable for vesting. Relying on the binding ratio in Godrej & Boyce v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that service of the notice and a live statutory process are mandatory, and found that these steps were absent in the present cases. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside, all mutation entries treating the lands as private forests were quashed, and the appeals were allowed.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of a Gazette‑published notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act as a basis for treating land as a private forest under Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA
- Whether service of the notice under Section 35(5) of the Indian Forest Act is a jurisdictional prerequisite for vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA
- The necessity of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act and compliance with Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA for acquisition to be valid
- The effect of prolonged dormancy and the concept of a "live" versus "stale" notice on the vesting process
- The applicability of the ratio decidendi in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra to subsequent purchasers and to the present batch of appeals
Legislation cited
- Constitution of India
- Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
- Indian Forest Act, 1927s. 34A, s. 35, s. 35(1), s. 35(3), s. 35(4), s. 35(5), s. 35(5A), s. 35(6), s. 35(7)
- Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961
- Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966
- Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975s. 22A, s. 24, s. 24(2), s. 2(c‑i), s. 2(f)(iii), s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(3), s. 5
- Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to sustainability of the order passed by the High Court in batch of writ petitions wherein the landholders questioned the legality of revenue annotations and mutation entries that described their lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having Headnotes† Forest Act, 1927 – s.35 – Protection of forests for special purposes – Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA) – 2(f)(iii) – Private forest – Writ petitions by the landholders challenging the legality of revenue
Subjects
LandholdersRevenue annotations and mutation entriesForest proceedingsProtection of forests for special purposesPrivate forestsRecord of rights in the names of the private ownersProtect title and possessionExpropriatory legislationJudicial disciplinePrecedentReliance on Godrej and Boyce’s caseSubsequent purchasersDiscipline of stare decisis
Judgment
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 500 : 2025 INSC 1296
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors.
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5454 of 2019)
07 November 2025
[Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to sustainability of the order passed by the High
Court in batch of writ petitions wherein the landholders questioned
the legality of revenue annotations and mutation entries that
described their lands as affected by forest proceedings and as
having vested in the State.
Headnotes†
Forest Act, 1927 – s.35 – Protection of forests for special
purposes – Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act,
1975 (MPFA) – 2(f)(iii) – Private forest – Writ petitions by the
landholders challenging the legality of revenue annotations
and mutation entries that described their lands as affected
by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State –
Petitioners sought quashing of those entries and a declaration
that their lands were not private forests within the meaning of
the MPFA, and directions to restore the record of rights in the
names of the private owners and for consequential reliefs to
protect title and possession – High Court declined to interfere
with the revenue mutations and annotations that described the
subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having
vested in the State, it proceeded on the footing that notices said
to have been issued around 1960 and published in the Official
Gazette were sufficient foundation to treat the lands as private
forest under the acquisition regime – High Court dismissed the
writ petitions and refused the declaratory and consequential
reliefs sought by the landholders – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – For vesting to occur u/s.3(1) of the MPFA
Act on the footing of s.2(f)(iii), a notice u/s.35(3) of the IFA must
not only be issued but must also be served up-on the landholder
* Author
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 501
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object, and
obliges the State to consider such objection – Notice that grants
time for objections cannot coexist with a final decision u/s.35(1)
without rendering the statutory hearing illusory – Mutation en-
tries are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition
that lacks the statutory predicates – They neither create title
in the State nor divest title from the private owner – On facts,
essential links in the statutory chain are missing – No proof of
service of any s.35(3) notice of the IFA on the then owners, no
final notification u/s.35(1) of the IFA – Actual possession has at
all times remained with private owners which is reflected in the
revenue records that describe them as occupants – No possession
was taken, no schemes set in motion, no compensation exercise
undertaken, and no inquiry held at a time proximate to the
appointed day – Materials produced by the State include undated
and unverified possession papers that do not inspire confidence
when set against decades of undisturbed private possession,
these features are wholly inconsistent with a completed vesting
u/s.3(1) of the MPFA Act – Satellite imagery and panchnamas
drawn in 2016 do not establish the character of the lands on the
appointed day – Nineteenth century notification, invoked for the
first time at the appellate stage to suggest linkage with a reserved
forest, not the foundation of the impugned mutations and cannot
be used to improve the case now – Administrative orders must
stand or fall on the reasons originally given and the High Court
could not sustain vesting on grounds that were never the basis
of action – Absence of any notification u/s.34A of the IFA further
weakens the State’s position – Restoration u/s.22A of the MPFA
Act presupposes a lawful vesting – When the foundational vesting
is unproven, any purported restoration cannot cure the defect,
and in any event the limited window created by s.22A cannot
be reopened decades later – Expropriatory legislation must be
construed strictly and Art.300-A requires that no person is deprived
of property save by authority of law – When a statute prescribes
a manner of doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not
at all – Several mandatory steps are absent – Any one missing
step would defeat vesting – Thus, the High Court erred in treating
the case as if only a consequential mutation remained – Record
shows that the revenue entries continued to carry the names of
the private owners, which indicates that even the State did not
treat these lands as vested forests – To hold that a subsequent
purchaser is in a worse position than one who developed land
502 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
would invert the logic of the statute and would reward illegality while
penalising restraint, said approach is rejected – Remand for an
inquiry u/s.6 of the MPFA Act neither warranted nor efficacious –
Impugned judgment rests on a misreading of the Gazette, an
impermissible dilution of mandatory statutory steps, and reliance
on materials that are extraneous to the original basis of action,
thus, cannot be sustained and is set aside – All mutation orders
and any declarations treating the subject lands as private forests
quashed and set aside. [Paras 13, 16]
Judicial discipline and precedent – Reliance on Godrej and
Boyce’s case – High Court distinguished Godrej and Boyce’s
case observing that owners there had an earlier consent
decree, long-standing sanctioned development, and an
evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through, and of
limited assistance to subsequent purchasers – Correctness:
Held: Judicial discipline required faithful application of the law
declared by this Court u/Art.141 of the Constitution – When a
judgment minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory
steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates
an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent – Such an
approach conveys a measure of pettiness that is inconsistent
with the detachment that judicial reasoning demands – This is an
unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare decisis – Present
appeals are indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce’s
case – Distinctions on which the High Court sought to sidestep
Godrej and Boyce’s case, not concurred with – Differences invoked
by the High Court are insubstantial and cannot displace the binding
ratio – High Court’s approach amounts to an attempt to avoid a
binding precedent rather than to apply it – Impugned reasoning
rests on a misreading of a Gazette publication that only reproduced
a draft text and expressly invited objections – Coordinate Benches
of the High Court have consistently followed Godrej and Boyce’s
case in closely comparable situations – Impugned judgment
nonetheless revives positions that Godrej and Boyce rejected –
Record discloses the same jurisdictional defect of non-service of a
notice u/s.35(3) of the IFA, the same absence of a final notification
u/s.35(1) of the IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps
u/ss.4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA Act – In such circumstances the
High Court could not, consistently with Art.141, avoid the binding
ratio by treating immaterial differences as determinative – Fidelity
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 503
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
to binding precedent and to the statutory scheme admits of no
other conclusion than that the impugned order must be set aside –
Constitution of India. [Para 14]
Case Law Cited
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 2 SCR
203 : (2014) 3 SCC 430; Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of
Maharashtra [2000] 1 SCR 570 : (2000) 3 SCC 143 – referred to.
Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra,
2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311; Satellite Developers Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 66; Sinhagad Technical
Education Society v. Deputy Conservator of Forests, 2015
SCC OnLine Bom 293; Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5832; Arjun Sitaram
Nitanwar (Dr.) v. Tahsildar, District Thane, 2015 SCC OnLine
Bom 295; Lalit A. Sangtani v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC
OnLine Bom 248; Bharat Chandulal Nanavati v. Union of India,
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3862; Global Estate Developers v.
State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8345; Indrajeet
Kashinath Kaiswal v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine
Bom 6743; Nana Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, 2016
SCC OnLine Bom 340; Shree Maruti Sansthan Trust v. State of
Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 7074; Vishram Vishwanath
Kunte v. State of Maharashtra, WP No. 594 of 2022, decided on
16.09.2022 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Forest Act, 1927; Maharashtra Private
Forests Acquisition Act, 1975; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980;
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966; Maharashtra Regional
and Town Planning Act, 1966.
List of Keywords
Landholders; Revenue annotations and mutation entries; Forest
proceedings; Protection of forests for special purposes; Private
forests; Record of rights in the names of the private owners; Protect
title and possession; Expropriatory legislation; Judicial discipline;
Precedent; Reliance on Godrej and Boyce’s case; Subsequent
purchasers; Discipline of stare decisis.
504 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5454
of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 6417 of 2015
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 5501, 5511,9434, 5468, 5458, 5473, 5455,
5466, 5456, 5457, 5460, 5469, 5462, 5503, 5465, 5459, 5461,
5467, 5463, 5464, 5483, 5834, 5504, 5512, 5474, 5508, 5476,
5506, 5478, 5487, 5480, 5481, 5608, 5502, 5509, 5513, 5505,
5507, 6245, 5491, 5490, 5489, 5471, 5470, 5472, 5488, 5499,
5482, 5477, 5486, 5475, 5485, 5484, 5479, 5492, 5493, 5497,
5498, 5495, 5496, 5494, and 5500 of 2019, and Civil Appeal No(s).
1504, 574, 582, 576, 1538, 1721, and 3433 of 2020, Civil Appeal
No(s). 1592, and 1594 of 2023, Civil Appeal Nos. 14074, 14075,
14076, 14077, 14087, 14078, 14083, 14079, 14080, 14081, 14105,
14086, 14098, 14088, 14089, 14106, 14094, 14097, 14082, 14085,
14073, 14070, 14103, and 14104 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Ms. Madhavi Divan, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Anil Kaushik, C.U. Singh,
Prasenjit Keswani, Siddharth Bhatnagar, Ms. Shyel Trehan, Atul
Y Chitale, Vineet Naik, Shekhar Naphade, Gaurav Agrawal,
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Vineet Naik, Shyam Mehta, Guru Krishna
Kumar, Ms. Madhavi Divan, Vinay Navare, Abhimanyu Bhandari,
Aniruddh Joshi, Mukul Rohatgi, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Ajit
Kumar Sinha, Sr. Advs., Santosh Krishnan, Sameer Choudhary,
Ms. Charu Sangwan, Avishkar Singhvi, Shubham S. Dayma, Ms.
Harshita Tyagi, Dhaval Mehrotra, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam,
Rahul Garg, Ms. Aditi Desai, Rajat Rana, Nitin Mishra, Ms. Mitali
Gupta, Ms. Vandana Anand, Rajat Sehgal, Surya Rajkapoor,
Upmanyu Tewari, Devajyoti Bhattacharya, Satyajit Saha, Mrs. V.
D. Khanna, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Monisha Mane Bhangale,
Pranav Sarthi, Ms. Shivalika Rudrabatla, Ms. Vidhi Jain, Ms.
Apoorva Singh, Ms. Harbani Shinh, Sidharth Das, Ms. Tatini Basu,
Kumar Shashank, Kunal Vajani, Sukand Kulkarni, Shubhang
Tandon, Ms. Shraddha Chirania, Kunal Mimani, Dharav Shah,
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 505
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Dhawal Desai, Ms. Tanesh Paranjape, Pranaya Goyal, Shardul
Singh, Ms. Prerna Gandhi, C. George Thomas, Shivaji M.
Jadhav, V.A. Gangal, Ms. Divya Parab, Sukand Kulkarni, Brij
Kishor Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Vignesh Singh, Aditya S.
Jadhav, Amit Kumar Gupta, Ankit Sahu, varad Kilor, Shivaji M.
Jadhav, Amit Mehta, Ooril Panchal, Kush Chaturvedi, Saket
Mone, Vishesh Kalra, Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini, Neel Kamal
Mishra, Syed Faraz Alam, Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Agarwal,
Shaurya Gupta, Satyajeet Kumar, Pravartak Pathak, Yashodhan
Chandurkar, Ms. Manisha Jain, Mansi Jain, Ms. Roohe Hina
Dua, Ms. Dhanakshi Gamdhi, Goutam Prasad, Arth Arora, Ms.
Dhankshi Gandhi, Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Pravartak
Pathak, Yashodhan Chandurkar, Ms. Manshi Jain, Ms. Abha R.
Sharma, Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Shreeyash Uday Lalit,
Neelam Prasad, Archit Jain, Ms. Runjhun Garg, Dr. Rukma
George, Himanshu Vats, Sumit Kumar Siddharth, Angad Pahal,
Yudhvir Dalal, Lavam Tyagi, Kumar Arjun Toppo, Ishaan George,
Anish R. Shah, Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Mohini Priya, Ishaan George,
Dr. Rukma George, Archit Jain, Sumit Kumar Siddharth, Yudhvir
Dalal, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Chirag M. Shroff,
Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Mayank Kshirsagar, Ameya Borwankar,
Parth Sarathi, Aashit Kankariya, Mrs. Anumita Verma, Aman
Varma, Vishesh Kalra, Ms. Smriti Churiwal, Ms. Riya Wasade,
Ms. Anoushka Deo, Ms. Sonia Sharma, Ms. Rajkumari Banju,
Satyajit A Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Sachin
Singh, Ananya Thapliyal, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Preetraj R. Dhok,
Saurav Agarwal, Mrs. Sonali Jaitley Bakhshi, Jaiyesh Bakhshi,
Ravi Tyagi, Mayank Mishra, Ms. Manmilan Sidhu, Ankit Tyagi,
Atharva Koppal, Ms. Bhumika Bhatnagar, Ms. Sudiksha Saini,
Shikhar Misra, Ms. Prachi Dubey, Kunal Cheema, Mr. Shubham
Chandankhede, Raghav Deshpande, Ms. Kirti Shar-ma, Amol
Chitale, Sarthak Sharma, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, R. P. Gupta, Ms.
Rekha Agarwal, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Ms. Kanika, Raj Singh
Rana, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N.pahune Patil, Yash
Prashant Sonavane, Ms. Shruti Munjal, Anupam Raina, Ms.
Chetna Verma, Karan Gaba, Joseph Pookkatt, Bhuvan Thakker,
Nilesh Sharma, Ms. Awantika Manohar, Ms. Parul Dhurvey,
Dhawesh Pahuja, M/s Ap & J Chambers, R. Chandrachud, Amey
Nabar, Dhuli Venkata Krishna, Preetam Shah, K. Krishna Kumar,
Gaganjyot Singh, Ms. Tanya Srivastava.
506 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Advs. for the Respondents:
Balbir Singh, K. Parameshwwar, Vinay Navare, Sr. Advs., Siddharth
Dharmadhikari, Shrirang B. Varma, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Naman Tandon, Bharat Bagla, Karan Sachdev, Ms. Shivali Shah,
Aditya Krishna, Dr. Ravindra Sadanand Chingale, Navneet R.,
Shreeyash Uday Lalit, Ms. Runjhun Garg, Himanshu Vats, Angad
Pahal, Lavam Tyagi, Ishaan George, T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas,
Satyajit A. Desai, Amit K. Pathak, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Siddharth
Gautam, Sachin Singh, Ananya Thapliyal, Preetraj R. Dhok, Ms.
Anagha S. Desai.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1. The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not dominion. The
Constitution of India creates courts of record that are independent
in their spheres and yet binds them together through a coherent
hierarchy. The High Courts in India possess a wide jurisdiction, but
the Supreme Court of India remains the final interpreter of law. Article
141 of the Constitution of India1 declares that the law laid down by
this Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144 of the
Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of
this Court. These are not ceremonial recitals. They are the structural
guarantees that convert dispersed adjudication into a single system
that speaks with one voice and commands public confidence.
2. Appellate jurisdiction exists to correct errors and to settle the law
so that like cases receive like outcomes. When a superior court
reverses, modifies, or remands, the court below must give full and
faithful effect to that disposition. The authority to decide on appeal
carries the authority to require compliance, for without obedience,
the hierarchy would become an empty form. Resistance or evasion
does not merely disserve a party before the court, it erodes
predictability, multiplies litigation, and weakens faith in the rule of
law. The maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which literally
1 Hereinafter referred to as, “the Constitution”
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 507
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
means that it is in the public interest that litigation should come to an
end, reminds us that the society has an interest in achieving finality,
and finality from the apex court is the glue that holds a nationwide
system of justice together.
3. Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into harmony. It
requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to binding precedent
even where a judge is personally unpersuaded. The lawful course
is to apply the precedent and, if needed, record reasons for inviting
a larger Bench to reconsider it. The unlawful and unjust course is
to distinguish in name while disregarding in substance or to recast
issues in order to sidestep a rule that binds. “Stare decisis et non
quieta movere” which means to stand by decisions and not to
disturb settled matters, is not a slogan but a safeguard of equality
before the law. Judges do not sit to settle scores. The gavel is an
instrument of reason and not a weapon of reprisal. A vindictive
stance is incompatible with the oath to uphold the Constitution
and the law.
4. Judges across our country must remember that collegiality is the
companion virtue of independence and that a reversal on appeal is
not a personal affront but the ordinary operation of a constitutional
hierarchy that corrects error and settles law. Respect for the senior
jurisdiction is not subservience. It is an acknowledgment that all
courts pursue a common enterprise to do justice according to law. An
Appellate Court reviews and, where necessary, sets right the decision
of the lower court with restraint and measured language, and the
courts below reciprocate through prompt, reasoned, and transparent
compliance. Courts speak through reasons, and reasons that align
with binding authority preserve both legality and legitimacy of the
judiciary. Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution make obedience
a constitutional duty and not a matter of personal preference. A
judgment that attempts to resist binding authority undermines the
unity of law, burdens litigants with avoidable expense and delay,
and invites the perception that outcomes depend on the identity
of the judge. In a constitutional judiciary, it is the law, as declared,
that brings the conversation to a close. We restate the simple duty
of Courts: apply precedent as it stands and give effect to appellate
directions as they are framed. In that discipline lies the confidence
of litigants and the credibility of courts.
508 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
5. The present batch of 96 civil appeals arises from the judgment dated
27.09.2018 rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
a group of writ petitions preferred by the appellants. The High Court
declined to interfere with the revenue mutations and annotations that
described the subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as
having vested in the State. The High Court proceeded on the footing
that notices said to have been issued around 1960 and published
in the Official Gazette were sufficient foundation to treat the lands
as private forest under the acquisition regime. On this approach the
High Court dismissed the writ petitions and refused the declaratory
and consequential reliefs sought by the landholders. One of those
petitions is Writ Petition No. 6417 of 2015 which has given rise to the
civil appeal before us titled “Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others versus
The State of Maharashtra and Others.”
6. Before proceeding to the specific facts of these appeals, it is necessary
to set out the provisions central to the matters before us.
6.1. The Indian Forest Act, 19272, as adapted and amended in the
erstwhile State of Bombay and in the State of Maharashtra,
contains Chapter V which deals with control over forests and
lands not being the property of Government. By the Indian
Forest Act as amended by Bombay Act 62 of 1948, Section 34-A
was inserted to provide an inclusive definition of “forest” for the
purposes of Chapter V. By the same amending law, “wastelands”
were removed from the reach of certain parts of Chapter V with
effect from 04.12.1948. Further amendments were carried out
by Bombay Act 24 of 1955 and by Maharashtra Act 6 of 1961.
Section 35 of this Act empowers the State Government to
regulate or prohibit specified activities in any forest for stated
public purposes. The aforementioned provisions have been
reproduced hereunder:
“34A. Interpretation :- For the purposes of the
Chapter “forest” includes any land containing trees
and shrubs, pasture, lands and any other land
whatsoever which the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a
forest.
2 Hereinafter referred to as, “IFA”
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 509
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
35. Protection of forests for special purposes :-
(1) The State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette-
(i) regulate or prohibit in any forest-
(a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for
cultivation ;
(b) the pasturing of cattle;
(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;
(d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the
stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees;
(e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;
(f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of
trees and timber; or
(g) the quarring of stone or the burning of lime or
charcoal or the collection or removal of any forest
produce or its subjection to any manufacturing
process;
(ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of forests
and their protection from fire; when such regulation
or prohibition appears necessary for any of the
following purposes;
(a) for the conservation of trees and forests;
(b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or
the reclamation of saline or water logged land, the
prevention of landslips or of the formation of ravines
and torrents, or the protection of land against erosion,
or the deposit thereon of sand, stones or gravel;
(c) for the improvement of grazing;
(d) for the maintenance of a water supply in spring,
river and tanks;
(e) for the maintenance, increase and distribution
of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel;
510 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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(f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works
and hydro-electric works;
(g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling stones,
floods and drought;
(h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways and
other lines of communication ; and
(i) for the preservation of the public health.
(2) The State Government may, for any such purpose,
construct at its own expense in any forest such work
as it thinks fit.
(3) No notification shall be made under sub section
(1) nor shall any work be begun under sub section
(2), until after the issue by an officer authorised by
the State Government in that behalf of a notice to the
owner of such forest calling on him to show cause
within a reasonable period to be specified in such
notice why such notification should not be made or
work constructed as the case may be, and until his
objection, if any, and any evidence he may produce
in support of the same, have been heard by an
officer duly appointed in that behalf and have been
considered by the State Government.
(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under
sub section (1) should not be made, may require
that for any period not exceeding one year or till
the date of the making of a notification, whichever
is earlier the owner of such forest and all persons
who are entitled or permitted to do therein any or
all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub section
(1), whether by reason of any right, title or interest
or under any licence or contract or otherwise, shall
not, after the date of the notice and for the period or
until the date aforesaid, as the case may be, do any
or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub section
(1), to the extent specified in the notice.
(5) A notice issued under sub section (3) shall be
served on the owner of such forest in the manner
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 511
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the
service of summons and shall also be published in
the manner prescribed by rules.
(5A) Where a notice issued under sub section (3) has
been served on the owner of a forest in accordance
with sub section (5), any person acquiring thereafter
the right of a ownership of that forest shall be bound
by the notice as if it had been served on him as
an owner and he shall accordingly comply with the
notice, requisition and notification, if any, issued
under this section.
(6) Any person contravening any requisition made
under sub section (4) in a notice to show cause why a
notification under sub section (1) should not be made
shall, on conviction , be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to six months or with
fine, or with both.
(7) Any person contravening any of the provision
of a notification issued under sub section (1) shall,
on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine,
or with both.”
6.2. The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975, came
into force on 30.08.1975. Section 2(c-i) of this Act defines
“forest” for the purposes of that Act.
“Section 2(c-i)- “forest” means a tract of land
covered with trees (whether standing, felled, found
or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody vegetation,
whether of natural growth or planted by human
agency and existing or being maintained with
or without human effort, or such tract of land on
which such growth is likely to have an effect on the
supply of timber, fuel, forest produce, or grazing
facilities, or on climate, stream flow, protection
of land from erosion, or other such matters and
includes-
512 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;
(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or
was part of a forest or was lying within a forest on
the thirtieth day of August, nineteen seventy five;
(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable
or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a
forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State
Government;
(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture
or for any purposes ancillary thereto;
(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing,
felled, found or otherwise;”
Section 2(f) defines “private forest” as follows:
“Section 2(f) - “‘private forest’ means any forest
which is not the property of Government and includes-
(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be
a forest under Section 34-A of the Forest Act;
(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification
issued under sub-section (1) of Section 35 of
the Forest Act, is in force immediately before the
appointed day;
(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been
issued under sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the
Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding
two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify
in this behalf;
(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been
issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act;
(v) in a case where the State Government and any
other person are jointly interested in the forest, the
interest of such person in such forest;
(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such
forest which are considered to be necessary for the
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 513
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and lands
appurtenant thereto;”
Section 3 provides that with effect from the appointed
day all private forests in the State shall stand acquired
and shall vest in the State Government free from all
encumbrances, subject to the limited saving provided
in Section 3(2).
“Section 3 - Vesting of private forests in State
Government
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law
for the time being in force or in any settlement,
grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or
order of any court, tribunal or authority or any other
document, with effect on and from the appointed
day, all private forests in the State shall stand
acquired and vest, free from all encumbrances, in,
and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over
the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the
State Government; and all rights, title and interest
of the owner or any person other than Government
subsisting in any such forest on the said day shall
be deemed to have been extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply
to so much extent of land comprised in a private
forest as is held by an occupant or tenant and is
lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day and
is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by
Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 for the time being in
force or any building or structure standing thereon
or appurtenant thereto.
(3) All private forests vested in the State Government
under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved
forests within the meaning of the Forest Act.”
Section 5 authorises State Government entry and
taking over of possession of private forests which
stand acquired and vested.
514 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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“Section 5 - Power to take over possession of
private forests
Where any private forest stands acquired and vested
in the State Government under the provisions of this
Act, the person authorised by the State Government
or by the Collector in this behalf, shall enter into
and take over possession thereof, and if any person
resists the taking over of such possession, he shall
without prejudice to any other action to which he may
be liable, be liable to be removed by the use of such
force as may be necessary.”
Section 24 repeals Sections 34-A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B,
36-C and 37 of the Indian Forest Act on and from the
appointed day, with a later re-enactment mechanism
for restored lands brought in by the Amending Act of
1978 operating through Section 22-A.
“Section 24 - Repeal of Sections 34-A to 37 of
the Forest Act
“(1) On and from the appointed day, Sections 34-A,
35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest Act
shall stand repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), on and from the date of commencement
of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)
(Amendment) Act, 1978 (14 of 1978), Sections 34-
A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest Act
shall, in respect of the lands restored under Section
22-A, be deemed to have been re-enacted in the
same form and be deemed always to have been in
force and applicable in respect of such lands, as if
they had not been repealed.”
6.3. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, came into force on
25.10.1980. Section 2 of that Act restrains the use of forest
land for non-forest purposes without the prior approval of the
Central Government and also regulates de-reservation and
assignment of forest land.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 515
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
6.4. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 19663, provides the
framework for preparation and maintenance of the record of rights
and for mutation of entries upon changes in title or enjoyment.
The MLRC also provides departmental remedies by way of
appeal, revision and correction of entries. These provisions form
the revenue backdrop against which the impugned mutations
and annotations were made and challenged.
7. The essential factual backdrop common to this batch of appeals
may be summarised as under:
7.1 The appellants are landowners in the State of Maharashtra. The
factual background across these appeals and cognate matters
that have reached the High Court and this Court over time is
broadly similar with only minor variations. The Respondent
State Authorities assert that during the early 1960s notices
under Section 35(3) of the IFA were issued and published in
the Official Gazette. The stated purpose of these notices was
to call upon owners of lands described as forest to show cause
why regulatory measures under Section 35(1) of the IFA should
not be made and to afford them an opportunity of objection
and hearing, including interim restraint as contemplated by
Section 35(4) of the IFA. Such notices were said to have been
addressed to the appellants and to other similarly placed private
landholders in the concerned districts. The landowners allege
that such notices were not personally served as contemplated by
Section 35(5) of the IFA, that no inquiry on objections was ever
held, and that no proceedings culminated in a final notification
under Section 35(1) of the IFA. The landowners state that the
proceedings then lay dormant for extended periods.
7.2 The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 4
commenced on 30.08.1975. The landowners allege that even
after its commencement the State Authorities did not take
possession under Section 5 of the MPFA and for decades the
lands continued to be dealt with as private holdings. Transfers
were effected, permissions were granted by revenue and
charity authorities, planning documents described the lands
3 Hereinafter referred to as, “MLRC”
4 Hereinafter referred to as, “MPFA”
516 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as agricultural or no development zones, possession remained
with private owners or transferees, and no compensation was
paid. The State Authorities, on the other hand, contend that
publication of the notices and the inclusive definition of private
forest in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA furnished the legal basis
for vesting.
7.3 Beginning around 2001, the State Authorities initiated an
administrative exercise to annotate village records so as to
reflect affectation by forest proceedings and vesting under the
MPFA. Talathis and Circle Officers made entries in village forms
including the other rights column of Form VII and Form XII
with references to notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA from
the 1960s and in several matters the name of the State was
thereafter carried into the ownership column. The landowners
allege that these mutations were made without prior notice
and without adherence to the MLRC. The State Authorities
state that the entries were ministerial reflections of statutory
consequences.
7.4 The annotations and mutations produced collateral effects.
Sub-Registrars declined registration of instruments having
regard to departmental instructions. Possession nonetheless
remained with private parties. No award of compensation was
made. Departmental remedies under the MLRC were invoked
by several landholders but many such proceedings did not
reach adjudication. In that situation writ petitions were filed
seeking correction of records, declaratory relief regarding title
and vesting, and restoration of entries consistent with private
title and possession. This pattern also appears in cognate
matters already decided, and it forms part of the common
factual narrative that frames the present batch.
8. The nature of the challenges brought before the High Court across
this subject matter, including earlier cognate petitions, was as follows:
8.1 The landholders approached the High Court by various
petitions to question the legality of revenue annotations and
mutation entries that described their lands as affected by forest
proceedings and as having vested in the State. They sought
quashing of those entries and a declaration that their lands
were not private forests within the meaning of the MPFA. They
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 517
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
also prayed for directions to restore the record of rights in the
names of the private owners and for consequential reliefs to
protect title and possession.
8.2 The principal grounds urged by the petitioners were that
publication of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA in the
Official Gazette without personal service under Section 35(5)
of the IFA could not lawfully found any adverse consequence.
They pleaded that no inquiry on objections was ever held and
that no notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA was ever
issued. They asserted that the proceedings lay dormant for
decades and that a stale or inchoate notice could not trigger
vesting under Section 3 of the MPFA. They further contended
that possession had never been taken under Section 5 of the
MPFA, that compensation had never been paid, and that the
lands continued to be treated as private holdings in revenue
and planning processes for long periods. Violations of the MLRC
and breach of natural justice were also pleaded.
8.3 The State responded that issuance of notices referable to
Section 35(3) of the IFA in the early 1960s brought the lands
within the inclusive definition of private forest in Section 2(f)
(iii) of the MPFA and that vesting under Section 3 of the
MPFA followed as a matter of law. It was submitted that the
challenged revenue entries were ministerial reflections of
statutory consequences. The State also raised objections
regarding delay and laches and pointed to departmental
remedies available under the MLRC.
8.4 In many of these petitions the High Court heard the matters
together and treated them as raising common questions. The
issues framed typically included whether the fact of a notice
said to have been issued under Section 35(3) of the IFA was by
itself sufficient to attract Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, whether
service under Section 35(5) of the IFA and a final notification
under Section 35(1) of the IFA were jurisdictional preconditions,
whether long dormancy could defeat subsequent assertions of
vesting, and whether the impugned mutations could stand in
the face of the procedures mandated by the MLRC.
9. In one cognate batch of writ petitions decided by the High Court
on 24.03.2008, namely “Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v.
518 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State of Maharashtra5, which was later set aside by this Court in
“Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra6, the High
Court gave the following findings:
9.1 In that matter, the petitioners were real-estate developers who
had acquired lands in Mumbai Suburban District long after
Gazette publications of notices said to be under Section 35(3)
of the IFA. For decades the lands had been treated as non-
agricultural and placed in industrial or residential zones under
successive development plans. Around 2005–2006, the State
Authorities made mutation and annotation entries recording
the lands as “private forest” and as vested in the State under
the MPFA. The petitioners challenged these entries and the
foundational reliance on old Section 35(3) notices, invoking
absence of personal service, the lack of any final notification
under Section 35(1) of the IFA, prolonged dormancy, and
inconsistency with permissions under the Maharashtra Regional
and Town Planning Act, 1966 and proceedings under the Urban
Land Ceiling law.
9.2 Proceeding principally on two Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of Maharashtra7,
the High Court held that the expression in Section 2(f)(iii) of
the MPFA, “a notice has been issued under Section 35(3) of
the IFA”, is satisfied by the fact of issuance, which could be
evidenced by Gazette publication. Service under Section 35(5)
of the IFA or culmination in a notification under Section 35(1) of
the IFA was not treated as a jurisdictional precondition.
9.3 The High Court further held that Section 35(4) of the IFA does not
create any lapse by efflux of time, and that the MPFA contains
no requirement that a notice be “live” or “subsisting.” The Court
declined to read such a gloss into Section 2(f)(iii), rejecting
arguments based on delay, abandonment, or desuetude.
9.4 Treating Section 34-A of the IFA as an inclusive interpretation
clause, the High Court rejected the submission that a prior
5 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311
6 (2014) 3 SCC 430
7 (2000) 3 SCC 143
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 519
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
declaration under Section 34-A was a sine qua non for measures
under Section 35 of the IFA or for invoking Section 2(f)(iii) of
the MPFA.
9.5 On vesting and its incidents, the High Court concluded that
Section 3 of the MPFA, with its non obstante clause, prevailed
over inconsistent zoning, permissions, or exemptions under
other enactments. Development plans under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and proceedings
under the Urban Land Ceiling law could not defeat statutory
vesting. The impugned revenue mutations and annotations
were sustained as ministerial reflections of such vesting, and
objections based on the MLRC were not accepted, particularly
in light of directions issued in public-interest proceedings to
update records.
9.6 Reliance was placed on the presumption of regularity of official
acts; the fact that many petitioners were derivative owners
without personal knowledge of the original events was noted.
On this reasoning, the writ petitions were dismissed.
10. The judgement in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State
of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court and decided
by a three Judge Bench on 30.01.2014 and has been the prevailing
precedent in such matters viz. Godrej & Boyce (supra) . This Court
gave the following findings:
10.1 This Court held that the mere issuance of a notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA is not, by itself, sufficient to treat land
as a “private forest” within Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA. The
answer to the principal question was returned in the negative.
10.2 Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of
the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced
from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on the
owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence,
and to be heard. Because interim restraints may be imposed
under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal consequences
attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service is inherent to
the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA, requiring service in the
520 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
CPC manner and publication as prescribed, reinforces this
conclusion.
10.3 On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra)
that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2(f)(iii) of the
MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra
amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded
on an erroneous premise regarding the two-hectare exclusion.
It was overruled to that extent.
10.4 The Court further clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA
saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and pursued
in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left undecided
for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged
to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956–57, never
taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect
vesting on the appointed day.
10.5 On the definitional plane, the Court reaffirmed that the “means
and includes” formulation in Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA does not
dilute the primary sense of “forest”. Lands long designated for
urban use, developed under sanctioned plans and permissions,
and integrated with municipal infrastructure could not, on the
admitted facts, be regarded as “forest” either in the primary
or extended sense of Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA.
10.6 Recognising the expropriatory character of the MPFA, the Court
applied strict construction. Fundamental norms of fairness
and good governance preclude unsettling settled civilian and
commercial arrangements after prolonged State inaction,
particularly where the State itself facilitated and acquiesced
in development over decades.
10.7 Even assuming arguendo that the lands were forest, wholesale
demolition and dispossession after half a century was neither
feasible nor in the public interest on the facts recorded. The
equities of third-party purchasers and residents, the State’s
prolonged acquiescence, and the practical impossibility of
“restoration” militated against such a course.
10.8 In consequence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s
judgement was set aside, and actions premised solely on
stale notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were quashed.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 521
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
11. After the judgement of Godrej and Boyce (supra), the High Court
has followed it as a binding precedent and used its findings to decide
similar matters, whose facts are akin to those of the appellants before
us. Some of these are enlisted hereunder:
11.1 Satellite Developers Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra8: Here the
High Court held that mere issuance of a notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA does not vest land in the State. It further
observed that entries made in 2006 pursuant to directions
in a public interest litigation would not, by themselves, effect
vesting, particularly when no further steps under Section 35(3),
Section 35(4), and Section 35(5) of the IFA were undertaken.
11.2 Sinhagad Technical Education Society v. Deputy
Conservator of Forests 9: In the case of a subsequent
purchaser, the High Court reaffirmed that service of notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA is mandatory.
11.3 Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 10:
Emphasising Godrej and Boyce (supra), the High Court
reiterated that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3)
of the IFA is not sufficient to vest land with the State and
declined a remand as futile given the authorities’ stated stance.
11.4 Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (Dr.) v. Tahsildar, District Thane11:
The High Court held that a bare Section 35(3) notice under
the IFA is insufficient to effect vesting.
11.5 Lalit A. Sangtani v. State of Maharashtra12: The High Court
underscored that due service of a notice under Section 35(3)
of the IFA is mandatory.
11.6 Bharat Chandulal Nanavati v. Union of India13: Addressing
a subsequent purchaser and proceedings under Section 22A
of the MPFA, the High Court held that “issued” in Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA necessarily includes service. Finding no
8 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 66
9 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 293
10 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5832
11 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 295
12 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 248
13 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3862
522 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
proof or contemporaneous record of service of the notice
dated 17.02.1956, the High Court concluded that proceedings
under Section 22A of the MPFA could not be founded merely
on Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
11.7 Global Estate Developers v. State of Maharashtra14: The
High Court confined itself to whether the land qualified as
“private forest” under the MPFA and reiterated the mandate
of service under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.8 Indrajeet Kashinath Kaiswal v. State of Maharashtra15: The
High Court clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA applies
only to “live” or “pipeline” notices under Section 35(3) of the
IFA, not stale notices left undecided.
11.9 Nana Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra16: In a matter
involving acquisition and subsequent return, the High Court
again insisted upon proof of service of the notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA.
11.10 Shree Maruti Sansthan Trust v. State of Maharashtra17:
For a subsequent purchaser, the High Court noted that apart
from an entry in the “Golden Register” there was no material
showing issuance and/or service of a notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA.
11.11 Vishram Vishwanath Kunte v. State of Maharashtra18: During
the pendency of an inquiry under Section 22A of the MPFA,
a mutation entry branded the land as forest; the High Court
deprecated recurring affidavits from State officers asserting
that Godrej and Boyce (supra) laid down no law, terming
this “continued defiance of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Godrej & Boyce…”.
12. However, for the present appellants, whose facts are similar to those
of the various petitioners in the different judgements of the High
Court as well as those in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) discussed
14 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8345
15 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6743
16 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 340
17 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 7074
18 WP No. 594 of 2022, decided on 16.09.2022
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 523
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
above, the High Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated
28.09.2018 dismissed all the writ petitions. It would be worthwhile
to record here that one member of the Division Bench of the High
Court had authored the decision in Oberoi Constructions Private
Limited v. State of Maharashtra (Supra) that was later overturned
in Godrej and Boyce (supra). The impugned judgment proceeds
on the following reasons:
12.1 The High Court framed the primary issue as whether Godrej
and Boyce (supra) applied, and secondly whether subsequent
purchasers could rely upon it when their predecessors-in-title
had not questioned the applicability of the MPFA or the steps
taken thereunder.
12.2 Proceeding from Section 3 of the MPFA, the High Court
held that vesting of all “private forests” was complete on
the appointed day (30.08.1975) and that any post-1975
transactions were ineffectual to confer title. Mutation entries
made in 2002 were treated as a ministerial reflection of an
earlier vesting rather than its source.
12.3 On Section 35 process under the IFA, the High Court accepted
the State’s case that notices under Section 35(3) of the
IFA had been issued and served, and, in several matters,
that a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA was in
force before the appointed day. Reliance was placed on
the “Golden Register”, Gazette extracts, possession notices
referable to Section 5 of the MPFA, lists circulated in 1976,
and panchanamas; the contrary pleadings of the petitioners
were described as guarded or vague.
12.4 The High Court distinguished Godrej and Boyce (supra),
observing that the owners there had an earlier consent decree,
long-standing sanctioned development, and an evidentiary
vacuum on service and follow-through. On that basis, the High
Court treated Godrej and Boyce (supra) as fact-specific and
of limited assistance to subsequent purchasers.
12.5 As to the term “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and
the service requirement traced to Section 35(5) of the IFA,
the High Court did not dispute the principle in Godrej and
Boyce (supra) but concluded that, on the records cited, the
requirement stood satisfied in these matters.
524 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12.6 On “stale” versus “live” notices, the High Court read Godrej
and Boyce (supra) as context-bound and, in any event, held
that even if Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were unavailable, the
State could succeed on the primary definition of “forest” in
Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA, including by reference to natural
growth and contiguity with reserved forest.
12.7 The High Court emphasised that most petitioners were
subsequent purchasers who came on the scene long after
30.08.1975, and stated it was “surprising” that they sought
to contest service under Section 35(3) of the IFA without
affidavits from original owners or contemporaneous material;
burden was effectively placed on the petitioners to dislodge
official records.
12.8 Entries describing lands as “Private Forest-Forest Department”
were justified as having been made pursuant to directions
in PIL No. 17 of 2002 and Government circulars; the High
Court considered the challenge to such entries, decades
after vesting, to be misconceived.
12.9 Arguments based on Section 21 of the MPFA were rejected;
the High Court treated that provision as an enabling route,
not a precondition to vesting already effected by Section 3
of the MPFA.
12.10 Contentions invoking the two-hectare exclusion in Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were declined, the High Court holding
that later allotment of gata/survey sub-divisions could not
undo vesting.
12.11 Objections raised under Section 22A of the MPFA and to
certificates under Section 6 of the MPFA were addressed
with reference to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the
High Court reiterating that prior approval under that Act was
necessary and past non-compliant issuances could not aid
the petitioners.
12.12 While one exceptional matter (e.g., involving long-standing
urban use or missing records) was remitted for verification
by the Collector, the High Court otherwise dismissed the
petitions, characterising several as commercially motivated
and not bona fide, and cautioning that entertaining them
would weaken forest protection.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 525
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
13. We have gone through the comprehensive material on record, the
submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and for the
respondent-State, as well as the impugned order of the High Court.
Having done so, we are of the considered view that the impugned
judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained for the following
reasons:
13.1 In our opinion, the controlling legal position is settled. For
vesting to occur under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the
footing of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the
IFA must not only be issued but must also be served upon the
landholder. The expression “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the
MPFA Act comprehends due service on the owner, because
service alone triggers the owner’s right to object, including the
jurisdictional plea that the land is not a forest within Section
2(c-i) of the MPFA Act, and obliges the State to consider such
objection. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the
reproduction of a draft text of Section 35(1) beneath a Section
35(3) show cause in the Gazette amounts to a concluded
notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. A notice that grants
time for objections cannot coexist with a final decision under
Section 35(1) without rendering the statutory hearing illusory.
Mutation entries are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect
an acquisition that lacks the statutory predicates. They neither
create title in the State nor divest title from the private owner.
13.2 On the facts across these appeals, we find that the essential
links in the statutory chain are missing. There is no proof of
service of any Section 35(3) notice of the IFA on the then
owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of the
IFA. Actual possession has at all times remained with private
owners and this position is reflected in the revenue records that
describe them as occupants. No possession was taken under
Section 5 of the MPFA Act, no schemes were set in motion
under Section 4, no compensation exercise was undertaken
under Section 7, and no inquiry under Section 6 was held at
a time proximate to the appointed day of 30 August 1975.
The materials produced by the State include undated and
unverified possession papers that do not inspire confidence
when set against decades of undisturbed private possession.
In one instance the State relies on a pipeline notice which was
526 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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addressed to a person who was not the owner as on 29 or 30
August 1975. In another, the land forms part of an industrial
estate converted to non-agricultural use long before 1975. In
yet another, there was never any claim that a Section 35(3)
notice was even issued. These features are wholly inconsistent
with a completed vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act.
13.3 We are not persuaded by the Respondent State’s reliance on
post-hoc material. Satellite imagery and panchnamas drawn
in 2016 do not establish the character of the lands on the
appointed day, which is the only relevant date for Section 3(1)
of the MPFA Act. A nineteenth century notification, invoked for
the first time at the appellate stage to suggest linkage with
a reserved forest, was not the foundation of the impugned
mutations and cannot be used to improve the case now.
The administrative orders must stand or fall on the reasons
originally given and the High Court could not sustain vesting on
grounds that were never the basis of action. The absence of
any notification under Section 34A of the IFA further weakens
the State’s position. We also find merit in the submission that
a restoration under Section 22A of the MPFA Act presupposes
a lawful vesting. When the foundational vesting is unproven,
any purported restoration cannot cure the defect, and in any
event the limited window created by Section 22A cannot be
reopened decades later. Expropriatory legislation must be
construed strictly and Article 300-A of the Constitution requires
that no person is deprived of property save by authority of law.
When a statute prescribes a manner of doing a thing, it must
be done in that manner or not at all. Here, several mandatory
steps are absent. Any one missing step would defeat vesting.
The High Court was therefore in error in treating the case as
if only a consequential mutation remained.
13.4 We are also unable to accept the distinctions drawn by the
High Court. The binding ratio on service, on the need for a live
process, and on strict compliance does not turn on whether an
appellant is an original owner or a subsequent purchaser. It
also does not turn on whether construction has occurred on the
land. The State itself has, on earlier occasions, recognised that
subsequent purchasers cannot be prejudiced by undisclosed
proceedings which they had no means to discover. The record
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 527
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
here shows that the revenue entries continued to carry the
names of the private owners, which indicates that even the
State did not treat these lands as vested forests. To hold
that a subsequent purchaser is in a worse position than one
who developed land would invert the logic of the statute and
would reward illegality while penalising restraint. We reject
that approach.
13.5 We are further of the view that a remand for an inquiry under
Section 6 of the MPFA Act is neither warranted nor efficacious.
Such an inquiry is designed to be contemporaneous with the
appointed day so that meaningful evidence on the character of
the land can be adduced by both sides. After the passage of
nearly half a century, that exercise would be largely academic
and would not cure the absence of the mandatory preconditions
of a served notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA and a lawful
progression towards a notification under Section 35(1). The
authorities have also adopted a concluded litigating stance on
the very matters they would be called upon to decide, which
would not inspire confidence in the fairness of any remanded
proceeding. In our opinion, the impugned judgment rests on
a misreading of the Gazette, an impermissible dilution of
mandatory statutory steps, and reliance on materials that are
extraneous to the original basis of action. It therefore cannot
be sustained.
14. While the High Court in the impugned judgement dismissed all the
writ petitions by a common order, it did not attempt any principled
differentiation among the petitions before it. Having closely examined
the record, and in order to assess the distinctions the High Court
is said to have perceived with the petitioners in Godrej and Boyce
(Supra), we have undertaken our own classification for clarity. We
have no hesitation in stating that had this exercise been undertaken
by the High Court in the impugned judgement, considerable judicial
time could have been saved and directed to the unsettled legal
questions on which many litigants rest their hopes. It is with this
consideration in mind that we proceeded to categorise the 96 civil
appeals into 3 categories.
14.1 The first category concerns the status of ownership, that is to
say whether the appellants’ title was derived before or after
528 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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the alleged notices under IFA were issued around 1960s by
the State Government. For clarification, if a title is devolved by
inheritance subsequently but if the land has been owned by
the same family throughout, the ownership would be deemed
to be continuing since the land came first in the family’s
possession. On our analysis, 77 appeals involve derivative
title and 19 involve continuing or ongoing title. The second
category concerns the period of ownership, namely whether
ownership commenced before or after the enforcement of
MPFA. In this category, 72 appellants acquired ownership
after MPFA and 24 appellants owned the land before MPFA.
The third category concerns the existence of construction on
the subject lands. In this category, 26 appellants have raised
some form of construction on the subject lands, while 70
appellants have not raised construction or the position is not
clearly established on the materials placed on record.
14.2 After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no
legally relevant distinction between the present cases and the
decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The ratio in Godrej
and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live process capable of
culminating in a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA,
and strict compliance with the statutory steps that alone can
support vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the
footing of Section 2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the
same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra).
There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3)
of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification
under Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with
private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action was
taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act. These
features mirror the very elements that led this Court to hold
that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce (Supra).
14.3 We do not accept the distinctions on which the High Court
sought to sidestep Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The fact that
some appellants are subsequent purchasers does not diminish
the requirement of service and a live statutory process.
Godrej and Boyce (Supra) itself concerned a batch in which
many parties were not original owners, yet the controlling
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 529
Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
principles were applied uniformly. The presence or absence of
construction is equally irrelevant to the legal question of vesting.
What matters is compliance with the prerequisites of the MPFA
Act and the IFA. The present record shows revenue entries
that continued to reflect private ownership and occupation. It
shows a pipeline notice addressed to a person who was not
the owner on the relevant date. It shows lands long converted
to non-agricultural or industrial use. None of this allows the
State to dispense with service under Section 35(3) of the IFA
or to conjure a final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA
from a draft placed beneath a show cause. In our opinion, the
differences invoked by the High Court are insubstantial and
cannot displace the binding ratio.
14.4 We find that the High Court’s approach amounts to an attempt to
avoid a binding precedent rather than to apply it. The impugned
reasoning rests on a misreading of a Gazette publication that
only reproduced a draft text and expressly invited objections.
It relies on material that is subsequent to the appointed day
and that was never the foundation of the impugned mutation
entries. It treats mutation as if it were constitutive of title and
not a ministerial reflection of underlying legal events. Each of
these moves stands at odds with Godrej and Boyce (Supra),
which requires strict adherence to the statutory sequence
before vesting can be asserted.
14.5 Judicial discipline required faithful application of the law declared
by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. Coordinate
Benches of the High Court have consistently followed Godrej
and Boyce (Supra) in closely comparable situations. The
impugned judgment nonetheless revives positions that Godrej
and Boyce (Supra) has rejected. We also note that the Bench
was presided over by the same Judge who had earlier taken
a contrary view that was set aside by this Court. We do not
attribute motive. However, when a judgment minimizes a binding
ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish
on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of a reluctance
to accept precedent. Such an approach conveys a measure of
pettiness that is inconsistent with the detachment that judicial
reasoning demands. In our view, this is an unfortunate departure
from the discipline of stare decisis.
530 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
14.6 We accordingly hold that the present appeals are
indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce (Supra).
The record discloses the same jurisdictional defect of non-
service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the same
absence of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA,
and the same want of contemporaneous steps under Sections
4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA Act. In such circumstances the High
Court could not, consistently with Article 141 of the Constitution,
avoid the binding ratio by treating immaterial differences as
determinative. In our opinion, fidelity to binding precedent and
to the statutory scheme admits of no other conclusion than
that the impugned order must be set aside.
15. In view of the foregoing analysis, the appeals are allowed.
16. The impugned judgment and order dated 27.09.2018 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 6417 of 2015,
amongst others, is set aside. The writ petitions before the High Court
in the aforementioned matter are allowed. All mutation orders and
any declarations treating the subject lands as private forests are
quashed and set aside. Consequential corrections be made in the
revenue records.
17. Liberty is reserved to the State to initiate such proceedings, in
accordance with law, as per the relevant Statutes and to bring them
to a logical conclusion after following due process of law.
18. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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