Holding

The Court held that the Dogra Report is procedurally defective, the earlier larger‑bench rulings (E Prabavathy, G Sudhakar and the 1996 compromise) prevail, and eligible workers shall receive monetary compensation instead of a mass absorption that would contravene constitutional equality principles.

Summary

The case concerned claims by thousands of Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) workers who had been employed as temporary, badli or part‑time staff between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991, seeking regularisation (absorption) under the Srivastav Award and earlier Tulpule and Jamdar Awards. The Supreme Court examined whether the Dogra Report’s verification of eligibility was valid, whether the two‑judge decision in Tamil Nadu Terminated Employees Association was per incuriam, and whether workers appointed after 4 March 1991 could rely on Section 18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act in view of the overriding provisions of Section 48 of the LIC Act. The Court held that the Dogra Report was flawed, that the earlier larger‑bench decisions (E Prabavathy, G Sudhakar and the 1996 compromise) remain binding, and that mass absorption would violate constitutional principles of equality (Arts 14, 16). Consequently, the Court ordered fresh verification of claims and directed monetary compensation in lieu of absorption for eligible workers. The writ and contempt petitions were disposed of in accordance with these directions.

Issues considered

The validity and scope of the Dogra Report’s verification exercise.
Whether the Srivastav Award and the earlier Tulpule and Jamdar Awards remain operative despite the 1996 compromise order.
Whether workers appointed after 4 March 1991 can claim absorption under Section 18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act given the overriding effect of Section 48 of the LIC Act.
The correctness of the two‑judge bench decision in Tamil Nadu Terminated Employees Association and its alleged conflict with larger‑bench precedents.
Whether LIC, as a public employer, must adhere to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in its recruitment and absorption processes.
The appropriateness of granting mass absorption of over 11,000 workers versus providing compensation.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 142, s. 16
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10, s. 18(3)(d), s. 25-D
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956s. 48, s. 49
Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960s. Regulation 8

Subjects

absorptiontemporary workerspublic employmentArticles 14 and 16Section 48 LIC ActIndustrial Disputes ActDogra ReportSrivastav Awardmass absorptioncompensation

Judgment

986 [2022]
SUPREME COURT 10 S.C.R. 986
REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A RANBIR SINGH
v.
SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE CORP. OF INDIA &
ANR.
B (Miscellaneous Application No.1150 of 2019)
In
(Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017)
In
C (Civil Appeal No. 6950 Of 2009)
APRIL 27, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, SURYA KANT
AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
D Labour Laws – Absorption – Of persons engaged by Life
Insurance Corporation of India as temporary/badli/part-time
workers – Claim for regularisation of workers employed from 20
May 1985 till 4 March 1991 – Dogra Report – Objections of LIC to
the Dogra report – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards – Srivastav award
– Validity of verification in the Dogra Report – Palpable conflict
E between decisions of the Supreme Court – Held: The conflict must
be harmonised by taking recourse to jurisdiction under Art.142 of
the Constitution – Directions accordingly issued in the facts and
circumstances of the case – Service Law.
Service Law – Public employment – Equal opportunity and
F fairness in public employment – Held: LIC as a statutory corporation
is bound by the mandate of Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution – As
a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must
meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process –
Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to public
G service – A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry
out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on flawed premises
without following a recruitment process which is consistent with the
principles of equality of opportunity governed by Arts. 14 and 16
of the Constitution – Such an absorption would provide the very
back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity
H
986
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 987
CORP. OF INDIA

and fairness in public employment – Constitution of India – Arts. A
14 and 16.
Labour Laws – Absorption – In Life Insurance Corporation
– Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and s.48 of
the LIC Act 1956 – Discussed – Held: Mere fact that a person is
appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does not entitle such a B
person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by virtue of or only by
reason of such an appointment – Life Insurance Corporation Act,
1956 – s.48 – Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff
Regulations), 1960 – Regulation 8 – Industrial Disputes Act 1947 –
– Service Law.
C
Practice and Procedure – Precedent – Conflicting judgments
of different Benches – Two-judge Bench not at liberty to take a
final view at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and
of a co-ordinate Bench – In case of difference of opinion, it had to
refer the matter to a larger Bench.
D
Disposing of the Writ Petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the
workers in the present batch of cases disputed the factual position,
asserted on behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge
Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association affirming the E
validity of the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever
to the final order dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil
appeals arising from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v.
Their Workmen. The interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.
Their Workmen, which forms the basis of the judgment in TN
Terminated Employees Association, was passed in the backdrop of F
a compromise which was arrived between LIC and eight out of
the nine Unions and Associations representing the workers. Since
the appeals were pending at that stage, the Court granted liberty
to the parties to the compromise to implement its terms as an
interim measure, without prejudice to the contentions of the ninth G
Union which had not entered into the compromise. But noticeably,
there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN Terminated
Employees Association to refer to the admitted position that
subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. Their
Workmen accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out of
H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers
in Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise,
there was no justification for the ninth Union to object. The Court
held that it would be in the interest of industrial peace that the
ninth Union should also fall in line and act on the terms of the
compromise. The civil appeals in LIC v. Their Workmen were
B
disposed of in terms of the above order dated 7 February 1996.
The terms of compromise clearly envisaged that the management
and the workers had agreed that the awards of the NIT dated 17
April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar Award)
“be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise in
C relation to the question of regular employment of the workmen
concerned in the said references”. Once the awards were
substituted by the terms of compromise, it would be an
impermissible interpretation of law to hold that the awards
continued to be operative and binding, notwithstanding the final
order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen.
D
The final order dated 7 February 1996 has not been adverted to
by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association.
The factual finding is based only on the interim order dated 1
March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v.
Their Workmen had a crucial bearing on the special leave petitions
E arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting aside
the Srivastav Award. [Para 53][1044-E-H; 1045-A-E]
2. The two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees
Association opined that the scheme which was framed in E
Prabavathy was the outcome of an order which was passed in writ
F petitions filed by the workers and not in the course of the
adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this ground, the Court
held that the decision in E Prabavathy would not come in the way
of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding a reference
under Section 10 of the ID Act. The decision in E Prabavathy was
rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals which
G was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the
pendency of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to
formulate a scheme for the regularisation of workers who had
been granted ad hoc employment for at least 85 days from time

H
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CORP. OF INDIA

to time. The three-judge Bench held, after assessing the terms A
of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable and
commended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LIC
was approved by this Court with a specific observation that the
clauses of the scheme extracted in the order would form a part of
the order of this Court. The decision of three Judges in E
B
Prabavathy was thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in
its order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar. Noticing that
the scheme which has been accepted in E Prabavathy governed
workers of the Tamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held that
the scheme would be equally applicable to the workers of all
divisions of LIC in the country. The Court therefore held that it C
was not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different group
of workers, in that case under the directions of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material to
note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was
a specific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workers
D
had been impleaded in the reference and had filed a statement of
the claim, having regard to the fact that the order of this Court
dated 23 October 1992 was between the same parties, the
workers had no valid ground to challenge the legality of this
Court’s order before the tribunal. Despite the clear observations
in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-judge Bench in E
TN Terminated Employees Association has come to the conclusion
that the order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy would
not preclude an industrial adjudication by the tribunal. The two-
judge Bench which delivered the judgment in TN Terminated
Employees Association was bound by the order in E Prabavathy ,
F
which was of a larger Bench of three judges, and the interpretation
which was placed on it by another two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar.
If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer the matter to a
larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view at variance
with binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinate
Bench. [Para 54][1045-E-H; 1046-A-F] G
3. There cannot be any dispute over the principle that the
judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association, followed by
the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present

H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A parties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before
this Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide
presence, it is faced with a situation involving conflicting directions
of this Court. LIC has submitted that while on the one hand, the
Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were substituted by the terms of
compromise on 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen, this
B
was preceded by the order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-
judge Bench in E Prabavathy which accepted the scheme of
absorption proposed by LIC and followed by the order dated 22
November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar which
interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy as being applicable to
C all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN Terminated
Employees Association is to substitute and supplant the schemes
which were evolved before this Court for providing absorption
on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were
accepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-
time workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period
D
of service would be eligible to be considered for the grant of the
permanency, subject to certain conditions. The orders passed by
this Court envisage that these workers would be considered for
the grant of permanency in the course of a recruitment process.
The impact of the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN
E Terminated Employees Association is that while on the one hand
the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7 February 1996 and
22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the other hand
the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime in
conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders.
Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to
F
step in and to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by
the decision in TN Terminated Employees Association which has
been urged to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so
is serious. [Para 56][1047-B-G]
4. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the
G workers that the principle which has been enunciated in the
Srivastav Award and which has been restored by the two-judge
Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association must apply to all
workers subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read
with Section 17A of the ID Act. Hence, a balance will now
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 991
CORP. OF INDIA

have to be drawn by this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction A
under Article 142 of the Constitution, which while on the one
hand factors in the finality which has attached to the judgment in
TN Terminated Employees Association but on the other hand also
factors in the essential concerns which have been expressed
before this Court by LIC. LIC had been restrained, due to the
B
interim orders which were passed in the course of the various
proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment through the
open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders from
pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has
now arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption
of part-time and badli workers would become a substitute for a C
recruitment process based on sanctioned posts, consistent with
the principles of reservation and pursued on the basis of a
structured recruitment which gives equal opportunities to all
applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment to
constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public
D
employer to follow a process which is fair and in consonance with
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive
process for recruitment will enable LIC to recruit the best among
the available talent. Substituting this by a back-door entry will be
detrimental to the interests of the corporation which is governed
by statute. [Para 57][1047-H; 1048-A-C, E-G] E
5. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group
of workers, who are governed by the order of this Court in E
Prabavathy, would also be eligible for absorption. By considering
the workers who are governed by the order in E Prabavathy to
be eligible for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clear F
error. The report has considered those workers who were clearly
outside the ambit of its remit since they were governed by a
specific order of this Court. That apart, it is evident that the Dogra
Report has proceeded on a generalised assumption that a majority
of workers had produced documents are eligible for absorption
(having drawn a negative inference from LIC’s non-production G
of documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary to bring
about a proper verification before the claims of the workers can
be truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carrying
out a proper verification stands clearly established. [Para
60][1051-D-G] H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 6. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power
on the Central Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of
Section 48 was introduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31
January 1981. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections
(2A), (2B) and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. By virtue of
sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the terms and
B
conditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC which
were in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, are
deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)
and have effect subject to the other provisions of the Section. By
a deeming fiction of law, the regulations which were in existence
C on the date of the Amending Act in relation to the terms and
conditions of service are given the status of rules framed under
clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48. The effect of sub-
Section (2C) is that the provision of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2)
and any rules made under it with retrospective effect, shall also
be deemed to have had effect from that date notwithstanding any
D
judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority
and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or in any
other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other
instrument for the time being in force. The rules which are framed
under Section 48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause which
E prevails, inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in the ID
Act. The vires of the Amending Act was upheld in a judgment of
a three-judge Bench of this Court in A V Nachane. Earlier the
employees were governed by the regulations framed by LIC
under Section 49 as well as by the provisions of the ID Act. Hence,
it was open to the workers to enforce their rights and remedies
F
in terms of the regulations framed under the LIC Act or in
accordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, after the
amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,
the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of
the ID Act to which they were entitled before the enforcement of
G the amendment. [Para 61, 62, 63 and 67][1051-G-H; 1052-B,G-
H; 1053-A-C; 1056-G-H; 1057-A-B]
7. It becomes necessary at this stage to advert to the
provisions of Regulation 8 of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India (Staff Regulations), 1960. Regulation 8(1) deals with
H temporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstante provision.
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 993
CORP. OF INDIA

Clause (1) of Regulation 8 is an enabling provision empowering A
LIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis,
subject to such general or specific directions which may be issued
by the Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8
stipulates that no person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1)
is, only by reason of such appointment, to be entitled to absorption
B
in the service of LIC or to claim preference for recruitment to
any post. The expression “shall only by reason of such
appointment be entitled to absorption” in this sub-clause (2) is
crucial. What the expression postulates is that a person who is
appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlement
to absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having C
been appointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation
8(2) does not postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorption
but it stipulates that absorption cannot be claimed merely on the
ground that a person was engaged on a temporary basis.
Regulation 8(2), for instance, will not preclude a claim for
D
absorption being made in terms of a scheme which is propounded
by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions which facilitate
absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the mere fact
that a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC, does
not entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by
virtue of or only by reason of such an appointment. [Para E
70][1058-B-F]
8. The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section
(2), sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the
clams of the workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now be
considered. The workers who have worked as temporary, badli F
or part-time workers after 4 March 1991, seek to assert their
claims on the basis of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18
specifies the person on whom settlements and awards are binding.
Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a settlement or award would bind
all the parties to the industrial dispute. Further, clause (d)
specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed of workers, G
the settlement and award binds not only persons who are
employed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on
the date of the dispute but all persons who subsequently become
employees in that establishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d),
in other words, extends the applicability of a settlement or award H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A beyond the workers who were engaged on the date of the dispute
to all persons who subsequently become employees in the
establishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulation expressly
permits the engagement of temporary workers and clause (2)
contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged under
its clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, be
B
entitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment on
any post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is that
Regulation 8 is deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause
(cc) of sub- Section (2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions
of Section 48(2C) postulate that a rule which is made under the
C clause shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in
the ID Act. Hence, the workers who have been recruited post 4
March 1991 cannot make a claim for absorption ipso jure under
Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result of the overriding
provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section 48.
[Para 71][1051-F-H; 1059-A-D]
D
9. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is
essential to recapitulate the key legal findings that will govern
the determination of rights and equities, which are as under:
(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court in
E LIC v. Their Workmen had accepted the terms of compromise
which was arrived at on 1 March 1989 between the management
of LIC and eight Unions, and imposed them upon the ninth Union
as well. In addition, the two-judge Bench of this Court had issued
certain directions;

F (ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court,
while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy, specifically
accepted the scheme formulated by LIC for regularising the
workers who were engaged on a temporary basis. The scheme
was also specifically incorporated as a part of the order. The three-
judge Bench in E Prabavathy held that the scheme proposed by
G LIC is reasonable and that: (a) the regularisation will be by
selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the scheme
would constitute a part of the order of this Court;
(iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court
in G Sudhakar directed that though the order dated 23 October
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 995
CORP. OF INDIA

1992 in E Prabavathy applied to the workers of the Tamil Nadu A
division, the scheme would equally be applicable to the workers
of all divisions of LIC in the country;
(iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court
dated 8 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association failed
to notice that as a result of the final order dated 7 February 1996 B
in LIC v. Their Workmen, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had
been substituted by the terms of compromise. The two-judge
Bench of this Court overlooked the final order dated 7 February
1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen and while adverting only to the
interim order dated 1 March 1989, it arrived at a palpably
erroneous conclusion that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards were C
still operative and binding; and
(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN Terminated
Employees Association and the curative petition stand dismissed,
LIC is confronted with a situation in which it is equally bound by
the earlier decision of the three-judge Bench dated 23 October D
1992 in E Prabavathy, the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated
7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen dealing with the appeals
arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and the judgment
of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar.
[Para 73][1059-F-G; 1060-B-C, H; 1061-A-F] E
10.1. There is a palpable conflict between the two judge
Bench decision in TN Terminated Employees Association dated
18 March 2015 on the one hand and the earlier binding decision
of a larger Bench in E Prabavathy on 23 October 1992 and of
subsequent Benches. This conflict must be harmonised by taking F
recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court finds that:
(i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra
Report was confined to the process of verification, as distinct
from an adjudication of rights and liabilities; G
(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because: (a) The report
failed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class III
workers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of two
years and Class IV workers who had put in 70 days of work in a
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A period of three years; (b) The lists which are appended to the
report contain patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequence
of a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and (c) The report
accepted the claims for absorption of those workers who were
specifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy,
in spite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order of
B
this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy as well as in
paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award;
(iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to
carry out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawed
premises without following a recruitment process which is
C consistent with the principles of equality of opportunity governed
by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an absorption
would provide the very back-door entry, which negates the
principle of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment.
[Para 74][1061-G-H; 1062-A-F]
D 10.2. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to
nearly four decades. The claims of those workers who are duly
found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions of
eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary
compensation in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement
E of all claims and demands. Directions accordingly issued. [Para
75][1062-F-H]
Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC
Employees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation
of India (2015) 9 SCC 62 : [2015] 5 SCR 806 – held
F per incuriam.
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra
Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461 : [1997]
4 Suppl. SCR 207; LIC of India v. G Sudhakar [Decision
of Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000]; A V
G Nachane v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 205 : [1982]
2 SCR 246; M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC,
Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : [1994] 1 SCR 433
and E Prabavathy v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
[Decision of Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No 10393 of
1992] – referred to.
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Case Law Reference A
[1982] 2 SCR 246 referred to Para 2
[1994] 1 SCR 433 referred to Para 2
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 207 referred to Para 2
[2015] 5 SCR 806 held per incuriam Para 15 B
INHERENT JURISDICTION : Miscellaneous Application
No.1150 of 2019. In Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1921 of 2017. In Civil
Appeal No.6950 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2007 of the High Court
C
of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.690 of 2004.
With
MA 1151/2019 IN C.A. NO.6950/2009, MA 1868/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1862/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1861/ D
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1874/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009,
MA 1873/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1660/2018 in C.A. No.6950/
2009, MA 1940/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1882/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1883/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) Nos.1921/2017 E
in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1876/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1888/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1866/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1860/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1393/2019 F
in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 31-32/2018 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1875/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1660/2018 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1765/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1944/2017 in C.A. No.6956/2009,
MA 1402/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1965-1967/2017 in C.A. No.
6953/2009, MA 1859/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1869/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in G
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1870/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017
in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1864/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1872/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, W.P.(C) No.43/2020, MA 1867/2019
in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1889/ H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA
1878/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009,
MA 1884/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/
2009, MA 1887/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in C.A.
No.6950/2009, MA 1891/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.1921/2017 in
C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1880/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017
B
in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1886/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/
2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1893/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No.
1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1894/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1892/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1895/2019
C in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1987/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) Nos.1968-1969/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009,
W.P.(C) No. 110/2020, MA 2085/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1965-
1967/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 2339/2019 in C.A. No. 6951/
2009, MA 557/2020 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1965-1967/2017 in C.A.
No. 6953/2009, MA 858/2020 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1965-1967/2017
D
in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 412/2021 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1968-
1969/2017 in C.A. No. 6953/2009, MA 1865/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C)
No.1921/2017 in C.A. No.6950/2009, MA 1879/2019 in
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA 1881/
2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009, MA
E 1890/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/2009,
MA 1885/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A. No. 6950/
2009 AND MA 1877/2019 in CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1921/2017 in C.A.
No. 6950/2009
E. M. Sudarshan Nachiyappan, Pallav Sishodia, Dr. Manish
F Singhvi, A. N. S. Nadkarni, R. Singaravelan, Salman Khurshid, Dr. P.
Ravishankar, Sr. Advs., Yadav Narender Singh, P. Mahadevan, P. V.
Yogeswaran, M. A. Chinnasamy, Ms. C. Rubavathi, M. Veeraragavan,
C. Raghavendran, V. Senthil Kumar, P. Rajaram, Ashish Upadhyay, B.
K. Pal, Vishal, Arun Mishra, Rajiv Kumar, Shailesh Madiyal, Krishna
M. Singh, Ajay Amrit Raj, Ashish Prakash, Sanjeev Gupta, Vaibhav Manu
G Srivastava, Bankey Bihari Sharma, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari, D. K. Devesh,
Ram Lal Roy, Ashok Panigrahi, Ms. Geetanjali Das Krishnan, Nabab
Singh, Salvador Santosh Rebello, Arzu Paul, Ms. Deepti Arya, Adiraj
Bali, V. N. Subramaniam, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Ms. Aiswariya Gupta,
Randhir Kumar Ojha, S. Nandakumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Anand
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 999
CORP. OF INDIA

Murthi Rao, M. S. Saran Kumar, Srinivasa Rao, P. Vasu, Naresh Kumar, A
Raktim Gogoi, G. Ananda Selvam, Samarth Shandilya, Ms. Lakshmi
Ramamurthy, Ms. Lubna Naaz, Ms. Sommya Chaturvedi, Mayilsamy
K., Aayush Kumaran Natarajan, S. Vinayak, P. Soma Sundaram, Vivek
Sharma, Ms. Resmitha R. Chandran, Biju Joseph, Hardik Vashisht, Ms.
Pooja Rohatgi, Pramod P., Anand Dilip Landge, Rakesh Shukla, Ms.
Sumita Hazarika, Karunakar Mahalik, A. Venayagam Balan, V. N. B
Raghupathy, C. B. Gururaj, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Ms. Khyali Singh, S.
K. Roshan, M. M. Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Anurag Bhardwaj, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Dhirendra Kumar Mishra, P. B. Reddy, Mrs. Kawaljit
Kochar, Utkarsh Vats, Deepanshu, Kusum Chaudhary, Advs. for the
appearing parties. C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into sections to facilitate analysis.
They are:
D
A Introduction ............................................................... 7*
B Dogra Report .......................................................... 23*
C LIC’s objections to the Dogra Report .................... 30*
D The E Prabavathy Group ....................................... 32*
E Sequel to E Prabavathy .......................................... 37* E
F Submissions ............................................................ 41*
G Prelude – Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their
Aftermath ............................................................... 52*
H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court . 57* F
I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report...... 69*
J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956 .............. 74*
K Structuring the Relief ............................................. 84* G
A Introduction
1. This litigation has a long and chequered history. The dispute, a
familiar terrain in service jurisprudence, pertains to the claim for absorption
of persons who were engaged by the Life Insurance Corporation of
* Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original Judgment H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A India1 as temporary/badli/part-time workers. Section 23(1) of the Life
Insurance Corporation Act 19562 enables LIC to employ such number
of persons as it thinks fit to discharge its functions. Pursuant to clauses
(b) and (d) of Section 49(2), LIC has framed the Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff Regulations) 19603. Regulation 8 empowers
LIC to appoint persons on a temporary basis in Class III and Class IV
B
posts. After an amendment which was notified on 7 August 1971,
Regulation 8 provides as follows:
“8.Temporary Staff:-
(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in these Regulations the
Managing Director or Executive Director (Personnel), a Zonal
C
Manager or a Divisional Manager may employ staff in classes III
and IV on a temporary basis, subject to such general or special
directions as may be issued by the Chairman from time to time.
(2) No person appointed under sub-regulation (1) shall only by
reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the services
D of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any
post.”
2. On 31 January 1981,Sections 48 and 49 were amended to impart
statutory force to the Staff Regulations. According to LIC, its staff and
employees are governed by the parent enactment and fall outside the
E purview of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 4. The validity of the
amendment to Sections 48 and 49 has been upheld by this Court in AV
Nachane v. Union of India5.
3. On 13 August 1982, an industrial dispute was raised by the
Western Zonal Insurance Employees Association alleging that LIC had
F been engaging in unfair labour practices by employing temporary, badli
and part-time workers and was restricting their employment to short
tenures to deprive them of the claim for permanency.
4. On 20 May 1985, the dispute was referred for adjudication by
the Central Government to the National Industrial Tribunal6, Bombay
1
G “LIC”
2
“LIC Act”
3
“Staff Regulations”
4
“ID Act”
5
(1982) 1 SCC 205 (“AV Nachane”). See also: M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager,
LIC, Machilipatnam, (1994) 2 SCC 323; and Life Insurance Corporation of India
v. Raghavendra Seshagirirao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461
6
H “NIT”
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1001
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

presided over by Justice RD Tulpule7, a former Judge of the Bombay A
High Court. The terms of reference were as follows:
“What should be the wages and other conditions of service of
badli, temporary and part-time workmen of the Life Insurance
Corporation of India as well as the conditions of their absorption
into regular cadre?” B
5. On 15 January 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal issued an interim
order restraining LIC from recruiting regular employees and from
terminating the services of the ad hoc workers working with LIC.
6. On 18 April 1986, the Tulpule Tribunal passed an award 8 which
was gazetted on 7 June 1986 stipulating that those ad hoc workers who C
were in employment between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985 will be
entitled for absorption. The award, inter alia, stipulated that:
(i) Workers claiming absorption in Class III posts should have
worked for 85 days in a period of two years; and
D
(ii) Workers in Class IV posts should have worked for 70 days
in a period of three years.
The calculation of the number of days worked was to be upto the
date of the reference. The award contemplated that in the future there
would be no occasion for LIC to employ workers in temporary and
E
badli categories, save and except for occasional and temporary work.
7. On 1 June 1987, LIC issued circulars for implementing the
Tulpule Award. These circulars were disputed by the Unions and
Associations representing the workers. Following this dispute over the
LIC circulars, the Central Government referred the Tulpule Award for
F
interpretation under Section 36-A of the ID Act to another NIT presided
over by Justice MS Jamdar9, a former Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The terms of reference were:
“Can the Award dated 17/4/1986 special reference to paragraph
44,45,46, 48, 49, 51,52,54,56,57,60,64 and 66 and the interim order
dated 14/3/1986 be interpreted to mean that the central office of G
the Life Insurance Corporation of India is empowered to issue
instructions/ guidelines, as contained in their circulars issued in
7
“Tulpule Tribunal”
8
“Tulpule Award”
9
“Jamdar Tribunal” H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A this behalf to implement the directions of the Award. If not what
could be the correct interpretation of various directions covered
by the said paragraphs in the circumstances of the case? Whether
the term ‘absorption’ referred to at various places in the Award
can be interpreted to mean ‘recruitment’?”
B 8. By an interim order dated 29 June 1987, the Jamdar Tribunal
prohibited LIC from recruiting persons to Class III and Class IV posts
from the ‘open market’ during the pendency of the proceedings. LIC
has argued before this Court that on account of the restraint imposed on
it from recruiting regular employees (through the interim orders dated
15 January 1986 of the Tulpule Tribunal and 29 June 1987 of the Jamdar
C Tribunal), a large number of ad hoc workers were appointed to carry
out the day-to-day administration of LIC all over India.
9. The Jamdar Tribunal rendered its award on 26 August 198810
and it was notified in the gazette on 1 October 1988. It held that the
absorption contemplated in the Tulpule Award did not imply recruitment.
D LIC challenged the interpretation rendered by the Jamdar Award under
Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court granted leave in the
proceedings11. During the pendency of the proceedings, terms of
compromise were arrived at between LIC and all the Unions representing
the workers, save and except the Akhil Bharatiya Jeevan Bima Nigam
E Chathurthi Sreni Karmachari Sangh 12. The terms of compromise
envisaged that the Jamdar and Tulpule Awards should be substituted by
the terms and conditions of the compromise “in relation to the question
of regular employment of the workmen concerned in the said references”.
The terms of compromise which were filed before this Courtare extracted
below:
F
“TERMS OF COMPROMISE
1. The Management and the workmen agree that the Award
of the National Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr.
Justice R.D. Tulpule, in Reference No.NTB-1 of 1988,
G published on 7th June 1986, and the Award of the National
Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mr. Justice M.S. Jandar,
dated 26th August 1988 in Reference No. NTB-1 of 1987,
10
“Jamdar Award”
11
SLP (Civil) No14906 of 1988, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No1790 of 1989
on the grant of leave
12
H “Karmachari Sangh”
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1003
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

published on 1st October 1988, be substituted by the Terms A
and Conditions of Compromise set out hereinafter in relation
to the question of regular employment of the workmen
concerned in the said Reference.
2. The Management agrees to consider the temporary/
part-time/badli workmen employed by the petitioner B
for 85 days in any two years in a Class III post and for
70 days in any three years in a Class IV post in any of
its establishments during the period 1.1.82 to 20.5.85,
for regular employment on the basis and in the manner
stated hereinbelow. The temporary/part-time/badli
workmen who had made applications for regular C
employment on or before 7.7.86 or those temporary/part-
time/badli workmen whose applications had been received
after 7.7.86 but before 6.3.87 and had been rejected on
account of late submission, shall be eligible for consideration
for regular employment. The selection of the candidate D
shall be made on the basis of the following
qualifications, age test, interview and also having
regard to the number of days worked by the
candidates.A panel of selected candidates shall be
made and the selected candidates shall be appointed
in regular employment from the panel in the order of E
merit prospectively from the dates to be notified as
and when vacancies in sanctioned posts for regular
employment are filled in from time to time :-
(i) QUALIFICATIONS – As per Circular No.Per/A/2D/492/
ASP/79, dated 27.11.79, prescribed for Class III employee F
subject to relaxation only in regard to percentage of marks,
required as per the qualifications as may be decided by the
Managing Director of the Petitioner-Corporation.
Per/A/2D/526/ASP/81, dated 24.6.1981 subject to
relaxation in the matter of basic qualifications as may be G
decided by the Managing Director of the Petitioner-
Corporation.
(ii) AGE – As per Regulation No. 18 of (Staff)Regulations,
1960, made by the Petitioner.
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (iii) TEST – As per Circular dated 27.11.1979, for Class III as
well as Class IV workmen and, in addition, as per Circular
dated 4.6.1981 for Class IV workmen only.
(iv) INTERVIEW – As per Circular dated 27.11.79 for both
Class III and Class IV workmen.
B 3. The temporary/part-time/badli workmen who had already
qualified in the written test held earlier for consideration
for eligible workmen for regular employment, will not be
required to appear again for test and they shall be considered
for interview on the basis of the test already held.
C 4. The test and interview for regular employment to be held
for the purpose of selection of the temporary/part-time/badli
workmen aforementioned, shall be commenced within one
month of the order of this Hon’ble Court in terms of this
Compromise. The selected candidates shall be appointed
D in regular employment in accordance with the panel of
selected candidates till it is exhausted. The petitioner shall,
however, be entitled to made recruitment straightway
wherever vacancies are more than the candidates in any
Division in view of the necessity or expediency for such
recruitment.
E
5. The recruitment of the temporary/part-time/badli workmen
in the categories of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, shall
be considered first and if any vacancy may remain unfulfilled
in that category, the petitioner shall be entitled to made
recruitment in accordance with its usual procedure
F according to its requirements.
6. In view of the abovementioned Terms of Compromise no
dispute in relation to the workmen concerned, as referred
in Clause 1 hereinabove, survives in regard to the matter
covered by this Compromise between the parties and the
G respective rights and obligations of the parties in relation to
regular employment of the said workman concerned shall
be determined and given effect accordingly, if any
controversy may arise.”
(emphasis supplied)
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1005
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

The terms of compromise were accepted by an interim order of a A
two-judge Bench of this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen13 on 1 March
1989. The order is extracted below:
“Special leave is granted. It appears that out of nine Unions eight
Unions said to berepresenting about 99% of the workers have
entered into a compromise with the Management. In the B
circumstances pending the final disposal of the appeal, wepermit
the Management and the members of the said eight Unions to
implement the terms of compromise by way of interim measure
without however, any prejudice to the rights and contentions of
the members of the other Union, who have not entered into such
compromise with the management.” C

10. On 7 February1996, the above civil appeal in LIC v. Their
Workmen (supra)was disposed of. This Court accepted the contention
of LIC that since eight unions had already accepted the compromise,
the ninth union (Karamchari Sangh) should fall in line and act on the
terms and conditions of the compromise in the interest of industrial peace. D
Since the litigating workers in Class IV posts were unable to take the
test during the pendency of the proceedings, LIC was directed to exempt
Class IV workers from appearing for the test and interview, if the
management had power to do so under the regulations or the instructions
governing their conditions of service.The Court observed that in the event E
that the management had no such power, it had “no doubt”that the test
prescribed for the workers would be of a lower standard than what had
been prescribed under the two circulars mentioned in the compromise.
Pursuant to the compromise, LIC appointed 1875 persons to Class III
posts and 1324 persons to Class IV posts in various divisions.
F
11. The genesis of the present dispute relates to a demand raised
by the Unions on 4 March 1991, pertaining to the claim for regularisation
of those workers who were employed from 20 May 1985 till the date of
reference on 4 March 1991. Acting on the demand, the Central
Government made the following reference to the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal14 under Sections 10(1)(d) and 2A of the ID Act: G
“Whether the action of the Management of Life Insurance
Corporation of India in not absorbing badli/temporary and part-
13
Civil Appeal No1790 of 1989 (1 March 1989) (“LIC v. Their Workmen”)
14
“CGIT” H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A time workmen employed in the establishment of LIC after
20.05.1985 is justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are
entitled?”
12. On 18 June 2001, the CGIT which was presided over by Shri
KS Srivastav, pronounced the award15 by directing the absorption of the
B temporary/badli workerson the same terms as the Tulpule and Jamdar
Awards, with some modifications. The Srivastav Award held that:
“88. In view of the fact I am of the definite view that such type of
workmen belonging to temporary/badly/ part time categories in
class III and Class IV service of the corporation who were
C employed after following the procedure and were allowed to
continue service beyond the qualifying period and were eligible
and suitable to every respect should be given absorption in the
service from date of the vacancy in the service in which they
could have been absorbed. It will also apply to these employees
whose service were terminated by the corporation.”
D
13. In its ultimate directions, the Srivastav Award directed that
the temporary, badli and part-time workers who were employed after
20 May 1985 should be granted absorption on the same terms and
conditions as was stipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (in respect
of workers who were employed from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985).
E LIC was directed to publish a notice in the newspapers for inviting
applications from individual workers for absorption. If no regular vacancy
was available, the award directed supernumerary posts to be created.
Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award is extracted below:
“94. In view of the matter I find and conclude that the action of
F corporation denying the absorption of these temporary/badli/part
time workmen as dealt with above in the body of this award and
employed after 20-05-85 is not justified. I further find that these
workmen employed after 20-5-85 should be given absorption in
their job on the same terms and conditions as laid down in the
G aforesaid two awards namely Hon’ble Mr Justice R.D. Tulpule
and of Hon’ble Mr Justice M.S. Jamdar in respect of the workmen
employed with effect from 1-1-82 to 20-05-85 and dealt with by
me as above. It is directed that the corporation shall take into
consideration for the absorption of the workmen, on their eligibility
15
H “Srivastav Award”
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1007
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and suitability as dealt with above in the award. The case of those A
workmen belonging to the category of temporary, badli, part-time
who had become eligible for their absorption in their job after
completing the qualified period of working and were suitable in
every respect but their services were terminated and they were
turned out of the job by the corporation should also considered for
B
the absorption of such terminated workmen of the corporation
shall publish a notice in the daily newspaper having wide circulation
throughout India and if in compliance of the notice the workman
concerned consent in writing within stipulated period which could
be given in the said notice the case of such workman should also
be considered for their absorption in the regular vacancy then C
existing. At the time of the consideration of absorption of such
workmen if it is found that no regular vacancy is available to such
workmen, supernumerary posts should also be created and such
workmen should be given absorption in it. It is also directed that
the cases of these workmen for absorption in existing vacancies
D
should be taken for consideration first irrespective of the regular
recruitment if taken. The case of the contractual workmen for
absorption shall be taken into consideration as per observation
made in the body of the award and on the basis on conditions as
stated above.”
14. The Srivastav Award was challenged by LIC in a writ petition16 E
before the Delhi High Court. By a judgment dated 15 April 2004, a
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court set aside the award and held that
the decisions of this Court in E Prabavathy v. Life Insurance
Corporation of India17 and LIC of India v. G Sudhakar18 directing
LIC to formulate a scheme for regularisation were binding on the CGIT. F
The judgment of the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court was the subject
matter of a batch of Letters Patent Appeals19 preferred by six Unions/
Associations. The appeals were dismissed on 21 March 2007 by the
Division Bench. The Division Bench also issued directions for age
relaxation and weight age of past service to the workers:
G
16
WP No 4346 of 2001 (High Court of Delhi)
17
SLP (Civil) No 10393 of 1992 (“EPrabavathy”)
18
Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000 (“G Sudhakar”)
19
LPA 678 of 2004 with LPA 690 of 2004, LPA 710 of 2004, LPA 722 of 2004, LPA
1023 of 2004 and LPA 1165 of 2004
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A “20. In that view of the matter, while dismissing the appeals filed
by the appellants, we issue directions in the following manner:
(a) for the next three years whenever an advertisement is made
by the respondent corporation for filling up vacancies in
Class III and Class IV posts, an opportunity shall be given
B to the appellants to submit their applications, which, if
submitted, shall be considered along with all other candidates
but giving age relaxation to the appellants and also giving
due weightage to the past services rendered by the
appellants.
C 21. In terms of the aforesaid order, the appeals stand disposed
of.”
15. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
was assailed in a batch of Special Leave Petitions20 filed by six Unions
and Associations representing the workers. In the meantime, LIC began
D the process of implementing the judgment of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court on 21 March 2007 by issuing an advertisement for
recruitment of Assistants, by allowing age relaxations and weightage for
temporary workers to compete with candidates from the open market.On
11 February 2008, this Court directed the maintenance of status quo.
The civil appeals were eventually disposed of by a two-judge Bench of
E this Court on 18 March 2015 in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time
Temporary LIC Employees Association v. Life Insurance
Corporation of India21 which concluded that the Srivastav Award was
binding. While restoring the Srivastav Award, the judgment of this Court
directed LIC to implement its directions and set aside the judgment of
F the Delhi High Court.
16. Following the judgment of this Court, LIC issued an
advertisement on 21 July 2015 calling for applications from workers
who were employed as badli/temporary/part-time workers in its
establishment from 20 May 1985 to 4 March 1991, in terms of the eligibility
criteria determined by the award. This led to the institution of contempt
G
proceedings before this Court on the ground that by restricting the eligibility
for recruitment to workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985
20
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No15269 of 2007 with SLP(Civil) No 18943 of 2007,
SLP(Civil) No 19958 of 2007, SLP(Civil) No 20058 of 2007, SLP(Civil) No 22712 of
2007 and SLP(Civil) No 23623 of 2007
21
H (2015) 9 SCC 62 (“TN Terminated Employees Association”)
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1009
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and 4 March 1991, LIC was in breach of the directions of this Court in A
TN Terminated Employees Association (supra). LIC also instituted
review petitions against the judgment in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra). The review petitions and the contempt petitions
were directed to be heard together. On 9 August 2016, the review sought
by LIC was partially allowed22 by restricting the award of back-wages
to 50 per cent. The relevant part of the directions of this Court is B
reproduced below:
“The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are entitled for
regularisation as permanent workmen in terms of the impugned
judgment and order dated 18.03.2015 passed by this Court, by
applying the terms and conditions of the modified award dated C
26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar, are held to be entitled to
full back wages as well. However, keeping in mind the immense
financial burden this would cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modify
the relief only with regard to the back wages payable and therefore,
we award 50% of the back wages with consequential benefits.
D
The back wages must be calculated on the basis of the gross
salary of the workmen, applicable as on the date as per the
periodical revisions of pay scale as stated supra. The computation
must be made from the date of entitlement of the workmen
involved in these cases, that is, their absorption, till the age
of superannuation, if any concerned workman has attained the E
age of superannuation as per the regulations of the review
petitioner-LIC, as applicable to the concerned workman.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The curative petitions instituted by LIC challenging the
judgment in review were rejected on 22 February 2017. In March 2017, F
LIC sorted out and distributed the applications which had been received
in pursuance of its notice dated 21 July 2017 through its zonal offices for
implementation of the decision in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra). On 16 May 2017, LIC issued directions to the
Zonal Managers to implement the Srivastav Award and the order of this
Court in the review of TN Terminated Employees Association G
(supra). The circular prescribed the following norms of eligibility for
absorption:
(i) The worker should have been engaged between 20 May
1985 and 4 March 1991;
22
(2016) 9 SCC 366 H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (ii) The name of the worker should figure in the list submitted
by the Unions to the CGIT in the industrial reference;
(iii) Class III workers ought to have been engaged for at least
85 days in two calendar years whileClass IVworkers should
have been engaged for at least 70 days in three calendar
B years;
(iv) The Union or theAssociation should have been an appellant
before the Supreme Court;
(v) The claimant worker should have submitted a biodata in
pursuance of the notice issued by the LIC on 21 July 2015
C for recruitment in regularised positions; and
(vi) The worker should have been engaged in accordance with
the rules prevalent in LIC.
18. In 2017, various divisions of LIC found 245 workmen to be
D eligible and they were offered absorption by the Zonal Offices. This led
to the initiation of contempt proceedings23 by the Unions who sought the
absorption of all temporary, part-time and badli workers and daily wagers
who were engaged after 20 May 1985till date.
19. On 11 May 2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court24 directed
the petitioning Unions in the contempt proceedings to submit material
E
documents to show the engagement of the workers between 20 May
1985 and 4 March 1991. This Court also directed LIC to nominate a
senior official to scrutinise the documents and to take a final decision in
accordance with the prescribed conditions. Consequently, LIC received
about eighty-three thousand representations. Upon scrutiny, LIC found
F seventy-six workers to be eligible for absorption. By an order dated 7
September 2018, a two-judge Bench of this Court25 directed the CGIT
at New Delhi to decide upon the eligibility of the claims made by the
Unions, Associations and individual workers within a period of three
months. However, the Court found that there was no breach of the
judgment dated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees
G
Association (supra). The order of this Court is extracted below:
23
Contempt Petition (Civil) 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal 6950 of 2009
24
Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of
2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (11 May 2018)
25
Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of
H 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (7 September 2018)
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1011
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“The crucial dispute in these proceedings is regarding the A
beneficiaries of the Award dated 18.06.2001 in I.D. No.27 of
1991 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT), New
Delhi.
The Award has been finally upheld by this Court in the judgment
rendered in Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC B
Employees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
and Others, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 62.
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India appearing
for the respondents/LIC, submits that for want of documents/
materials, the LIC is not in a position to verify as to who are the C
actual beneficiaries of the Award. Learned counsel appearing for
the Union(s) and the individual workers, however, would submit
that despite producing the records and despite availability of the
original records with the LIC, no positive decision is taken by it.
Faced with such a situation, we are of the view that the CGIT, D
New Delhi should look into the matter with regard to the claims
made by the Union(s)/individual workmen, regarding entitlement
to the benefits under the Award and submit a report to this Court.
Accordingly, we direct the CGIT, New Delhi to look into the claims
made by the Union(s)/individual Workmen and submit a report to
this Court within three months. E

There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents that the
benefit of Award should be made available to those who have
been engaged as Badli workers after 4.3.1991. That is a matter
for interpretation by this Court. For the time being, CGIT, New
Delhi would limit its enquiry only to the claims of the Badli workers F
between 20.05.1989 and 04.03.1991, as already indicated by this
Court in the order dated 11.05.2018.
We do not find that it is a case of contempt. Therefore, the
contempt notices are discharged. However, the applications/
petitions be kept pending for the purpose of necessary assistance G
to the Court.”
On 10 September 201826, the above order was modified by the
same two-judge Bench in the following terms:
26
Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of
2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (10 September 2018) H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A “There is also a dispute raised by some of the respondents that
the benefit of Award should be made available to those who have
been engaged as Badli/Part-time/Temporary workers after
4.3.1991. That is a matter for interpretation by this Court. For the
time being, CGIT, New Delhi would limit its enquiry only to the
claims of the Badli workers between 20.05.1985 and
B
04.03.1991, as already indicated by this Court in the order dated
11.05.2018.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Thereafter, on 12 December 201827, while dealing with the
C batch of contempt petitions, a two-judge Bench of this Court directed
the CGIT, in terms of this Court’s previous directions dated 7September
2018 in the same contempt proceedings, to “look into the matter with
regard to the claims made by the Union(s) individual workmen”. The
CGIT was directed to submit its report within four months, as
contemplated by the order dated 7 September 2018 and modified on 10
D September 2018 in the contempt proceedings. Between October 2018
and 16 May 2018, the CGIT issued notice to the Unions and individuals
in the earlier industrial reference to submit their claims. As many as
15,500 claims were submitted on behalf of the Unions, Associations and
individual workers claiming absorption and the benefit of the Srivastav
E Award dated 18 June 2001. LIC submitted its responses before the CGIT.
The CGIT submitted its report on 31 May 201928 to this Court. The
report ofthe CGIT will be referred to as the Dogra Report, adopting the
name of the presiding officer.
B Dogra Report
F 21. Before the presiding officer of the CGIT, LIC set up the plea
that only those workers whose names were mentioned in the original
certified list in the industrial reference were entitled to the benefit of the
Srivastav Award. LIC argued that this was also the direction issued by
the Supreme Court in the contempt proceedings arising out ofa review
G of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) on 10 September
2018 and reiterated on 12 December 2018. On the other hand, the Unions
representing the workers, as well as the individual workers, claimed that
they were entitled to the benefit of the award irrespective of whether
27
Ranbir Singh v. S K Roy, Chairman, LIC, Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of
2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009 (12 September 2018)
28
H “Dogra Report”
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1013
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

their claim found place in the original list as certified before the CGIT in A
the industrial reference. Dealing with this aspect, the Dogra Report
concluded that though the order dated 10 September 2018 required the
CGIT to verify the list which was already on the record, this did not
imply that only those workers whose names figured in the certified list
were entitled to absorption, to the exclusion of others. Paragraphs 24
B
and 25 of the Dogra Report have a bearing on the present proceedings
and are hence extracted below:
“24. To my mind, answer to this question has to be given in the
light of backdrop of the circumstances which culminated into
passing of the Award in ID case No.27 of 1991 which was
admittedly upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated C
18/3/2015 reported as (2015) 9 SCC 62 – Tamil Nadu Terminated
Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Vs. Life Insurance
Corporation of India. No doubt, Hon’ble Apex Court in its order
dated 10/9/2018 has observed that this Tribunal will verify the list
which is available on record. But this does not mean that only D
such workmen whose names are mentioned in the original/certified
list attached with the reference, are liable to be considered for
absorption, to the exclusion of other workmen. This Tribunal has
to keep in mind that contempt petitions were earlier filed by
members of Various Unions before Hon’ble Supreme Court and
LIC had also filed contempt petitions in High Court of Delhi against E
Regional Labour Commissioner. During pendency of said petition,
E. Prabhavati and others were impleaded as party at the instance
of LIC vide order dated 25/9/2008. Thereafter, memo of parties
was filed by LIC by adding Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC
Employees Welfare Association as Respondent No.47. In view F
of this, the contention of the LIC that members of E. Prabhavati
& others or Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees
Welfare Association are not entitled to any relief, is not tenable,
when the said Association has been held to be necessary party.
There is not even a whisper in any of the judgment/order of
Hon’ble High Court or Hon’ble Supreme Court that only workmen G
whose names are mentioned in the certified/original list of CGIT
Award are to be granted relief. An overall examination of the
order dated 10/9/2018 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court shows that
this Tribunal is required to verify the list available on record but
there is no direction to exclude members of other Union/workmen H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A inasmuch as Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the claims
of contempt petitioners has ordered this Tribunal to consider the
claims of those workers who were employed as Badli workers
with the Management of LIC during the period from 20/5/1985 to
4/3/1991 subject to fulfilment of number of days as mentioned in
the Award.
B
25. It is settled principle of law that while considering the order/
judgment of Constitutional Court, this Tribunal is required to keep
in mind entire spectrum of the orders as well as background of
the case. It is not proper to cull out a single para or a sentence
from the order/judgment so as to defeat the very purpose of the
C order so passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. If the orders dated
11/5/2018, 7/9/2018 and 10/9/2018 are taken into consideration, it
is crystal clear that claims of all such workmen and Union/s who
worked as Badli workers during the period from 20/5/1985 to 4/3/
1991 are required to be considered by this Tribunal. Although I
D am in full agreement with the submission made on behalf of the
Management/LIC that initial onus is always upon the workmen
concerned to prove that they were in the employment of the
Management at the relevant time, however this Tribunal cannot
ignore the fact that UC has not filed on record any document/
record relating to employment of various workmen rather has
E simply taken a plea that same being old record is not traceable.”
22. The Dogra Report noted that LIC had admitted that 321
workerswere found to be eligible for absorption in terms of the Srivastav
Award. The report found fault with LIC for making contradictory claims
that 321 workers were eligible for absorption when the records of workers
F were allegedly old and not traceable. The Dogra Report drewan adverse
inference against LIC for having failed to maintain the records in
pursuance of the burden cast upon it by Section 25-D of the ID Act,
particularly when the reference was pending since 1991. Paragraph 29
of the report is extracted below:
G “29) During the course of arguments as well as in the reply filed
on behalf of the Management/LIC, it is clear that Management
has admitted that till date 321 Nos. of employees were found to
be eligible in terms of the Award and they were considered eligible
for absorption. It is not understandable tothis Tribunal as to what
H were the basis for the Management/LIC for coming to the
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1015
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

conclusion that only 321 Nos. of workmen/employees were found A
to be eligible and covered by the Award of CGIT in ID case
No.27/1991, when the Management has come up with a plea that
record relating to the workmen being old record is not traceable.
It is worthwhile to mention here that Section 25-D of the ID Act
specifically provides that it is the duty of every Employer to
B
maintain a muster roll and to provide for the making of entries
therein by the workmen who may present themselves for work at
the establishment. This Tribunal has to keep in mind a vital fact
that since the reference bearing ID No.27/1991 is pending before
various Courts since 1991, the Management/LIC was/is required
to keep the record in safe custody when the case of such a huge C
magnitude was pending before the Courts. In such circumstances,
this Tribunal is constrained to draw adverse inference against the
management.”
23. Based on the above hypothesis, the report proceeded to decide
“prima facie” the claims of the Unions and individual workers. While D
taking up the claims made by the All India Life Insurance Employees
Association and its affiliate, Life Insurance Employees Association, Delhi,
the report notes that 6998 claims had been filed (as contained in Annexure
A). Upon scrutiny, LIC drew the attention of the CGIT to the fact that
3592 duplicate entries were found in the claims which were submitted
(as contained in Annexure A-1). Noting that the “Unions have not seriously E
disputed the same”, the Dogra Report concludes that “such claimants
are to be given benefit of absorption only once”. The Dogra Report also
notes that workers who had started working beyond the cut-off date of
4 March 1991 would not be covered in the enquiry. This observation in
the Dogra Report was in view of the order of this Court in the contempt F
proceedings arising out of the review of TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra) on 7 September 2018, which had specifically
observed that whether the benefit of the Srivastav Award should be
given to those who had been engaged as badli workers after 4 March
1991was a matter for interpretation by this Court. Hence, for the time
being, CGIT had been directed to limit its enquiry only to the claims for G
the period between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991 (as contained in
Annexure A-2).In this context, the Dogra Report held that those workers
who had commenced work after 4 March 1991 would not be covered
by its enquiry.
H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 24. The Dogra Report accordingly found the following workers
to be entitled to absorption:
a) The All India Insurance Employees Association Calcutta
and Western Zone Insurance Employees Association had
filed a claim on behalf of 3337 workers as part of the list
B contained in Annexure B.LIC argued that in this list of 3337
workers, 3332 workers did not find mention in the original
certified list. The Dogra Report perused the documents and
found that all3337 workers were entitled to the benefit of
absorption;
C b) All India LIC Employees Association had filed claims on
behalf of 97 workers as a list contained in Annexure C.
The Dogra Report found that all 97 workers (except one
who commenced work post 4 March 1991) were entitled
to absorption and LIC’s argument of fabrication of
documents was baseless when considered against the
D general practice of the Branch Managers at LIC;
c) National Organization of Insurance Workers filed a claim
on behalf of workers as a part of Annexure D. The Dogra
Report found that all 401 workers in accordance with
Annexure D were eligible for absorption;
E
d) The All India National Life Insurance Federation Bombay
filed two claims on behalf of 1674 workers of the Nagpur
Association (Annexure E) and 371 workers of the
Hyderabad Association (Annexure F). The Nagpur
Association conceded that approximately 84 entries were
F blank, and 38 workers who had worked after 4 March 1991
and three who worked prior to 1 January 1982 would not
be entitled to any benefit. Thus, the 1590 remaining workers
of the Nagpur Association were found to eligible for
absorption (contained in Annexure E-1). The legal heirs of
G two deceased workers were held to be entitled to monetary
benefit in lieu of service. As regards the 371 workers of
the Hyderabad Association, the Dogra Report excludes those
who had either worked prior to 20 May 1985 or after 4
March 1991 and those eligible for absorption were detailed
out in Annexure F-1;
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1017
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

e)The Akhil Bhartiya Jivan Nigam filed claims on behalf of A
890 workers as a part of a list contained in Annexure G. It
was admitted thatof the 890 workers, 692 were engaged
after 4 March 1991, there were 8 repeat entries and
2workerswere engaged prior to 1985. Consequently, after
carrying out the exclusions, Annexure G-1 represented the
B
list of eligible workers identified by the Dogra Report for
absorption;
f) The Tamil Nadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC
Employees Welfare Association filed claims on behalf of
376 workers in Annexure H. After excluding those who
had worked prior to or after the cut-off date, a list of eligible C
employees was tabulated by the Dogra Report in Annexure
H-1. Workers who had reached the age of superannuation
were held entitled to receive all consequential benefits from
LIC; and
g) Annexure I contained the names of a group of workers, D
described as the “E- Prabhavati workmen”29 containing
1333 workers. After excluding those who had worked less
than the requisite number of days for absorption and those
who had been engaged after 4 March 1991, the Dogra
Report found the remaining workers to be eligible for
absorption and their claims were tabulated in Annexure I E
(A).The specific case of the E Prabhavati group of workers
will be dealt with in the course of the present judgment. At
this stage, it is be material to note that LIC had contended
that this batch of workers had been specifically excluded
by paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award. Notwithstanding F
this, the Dogra Report has held that this batch of workers
would also be entitled to absorption.
25. Apart from the persons named in the annexures mentioned
above, the Dogra Report has concluded that the following claims by the
Union for absorption would have to be allowed:
G
(i) Annexure J filed on behalf of 36 workers by the LIC
Workers Union Kanpur– where 35 workers were allowed
absorption (except 1 worker recruited after the cut-off
date);
29
Interchangeably referred as “EPrabavathy” H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (ii) Annexure K filed on behalf of 17 workers by the LIC
Workers Union, Gujarat Unit –where 4 out of the 17
workers were held eligible;
(iii) Annexure L filed on behalf of 119 workers from the Jodhpur
Division of LIC –where all were held eligible for absorption
B (while it was noted that 1 worker’s name appeared twice);
(iv) Annexure M – 22 workers were held entitled to absorption;
(v) Annexure N – 2 workers out of the 54 were held entitled to
absorption since only these two worked during the relevant
period; (vi) Annexure O – 1 out of 9 workers was
C held entitled to absorption, since the others had been
employed after the cut-off date of 4 March 1991;
(vii) Annexure P –4 workers were held entitled to absorption;
(viii) Annexure Q –workers in this list were held not entitled to
D the benefit of absorption as they had worked after the cut-
off date of 4 March 1991; and
(ix) Apart from the above annexures, the Dogra Report
scrutinized the claim of several individual workers and
determined whether they were entitled to absorption.
E C LIC’sobjections to the Dogra Report
26. Broadly speaking, LIC has urged the following objections to
the Dogra Report:
(i) The CGIT was not entrusted with the task of adjudication
but of verification;
F
(ii) The orders passed by this court in the contempt proceedings
arising out of the review of the decision in TN Terminated
Employees Association (supra) on 11 May 2018, 7
September 2018 and 10 September 2018 indicate that:

G (a) In the course of verification, CGIT was not entitled
to travel beyond the Srivastav Award dated 18 June
2001;
(b) The CGIT had to verify only those claims where the
workers were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4
March 1991; and
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1019
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(c) The verification by CGIT was to be confined only to A
those badli, temporary and part-time workers whose
names were contained in the original certified list in
the reference leading to the Srivastav Award dated
18 June 2001;
(iii) The CGIT was duty-bound to verify only the documents B
produced by LIC to determine whether the workers were
working during the specified period.The Dogra Report has
found that almost all the names of workers submitted by
the Union were eligible without due verification;
(iv) A total of 15,465 claims were submitted, which include: C
(a) Persons who were engaged beyond the stipulated
period between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;
(b) Persons whose names were not in the certified list
before the CGIT in the industrial reference; and
D
(c) Persons from the E Prabhavati group who were not
covered by the Srivastav Award, as expressly set
out in paragraph 75 of the award;
(v) During the course of the verification by LIC, it was found
that the documents/material produced by several workers
E
were fabricated and there was a duplication of names; and
(vi) Though paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award had
categorically held that the group of workers described as
the “E Prabhavati” group were not entitled to relief, the
Dogra Report held them to be entitled for absorption. LIC
F
has also submitted objections to the certification which has
been carried out in respect of certain workers whose names
are set out in the annexures to the Dogra Report.
27. At this stage, it would be material to note that the original
certified list of workers in the reference contained the names of 4024
workers. According to LIC, if the certification exercise carried out in G
the Dogra Report were to be accepted,about11,780 workers would be
entitled to absorption.
D The E Prabavathy Group
H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 28. The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 details the history
pertaining to this group of workers. Paragraphs 19-20 and 75 of the
Award are extracted below:
“19. Thereafter the employees employed as temporary, badli and
part time after 20th May 1985 raised demand for their absorption
B regularising too in the regular service. When their demands were
not accepted by the corporation several writ petitions in this respect
were filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras. These writ
petitions were filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras
between the years 1989 to 1991.The writ petition No.10367/89
filed was between the terminated full time temporary LIC Welfare
C Association and Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, Khanjawar. This
writ petition alongwith other writ petitions total 18 writ petitions
were listed for hearing before the full bench of Hon’ble High
Court of Madras. After hearing the parties of all the writ petitions
the Hon’ble High Court of Madras gave judgment which is
D reported as 1993(1) LLJ 1030 between terminated full temporary
employees welfare association and Senior Divisional Manager,
LIC, Khanjawar. All the writ petitions were dismissed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Madras.
20. Parties had then preferred civil appeal before the Hon’ble
E Supreme Court of India against judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court of Madras. These civil appeals were numbered as SLP (C)
10393 to 10413/92 E. Prabhawati and others Vs. LIC of India
and others. It appears that in the said civil appeal on the directions
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Corporation had framed a scheme
for the regularization of the employees who were granted ad hoc
F appointments for 85 days at intervals from time to time was placed
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After hearing the parties by
means of interim order dated 23-10-92 found the scheme as
reasonable and was approved to the existence of the scheme
contained in clauses (a) and (d) of paragraph 1 and the corporation
G was directed to proceed to regularise the employees eligible in
accordance with the scheme. The clauses of (a) and (d) of the
scheme have been reproduced in the order by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India. With the aforesaid direction all the civil
appeals were disposed of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1021
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

[…] A
75. Now as regard the binding effect of the order dated 23-
10-92 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP No.
10393-10411/92 E. Prabhawathy and others Vs. Life Insurance
Corporation of India and another confirming the scheme of
absorption/regularisation as argued on behalf of the corporation B
in my view can be well accepted. The order passed I find is
between the same parties. E. Prabhawathy and other is the party
in this proceeding being impleaded at the subsequent stage of the
proceeding. Statement of claim has been filed in the present case
by the aforesaid workmen. The said order dated 23-10-92 of
Hon’ble Supreme Court is thus between same parties of the case C
and in view of the circumstances. I find that workmen has no
ground to challenge the legality of the said order dated 23.10.92.
The conditions of the workmen made in this regard are not
accepted.”
29. At this stage, it would be material to note that on 23 October D
1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court specifically dealt with the above
group of workmen in E Prabavathy (supra). The judgment of this Court
is extracted below in its entirety:
“ORDER
E
Special Leave granted.
In State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc. v. Piara Singh & Ors. etc.
etc., (JT 1992(5) S.C. 179), this court indicated how regularization
of adhoc/temporary employees in Government and Public Sector
Undertakings should be effected. While laying down the guidelines F
in this behalf, this court observe in paragraph 43 as under:-
“The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the
prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may
sometimes call for an adhoc or temporary appointment to be
made. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace
G
such an adhoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected
employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee
may also compete along with others for such regular selection/
appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does
not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The
H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be
withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc/
temporary employee.”
The LIC was asked to work out a scheme for the purpose of
regularization of employees who were granted adhoc appointments
B for 85 days at intervals from time to time. The learned counsel for
the LIC has placed before us a Scheme for regularization of such
adhoc employees. We have given our anxious consideration to
the Scheme proposed by the LIC and have also heard both Mr.
Ramamurthy and Mr. Salve at length and we are of the opinion
that the Scheme proposed by LIC is a reasonable one and
C commands acceptance, save and except the fact that the
recruitment scheduled for November, 1992 will be postponed by
not less than six weeks to enable the eligible adhoc employees to
compete with others for selection at the said recruitment. We are
of the opinion that the relaxation granted to these adhoc employees
D for having worked with the LIC in the past in the matter of age
and qualification suffices. The further provision that if such an
adhoc employee has worked between 20th May, 1985 and till
date for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years, is a
reasonable stipulation for eligibility for regularization. We are of
the opinion, the scheme is in consonance with the guidelines which
E we have laid down in paragraphs 43 to 49 of Piara Singh’s
judgment. Mr. Salve, the learned counsel for the LIC, also informed
us that in regard to future adhoc appointments/regularization the
LIC is in the process of making a scheme consistent with the
guidelines laid down in Piara Singh’s case so that this device of
F employment for 85 days which has not been approved may not be
resorted to in future. The Scheme contained in Clauses (a) to (d)
of paragraph 1, which is as under, is approved subject to the
postponement of the recruitment scheduled in November, 1992
by at least six weeks and the LIC will proceed to regularize the
employees eligible under the Scheme;
G
(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85
days in any two consecutive calendar years with the Life
Insurance Corporation between 20th May, 1985 uptill date and
who confirmed to the required eligibility criteria for regular
recruitment on the dates of their initial temporary, appointment
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1023
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

will be permitted to compete for the next regular recruitment A
to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after the regular
recruitment for these posts currently scheduled for November,
1992.
(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with all
other candidates who may apply for such appointments, B
including those from the open market.
(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applying
for regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on the
date of their first temporary appointment for securing regular
appointment with the Life Insurance Corporation. C
(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can apply
for regular recruitment in the normal course.
This regularization will, in the circumstances, be by selection for
appointment. We make the above clauses of the Scheme as part
of our order. D
Mr. Ramamurthy, the learned counsel for the petitioners, further
submitted that certain questions of law in regard to the
interpretation of section 84 of the LIC Act, 1956, as amended by
the LIC Amendment Act, 1981, and Section 2(oo) (bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arise for consideration in the present E
case in view of the judgment of the Madras High Court. We may
state that we express no opinion on the said questions of law as
they do not survive in view of the scheme which LIC has worked
out and which we have approved.It is not necessary for us to go
into those questions and we leave them open for decision in an F
appropriate case in future.
The Civil Appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no order
as to costs.”
30. The above order of the three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy
(supra) indicates that LIC had been directed by the Court to work out a G
scheme for the purpose of regularising workers who were granted adhoc
appointment for a period of 85 days from time to time. A scheme was
prepared by LIC. The three-judge Bench had given “its anxious
consideration to the scheme proposed by the LIC” and having heard
both counsel for the workers and for LIC, held that it was “of the opinion
H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A that the scheme proposed by LIC is reasonable one and commands
acceptance”. The only modification was a postponing of the recruitment
which was scheduled on 1 November 1992 to allow eligible ad hoc
workers to compete with others for selection at the recruitment. This
Court affirmed the relaxation of age and qualifications granted by the
scheme to eligible ad hoc workers who had worked between 20 May
B 1985 “till date” in any two calendar years. This Court accepted the
scheme which was proposed by LIC, subject to the modification noted
above. This Court held that regularisation would be by selection for
appointment. The clauses of the scheme were incorporated as a part of
the order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra). In this
C backdrop, paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award specifically excluded
the claims of the E Prabavathy workers who were governed by the
order of this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra).
The grievance of the LIC isthat despite this, the Dogra Report concludes
that this group of workers would be eligible for absorption in terms of
the Srivastav Award.
D E. Sequel to E Prabavathy
31. Following the order of this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E
Prabavathy (supra), LIC framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India
(Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions 1993. A contempt petition
was moved before this Court alleging that the scheme which was notified
E by LIC on 28 June 1993 was not in accordance with the order in E
Prabhavathy (supra). The contempt petition was dismissed by this Court
on 12 July 1993.
32. In 1998, a batch of writ petitions was filed in the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh seeking the relief of absorption on a permanent basis.
Among the petitions was a petition instituted by G Sudhakar and others.
F
A Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed the
petition, placing reliance on the decision in E Prabavathy (supra). On 3
November 1998, the Division Bench of the High Court directed LIC to
frame a scheme for regularisation. LIC preferred a Special Leave Petition
against the judgment of the Division Bench in G Sudhakar (supra) which
G was allowed by this Court30 on 22 November 2001. A two-judge Bench
of this Court held in G Sudhakar (supra) that the scheme approved in E
Prabavathy (supra) shall govern the absorption of all adhoc workers in
the country. This Court’s order dated 22 November 2001 in G Sudhakar
(supra) is extracted below:
30
H Civil Appeal No 2104 of 2000
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1025
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“This appeal is by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for A
short “the Corporation”) against the Division Bench Judgment of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Respondents filed a Writ
Petition praying for a mandamus to the corporation for their
absorption on permanent basis which stood dismissed.
On an appeal being carried, the Division Bench of the High Court B
disposed of the appeal with a direction to the corporation to frame
a scheme for regularisation of the employees and regularise their
services in accordance with such scheme. It is this direction of
the High Court which is the subject matter of challenge in this
Appeal.
C
Mr. Salve, the learned Solicitor General appearing for the
Corporation stated that, in fact, in the case of E. Prabhavathy &
Ors. v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (Civil
Appeals arising out of SLPs Nos. 1039-10413/1992), this Court
was in seisin of a similar problem and during the hearing of that
appeal, a tentative scheme was produced before this Court and D
the Court framed the terms of those schemes as a part of the
order and disposed of the appeal in terms of the said scheme on
23rd October, 1992. The four clauses of the said scheme which
formed a part of the order are quoted hereinbelow in extenso :-
“Scheme : E

(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85 days
in any two consecutive calendar years with the Life Insurance
Corporation between 20th May, 1985 uptill date and who
conformed to the required eligibility criteria for regular recruitment
on the dates of their initial temporary appointment will be permitted F
to compete for the next regular recruitment to be made by the
Life Insurance Corporation after the regular recruitment for these
posts currently scheduled for November, 1992;
(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits with all
other candidates who may apply for such appointments, including G
those from the open market.
(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for applying
for regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on the
date of their first temporary appointment for securing regular
appointment with the Life Insurance Corporation; H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can apply for
regular recruitment in the normal course.
According to the learned Solicitor General, since a scheme is in
existence, it is no longer necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for
these employees who were the parties before the Andhra Pradesh
B High Court. He also stated that in the meantime, a set of instructions
have been framed called the “Life Insurance Corporation of India
(Employment of Temporary Staff) Instructions, 1993” which takes
care of such employees who were continuing for a fairly long
period without being regularised.
C Mr. Krishnamurthy, the learned Senior Counsel, on the other hand,
contended that the aforesaid instructions will not govern the case
of the employees who were there before the High Court, as they
were the appointees between 1986 and 1993. He further contended
that a similar matter, in the case of The Management of the LIC
of India v. Their Workmen (C.A. Nos. 1790/89) a Bench of this
D Court has disposed of with a direction to consider the case of
regularisation considering the suitability at a lesser standard by its
judgment dated 7th February, 1996 and, therefore, there is no
infirmity with the impugned direction of the High Court.
Having examined the judgment dated 7th February, 1996 of this
E Court in C.A. Nos. 1790/89, we find that the earlier 3 judge bench
decision dated 23rd October, 1992 has not been noticed. The
aforesaid three-judge bench decision unequivocally makes the
provisions of the scheme as a part of the order. Necessarily,
therefore, the case of regularisation of the employees of the
F corporation could be dealt with in accordance with the said scheme
and it would not be necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a
group of employees. Mr. Krishnamurthy further contended that
the E. Prabhavathy’s case (supra) relates to the employees of
Tamil Nadu division. But, it is not disputed that they are the
employees of the Corporation. If the Corporation has evolved a
G scheme assuming for the Tamil Nadu division, then the same could
be equally applicable to the employees of all Divisions in the
country. That being the position, the scheme which has been
approved and formed a part of the order of this Court dated 23-
10-1992 should govern the case of these respondents who were
H writ petitioners before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1027
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Needless to mention, in the earlier decision of this Court dated A
23-10-1992 this Court has not limited the applicability of the scheme
only to the employees of the Tamil Nadu Division. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was not justified
in issuing the impugned direction to the Corporation to evolve a
new set of scheme to govern the case of the employees who had
B
filed writ petitions in the High Court. We, therefore, set aside the
impugned direction of the Division Bench of the High Court and
substitute the same with the direction that the case of regularisation
of these respondents shall be considered in accordance with the
scheme which formed a part of the order of this Court dated 23-
10-1992, if not already considered. This appeal accordingly stands C
disposed of.”
33. The above judgment of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra) lays
down that:
(i) The order dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra)
made the scheme as a part of its order. Necessarily, the D
case for the regularisation of the workers of LIC would be
dealt with in accordance with the scheme. Hence, it was
not necessary to evolve a fresh scheme for a different group
of workers;
(ii) Though E Prabavathy (supra) dealt with workersof the E
Tamil Nadu Division, the scheme which was evolved by
LIC would equally be applicable to workers of all divisions
in the country;
(iii) The decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has not limited the
applicability of the scheme only to the workersof the Tamil F
Nadu division; and
(iv) The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
was not justified in evolving a new scheme to govern the
workers who had filed a Writ Petition and its judgment
accordingly stands set aside. G
34. The decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 7
February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) arising out the Jamdar
and Tulpule Awardsh as notnoticed the earlier decision dated 23 October
1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra). Subsequently, on
H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 18 January 2011 in LIC v. D V Anil Kumar31,a two-judge Bench of
this Court disposed of the appeal by accepting the terms of the scheme
framed by LIC for the absorption of Class IV workers. The attention of
this Court has also been drawn to an order dated 20 October 2016 of
this Court in Hashmuddin v. LIC32 followed by an order dated 15
January 2020, which accepted a scheme formulated by LIC for workers
B
who had rendered service for more than sixteen years.
F Submissions
35. On behalf of LIC, Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel, made
the following submissions:
C (i) As a consequence of the Dogra Report, LIC would be
required to regularise about 11,780 workers who claim to
have worked for a limited number of days. No verification
of these claims has been done either by the LIC or by the
CGIT in the Dogra Report. This would amount to an illegal
D backdoor entry, which would be contrary to the statutory
regulations framed by the LIC. Further, LIC would also
face the issue of a lack of sanctioned postsfor these
workers;
(ii) The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 and the Jamdar
E Award dated 26 August 1988 directed the regularisation of
personsworking between 1 January 1982 and 20 May 1985
who:(a) had worked as Class IV workers for a minimum
period of 70 days in any three calendar years; or (b) had
worked as Class III workers for a minimum period of 85
days in any two calendar years. However, these awards
F were substituted by a settlement which was arrived at in
the civil appeals before this Court in LIC v. Their
Workmen (supra), which were finally adjudicated upon by
an order dated 7 February 1996;
(iii) Both the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards directed regularisation
G and absorption without verifying the existence of sanctioned
posts. During the pendency of the litigation, LIC was
injuncted from making fresh recruitment till the awards were
pronounced. As a result of the interim orders dated 15
31
Civil Appeal Nos 953-968 of 2005 (“LIC v. D V Anil Kumar”)
32
H Civil Appeal No 2268 of 2011
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1029
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

January 1986 and 29 June 1987, LIC could not pursue an A
open, competitive and transparent process for selection on
the basis of an advertisement followed by a written
examination and interview. The last recruitment process
took place in 1984, andtill 1993 there was no fresh
recruitment. This necessitated the making of temporary
B
appointments between 1985 and 1991 to operate LIC’s 2048
branches across India;
(iv) The Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001 arose out of a
reference dated 4 March 1991,which required the tribunal
to adjudicate whether LIC’s action of not absorbing badli/
temporary/part-time workers employed after 20 May 1985 C
was justified. The award directed the absorption of “the
concerned workmen”, i.e., those employed after 20 May
1985 (and thus not covered by the Tulpule and Jamdar
Awards) who had worked as Class III workersfor a
minimum of 85 days in two calendar years or who had D
worked as Class IV workers for a minimum of 70 days in
three calendar years. The award directed that if regular
vacancies did not exist to accommodate these persons,
supernumerary posts would have to be created by LIC.
Such a direction would be contrary to the principles which
have been enunciated in the decision of this Court in ONGC E
v. Krishan Gopal33. LIC as a statutory corporation is
governed by its regulations, and no appointment beyond the
vacancies in sanctioned posts can be made;
(v) The LIC Act was amended by Act 1 of 1981. The
amendment to Section 48(2A) stipulates that the regulations F
which have been framed prior to 1981 are deemed to be
rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Further, Section
48(2C) stipulates that the rules framed under Section
48(2)(cc) would override the provisions of the ID Act. The
provision has been held to be constitutionally valid by this G
Court in M. Venugopal v. LIC34;
(vi) Though LIC is bound by the judgment of this Court in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has
33
2020 SCC OnLine SC 150
34
(1994) 2 SCC 323 (“M. Venugopal”) H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A restored the Srivastav Award (subject to its modification in
thereview petition in regards the quantum of back wages),
it is also bound by:
(a) The order dated 23 October 1992 of a three-judge
Bench of this Court in E Prabavathy(supra) which
B upheld the scheme formed by LIC for absorption of
ad hoc workers;
(b) The order dated 22 November 2001 of a two-judge
Bench of this Court in G Sudhakar (supra)which
held that the scheme which was accepted in E
C Prabavathy (supra) would not be limited only to the
workers in that case but would be applicable to all
the workers of LIC in all its divisions across India;
and
(c) The settlement which substituted the Tulpule and
Jamdar Awards, which was recorded by this Court
D
while disposing of the civil appeals by its final order
dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen
(supra);
(vii) On 16 May 2017, LIC issued instructions under Regulation
4 of its Staff Regulations to all Zonal Managers to implement
E the Srivastav Award and this Court’s orders. Consequently,
245 workers were offered absorption after being found
eligible;
(viii) In terms of the order of this Court dated 18 January 2011 in
LIC of India v. DV Anil Kumar (supra), LIC framed a
F scheme to regularise Class IV workers who were engaged
for 5 years or more and consequently, 4770 persons were
appointed on regular posts;
(v) Following the order of this Court dated 11 May 2018 in the
contempt proceedings35, LIC received 8300 representations
G from individuals claiming to be covered by the Srivastav
Award, which were then scrutinised by a senior officer.
Subsequently, 76 claimants were found to be eligible for
absorption in addition to the 245 individual claimants who
had been absorbed earlier;
35
H Contempt Petition (Civil) No 1921 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No 6950 of 2009
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1031
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(vi) By the order of this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the A
contempt proceedings arising out a review of TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra), it was
expressly made clear that:
(a) The question whether the benefit of the Srivastav
Award should be made available to those who were B
engaged as badli and temporary workers after 4
March 1991 is a matter for interpretation before this
Court;
(b) The CGIT would limit its inquiry only to the claims of
the workers who were employed between 20 May C
1985 and 4 March 1991; and
(c) No case in contempt had been established;
(vii) The above position is further clarified by this Court’s order
dated 10 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising
out the review of TN Terminated Employees D
Association (supra), in terms of which CGIT was directed
to verify the list which was available on its record. Thus,
the CGIT was required to scrutinise the applications claiming
the benefit of the award against the list of workers who
were before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award. Hence, LIC E
scrutinized the claims of only those who were part of the
certified list before the CGIT in the Srivastav Award and
had worked between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;
(viii) All India Life Insurance Employees Association and Life
Insurance Employees Association (R6 and R2 in the Dogra F
Report), All India Insurance Employees Association and
Western Zone Insurance Employees Association (R3 and
R4 in the Dogra Report), National Organisation of Insurance
Workers (R7 in the Dogra Report) and All India National
Life Insurance Employees Federation (R9 in the Dogra
Report) were all signatories to the compromise which G
substituted the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and was noted
in this Court’s interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v.
Their Workmen (supra). Further, by the order of this Court
dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),
the Karamchari Sangh (R10 in the Dogra Report) was also
H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A directed to follow the terms of compromise. Hence, these
Unions and Associations who had entered into the
compromise substituting the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards
are governed by its terms;
(ix) The scrutiny which was envisaged by the order of this Court
B required the CGIT to: firstly, check the presence of the
names of the claimants in the CGIT list in the Srivastav
Award; and secondly, conduct a verification of documents
such as appointment letters, extension letters and relieving
letters to scrutinise whether the claimants were actually
employed for 70/85 days for three/two years respectively.
C Based on this scrutiny, the 321 eligible workers (245+76)
who were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award have already
been absorbed, and any other claims by the workers
individually or through the ten Unions are not maintainable;
(x) The Dogra Report has erroneously held that the
D compromise which was arrived at between the parties was
in addition to the rights declared in the Tulpule and Jamdar
Awards.To support its reasoning, the Report relies on the
findings of this Court at paragraph 39 to 41 of its judgment
dated 18 March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees
E Association (supra).However, those observations have
only adverted to the interim order dated 1 March 1989of
this Court in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), and not its
final order dated 7 February 1996;
(xi) Instead of carrying out the task of verification, the Dogra
F Report only takes a prima facie view and has merely stated
that the majority of the workers were eligible for absorption
without carrying out the process of verification;
(xii) Though the Unions have admitted that they do not possess
either the residential addresses or other particulars of the
G claimants situated in various regions, the Dogra Report has
found 1452 workmen to be eligible across the country; and
(xiii) In summary, the Dogra Report is flawed because it:
(a) Does not consider the CGIT certified list of the
Srivastav Award, as directed in the order of this Court
H dated 10 September 2018;
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1033
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(b) Ignores that it was not carrying out an adjudicatory A
function but only a verification exercise;
(c) Initially states that the claimants who had joined after
4 March 1991 are not being scrutinised, yet the final
directions consider many such claims; and
(d) Ignores paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award and B
gives benefit to persons who are governed by the
scheme accepted by this Court in E Prabavathy
(supra).
36. On behalf of the Unions, Associations and workers, arguments
have been addressed by Dr Manish Singhvi, Mr Pallav Sishodia, Mr R C
Singaravelan, Mr V Prakash and Mr Salman Khurshid, Senior Counsel.
In addition to the submissions of Senior Counsel, we have heard Mr
Nandakumar, Mr Rakesh Shukla andMr Shailesh Madiyal. In addition,
Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in various Miscellaneous
Applications have been furnished with an opportunity of being heard in D
seriatim. The submissions which have been urged on behalf of the
workers are summarised below:
(i) The present proceedings in the Miscellaneous Applications
pertain to the implementation of the Srivastav Award dated
22 June 2001. The Srivastav Award has been upheld in the E
decision of this Court in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra);
(ii) The review petitions arising from the decision in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) were
dismissed by the judgment in TN Terminated Full Time F
Temporary LIC Employees Assn. v. LIC 36 and the
curative petition was also dismissed on 22 February 2017.
Thus, the Srivastav Award has attained finality subject to
the modification thatthe quantum of back-wages has been
reduced to fifty per cent. The doctrine of res judicata
applies between the parties and at this stage, it would not G
be open to set aside or alter the contents of the award;
(iii) Though the contempt petitions were disposed of, the CGIT
was directed to look into the implementation of the Srivastav
36
(2016) 9 SCC 366
H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A Award. The Dogra Report dated 31 May 2019 has been
prepared by the CGIT in pursuance of the mandate of this
Court;
(iv) Four grounds have been advanced on behalf of LIC to assail
the Dogra report:
B (a) No documents were produced to establish that the
workers had worked for 85 days and 70 days across
a period of two and three years respectively;
(b) The Dogra Report had to consider only the CGIT
certified list which was part of the reference
C proceedings;
(c) The Srivastav Award would not apply to workers
who commenced work after 4 March 1991; and
(d) The Dogra Report also permits the absorption of the
D workers governed by the judgment of this Court in E
Prabavathy (supra);
(v) In response to the above grounds, it is submitted that the
Dogra Report has correctly drawn an adverse inference
against LIC for not producing the records which were in
their possession, while approving the lists. Further, the report
E
duly notes that a majority of the workers had produced
documents, which have been accepted after verification;
(vi) In the event, however, that this Court is inclined to remit
the proceedings back for proper verification of the workers
who are covered by the Srivastav Award, the following
F
methodology should be adopted:
(a) LIC has now stated before this Court that its divisional
officesare in possession of the records. LIC must
produce in the first instance the records available
with it for the purpose of verification; and
G
(b) The verification to be carried out under the directions
of this Court should not be confined to any particular
document and the primary onus must lie on LIC to
show whether the workers have actually worked
during the relevant period;
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1035
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(vii) The Srivastav Award did not only deal with the cases of A
workers who had actually filed cases in the industrial
reference. The award specifies that it would apply to all
workers, and consequently directed that an advertisement
be issued for that purpose. If the award was intended to be
limited to the CGIT certified list, there was no occasion to
B
direct a verification to be carried out by the CGIT since the
certified list was already available with LIC.Hence, the
direction in the order of this Court dated 10 September 2018
in the contempt proceedings arising out of the review of
TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), that
the verification would be carried out of the CGIT list, cannot C
be read out of context.Consistent with the principles of
collective bargaining under the ID Act, all workers who
were beneficiaries of the Srivastav Award should be granted
absorption;
(viii) The plea that workers employed after 4 March 1991 are D
not entitled to relief under the Srivastav Award is contrary
to the provisions of Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. The
purpose of Section 18(3)(d) is to ensure that an award
governs not only those who are in service when it is made
but to subsequent workers as well. In any event, at least
those workers who were in employment on 18 June 2001, E
when the award was made, should be granted relief;
(ix) The applicability of the orders of this Court in E Prabavathy
(supra) and G Sudhakar (supra) has been considered in
the judgment of this Court in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra), and that interpretation has attained F
finality. Hence, those orders ought not to become the basis
to reopen the present proceedings;
(x) As a matter of fact, the Dogra Report suffers from under-
inclusion since the claims of workers who were engaged
after 4 March 1991 have not been considered, though they G
may have applied in pursuance of the advertisement issued
by the LIC to implement the Srivastav Award;
(xi) The compromise which was arrived at before this Court,
as noted in its orders dated 1 March 1989 and 7 February
H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 1996, indicates that it was confined to persons who worked
from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985. Hence, it has no
relevance to the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001, which
relates to persons who were engaged after 20 May 1985;
(xii) The terms of reference which resulted in the Srivastav
B Award related to the employment of badli, temporary and
part-time workers after 20 May 1985. Consequently, there
is no warrant for restricting the operation of the award to
the period upto 4 March 1991 (which was the date of
reference). The benefit of the award must enure not only
to the workers who were engaged as temporaries or badlis
C after 20 May 1985 till the date of reference but the same
principle must also apply to workers who have been engaged
thereafter; and(xiii) The judgment of this Court has directed
the payment of fifty per cent back-wages. For the period
after the date of the Srivastav Award, full back-wages should
D be granted to those who have been absorbed. Back-wages
cannot be granted only for the period of 70/85 days, and at
the rates which were made applicable to the badli workers.
37. The rival submissions would now fall for analysis.
G Prelude –Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, and their Aftermath
E
38. The Tulpule Award dated 17 April 1986 was made in the
context of a reference to the NIT pertaining to the absorption of badli/
temporary/part-time workers as regular employees of LIC. The award
held that all workers who had worked in any capacity, temporary, badli
or part-time, between 1 January 1982 till 20 May 1985, should be
F considered as eligible for absorption provided that: (a) Class IV worker
sought to have worked for 70 days in any three calendar years; and
(b)Class III worker sought to have worked for 85 days in any two calendar
years.
39. The Jamdar Award dated 26 August 1998 clarified the meaning
G of the Tulpule Award dated 17April 1986.The award discussed the object
of the earlier reference, and indicated that LIC had engaged badli/
temporary/part-time workers on a large-scale and restricted their
employment to a particular number of days in order to prevent them
from gaining the status of permanency on the basis of the number of
days worked. Hence, it held that the object of the reference was to put
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1037
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

an end to such unfair legal practices, to regularise the employment of A
persons who would have been ordinarily absorbed but for such practices
and to reduce to aminimum the disproportionately large contingent of
such employees who had been deprived of security of service. The
Jamdar Award noted that the Tulpule Award did not contemplate that in
computing the number of work days only the days worked in two/three
B
consecutive calendars year should be taken into consideration. Further,
it noted that when the Tulpule Award spoke of “absorption”, it did not
mean “recruitment”.
40. The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards were the subject matter of a
challenge before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in LIC
v. Their Workmen (supra).On 1 March 1989, this Court while granting C
leave to appeal recorded that eight out of the nine Unions, representing
about 99 per cent of the workers, had entered into a compromise with
LIC. It was in this backdrop that, pending the disposal of the civil appeals,
this Court permitted LIC and these eight Unions to implement the terms
of compromise, without prejudice to the rights of the ninth Union. The D
terms of compromise envisaged that it would operate in substitution of
the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards on the question of the regular employment
of the workers concerned in those references. The terms of the
compromise adopted the norm of employment for 85 days in any two
years for Class III workers and employment for 70 days in any three
calendar years for Class IV workers between 1 January 1982 and 20 E
May 1985. Temporary, part-time and badli workers who had made
applications before a stipulated date were held eligible to be considered
for regular employment. The compromise envisaged that the selection
of candidates shall be made on the basis of qualifications, age, written
test and interview, and also having regard to the number of days worked. F
According to the compromise, initially a list of selected candidates was
to be drawn up, from which regular employment would be offered in
order of merit prospectively from the dates notified, as and when vacancies
in sanctioned posts for regular employment were filled up from time to
time. Further, as a result of the compromise, the process of recruitment
for these candidates would be subject to certain relaxations. Finally, it G
was envisaged that the dispute in relation to the workers concerned,
which had resulted in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, would no longer
survive, and the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to regular
employment would be governed only by the compromise.
H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A 41. The compromise was ultimately adopted in the final order of
this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),
which disposed of the civil appeals. In the order, this Court accepted the
submission of LIC that since eight out of nine Unions (representing an
overwhelming majority of workmen) had accepted the compromise, the
ninth Union must also act on the basis of its terms and conditions. The
B
Court, however, directed that LIC shall exempt Class IVworkers (whom
the ninth Union was representing) from a test and interview, if it had the
power to do so under the regulations and instructions governing their
conditions of service. In the alternative, if there was no such power, it
directed that the test which was prescribed for these workers should be
C of a lower standard than the test prescribed in the two circulars mentioned
in the compromise.
42. There is absolutely no manner of doubt that the compromise
which was arrived at by eight out of nine Unions indicated that the Tulpule
and Jamdar Awards would stand substituted by the terms of the
D compromise. The compromise clearly stipulated that the workers who
fulfilled the requisite days of work in Class III or, as the case may be,
Class IV posts would be eligible. As and when vacancies would arise,
they would be offered regular appointment.
43. Prior to the final order of this Court in the civil appeals arising
E from the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards, the litigation in the E Prabavathy
batch was settled by the order dated 23 October 1992.In the order, the
Court found that the scheme for absorption which was propounded by
LIC was reasonable. The scheme envisaged that all temporary workers
who had worked for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years
with LIC between 20 May 1985 and 23 October 1992 and who conformed
F to the required eligibility criteria for regular appointment on the date of
their initial appointment, would be permitted to compete at the next regular
recruitment to be made by LIC. These candidates would be considered
on their merit as against the other candidates who applied for these
posts, including from the open market. They would also be given an age
G relaxation while applying for a post, if they were eligible for it on the
date of their first temporary appointment. This scheme was approved,
subject to the postponement by at least six weeks of a recruitment
scheduled for November 1992, in orderto enable all eligible adhoc
workers to compete with others for selection at that recruitment. The
decision in E Prabavathy (supra) was evidently not noticed in this Court’s
H order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra).
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1039
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

44. The order of a two-judge Bench of this Court dated 22 A
November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra) noted that in E Prabavathy
(supra), a Bench of three-judges had embodied the clauses of the scheme
as a part of their order. Hence, the order in G Sudhakar (supra)
expressly clarified that though the scheme before this Court in E
Prabavathy (supra) was evolved in relation to a case from the Tamil
B
Nadu Division of the LIC, it would be equally applicable to the workers
of all divisions of LIC in the country. Consequently, in G Sudhakar
(supra), it was held that the scheme would apply to workers who were
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as well, and there was no
occasion for the High Court to direct that a new scheme should be
framed by LIC. C
45. It is important to note that the orders of this Court dated 23
October 1992 (in E Prabavathy (supra)) and 7 February 1996 (disposing
the civil appeals challenging the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards) pre-date
the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001. On the other hand, the order in
G Sudhakar (supra), which was dated 22 November 2001, was evidently D
passed after the Srivastav Award.
H Srivastav Award and the Judgement of this Court
46. The reference before the tribunal leading up to the Srivastav
Award was made on 4 March 1991. The reference was in relation to
the justification ofLIC’s non-absorption of persons recruited as temporary, E
badli and part-time workers after 20 May 1985. The Srivastav Award
contains an observation that LIC was not guilty of unfair labour practices
by continuing persons recruited as temporary, badli and part-time workers
as non-regular employees. The above observation in the award was in
view of the submission of LIC (which was not refuted by the workers) F
that the workers were continuing in their positions on the basis of injunction
orders issued by tribunals and the court, and due to the pressure of the
Unions. However, the award also noted that the terms of the reference
did not encompass this aspect and the tribunal was not recording a finding.
47. Paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award referred to the order of
G
this Court dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) which
governed the scheme of absorption/regularisation for that batch of
workers. It noted that the E Prabavathy group of workers were impleaded
to the proceedings leading to the award, and had filed a statement of
claim. However, the award concluded that since the order dated 23
October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) was between the same parties, H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A the legality of the order of this Court could not be challenged by the
workers before the tribunal. Hence, the contention of the workers in
that regard was not accepted.
48. In paragraph 88, the Srivastav Award concluded:
“88. In view of the fact, I am of definite view that such type of
B workmen belonging to temporary and part time categories in class
III and class IV service of corporation who were employed after
following the procedure and were allowed to continue service
beyond the qualifying period and were eligible and suitable in every
respect should be given absorption in the service from date of the
vacancy in the service in which they could have been absorbed.
C It will also apply to those such employees whose services were
terminated by the corporation”
The award finds that LIC was not justified in denying absorption
to those temporary/badli/part-time workers who were employed after
20 May 1985, and that they should be given absorption on the terms and
D conditions which werestipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (which
were in respect of workers employed between 1 January 1982 to 20
May 1985). LIC was directed to take into consideration their claim for
absorption on the basis of their eligibility and suitability, as dealt with in
the Srivastav Award. Thus, all the badli, part-time and temporary workers
E who have rendered the qualifying period of service and were suitable
would also have to be considered for absorption by LIC by publishing a
notice in the newspaper. The Srivastav Award directed that in case no
regular vacancy was available, supernumerary posts shall be created by
LIC for the purpose of absorption and that the case for absorption against
existing vacancies would be considered first, irrespective of regular
F recruitment.
49. The Srivastav Award was set aside by the Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the
Single Judge. Eventually, the dispute travelled to and resulted in the
decision of this Court in TN Terminated Employees Association
G (supra).
50. The judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association
(supra), dated 18 March 2015, arose from concurring judgments of a
Single Judge and of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court by
which the Srivastav Award had been set aside. In appeal, the principal
issue which came for consideration before this Court was:
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1041
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“34.1. (i) Whether the setting aside of the award passed by CGIT A
dated 18-6-2001 by the learned Single Judge by placing reliance
upon compromise reached between the parties in SLP No. 14906
of 1988, which was filed against the award of Justice Tulpule,
which award was clarified and affirmed by Justice SM Jamdar,
legal and valid?”
B
The next issue, in relation to the workers’ claim for relief, was
consequential in nature. After noticing the interim order dated 1 March
1989 passed by this Court in the proceedings arising out of the Tulpule
and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), Justice Gopala
Gowda, speaking for the two-judge Bench, observed:
C
“40. From the perusal of the above order of this Court
in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-
3-1989 (SC)] , nowhere has it been stated in the terms of the
compromise between the parties that the award of Justice R.D.
Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 which was clarified upon reference made
by the Central Government under Section 36-A of the Act by D
Justice Jamdar, is either set aside by this Court or substituted the
compromise terms in the place of the award except the order
referred to supra passed in the above SLP No. 14906 of 1988. In
fact, on the other hand it is clearly stated that the compromise
terms are between the parties to the said SLP and that it shall not E
prejudice the respective rights and obligations in relation to the
members of the other union. Therefore, the effect of the award
of Justice R.D. Tulpule with regard to the direction given to the
Corporation regarding absorption of badli, temporary employees
as permanent employees has not been substituted by terms and
conditions of the compromise.” F

In the above extract, the Court referred to the interim order of
this Court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) by
which, pending the disposal of the appeals,eight out of the nine Unions
who had entered into terms of compromise with LIC were permitted to
implement it as an interim measure, without prejudice to the rights and G
contentions of the remaining Union which had not entered into a
compromise. Relying exclusively on the interim order of this Court, it
was held:
“41. The award of Justice R.D. Tulpule dated 17-4-1986 reiterated
by way of clarification in the award passed by Justice Jamdar H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A dated 26-8-1988, in the dispute subsequently has been operative
even after the compromise arrived at between the parties to the
compromise in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988,
order dated 1-3-1989 (SC)] before this Court. Therefore, the
contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the
Corporation that the said awards are not in operation and that
B
only the terms and conditions of compromise and orders of this
Court are binding upon the workmen concerned in these appeals
is both not factually and legally correct. This abovesaid argument
of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Corporation is not
tenable in view of the categorical statement made by this Court in
C its orders passed in SLP referred to supra, wherein, this Court
has permitted the management and members of the said 8 unions
to implement the terms of compromise by way of interim measure
without any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the members
of other union who have not entered into compromise with the
management of the Corporation. It is not the case of the
D
Corporation in these appeals either before CGIT or before the
High Court or in these proceedings the workmen concerned have
also accepted the said terms and conditions of the compromise
arrived at between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988. This
Court in the order passed in the abovesaid SLP which is extracted
E hereinabove has made it very clear that the said compromise was
entered into between unions therein, but it does not prejudice the
rights and contentions of the workmen concerned whose disputes
are in relation to their absorption in their respective posts who
were appointed after 20-5-1985. Further, even if some of the
workmen are bound under the said compromise that arose out of
F
SLP No. 14906 of 1988, this in no way deters their right to raise
an industrial dispute and get the same adjudicated vide order of
reference by the appropriate Government to CGIT. The award of
CGIT was concluded after rightly examining the facts,
circumstances of the case and the legal principles laid down in
G the awards passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. More
importantly CGIT award was passed after rightly appreciating
the points of dispute referred to it and on the merits of the case.”
The interpretation of the interim order which has been placed by
the Court emerges from the following extract:
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1043
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“46. Further, by a careful reading of the said order A
in LIC v. Workmen [ SLP (C) No. 14906 of 1988, order dated 1-
3-1989 (SC)] , it has been made clear that the awards passed by
NIT (by Justice Jamdar and Justice Tulpule) after adjudicating
the points of dispute in the industrial dispute raised by similarly
placed workmen is not disturbed by substituting the terms and
B
conditions of compromise between the parties therein in SLP No.
14906 of 1988. Therefore, the awards in relation to the absorption
of the workmen as permanent workmen in the Corporation have
got statutory force. This is what is stated by CGIT in its award
dated 18-6-2001 on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record,
which was erroneously set aside by the High Court by assigning C
erroneous reasons which is sought to be justified by the Senior
Counsel on behalf of the Corporation by placing reliance upon the
orders and the Scheme framed in E. Prabavathy [E.
Prabavathy v. LIC, SLP (C) No. 10393 of 1992, order dated 23-
10-1992 (SC)] and G. Sudhakar [ Civil Appeal No. 2104 of 2000,
D
order dated 22-11-2001 (SC)] cases which Scheme has no
application to the case of the workmen concerned involved in
these appeals referred to supra.”
51. The Court proceeded to hold that both the award of Justice
Tulpule, reiterated by way of the clarificatory award of Justice Jamdar,
are operative and they have not been terminated by either of the parties E
as provided by Section 19(6) of the ID Act. The Court held that the
terms of compromise and the scheme formulated in E Prabavathy (supra)
and G Sudhakar (supra) do not result in the substitution of the awards
made by Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. The Court held that the
Srivastav Award would have to be observed by LIC until it was replaced F
by another settlement in relation to the service conditions of the workers
under Section 12 read with Section 18(3) of the ID Act or by another
award following the termination of the awards which are in operation.
The judgment of this Court concluded that:
(i) The Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to remain G
operative;
(ii) The Awards do not stand substituted by the interim order
of this court dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their
Workmen (supra);
H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (iii) The orders of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra) and G
Sudhakar (supra) would not stand in the way of an
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal; and
(iv) Unless the awards are substituted either by another award
or settlement, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards continue to
B remain operative and binding.
52. On this basis, the Court concluded that the Srivastav Award
was legal and valid and shall be implemented by LIC by absorption of
the workers concerned in permanent posts. The operative direction which
was issued by this Court is extracted below:
C “54. It is needless to mention that since we are of the view that
the award passed by CGIT in ID No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid,
it shall be restored and implemented by the Corporation by
absorbing the workmen concerned in the permanent posts and if
they have attained the age of superannuation, the Corporation
D will be liable to pay all consequential benefits including the
monetary benefits taking into consideration the pay scale and
revised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.”
53. None of the Counsel appearing on behalf of the workers in
the present batch of cases disputed the factual position, asserted on
E behalf of LIC, that the judgment of the two-judge Bench in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) affirming the validity of
the Srivastav Award contains no reference whatsoever to the final order
dated 7 February 1996 in the batch of civil appeals arising from the
Tulpule and Jamdar Awards in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra). The
interim order dated 1 March 1989 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),
F which forms the basis of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra), was passed in the backdrop of a compromise which
was arrived between LIC and eight out of the nine Unions and
Associations representing the workers. Since the appeals were pending
at that stage, the Court granted liberty to the parties to the compromise
G to implement its terms as an interim measure, without prejudice to the
contentions of the ninth Union which had not entered into the compromise.
But noticeably, there is a clear omission on the part of the Court in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) to refer to the admitted
position that subsequently on 7 February 1996, this Court in LIC v. Their
Workmen (supra) accepted the submission of LIC that since eight out
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1045
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of the nine unions (representing nearly 99 per cent of the workers in A
Class III and Class IV posts) had accepted the compromise, there was
no justification for theninth Union to object. The Court held that it would
be in the interest of industrial peace that theninth Union should also fall
in line and act on the terms of the compromise. The civil appeals in LIC
v. Their Workmen (supra) were disposed of in terms of the above
B
order dated 7 February 1996. The terms of compromise clearly envisaged
that the management and the workers had agreed that the awards of the
NIT dated 17 April 1986 (Tulpule Award) and 26 August 1988 (Jamdar
Award) “be substituted by the terms and conditions of compromise in
relation to the question of regular employment of the workmen concerned
in the said references”. Once the awards were substituted by the terms C
of compromise, it would be an impermissible interpretation of law to
hold that the awards continued to be operative and binding, notwithstanding
the final order of this Court dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their
Workmen (supra). The final order dated 7 February 1996has not been
adverted to by the two-judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees
D
Association (supra). The factual finding is based only on the interim
order dated 1 March 1989. The final order dated 7 February 1996 in
LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had a crucial bearing on the special
leave petitions arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court setting
aside the Srivastav Award.
E
54. That having been said, it is necessary to also advert to the
interpretation which was placed on the decisions of this Court in E
Prabavathy(supra) and G Sudhakar (supra). The two-judge Bench in
TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) opined that the
scheme which was framed in E Prabavathy (supra) was the outcome
of an order which was passed in writ petitions filed by the workers and F
not in the course of the adjudication of an industrial dispute. On this
ground, the Court held that the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) would
not come in the way of an adjudication by the CGIT or NIT while deciding
a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. The background of the
decision in E Prabavathy (supra) has already been noticed earlier. The
G
decision was rendered on 23 October 1992 in a batch of civil appeals
which was being considered by a three-judge Bench. During the pendency
of the civil appeals, the Court called upon LIC to formulate a scheme for
there gularisation of workers who had been granted ad hoc employment
for at least 85 days from time to time. The three-judge Bench held, after
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A assessing the terms of the scheme proposed by LIC, that it was reasonable
and commended itself for acceptance. The scheme proposed by LIC
was approved by this Court with a specific observation that the clauses
of the scheme extracted in the order would form a part of the order of
this Court. The decision of three Judges in E Prabavathy (supra) was
thereafter interpreted by a two-judge Bench in its order dated 22
B
November 2001 in G Sudhakar (supra).Noticing that the scheme which
has been accepted in E Prabavathy (supra) governed workers of the
Tamil Nadu Division of LIC, the Court held that the scheme would be
equally applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC in the country.
The Court therefore held that it was not necessary to evolve a fresh
C scheme for a different group of workers, in that case under the directions
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. As a matter of fact, it is also material
to note that in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award itself there was a
specific finding that though the E Prabavathy group of workers had
been impleaded in the reference and had filed a statement of the claim,
having regard to the fact that the order of this Court dated 23 October
D
1992 was between the same parties, the workers had no valid ground to
challenge the legality of this Court’s order before the tribunal. Despite
the clear observations in the Srivastav Award, the judgment of the two-
judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has
come to the conclusion that the order of the three-judge Bench in E
E Prabavathy (supra) would not preclude an industrial adjudication by the
tribunal. The two-judge Bench which delivered the judgment in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) was bound by the order
in E Prabavathy (supra), which was of a larger Bench of three judges,
and the interpretation which was placed on it by another two-judge Bench
in G Sudhakar (supra). If the two-judge Bench differed, it had to refer
F
the matter to a larger Bench but it was not at liberty to take a final view
at variance with binding decisions of a larger Bench and of a co-ordinate
Bench.
55. A plea has been urged on behalf of the workers that the
G judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) has
attained finality following the dismissal of the review petition on 9 August
2016 (save for the modification by which the quantum of back-wages
was reduced to fifty per cent) and the subsequent dismissal of a curative
petition. We are cognizant that the ground, submitting that the decision
ignored the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen
H (supra), was specifically pleaded in review. The only observation in the
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1047
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

judgment in review is that LIC has not submitted anything on record to A
indicate that the judgment suffers from an error apparent in law. However,
having regard to the immense financial burden, the quantum of back-
wages would be reduced to fifty per cent.
56. Now, there cannot be any dispute over the principle that the
judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra), followed B
by the order in review dated 9 August 2016, are between the present
parties and finality has attached to them. LIC is, however, before this
Court urging that as a statutory entity with a nationwide presence, it is
faced with a situation involving conflicting directions of this Court. LIC
has submitted that while on the one hand, the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards C
were substituted by the terms of compromise on 7 February 1996 in
LIC v. Their Workmen (supra), this was preceded by the order dated
23 October 1992 of a three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) which
accepted the scheme of absorption proposed by LIC and followed by
the order dated 28 November 2001 of a two-judge Bench in G Sudhakar
(supra) which interpreted the decision in E Prabavathy (supra) as being D
applicable to all divisions of LIC. The impact of the judgment in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) is to substitute and
supplant the schemes which were evolved before this Court for providing
absorption on specified terms. The essence of the schemes which were
accepted by this Court was that those temporary, badli and part-time E
workers who fulfilled the requirement of the threshold period of service
would be eligible to be considered for the grant of the permanency, subject
to certain conditions. The orders passed by this Court envisage that
these workers would be considered for the grant of permanency in the
course of a recruitment process. The impact of the judgment of the two-
judge Bench in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) is F
that while on the one hand the Court’s orders dated 23 October 1992, 7
February 1996and 22 November 2001 continued to hold the field, on the
other hand the restoration of the Srivastav Award brings in place a regime
in conflict with what has been accepted by this Court in these orders.
Faced with this predicament, it is necessary for this Court to step in and G
to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice caused by the decision in
TN Terminated Employees Association (supra) which has been urged
to be per incuriam. The consequence of not doing so is serious.
57. The Court is now confronted with claims on behalf of the
workers that the principle which has been enunciated in the Srivastav H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A Award and which has been restored by the two-judge Bench in TN
Terminated Employees Association (supra) must apply to all workers
subsequently engaged by applying Section 18(3)(d) read with Section
17A of the IDAct. Hence, a balance will now have to be drawn by this
Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
B Constitution, which while on the one hand factors in the finality which
has attached to the judgment in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra) but on the other hand also factors in the essential
concerns which have been expressed before this Court by LIC. The
formula of providing absorption to part-time, badli or temporary workers
who have put in 85 days in any two calendar years in a Class III post
C
or70 days in any three calendar years in a Class IV post will, unless a
balance were to be drawn, become an avenue for disregarding the need
for an open and transparent process of recruitment by a public sector
corporation governed by therule of law and the mandate of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. The judgments of this Court, in the context of
D public employment, lay stress on providing equality of opportunity. As
we have recorded earlier in the course of the statements of facts, LIC
had been restrained, due to the interim orders which were passed in the
course of the various proceedings, from taking recourse to recruitment
through the open market. LIC having been restrained by judicial orders
E from pursuing an open recruitment process, the situation which has now
arisen is that unless a balance were to be drawn, absorption of part-time
and badli workers would become a substitute for a recruitment process
based on sanctioned posts, consistent with the principles of reservation
and pursued on the basis of a structured recruitment which gives equal
opportunities to all applicants. Such a consequence is a serious detriment
F
to constitutional parameters and to the duty of LIC as a public employer
to follow a process which is fair and inconsonance with Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. An open and competitive process for recruitment
will enable LIC to recruit the best among the available talent. Substituting
this by a back-door entry will be detrimental to the interests of the
G corporation which is governed by statute.

I Validity of the verification in the Dogra Report

58. Mr ANS Nadkarni, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
LIC, assailed the Dogra Report on the ground that the remit before the
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1049
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

CGIT was only to verify and not to adjudicate. There is no doubt about A
the premise that the task which was entrusted to CGIT by the order of
this Court dated 7 September 2018 in the contempt proceedings arising
out of the review of TN Terminated Employees Association (supra)
was of verification. But it becomes necessary to consider whether the
remit to the CGIT was only confined to the certified list of workers in B
the industrial reference. It is true that by the order of this Court dated 10
September 2018, the CGIT was directed to verify the list on the record.
However, an isolated sentence in the order of this Court cannot be read
torn from its context. Paragraph 94 of the Srivastav Award required
LIC to also consider the case of those workers who belonged to the
C
temporary, badli and part-time category, who had completed the qualified
period of working and were suitable in every respect but whose services
had been terminated. LIC was directed to publish a notice in the daily
newspapers so as to enable such workers to lodge their claims for
absorption. LIC issued a public notice in the newspapers on 21 July
2015.Each applicant was required to submit a form for being considered D
for absorption, of which item 10(b) required a disclosure of the details of
the petition before the CGIT including whether the applicant was a
petitioner in the industrial reference. The crucial aspect, however, is that
the verification which was carried out by the CGIT was not specifically
restricted to the certified list of workers. The judgment of this Court in E
the course of the proceedings in review, records the following submissions
being made on behalf of LIC:

“6. The learned Attorney General further submits that as on 31-
3-2015, LIC had 55, 427 Class III employees and 5190 Class IV
employees. If LIC is directed to consider the absorption of the F
workmen to the advertisement, then the number of Class III
employees will increase by 11.14% and Class IV employees by
56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in addition
to the increase in its financial burden and that the same will be
contrary to the interests of the policy-holders. The learned Attorney G
General estimates the financial liability for implementing the order
of this Court at approximately Rs 7087 crores, with the annual
liability at around Rs 728 crores per year and that this will be a
huge financial burden for LIC to bear.”
H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A The above submission indicates that if LIC were directed to
consider the absorption of the workers pursuant to the advertisement,
the strength of the Class III employees would increase by 11.1 per cent
and Class IV employees by 56.65 per cent, resulting in an annual financial
liability of Rs 728 crores. Hence, there is merit in the contention of the
B Counsel for the workers that the above submission, which is recorded in
paragraph 6 of the judgment in review, does not comport with LIC’s
present stance that the verification was to be confined only to the certified
list.

59. This having been said, it is evident that the Dogra Report
C suffers from clear and manifest errors. As we have already noted earlier,
LIC had drawn the attention of the Presiding Officer to the fact that the
claims which had been submitted by the Unions, Associations and
individual workers during the course of the verification contained duplicate
entries. LIC has produced a chart containing details of various workers
D and claimants.For convenience of reference, the chart is extracted below:
Chart containing details of various Workmen/Claimants from various Associati ons before the Ld. CGIT Court, New Delhi in
I.D. No. 27/1991.
All All All All All EP & Tamil Akhil LIC G INDIVI TOTA
India India India India India Ors Nadu Bhara Work UJ DUAL L
Insur LIC Life Natio Natio (TFT Termi tiya ers’ A S
ance Empl Insur nal nal TUCE nated Jeeva Unio R
Empl oyees ance Life Life WA) Temp n n, AT
oyees Feder Empl Insur Insur orary Bima Kanp TE
E Asso ation oyees ance ance
ciatio Asso Empl Empl
Ful l
Time
Niga ur
m
M
PR
n ciatio oyees oyees LIC Chath A
n Feder Feder Empl o urtha R
ation ation yees Sreni Y
-BNP -VN Asson Kara LI
mcha CE
NAME OF ri A
UNION/ASSO Sang
CIATION h
Claimants as 10
F A
per their list
3337 97 6996 1674 371 1333 376 890 35
5
252 15465
DUPLICATE
Less 0 0 3582 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 3592
ENTRIES
BLANK
Less 0 0 9 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93
ENTRIES
10
B Net 3337 97 3404 1590 371 1333 375 881 35 252 11780
5
Less ENGAGED
AFTER
04.03.1991,
10
G not reckoned 5 1 2109 38 22 477 102 692 1
0
33 3580
as per Hon’ble
SC order
07.09.18
Less ENGAGED
BEFORE
20.05.1985,
not reckoned 0 0 2 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 10
as per Hon’ble
SC order
07.09.18
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1051
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

C Net 3332 96 1293 1549 347 856 272 187 34 5 219 8190 A
Less Name not
found in
certified lists 3332 94 1184 1543 339 0 61 186 34 5 219 6997
received from
CGIT
Less Engaged less
than 85 days 0 0 9 1 0 11 90 0 0 0 0 111
(CIII)
Less Engaged less
than 70 days 0 0 7 1 6 6 36 0 0 0 0 56
(CIV)
B
D Net 0 2 93 4 2 839 85 1 0 0 0 1026
Party in E.P &
Less 0 0 0 0 0 839 83 0 0 0 0 922
Ors
E Net 0 2 93 4 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 104
Less Documents not
submitted to
0 0 26 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 32
prove
eligibility
Criminal Case
Less
pending
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C
Fabricated
Less 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Documents
Found eligible,
G 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
Absorbed

Note:- 2 Individual Petitioners Sl.no. 29 & 31 have now submitted
their claim through INTUC-BNP, however no substantiating documents
have been submitted” D
60. The Dogra Report eventually concludes that the group of
workers, who are governed by the order of this Court in E Prabavathy
(supra), would also be eligible for absorption. By considering the workers
who are governed by the order in E Prabavathy (supra) tobe eligible
for absorption, the Dogra Report has fallen into a clear error. The report E
has considered those workers who were clearly outside the ambit of its
remit since they were governed by a specific order of this Court. That
apart, it is evident that the Dogra Report has proceeded on a generalised
assumption that a majority of workers had produced documents are
eligible for absorption (having drawn a negative inference from LIC’s
non-production of documents). In this backdrop, it would be necessary F
to bring about a proper verification before the claims of the workers can
be truly considered. The deficiency of the Dogra Report in carrying out
a proper verification stands clearly established.
J The Interplay between the Industrial Disputes Act 1947
and Section 48 of the LIC Act 1956 G
61. Section 48 of the LIC Act confers a rule making power on the
Central Government. Clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of Section 48 was
introduced by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 31 January 1981. Under
clause (cc), the Central Government is empowered to frame rules dealing
with the following matters: H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A “(cc) the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the
Corporation, including those who became employees of the
Corporation on the appointed day under this Act;”
62. Simultaneously by the Amending Act, sub-Sections(2A), (2B)
and (2C) were introduced into Section 48. These Sections provide as
B follows:
“(2A) The regulations and other provisions as in force immediately
before the commencement of the Life Insurance Corporation
(Amendment) Act, 1981, with respect to the terms and conditions
of service of employees and agents of the Corporation including
C those who became employees and agents of the Corporation on
the appointed day under this Act, shall be deemed to be rules
made under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and shall, subject to the
other provisions of this section, have effect accordingly.
(2B) The power to make rules conferred by clause (cc) of sub-
D section (2) shall include-
(i) The power to give retrospective effect to such rules; and
(ii) The power to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal,
the regulations and other provisions referred to in sub-section (2A),
with retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the twentieth
E day of June, 1979.
(2C) The provisions of clause (cc) of sub-section (2) and sub-
section (2B) and any rules made under the said clause (cc) shall
have effect, and any such rule made with retrospective effect
from any date shall also be deemed to have had effect from that
F date, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court,
tribunal or other authority and notwithstanding anything contained
in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any other law
or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument for the
time being in force.”
G 63. By virtue of sub-Section (2A), the regulations governing the
terms and conditions of service of the employees and agents of LIC
which were in force immediately before Amending Act 1 of 1981, are
deemed to be rules made under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) and have
effect subject to the other provisions of the Section. By a deeming fiction
of law, the regulations which were in existence on the date of the
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1053
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Amending Act in relation to the terms and conditions of service are A
given the status of rules framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section (2) of
Section 48. The effect of sub-Section (2C) is that the provision of clause
(cc) of sub-Section (2) and any rules made under it with retrospective
effect, shall also be deemed to have had effect from that date
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or
B
other authority and notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act, or
in any other law or any agreement, settlement, award or other instrument
for the time being in force. The rules which are framed under Section
48(2)(cc) operate with a non-obstante clause which prevails,inter alia,
notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. The vires of the
Amending Act was upheld in a judgment of a three-judge Bench of this C
Court in AV Nachane (supra). Justice AC Gupta, speaking for himself
and Justice RS Pathak (as the learned Chief Justice then was), repelled
the challenge to the validity of the Amending Act based on Article 14 of
the Constitution. The Court also rejected the submission that sub-Section
(2C), which was introduced into Section 48 by the Amending Act, suffered
D
from the vice of excessive delegation. While upholding the Amending
Act, the Court held:
“8. The contention that Article 14 is infringed arises on the
provision of sub-section (2-C) of Section 48 that any rule made
under clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of that section touching the
terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation E
shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is true that after rules are made
regarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise an
industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules will
be taken away and to that extent the provisions of the Industrial F
Disputes Act will cease to be applicable. It was argued that there
was no basis on which the employees of the Corporation could be
said to form a separate class for denying to them the protection of
the Industrial Disputes Act. The reply on behalf of the Union of
India and the Life Insurance Corporation was that the remuneration
that was being paid to Class III and Class IV employees of the G
Corporation was far in excess of what was paid to similarly
situated employees in other establishments in the public sector.
Some material was also furnished to support this claim though
that were certainly not conclusive. The need for amending the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 as appearing from the H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A preamble of the Amendment Act and the Ordinance is as follows:
“... for securing the interests of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India and its policy-holders and to control the cost of administration,
it is necessary that revision of the terms and conditions of service
applicable to the employees and agents of the Corporation should
be undertaken expeditiously.” Referring to the preamble of the
B
Act the Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India and
the Corporation submitted that the problem of mounting cost of
administration led to the making of the impugned law. He added
that it was felt that no improvement in the situation was possible
by the process of adjudication and a policy decision was taken
C that in the circumstances the proper course was legislation and
that is why the Amendment Act was passed and the impugned
Rules were framed. The learned Attorney-General submitted that
it was for Parliament to decide whether the situation was
remediable by adjudication or required legislation. According to
him the Life Insurance Corporation Act as amended and the Rules
D
made after amendment placed the Corporation in the same position
as other undertakings, that the advantages being enjoyed by the
employees of the Corporation which were not available to similarly
situated employees of other undertakings have been taken away
removing what he described as discrimination in favour of the
E employees of the Life Insurance Corporation. We have already
said that the material produced on behalf of the Union of India
and the Corporation to show that the terms and conditions of
service of the employees in several other undertakings in the public
sector compared unfavourably to those of the Corporation
employees was not conclusive. But the burden of establishing
F
hostile discrimination was on the petitioners who challenged the
Amendment Act and the Rules. It was for them to show that the
employees of the Life Insurance Corporation and the employees
of the other establishments to whom the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act were applicable were similarly circumstanced to
G justify the contention that by excluding the employees of the
Corporation from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act they
had been discriminated against. There is no material before us on
the basis of which we can hold that the Amendment Act of 1981
and the Rules made on February 2, 1981 infringe Article 14. We
do not think that on the facts of this case Express
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1055
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 578 A
: 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] , and Moti Ram
Deka v. General Manager [AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR
683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467] relied on by the petitioners, have any
application.”
64. The Court, however, held that Rule 3 of the Life Insurance B
Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and
Dearness Allowance) Rules 198137 could not nullify the effect of a writ
issued by this Court in its earlier decision in LIC v. D.J. Bahadur38,
which directed LIC to give effect to the industrial settlement relating to
bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, award or legislation. Holding
that the Amending Act of 1981 and the Bonus Rules were relevant C
legislation, the Court held that these would operative prospectively from
the date of the publication of the rules. There was also a concurring
opinion of Justice O Chinappa Reddy. While dealing with the constitutional
validity under Article 14, the main judgment notes that after rules are
made regarding the terms and conditions of service, the right to raise an D
industrial dispute in respect of matters dealt with by the rules is taken
away and to that extent the provisions of the ID Act will cease to be
applicable.
65. In the subsequent decision of another Bench of three-judges
of this Court in M Venugopal (supra), the impact of the Amending Act E
of 1981 on the application of the ID Act came up for consideration. The
services of the appellant, who was a probationary Development Officer
in LIC, were terminated on his failure to fulfil the targets assigned. A
writ petition challenging the termination was allowed by a Single Judge
of the High Court on the ground that the termination amounted to a
retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, and F
that the termination was void due to the failure to comply with Section
25F. In appeal, the Division Bench held that as a result of clause (bb)
which was introduced in Section 2(oo) from 18 August 1984, the
termination of a probationer would not amount to a retrenchment within
the meaning of Section 2(oo). Regulation 14(2) of the Staff Regulations G
was, as a consequence of Section 48(2A) as introduced by the Amending
Act, deemed to be rules framed under Section 48(2)(cc). Clause (4) of
Regulation 14 permitted LIC to discharge an employee during the period
of probation. Before the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of
37
“Bonus Rules”
38
(1981) 1 SCC 315 H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A the ID Act, there were only three exceptions which excluded a termination
of service from the ambit of retrenchment, namely:
(i) Voluntary retirement;
(ii) Retirement on superannuation; and
(iii) Termination due to continued ill-health.
B After the introduction of clause (bb), Parliament excluded from
the purview of retrenchment, in addition, the following:
(i) Termination as a result of the non-renewal of a contract of
employment upon its expiry; and
(ii) Termination of a contract under a stipulation in that behalf
C contained in the contract of employment.
It was held that in this case the termination of the services of the
probationer was in terms of the contract of an employment in terms of
the stipulation contained in Regulation 14, and hence non-compliance
with Section 25F would not vitiate the orders of termination.
D 66. Justice NP Singh, speaking for the three-judge Bench, then
went on to elucidate on the impact of Amending Act 1 of 1981, more
particularly the insertion of clause (cc) into sub-Section (2) and the
insertion of sub-Sections (2A), (2B) and (2C) in Section 48. The Court
held that the ID Act and the LIC Act have both been framed by
E Parliament, with the amendments introduced from 31 January 1981 in
Section 48 containing a non-obstante clause in sub-Section (2C) making
the intent of Parliament “apparent and obvious”. The Court held:
“The framers of the Corporation Act through the amendments
aforesaid have given the provisions of the Corporation Act an
overriding effect over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
F Act, so far as the provisions relating to the terms and conditions
of employment, which are in conflict with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act are concerned. Unless the said attempt is
held to be ultra vires being in conflict with any of the provisions of
the Constitution it was open to the Parliament to treat the employees
G and agents of the Corporation as a separate class for purpose of
fixing their terms and conditions of service.”
67. The Court held that earlier the employees were governed by
the regulations framed by LIC under Section 49 as well as by the
provisions of the ID Act. Hence, it was open to the workers to enforce
their rights and remedies in terms of the regulations framed under the
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1057
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

LIC Act or in accordance with the provisions of ID Act. However, after A
the amendments which were introduced by Parliament in Section 48,
the employees of LIC would not be entitled to the protection of the ID
Act to which they were entitled before the enforcement of the
amendment. The Court held that the validity of the amendment had been
upheld in the earlier decision in AV Nachane (supra), and concluded:
B
“14. The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation
Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under
Section 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will be that termination of
the service of the appellant shall not be deemed to be a
“retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo) even if sub- C
section (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once
Section 2(oo) is not attracted, there is no question of application
of Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the service
of the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the
service of the appellant during the period of probation is in terms D
of the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of the
Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section
48(2)(cc) of the Corporation Act.”
68. Therefore, in view of the amended provisions of Section 48(2A)
and (2C),the termination of the service of the appellant was held not to E
amount to a retrenchment even when clause (bb) had not been introduced
in Section 2(oo) of the ID Act. Since Section 2(oo) would anyways not
stand attracted where the services of a probationer were terminated
under Regulation 14(4) of the Staff Regulations which, deemed to be a
part of the rules under Section 48(2)(cc), hasan overriding effect over
the ID Act and would prevail. F
69. The above provisions of Section 48 were specifically placed
before the two-judge Bench of this Court, as is evident from a bare
reading of the judgment in TN Terminated Employees Association
(supra). However, the Court declined to go into the submission based on
the provisions of Section 48, holding that the Staff Regulations provided G
only two types of employment:(i) Regular; and (ii) Temporary. The Court
held that employment in the capacity of badli/part-time workers was
not provided in the Staff Regulations, and there was no specific
nomenclature of that nature in the Staff Regulations. The decision of the
two-judge Bench evidently does not notice either the judgment in AV
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A Nachane (supra) or the decision in M Venugopal (supra), both of which
have been delivered by three-judge Benches. They are binding precedents
and could not have been brushed aside.
70. `That apart, it becomes necessary at this stage to advert to
the provisions of Regulation 8 of the Staff Regulations. Regulation 8(1)
B deals with temporary staff and is prefaced with a non-obstante
provision.Clause (1) of Regulation 8is an enabling provision empowering
LIC to employ staff in Classes III and IV on a temporary basis, subject
to such general or specific directions which may be issued by the
Chairperson from time to time. Clause (2) of Regulation 8 stipulates that
no person who is appointed under Regulation 8(1) is, only by reason of
C such appointment, to be entitled to absorption in the service of LIC orto
claim preference for recruitment to any post. The expression “shall only
by reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption” in this sub-
clause (2) is crucial. What the expression postulates is that a person
who is appointed on a temporary basis can nether claim an entitlement
D to absorption or a preference in recruitment merely by having been
appointed on a temporary basis. In other words, Regulation 8(2) does
not postulate an absolute bar to a claim for absorption but it stipulates
that absorption cannot be claimed merely on the ground that a person
was engaged on a temporary basis. Regulation 8(2), for instance, will
not preclude a claim for absorption being made in terms of a scheme
E which is propounded by LIC, so long as the scheme contains provisions
which facilitate absorption on stipulated terms and conditions. But the
mere fact that a person is appointed in a temporary capacity by LIC,
does not entitle such a person ipso jure to seek absorption merely by
virtue of or only by reason of such an appointment.
F 71 The impact of the provisions of clause (cc) of sub-Section (2),
sub-Section (2A) and sub-Section (2C) of Section 48 on the clams of
the workers appointed after 4 March 1991 must now be considered.
The workers who have worked as temporary, badli or part-time workers
after 4 March 1991, seek to assert their claims on the basis of Section
G 18(3)(d) of the ID Act. Section 18 specifies the person on whom
settlements and awards are binding. Section 18(3)(a) stipulates that a
settlement or award would bind all the parties to the industrial dispute.
Further, clause (d) specifies that where a party to the dispute is composed
of workers, the settlement and award binds not only persons who are
employed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on the date of
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1059
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the dispute but all persons who subsequently become employees in that A
establishment or a part of it. Section 18(3)(d), in other words, extends
the applicability of a settlement or award beyond the workers who were
engaged on the date of the dispute to all persons who subsequently
become employees in the establishment. Regulation 8 of the Staff
Regulation expressly permits the engagement of temporary workers and
B
clause (2) contains a provision to the effect that a person who engaged
under its clause (1) shall not, only by reason of such appointment, be
entitled to absorption or to claim a preference for recruitment on any
post. The effect of sub-Section (2A) of Section 48 is that Regulation 8 is
deemed to be a rule which is framed under clause (cc) of sub-Section
(2) of Section 48. Moreover, the provisions of Section 48(2C) postulate C
that a rule which is made under the clause shall have effect
notwithstanding anything contained in the ID Act. Hence, the workers
who have been recruited post 4 March 1991 cannot make a claim for
absorption ipso jure under Section 18(3)(d) of the ID Act, as a result of
the overriding provision which is contained in sub-Section (2C) of Section
D
48.
K Structuring the Relief
72. For the reasons recorded above during the course of analysis,
LIC as a statutory corporation is bound by the mandate of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution. As a public employer, the recruitment process E
of the corporation must meet the constitutional standard of a fair and
open process. Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema
to public service.
73. In structuring the relief in present proceedings, it is essential
to recapitulate the key legal findings that will govern the determination F
of rights and equities:
(i) On 7 February 1996, a two-judge Bench of this Court in
LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) had accepted the terms
of compromise which was arrived at on 1 March 1989
between the management of LIC and eight Unions, and G
imposed them upon the ninth Union as well. In addition, the
two-judge Bench of this Court had issued certain directions:
(a) LIC should exempt Class IV workers from a test
and interview, if the management has the power to
H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A do so under the regulations/instructions governing
their conditions of service; and
(b) In the event that the management of LIC does not
possess such a power, the test to be prescribed for
these workers would be of a lesser standard
B compared to other applicants from the open market
till the next regular recruitment;
(ii) On 23 October 1992, a three-judge Bench of this Court,
while disposing of the civil appeals in E Prabavathy (supra),
specifically accepted the scheme formulated by LIC for
regularising the workers who were engaged on a temporary
C basis. The scheme was also specifically incorporated as a
part of the order in the following terms:
“(a) All those temporary employees who have worked
for 85 days in any two consecutive calendar years with
the Life Insurance Corporation between 20th May 1985
D uptil date and who confirmed totehe required eligibility
criteria for regular recruitment on the dates of their initial
temporary appointment will be permitted to complete
for the next regular recruitment to be made by the Life
Insurance Corporation after the regular recruitment for
these posts currently scheduled for November, 1992.
E
(b) These candidates will be considered on their merits
with all other candidates who may apply for such
appointments, including those from the open market.
(c) These candidates will be given an age relaxation for
applying for regular recruitment provided that they were
F
eligible on the date of their first temporary appointment
for securing regular appointment with the Life Insurance
Corporation.
(d) If these candidates are otherwise eligible, they can
apply for regular recruitment in the normal course. This
G regularisation will, in the circumstances, be by selection
for appointment. We make the above clauses of the
scheme as part of our order.”
The three-judge Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) held that the
scheme proposed by LIC is reasonable and that:(a)the regularisation
H
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1061
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

will be by selection for appointment; and (b) the above clauses of the A
scheme would constitute a part of the order of this Court;
(iii) On 22 November 2001, a two-judge Bench of this Court in
G Sudhakar(supra) directed that though the order dated
23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra) applied to the
workers of the Tamil Nadu division, the scheme would B
equally be applicable to the workers of all divisions of LIC
in the country;
(iv) The judgment of the two-judge Bench of this Court dated 8
March 2015 in TN Terminated Employees Association
(supra) failed to notice that as a result of the final order C
dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra),
the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards had been substituted by
the terms of compromise. The two-judge Bench of this Court
overlooked the final order dated 7 February 1996 in LIC v.
Their Workmen (supra)and while adverting only to the
interim order dated 1 March 1989,it arrived at a palpably D
erroneous conclusion that the Jamdarand Tulpule Awards
were still operative and binding; and
(v) Though the petition seeking review of TN Terminated
Employees Association (supra) and the curative petition
stand dismissed, LIC is confronted with a situation in which E
it is equally bound by the earlier decision of the three-judge
Bench dated 23 October 1992 in E Prabavathy (supra),
the judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 7 February 1996
in LIC v. Their Workmen (supra) dealing with the appeals
arising out of the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards and the F
judgment of the two-judge Bench dated 22 November 2001
in G Sudhakar (supra).
74. The position as it now stands, results in a palpable conflict
between the two-judge Bench decision in TN Terminated Employees
Association (supra) dated 18 March 2015 on the one hand and the
G
earlier binding decision of a larger Bench in E Prabavathy (supra) on
23 October 1992 and of subsequent Benches. This conflict must be
harmonised by taking recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 142 of the Constitution. In arriving at a conclusion, this Court
finds that:
H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (i) The remit of the CGIT which resulted in the Dogra Report
was confined to the process of verification, as distinct from
an adjudication of rights and liabilities;
(ii) The Dogra Report is flawed because:
(a) The report failed to carry out an accurate verification
B of only those Class III workers who had put in at
least 85 days of work in a period of two years and
Class IV workers who had put in70 days of work in
a period of three years;
(b) The lists which are appended to the report contain
C patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequence
of a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and
(c) The report accepted the claims for absorption of those
workers who were specifically governed by the
decision of this Court in E Prabavathy (supra),inspite
D of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order
of this Court dated23 October 1992 as well as in
paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award;
(iii) A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry
out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such
flawed premises without following a recruitment process
E
which is consistent with the principles of equality of
opportunity governed by Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. Such an absorption would provide the very
back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal
opportunity and fairness in public employment, which has
F been specifically decried by this Court in Secretary, State
of Karnataka v. Umadevi39.
75. The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to nearly four
decades. Finality has to be wrung down on the dispute to avoid uncertainty
and more litigation. Nearly thirty-one years have elapsed since 1991.
G We have come to the conclusion that the claims of those workers who
are duly found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions of
eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary compensation in
lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement of all claims and
demands. Thus, this Court directs the following:
39
H (2006) 4 SCC 1
RANBIR SINGH v. SK ROY, CHAIRMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 1063
CORP. OF INDIA [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(i) A fresh verification of the claims of workers who claim to A
have been employed for at least 70 days in Class IV posts
over a period of three years or 85 days in Class III posts
over a period of two years shall be carried out;
(ii) The verification shall be confined to persons who were
working between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991; B
(iii) All persons who are found to be eligible on the above norm
shall be entitled to compensation computed at the rate of
Rs50,000 for every year of service or part thereof. The
payment of compensation at the above rate shall be in lieu
of reinstatement, and in full and final settlement of all claims C
and demands of the workers in lieu of regularisation or
absorption and notwithstanding the directions issued by this
Court in TN Terminated Employees Association (supra);
(iv) In carrying out the process of verification, the Committee
appointed by this Court shall not be confined to the certified D
list before the CGIT and shall consider the claims of all
workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4
March1991;
(v) For the purpose of verification, LIC shall make available all
the records at the Divisional level to the Committee E
appointed by this Court;
(vi) It will be open to the workers concerned or, as the case
may be, the Unions and Associations representing them, to
make available such documentary material in their
possession for the purpose of verification; F
(vii) The process of verification shall be carried out independently
without regard to the Dogra Report, which is held to be
flawed;
(viii) The payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement shall
be effected by LIC within a period of three months from G
the date of receipt of the report of verification by the
Committee; and
(ix) The task of verification shall be carried out by a Committee
consisting of:
H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 10 S.C.R.

A (a) Mr Justice P K S Baghel, former Judge of the Allahabad
High Court; and
(b) Shri Rajiv Sharma, former District Judge and member of
the UPHJS.
LIC shall provide all logistical assistance to the Committee and
B bear all expenses, including secretarial expenses, travel and incidental
expenses, as well as the fees payable to the members of the Committee.
Justice P K S Baghel shall fix the terms of remuneration payable to the
members of the Committee.
76. The Miscellaneous Applications and the Writ Petitions shall
C be governed by the above directions and are disposed of in the above
terms.
77. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Writ petitions disposed of.
D (Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

E

F

G

H