Holding

The term 'transfer' under the Land Acquisition Act is to be construed broadly to include development and collaboration agreements and licences issued during the suspect period, thereby bringing such transactions within the scope of the deemed award.

Summary

The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the term "transfer" under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, holding that it includes development and collaboration agreements and licences issued during the suspect period (27‑08‑2004 to 29‑01‑2010). It examined numerous applications concerning projects such as Green Heights, Godrej, Karma, R.P. Estates, Subros, Express Greens (DLF), Kalinga, ABW, Speed Town, Innovative and Legend Heights, and determined which lands fall within the deemed award and which are excluded. The Court directed specific compensation payments of Rs 5 crore per acre by Green Heights and Godrej to HSIIDC, inclusion of Karma’s 25.95 acres in the deemed award, and exclusion of lands of R.P. Estates and Subros. It also ordered verification of allottees' claims, refunds where appropriate, and completion of pending acquisition references within a year. Overall, the judgment reinforced the earlier Rameshwar decision, treating the collusion between developers and the State as a fraud on power and providing detailed remedial directions.

Issues considered

The proper interpretation of the term 'transfer' under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the context of development and collaboration agreements.
Whether the lands involved in specific projects (e.g., Green Heights, Godrej, Karma, etc.) should be included in or excluded from the deemed award dated 26‑08‑2007.
The quantum of compensation payable by developers to HSIIDC for lands covered by the deemed award.
The procedure for verification of allottees' claims, refunds, and completion of pending acquisition references.
The applicability of related statutes such as the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013, and the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Land acquisitionTransfer of propertyCollaboration agreementDeemed awardFraud on powerCompensationHSIIDCDevelopment licenceReal estateThird‑party buyers

Judgment

[2022] 13 S.C.R. 711 711

RAMESHWAR AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
(Miscellaneous Application No. 50 of 2019)
In B
(Civil Appeal No. 8788 of 2015)
JULY 21, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.] C
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss. 4, 6 and 23 – Term ‘transfer’
in context of *Rameshwar & Ors vs State of Haryana’s case –
Meaning and nature of – Exclusion of the land from the deemed
award or forms part of the deemed award – On facts, issuance of
Notification u/s.4 on 27.08.2004, followed by the declaration u/s.6 D
and the receipt of objections from the landowners as also the matter
posted for publication of the award on 26.08.2007 – However, on
29.01.2010 the State decided to withdraw from the acquisition – In
the interim period, land owners induced to sell or transfer their
land to colonizers/developers at significantly lower rates of
compensation – Most of the colonizers/developers entered into E
collaboration agreements after the notification u/s.4 – They sought
and were granted licenses by the Department of Town and Country
Planning – Challenged to, in the *Rameshwar’s case - This Court
held that decision to withdraw from the acquisition was a fraud on
the power under the Land Acquisition Act and invalidated all F
transfers effected from the date of publication to the date of
publication of State’s decision to revoke the acquisition –
Applications by the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure
Development Corporation-HSIIDC and several others seeking
clarification of *Rameshwar’s case – Held: Term ‘transfer’ used
in *Rameshwar’s case is not confined to sale, lease or other G
encrumbrance – It includes development and/or collaboration
agreements, as well as licenses issued during the suspect period,
whether or not in favour of the developer – Lands covered by
licenses issued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);
Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with Unitech); H
711
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier (ultimately used by
Godrej); Express Greens (DLF); Kalinga and Innovative amount to
transfer – With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores per
acre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC – With respect to
Godrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Godrej to HSIIDC
B – Upon full compliance thereof, the lands covered by Green Heights
and Godrej’s projects would be excluded from the deemed award –
With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land forms part of the
deemed award – Lands belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros,
excluded from the deemed award – With respect to Kalinga, the
HSIIDC to complete verification of all the relevant documents –
C
With respect to ABW, the HSIIDC to refund the amounts payable to
the allottees of the entire project – With respect to Legend Heights,
HSIIDC to hand over commercial units to allottees who were either
granted occupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance was
executed – Issuance of direction to the State to ensure that all
D references pertaining to the acquisition are answered as expeditiously
as possible.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It is clear that the collaboration agreements
E formed the first element of a two-step process whereby the
colonizers / developers (who might have been also land owners)
having acquired lands, prior to the preliminary notification, went
ahead and entered into commitments by executing collaboration
agreements after the notification under Section 4, and even
F declaration under Section 6, with full knowledge. The
consideration for parting with developmental rights was far higher
than the market value of the lands which they would have been
entitled to. These acts ultimately culminated with the decision
not to acquire the lands. The second step – and the important
one persuading the State not to acquire the lands - was the
G
application for, and the grant of, development licenses. Uniformly,
in all these cases, the applications were made prior to the
scheduled date of publication of the award (26.08.2007). This is a
significant and tell-tale factor because there was no way the
applicants would have ordinarily known that an award would not
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 713

be pronounced on the concerned date. In fact, the application A
clearly indicates foreknowledge that their lands would not be
ultimately acquired. This is what may be characterized as the
proverbial ‘smoking gun’ which establishes the complicity of
these individuals and entities. [Para 39][745-D-G]
2. Land ownership typically carries with it a bundle of rights. B
A landowner has the right to possess, sell, lease, develop, sub–
let, occupy, etc. On an overall analysis of the common features of
all the collaboration agreements, it is evident that except for the
empty husk of a title, the land owner parted with predominant
and substantial rights over the property, including possession. C
In almost all the cases, these rights were parted for consideration
which was far above the notified acquisition rates. This observation
applies in the case of the two companies – Frontier and Karma,
who continued to be the land owners of the land. Such ‘emptying
out’ of all important attributes that constitute rights and interest D
over the property cannot but be viewed as a ‘transfer’. To hold
otherwise would mean that after receiving substantial amounts –
equal to many times over the existing market rates (that could
ordinarily have been claimed by the landowner in respect of their
holding in acquisition proceedings) – and entitling the developer
E
to create third–party rights in respect of not a few but hundreds
of people, nevertheless, the landowner could still hold out and
claim their right to not part with the title. Such a conclusion would
defy reason and commonsense and cannot be countenanced. In
the circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreements in
all these cases which ultimately culminated in the grant of licenses F
would fall within the mischief of the term ‘transfer’ as envisioned
in the main judgment, as it foreclosed the enjoyment and
possession by the landowner, who willingly parted with such
rights, for valuable consideration and acquiesced to irreversible
changes on it. [Para 40][746-A-E] G
3. The findings are summarized as follows:
a. The expression ‘transfer’ used in the main judgment,
Rameshwar v State of haryana (2018) 6 SCC 215 is not confined
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A to sale, lease or other encumbrance. It includes development
and/or collaboration agreements, as well as licenses issued (for
development) during the suspect period, whether or not in favour
of the developer.
b. As a corollary to the above, the lands covered by licenses
B issued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);
Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with Unitech);
Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier (ultimately used by
Godrej); Express Greens (DLF); Kalinga and Innovative amount
to transfer.

C c. With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores per
acre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC. With respect to
Godrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Godrej to
HSIIDC. Upon full compliance with directions above, the lands
covered by Green Heights and Godrej’s projects shall be
excluded from the deemed award.
D
d. With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land subject
of License No. 206 of 2008 forms part of the deemed award.
e. Lands measuring 2.9875 acres and 10.881 acres
respectively belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros, are excluded
from the deemed award.
E
f. With respect to Express Greens (DLF), contentions to
exclude the project from the deemed award are rejected.
g. With respect to Kalinga, it is directed that HSIIDC shall
complete verification of all the relevant documents furnished by
Kalinga.
F
h. With respect to ABW, it is directed that HSIIDC to refund
the amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project.
i. With respect to Speed Town, the contentions to exclude
the land from the deemed award are rejected. It is held that Speed
Town shall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, in
G
respect of the land, on the same basis as in the case of all others
entitled to it.
j. With respect Paramveer, the contentions to exclude the
hotel block from the deemed award are rejected. All rights, title
and interest in those portions of Innovative’s properties shall
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 715

vest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award. Innovative A
shall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all other developers/
owners in accordance with the main judgment.
k. With respect to Legend Heights, HSIIDC is directed to
Hand over commercial units to allottees who were either granted
occupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance was executed. B
l. With respect to Dharamveer and other petitioners, as
well as similarly placed individuals the rights and title in respect
of lands under their occupation is vested with HSIIDC.
m. The State is directed to ensure that all references
pertaining to the acquisition are answered as expeditiously as C
possible. The concerned reference courts are hereby directed
to conclude all the proceedings in 185 references received for
365 acres of land and pronounce the award in accordance with
law within the stipulated period.
n. It is clarified that wherever the allottees have not paid D
the full amounts (payable in terms of the agreements) HSIIDC
shall be entitled to the same rights in law as in the case of the
original builder/developer, which include, but are not limited to,
insisting full payment before handing over possession to the
allottees. [Para 121][770-A-D; F,H; 771-A, C; 772-E; 773-C-D,
F, G; 774-C, F-H] E
*Rameshwar v State of haryana (2018) 6 SCC 215 –
Clarified.
Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(2008) 10 SCC 345 : [2008] 10 SCR 697; Ashok Kumar
Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar AIR 2014 Cal 92; Sushil F
Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors. (2019) 2
SCC 241 : [2018] 12 SCR 756; Unitech Ltd. v. Union
of India (2016) 2 SCC 569 : [2015] 12 SCR 992;
Dharamvir v State of Haryana SLP (C) No. 5490 of
2021 – referred to. G
Case Law Reference
[2008] 10 SCR 697 referred to Para 32
[2018] 12 SCR 756 referred to Para 35
[2015] 12 SCR 992 referred to Para 36
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION :
Miscellaneous Application No.50 of 2019 In Civil Appeal No.8788 of
2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2018 in C.A. No.8788
of 2015 passed by the Supreme Court of India.
B With
Diary No(s). 26552/2019, MA 2150/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015,
MA 2149/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, CONMT. PET.(C) No. 2226/
2018 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 1175/2019 in C.A. No. 8788/2015,
Diary No(s). 24553/2019, Diary No(s). 45026/2019, SLP(C) No. 5490/
C 2021, Diary No(s). 7888/2020, CONMT. PET. (C) No. 513/2020 in C.A.
No. 8788/2015, MA 1521/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 2067/2020
in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 2228/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, SLP(C)
No. 2147/2021, Diary No(s). 5699/2021, Diary No(s). 7775/2021, Diary
No(s). 9505/2021, Diary No(s). 6705/2022, Diary No(s). 9002/2022, M.A.
D No. 864/2019, Diary No. 45009/2019. AND CONMT. PET. (C) No.
716/2021 in MA 50/2019 in C.A. No. 8788/2015.
Tushar Mehta, SG, K.M. Nataraj, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASGs,
Anil Grover, Alok Sangwan, Sr. AAGs, Brijender Chahar, Gopal Shankar
Narayan, P.S. Patvalia, Sanjib Sen, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Shankaranayan,
E Ms. Sonia Mathur, Pinaki Mishra, Randeep Roy, Nikhil Nayyar, R. S.
Rai, Ms. Kiran Suri, Sanjiv Sen, Sr. Advs., Ms. Rashi Bansal, Amit
Sharma, Rajan Kr. Chourasia, Sachin Sharma, Ashok Panigrahi, Arvind
Kumar Sharma, Mrs. Jyoti Chahar, Karan Chahar, Ms. Pooja Chahar,
Shashi Bhushan, Vinay Garg, Naman Joshi, Guneet Sidhu, Yuvraj Francis,
Ms. Manisha Ambwani, Ankit Vijaywargiya, Aditya Verma, Prateek
F Rathee, Sunny Choudhary, Piyush Singh, Aditya Parolia, Akshay
Srivastava, Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Goel, Nithin Chandaran, Parijat
kishore, Abhay Singh, M. Saurabh tanwar, Anurag Ojha, Karan Aggarwal,
Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, Devashish Bharuka, Ms. Sarvshree, Justimne
George, Ms. Shriya Chanda, Kapil Choudhary, Siddhant Buxy, M. L.
G Lahoty, Paban K. Sharma, Anchit Sripat, Pranab Kumar Nayak,
Himanshu Shekhar, Nitin Bhardwaj, Ms. Anusha Magarajan, Mrs. Pragya
Baghel, Ms. Samten Doma, Sourabh Tandon, Siddharth Batra, Ms.
Shivani Chawla, Chinmay Dubey, Ankur Bansal, M.K. Maroria, Zoheb
Hussain, Rajat Nair, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Sughosh Subramaniyam, Raghav
Sharma, Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Ms. Cleste Aggarwal, B. Krishna
H Prasad, Ms. Noopur Singhal, Rahul Khurana, Satish Kumar, Sanjay
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 717

Kumar Visen, Navin Gupta, Ms. Babita Mishra, Suresh Kumar Bhan, A
Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Pravin Bahadur, Ms. Kritika Sachdeva, Lakshya
Khanna, Jappanpreet Hore, M/S. Karanjawala & Co., Mahesh Agarwal,
Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Himanshu Satija, Ms. Ayushi Amod, Kunal
Dawar, E. C. Agrawala, Pulkit Deora, Udit Gupta, Akshay Goel, Ms.
Mahima Dayani, Anup Jain, Arnav Vidhyarthi for Udit Kishan &
B
Associates, Ms. Sugandha Batra, Ramendra Mohan Patnaik, Ayush
Shrivastava, Ms. Rubina Virmani, Rituraj Singh, Shivendra Singh, Somesh
Arora, Aviral Kashyap, Vimal Sinha, Ms. Gunjan Sinha Jain, Ramkrishna
Veerendra, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Abhinav Agrawal, Rajiv K.
Virmani, Gaurav Jain, Atul Malhotra, Himanshu, Sourav Jindal, Abhishekh
Garg, Akshay Goyal, Shish Pal Laler, Hitesh Kumar, Atul Vedant Pradhan, C
Aayush, Ravi Panwar, S. S. Jauhar, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Amit Pawan,
Rajat Kapoor, Rohit Rajershi, Avadh Bihari Kaushik, Ranbir Singh Yadav,
Amarjeet Singh, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Mrs. Shally Bhasin, Ms.
Meenakshi Chauhan, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
INDEX
Background……………………………………………....para(s) 1-6 E
I. Applications filed by:
(a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd…………………para(s) 7-10
(b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd………………..para(s) 11-18
(c) Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd……….....para(s) 19-27 F
(d) Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c)…para(s) 28-45
II. Applications filed by:
(a) M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Subros
Ltd……………………...........................................para(s) 46-50 G
III. Applications filed by:
(a) Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd…para(s) 51-64
IV. Applications filed by:
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A (a) M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd………………...para(s) 65-75
V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd………………………….para(s) 76-88
VI. Applications filed by:
(a) Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd………………para(s) 89-101
B VII. Applications pertaining to Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt.
Ltd.:
(a) Legend Height Owners Welfare Association.....para(s) 102-
104
(b) Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd…………...para(s) 105-106
C
(c) Analysis of VII (a) and (b)……………………para(s) 107-113
VIII. Applications filed by:
(a) Dharamvir & Ors………………………………para(s) 114-118
D IX. Other issues……………………………………..para(s) 119-120
Conclusion……………………………………….para(s) 121(a)-(p)
Background
1. The present judgment will dispose of various applications filed
by the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development
E
Corporation (hereinafter, “HSIIDC”) and others, by way of clarifications
sought on the judgment delivered by this Court in Rameshwar v. State
of Haryana1(hereinafter, “main judgment”).
2. The main judgment of this Court had, after duly considering the
sequence of facts and developments which occurred after publication
F of the notification under Section 4 of the (now repealed) Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter, “Acquisition Act”) on 27.08.2004, read with the
final decision of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “State”) dated
29.01.2010 to not proceed with the said acquisition, declared as mala
fide and inoperative the decision dated 29.01.2010. The Court’s reasoning
G was that the State, in principle, had decided to withdraw from the
acquisition afterthe notification under Section 4, which was followed by
the declaration under Section 6 and the receipt of objections from the
concerned lands owners etc., even when the matter was posted for
publication of the award on 26.08.2007. In the interim period, land owners,
1
H Rameshwar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 215.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 719
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

alarmed by the prospect of losing their holdings, were induced to sell or A
otherwise transfer their lands to colonizers / developers at significantly
lower rates of compensation. Most of such colonizers / developers had
entered into collaboration agreements after the notification under Section
4, sought (and were granted) licenses by the Department of Town and
Country Planning of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “DTCP”). This
B
Court found that upon an overall consideration of the materials (which
included relevant official notings in government files, ministerial decisions
and notifications), the state machinery was used to further private ends.
The Court held that such a decision to withdraw from acquisition was a
fraud on power under the Acquisition Act. Therefore, the judgment
invalidated all transfers effected from the date of publication of the C
notification under Section 4, to the date of publication of the State’s
decision to revoke the acquisition i.e., from 27.08.2004 to 29.01.2010
(hereinafter, “suspect period”).
3. Apart from invalidating the State’s final decision, the judgment
also contained consequential directions on various aspects. Before moving D
further, it would be useful to extract these directions:
“42. Having bestowed our attention to various competing
elements and issues we deem it appropriate to direct:
42.1. The decisions dated 24-8-2007 and 29-1-2010 referred
to hereinabove are set aside as being brought about by mala
E
fide exercise of power. In our considered view, those decisions
were clear case of fraud on power and as such are annulled.
42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when the
matters were already posted for pronouncement of the award
on 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps prior
thereto were properly and validly undertaken, and since the F
decision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exercise
of fraud on power, it is directed that an award is deemed to
have been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands:
(i) which were covered by declaration under Section 6 in the
present case, and G
(ii) which were transferred by the landholders during the
period 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010.
The lands which were not transferred by the landholders
during the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are not
governed by these directions. H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 42.3. Subject to the directions issued hereafter, the lands
covered under aforementioned Direction 42.2 shall vest in
HUDA/HSIIDC , as may be directed by the State of Haryana,
free from all encumbrances. HUDA/HSIIDC may forthwith take
possession thereof. Consequently, all licences granted in
respect of lands covered by the deemed award dated 26-8-
B
2007 will stand transferred to HUDA/HSIIDC.
42.4. Since the dropping of acquisition on 24-8-2007 and
subsequent decision dated 29-1-2010 have been set aside,
the period between 24-8-2007 and up to the date of this
judgment shall not be counted for the purposes of Section
C 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013.
42.5. All transactions entered into during the period from 24-
8-2007 till 29-1-2010, pursuant to which the original
D landholders transferred their holdings in favour of builders/
private entities or third parties shall be subject to and the
interest of the respective parties shall be governed by the
directions issued hereafter.
42.6. Consistent with the directions issued in para 33 of Uddar
E Gagan [Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11
SCC 378: (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198], the builders/private entities
will not be entitled to recover the consideration paid by them
to the landholders. The sale consideration paid by the
builders/private entities to the landholders shall be treated
F towards compensation under the award and the landholders
will not be required to refund any amount to such builders/
private entities. The landholders will be at liberty to prefer
Reference under Section 18 of the Act within a period of three
months from today. For the purposes of maintaining such
reference the reasoning that weighed while passing awards
G dated 9-3-2006 and 24-2-2007 shall be the basis. If the
Reference Court were to enhance the compensation, the
amounts received by the landholders by way of consideration
from the builders/private entities shall be appropriated towards
such sum awarded by the Reference Court. If the landholders
H are still entitled to something more than what they had received
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 721
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

from the builders/private entities, the differential sum shall A
be made over to them by the State of Haryana towards
acquisition of their interest in the lands in question. If,
however, what the landholders had received towards
consideration from the builders/private entities is found to be
in excess of what is awarded by the Reference Court, the
B
remainder shall not be recovered from them.
42.7. Consistent with the directions issued by this Court in
paras 33.6 and 33.7 in Uddar Gagan [Uddar Gagan Properties
Ltd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198]
, the builders/private entities will be entitled to refund/
reimbursement of any payment made to the landholders or C
the amounts that had been spent on development of the land,
such payments shall be made by HUDA or HSIIDC on being
satisfied about the extent of actual expenditure not exceeding
HUDA or HSIIDC norms on the subject, as the case may be.
Refund will however be in respect of amount at which the D
landholders sold the land and not of subsequent sales. As
regards subsequent transactions, the subsequent purchasers
will have remedies against their respective vendors. Claims
of builders/private entities entitled to refund will be taken up
after settling claims of third parties from whom the builders/
private entities had collected monies. No interest will be E
payable on such amounts.
42.8. The third parties from whom money had been collected
by the builder/private entities will either be entitled to refund
of the amount from and out of and to the extent of the amount
payable to the builder/private entities in terms of above F
direction, available with the State, on their claims being
verified or will be allotted the plots or apartments at the agreed
price or prevalent price, whichever is higher. Every such claim
shall be verified by HUDA or H SI IDC . In cases where
constructions have been erected and the entire project is G
complete or is nearing completion, upon acceptance of the
claim, the plots or apartments shall be made over to the
respective claimants on the same terms and conditions. Except
for such verified and accepted claims, the remaining area or
apartments will be completely at the disposal of HUDA
H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A or HSIIDC, as the case may be, which shall be free and competent
to dispose of the same in accordance with the prevalent policy
and procedure. In order to facilitate such exercise all third
parties who had purchased or had been allotted the plots or
apartments shall prefer claims within one month from today,
which claim shall be verified within two months from today.
B
42.9. As found by us in the preceding paragraphs, substantial
sums were made over to “middlemen”. In the pending
investigation, CBI may do well to unravel the truth. In any
case, such hefty sums which were made over to “middlemen”
cannot be said to be rightfully earned by and belonging to
C them. In fact, this actually represents the return for being able
to garner the lands in question and getting requisite licences
under the provisions of the Haryana Act and a benefit derived
out of fraud on power. In our view, this money rightfully
belongs to the State and none other. We direct the authorities
D of the State as well as the Central Government to reach the
depths of such transactions and recover every single pie and
make it over to the State Government. A complete investigation
in the transactions including unearthing unnatural gains
received by “middlemen” shall be undertaken by CBI.”
4. The present applications have been preferred by HSIIDC and
E several colonizers / developers, transferees, license holders as well as
associations of allottees of flats or commercial plots, consumers, etc.
The primary question which this Court has been called upon to answer
is as to the nature of the term ‘transfer’, adverted to in para 42 of the
main judgment.
F 5. The colonizers / developers and license holders on the one
hand submitted that so long as the lands were not ‘transferred’ by their
owners (who continued to hold title), mere grant of developmental rights
or other associated rights by instruments such as builder development
agreements, collaboration agreements, and other contracts would not
amount to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of the main judgment. The stand
G
of HSIIDC and the State (based upon the opinion of the learned Advocate
General of Haryana) on the other hand was that entering into such
development agreements or contracts was in fact a ‘transfer’ as it
impeded the enjoyment of title by the owners. It was further submitted
that such agreements led to issuance of licenses, which were the basis
H for ultimately deciding not to acquire such lands.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 723
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

6. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary to A
set out the facts in regard to the relevant transactions.
I. Applications filed by (a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt.
Ltd.; (b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and (c)
Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd.
a. M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd. and Green Heights B
Projects Pvt. Ltd.
7. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paradise”) purchased
2.681 acres of land in village Lakhnaula on 06 - 07.04.2004, by registered
sale deeds. 2 On 09.09.2007, Paradise entered into a collaboration
agreement with M/s. Sunshine Telecom Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, C
“Sunshine”). The consideration for that agreement was ` 75 lakhs -
received by Paradise. In addition, Paradise was entitled to 35% share in
the built-up commercial office space with proportionate land rights and
common area rights of the developed property. Paradise granted the
‘absolute developmental right’ of land for construction of commercial D
office space. The agreement also recorded that the period for completion
of the project was to be sixty months.
8. Based on this collaboration agreement, an application was made
for grant of license to the DTCP, and License No. 59 of 2009 was
granted on 26.10.2009. Paradise alleged that Sunshine did not adhere to E
the terms of the collaboration agreement. Paradise claims to have
refunded all amounts received by it and annulled that transaction by
deed dated 30.03.2013. Paradise thereafter entered into another
collaboration agreement with M/s. Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter, “Green Heights”) for development of the same lands on
30.03.2013. This collaboration agreement referred to License No. 59 of F
2009, which was valid up to 25.10.2013. Paradise parted with all rights
of development to Green Heights.3 In terms of this collaboration
agreement, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores as consideration. The
collaboration agreement also recorded the liability of Paradise to the
tune of ` 4.25 crores to the DTCP. G
2
Referred to in the collaboration agreement between Paradise and Green Heights Projects
Pvt. Ltd. dated 30.03.2013. The collaboration agreement was executed on behalf of
Paradise by its then director, Mr. Lalit Modi and on behalf of Green Heights Projects
Pvt. Ltd. by its director, Mr. Virendra Kumar Bhatia.
3
Detailed facts, with documents are set out in I.A. 112515/2020 in M.A. 2150 of 2020.
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 9. Both Paradise and Green Heights contend that no ‘transfer’
took place in the suspect period. It was argued on their behalf by learned
Senior Advocates Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Ms. Kiran Suri that parties
were (and continued to be) the owners of the lands in question, which
were purchased prior to the notification under Section 4 dated 27.08.2004.
In these circumstances, Paradise was legitimately entitled to enter into
B
collaboration agreements, first with Sunshine Telecom, and later with
Green Heights. Paradise received valuable consideration in its agreement
with Green Heights. It was argued that Green Heights had invested `
144.91 crores in the project and constructed a total of 371 units. Counsels
further submitted that a sum of ` 139.78 crores had been received from
C allottees who booked the properties. The amounts received and the
particulars of the allottees who had paid for respective allotted units
have been revealed to the Court by Green Heights4. It was therefore
urged that firstly, the transaction which Paradise entered into initially
with Sunshine and subsequently with Green Heights, did not fall within
the mischief of the proscribed transactions that were covered by the
D
main judgment. Secondly, the project was completed and the allottees
had paid almost the entire consideration which was utilized in the
construction of the building. The counsels submitted that the Court should
clarify that there was no ‘transfer’ in respect of the land covered by
License No. 59 of 2009.
E 10. HSIIDC and the State urged that though there was no ‘transfer’
or conveyance of the title in the strict sense, what was apparent was
that in terms of the collaboration agreements, though the original
landowner held nominal title, effective control of the lands was parted to
the colonizer / developer. In the case of Sunshine, the consideration was
F ` 75 lakhs, which was in excess by more than twice the value of
compensation offered under the Acquisition Act in adjacent lands. In the
case of Green Heights, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores. It was
submitted that under the collaboration agreement, the colonizer / developer
was entitled to develop the lands, build upon it, and allot the residential or
commercial unit, as the case was, to those who entered into agreements
G and paid valuable monies. Crucial rights such as possession, the right to
construct as per one’s choice, and the right to sell, all devolved on the
colonizer / developer, who would be entitled to a share of the proceeds.
Therefore, it was urged that the real purpose behind the transactions
4
I.A. No. 118401 of 2020 in M.A. No. 2150 of 2020.
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 725
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

ought to be viewed holistically, and not only one facet of it, i.e., retention A
of the title by the landowners. HSIIDC and the State therefore, contended
that these lands clearly fell within the description of ‘transfers’ and should
be included in the award deemed to have been passed on 26.08.2007 by
the main judgment (hereinafter, “deemed award”).
b. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and Unitech Ltd. B
11. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Karma”) had
purchased lands in villages Manesar, Naurangpur and Lakhnaula,
between 1996 and 2004. In respect of the total 207.11 acres it had
acquired, Karma was granted a conversion of land use (hereinafter,
“CLU”) certificate by the State on 13.03.1996. C
12. The notification issued under Section 4 had included these
207.11 acres, as well as another lot of 25.95 acres in villages Naurangpur
and Lakhnaula, owned by companies whose dominant shareholder (to
the extent of 90%) was also the majority shareholder in Karma. When
the declaration under Section 6 was published on 25.08.2005, Karma’s D
lands, which were the subject of the CLU (207.11 acres), were dropped
from acquisition. This was apparently in tune with the existing policy of
not acquiring lands whose use had been converted. There is no controversy
about those lands at present.
13. In these proceedings, it is the smaller parcel of 25.95 acres of E
land, which is the subject matter of consideration. Unlike the lands for
which CLU had been obtained, these 25.95 acres were included in the
acquisition proceedings, in the declaration under Section 6. In respect of
these lands, Karma had entered into a collaboration agreement on
16.02.2004, and a supplementary agreement on 24.12.2006, after the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 i.e., after 25.08.2005. The F
collaboration agreement envisaged development of these lands by M/s
Unitech Ltd. (hereinafter, “Unitech”). According to the arrangement, a
large number of golf villas were to be built and given out on long-lease
basis. During the proceedings before this Court, Unitech stated that it
had paid ` 15 crores to Karma as consideration for the same. G
14. By the time the supplementary agreement was executed on
24.12.2006, the Delhi High Court approved a scheme of amalgamation
of the land-owing companies, merging them with Karma. Karma then
applied to the DTCP for a license to develop a group housing colony on
15.01.2007. Consequently, License No. 206 of 2008 was issued on
H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 16.12.2008. Thereafter, when the award scheduled for 26.08.2007 was
not pronounced, and the decision of the State to not acquire lands was
taken on 29.01.2010, these 25.95 acres belonging to Karma were
excluded from acquisition.
15. Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Senior Advocate for Karma,
B argued that the State’s attempt to include Karma’s land in the deemed
award was untenable. He also urged that the landowning companies
which eventually merged with Karma had as a matter of fact purchased
these lands as early as the mid-1990s. Karma’s bona fides was evident
from the fact that the largest portion of its acquired land, i.e., 207.11
acres, was left out of the acquisition on a proper application of the existing
C policy, which the State consciously followed. By this policy, lands which
had CLU certificates were excluded. Therefore, the 207.11 acres
earmarked for the development of the golf course which was a subject
matter of the CLU obtained in 1996 was excluded; consequently, it did
not find place in the declaration under Section 6. It was submitted that
D even though the non-CLU lands, i.e., 25.95 acres, did not fulfill the terms
of the policy, nevertheless, the justification for not letting the State proceed
with their acquisition was that neither Karma nor its predecessors had
attempted to influence the acquisition. Karma submitted that while these
lands were included in the notification under Section 6, they stood on the
same footing as the lands owned by other bona fide land owners, because
E they were not the subject matter of any speculation. The lands had been
purchased at least ten years or so prior to the notification issued under
Section 4. In the circumstances, Karma was justified in seeking a license
after waiting for a reasonable period of time, even within the suspect
period. Mr. Chahar also pointed out that no malice or ulterior motive
F could be attributed to Karma because its collaboration with Unitech was
entered into on 16.02.2004, which was prior to the notification under
Section 4.
16. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that Karma’s
applications, i.e., M.A. No. 1046/2019, and connected applications, were
G for directions for release of a total area of 9.7 acres. It was submitted
that these were seven distinct units of land which Karma was forced to
purchase because they fall in pockets within the larger area of 207.11
acres, left out of the acquisition when the declaration under Section 6
was issued. It was submitted that being a contiguous land, it interfered
with the integrity of the golf course. Their inclusion in acquisition would
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 727
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

ultimately disturb the peaceful enjoyment of land, which Karma was A
legitimately entitled to. He also relied upon a policy of the State dated
14.06.2012 (issued under a letter5) which contained a comprehensive
policy in respect of leftover pockets of land. It was submitted that this
Court should grant liberty to the State to release the lands which were
the matter of acquisition in view of this policy. However, at the end of
B
the hearings, Mr. Chahar sought and was granted liberty to withdraw
the application (M.A. No. 1046 of 2019). The application was therefore
dismissed as withdrawn on 19.04.2022.
17. Learned counsel for HSIIDC Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen argued
that even though Karma or its affiliates had purchased the lands earlier,
only 207.11 acres was covered by a previously issued CLU. Its exclusion C
from acquisition was justifiable due to extant policy. However, with respect
to 25.95 acres, it was included in the declaration under Section 6, and
there was no justification for its non-inclusion in the deemed award. It
was urged that Karma’s intensions were clear because even after the
declaration under Section 6 was issued, and much before the scheduled D
date for the award, on an assumption that it still owned the land and
could develop it, an application was made on 15.01.2007 for license. It
was also submitted that Karma’s submissions that the collaboration
agreement with Unitech was arrived at earlier, were of no avail given
that the supplementary agreement was also executed by the parties after
the declaration under Section 6. Clearly, these events were meant to E
create an impediment in the acquisition and ultimately led to the decision
by which the proposed award was never announced in respect of these
lands and finally, the State decided to drop the acquisition in respect of
25.95 acres on 29.01.2010.
18. It was also urged by the State and HSIIDC that unlike in F
other cases, there had been no development on the land. Further, interests
like those of third party allottees was not involved. In these circumstances,
the lands which were deliberately excluded from acquisition, after they
formed part of the final declaration, by non-publication of the award,
clearly fell within the mischief of what could be termed as ‘transfer’ in G
the main judgment.
c. Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd., Balbir Singh, Ram
Pyari, M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd., and Godrej
Properties Ltd.
5
No.PF-31/7/10/2012-2 TCP dated 14.06.2012. H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 19. Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Frontier”)
had originally purchased 8.568 acres of land at village Naurangpur on
16.08.2004 under its erstwhile name Conway Developers Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter, “Lot 1”). The consideration paid was 5.62 crores. Another
parcel, i.e., 5.175 acres of land was jointly owned by one Balbir Singh
and Ram Pyari (hereinafter, “Lot 2”). Both lots were included in the
B
notification under Section 4, as well as the declaration under Section 6.
During this period, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari entered into a collaboration
agreement with M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Earl”) on
24.08.2006 for its development. Soon thereafter, Earl entered into a
development collaboration agreement with Frontier in respect of Lot 2
C on 11.12.2006. Frontier agreed to jointly develop both lots. This agreement
was followed up with a supplementary agreement between Balbir Singh,
Ram Pyari, and Earl under which further amounts were given to the
owners as consideration.
20. On 11.12.2006, Frontier applied to the DTCP for a license
D enclosing the collaboration agreement and related documents. Along with
this, a sum of 1.17 crores was also paid for the license. On 07.05.2008,
License No. 88 of 2008 was issued in the name of Frontier, Balbir Singh,
Ram Pyari and Earl in respect of the entire composite area of 13.743
acres (Lot 1 + Lot 2). After the final decision of the State to drop the
acquisition on 29.01.2010, on 24.06.2010, the four licensees transferred
E their rights to develop all 13.743 acres to Godrej Properties Ltd.
(hereinafter, “Godrej”).
21. In this agreement, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari were to receive
55,328.60 sq. ft. of built-up area. The agreement (by clause 2.11) showed
exact areas - including built up areas - which were to come up; what
F was allocable for amenities, common facilities, etc. The consideration
was that Frontier was to have a 30% right in the gross share of revenue,
and Godrej the remaining 70%. Godrej paid Frontier an interest-free
deposit equal to 16 crores of which 5.5 crores was non-refundable;
in addition, Frontier’s expenses till then were reimbursed. The prior
G commitments of Frontier, including allotment of land to owners (55,328.60
sq. ft.) and additional 1,00,000 sq. ft. for 50 residential flats in favor of
the Jammu & Kashmir All India Service Officers Society was also agreed
to.
22. The materials on record show that a group housing colony
H styled as “Godrej Frontier” was developed. The occupation certificate
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 729
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

was granted by the DTCP on 16.10.2014 for residential, EWS and A
commercial units, and on 19.06.2017 for community building. The group
housing colony comprised of 567 units in total – 475 residential, 84 EWS
and 8 commercial. Godrej disclosed in its affidavit that it sold 357
residential units, 8 commercial shops and 83 EWS units from its share
and a negligible number of units remained unsold, i.e., 4 residential units;
B
1 EWS unit and a nursery school. Of the group housing units developed
by Godrej Frontier, 199 units were registered in favour of third-party
buyers.
23. It was argued, on behalf of Godrej, by learned Senior Advocates
Mr. Pinaki Misra and Mr. Randeep Singh Rai that the original landowners
in question were not aggrieved. They were neither parties before any C
forum, nor did they allege any fraud, influence nor were theydistressed.
Landowners in the present case transacted voluntarily with the colonizers
/ developers. There was no allegation offraud or illegality against Godrej.
It wasemphasized that the original landowners retained their respective
titles in the project land. It was urged that this Court’s main judgment D
onlyapplied to cases involving forceful and fraudulent saleof lands at
throwaway prices after the issuance of notification under Section 4 and
declaration under Section 6. The basis of the main judgment was against
the illegal monetary gains by thebuilders on purchasing land at throwaway
prices fromfarmers by threatening them with effects of the acquisition.In
the present case, theownership of the land was intact and no illegal E
monetary gain was made. Moreover,no middle men were involved.
Therefore, thepresent land was not covered by the purview of
directionsgiven in the main judgment.
24. Counsels highlighted the following portions of the main
judgment: F

“42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when the
matters were already posted for pronouncement of the award
on 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps prior
thereto were properly and validly undertaken, and since the
decision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exercise G
of fraud on power, it is directed that an award is deemed to
have been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands:
(i) which were covered by declaration under Section 6 in the
present case, and
H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A (ii) which were transferred by the landholders during the
period 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010.
The lands which were not transferred by the landholders
during the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are not
governed by these directions”.
B 25. In the present case, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari owned Lot 2
much before the notification under Section 4,and these landowners
continued to hold title of the land as on the date of filing their affidavits
before this Court. The only difference was that the flats developed on
the land had been sold to bona fide consumers and conveyance deeds
C had been executed in their favour by the landowners and the colonizers
/ developers. Out of the entire flats developed on the said land, some
had been allocated to respective stakeholders including the landowners.
The original landowner in the case of Lot 1 was always Frontier, which
had also purchased the lands before the notification under Section 4. In
these circumstances, the project should not be covered by the deemed
D award as stipulated in the main judgment.
26. It was urged that entering into collaboration agreements,
applying for licenses and issuing licenses could not be construed as
‘transfers’, or a burden on the title. It was submitted that these were
legitimate activities that landowners with valid title could perform. It
E was also urged that Godrej in fact took over development five months
after the lands were released from the cloud of acquisition (the
collaboration agreement was dated 24.06.2010, whereas the decision of
the State to drop the acquisition proceedings was taken on 29.01.2010).
Godrej therefore could not be accused of any wrongdoing, because it
F entered into agreement with bona fide land owners after any kind of
impediment on collaboration had ceased. Furthermore, it developed the
property by beginning construction only in 2011, after obtaining all
permissions.
27. It was lastly urged that in case the interpretation of the main
G judgment were so as to include the present lands within the ambit of the
deemed award, then the purpose of carving out an exception in para
42.2 would be defeated. Moreover, the main judgment was meant to
protect the interests of farmers, and in this case, any alternate
interpretation would end up harming their interests. Likewise, the genuine
interests of bona fide third-party consumers would be jeopardized.
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 731
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

d. Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c): A
28. To discern the content and nature of the transactions whereby
landowners conferred rights upon colonizers / developers, it would be
necessary to notice some relevant conditions in the collaboration
agreements placed on record by the parties:
Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh and Earl B
Infotech (dated 24.08.2006)
“7. That the Owners shall execute General Power of Attorney
(GPA) and Special Power of Attorney and/or any other
document or papers in favour of the Developer or it’s nominee
to enable the Developer to apply for all regulatory approvals, C
licenses, sanctions and no objections for development of the
said land and to raise constructions thereon as agreed hereto.
However, in the event, any other/further document in respect
of said land the Owners have to sign the same to enable to
Developer to obtain the necessary license/permission and
D
complete the development of the colony on the said. Land.
The Owners shall sign the same without raising any objection
in any manner whatsoever and withinthe stipulated period.
****
9. That the Owners further undertakes that he/she/they shall
E
not deal with the said land in any manner whatsoever and
shall henceforth keep thesaid land free from any change, lien,
litigation, claim etc. And shall notcreate any obstruction or
impediment in the development of the said landof the
‘Development’.
**** F

12. That Owners will hand over the actual physical possession
of the said land to the developer for purpose of developing
for the purpose of the residential/commercial Group Housing/
industrial/Special Economic Zone complex agreed to be
developed at the time of signing of this agreement and to G
enable the developer to discharge its part of obligations.
****
18. That the developer shall commence and complete the
development of the said residential/Commercial/Group
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A Housing/Industrial Complex byproviding the entire finance,
equipment, inputs material infrastructureand expertise
necessary to develop the Special Economic Zone/residential/
Commercial/ Industrial Complex in accordance with
thesanctioned plans and any modifications thereof as may
becomenecessary or agreed to during the progress of the work.
B
That theDeveloper is fully empowered and entitled to assign
this agreement infavour of any Third Party at its absolute
discretion without any recourseto the Owners and the Owners
shall have no objection for suchassignment.
xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx
C
21. The Owners shall not interfere with or obstruct in any
manner
with the execution and completion of the work of development
the said residential/ commercial/Group Housing /Industrial
D complex and/or booking and sale of developer’s share of
development, built or unbuilt areas of the project. However,
if any defect is pointed out in the development while the work
is in the progress by the Owners, the same will be removed
and rectified by the developer.

E 22. It is agreed between the parties that the possession of the
said land once delivered/handed over to the developer for
the purpose of the
aforementioned project shall not be disturbed nor any
interference caused by the Owners till the project is complete.
F 1t is clarified that the ownership in the said land shall
continue to vest exclusively in the Owners and developer shall
not be entitled to claim any right, title or interest in the said
portion of the said land or any part thereof before successful
completion of the project complex as provided herein after
which the Ownership in the property shall be of both the
G parties as per their respective shares.
****
24. That the Qwners shall be entitled to retain or let out or
sell the areatheir respective share to any party either in whole
or in parts, but subjectto Para No. 16 hereinabove. If in case
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 733
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the Owners are desirous of sale oftheir residential plots areas A
forming part of their allocation, they shall firstoffer the same
for purchase to the Developer. It is however, madeclear that
the Developer shall be afforded a period of two weeks from
thedate of receipt of written intimation from the owners along
with offer in writing, to communicate its decision pertaining
B
to purchase of the allocation of the owner, in case Developers
is in a position to match the highest offer available with the
Owners for sale of their property referred to above, it shall
be entitled to pay the sale consideration amount within a
period of 90 days from the date of receipt of intimation from
the owners and to purchase the property being alienated by C
the Owners. In case Developers fails to respond within the
period of two weeks referred to above calculated from the
date of receipt of written intimation by the Developers from
the Owners, the Owners shall be at liberty to sell their area to
third party. The developer shall be entitled to enter into any
D
agreement to sell/lease/rent or to dispose of its share in any
manner to receive the payments and to execute the necessary
documents in favor of such purchaser. The Owners shall also
join hands in executing the documents in favour of such
purchaser and shall also do all other acts, deeds and things
which may be required to be done in order to confer legal E
and perfect title in favour of such purchaser and all receipt
shall be issued for an on behalf of the owners and developer
conclusively thereby binding both the parties for the
transaction.”
(emphasis supplied) F
Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari,
Earl and Godrej (dated 24.06.2010)
“2.9 The Power of Attorney shall be irrevocable (except
inaccordance with the terms of this agreement) and the
Developer shall be entitled to appoint one or more G
substitutesunder the said Power of Attorney for the exercise
of any or all of the powers and authorities thereunder in
favour of its Affiliates.”
****
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734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 4.2 Marketing
It is agreed between the parties hereto that the Developer
shallhave the exclusive marketing rights of the Project. It shall
alsobe the obligation of the Developer to sell and market the
areareserved for Frontier commitments.
B ****
6.7 Developer shall have exclusive possession of the said
property and shall allow reasonable access to Frontier as
may be required. Developer also agrees to provide for
inspection of all Project related information on a quarterly
C basis to Frontier.
****
6.8 The original title documents pertaining to Land B are
inthe possession of Land B Owners. Earl and Frontier
D shallprocure from Land B Owners to deposit the same withthe
Developer prior to the formation of a society of prospective
purchaser of flats in the Project, in conformity with the
Applicable law.”
(emphasis supplied)
E
In light of the above extracts of the documents, it would now be
necessary to examine the true nature of the collaboration agreements
whereby the owner (title holder) parted with possession to the colonizer
/ developer for payment of valuable consideration and allocation of a
F certain number of constructed units or percentage of built-up area.
29. The common refrain of the colonizers / developers was that
while the collaboration agreements were entered into during the suspect
period, the title to the lands had never passed onto them. Further, (in
some cases) licenses were obtained only after the time for announcing
G the award had expired.
30. The question then revolves around the true nature of these
development rights, and whether the directions issued in the main judgment
were applicable to their ‘transfer’. In these cases, undoubtedly transfer
of such rights was done after the lands were notified under Section 4
(except in the case of Karma where apart from the original development
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 735
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

agreement dated 16.02.2004, a supplementary agreement was entered A
later into on 24.12.2006). Additionally, soon after the collaboration
agreements were executed, licenses were applied for and issued (License
Nos. 88 of 2008, 59 of 2009 and 206 of 2008) after the declaration
under Section 6 but before the State’s final decision to not acquire the
lands on 29.01.2010.
B
31. The following are the features common to all the collaboration
agreements:
i. Possession was handed over to the colonizer / developer;
ii. Full rights of development – the nature, the kind of colony
or group housing units to be constructed as well as their C
numbers were at the absolute discretion of the colonizer /
developer;
iii. Substantial amounts were paid to the land owner (and in
the case of Frontier, in addition to the original landowners,
the intervening developer as well, such as Earl); D
iv. Wherever intervening rights existed (such as those of
Frontier which had already committed to allot a certain
number of developed or constructed units to third parties)
the ultimate developer (such as Godrej) took over such
liability;
E
v. The landowners, and wherever applicable, the intervening
developer, were in addition, entitled to a share in the proceeds
and to a certain number of units of constructed or developed
lands defined specifically in the agreement;
vi. Power of attorney documents were executed in favour of F
the colonizer / developer, to facilitate the latter’s intent to
develop the lands;
vii. The consideration paid to landowners in all these cases far
exceeded the market value of the lands, prevailing at the
time of the notification under Section 4;
G
viii. The landowner – and wherever applicable, the intervening
colonizer / developer – executed registered power of
attorneys to the final developer, and in all cases agreed to
execute registered sale deeds to the allottees of the colonizer
/ developer as and when called upon to do so; and
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736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A ix. In some cases, on the strength of these collaboration
agreements, licenses were applied for by the landowner or
by the intervening developer.
32. The nature of collaboration agreements has been discussed
by this Court in Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. &
B Anr.6 In this case, the parties had entered into a collaboration agreement
for the construction of a residential building. The usual conditions, such
as handing over possession, non-interference in the project, handing over
title documents to enable sale of constructed units to third parties, etc.
were agreed to. Holding that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was
applicable to the collaboration agreement, and that the parties could not
C be viewed as constituting a ‘joint venture’ given the power inequality
between them, this Court held as follows:
“27. What then is the nature of the agreement between the
appellant and the first respondent? The appellant is the owner
of the land. He wants a new house, but is not able to construct
D a new house for himself either on account of paucity of funds
or lack of expertise or resources. He, therefore, enters into
an agreement with the builder. He asks the builder to construct
a house and give it to him. He says that as he does not have
the money to pay for the construction and will, therefore,
permit the builder to construct and own additional floor(s)
E as consideration. He also agrees to transfer an undivided
share in the land corresponding to the additional floor(s)
which falls to the share of the builder. As a result, instead of
being the full owner of the land with an old building, he
becomes a co-owner of the land with a one-third share in the
land and absolute owner of the ground floor of the newly
F
constructed building and agrees that the builder will become
the owner of the upper floors with corresponding two-third
share in the land. As the cost of the undivided two-third share
in the land which the landowner agrees to transfer to the
builder, is more than the cost of construction of the ground
G floor by the builder for the landowner, it is also mutually
agreed that the builder will pay the landowner an additional
cash consideration of Rs 8 lakhs.
28. The basic underlying purpose of the agreement is the
construction of a house or an apartment (ground floor) in
6
H Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., (2008) 10 SCC 345.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 737
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

accordance with the specifications, by the builder for the A
owner, the consideration for such construction being the
transfer of undivided share in land to the builder and grant
of permission to the builder to construct two floors. Such
agreement whether called as a “collaboration agreement” or
a “joint venture agreement”, is not, however, a “joint venture”.
B
There is a contract for construction of an apartment or house
for the appellant, in accordance with the specifications and
in terms of the contract. There is a consideration for such
construction, flowing from the landowner to the builder (in
the form of sale of an undivided share in the land and
permission to construct and own the upper floors). To adjust C
the value of the extent of land to be transferred, there is also
payment of cash consideration by the builder. But the
important aspect is the availment of services of the builder by
the landowner for a house construction (construction of the
owner’s share of the building) for a consideration. To that
D
extent, the landowner is a consumer, the builder is a service
provider and if there is deficiency in service in regard to
construction, the dispute raised by the landowner will be a
consumer dispute. We may mention that it makes no difference
for this purpose whether the collaboration agreement is for
construction and delivery of one apartment or one floor to E
the owner or whether it is for construction and delivery of
multiple apartments or more than one floor to the owner. The
principle would be the same and the contract will be
considered as one for house construction for consideration.
The deciding factor is not the number of apartments
F
deliverable to the landowner, but whether the agreement is in
the nature of a joint venture or whether the agreement is
basically for construction of certain area for the landowner.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. The above judgment, while clarifying the purpose of G
collaboration agreements, falls short of delving into the legal effects of
the transfer of such development rights. Parting with rights which are
fundamental to ownership, for valuable consideration (in cash or by
handing over constructed units), leaving only the nominal ‘title’ with the
landowner, is a common feature of such collaboration agreements. Given
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A the evolution in complexity of real estate contracts, and the absence of
the definition of collaboration agreements in legislation, their interpretation
by various High Courts assumes significance. In a question pertaining to
the applicability of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to such contracts, a Full
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim
Kumar Kar7while addressing the nature of development agreements,
B
also answered the question in affirmative:
“45. This leads to the unavoidable discussion as to what may
be regarded as a Development Agreement as referred to in
the questions framed for the reference and the Judgments of
this Court cited by the parties. Without intending the discussion
C to be an exhaustive treatise on Development Agreements of
all hues, it may be recognized there can be several Agreements,
which can be loosely described as Development Agreements
in the sense that such expression has been used in the
judgments cited in course of the present proceedings. An owner
D without any funds or the independent resources to construct
a new building on such owner’s land may engage another
for such purpose with the consideration for the construction
being paid by allocation of a part of the constructed area.
There could be several variants of the same basic structure
of a Development Agreement with the Agreement either
E providing for the owner being entitled to a sum of money in
addition to a specified share in the constructed area or with
a Developer being required to rid the land of its
encumbrances, whether monetary or otherwise, prior to the
construction being taken up. There may be other similar
F Agreements under which the Developer is required to
temporarily relocate an existing tenant or occupant and
ultimately provide the tenant or occupant a part of the
constructed area. In the context in which certain Agreements
pertaining to the construction of new buildings contemplate
the construction to be undertaken or orchestrated by a person
G other than the owner of the land, whether upon the demolition
of the existing structure or otherwise, with such person other
than the owner having a share in the constructed area, such
Agreements have now come to be regarded as Development
Agreements. Whether or not such Agreements are in the nature
7
H Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar, AIR 2014 Cal 92.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 739
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

of collaboration or joint venture, they are loosely referred to A
as Development Agreements in several Judgments. Such
Agreements are not merely for the construction of any building
or for the mere execution of any other work on the land. The
Developer is not merely a Contractor engaged to undertake
the construction; the Developer is, under the Agreement with
B
the owner, promised a part of the constructed premises as
owner thereof together with the proportionate area of the land.
In the context in which certain Agreements are referred to as
Development Agreements and the non-owner party to such
an Agreement is regarded as the Developer qua the nature of
the work envisaged under the Agreement, the Developer always C
has a share in the building or the area proposed to be
constructed – which implies a proportionate share of the piece
of earth – and such Agreement envisages the Developer to
have a share of, and interest in, the final product which is the
outcome of the Agreement.
D
46. In such sense, a Development Agreement which envisages
the party thereto other than the owner being responsible for
ensuring the construction of a building on the subject land
and having a share therein, there is an inescapable contract
to transfer immovable property. In form, a Development
Agreement which envisages the Developer to have a share in E
the building proposed to be constructed in terms of the
Agreement, the Agreement may appear to be somewhat not
resembling an Agreement for transfer of an immovable
property; and, indeed, it is not an Agreement simpliciter for
sale of an immovable property. In law, however, a Development F
Agreement of the kind described herein entails the transfer
of immovable property in the sense that the Developer or an
assignee of the Developer, at the instance of the Developer,
would be entitled not only to a part of the constructed area
but the proportionate share of the land on which the
construction is made.” G

(emphasis supplied)
34. Thus, collaboration agreements which enable the colonizer /
developer to retain a significant portion of the constructed area as
consideration, are not in the nature of pure construction contracts. An H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A analysis of these agreements depicts the transfer of crucial rights and
interests in the property, which otherwise are enjoyed only by the
landowner, falling short only in respect of the ‘title’.
35. In Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors.,8this
Court stressed on the necessity to analyze the terms of the collaboration
B agreement in order to determine if any ‘charge’ or ‘interest’ had been
created in the land. If so, such agreements could attract the application
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:
“17. The expression “development agreement” has not been
defined statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclature
C which is used to be describe a wide range of agreements which
an owner of a property may enter into for development of
immovable property. As real estate transactions have grown
in complexity, the nature of these agreements has become
increasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without intending
to be exhaustive), development agreements may be of various
D kinds:
17.1. An agreement may envisage that the owner of the
immovable property engages someone to carry out the work
of construction on the property for monetary consideration.
This is a pure construction contract;
E
17.2. An agreement by which the owner or a person holding
other rights in an immovable property grants rights to a third
party to carry on development for a monetary consideration
payable by the developer to the other. In such a situation, the
owner or right holder may in effect create an interest in the
F property in favour of the developer for a monetary
consideration;
17.3. An agreement where the owner or a person holding any
other rights in an immovable property grants rights to another
person to carry out development. In consideration, the
G developer has to hand over a part of the constructed area to
the owner. The developer is entitled to deal with the balance
of the constructed area. In some situations, a society or similar
other association is formed and the land is conveyed or leased
to the society or association;
8
H Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 241.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 741
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

17.4. A development agreement may be entered into in a A
situation where the immovable property is occupied by tenants
or other right holders. In some cases, the property may be
encroached upon. The developer may take on the entire
responsibility to settle with the occupants and to thereafter
carry out construction; and
B
17.5. An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop a
plot of land which is occupied by slum dwellers and which
has been declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be old
and dilapidated buildings which are occupied by a number
of occupants or tenants. The developer may undertake to
rehabilitate the occupants or, as the case may be, the slum C
dwellers and thereafter share the saleable constructed area
with the owner.
18. When a pure construction contract is entered into, the
contractor has no interest in either the land or the construction
which is carried out. But in various other categories of D
development agreements, the developer may have acquired a
valuable right either in the property or in the constructed
area. The terms of the agreement are crucial in determining
whether any interest has been created in the land or in respect
of rights in the land in favour of the developer and if so, the E
nature and extent of the rights.
19. In a construction contract, the contractor has no interest
in either the land or the construction carried out on the land.
But, in other species of development agreements, the developer
may have acquired a valuable right either in the property or F
the constructed area. There are various incidents of ownership
in respect of an immovable property. Primarily, ownership
imports the right of exclusive possession and the enjoyment
of the thing owned. The owner in possession of the thing has
the right to exclude all others from its possession and
enjoyment. The right to ownership of a property carries with G
it the right to its enjoyment, right to its access and to other
beneficial enjoyments incidental to it. (B. Gangadhar v. B.G.
Rajalingam [B. Gangadhar v. B.G. Rajalingam, (1995) 5 SCC
238, para 6] .) Ownership denotes the relationship between
a person and an object forming the subject-matter of the H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A ownership. It consists of a complex of rights, all of which are
rights in rem, being good against the world and not merely
against specific persons. There are various rights or incidents
of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in
every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy
the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate
B
it. (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee [Swadesh
Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee, (1991) 4 SCC 572] .)
An essential incident of ownership of land is the right to
exploit the development, potential to construct and to deal
with the constructed area. In some situations, under a
C development agreement, an owner may part with such rights
to a developer. This in essence is a parting of some of the
incidents of ownership of the immovable property. There could
be situations where pursuant to the grant of such rights, the
developer has incurred a substantial investment, altered the
state of the property and even created third-party rights in
D
the property or the construction to be carried out. There could
be situations where it is the developer who by his efforts has
rendered a property developable by taking steps in law. In
development agreements of this nature, where an interest is
created in the land or in the development in favour of the
E developer, it may be difficult to hold that the agreement is not
capable of being specifically performed. For example, the
developer may have evicted or settled with occupants, got
land which was agricultural converted into non-agricultural
use, carried out a partial development of the property and
pursuant to the rights conferred under the agreement, created
F
third-party rights in favour of flat purchasers in the proposed
building. In such a situation, if for no fault of the developer,
the owner seeks to resile from the agreement and terminates
the development agreement, it may be difficult to hold that
the developer is not entitled to enforce his rights. This of
G course is dependent on the terms of the agreement in each
case. There cannot be a uniform formula for determining
whether an agreement granting development rights can be
specifically enforced and it would depend on the nature of
the agreement in each case and the rights created under it.”
H (emphasis supplied)
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 743
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

36. The recognition of transfer of valuable rights by collaboration A
agreements was also commented upon in Unitech Ltd. v. Union of
India,9 whereinthis Court was concerned with whether a collaboration
agreement constituted ‘transfer’ of property under Chapter XX-C of
the Income Tax Act, 1961. Vidarbha Engineering Industries entered into
a collaboration agreement with Unitech on 17.03.1994 for development
B
and construction of a commercial project at Dahipura and Untkhana in
Nagpur. Unitech was to retain 78% of the total constructed area,
transferring the rest 22% to Vidarbha. It is imperative to note that Vidarbha
itself had leased said land from Nagpur Improvement Trust for a period
of thirty years, and could not transfer title to any third party such as
Unitech. The Court interpreted Section 269-UA of the Income Tax Act, C
1961 which included transfer of any ‘right’ or enabling enjoyment of
immovable property, as follows:
“6. It is clear from the agreement that the transfer of rights of
Vidarbha Engineering in its land does not amount to any sale,
exchange or lease of such land, since, only possessory rights D
have been granted to Unitech to construct the building on
the land. Nor is there any clause in the agreement expressly
transferring 22% of the building to Vidarbha after it is
constructed by Unitech. Clause 4.6 only mentions that as a
consideration for Unitech agreeing to develop the property it
shall retain 78% and the share of Vidarbha Engineering will E
be 22%. In fact Parliament has defined “transfer”,
deliberately wide enough to include within its scope such
agreements or arrangements which have the effect of
transferring all the important rights in land for future
considerations such as part acquisition of shares in buildings F
to be constructed, vide sub-clause (ii) of clause (f) of sub-
section (2) of Section 269-UA. There is no doubt that the
collaboration agreement can be construed as an agreement
and in any case an arrangement which has the effect of
transferring and in any case enabling the enjoyment, of such
property. Undoubtedly, the collaboration agreement enables G
Unitech to enjoy the property of Vidarbha Engineering for
the purpose of construction.There is also no doubt that an
agreement is an arrangement. It must, therefore, be held that

9
Unitech Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 2 SCC 569. H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A the collaboration agreement effectuates a transfer of the
subject land from Vidarbha Engineering to Unitech within
the meaning of the term in Section 269-UA of the Act. It appears
to be the intention of parliament to cover all such transactions
by which valuable rights in property are in fact transferred
by one party to another for consideration, under the word
B
“transfer”, for fulfilling the purpose of pre-emptive purchase
i.e. prevention of tax evasion. A judgment of the Patna High
Court in Ashis Mukerji v. Union of India [Ashis
Mukerji v. Union of India, (1996) 222 ITR 168 (Pat)] cited
before us takes the view that a development agreement is
C covered by the definition of “transfer” in Section 269-UA.
We note the same with approval.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, the collaboration
agreement was considered as a ‘transfer’, even though no title vested
D with Vidarbha in order to pass the same to Unitech.
37. The features set out earlier in this judgment demonstrate that
the landowner in all the cases were aware that the notification was
issued under Section 4 on 27.08.2004. No doubt, such landowners did
not acquire the land after such notification. However, during the
E subsistence of the notification, which constituted the manifest intention
of the State to acquire the lands, the third parties’ rights were consciously
created for substantial consideration. In the case of Paradise, the initial
sum paid was 75 lakhs, and in the subsequent agreement with Green
Heights, the sum paid was 28 crores for parting with development
F rights relating to 2.681 acres. Similarly, in the case of Balbir Singh and
Ram Pyari, the initial agreement with Frontier entitled the landowners to
1000 sq. yds out of each developed acre plus 52 lakhs, and in the
subsequent agreement with Godrej, the landowners were entitled to
55,328.60 sq. ft. of built up units, and Frontier was entitled to 30% share
of the receipts in the project. In the case of Karma, the developer Unitech
G paid 15 crores and was entitled to a share of receipts of developed
units sold.
38. The main judgment of this Court has carefully considered and
gone into great lengths to examine the file notings which led to the final
decision of the State not to acquire such lands. In the case of Frontier,
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 745
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the records clearly demonstrate that a noting was approved by the State A
Government at the highest level that All India Service Officers of the
Jammu & Kashmir cadre had requested for lands for their residential
housing society. This request was the main basis for the decision not to
acquire Frontier’s lands which was the subject matter of License No.
88 of 2008. After said decision, Frontier parted with all its rights to Godrej,
B
as did the owners of other parcels of land, i.e., Balbir Singh and Ram
Pyari. These facts clearly demonstrate how the entire state machinery
was subverted. The collaboration agreement with Godrej shows that 50
residential units were committed to the Jammu & Kashmir cadre of All
India Service Officers (just above 10% of the total number of flats
ultimately constructed). Likewise, in the case of Paradise, Frontier and C
Karma too, entering into collaboration agreements and the seeking grant
of licenses formed the basis for the State’s final decision not to go ahead
with the acquisition even though a declaration under Section 6 had been
published.
39. It is clear that the collaboration agreements formed the first D
element of a two-step process whereby the colonizers / developers (who
might have been also land owners) having acquired lands, prior to the
preliminary notification, went ahead and entered into commitments by
executing collaboration agreements afterthe notification under Section
4, and even declaration under Section 6, with full knowledge. The
consideration for parting with developmental rights was far higher than E
the market value of the lands which they would have been entitled to.
These acts ultimately culminated with the decision not to acquire the
lands. The second step – and the important one persuading the State not
to acquire the lands 10- was the application for, and the grant of,
development licenses. Uniformly, in all these cases, the applications were F
made prior to the scheduled date of publication of the award (26.08.2007).
This is a significant and tell-tale factor because there was no way the
applicants would have ordinarily known that an award would not be
pronounced on the concerned date. In fact, the application clearly
indicates foreknowledge that their lands would not be ultimately acquired.
This is what may be characterized as the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ which G
establishes the complicity of these individuals and entities.
10
In the case of Frontier Developers (earlier known as Conway), the request for de-
notification was made, by a letter dated 17.08.2007, to the state of Haryana - a fact
noted in the status report filed by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter, “ED”)
before the Court. H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 40. Land ownership typically carries with it a bundle of rights. A
landowner has the right to possess, sell, lease, develop, sub-let, occupy,
etc. On an overall analysis of the common features of all the collaboration
agreements as carried out in an earlier part of the judgment, it is evident
that except for the empty husk of a title, the land owner parted with
predominant and substantial rights over the property, including possession.
B
In almost all the cases, these rights were parted for consideration which
was far above the notified acquisition rates. This observation applies in
the case of the two companies – Frontier and Karma, who continued to
be the land owners of the land. Such ‘emptying out’ of all important
attributes that constitute rights and interest over the property cannot but
C be viewed as a ‘transfer’. To hold otherwise would mean that after
receiving substantial amounts – equal to many times over the existing
market rates (that could ordinarily have been claimed by the landowner
in respect of their holding in acquisition proceedings) – and entitling the
developer to create third-party rights in respect of not a few but hundreds
of people, nevertheless, the landowner could still hold out and claim their
D
right to not part with the title. Such a conclusion would defy reason and
commonsense and cannot be countenanced. In the circumstances, it is
held that the collaboration agreements in all these cases which ultimately
culminated in the grant of licenses would fall within the mischief of the
term ‘transfer’ as envisioned in the main judgment, as it foreclosed the
E enjoyment and possession by the landowner, who willingly parted with
such rights, for valuable consideration and acquiesced to irreversible
changes on it.
41. The above observations are dispositive of the issue. However,
this Court cannot be oblivious to the existing state of affairs. The
F collaboration agreement entered into between Paradise and Green Heights
and Frontier and Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari with Godrej have led to
construction of units. This Court has been shown materials which
establish that in the case of Green Heights, the number of constructed
units is 438 (of which 371 have been sold) and in the case of Godrej, the
constructed units is 567. It is also on record that Green Heights has
G received 70.92 crores as against sale value of agreements. Likewise,
there is no denial of the fact that Godrej has also received substantial
amounts in the range of 300 crores towards its residential units sold.
In these circumstances, the Court would have to strike a proper balance
and protect the interests of such third-party consumers to ensure that
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 747
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

they do not suffer on account of the past sins of the colonizers / developers A
or land owners, as the case may be.
42. The main judgment recorded that in another transaction, one
of the colonizers / developers had paid 4.5 crores per acre at the
relevant time (in 2009). During the hearing, learned counsel for the State
mentioned that the current value of these contiguous land is to the tune B
of 5.3 crores. Keeping these facts in mind, this Court is of the opinion
that to balance the equities and in the overall interest of the home buyers,
for 2.681 acres which is the subject matter of the collaboration agreement
between Paradise and Green Heights, and for 13.743acres, which is the
subject matter of collaboration agreement between Frontier, Earl, Balbir
Singh, Ram Pyari and Godrej, the following sums should be paid to C
HSIIDC:
i. A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 2.681
acres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 2.681 acres
x 5 crores= 13,40,50,000-/ (rupees thirteen crores, forty
lakhs, and fifty thousand only). This amount will be paid by D
Green Heights which will be entitled to recover from
Paradise such proportionate sums it may be entitled to claim
having regard to the terms of their agreement.
ii. A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 13.743
acres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 13.743 x E
5 crores = 67, 36, 30,000/- (rupees sixty-seven crores,
thirty-six lakhs and thirty thousand only). This amount will
be paid by Godrej, which shall be entitled to claim such
proportionate sums as it may be entitled to in terms of its
agreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari F
in accordance with law.
These amounts shall be deposited with HSIIDC within six months,
from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6%
per annum shall be levied from the date of default. The lands covered by
these projects shall, subject to such payments be excluded from the G
deemed award.
43. As far as Karma’s lands are concerned, the materials on record
disclose that no development has taken place, and there is no allotment
in respect of their lands. Karma had in fact entered into a collaboration
agreement with M/s Unitech Ltd., and based on that, it applied for license
H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A on 15.01.2007. The license was ultimately granted before the date of
the decision of the State not to acquire its land. In these circumstances,
this Court holds that the collaboration agreement – especially the
supplementary agreement which was entered into after even the
declaration under Section 6 was published – the application for license
and the grant of license constituted an irreversible clog in the ownership
B
of the lands. Karma received substantial amounts to the tune of 15
crores, and in terms of the agreement placed on record, was entitled to
far more substantial amounts had the development in fact been completed.
In these circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreement and
the grant of license amounted to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of the
C expression in para 42.6 of the main judgment. Such land will therefore,
form part of the deemed award. The State shall take appropriate steps
and issue the supplementary award in respect of these lands within six
months from the date of this judgment.
44. It is also clarified that Karma would be entitled to compensation
D in accordance with the Acquisition Act as on the date of the notification
under Section 4. The compensation in such case shall be determined
within the same time-frame as indicated in the award. Karma shall be
entitled to statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on such
determined compensation. In the event Karma is aggrieved, it is open to
it to seek such recourse or redress in law as is available.
E
45. I.A No. 112515/2020; I.A. No. 117025/2020; I.A. No. 118401/
2020; and I.A. No.116268/2020 of M.A. No. 2150/2020 are disposed of
in terms of the above findings and directions. I.A. No. 82000/2020 is
dismissed as withdrawn as prayed for in I.A. No. 112682/2020 of M.A.
1175/2019.
F
II. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Subros Ltd.
46. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “R.P. Estates”) owned
2.9875 acres of land, and M/s. Subros Ltd. (hereinafter, “Subros”) owned
10.881 acres. The lands of both these concerns were included in the
G notification under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6.
The State decided to release these lands, as indicated by its letter to
Subros dated 22.08.2007. This stand was reiterated by the State in these
proceedings, where it was submitted that as there were no sale
transactions with respect to these lands, it was decided not to include
them in the deemed award. It was also stated that no developmental
H rights were parted by them.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 749
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

47. Learned counsel appearing for both the entities reiterated the A
State’s submissions, that the lands were vested in these two concerns
and continued to be so vested. In the circumstances, R.P. Estates and
Subros had to be treated as bona fide land owners, since they did not
enter into any transactions during the suspect period.
48. In three applications (i.e., I.A. Nos. 111557 of 2020, 111562 of B
2020 and 111563 of 2020) in M.A. No. 2067 of 2020, R.P. Estates further
submitted that it applied for license from the DTCP much after the date
of the deemed award and was granted License No. 82 of 2009 on
08.12.2009. It also disclosed that developmental rights were thereafter
transferred to another enterprise called M/s. Elan Ltd. in 2013-14. The
application and pleadings show that the project was completed on C
14.01.2020 and the application for grant of occupation certificate was
thereafter made, with 305 units allotted to third parties out of a total of
362.
49. Subros had initially challenged the acquisition by filing a writ
petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.11 However, after it D
received a letter from the DTCP, communicating recommendation for
withdrawal from acquisition, Subros withdrew its petition. Thereafter, it
applied for license, and was granted the same on 13.06.2008. Subros did
not enter into any collaboration agreement or sell its rights during the
suspect period - it sold the lands to one Akme Projects Ltd. much later E
on 23.01.2012.
50. Having regard to the overall circumstances, this Court is of
the opinion that the lands owned by both R.P. Estates and Subros should
be excluded from the deemed award. The judgment of the Court dated
12.03.2018 is therefore clarified to the above extent. I.A. No. 111557/ F
2020; I.A. No. 111562/2020; and I.A. No. 111563/ 2020 of M.A. No.
2067/2020; I.A. No. 116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021 and I.A. No.
123690/2021 of M.A. No. 50/2019 are disposed off accordingly.
III. Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd.
51. Express Greens was a project of DLF Home Developers Ltd. G
(hereinafter, “DLF”). The main judgment of this Court had dealt with
the manner in which the land for this project was acquired from the
original landowners in the village Manesar by a group of companies and
11
M/s Subros Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 2787/2006 (dismissed on
20.09.2007).
H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A entities owned or wholly controlled by ABW Infrastructure Ltd.
(hereinafter, “ABW”). These lands, in aggregate, measured 33.536 acres.
ABW and its group of companies obtained License No. 283 and 284 for
their development. These lands were part of the 235 acres which ABW
had purchased during the subsistence of the acquisition proceedings.
Eventually, before the final decision to drop the acquisition was taken by
B
the State on 29.01.2010, the lands and licenses were transferred to DLF
for a consideration of 150.95 crores.
52. Several home buyers filed applications (I.A. No. 110995/ 2019;
I.A. No. 91793/ 2020 and I.A. No. 113206/ 2020 (in M.A. (D) No.
26552/ 2019), I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487/2020 and I.A.
C No. 89570/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888 of 2020; I.A. No. 49986-87/2021
in M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021 and I.A. No. 49990/2021 and I.A. No. 31079-
81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020). The submission on behalf of
these applicants, who sought impleadment and directions, was that in
terms of this Courts’ main judgment, they were entitled to clear title over
D the residential units of flats constructed and allotted by DLF. It was
submitted that a substantial number of flats had been handed for occupation
to the allottees. However, with respect to many such allottees, sale deeds
had not been executed and registered. Furthermore, it was submitted
that several flats had not been completed though their allottees were
entitled to the units. In addition, during arguments it was submitted that
E certain common amenities such as lifts had not been installed, and
community centres, club houses, etc. had not been completed or were
not in usable condition.
53. It was urged on behalf of Express Green Home Owners
Association by Mr. A. N. Nadkarni, learned Senior Advocate, that in
F cases where the flats were handed over to the home buyers, not only
would they be entitled to clear title, which necessitated clear directions
from this Court, but also that it would be in the overall interest of the
home buyers that the maintenance of common areas as well as the
completion of unbuilt units should be made over to DLF.
G 54. This was seconded by Mr. Gopal Shankarnarayanan, learned
Senior Advocate appearing for some home buyers, who urged that such
buyers invested their hard-earned savings and in some cases even obtained
bank advances, on the strength of the reputation and name of DLF. If
the entire project were to be made over to HSIIDC, the value of the
H residential units under their occupation and ownership would considerably
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 751
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

reduce. Therefore, it was urged that DLF be directed to complete the A
project, and maintain the colony, according to the high standards it was
known to keep.
55. In its reply (MA (D) 2665/ 2019), and during hearings, DLF
represented by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pinaki Misra submitted
that the company was willing to undertake the balance finishing work B
such as repair and renovation of common areas, strengthening of
compound walls, construction of club house etc. and bear all associated
expenses. However, this was on the condition that DLF be handed over
with the entire project including the entitlement to the balance sale
consideration based upon the existing executed agreements with allottees
in respect of units allotted to them. DLF also urged in para 18 of its C
reply12 that it should be allowed to utilize FAR of approximately three
lakh sq. ft. in the manner it chose. In lieu of this, it was contended that
DLF would give up its claim towards 372.83 crores in accordance
with the main judgment of this Court. In these circumstances, it was
urged that this Court should exclude the area of 33.536 acres, i.e., the D
subject matter of License No. 283 and 284, from the deemed award to
enable further development.
56. The State and HSIIDC resisted these contentions. It was
pointed out that a detailed analysis was made in the main judgment which
disclosed the trail of suspect transactions. ABW had acquired more than E
235 acres after the notification under Section 4 was issued, by threats to
the land owners. Not only was land purchased, even licenses were applied
for and obtained – these in fact formed the backbone for the demand to
the state of withdrawal from acquisition. It was during the pendency of
these proceedings that DLF chose to transact and purchase the lands
that it ultimately did as well as acquire all rights under the two licenses F
for development of 33.536 acres which ultimately led to the Express
Greens project.
57. It was highlighted that DLF paid over 150 crores to acquire
these rights. The clear intention of this Court in this regard is to be found
in para 42.8 of the main judgment where it clarified that third party G
purchasers/allottees would be entitled to the units allotted to them and
would thereafter enjoy perfect title, and in respect of all unallotted lands,
residential or constructed units, rights, title and interest would devolve
absolutely upon HSIIDC. It was submitted that the sale deeds executed
12
M.A. (D.) No. 26552 of 2021 dated 24.08.2020. H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A by DLF would be validated by HSIIDC and wherever sale deeds had
not been executed, they would be so executed by HSIIDC after due
verification in a time-bound manner. It was submitted that likewise with
respect to any unfinished work, the rights, title and interests in the colony
would be that of HSIIDC and not of DLF.
B 58. It is evident on a reading of various parts of the main judgments
that ABW was in the eye of the storm. This Court’s main judgment is
explicit about the fact that DLF chose to dip its hands in murky waters
by acquiring rights to the 33.536 acres as well all rights under the licenses
for 150 crores from ABW..13 In these circumstances, there can be no
question of seriously deliberating upon the application for release of these
C 33.536 acres of land from the deemed award. There is absolutely no
merit in the submissions on behalf of DLF that the title to lands continued
with the original owners. The entire exercise of ABW was to acquire
these lands and then transfer them to those capable of developing the
lands, such as DLF. Those contentions are accordingly rejected. However,
the rejection of DLF’s claim does not in any way impinge on the rights,
D
title and interest of the allottees, who were handed over possession of
their flats, upon payment of full consideration, or those allottees entitled
to it, after payment of the balance sums. The HSIIDC shall complete
the process of validating their title, including the title to the undivided and
proportionate land share, within six months from the date of this judgment.
E 59. So far as the complaints of the home buyers are concerned,
this Court had directed for the latest status report to be placed before it,
which was furnished by way of an additional affidavit dated 28.04.2020,
by DLF.This affidavit enclosed the details of the project. A total of 1348
units were constructed, of which 1223 were sold, and 510 sale deeds
were registered. Possession was granted to 882 allottees. It is evident
F
therefore that 441 allottees are yet to be handed over possession;
furthermore 713 sale deeds are yet to be executed and registered. The
HSIIDC is therefore directed to ensure that the balance allottees are
notified about the execution of sale deed and the process of execution
and registration of sale deed is completed in their case within six months
G from the date of this judgment. HSIIDC shall ensure that a designated
nodal officer is deployed to scrutinize the relevant documents and facilitate
the execution of such sale deeds.
13
The status report of ED reveals that on 13.04.2008, a request for transfer of license
in favour of DLF was made to the DTCP. DLF also continued to engage in correspondence
in this regard (on 26.09.2008, 14.01.2010, 29.09.2010, etc.)
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 753
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

60. The affidavit also discloses that a total of 116 townhouses/ A
independent floors were constructed. 77 townhouses/independent floors
were sold and the structure of 25 of them was complete. The affidavit
further stated that 39 houses/independent floors are unsold and
construction of 11 townhouses are complete. Thus, all rights, title and
interest in respect of unsold 39 townhouses in the independent floors
B
vest with the HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordance with its
policies and applicable laws. Likewise, in case of unsold apartments, all
rights, title and interest shall vest with HSIIDC.
61. According to the affidavit, 96 apartments on the 15th tower
have been completed but no occupation certificate has yet been issued.
In case the application is pending, the DTCP shall ensure due inspection C
and decision on the occupation certificate. If any deficiency has to be
rectified the same shall be completed by the HSIIDC.
62. As far as the complaint with respect to lifts etc. is concerned,
the affidavit discloses that all lifts have been installed; the certificates by
the concerned State authorities have been placed on the record. With D
respect to club houses in sector M-1, the club house has not been
constructed – only basement structure is complete and for sector M-
1(A) the club houses have not yet been issued completion certificate.
With respect to the boundary wall the additional affidavit states that 218
meters in tower M-1 and 434 meters in tower M-1(A) has been damaged. E
The HSIIDC is directed to take up work immediately and complete the
same with eighteen months from the date of this judgment, as it is in the
interest of safety and security of the residents.
63. Having regard to the above discussion, it is held that the request
of the Express Green Home Owners Association and DLF to exclude F
the project from deemed award is not tenable. It is accordingly rejected.
It is further declared that all unconstructed and unallotted portions as
well as construction rights (such as FAR) in respect of unconstructed,
unallotted plots etc., including two school sites, shall vest absolutely with
HSIIDC. HSIIDC shall be entitled to develop these areas in accordance
with its policies within the frame work of the applicable Master Plan G
development laws. DLF is therefore, entitled to collect amounts, if any,
in terms of the main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over all records
relating to the allottees, and technical data, pertaining to the entire project
to HSIIDC within one month from the date of this judgment.
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 64. I.A. No. 110995/2019; I.A. No. 91793/2020 and I.A. No.
113206/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; I.A. No. 36484-85/ 2020;
I.A. No. 36487 and I.A. No. 89570/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888/ 2020;
I.A. No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 9505/
2021; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020 are disposed
off in the above terms.
B
IV. M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
65. An application (MA No. 50/2019) was filed by Kalinga Realtors
Pvt. Ltd. the first applicant, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the second
applicant, Anant Raj Ltd. Both applicants are cumulatively referred to
C as “Kalinga”. The claim in this application is for a direction for proper
calculation of amounts payable by HSIIDC to Kalinga, in terms of the
main judgment. It is a matter of record, that Kalinga sought NOC from
DTCP to purchase the land in October 2009. The same was granted in
January, 2010 and sale deed executed shortly thereafter on 23.04.2010.
ABW and its group of companies had acquired License No. 67 of 2009
D dated 19.11.2009, which was transferred to Kalinga pursuant to the sale
deed on 12.07.2010. Thus, Kalinga’s attempt to purchase the land and
rights granted by the license clearly fell within the mischief of the main
judgment of this Court.
66. Kalinga submits that it furnished all details and particulars, in
E support of its claim that it had incurred expenses to the tune of 308
crores14, for the construction of the housing project called “Madelia”. It
is submitted that Kalinga expended the amounts and deployed resources
for the development of the area and construction of 13 towers, of which
10 are complete and in respect of which claims have been received for
F 257 allottees.
67. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, urged that this Court
had sought information from HSIIDC, which filed replies and further
affidavits. Despite these, a clear picture has not been given. Instead of
verifying all the invoices and materials, apparently HSIIDC has conducted
G a piece meal inquiry. It was pointed out that HSIIDC had admitted that
according to its valuation and verification, the cost payable was 11.68
crores; even that has not crystallized into a concrete assurance to pay.
68. Learned counsel pointed to an auction notice, issued by
HSIIDC, in respect of Kalinga’s project, inviting prospective bidders to
14
H Detailed at pg. 40 of M.A. No. 50 of 2019.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 755
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

submit offers for completion. It was urged that the reserve price, including A
price for the land (12.45 acres) and the constructed towers (which were
described in detail in the auction notice) were grossly undervalued by
HSIIDC, which has offered a pittance of 11.68 crores. It was submitted
on behalf of Kalinga that HSIIDC should be compelled to revise the
valuation, within a time bound manner, and this Court should appoint an
B
arbitrator.
69. Counsel for the State and HSIIDC urged that Kalinga cannot
claim a grievance, because it was a direct beneficiary of the transactions
during the suspect period. It chose to enter into the field, by entering into
transactions with ABW, intending fully to make substantial profits, on
account of the depressed cost of land. However, this Court’s main C
judgment resulted in its land being included in the deemed award - it can
be at best entitled to those amounts which it actually expended. It was
submitted that HSIIDC was prepared to verify all the bills and invoices,
provided they were genuine and arrive at the amounts payable. Counsel
also submitted that in the event of a dispute, HSIIDC was prepared to D
submit the dispute to arbitration.
70. From the above discussion, it is evident that Kalinga’s grievance
is regarding the amounts it claims it is entitled to. The gap between its
claim ( 308 crore) and what HSIIDC offered at one time ( 11.68
crores) is too excessive. The materials placed on record show that E
HSIIDC in fact, did put up the entire land, with the construction for
auction 15 on an ‘as is where is’ basis. The date of e-auction was
21.09.2021, with a reserve price of 309 crores. The advertisement
also states that 12 towers were constructed with finishing remaining;
other works (EWS, community centre, etc.) were yet to be constructed.
The advertisement further states that the successful bidder was to step F
into Kalinga’s shoes and complete the project.
71. It is apparent to this Court from the materials on record that
the initial valuation of 11.68 crores made by HSIIDC is inaccurate,
particularly in view of the reserve price indicated by it in the auction
notice. However, in view of the final order proposed, no final opinion or G
finding is recorded.
72. It is directed that HSIIDC shall complete verification of all
the relevant documents furnished by Kalinga. Any additional documents
15
In its portal HTTPS://HSIIDC.BIDX.IN.
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A or invoices, or relevant materials which Kalinga may wish to rely upon,
shall be furnished to HSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, HSIIDC
shall conduct verification, and based upon that exercise, and relevant
inquiries (for which it may seek such assistance of Kalinga as is
necessary) indicate the final valuation within six months from the date
of this judgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuation shall be
B
released, within three months of completion of verification. In case
Kalinga disputes the figure, it is open to it to firstly accept the amount
offered, on a without prejudice basis, and secondly, indicate its
unwillingness to accept that offer towards final settlement. In such event,
Kalinga and HSIIDC shall jointly submit the dispute to arbitration, to a
C mutually agreed person. In the event no agreement is possible, the
arbitration shall be referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre
(hereinafter, “DIAC”). The Chairman of the DIAC shall then nominate
an arbitrator, who shall enter upon reference. It would be advisable, in
such event, that the arbitrator also seeks the assistance of a technical
person, versed in verification of construction related documents, as an
D
expert. The fee for the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties;
the proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.
73. Some flat owners, who had booked units in the project have
applied for appropriate directions to HSIIDC, to refund the amounts
E deposited by them. HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents,
in relation to all those who claim refund as allottees of Kalinga, within
six months. Such allottees or flat owners, (who have not obtained
possession) shall be disbursed the amounts they are entitled to within six
months thereafter.
F 74. In the event of any dispute, with respect to the entitlement or
amounts payable, it is open to the concerned allottee or flat buyer to take
recourse to appropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing civil suit, or
complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is clarified that
no proceeding, application or contempt petition in this regard, will be
G entertained by this court.
75. I.A. No. 46028/2020; IA No. 59743/2020; I.A. No. 118798/
2020; IA No. 103292/2020 and I.A. No. 137407/2019 in M.A. No. 50/
2019; I.A. No. 30807/2020; I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020;
and I.A. No. 191983/2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45009/2019; I.A. No. 192027/
H 2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45026/2019; Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 and
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 757
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Contempt Petition (D) No. 21733/2021 are disposed off in terms of the A
above directions.
V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd.
76. ABW was earlier known as M/s. Aditya Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.
ABW and its associated companies had purchased maximum land
measuring over 235 acres. ‘ABW Aditya Niketen’ was floated by ABW B
in M-I, M-I(A) and M-I(C) adjoining HSIIDC Residential Sector-1,
Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana. That project was the subject matter of the
proceedings throughout culminating in the main judgment of this Court.
77. From 2009 onwards, 1993 allottees booked their flats, built
floors, plots shops, commercial space as the case was, with ABW. In C
ABW Aditya Niketan and City Centre,a residential plotted colony, on
104.912 acres of land with 236 plots, 1488 of floors/flats and 269 shops
and commercial places, was to be developed and constructed, pursuant
to License No. 66 of 2009 dated 09.11.2009 issued by DTCP.
78. The ABW Manesar Allottee Welfare Society, 118-C, Sector D
30, Gurgaon, Haryana (hereinafter, “Society”) was registered on
21.09.2012. The Society has filed on behalf of its member allottees,
several applications, seeking directions. It has filed charts, and proof of
payment, by way of copy of receipts issued by ABW, to substantiate its
claim of genuine allottees being its members. The Society has sought E
impleadment before the High Court, in the original proceedings, out of
which the main judgment culminated, in this Court. The society was also
impleaded during proceedings in this Court.
79. The Society claims that in adherence to the directions contained
in para 42.8 of this Court’s main judgement, the allottees preferred their F
claims and submitted all required information to HSIIDC primarily
indicating description of the plot/unit, exact measurement of the area,
purchase price and the total payment made to ABW including (a) basic
sale price, (b) External and Internal Development Charges, (c) service
tax, etc. Along with the claim form, the necessary documents were also
enclosed, namely, provisional allotment letter, payment receipts, ID proof G
and address proof. An attested affidavit duly supporting the contents of
the claim was also submitted.
80. The Society claims that as there was no indication of
compliance with the direction contained in para 42.8 of the main judgment,
on 07.01.2019 it filed an application under the Right to Information Act, H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 2007. The HSIIDC responded by its reply dated 24.01.2019 stating that
claims of 220 plot buyers, 1270 flat/floor buyers and 157 commercial
shop buyers had already been received by it. The Society claims it has
regularly and continuously impressed upon HSIIDC as to the delay in
adherence and compliance of the judgement, but with no effect. The
Society’s grievance is that despite diligence by its members, HSIIDC
B
failed to verify their claims within a period of two months and after deep
slumber of nine months, it moved an application (M.A. No.50 of 2019)
for three months extension of time and this Court’s order dated 18.01.2019
granted extension up to 22.04.2019.
81. It was submitted that even in the extended period the necessary
C compliance was not made and once again I.A. No.68542 of 2019 (in
M.A. 864 of 2019) was moved by HSIIDC for yet another extension. It
was therefore submitted that although a comprehensive direction was
passed by this Court specifically in favour of the innocent allottees,
HSIIDC’s inaction has resulted in nothing even after a lapse of 15 months.
D The Society had moved a contempt proceeding, Contempt Petition
No.2226 of 2018 against HSIIDC as well. The Society is therefore seeking
urgent directions, to HSIIDC for completion of its responsibilities.
82. It was further urged that given that HSIIDC has demonstrably
failed in complying with the terms of this judgment, it would be in the
E interest of all allottees that the land is handed over on an ‘as is where is
basis’ to the respective buyers of plots, flats or commercial units and a
direction issued consequently to HSIIDC to execute conveyance deeds.
It is submitted that the Society and the buyers themselves will undertake
the work of completing the project having regard to the fact that necessary
approvals were granted in terms of License No.66 of 2009; the zoning
F plans have been approved and furthermore clearance was granted by
the concerned Forest and Environment Departments. In addition, to
facilitate development, previous deposits of EDC of 29.99 crores and
IDC of 14.08 crores was paid long back by the developer, i.e., ABW..
No doubt, the project land stands transferred to HSIIDC. Further, it was
G submitted that this circumstance is not an impediment to permit the
allottees joined together through the Society and to complete the project.
83. On behalf of the State and HSIIDC, it was urged that the
process of verification has been delayed. It was further urged that of
the total licensed land measuring 104.682 acres, an extent of 2.306 acres
H were acquired for Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran through an award
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 759
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

dated 27.12.2016. Furthermore, a sum of 8.31 crores was paid over to A
the erstwhile owner ABW. It was further submitted that the records
indicate total compensation paid to ABW for the land which vested in
the State under the deemed award was 12.51 crores, of which 3.32
crores has been paid by the LAC, with 9.91 crores still pending.
84. It was further argued that there has been no development on B
the land; that no structure or construction or development was undertaken
by ABW as on date. A total of 1995 units were contemplated under the
scheme - included 453 plots and 221 commercial units. Furthermore, it
was submitted -during the hearings before this Court- that a total of 270
claims for refund had been made. In view of the fact that it was submitted
on affidavit by HSIIDC dated 12.04.2022 that it had decided to settle C
270 claims on pro rata basis for 20.486 crores. Other claims on the
lands of ABW measuring 104.282 acres, including buyers’ claims working
out to 128.38 crores and third-party claims working out to 172.15
crores. M/s. Alchemist claimed 33.99 crores as an investor, for the
credit facility provided to ABW and its associates, which was rejected. D
Likewise, the claim of 1.28 crores to the land given to ABW and its
group companies too was rejected. After the hearings were concluded,
the HSIIDC filed an affidavit indicating that the figures indicated have
now undergone a change, because more refund claims were received,
driving upwards the total amounts needed to be refunded.
E
85. After obtaining instructions, learned counsel appearing for
HSIIDC submitted that since there has been no development or
construction, the question of granting any compensation in respect of
ABW’s allottees would not arise. Therefore, the HSIIDC would refund
all unverified claims on pro rata basis to the allottees and those who had
applied under the scheme together with 6% interest per annum from the F
date of this Court’s judgment.
86. As found in the main judgment as well as the previous part of
this judgment, ABW was one of the prime movers behind the entire
subversion and abuse of the state machinery for acquisition of farmer’s
lands. ABW obtained licenses for 104.682 acres and floated schemes G
for plots with two-three storied structures and residential as well as
commercial units. Despite the fact that licenses were granted way back,
even as on the date of the judgment of this Court (and even now), no
development has taken place. All that was asserted on behalf of the
Society was that IDC and EDC amounts were paid. HSIIDC’s stand is H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A that these charges are in fact in arrears. Having regard to the totality of
circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the claim by the Society
that the lands be made over to it or the residents on an ‘as is where is’
basis for development by them is untenable.
87. The main judgment expressly stated that it is only in cases
B where construction is completed or nearing completion that the interests
of third party allottees were protected. However, such is not the situation
in the case of 104.682 acres of land that belonged to ABW. There is no
denial that such lands have now been vested in HSIIDC as a consequence
of the main judgment of this Court and are to be included as part of the
deemed award. It is apparent that the when the Court delivered the
C main judgment, it was unaware of the true nature of acts in relation to
each project, especially in relation to ABW, i.e., that no development
had taken place and that allottees had merely paid certain instalments to
the colonizer / developer. Furthermore, the materials on record disclose
that a large number of claims have been made for refund. Having regard
D to these facts and being aware of the practical reality that were HSIIDC
mandated to now proceed with the project, it would not be reasonable to
expect completion of such project in the foreseeable future, at least for
the next 5-7 years, it would be in the fitness of things that HSIIDC
refunds the amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project, i.e.,
allottees of residential units/plots and commercial or shop space. HSIIDC
E shall take up this process as expeditiously as possible and facilitate the
verification and payment of these amounts at the earliest, so that the
process is completed within the next twelve months from the date of this
judgment. In case, the HSIIDC is unable to refund the amounts, by that
date, the sums shall carry interest at 6% p.a.
F 88. I.A. No. 102358/2019; I.A. No. 189667/2019; I.A. No. 83251/
2020; I.A. No. 62216/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 24553/2019; I.A. No. 42263/
2022 and I.A. No. 49262/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022; I.A. No.
76605/2020 and I.A. No. 76602/2020 in M.A. No. 1521/2020; I.A. No.
75955/2020 in Contempt Petition No. 513/2020; Contempt Petition No.
G 2226/2018; and Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 are disposed off in terms
of the above directions.
VI. Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd.
89. Eleven applications were preferred in relation to lands that
were inter alia, subject of license No. 175 of 2008 dated 30.09.2008
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 761
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

pertaining to 2.443 acres of land in village Naurangpur acquired by Girnar A
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Girnar”) and License No. 76 in favour
of one Navin Rao to the extent of 11.519 acres). Girnar was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Unitech, and Navin Rao too was an affiliate of
Unitech. Applications were preferred by Unitech, and one Speed Town
Planners Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Speed Town”) which claimed to be entitled
B
to rights to 19.56 acres.
90. In 2008, Girnar obtained license No. 175 of 2008 dated
30.09.2008 for developing a commercial colony on 2.443 acres out of
the 19.56 acres of land. The license was granted by DTCP. Out of the
2.443 acres, an area of 1.5125 acres was notified under Section 4 of
Acquisition Act, on 07.08.2013 and under Section 6 on 31.07.2013. Finally, C
1.5125 acres of land was acquired under Award No. 13 dated 29.07.2016,
for development and utilization of sectors roads (Sector 75 to 80) at
Gurugram. Unitech urges that the acquisition of 1.5125 acres rendered
the balance area of 0.93 acres to be commercially non-viable for any
construction/development thereon as it was not be possible to consume D
the entire permissible FAR of 2.443 acres on the residual parcel of land.
It is contended that an agreement to sell was executed on 14.03.2016
between Girnar as vendor and Speed Town as vendee for the sale of a
portion of land admeasuring 9.69 acres, out of balance 17.116 (19.56 -
2.443 = 17.116 acres) at the rate of 4.40 crores per acre, for a total
sale consideration of 42.636 crores. Of that consideration, a sum of E
33.21 crores was received by Girnar from Speed Town for sale of 9.69
acres from 13.01.2016 to 18.06.2016 while an amount of 9.426 crores
( 42.636 - 33.21 = 9.426) is outstanding in the books of accounts.
91. In terms of the agreement, Speed Town was obliged to clear
the balance outstanding amount of 9.426 crores upon submission of F
the sale deed for registration.
92. Applications are preferred by Unitech and Speed Town. Speed
Town claims to have entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar,
on 12.02.2016. Subsequently, the agreement to sell was entered into by
the parties, and the sum of 33.21 crores was paid to Girnar. Speed G
Town seeks directions that the lands in respect of which it entered into
collaboration agreement (9.69 acres) ought to be released from the
deemed award directions of this Court in its main judgment. In the
alternative, it claims for a direction that Girnar should refund amounts
paid by it. H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 93. During the hearing, Mr. Joydeep Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate contended that Speed Town was a bona fide purchaser which
had first entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar, and later
entered into agreement to sell. It was urged that Girnar’s holding company
Unitech was under a cloud and its management has been replaced by
virtue of orders of this Court.
B
94. It was urged that on the basis of the main judgement, the
physical possession of Girnar’s entire land parcels, measuring 19.56 acres,
(comprising of 2.443 acres of licensed and 17.117 acres of unlicensed
land), was taken over by HSIIDC in furtherance of District Revenue
Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector’s letter No. 382/LAC dated
C 06.07.2018 and correspondingly reflected in the revenue records.
95. Apparently, Speed Town sent a notice dated 24.04.2018 to
Girnar to refund the amount of 33.21 crores for the land along with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of payment till the
date of actual refund. Speed Town invoked the arbitration clause, and
D submitted the dispute for arbitration. This culminated in an award in its
favour.
96. It is argued that the site inspection carried out by Unitech’s
land division on 15.03.2021 noted that barring the licensed land of 2.443
acres and 2.08 acres (out of the total unlicensed land parcel of 17.117
E acres), the residual land was under unauthorized cultivation since
November 2020.
97. The applicants seek directions for exclusion of the lands from
the deemed award, urging that they were not purchased from any farmers
but rather from one Angelique International Ltd. (hereinafter,
F “Angelique”), a public limited company, through a registered sale deed
executed on 23.08.2007. The main judgment was based on the premise
that the land sellers were the farmers whose only source of income was
agriculture. The entire tenor of the main judgement was therefore farmer-
centric. In the case of Girnar, the position is entirely different since the
land was purchased from a public limited company which was incorporated
G
on 03.01.1996. It was submitted that the original owner, Angelique was
a project engineering and construction company and the other assumptions
based on which this Court delivered the main judgment, were inapplicable
to it. Furthermore, the land parcels purchased by Angelique were mutated
in the name of Girnar on 06.06.2006 and 23.08.2007 and, therefore, their
H ownership is prior to the dates of mutation. Hence, the seller company
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 763
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

was not in the business of buying and selling land only for minting quick A
money by duping innocent farmers.
98. It was argued that Girnar acquired ownership of 19.56 acres
from Angelique by registered sale deed dated 23.08.2007 whereas the
cut-off date fixed by this Court was 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010, meaning
thereby that all land transactions of sale and purchase during the B
pendency of acquisition proceedings from 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010 were
cancelled by the main judgment.
99. On behalf of the HSIIDC and the State, it was urged that
neither Unitech, nor Speed Town, were entitled to any relief. It was
highlighted that the acquisition of the land from Angelique, during the
suspect period, was expressly noticed by this court. The sale deed, in C
the present case, was executed just before the scheduled pronouncement
of the award. Furthermore, during the pendency of proceedings, Girnar
transferred its development rights to Speed Town, which chose to acquire
it, and did so at its own peril. Speed Town later entered into agreement
to sell. However, at the root of all these transactions, was the transfer of D
ownership during the suspect period, i.e., after issuance of the notification
under Section 4. Counsel drew the notice of this Court to paras 34.2 and
35 of the main judgment which clarified the issue beyond any doubt.
100. This Court’s main judgment, has noted in more than one
place, from paras 26.1 to 26.9, and traced the sequence of events which
E
led to the notification of 912 acres for acquisition, the resultant panic and
scramble on the part of landowners to get rid of their holdings, the purchase
of these lands, and in many places, their entering into agreements of sale
or development agreements, by builders, which made no mention of the
impending acquisition, leading to a demand to drop acquisition, which
was ultimately done at two points of time, i.e. 24.08.2007 and 29.01.2010. F
The transactions relating to lands owned by Girnar, and Unitech’s
associates, squarely fall within the suspect period. In these given
circumstances, Unitech’s plea, or that of Speed Town, that the
collaboration agreement with the latter- and the agreement to sell, -
were executed after the suspect period, are untenable. The taint that
G
attaches with the initial transaction (i.e., Girnar acquiring the lands during
the acquisition process) attaches equally, to Speed Town’s transaction,
because the entire premise, which persuaded the vendor to sell the lands,
was that the acquisition proceedings would go through, divesting their
title. However, the vendee and its holding company appeared to have
full knowledge of the nature of future events, in which they probably H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A had a hand. Thus, the request for exclusion of these lands, from the
deemed award, is untenable and is accordingly rejected. Speed Town
shall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, in respect of the
land, on the same basis as in the case of all others entitled to it.
101. I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020 and I.A.
B No. 53868/2022 in M.A. No. 2228/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No.
31180/2021; I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. Nos. 128798-99/2021; and I.A.
No. 128801/2021 in MA (D) No. 5699/2021 are disposed off in the above
terms.
VII. Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd.
C a. Legend Height Owners Welfare Association
102. 3.35 acres of agricultural land in Naurangpur was purchased
by two individuals, i.e., Shri Ashok Kumar Lakhotia and Shri Subhash
Chand Goyal by sale deeds dated 26.02.2004 and 08.03.2004. It was
claimed that these two also obtained possession. The lands became the
subject matter of acquisition in the notification under Section 4. The
D
original owners sought for release of land and thereafter objected under
Section 5A of the Acquisition Act. Some lands were released from
acquisition, however, the major portion was included in the declaration
under Section 6. Request for release of these lands for acquisition was
made. This was followed up by an order dated 31.07.2007 releasing the
E land from acquisition. M/s. Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter, “Innovative”) thereafter entered the scene on 15.10.2007.
Subsequently, they sought for and were granted license to develop the
lands on 20.06.2008 (License No. 128 of 2008). Apparently, meanwhile
on 19.12.2007, Innovative purchased the two parcels of lands. Innovative
claims that pursuant to the license granted by DTCP, it developed the
F
land and constructed commercial tower.
103. After the main judgment was delivered, the state while
ensuring the publication of the deemed award also included the lands
which were the subject matter of License No. 128 of 2008. Aggrieved,
Innovative approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court in writ
G proceedings.16 The writ petition however was rejected by the High Court
by an order which has been impugned in the present case by special
leave.17
16
M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 18336
of 2020 (dismissed on 03.11.2020).
17
M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 2147 of
H 2021.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 765
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

104. The construction put up by Innovative is a commercial building A
known as “Legend Heights”. Several individuals and entities claimed to
have purchased spaces within it. They have approached this Court by
filing an application - i.e., the Legend Height Owners Welfare Association
(hereinafter, “Legend Heights Association”). It claims to represent 35
individuals who allegedly paid substantial amount ranging between 13
B
lakhs and 65 lakhs. The details of the application filed by Legend
Heights Association list the amounts paid to Innovative and also describes
the units allotted in the building to the individuals.
b. Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd.
105. Another set of applications has been preferred by Paramveer C
Distributors Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paramveer”) a non-banking financial
institution. It alleges having entered into an agreement with Innovative
on 08.06.2017, whereby an area measuring 96,216.03 sq. ft. was agreed
to be purchased by it for a total consideration of 16 crores. The areas
sold was for a hotel block. The relevant condition stipulated that out of
16 crores payable by the buyer, 8.05 crores, by way of outstanding D
dues of one Ms. Saraswati Devi was agreed to be adjusted. Another
sum of 4.24 crores by way of outstanding dues of Paramveer, was
agreed to be adjusted. The balance amount was to be paid in the ratio of
55:45 respectively.
106. Paramveer therefore contends that it is entitled to the built- E
up space in respect of the hotel block constructed by Innovative.
c. Analysis of VII (a) and (b)
107. HSIIDC in its response to the special leave petition and the
applications (by Legend Heights Association and Paramveer) submits F
that no construction has been undertaken with respect to the hotel block.
It is argued that this Court should not take cognizance of submissions on
behalf of Paramveer since no credible material has been placed on record
to establish the genuineness of the transactions claimed by it. As far as
the commercial complex of Legend Heights is concerned, HSIIDC points
out that since the land transactions for sale of lands, as well as the G
license in respect of these lands, was issued during the suspect period, it
has to be included in the deemed award.
108. From the factual narrative it is evident that the original owners
of lands themselves purchased the lands in early February 2004. This
Court cannot per se attribute the foreknowledge about the acquisition. H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A However, their subsequent conduct in seeking for denotification which
led to the ultimate withdrawal from acquisition of those lands (even though
they were included in the notification under Section 6) is an established
fact. Innovative concededly entered into transactions for purchase of
lands in 2007 and applied and obtained the requisite license in 2008.
B 109. At the same time, this Court is cognizant of the fact that a
number of allottees appear to have invested substantial amounts (in
respect of the commercial building of Legend Heights, and not the hotel
building of Paramveer). Although HSIIDC is silent as to whether the
occupation certificates have been granted, there is some material on
record (by way of averments in the special leave petition as well as in
C the application by the Legend Heights Association) that several sale
deeds/conveyance were executed and registered.
110. The larger interest of justice would lie in ensuring that such
of the allottees who are either granted occupation, and /or in whose
favour conveyance has been executed, should be handed over the
D commercial units that they had originally booked. As far as others are
concerned, HSIIDC should first verify the claims of all persons/entities
who claim to have paid substantial amounts and have not been allotted
their spaces, and shall, depending on the stage and nature of construction
and the extent of amount paid (it is more than 75 per cent of the total
consideration) hand over possession of the units, after due completion.
E 111. In case any allottee seeks refund, HSIIDC should ensure
that the amounts are duly verified and repaid within six months of the
date of this judgment. In the case of default, HSIIDC shall pay 6% per
annum as interest. In respect of all unallotted units and areas which can
be constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively with HSIIDC.
F 112. So far as Paramveer is concerned, this Court is of the opinion
that the agreement entered into with Innovative records that certain
amounts (over 12 crores) were due and payable to the allottees, which
was subsequently adjusted in the builder buyer agreement for the hotel.
The details of those transactions have nowhere been verified or placed
on record. In addition, Innovative has stated that construction of the
G hotel block has not taken place. In the circumstances, all rights, title and
interest in those portions of Innovatives’ properties shall vest in HSIIDC
and be part of the deemed award.
113. Needless to add, Innovative shall be entitled to amounts like
in the case of all other developers/owners in accordance with the main
H judgment. HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any dispute in
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 767
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim in substantiative A
legal proceedings and not their miscellaneous applications before this
court. I.A. No. 41690/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; I.A. No.
84064-67/2020; I.A. No. 91091/2020; I.A. No. 84067 of 2020 in M.A.
No. 50/2019 and SLP No. 2147 of 2021 are disposed off in the above
terms.
B
VIII. Dharamvir & Ors.
114. 105 individuals approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court,
through a common writ petition, claiming directions that they were
residents of village Manesar.18 The claim put forth by them was that
they were bona fide and innocent purchasers who had acquired the
lands which were included in the notification under Section 4. They C
acquired rights in respect of lands – presently under their occupation
during the suspect period, i.e., between 27.08.2004 and 29.01.2010. It is
alleged that assuming the transactions to be free from any cloud on the
title, these petitioners had even proceeded to construct upon lands. The
claim made to the Punjab & Haryana High Court was that their lands D
should be excluded from the deemed award. The High Court declined
the claim, reasoning that the purchases were made by them during the
suspect period and this court’s judgment provided relief only to the original
land owners who had not transferred, alienated or in any manner sold or
parted with rights in respect of the land. Since these petitioners admittedly
claimed to have purchased the land when they were facing acquisition, E
no relief could be granted to them. It was argued on behalf of these
petitioners by Mr. Rathi that all the petitioners invested their hard-earned
money and had built houses in which they have been living all this while.
It was urged that many of those dwellers are ex-army personnel.
115. During the course of hearing, HSIIDC submitted that the F
land occupied by such individuals are to the extent of 27 acres. HSIIDC
expressed practical difficulties in verifying the transactions claimed to
be bona fide. It was pointed out that these petitioners proceeded to
complete the alleged transactions even though the lands were facing
imminent acquisition. This court has granted relief only to those land
owners who were coerced into selling lands to developers. Such G
developers used the acquisition proceedings to make profit and ultimately
ensure that the acquisitions were dropped. These individuals, however,
ran the risk of acquisition being completed.

18
Dharamvir v State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 5490 of 2021. H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A 116. The entire tenor and reasoning of the main judgment is that
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were used as device,
whereby through a web of holding or shell companies, developers
ultimately entered into transactions and paid valuable amounts towards
developmental rights – during pendency of acquisition proceedings. Those
rights in turn were exploited to persuade the state machinery to withdraw
B
from the acquisition. The prices of land had risen astronomically by then.
Taking all these facts into consideration, as well as the fact that
developers had proceeded to develop properties and construct buildings
in which units were sold or allotted, this Court allowed only one kind of
exception, i.e., that bona fide purchasers of such units, flats or shops
C etc. to be vested with title. In respect of all unallotted, unconstructed
land as well as buildings and land forming part of each of such project,
title was to vest in HSIIDC.
117. Wherever development agreements were entered into and
licenses issued, and no activity took place in the form of construction or
D development, land was to vest in HSIIDC. If the above thread of
reasoning were to be considered, it is apparent that third-party bona
fide purchasers who secured allotment by paying valuable considerations
which is verifiable as a matter of fact (by independent material) was
protected. In the case of all other transactions, however, such protection
was not extended for the simple reason that there is no manner for
E verifying whether in fact a bona fide transaction of the kind alleged
took place. For these reasons, this Court is of the opinion that there is no
infirmity with the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court.
118. As a result of the above, the right and title in respect of lands
F under occupation of these petitioners is vested with HSIIDC. It is up to
the HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissible in accordance with
its parent enactment and a non-discriminatory manner by a scheme, in
regard to such land (i.e. the 27 acres to which the petitioners and others
like them may claim relief) as it may deem appropriate. In case the
G HSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by all provisions of the
Master Plan and Zoning and such other rules and regulations as are
applicable, in the area and shall strictly enforce them.
IX. Other issues
119. During the hearing, it was submitted that out of the 688 acres
H finally notified under Section 6, 420 acres were finally included as part
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 769
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

of the deemed award. Learned counsel urged that HSIIDC has sought A
to grant benefit to developers who made colossal profits and have sought
to wriggle out from the impact of the judgment to various stratagem,
including by filing applications for extension/clarification etc. During the
course of hearing, all these applications, the submissions of all parties
and that of HSIIDC (which has also preferred this application for
B
directions and clarifications) were considered. Out of the 912 acres
originally notified under Section 4 of the deemed consideration of
objections under Section 5A, 688 acres were apparently notified under
Section 6. The entire acquisition was abandoned on 29.01.2010. This
Court, in its main judgment has, in many places - held, in the that the
state’s decision to not to go ahead with the acquisition was mala fide C
and amounting to a fraud under the Acquisition Act. The HSIIDC through
its applications sought clarifications about whether the term ‘transfer’,
includes only conveyance or formal transfer of lands or would it include
parting with valuable developmental rights. In an earlier portion of this
judgment, this aspect has been elaborately dealt with, and concluded
D
that the expression ‘transfer’ has to be interpreted widely and not in a
narrow or technical manner. Thus, in all cases where collaboration
agreements were entered into or developmental rights were parted for
valuable consideration or where licenses were applied for during the
suspect period whether in favor of the original land owner who might
have entered into collaboration agreement and received monies, the E
transactions would fall within the mischief of transfer. Having regard to
these conclusions, the applicants’ apprehensions are unfounded.
120. As far as other steps with respect to acquisition are concerned,
during the course of hearing, the Court was told that in respect of 365
acres of land, 185 references have been received. The State shall ensure F
that these are answered as expeditiously as possible the concerned
reference courts are hereby directed to conclude all the proceedings in
185 references and pronounce the award in accordance with law within
a period of one year from the date of this judgment. All rights and
contentions of the parties are kept open. I.A. No. 118408/2020; I.A.
No. 118410/2020 and I.A. No. 126826/2020 in M.A. No. 2149/2020 are G
disposed off in the above terms. The applications on behalf of the State
and HSIIDC (I.A. 2254/2019 and I.A. 100745/2020 in M.A. No. 50/
2019; and I.A. 93822/2019 in M.A. No. 1175/2019) are also accordingly
disposed off.
H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A Conclusions and Directions:
121. In the light of the above discussion, this Court’s findings are
summarized as follows:
a. The expression ‘transfer’ used in the main judgment,
especially in light of para 42.6, is not confined to sale, lease
B or other encumbrance. It includes development and/or
collaboration agreements, as well as licenses issued (for
development) during the suspect period, whether or not in
favour of the developer.
b. As a corollary to the above, the lands covered by licenses
C issued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);
Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with
Unitech); Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier
(ultimately used by Godrej); ExpressGreens (DLF); Kalinga
and Innovative amount to transfer.
c. With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores per
D acre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC. Therefore,
the final amount payable is 2.681 acres x 5 crores =
13,40,50,000 /- (rupees thirteen crores, forty lakhs, and fifty
thousand only) within six months from the date of this
judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum
E shall be levied from the date of default. Green Heights is
entitled to recover from Paradise such proportionate sums
it may be entitled to claim having regard to the terms of
their agreement.
d. With respect to Godrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is
payable by Godrej to HSIIDC. Therefore, final amount
F
payable is 13.743 acres x 5 crores = 67,36,30,000 /-
(rupees sixty-seven crores, thirty-six lakhs and thirty
thousand only) within six months from the date of this
judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum
shall be levied from the date of default. Godrej is entitled to
G claim such proportionate sums as it may be entitled to in
terms of its agreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh and
Ram Pyari in accordance with law.
e. Upon full compliance with directions above, the lands
covered by Green Heights and Godrej’s projects shall be
H excluded from the deemed award.
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 771
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

f. With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land subject of A
License No. 206 of 2008 forms part of the deemed award.
The State shall take appropriate steps and issue the
supplementary award in respect of these lands within six
months from the date of this judgment. Karma is entitled to
compensation in accordance with the Acquisition Act as on
B
the date of the notification under Section 4, and is entitled
to statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on such
determined compensation.
g. Lands measuring 2.9875 acres and 10.881 acres
respectively belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros, are
excluded from the deemed award. C

h. With respect to Express Greens (DLF), contentions to
exclude the project from the deemed award are rejected.
It is directed that:
(i) HSIIDC shall complete the process of validating the D
title of allottees, including the title to the undivided
and proportionate land share, within six months from
the date of this judgment;
(ii) HSIIDC shall notify the balance allottees about the
execution of sale deed - the process of execution E
and registration of sale deed to be completed within
six months from the date of this judgment.HSIIDC
shall ensure that a designated nodal officer is
deployed to scrutinize the relevant documents and
facilitate the execution of such sale deeds; and
F
(iii) All rights, title and interest in respect of the unsold
39 townhouses in the independent floors vests with
the HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordance
with its policies and applicable laws. Likewise, in case
of unsold apartments, all rights, title and interest shall
vest with HSIIDC. G
(iv) With respect to 96 apartments on the 15th tower
which have been completed but no occupation
certificate has yet been issued, the DTCP shall ensure
due inspection and decision on the pending occupation
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A certificates. HSIIDC to complete any deficiency that
has to be rectified.
(v) With respect to club houses and boundary wall in
sector M-1 and M-1(A), the HSIIDC is directed to
take up work immediately and complete the same
B with eighteen months from the date of this judgment.
(vi) All unconstructed and unallotted portions as well as
construction rights (such as FAR) in respect of
unconstructed, unallotted plots etc., including two
school sites, shall vest absolutely with HSIIDC.
C HSIIDC is entitled to develop these areas in
accordance with its policies within the frame work
of the applicable Master Plan development laws.
DLF is entitled to collect amounts, if any, in terms of
the main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over all
records relating to the allottees, and technical data,
D pertaining to the entire project to HSIIDC within one
month from the date of this judgment.
i. With respect to Kalinga, it is directed that
(i) HSIIDC shall complete verification of all the relevant
E documents furnished by Kalinga. Any additional
documents or invoices, or relevant materials which
Kalinga may wish to rely upon, shall be furnished to
HSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, HSIIDC shall
conduct verification, and based upon that exercise,
and relevant inquiries (for which it may seek such
F assistance of Kalinga as is necessary) indicate the
final valuation within six months from the date of this
judgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuation
shall be released, within three months of completion
of verification.
G (ii) HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents,
in relation to all those who claim refund as allottees
of Kalinga, within six months. Such allottees or flat
owners, (who have not obtained possession) shall be
disbursed the amounts they are entitled to within six
months thereafter.
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 773
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

(iii) In the event of any dispute, with respect to the A
entitlement or amounts payable, it is open to the
concerned allottee or flat buyer to take recourse to
appropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing civil suit,
or complaints under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986. It is clarified that no proceeding, application or
B
contempt petition in this regard, will be entertained
by this Court.
j. With respect to ABW, it is directed that HSIIDC to refund
the amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project,
i.e., allottees of residential units/plots and commercial or
shop space, within the next twelve months from the date of C
this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be levied from date of default. The lands of
ABW shall form part of the deemed award.
k. With respect to Speed Town, the contentions to exclude
the land from the deemed award are rejected. It is held D
that Speed Town shall be entitled to the compensation to be
decided, in respect of the land, on the same basis as in the
case of all others entitled to it.
l. With respect Paramveer, the contentions to exclude the hotel
block from the deemed award are rejected. All rights, title E
and interest in those portions of Innovative’s properties shall
vest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award.Innovative
shall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all other
developers/owners in accordance with the main judgment.
HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any dispute F
in this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim in
substantiative legal proceedings and not their miscellaneous
applications before this Court
m. With respect to Legend Heights, HSIIDC is directed to:
(i) Hand over commercial units to allottees who were G
either granted occupation, and /or in whose favour
conveyance was executed. As far as others are
concerned, HSIIDC to first verify the claims of all
persons/entities who claim to have paid substantial
amounts and have not been allotted their spaces, and
H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.

A shall, depending on the stage and nature of
construction and the extent of amount paid (it is more
than 75 per cent of the total consideration) hand over
possession of the units, after due completion.
(ii) Duly verify and pay refunds sought by any allottee
B within six months of the date of this judgment, failing
which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be
levied from date of default.
(iii) In respect of all unallotted units and areas which can
be constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively with
C HSIIDC.
n. With respect to Dharamveer and other petitioners, as well
as similarly placed individuals the rights and title in respect
of lands under their occupation is vested with HSIIDC. It
is up to the HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissible
D in accordance with its parent enactment and a non-
discriminatory manner by a scheme, in regard to such land
(i.e., the 27 acres to which the petitioners and others like
them may claim relief) as it may deem appropriate. In case
the HSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by all
provisions of the Master Plan and Zoning and such other
E rules and regulations as are applicable, in the area and shall
strictly enforce them.
o. The State is directed to ensure that all references pertaining
to the acquisition are answered as expeditiously as possible.
The concerned reference courts are hereby directed to
F conclude all the proceedings in 185 references received
for 365 acres of land and pronounce the award in accordance
with law within a period of one year from the date of this
judgment.
p. It is clarified that wherever the allottees have not paid the
G full amounts (payable in terms of the agreements) HSIIDC
shall be entitled to the same rights in law as in the case of
the original builder/developer, which include, but are not
limited to, insisting full payment before handing over
possession to the allottees.
H
RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. 775
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

122. I.A. No.112515/2020; I.A. No.117025/2020; I.A. No.118401/ A
2020; I.A. No.116268/2020; I.A. No.111557/ 2020, I.A. No. 111562/
2020; I.A. No.111563/2020; I.A. No.116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021,
I.A. No.123690/2021; I.A. No.110995/ 2019, I.A. No. 91793/ 2020; I.A.
No. 113206/ 2020; I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487; I.A. No.
89570/ 2020; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022; I.A. No.102358/2019; I.A. No.
B
189667/2019; I.A. No. 62216/2020; I.A. No. 42263/2022; I.A. No. 49262
of 2022; I.A. No. 75955/2020; I.A. No. 83251/2020; I.A. No. 76605/
2020; I.A. No. 76602/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No. 31180/2021;
I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020;
I.A. No. 128798-99/2021; I.A. No. 53868/2022; I.A. No. 128801/2021;
I.A. No. 91091/2020;I.A. No. 41690/2021; I.A. No. 84064-65 of 2020; C
I.A. No. 84066 of 2020; I.A. No. 84067/2020; I.A. No. 118408/2020;
I.A. No. 118410/2020; I.A. No. 126826/2020; I.A. 2254/2019; I.A. 93822/
2019; I.A. 100745/2020; I.A. No. 46028/2020, I.A. No. 30807/2020;
I.A. No. 191983/2019; I.A. No. 192027/2019; I.A. No. 137407/2019;
I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020; I.A. No. 59743/2020; I.A.
D
No. 118798/2020; I.A. No. 103292/2020; I.A. No.68542 of 2019; I.A.
No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in MA No. 50/2019; M.A.
No. 864/2019; MA (D) 24553/2019; MA (D) 45009/2019; M.A. (D)
No. 45026/2019; M.A. No. 1175/2019; M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; M.A.
(D) No. 7888/2020; M.A. No. 1521/2020; M.A. No. 2067 of 2020; M.A.
2150 of 2020; M.A. No. 2149/2020; M.A. No. 2228/2020; M.A. (D) E
No. 5699/2021; M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021;
M.A. (D) No. 6705/2020; M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022 and Contempt Petition
No. 2226/2018, Contempt Petition No. 513/2020, Contempt Petition No.
716/2021, SLP (C) No. 2147/2021 and SLP (C) No. 5490/2021 are thus
disposed off in the aforementioned terms.
F

Nidhi Jain Applications disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

G

H