RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDIversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                        [2022] 11 S.C.R. 1                             1


                 RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI                                 A
                                 v.
              THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1066 of 2010)
                        AUGUST 25, 2022                                B
         [B. R. GAVAI AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI
                    NARASIMHA, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860: ss. 201, 380, 435, 457 and 477 rw s. 120B
– Theft of cash from the Bank – Criminal conspiracy – Prosecution
                                                                       C
of three employees of the Bank, for offences of theft of Rs. Six
Lakhs from the safe and strong room of the Bank, house-trespass,
destruction of valuable security, and other offences – Main accused
persons A1 and A2 convicted and sentenced concurrently on the
basis of the oral and documentary evidence, as per which the money
is proved to have been recovered from their possession – Appellant,    D
head cashier in the custody of one of the keys of the dual locker
system maintained by the Bank, convicted and sentenced for the
very same offences only with the aid of s. 120B – Trial court
convicted and sentenced the appellant u/ss. 201, 380, 435, 457
and 477 rw s. 120B – High Court confirmed the conviction, however
                                                                       E
reduced the sentence u/s. 201 – On appeal, held: There is neither
any overt act attributable to the appellant, nor any recovery of
stolen property from him – Failure of the prosecution to produce
any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior
meeting of minds between the appellant and A-1 and A-2 which is
quintessential for a charge u/s. 120-B – No physical manifestation     F
of such a concurrence extractable from surrounding circumstances,
declarations, or the conduct of the appellant – Also, the Court has
cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with the legal
requirement of proof of agreement – Furthermore, the prosecution
failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant, being
                                                                       G
the custodian of only one set of the keys for the dual lock system
functional in the Bank, could alone be made responsible for
providing access to the strong room and the safe in the Bank –
Thus, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, even by
inference through circumstantial evidence, the appellant entitled to
                                                                       H
                                 1
2                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A   be acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy – Order by the
    courts below, quashed and set aside.
              State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr. (2000) 8 SCC
              203 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 409; State (NCT of Delhi) v.
              Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 : [2005] 2 Suppl.
B             SCR 79; Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of
              Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 156 : [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 96;
              Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI (2003) 3 SCC 641 : [2003]
              1 SCR 119 - referred to.
                                    Case Law Reference
C   [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 409                     referred to       Para 22
    [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79                      referred to       Para 23
    [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 96                      referred to       Para 24
    [2003] 1 SCR 119                            referred to       Para 25
D
          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
    1066 of 2010.
          From the Judgment and Order dated 05.08.2008 of the High Court
    of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.
    213 of 2006.
E
              Ms. S. Janani, Adv. for the Appellant.
         Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Prithiviraj Singh, Mirza Kayesh Begg,
    Prakhar Srivastav, Astik Gupta, Ms. Ayushi Mittal, Advs. for the
    Respondent.
F             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
              PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
          1. This appeal by accused no. 31, challenges the judgment of the
    High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 2006
    confirming the conviction of the Appellant imposed by the Additional
G
    Sessions Judge, Guna for offences under Sections 201, 380, 435, 457
    and 477 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The
    High Court also confirmed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
    four years along with a fine of Rs. 500 under Sections 380, 435, 457 of
    1
H       hereinafter referred to as Appellant.
  RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                               3
    PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

the IPC and rigorous imprisonment of two years along with a fine of          A
Rs. 500 under Section 201 IPC. However, the sentence under Section
477 IPC was reduced by the High Court from rigorous imprisonment for
six years to four years.
       2.1 Three accused, employees of Guna Branch of Central Bank
of India, were prosecuted for the above-referred offences of theft (of       B
Rs. Six Lakhs from the safe and strong room of the Bank), house-trespass,
destruction of valuable security, and other offences. While the main
accused, Pradeep Saxena (hereinafter referred to as ‘A-1’) and Vinod
(hereinafter referred to as ‘A-2’), were convicted and sentenced
concurrently given the oral and documentary evidence, as per which the
money is proved to have been recovered from their possession, the            C
Appellant (A-3) was convicted and sentenced for the very same offences
only with the aid of Section 120B of the IPC.
       2.2 The enquiry against the appellant is therefore confined to the
existence or the proof of criminal conspiracy between him and the other
accused. The charge of conspiracy against the appellant arose because,       D
as Head Cashier, he was to be in the custody of one of the keys of the
dual locker system maintained by the Bank for the safe custody of cash
and valuable security.
     3. The case of the prosecution is that, upon transfer of the existing
Branch Manager Shri R.K. Makore, Senior Manager                              E

       Shri K.R. Lydia (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-4’) was given
the additional charge as Manager-in-Charge. As he was on leave for
attending a meeting in the Regional Office, Gwalior, another employee
Shri Sushil Kumar Verma (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-10’) was given
the additional charge as Manager-in-Charge. Guna is a very small branch      F
of the Central Bank of India but on 11.06.2004 a large amount of
Rs. Fifteen Lakhs came into the custody of the Bank, and everybody in
the Bank was aware of this fact. The next day, 12.06.2004, happened to
be a Saturday, and after the transactions were completed and the branch
was closed at 5.45 p.m., it reopened only on Monday, i.e., 14.06.2004 at     G
10.30 a.m., intervening Sunday being a holiday. As the commission of
theft and other offences occurred after Saturday evening at 5.45 p.m.
and before 10.30 a.m. on Monday, and the locks of the building were not
broken, all the transactions before and after the closure became relevant
to detect the crime. The prosecution explained the events as under.
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4            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A          4. On 12.06.2004 at around 3.30 p.m., there was a problem with
    the computer at the Bank, and PW-10 got involved in rectifying it. As
    the Bank was about to close, a customer Smt. Seema Jain walked in and
    sought to use the bank locker, for which PW-10 sought the help of the
    Appellant. The Appellant, along with Sanjay Daria (hereinafter referred
    to as ‘PW-12’), entered the locker room and helped the customer operate
B
    the locker. After the above-referred transaction, the Appellant left the
    Bank. PW-10, PW-12 and A-1 remained in the premises till 5.45 p.m.,
    and by the end of the day, after A-1 secured the locks of the main gate,
    PW-10 and PW-12 left for their respective residences.
           5. On Monday i.e., 14.06.2004, the sanitation employee Rajendra
C   Premi (PW-9) went to the house of the Appellant to collect the key to
    the main gate of the Branch. After reaching the Bank, he started his
    routine work of cleaning when another peon Dashrath Yadav (hereinafter
    referred to as ‘PW-5’), security guard Ram Naresh Bhadoria (PW-7),
    and PW-10 also reached the Bank at about 10.00 a.m. Around the same
D   time, the Appellant also reached the Bank. PW-5 was asked to open the
    main gate of the strong room, and it is the case of the prosecution that
    this gate could not be opened with the key of the Manager-in-Charge
    PW-10. However, it opened with the help of the Appellant’s key. As
    soon as they entered the strong room, they sensed a burning smell of
    petrol. After that, they sought to open the grill gate of the strong room.
E   This could also not be opened with the key in the custody of PW-10, but
    could be opened with the key of the Appellant. Upon entering the room
    past the grill gate, the employees saw that the bank registers were thrown
    open, and some of them were in a burnt condition. Further, even the safe
    inside the strong room could not be opened with the key of PW-10 but
F   could be opened with the key of the Appellant. Upon opening the safe,
    they noticed that the bundle of currency notes and secured documents
    were in half-burnt condition and lying scattered. After inspection, it was
    noticed that out of Rs. 18,07,691/- in the custody of the Bank as of
    12.06.2004, an amount of Rs. Six Lakhs was missing, and currency
    notes worth Rs. 17,160/- were in a half-burnt condition. At this point,
G   A-1 was not in the Bank. PW-10 informed Senior Manager PW-4 about
    these events at 10.30 a.m. PW-4 returned to the Bank and finally lodged
    the FIR No. 538 of 2004 on 14.06.2004 at 6.15 p.m. before the Police
    Station Guna. The FIR was registered for offences under Sections 436
    and 380 of the IPC.
H
  RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                    5
    PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

       Investigation:                                                             A
       6. During the course of the investigation, A-1 was interrogated on
15.06.2004. Based on the information given by him through Memo Ex.
P-5, Rs. 5,40,000 was recovered from a briefcase at the ‘tand’ of a
room in A-2’s house, and the balance amount of Rs. 50,000 was also
recovered from a locker secured in an almirah in his house. Further,              B
A-2 led the investigation to identify and recover the plastic bottle containing
the remaining petrol, hidden in the canteen of the branch. The Investigating
Officer seized it through memo Ex. P-58.
       7. In the absence of evidence of breaking of the locks of the
building, or of the main gate, grill gate of the strong room, or even the         C
safe in the Bank, it was inferred that the act of theft was not possible
without the usage of actual keys. As the second set of keys were in the
official custody of the Appellant, he was arrested.
      8. While A-1 and A-2 were charged for offences under Sections
436, 457, 380, 201 and 477 of the IPC, the Appellant was charged for              D
the same crimes with the aid of Section 120B therein. All the three
accused were tried together by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Guna,
in Sessions Case No. 228 of 2004.
       Trial:
       9. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses, being PW-1 to PW-                E
20 and marked as many as 65 documents. As there was no direct
evidence of the commission of the offence, the prosecution had to rely
on circumstantial evidence through testimonies of PW-4, PW-5, PW-6,
PW-7, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-15 to prove that the theft and incineration
of currency notes and documents by the sprinkling of petrol had in fact           F
taken place at the instance of A-1 and A-2.
       Trial Court:
       10. The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 07.03.2006, rejected
the plea of A-1 and A-2 that no offence of theft was committed as the
entire cash was recovered, by holding that the cash receipts recovered            G
from A-2 based on A-1’s statements, bore slips of different banks, and
undoubtedly comprised stolen property. Further, the argument that branch-
wise account statements of the Bank from 12.06.2004 and 14.06.2004
did not show any variation in the amount maintained by the Bank, was
                                                                                  H
6             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A   rejected by the Trial Court based on the testimony of PW-4 and the
    recoveries made.
           11. The Trial court convicted A-1 and A-2 for all the offences and
    sentenced them as indicated earlier. Dealing with the access of the
    accused into the Bank, the strong room, and then into the safe therein,
B   the Trial Court relied on the evidence of PW-4, who referred to the rules
    governing the operation of strong room and safe with the aid of dual lock
    system. Based on testimonies of PW-4, PW-5, PW-7, PW-8, PW-10,
    the Trial Court concluded that the Appellant was in the exclusive custody
    of one of the keys that could have been used for operating the grill gate,
    strong room, as well as the safe of the Bank. After referring to the
C   statements of these witnesses, the Trial Court concluded that as the
    Appellant is the custodian of one set of keys, he was a part of a conspiracy
    with A-1 and A-2 to commit the offences. It is on this inference that the
    Trial Court convicted the Appellant for the same offences with the aid
    of Section 120B of the IPC and proceeded to sentence him along with
D   the other accused.
          High Court:
          12. As indicated above, the High Court has confirmed the conviction
    and sentence of the Trial Court with a simple modification that rigorous
    imprisonment for six years under Section 477 of the IPC was reduced to
E   rigorous imprisonment of four years.
           13. Before considering the submissions made on behalf of the
    Appellant, we may note that all the three accused have already served
    their sentences.

F         Submissions:
            14.1 Ms. S. Janani, AOR appeared on behalf of the Appellant,
    had reiterated the submissions made on behalf of A-1 and A-2 in the
    Trial Court, that there was no loss caused to the Bank, as the entire
    stolen amount was recovered. She sought to demonstrate that the
    accounts maintained by the Bank did not reflect any variation in the
G
    amounts; hence, the Trial Court, as well as the High Court, were not
    justified in concluding that commission of theft took place and accordingly
    convicting the Appellant.
          14.2 We heard Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, AOR, assisted by
    Shri Prithiviraj Singh, Shri Mirza Kayesh Begg, Shri Prakhar Srivastav,
H
  RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                 7
    PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Shri Astik Gupta, Ms. Ayushi Mittal for the State. Shri Razdan has             A
submitted that the Trial, as well as the High Court, correctly concluded
the findings on the basis of well-appreciated evidence, and there is no
occasion for interfering with the judgment of the High Court.
      Analysis:
       15. We are not convinced with the argument of Ms. Janani, that          B
neither an offence of theft has taken place nor any loss was caused to
the bank, for the very same reason that the Trial Court as well as the
High Court had given while confirming the conviction of A-1 and A-2.
We reiterate that apart from the testimony of the Senior Manager
PW-4, proving the fact of theft, both the Courts have observed that the        C
recovered currency notes from A-2’s house bore slips of different banks,
including the Central Bank of India and the Punjab National Bank. Mere
recovery of the stolen amount by the Bank does not exonerate A-1 and
A-2 and for that matter, even the Appellant. We, therefore, have no
hesitation in rejecting this submission.
                                                                               D
       16. So far as the Appellant is concerned, we have noted that
there is neither any overt act attributable to him, nor any recovery of
stolen property from him. The conclusion drawn against him is only for
the reason that he was in exclusive possession of the set of keys used to
open the locks of the main gate, the grill of the strong room and the safe
inside it on 14.06.2004. Hence, his conviction and sentence were based         E
exclusively on the charge of conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC.
       17. Before we consider Appellant’s liability for being the authorized
custodian of one set of keys for the lockers, it is necessary to examine
the system of dual locking adopted by the Bank. The Office Manual of
the Bank provides that cash was to be stored in the strong room of the         F
Bank, guarded by a Dual Control System, where locks are secured by
two keys operable successively and separately. The Branch Manager
and the Cashier-in-Charge are to be in the joint custody of the sets of
keys to the strong room and the safe. The relevant clauses in the Manual
are extracted herein below for ready reference:                                G
      “2.1.1 The branch cash balance must be kept overnight in
      the strong room, or at the smaller branches where no strong
      room has been installed in a fire-proof safe, in the joint custody
      of the Head Cashier and the Manager or any other officer
      authorized to hold joint custody of cash.
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8               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A         2.1.2 The strong room or fire-proof safe, must be under the
          double lock of the Head Cashier and officer-in-charge, and
          both must be present whenever the strong room or safe is
          opened to withdraw or deposit cash and neither official may
          enter the cash portion of the strong room except in the presence
          of the other.
B
          2.1.3 Under the dual control system, it is advisable that the
          Branch Manager should hold the second key of the cash safe
          and the cashier-in-charge the first key. First and second keys
          are so named according to the order of locking the safe. For
          the strong room door, the Branch Manager will hold the first
C         key and the Cashier-in-Charge the second key.
          ...
          2.1.6 The key holders are jointly responsible for the contents
          of the strong room/safe.”
D           18. Returning to the charge under Section 120B of the IPC, the
    evidence available on record will only show that when on Monday morning,
    i.e. 14.06.2004, PW-5 and Manager-in-charge PW-10, along with the
    Appellant, sought to open the main gate, grill gate of the strong room, as
    well as the safe, the locks allegedly could not be opened with the set of
E   keys in possession of PW-10, but could be opened through the set of
    keys in custody of the Appellant. Precisely what caused the locks to not
    open with the keys of PW-10 is not explained. The fact that these locks
    could be opened by the key in possession of the Appellant cannot by
    itself lead to an inference that he alone was responsible for enabling A-
    1 and A-2 to access the safe to commit the offences. The very purpose
F   and object of the dual lock system is to prevent any single custodian
    from accessing the strong room and the safe.
           19. As per Clause 2.1.2 of the Office Manual, both the key holders
    were mandatorily required to be present each time the locks were secured
    or opened, except in emergency circumstances which stipulate handing
G   over the key to the next senior official and recording the same in the key
    movement register. We may note here that the key movement register
    was not seized or produced by the prosecution on the premise that it
    was practically never used. Further, Clause 2.1.6 of the Office Manual
    stipulates that both the key holders are jointly responsible for the contents
    of the strong room and the safe. Under these circumstances, we are of
H
  RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                 9
    PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

the opinion that the Appellant cannot be solely held accountable for the       A
failure to comply with the Office Manual, and for this reason the
Appellant’s exclusive possession of the keys cannot render him culpable
of the offences as mentioned earlier.
       20. In his evidence, PW-10 stated that on 12.06.2004, he caused
the main gate of the branch to be closed by A-1, a contingent employee.        B
Thereafter, on 14.06.2004, the sanitation employee obtained this set of
keys from the house of the Appellant, a fact used by the prosecution to
imply that after the branch was locked on 12.06.2004, the Appellant was
in possession of the keys to the main gate of the branch. On this, the
Trial Court glossed over the lapse on the part of PW-10. This questionable
observation of the Trial Court is as follows:                                  C

      “It was admitted by Sushil Verma (PW-10) in the paragraph
      No. 30 of the cross-examination that locks could be locked
      as per the rules of the bank only by the authorised person.
      The accused Pradeep being not a casual worker, but even
      then he had committed error deliberately while handing over              D
      the key. The witness stated further in the paragraph No. 36
      that the external, gate was got closed by the accused Pradeep.
      It is correct to say that he had no authority to close the gate.
      Thus the witness did not get the lock locked by the authorised
      person as per the rule of the bank, but the lock was locked              E
      by unauthorised person. But the errors committed by the
      witness do not exempt the accused from the consequences of
      the crime. It does not provide any benefit to the accused.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)
        21. Apart from the fact that the Appellant by himself could not        F
have operated the strong room and the safe of the Bank without the
presence of the officer who was in the custody of the other set of keys,
it is also important to note that the prosecution completely failed in
adducing any evidence to indicate the existence of any agreement
between the Appellant on the one hand and A-1 and A-2 on the other.            G
The link necessary for proving the charge of conspiracy is entirely missing.
      22. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy
under Section 120B of the IPC is an agreement to commit an offence.
Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial
evidence. Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an
                                                                               H
10               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A    agreement between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. In the decision of
     State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr.2, this Court noted that an
     agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must
     surface in evidence through some physical manifestation:
              “12. ...As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has
B             to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused
              beyond reasonable doubt. ...A few bits here and a few bits
              there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be
              adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of
              the crime of criminal conspiracy...
C             13. ...The most important ingredient of the offence being the
              agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act.
              In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must
              inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing
              the same end or they have come together to pursue the
              unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators
D             but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind
              of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be
              established. The express agreement need not be proved. The
              evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the
              unlawful act is not sufficient...”         (emphasis supplied)
E          23. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against
     the Appellant must evidence explicit acts or conduct on his part,
     manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common design
     with A-1 and A-2. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu3, this
     Court held:
F             “101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the
              cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken
              into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather
              than adopting an isolated approach to each of the
              circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances
G             should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard
              to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy,
              the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the


     2
         (2000) 8 SCC 203.
H    3
         (2005) 11 SCC 600.
     RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                           11
       PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

         parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their          A
         concurrence as to the common design and its execution.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)
       24. In accepting the story of the prosecution, the Trial Court, as
well as the High Court, proceeded on the basis of mere suspicion against
the Appellant, which is precisely what this Court in Tanviben               B
Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat4, had cautioned against:
         “45. The principle for basing a conviction on the basis of
         circumstantial evidences has been indicated in a number of
         decisions of this Court and the law is well settled that each
         and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly               C
         established by reliable and clinching evidence and the
         circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from
         which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the
         accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against
         the guilt is possible. This Court has clearly sounded a note of    D
         caution that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial
         evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion
         may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself
         that various circumstances in the chain of events have been
         established clearly and such completed chain of events must
         be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence    E
         of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the
         important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped
         and the other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish
         the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. It has
         been held that the Court has to be watchful and avoid the          F
         danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal
         proof for sometimes, unconsciously it may happen to be a
         short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has
         been indicated by this Court that there is a long mental
         distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and the
         same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. (Jaharlal Das      G
         v. State of Orissa (1991) 3 SCC 27)”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)


4
    (1997) 7 SCC 156.                                                       H
12               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A          25. It is not necessary that there must be a clear, categorical and
     express agreement between the accused. However, an implied agreement
     must manifest upon relying on principles established in the cases of
     circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the majority opinion of Ram
     Narayan Popli v. CBI5, this Court had held:
B             “354. ... For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical
              manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The
              express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to
              the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not
              sufficient...”
C           26. In view of the clear enunciation of law on the criminal
     conspiracy by this Court, we find that the prosecution has failed to produce
     any evidence whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior
     meeting of minds between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. There is no
     physical manifestation of such a concurrence extractable from
     surrounding circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the Appellant.
D    The evidence is shorn of even a passive acknowledgment of conspiracy
     of the Appellant with the accused, let alone heralding a clear and
     conscientious participation of the Appellant in the conspiracy. As noted
     above, this Court has cautioned against replacing mere suspicion with
     the legal requirement of proof of agreement.
E           27. For the reasons stated above we are of the opinion that the
     prosecution failed to establish the circumstances in which the Appellant,
     being the custodian of only one set of the keys for the dual lock system
     functional in the Bank, could alone be made responsible for providing
     access to the strong room and the safe in the Bank. We are also of the
F    clear opinion that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of any
     agreement between the Appellant, A-1 and A-2, which is quintessential
     for a charge under Section 120B of the IPC. In the absence of such an
     agreement, even by inference through circumstantial evidence, the
     Appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy.

G             28. For the reasons and conclusions drawn by us, we hereby:
              i) Allow Criminal Appeal No. 1066 of 2010.
           ii) The judgment passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
     Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 2006 dated 05.08.2008 and the judgment of
     5
H        (2003) 3 SCC 641.
  RAM SHARAN CHATURVEDI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                 13
    PRADESH [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

the First Additional Sessions Judge, Guna in Sessions Case No. 228 of          A
2004, dated 07.03.2006, are hereby quashed and set aside.
       iii) The Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.
       iv) Parties to bear their own costs.
                                                                               B
Nidhi Jain                                                   Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)




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