PRABHAKARversusJOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE DEPARTMENT &ANR.

                        [2015] 9 S.C.R. 890


A                          PRABHAKAR
                                  V.

    JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE DEPARTMENT &ANR.
         (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27080 of 2015)
B
                      SEPTEMBER 07, 2015
              [A. K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.]

          Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 10, 2(k) - Industrial
c   Dispute - Delay in raising - Power of appropriate
    Government to make a reference of the dispute - On facts,
    termination of services ofpetitioner-worker, however industrial
    dispute raised after 14 years - Award by Labour Court
    directing reinstatement of petitioner in service without back
D    wages and other benefits - Writ petition by Management
    dismissed by Single Judge of the High Court- However, writ
    appeal by Management allowed by Division Bench of the
    High Court- Correctness of- Held: High Court was correct
    holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after
E   fourteen years of termination without any justifiable
    explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no
    jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing
    dispute - Although there is no limitation prescribed under
     the Act for making a reference u/s. 10(1), yet it is for the
F    'appropriate Government' to consider whether it is expedient
     or not to make the reference - Words 'at any time' used ins.
     10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of
    reference - However, very stale claims should not be
    generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there
G   is satisfactory explanation for delay since it is risky to
    industrial peace.

         Doctrines- Doctrine of /aches and delays and doctrine
    of acquiescence - Formulation of - Explained.
H
                                 890
   PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                    891
                · DEPARTMENT

     Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court          A

      HELD: 1.1 High Court correctly decided the issue
holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e.
after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable
explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had          s
no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-
existing dispute. [Para 43] [923-H'; 924-A]

        1.2 An industrial dispute has to be referred by the
appropriate Government for adjudication and the                c
workman cannot approach the Labour Court or
 Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which
are covered by Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
.Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those
cases where the appropriate Government forms an                o
 opinion that 'any Industrial dispute exists or is
 apprehended'. The words 'industrial dispute exists' are
of paramount importance unless there is an existence
 of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended
or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near          E
future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or
 apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non
 for making the reference .. No doubt, at the time of taking
a decision whether a reference is to be made· or not, the
appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of         F
the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative
 function. At the same time, on the basis of material on
 record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial
dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is
 necessary. Such existence/apprehension of. industrial         G
dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though
 it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material
on record. Dispute or difference arises when one party
 make a demand and other party rejects the same. Before        H
892         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015]9 S.C.R.

A     raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a
      necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the
      services of a workman are terminated and he does not
      make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging
      wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within
 B    reasonable time and raises the same after considerable
      lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial
      dispute still exists. Since there is no period of limitation,
      it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even
      belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long
 C    period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute
      still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of
      limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the
      workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this.
      purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable
 0
      period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such
      delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute
      cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give
      satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and
 E    demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue
      is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of
      the reason that law of limitation has no application. On
      the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no
      longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then
 F    it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be
      referred. In those cases where there was no agitation by
      the workman against his termination and the dispute is
      raised· belatedly and the delay or laches remain
      unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived
 G    his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and,
      therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had
      become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'. In such
      circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse
      to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/
 H    Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial
   PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                 893
                 DEPARTMENT

dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act A
and, therefore, no relief can be granted. [Para 40) [920-F-
H; 921-A-H; 922-A-H; 923-A-B]

      1.3 In those cases where the Court finds that
dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always B
permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into
consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is
still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement
without back wages or lesser back wages or grant
compensation instead of reinstatement. The law on this C
issue has to be applied in the said perspective in such
matters. [Para 41) [923-B-D]

      1.4 Although there is no limitation prescribed under
the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the o
Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to consider
whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The
words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of
any limitation in making an order of reference and laws
of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the E
Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that
very stale claims should not be generally encouraged
or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory
explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to
industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after F
long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account
the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the
employers' financial· arrangement and to avoid
dislocation of an industry. [Para 42) [923-D-G]
                                                              G
      1.5 It is now a well recognised principle of
jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time
is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period
prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings,
 in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches H
894      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [20~5] 98.C,R.



A and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-
  suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly
  without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action
  after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an
  application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities".
B This principle is applied in those cases where
  discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as
  specific performance, permanent or temporary
  injunction, appointment of receiver etc. These principles
  are also applied in the writ petitions filed under Articles
C 32 and 226 of Constitution of India. In such cases, Cou'rts
  can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner's
  part has prejudiced the respondent even though the
  petitioner might have come to Court within the period
  prescribed by the Limitation Act. [Paras 36, 37) [919-C-F]
0
        1.6 Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and
  sees another·acting in a manner inconsistent with that
  right and makes no objection while the act is in progress
  he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based
E on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a
  case party who did not make any objection acquiesced
  into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and,
  therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged
F wrong. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation
   is pn~scribed within which the action is to be brought
  befo're'the Court, if the action is not brought within that
  prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy
  and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of
G limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where
   no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the
  aggrieved party does not approach the machinery
  provided under the law for redressal of his gri9vance, it
  can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground
H of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the
  ·1PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE               895
                  DEPARTMENT

presumption that such person has waived his right or A
acquiesced into the act of other. These principles as part
of equity are based on principles relatable to sound
public policy that if a person does not exercise his right
for a Ion~ time then such a right is non-existent. [Paras
38, 39] [919-G-H; 920-A-D]                                 B

  Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana
  Roadways, Hissar(2014) 10 SCC 301; Sapan Kumar .
         v:
  Pandit U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. 2001 (3)
  SCR 1081: (2001) 6 SCC 222; State of Madras v. C.P.      c
  Sarathy &Anr. (1953) 4 SCR 334; Western India Match
  Company Ltd. v. The Western India Match Co. Workers
  Union & Ors. 1970 (3) SCR 370: (1970) 1 SCC 225;
  Ram Avtar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
  1985 (3) SCR 686: (1985) 3 SCC 189; The Se~retary,       D
  Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat & Ors. 2000
  (1) SCR 787: (2000) 3 SCC 93; Prem Kakarv. State of
  Haryana &Anr. 1976 (3) SCR 1010: (1976) 3 SCC 433;
  Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana &Anr. 1995 (6) Suppl.
  SCR 629: (1996) 2 SCC 66; Shalimar Works Ltd. v.         E
  Their Workmen (1960) 1 SCR 150; Vazir Sultan
  Tobacco Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1964)
  1 LLJ 622; Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty
  & Ors.2000 (1) SCR 459: (2000) 2 SCC 455 - referred
                                                           F
  to.

  Blacks Law Dictionary 51" Edn p 424 - referred to.

                   Case Law Reference
                                                           G
(2014) 10 sec 301        referred to.   Para 3, 25
2001 (3) SCR 1081        referred to.   Para 5, 24
(1953) 4 SCR 334         referred to.   Para 9, 10,17
                                                           H
896         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     1970 (3) SCR 370         referred to.   Para 10
      1985 (3) SCR 686         referred to.   Para 15
      2000 (1) SCR 787         referred to.   Para 17
      1976 (3) SCR 1010        referred to.   Para 17
B
      1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 629 referred to.    Para 17
      (1960) 1 SCR 150         referred to.   Para 20
      (1964) 1 LLJ 622         referred to.   Para 22
c      2000 (1) SCR 459        referred to.   Para 23
              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave
      . Petition (Civil) No. 27080 of 2015

       From the Judgment and Order dated 06.06.2011 of the
D High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in Writ
  Appeal No. 6145 of2009.

          Sharanagouda Patil, Supreeta Patil, (for S-legal.
      Associates) for the Petitioner.
 E
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           A. K. SIKRI, J. Delay condoned.

        1) This special leave petition arises from the judgment
 Fdated.June 06, 2011 passed by the High CourtofKarnataka,
  Circuit Bench at Dharwad, whereby writ appeal of the
  respondents (hereinafter referred to as the 'Management')
  herein was allowed resulting in setting aside the award of the
G Labour Court directing reinstatement of the petitioner herein
  in service without back wages and other benefits, even when
  the said order was _up_held by the Single Judge of the said
  High Court in the writ petition filed by the Management
  challenging the award.
H
      PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                    897
             DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

      2) We may state at the outset that the main factor with A
which the High Court has been influenced is that the petitioner,
whose services were terminated on April 01, 1985, raised the
industrial dispute only in the year 1999, i.e. after a period of
more than fourteen years. On the facts of this case, the High
Court has held that there was no 'live' dispute and even when B
no period of limitation is provided for raising the disputes under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act') and provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not
applicable, there could not have been a reference at such a
belated stage, inasmuch as, after a lapse of such abnormal C
time, the dispute ceases to exist and, therefore, the appropriate
Government had no jurisdiction or power to make a reference
of a non-existent dispute. The petitioner has questioned the
appropriateness of this view taken by the High Court.
                                                                   D
      3) Primary submission of the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner is that once it is accepted that the law of
limitation does not apply, the Government could make the
reference even if the dispute was raised belatedly and in such
circumstances power of the Labour Court is to mould the relief.   E
In support of this contention, learned counsel referred to the
judgment of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. General
Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar1 • In order to
appreciate the aforesaid contention, we scan through the basic    F
facts of the present case.

      4) The petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the
Sericulture Department, Government of Karnataka, Belgaum
on April 01, 1984. His services were terminated on April 01,
1985. During the period April 01, 1985 till 1999, the petitioner G
did not approach any judicial/quasi-judicial authority
challenging the said termination. In fact, not even a notice or
legal notice was served upon the Management questioning
    (2014) 10 sec 301
1
                                                                  H
898        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [20~5]9 S.C.R.



A the validity of the said termination. However, some time in the
  year 1999, the petitioner approached the appropriate
  Government alleging that his services were terminated illegally
  and in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act.
  Insofar as delay is concerned, in the claim made by the
B petitioner, only explanation given was that he had approached
  the Management on several occasions with request to reinstate
  him in service and pay back wages and other consequential
  benefits He also alleged that though the Management initially
  assured that they would reinstate him, but dragged on the
C matter on one pretext or the other and when they ultimately
  told him that they would not reinstate him into service, he had
  no alternative but to raise the industrial dispute. The
  conciliation proceedings have started, which ended in failure.
  Thereafter, the appropriate Government referred the matter
0
  regarding validity of termination of the petitioner for
  adjud 1cation.

          5) The Management had taken a specific plea in the
   conciliation proceedings as well as before the Labour Court
 E that such a reference was not competent and the Retitioner
   was not entitled to any relief when he had raised the dispute
   after fourteen years of his termination. On merits it was pleaded
   that the Management had not termi.nated the services and, in
 F fact, it is the petitioner who left th;e services. Various issues
   were framed by the Labour Court, which included a specific
   issue as to whether any relief could be given when the dispute
   was raised after fourteen years of alleged termination. After
   the evidence was led, the Labour Court passed !Pe.award
 G holding that the petitioner had worked for more;than 240 days
   and his services were terminated by the Management without
   complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The
   termination was, thus, held to be invalid. The contention of the
   Management that the petitioner had left the service of his own
 H was negatived by the Labour Court with the reason that no
       PRABl;IAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                 899
                DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

  person would give UP. the work easily without any cause and A
  as the petitioner had not got any alternate employment
  anywhere, the question of leaving his job by himself did not
  arise. Insofar as the issue of raising the dispute belatedly is
  concerned, the Labour Court held that even ifthere was a delay
  of fourteen years, only relief was required to be moulded B
  because of that reason. Thus, the Labour Court ordered
  reinstatement, but denied back wages or other benefits. For
  this purpose, the Labour Court referred to the judgment of this
. Court in Sapan Kumar Panditv. U.P. State Electricity Board
  &~2                                                             c
      6) As pointed out above, the writ petition preferred by
 the Management against this award was dismissed by the
 Single Judge of the High Court. Against the order of dismissal
 passed by the learned Single Judge, the Management D
 preferred writ appeal, which has been allowed by the Division
 Bench vide impugned judgment dated June 06, 2011. This
 special leave petition is preferred challenging the said
 judgment and there is also a delay of 1438 days in filing the
 same.                                                          E

        7) F_rom the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that
  for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the
  petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averred
 that the petitioner had approached the Management time and F
  again and was given assurance that he would be taken back
  in service, there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No
  notice was served upon the Management. There is no
  assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of
. time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently, even G
 the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation
  anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised
  after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the
  2
      (2001) s sec 222                                             H
900            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen,
      namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was
      appropriate.

             8) It may be stated that the question is of utmost
B     importance as it is seen that many times, as in the instant case,
      the workers raise dispute after number of years of the cause
      of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving?
      Or whether it can be said that dispute does not exist when the
      concerned workmen after his say termination kept quiet for
C     number of years and thus acquiesced into the action?

            9) Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid
      questions, it would be proper to discuss the power of
      'appropriate Government' under Section 10 of the Act in
o     referring or refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication. It is a
      peculiar position provided under the Act that an aggrieved
      workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial
      Tribunal directly for adjudication of !industrial dispute'. Except
      those cases falling under Section 2A of the Act, he has to seek
 E    reference of dispute to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under
      Section 10 of the Act. 'Appropriate Government', as defined
      under Section 2(a) oftheAct, is empowered to referthe dispute.
      Section 10( 1) stipulates that 'appropriate Government' may,
      at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute to a Board,
 F    Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal where 'it is of the opinion
      that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'.
      Interpreting this Section, way back in the year 1953, this Court
      in the case of State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy &Anr. 3 stated
      the following propositions:
 G
              "(i) The Government should satisfy itself, on the facts
              and circumstances brought to its notice, in its
              subjective opinion that an 'industrial dispute' exists
              or is 'apprehended';
 H      3
            (1953) 4 SCR 334
        PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                   901
               DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
        · (ii) the factual existence of a dispute or its           A
          apprehension and the expediency of making
          reference are matters entirely for the Government
          to decide;

         (iii) the order making a reference is an                  B
         administrative act and it is not a judicial or a quasi-
         judicial act; and

         (iv) the order of reference passed by the
         Government cannot be examined by the High Court           c
         in its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution
         to see if the Government had material before it to
         support the conclusion that the dispute existed or
         was apprehended."
                                                                   D
      These propositions were based on unamended Act
which did not contain the words 'where the appropriate
Government is of the opinion'.

      10) In Western India Match Company Ltd. v. The
Western India Match Co. WorketS Union & OtS.4 , this Court         E
took support of C.P. Sarathy's5 case to hold that function of
the appropriate Government to make reference under Section
10(1) is an administrative function. This view that the
appropriate Government is performing an administrative act         F
and not judicial or quasi-judicial act while making reference is
found in various judicial pronouncements made by this Court
even thereafter.

      11) The satisfaction of the existence of an industrial
dispute or the satisfaction that an industrial dispute is G
apprehended is 'a condition precedent to the order of
reference'. An order of reference cannot be made mechanically

• c1e10) 1 sec 22s
5
    Note 3 above                                                   H
902       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9S.C.R.


A without forming an opinion. For formation of the necessary
  opinion, the 'appropriate Government' must also be satisfied
  that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication
  is a 'workman'. If the dispute is not between an employer and
  his workman, it is not an 'industrial dispute' and the Government
B can justifiably refuse to refer the dispute. From the material
  placed before it, the Government reaches an administrative
  decision whether there exists an existing or apprehended
  industrial dispute. In either event, it can exercise the power
  under this Section.
c
         12) The adequaey or the sufficiency of the material on
  which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of juaicial
  scrutiny. If the action of the Government in making the reference
  is impugned by a party, it·would be open to such a party to
D show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute and
  that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if
  the dispute was an industrial dispute, its factual existence and
  the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of
  a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to
E decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold
  the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of
  jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no
  material before the Government on which it could have come
F to an affirmative conclusion on those matters.

        13) When the 'appropriate Government' makes a
  reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication, it does not
  decide any question of fact or law. The only condition, which
  the exercise of that power should satisfy, is that there should
G be the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. When
  once the Government is satisfied about this question, it
  acquires jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication.
  However, the condition precedent to the formation of such
H opinion, that there should be an _existing or apprehended
    , PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                    ·903
             DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
 'industrial dispute', is imperative and the recitals of the A
 existence or apprehension of the industrial dispute cannot
 preclude the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and
 to determine whether, in fact, there was any material before
 the 'appropriate Government' and if there was; whether the
 Government applied its mind in coming to the conclusion that B
 an industrial dispute was in existence or was apprehended
 and it was expedientto make the reference. Therefore, an order
 of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the
 appropriate Government had no material before it or it has not
 applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into C
 consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken
 into consideration.

      14)"Likewise, when the appropriate Government refuses
 to make reference, it is also amenable to judicial review if it is D
 shown that the appropriate Government did not tak!3 into
 consideration the relevant material which could show existence
 or apprehension of industrial dispute or if it is shown that the
 reasons for refusing to make reference are irrelevant or not
 germane to the formation of opinion.                               E

          15) It has been held in catena of judgments that while
  performing this administrative function, the Government would
  not decide the dispute between the parties which may be.
  termed as judicial function and such judicial function is to be F
  discharged by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal only. In Ram
  Avtar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Haryana &Anr. 6 , this Court
  held that ifthe Government, while refusing to make reference
  delves into the merits of the dispute, it is not permissible under
  law and the appropriate course to make reference and such G
  dispute are to be settled/decided by the Labour Court/Industrial
  Tribunal as an adjudicatory authority. Following observations
, of the Court are worth noting:
  6
    (1985) 3 sec 189
                                                                     H
904°      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


 A       "Therefore the view that while exercising power
         under Section 10(1) the functions performed by the
         appropri~te Government is ans administrative
         function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function
         is beyond the pale of controversy.
 B
         Now if the Government performs an administrative
         act while either making or refusing to make a
         reference under Section 10(1 ), it cannot delve into
         the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the
c        determination of lis. That would certainly be in
         excess of the power conferred by Section 10.
         Section 10 requires the appropriate Government
         to be satisfied that the industrial dispute exists or
         is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate
 D       Government to determine prima facie whether an
         industrial dispute exists or claim is frivolous or
         bogus or put forth extraneous and relevant reasons
         not for justice of industrial peace and harmony. Every
         administrative determination must be based on
 E       ground relevant and germane to the exercise of
         power. If the administrative determination is based
         on the relevant, extraneous or grounds not germane
         to the exercise of power, it is liable to be questioned
         in exercise of the power of judicial review."
 F
        16) From the aforesaid discussion, it clearly follows that
  even when making a reference by the appropriate Government
  is an administrative act, before making such a reference it
  has to form an opinion as to whether any industrial dispute
G exists or is apprehended. While forming this opinion, the
  appropriate Government is supposed to take all relevant facts
  into consideration touching upon this aspect. If the power is
  not exercised properly, it is amenable to judicial review. Thus,
H where an industrial dispute exists or his apprehended, but the
          PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                905
                 DEPARTMENT[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
   appropriate Government refuses to make reference, such a A
   refusal can be challenged in the court of law. Conversely, which
   is equally true, if the reference is made even when no dispute
  exists or is apprehended, such a reference will also be subject
  to judicial review.
                                                                    B
         17) We may refer to the judgment in the case of The
  Secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat &
  Ors. 7 In that case, the "appropriate Government" refused to
  make a reference on the ground that the concerned employee
  who had raised the dispute was not 'workman' within the C
  meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. While doing so, the
  Government considered the salary and allowances drawn by
  the employee as well as the nature of work performed by him,
  including his power to sanction expenses incurred by his Office.
  The concerned employee (respondent in the said case) filed D
  a writ petition against the order of the appropriate Government
  refusing to make reference and the High Court in that writ
  petition directed the Government to make the reference as to
· whether he was a workman. Appeal filed by the appellant
  therein was also dismissed and in these circumstances the E
  appellant preferred Special Leave Petition and that is how the
  matter came up for consideration before this Court. Granting
  leave and ultimately allowing the appeal of the appellant, this
  Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the F
  order of the Government refusing to make reference. Relying
  upon its earlier judgment in the case of C.P. Sarathy8, Prem
  Kakarv. State of Haryana &Anr. 9 , and Sultan Singh v. State
  of Haryana & Anr. 10 , the Court observed that the order under
  Section 10 of the Act was an administrative order and the G           .
  Government was entitled to go into the question whether
 7 c2000) 3      sec 93
 8 Note 3 above.
 9
      (1976) 3 sec 433
 10
      (1996) 2 sec 66
                                                                  H
.9P.6, .. ,.    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      '[2015]9'S.C.R ·


  A      industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and it will be only
         subjective satisfaction on the basis of material on records and
         being an administrative' order no /is is involved. The position
         in law was summarised as under:

   B           (i) the appropriate Government would not be
               justified in making a reference under Section 10 of
               the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and
               circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial
               dispute exists or apprehended and if such a
  c            reference is made it is desirable, wherever
               possible, for the Government to indicate the nature
               of dispute in the order of reference;

               (ii) the order of the appropriate Government making
  D            a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an
               administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-
               judicial one and the Court, ther~fore, cannot
               canvass the order of the reference closely to see if
               there was any material before the Government to
  E            support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-
               judicial order;

               (iii) an order made by the appropriate Government
               under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative
  F            order no /is is involved, as such an order is made
               on the subjective satisfaction of the Government;

               (iv) if it appears from the reasons given that the
               appropriate Government took into account any
.G             consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the
               Court may in a given case consider the case for a
               writ of mandamus and;

               (v) it would, however, be open to a party to show
               that what was referred by the Government was not
  H
               an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act.
        PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                       ,,
                                                                  907 -l
               DEPARTMENT [A K. SIKRI, J.]

      18) At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly'~ A
the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes.
Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the
Industrial DisputesActand under the Industrial DisputesAct
no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled
by series of judgments of this Court.                            B

       19) On the reading of these judgments, which are
discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some
decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of
considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference C
but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but
denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted
compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in
some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there
was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 D
of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of
time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to
become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at
this juncture.
                                                                   E
       20) As early as in 1959, this Court in the case of Shalimar
Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen 11 pointed out that there is no
limitation prescribed in making a reference of disputes to
Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act. Atthe same
time, the Court also remarked that the dispute should be F
referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after
conciliation proceedings have failed. In that case, reference
was made after four year of dispute having arisen. In these
circumstances, this Court held that relief of reinstatement
should not be given to the discharged workmen in such a G
belated and vague reference.

     21) Again, in Western India Match Company Ltd. 12 ,
though upholding the reference of dispute made nearly six years
11
     (1960)1SCR150                                                H
12
     Note 4 above
908       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A after the previous refusal to make the reference, the Court
  observed that in exercising its discretion to make reference,
  the Government will take into consideration the tirne which had
  lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it
  decides to reconsider it in the interest of justice and industrial
B peace. Following observations from this judgment need to be
  noticed for the purposes of the present case:
         "8. From the words used in Section 4(k) of the Act
         there can be no doubt that the Legislature has left
c        the question of making or refusing to make a
         reference for adjudication to the discretion of the
         Government. But the discretion is neither unfettered
          nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that
        ·there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by
D        the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended
         when the Government decides to refer it for
          adjudication. No reference thus can be made
         unless at the time when the Government decides
         to make it an industrial dispute between the
 E        employer and his employees either exists or is
         apprehended. Therefore, the expression "at any
         time", though seemingly without any limits, is
         governed by the context in which it appears.
         Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would
 F
         arise after conciliation proceedings have been
         gone through and the conciliation officer has made
         a failure report. But the Government need not wait
         until such a procedure has been completed. In an
G        urgent case, it can "at any time", i.e., even when
         such proceedings have not begun or are still
         pending, decide to referthe dispute for adjudication.
         The expression "at any time" thus takes in such
         cases as where the Government decides to make
H        a reference without waiting for conciliation
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                     909
       DEPARTMENT [AK. SIKRI, J.]

proceedings to begin or to be completed. As                  A
already stated, the expression "at any time" in the
context in which it is used postulates that a
reference can only be made if an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended. No reference is
contemplated by the section when the dispute is              B
not an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no
longer exists or is not apprehended, for instance,
where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which
there is an agreement or a settlement between the
parties or where the industry in question is no longer       c
in existence.

         xx             xx               xx
 13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders
                                                             D
its previous decision and decides to make the
reference, such a decision might cause
inconvenience to the employer because the
employer in the meantime might have acted on the
belief that there would be no proceedings by way             E
of adjudication of the dispute between him and his
workmen. Such a consideration would, we should
think, be taken into account by the Government
whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides
to reopen its previous decision as also the time             F
which has lapsed between its earlier decision and
the date when it decides to reconsider it. These
are matters which the Government would have to
take into account while deciding whether it should
reopen its former decision in the interest of justice        G
                                                         •
and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its
jurisdiction under Section 4(k) of the Act. Whether
the intervening period may be short or long wouid
necessarily depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, and therefore, in                H
910                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A               construing the expression "at any time" in Section
                4(k) it would be impossible to· lay down any limits
                to it."

           22) Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Companyv. State
8     of Andhra Pradesh 13 , the Andhra Pradesh High Court held
      that reference made nearly six years after the dispute
      amounted to inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable.

            23) In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty &
               14
C     Ors. , the Court cautioned that power of reference should be
      exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a
      mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed that power
      to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled
      matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory
D     limitation period, The Court not only reiterated that the courts·
      had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also
      made following pertinent observations on delay:

                "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the
E               appropriate Government to .exercise its powers
                under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power
                can be exercised at any point of time and to revive
                matters which had since been settled. Power is to
                be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner.
F               There appears to us to be no rational basis on which
                the Central Government has exercised powers in
                this case after a lapse of about seven years of the
                order dismissing the respondent from servic~. At
                the time reference was made no industrial dispute
G               existed or could be even said to have been
                apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not
                be the subject-matter of reference under Section
                10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to
      13
           (1964) i LLJ 622
H     1
       • (2000) 2   sec 455
PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                  911
       DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
be stale would depend on the facts and                    A
circumstances of each case. When the matter has
become final, it appears to us to be rather
incongruous that the reference be made under
Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the
present one. In fact it could be said that there was      B
no dispute pending at the time when the reference
In question was made. The only ground advanced
by the respondent was that two other employees
who were dismissed from service were reinstated.
Under what circumstances they were dismissed              c
and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned.
Demand raised by the respondent for raising an
industrial dispute was ex facie bad and
incompetent.
                                                          D
7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the
respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which
resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or
there was even any irregularity. He availed his
remedy of appeal under the rules governing his            E
conditions of service. It could not be said that in the
circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was ·
even apprehended after a lapse of about seven
years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever
                                                          F
a workman raises some dispute it does not
become an industrial dispute and the appropriate
Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make
the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as
an industrial dispute. The Central Government             G
lacked power to make reference both on the ground
of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of
the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing
or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is
to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The         H
912    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     present reference is destructive to the industrial
      peace and defeats the very object and purpose of
      the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the
      High Court seeking an order to quash the reference
      in question.
B
      8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a
      reference has been made under Section 10 of the
      Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and
      the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in
c     the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a
      correct proposition to state. An administrative order
      which does not take into consideration statutory
      requirements or travels outside that is certainly
      subject to judicial review, limited though it might be.
D     The High Court can exercise its powers under Article
      226 of the Constitution to consider the question of
      the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National
      Engg. Industries Ltd. v. Staff] of Rajasthan {(2000)
      1 SCC 371} this Court observed:
E
      "24. It will be thus seen that High Court has
      jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is
      an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and
      none apprehended which could be the subject
F     matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial
      Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a
      question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal,
      which could be examined by the High Court in Its
      writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial
G     Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the
      appropriate Government with power to make the
      reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate
      it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or
      apprehended the appropriate Government lacks
H
      power to make any reference."
         PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                 913
                DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

       24) Even in Sapan Kumar Pandit15 , the Court A
emphasized that limitation period for making the reference is
co-extensive with the existence of dispute, meaning thereby
that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision
was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference.
In the facts of that case, the Court found that dispute remained B
alive and, therefore, reference was legally made. What is
significant is that the Court in that judgment interpreted the
words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act and
clarified that though these words, prima facie, indicate that
there is no time limit for making the reference, but such a C
meaning cannot be assigned to these words and the real test
is the existence of a dispute cin the date of reference for
adjudication. We would like to reproduce paras 8 and 9
elaborating this principle:
                                                                 D
         "8. The above section is almost in tune with Section
         10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the
         difference between these two provisions does not
         relate to the points at issue in this case. Though no
         time limit is fixed for making the reference for a       E
         dispute for adjudication, could any State
         Government revive a dispute which had submerged
         in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindled by
         making a reference of it to adjudication? The words
                                                                  F
         "at any time" as used in the section are prima facie
         indicator to a period without boundary. But such an
         interpretation making the power unending would be
         pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-
         section itself to indicate that the time has some        G
         circumscription. The words ''where the Government
         is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is
         apprehended" have to be read in conjunction with
.,.,,_
15
       __the words "at any time". They are, in a way,
     Note 2 above                                                 H
914     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A      complimentary to each other. The Government's
       power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication
       has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be
       done only so long as the dispute exists. In other
       words, the period envisaged by the enduring
B      expression "at any time" terminates with the eclipse
       of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if
       the dispute existed on the day when the reference
       was made by the Government, it is idle (sic- ideal)
       to ascertain the number of years which elapsed
c      since the commencement of the dispute to
       determine whether the delay would have
       extinguished the power of the Government to make
       the reference.
D       9. Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute
        in existence on the date of reference for
        adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then
        the Government's power to make a reference would
        have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer
E       is in positive terms the Government could have
        exercised the power whatever be the range of the
        period which lapsed since the inception of the
        dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government
        in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility
F
        of what another party would think, whether any
        dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if
        in the opinion of the Government the dispute
        existed then the Government could make the
G       reference. The only authority which can form such
        an opinion is the Government. If the Government
        decides to make the reference, there is a
        presumption that in the opinion of the Government,
      ·there existed such a dispute."
H
        PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                     915
               DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

      25) In Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana A
Roadways, Hissar16 , this Court scanned through most of the
available case law on the subject and emphasized that the
words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act would
imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court
held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power B
and referred the dispute to Labour Court within reasonable
time considering circumstances in which the appellant therein
was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for
delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. In that case,
it was found that there was a criminal case pending against C
the workman and further the Management had assured him
that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed
that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of
evidence due to the said delay.
                                                                  D
        ,26) The aforesaid case law depicts the following:
          (a) Law of limitation does not apply to the
          proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act,
          1947.                                                      E

          (b) The words 'at any time' used in Section 10would
          support that there is no period of limitation in making
          an order of reference.
                                                                     F
          (c) At the same time, the appropriate Government
          has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is
          still existing or live dispute and has not become a
          stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be
          refused.                                                  . G
          (d) Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/
          non-existent at the time when the workman
         ·approaches the appropriate Government is an
16
     (2014) 10 sec 301                                               H
916       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A        aspect which would depend upon the facts and
         circumstances of each case and there cannot be
         any hard and fast rule regarding the time for making
         the order of reference.

B       27) If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid
  perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments.
  At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the
  reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the
  workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding
C the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions,
  this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated
  or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the
  reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be
  kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to
D be discussed with some elaboration, which would include
  discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by
  the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to
  embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central
  aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the
E dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government
  had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour
  Court/ lndu:;;trial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming
  before it.

F       28) In this process, let us first examine as to what would
  constitute 'industrial dispute' because of the simple reason
  that the appropriate Government has power to refer what is
  known as an 'industrial dispute' and likewise the Labour Court/
  Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide if there is an
G industrial dispute. We are not go"ing into the entire gamut of
  what constitutes 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of
  Section 2(k} of the Act. Our focus is only on the aspect that
  what can be referred should be the dispute which is existing
H and in praesenti when the reference ::; sought. To put it
    PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                     917
           DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
otherwise, if it no longer r~mains an industrial dispute or A
industrial dispute 'does not exist' at that time, there would not
be any question on making reference or adjudicating the matter
as it is not an industrial dispute.

      29) Section 2(k) of the IDA defines 'industrial dispute'   B
and it reads as under:
     "'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference
     between employers and employers, or between
     employers and workmen, or between workmen and
     workmen, which is connected with the employment
                                                                 c
     or non-employment or the terms of employment or
     with the conditions of labour, of any persons;"
     30) As per Section 2A dispute relating to discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination of an individual are also D
deemed as industrial dispute and, therefore, an individual is
given right to raise these disputes.

       31) The term 'industrial dispute' connotes a real and
substantial difference having some element of persistency, and E
likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the
community. The expression 'dispute or difference' as used in
the definition, therefore, means a controversy fairly definite and
of real substance, connected with the employment or non-
employment or with the terms of employment or the conditions F
of labour of any person, and is one in which the contesting
parties are directly interested in maintaining the respective
contentions.

     32) To understand the meaning of the word 'dispute', it G
would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary
meaning of the term:
     'Dispute': "to argue about, to contend for, to oppose
     by argument' to call in question - to argue or debate       H
918         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A           (with about or over), - a contest with words; an
            argument; a debate; a quarrel;
            33) Blacks law dictionary, 5th Edition, page 424 defines
      'dispute' as under:
B          " A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or
           rights; an assertion of a right, claim or demand on
            one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on
           the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for
           which a suit is brought and upon which issue is
c
           joined, and in relation to which jurors are cal.led and
           witnesses examined."

             34) Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand
      is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other
D     side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an 'industrial
      dispute' cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is
      made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the
      employer. How such demand should be raised and at what
E     stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this
      aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no
      demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action
      arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be
      the consequence if after the termination of the services of
F     petitioner on April 01, 1985, the petitioner does not dispute
      his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand .
      for reinstatement for number of years? Can it still be said that
      there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make
      such demand after lapse of several years and on making such
G     demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can
      always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after
      the termination of the services when the workmen did not raise
      any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer
      presumed that the workmen has accepted his termination and,
H     therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It
    PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                     919
           DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

can be said that workmen, in such a case, acquiesced into        A
the act of the employer in terminating his services and,
therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse
of several years make a demand and then convert it into a
'dispute' what had otherwise become a buried issue.
                                                                 B
     35) Let us examine the matter from another aspect, viz.
!aches and delays and acquiescence.

       36) It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence
that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even c
when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute
relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have
coined the doctrine of !aches and delays as well as doctrine of
acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached
the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for D
bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of !aches
is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats
equities".

       37) This principle is applied in those cases where E
discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as specific
performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment
of receiver etc. These principles are also applied in the writ·
petitions filed under Articles 32 and 226 of Constitution of India.
In such cases, Courts can still refuse relief where the delay on F
the petitioner's part has prejudiced the respondent even though
the petitioner might have come to Court within the period
prescribed by the Limitation Act.

      38) Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees G
another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and
makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot
afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine
of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did
not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful H
920         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain
      against that alleged wrong.

        39) Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is
  prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the
s Court, ifthe action is not brought within that prescribed period
  the aggrieved party looses remedy and cannot enforce his legal
  right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other
  cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long
  period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery
C provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can
  be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of
  unexplained delay and !aches and/or on the presumption that
  such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of
  other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity
D are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if
  a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such
  a right is non-existent. ·

            40) On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise
E     the legal position as under:

         An industrial dispute has to be referred by the
  appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman
  cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly,
F except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the
  Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those
  cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion
  that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. The
  words 'industrial dispute exists' are of paramount importance
G unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the
  dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute
  may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus,
  existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine
  qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of
H taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not,
    PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                         921
           DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the       A
dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function.
At the same time, on the basis of material on record,
satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the
apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such
existence/apprehension of industri~I dispute, thus, becomes          B
a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective
satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not
concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there
is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows
would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or      C
difference arises when one party make a demand and other
party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of
cases that before raising the industrial disp.ute making of
demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if          D
the services of a workman are terminated and he does not
make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful
termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time
and raises the same after considerable lapse of period,
whether it can be said thafindustrial dispute still exist. Since     E
there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to
raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is
raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such
a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of
limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that     F
there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to
demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and
there are !aches and delays, such delay has not resulted into
making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if
the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these       G
!aches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances
discloses that issue is still alive, delay would notcome in his
way because of the reason that law of limitation has no
application. On the other hand, if because of such delay
dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead",      H
922         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A    then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred.
     Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice
     after his termination, questioning the termination and
     demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were
     discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to
 B sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there
     were assuran~s by the Management to the effect that he would
     be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he
     did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the
     labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the
 C remedy under Section 2AoftheAct. In such a scenario, it can
     be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the
     workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very
     example, even· if the notice of demand was sent but itdid not
     evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection
 0
     by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and
     thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can
     be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and
     rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the
 E said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches
     the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which
     was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed
   . on the ground that Civil. Court did not have jurisdiction to
     enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant
 F any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed
     or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under
     the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as
     the workman had not accepted the termination but was
     agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, In
 G those cases where there was no agitation by the workman
     against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and
     the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed
     that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of
     termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is
 H raised it had become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'.
    PRABHAKAR v. JOINT DIRECTOR, SERICULTURE                       92a
           DEPARTMENT [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse A
to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/.
Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute"
within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no
relief can be granted.
                                                                   B
        41) We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where
the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly,
it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay
into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still
open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back C
wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead
of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this
issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such
matters.
                                                                   D
      42) To summarise, although there is no limitation
prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section
10( 1) of the Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to
consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference.
The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of E
~ny limitation in making an order of reference and laws of
limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act.
However, t~e policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale
claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed
inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay F
as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the
entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary
also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely
to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid
dislocation of an industry.                                        G

      43) On the application of the aforesaid principle to the
facts of the present case, we are of the view that High Court
correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such
a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without   H
924          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 9 S.C.R


A     any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate
      .Government had not jurisdiction or power to make reference
      of a non-existing dispute.

            44) This special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
 B
      Nidhi Jain                                        SLP dismissed.