P. ANJANAPPA (D) BY LRSversusA.P. NANJUNDAPPA & ORS.

                [2025] 11 S.C.R. 423 : 2025 INSC 1286

                        P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs
                                   v.
                        A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 3934 of 2006)
                              06 November 2025
      [Vikram Nath,* Sandeep Mehta and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the registered release deeds are valid and
       binding, and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and
       share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3; whether
       the document styled as the palupatti-partition deed can be relied
       upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status as
       well as the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment; and
       what constitutes the partitionable estate and how the shares are
       to be worked out inter se the parties, including the treatment of
       Schedule “B” property and item no. 17 of “C” schedule and the extent
       to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.

                                  Headnotes†
       Family settlement – Joint family property – Registered
       release deeds document styled as the palupatti- partition
       deed – Reliance – Suit for partition and separate possession –
       Suit schedule properties comprised of three parts:
       Schedule A-immovable properties belong to one, (now
       deceased), continued as joint family properties; Schedule B -
       immovable properties purchased under a registered sale deed;
       Schedule C-movables, including, inter alia, an item representing
       amounts realised by way of rent from the Schedule B
       properties – Parties trace lineage to one-common ancester –
       Dispute regarding partition of Schedule B properties – Suit
       for partition and separate possession of their alleged shares
       in the suit schedules, together with consequential accounts
       including mesne profits by the plaintiff no. 1 and 2 –
       Plaintiff contended that the said properties blended with the
       income of the joint family and were also subject to partition
       whereas the defendant contended that during the lifetime of
       deceased registered release deed has been executed and
       after deceased’s death partition was recorded in a palupatti-
* Author
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       partition deed, pursuant to which they had been in separate
       possession and enjoyment – Trial Court decreed the suit by
       a preliminary decree – In appeal thereagainst, the High Court
       dismissed the appeal – Correctness:
       Held: Under Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought
       about by an unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise,
       and a writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the
       fact of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent
       possession – Family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied
       upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed
       the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral
       use – Having perused the original records, including the registered
       instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous
       revenue extracts, both the registered release deed are duly proved
       and carry legal effect – One registered release deed severed plaintiff
       no. 2 from the coparcenary in 1956 and bars any claim by him to
       the joint family estate, and the other severed defendant no. 3 from
       the coparcenary in 1967 and bars any claim by him to the joint
       family estate – In consequence, as on the death of the propositus
       in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary comprised only plaintiff no. 1
       and defendant no. 5 – Unregistered partition deed, including the
       palupatti may be relied upon for the limited collateral purposes of
       proving severance of the joint family status and title, explaining the
       nature of possession, recording the arrangement made thereunder,
       and evidencing the parties’ subsequent conduct – Document styled
       as palupatti, is admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes
       of proving that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance of
       joint status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 and that
       each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the properties allotted
       under the partition deed and shall not be treated as a conveyance
       that creates or extinguishes rights by itself – Partitionable pool shall
       consist of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C – Shares
       over this pool fixed for plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5, each of the
       five daughters, predeceased daughter to be given effect in favour
       of defendant no. 2 as representing her estate – Plaintiff no. 2
       and defendant no. 3 take no share – Schedule B and item 17 of
       Schedule C are excluded from the hotchpot – Defendant no. 5 and
       defendant no. 6 shall hold these in equal halves – Judgment and
       decree and the preliminary decree set aside – Fresh preliminary
       decree substituted in the stated terms. [Paras 7.9, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5,
       8.9, 10, 11]
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                           425

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


                              Case Law Cited
     Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC
     353; Elumalai v. M. Kamala [2023] 1 SCR 261 : (2023) 13 SCC
     27; Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama [2018] 10 SCR 503 :
     (2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13; Yellapu Uma Maheswari v. Buddha
     Jagadheeswararao (2015) 16 SCC 787; K.G. Shivalingappa v. G.S.
     Eswarappa (2004) 12 SCC 189; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa
     [2019] 8 SCR 212 : (2019) 6 SCC 409; Kalyani v. Narayanan
     (1980) Supp. SCC 298; Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan
     Singh (2006) 1 SCC 148 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Evidence Act, 1872; Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Hindu
     Succession Act, 1956.

                             List of Keywords
     Partition; Separate possession and enjoyment; Registered release
     deeds; Share entitlements; Palupatti; Partition deed; Collateral
     purpose; Severance of joint status; Subsequent possession and
     enjoyment; Partitionable estate; Joint family properties; Registered
     sale deed; Preliminary decree; Coparcenary; Joint family estate;
     Unregistered partition deed; Limited collateral use; Conveyance;
     Creates or extinguishes rights; Partition by metes and bounds.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3934
     of 2006
     From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2005 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No. 750 of 1994

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     G L Vishwanath, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Ms. Lalit Mohini
     Bhat, Ms. Nayana Tara B G, Rahul Jain.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Shekhar Devasa, Sr. Adv, Radhakrishna S Hegde, Prakash
     Chandra Sharma, Rajeev Singh, T. Muthanna, Manish Tiwari,
     M/S. Devasa & Co.
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                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Vikram Nath, J.

1.     The present civil appeal arises from the final judgment and decree
       dated 30 August 2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
       Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 750 of 1994 (hereinafter,
       “impugned judgment”), whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal
       and affirmed the judgment and preliminary decree dated 19 August
       1994 rendered by the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District,
       in Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 decreeing a suit for partition and
       separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The appellants
       before this Court are the legal heirs of late P. Anjanappa, who was
       arrayed as defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, and for ease of
       reference the parties shall hereinafter be described by their status
       before the Trial Court, with the appellants being referred to as
       defendant no. 5.
2.     The facts giving rise to the present case are set out hereafter.
       2.1. The parties trace their lineage to one Pillappa, who is stated
            to be the common ancestor. His widow Muniyamma was
            arrayed as defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court. The plaintiffs
            pleaded that Pillappa had four sons, namely plaintiff no. 1 A.
            P. Nanjundappa, plaintiff no. 2 Venkataswamappa, defendant
            no. 3 Sreeramappa, and defendant no. 5 P. Anjanappa, and five
            daughters, namely plaintiff no. 3 Narayanamma, plaintiff no. 4
            Sonnamma, plaintiff no. 5 Anjanamma, and defendant no. 4
            Lakshmamma, besides one daughter who had predeceased and
            whose branch was represented in the suit as defendant no. 2.
            Defendant no. 6 Muniswamappa is the husband of plaintiff no.
            3 and is not a member of the joint family. Defendant no. 7 is
            a lessee in respect of certain items of the suit properties. The
            other defendants are members of the wider family as reflected
            in the array of parties.
       2.2. The suit schedule properties comprised of three parts. Schedule
            “A” described immovable properties said to have originally
            belonged to Pillappa and thereafter to have continued as joint
            family properties in the hands of the coparcenary comprising
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                        427

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


          the parties to the suit. Schedule “B” described immovable
          properties purchased under a registered sale deed dated 25
          April 1974 in the joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant
          no. 6. Schedule “C” described movables, including, inter alia,
          an item representing amounts realised by way of rent from the
          Schedule “B” properties.
     2.3. The plaintiffs’ case, in brief, was that Schedule “A” properties
          were joint family properties liable to partition and that Schedule
          “B” properties, though standing in the joint names of defendant
          no. 5 and defendant no. 6, had been acquired from and blended
          with the income of the joint family and were therefore also subject
          to partition. It was further asserted that defendant no. 7 had
          been inducted as yearly lessee in respect of items comprised
          in Schedule “B” and that defendant no. 5 had collected the
          lease amounts, which were liable to be brought to account
          as part of Schedule “C”. The plaint also adverted to certain
          agricultural operations, including a casuarina plantation, and
          claimed accounting of the proceeds.
     2.4. Defendant no. 5 contested the suit. His principal defences,
          as pleaded were: that plaintiff no. 2 had during the lifetime of
          Pillappa executed a registered release deed; that defendant
          no. 3 had, in the year 1967, executed a registered release deed
          relinquishing his rights in the joint family properties; and that
          after the death of Pillappa in the year 1969 there had been,
          on 11 February 1972, a partition between plaintiff no. 1 and
          defendant no. 5 in the presence of panchayatdars, recorded in a
          palupatti (‘Palupatti’ means partition deed or a family settlement
          agreement) pursuant to which they had been in separate
          possession and enjoyment and separate entries had been
          made in the revenue records. Defendant no. 5 further pleaded
          that Schedule “B” properties were his self-acquisitions, that
          defendant no. 6 was only a name lender, and that the plaintiffs’
          sisters had been given in marriage with customary expenses
          and were not entitled to shares in the immovable properties.
     2.5. Defendant no. 6, though not a member of the joint family,
          was a joint purchaser of Schedule “B” and was impleaded on
          that footing. Defendant no. 7, being the lessee in respect of
          Schedule “B”, was impleaded to answer the claim for rendition
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            of accounts of rent. The remaining defendants were added as
            necessary parties to an action for partition.
       2.6. On 2 July 1987, plaintiff no. 1 and plaintiff no. 2 instituted
            Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 before the Court of the City Civil
            Judge, Bangalore Rural District, seeking partition and separate
            possession of their alleged shares in the suit schedules, together
            with consequential accounts including mesne profits.
       2.7. Upon service of summons, defendant no. 5 entered appearance
            and contested the suit. Defendant no. 6, though he did not at
            first file a written statement, lodged a counter claim asserting
            half share in Schedule “B” properties as a joint purchaser and
            sought a corresponding share in the amounts described as
            item no. 17 in Schedule “C”. Defendant no. 7 filed a written
            statement admitting its status as lessee in respect of Schedule
            “B” and stating that rents had been paid to defendant no. 5 until
            disputes arose between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6,
            whereafter the lessee expressed willingness to deposit rents
            in court. Defendants nos. 1 to 4 did not contest the matter and
            remained absent.
3.     The Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence,
       decreed the suit for partition and separate possession by a preliminary
       decree dated 19 August 1994. The Trial Court’s decision was based
       on the following reasons:
       3.1. In relation to Schedule “A”, the Trial Court held that the
            properties were joint family properties. It rejected the defence
            of a concluded partition as of 11 February 1972 on the basis
            of an unregistered palupatti. The Trial Court recorded that
            the document, being unregistered, could not be received in
            evidence to prove either severance in status or the quantum
            of shares, and that the surrounding revenue materials did not
            demonstrate that the alleged partition had been acted upon.
            The Trial Court noted that entries in the revenue records
            reflected possession by inheritance and management rather
            than by partition, that there was no subdivision or demarcation
            in accordance with a partition, and that the conduct relied upon
            by defendant no. 5, including a subsequent alienation said
            to discharge family debts, was inconsistent with a complete
            earlier severance.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                        429

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


     3.2. In relation to Schedule “B”, the Trial Court found that the
          properties were purchased in the joint names of defendant no. 5
          and defendant no. 6 under a registered sale deed dated 25 April
          1974 and that the lease granted in favour of defendant no. 7
          had been executed jointly by defendant no. 5 and defendant
          no. 6. On an appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence,
          including the admissions elicited from defendant no. 5, the Trial
          Court rejected the plea that defendant no. 6 was a mere name
          lender and negatived the contention that the entire of Schedule
          “B” was the self-acquisition of defendant no. 5. The Trial Court
          concluded that defendant no. 6 was entitled to a half share in
          Schedule “B” and to a half share in the moneys represented by
          item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, with the remaining half of those
          items forming part of the family pool for partition.
     3.3. In relation to the release deeds set up by defendant no. 5, the
          Trial Court held that the registered release deed attributed to
          plaintiff no. 2 was not shown to have been acted upon, since
          the proponent did not lead convincing evidence to establish
          separation of plaintiff no. 2 from the joint family or exclusion of
          his claim to partition. As regards defendant no. 3, the Trial Court
          noticed the release deed and treated him as having separated
          for the purpose of survivorship, yet held that he would participate
          to the extent of a share in the notional accretion arising on the
          death of the father. On that footing, the Trial Court declined to
          exclude either plaintiff no. 2 or defendant no. 3 from the suit
          entirely.
     3.4. The computation of shares was undertaken on the basis that, at
          the time of the death of Pillappa in the year 1969, the coparcenary
          consisted of the father and three sons, namely plaintiff no. 1,
          plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, with defendant no. 3 being
          treated as separated for the purpose of survivorship. A notional
          partition was therefore posited to the extent of 1/4 in favour of
          Pillappa. The Trial Court then proceeded on the footing that
          the notional 1/4th share of Pillappa devolved in equal measure
          among nine sharers represented in the suit, namely plaintiff
          no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, defendant no. 5, the four daughters, the
          branch of the predeceased daughter represented by defendant
          no. 2, and defendant no. 3. On that basis, each of the nine
          received an accretion of 1/36, and plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff
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            no. 2, and defendant no. 5 each took, in addition, 1/4 as their
            coparcenary share, yielding a total of 5/18 for each of plaintiff
            no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, and 1/36 for each
            of plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4,
            defendant no. 3, and defendant no. 2. The share of defendant
            no. 6 was determined separately as 1/2 of Schedule “B” and
            1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, outside the family pool, in
            terms of the findings recorded in relation to those items.
       3.5. The Trial Court directed an enquiry into mesne profits and
            consequential accounts, including in respect of the lease moneys
            pertaining to Schedule “B”, to be worked out in the final decree
            proceedings in accordance with the shares so declared.
4.     Aggrieved by the preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994, defendant
       no. 5 preferred Regular First Appeal no. 750 of 1994 before the High
       Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. By the impugned judgment dated
       30 August 2005, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed
       the decree of the Trial Court with the following observations:
       4.1. The High Court noted the defence of defendant no. 5 that
            there had been a partition on 11 February 1972 reduced into
            a palupatti and that the revenue entries thereafter reflected
            separate possession. Upon examining the document and the
            surrounding materials, the High Court held that the palupatti,
            being unregistered, was inadmissible to prove either severance
            of the joint family status or the quantification of shares. It further
            found, on an appraisal of the mutation extracts, record of rights,
            and other revenue papers, that the entries indicated possession
            by inheritance and management rather than pursuant to a
            partition; that there was no phodi or sub-division (‘Phodi’ means
            process of surveying and demarcating land) corresponding to
            a partition; and that a subsequent alienation reciting discharge
            of joint family debts was inconsistent with an earlier partition.
            The plea of an effective partition as on 11 February 1972 was
            therefore rejected.
       4.2. In relation to the release attributed to plaintiff no. 2, the High
            Court concurred with the Trial Court that the document had not
            been shown to have been acted upon, and that there was no
            reliable evidence of plaintiff no. 2 having separated so as to forfeit
            a claim in partition or in the devolution of the notional share of
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                          431

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


          the father. As regards the release attributed to defendant no. 3,
          the High Court referred to the nature of the instrument and the
          applicable stamp requirements and held that the proponent had
          not established its efficacy to exclude defendant no. 3 entirely.
          The High Court supplemented the reasons recorded by the
          Trial Court and declined to disturb the inclusion of defendant
          no. 3 for purposes of computing shares.
     4.3. On Schedule “B”, the High Court affirmed the findings that the
          properties were purchased jointly in the names of defendant
          no. 5 and defendant no. 6 and that the lease in favour of
          defendant no. 7 was executed by both of them. Having regard
          to the admissions in the evidence of defendant no. 5 and the
          tenor of the documents, the High Court rejected the contention
          that defendant no. 6 was a mere name lender and upheld his
          entitlement to a one half share in Schedule “B” and a one half
          share in the moneys represented by item no. 17 of Schedule
          “C”. It held that only the remaining one half of those items would
          enter the family pool for partition.
     4.4. On the basis of the above conclusions, the High Court affirmed
          the computation adopted by the Trial Court, namely that plaintiff
          no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5 would each be entitled
          to 5/18 in the family pool and that plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4,
          plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4, defendant no. 3, and defendant
          no. 2 would each be entitled to 1/36, with defendant no. 6
          holding 1/2 of Schedule “B” and 1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule
          “C” outside the family pool.
     4.5. Consequential directions were issued for disbursal of rents
          earlier deposited in respect of Schedule “B” in proportion to
          the shares as affirmed, and certain ministerial corrections in
          the cause title were permitted.
5.   Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the first appeal, the appellants,
     who are the legal heirs of defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, have
     preferred the present civil appeal. Respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein
     are plaintiff nos. 1 to 5 before the Trial Court. Respondent no. 6
     herein is defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court, respondent no. 7
     is defendant no. 2, respondent no. 8 is defendant no. 3, respondent
     no. 9 is defendant no. 6, respondent no. 10 is defendant no. 4, and
     respondent no. 11 is defendant no. 7. As already stated, the parties
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       shall hereinafter be referred to by their descriptions as they stood
       before the Trial Court.
6.     Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and the
       rival submissions of the respective parties, the questions that fall for
       our determination are as follows:
       I.     Whether the registered release deeds dated 09.11.1956
              (Ex.D 15) and 14.09.1967 (Ex.D-16) are valid and binding, and
              if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and share
              entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3.
       II.    Whether the document dated 11.02.1972 styled as the palupatti
              (Ex.D-17 with schedule Ex.D-17(a)) can be relied upon for
              collateral purposes to establish severance of status as well as
              the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment.
       III.   Consequent upon the answers to the above, what constitutes
              the partitionable estate and how the shares are to be worked
              out inter se the parties, including the treatment of Schedule
              “B” property and item no. 17 of “C” schedule and the extent to
              which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.

7.     Issue I - Validity and effect of the two release deeds.
       7.1. The parties are at variance on whether plaintiff no. 2 and
            defendant no. 3 had, prior to the death of the propositus in
            1969, effectively severed themselves from the joint family and
            abandoned all claim to its estate (and to the father’s share
            upon notional partition). The plaintiffs contend that the alleged
            releases were either not proved, or, if proved, were ineffectual
            for want of being “acted upon.” The appellant (defendant no. 5)
            maintains that both instruments are registered releases executed
            for consideration, as borne out by the parties’ subsequent
            conduct, and operate to exclude plaintiff no. 2 and defendant
            no. 3 from any share.
       7.2. Having perused the original records, including the registered
            instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous
            revenue extracts placed before us, we are satisfied that both
            Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are duly proved and carry legal effect.
       7.3. As regards Ex.D-15 (09.11.1956), it is a registered deed
            by which plaintiff no. 2 unequivocally released his right and
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                         433

            P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


            interest in the joint family and in the estate of his father in
            consideration of a cash payment. It recites, in clear terms, a
            complete severance of all claims save the bond of blood. The
            deed was produced and exhibited without objection; there was
            no cross-examination of defendant no. 5 on its execution or
            contents; and plaintiff no. 2 did not present himself for cross-
            examination to dislodge the document. In these circumstances,
            the statutory presumption that attaches to a registered instrument
            operates, and, in the case of Ex.D-15 which was more than
            thirty years old when tendered, the presumption under Section
            90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/Section 89 of the Bharatiya
            Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is also attracted. The burden to rebut
            the deed’s genuineness and effect lay squarely on those who
            impeached it. No credible rebuttal was led. This principle has
            been reiterated by this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal1 in the
            following terms:
                   “27. There is a presumption that a registered
                   document is validly executed. A registered document,
                   therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The
                   onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads
                   evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant
                   case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the
                   said presumption.”
     7.4. The Trial Court declined to give effect to Ex.D-15 on two grounds:
          first, that the deed was not mentioned in the later palupatti;
          and second, that it was not shown to have been “acted upon.”
          In our considered opinion, both reasons are misconceived. A
          release by a coparcener for consideration operates immediately
          to divest his subsisting coparcenary interest; it does not depend
          for its efficacy on any further act of implementation. Silence in
          a later, separate memorandum does not undo a concluded,
          registered relinquishment inter partes, particularly when the
          deed is produced from proper custody and stands unchallenged
          in cross-examination.
     7.5. We accordingly hold Ex.D-15 to be valid and binding and to
          have the effect of removing plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary


1   (2006) 5 SCC 353.
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            from 1956 onwards. To the extent Ex.D-15 adverts to the
            father’s separate or future entitlement, we treat the covenant,
            consideration and long-standing conduct as creating an equitable
            estoppel against plaintiff no. 2 setting up a contrary claim now.
            The estoppel effect of similar release deeds was observed by
            this Court in Elumalai v. M. Kamala2 as follows:
                   “16. This Court went on to approve the view taken
                   by the High Court of Allahabad in Latafat Husain v.
                   Hidayat Husain [Latafat Husain v. Hidayat Husain,
                   1936 SCC OnLine All 315 : AIR 1936 All 573] . The
                   Court found as follows : (Gulam Abbas case [Gulam
                   Abbas v. Haji Kayyum Ali, (1973) 1 SCC 1] , SCC
                   pp. 4-5, paras 5 & 7)
                   “5. … With due respect, we are unable to concur with
                   the view [Abdul Kafoor v. Abdul Razack, 1958 SCC
                   OnLine Mad 129] of the Madras High Court that a
                   renunciation of an expectancy, as a purported but
                   legally ineffective transfer, is struck by Section 23
                   of the Indian Contract Act. As it would be void as a
                   transfer at all there was no need to rely on Section
                   23, Contract Act. If there was no “transfer” of property
                   at all, which was the correct position, but a simple
                   contract, which could only operate in future, it was
                   certainly not intended to bring about an immediate
                   transfer which was all that the rule of Muslim law
                   invalidated. The real question was whether, quite
                   apart from any transfer or contract, the declarations in
                   the deeds of purported relinquishment and receipt of
                   valuable consideration could not be parts of a course
                   of conduct over a number of years which, taken as a
                   whole, created a bar against a successful assertion of
                   a right to property when that right actually came into
                   being. An equitable estoppel operates, if its elements
                   are established, as a rule of evidence preventing the
                   assertion of rights which may otherwise exist.
                   ***


2   (2023) 13 SCC 27.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                             435

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


                7. Sir Roland Wilson, in his “Anglo Mohamadan Law”
                (p. 260, para 208) states the position thus:
                ‘For the sake of those readers who are familiar with the
                joint ownership of father and son according to the most
                widely prevalent school of Hindu Law, it is perhaps
                desirable to state explicitly that in Mohammedan,
                as in Roman and English Law, nemo est heres
                viventis………a living person has no heir. An heir
                apparent or presumptive has no such reversionary
                interest as would enable him to object to any sale
                or gift made by the owner in possession; See Abdul
                Wahid [Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi, 1885 SCC
                OnLine PC 4 : (1884-85) 12 IA 91 : ILR (1885) 11 Cal
                597] which was followed in Hasan Ali [Hasan Ali v.
                Nazo, 1889 SCC OnLine All 29 : ILR (1889) 11 All
                456] . The converse is also true : a renunciation by
                an expectant heir in the lifetime of his ancestor is not
                valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of
                the inheritance.’
                This is a correct statement, so far as it goes, of the law,
                because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit
                cannot bind the expectant heir’s conduct in future.
                But, if the expectant heir goes further and receives
                consideration and so conducts himself as to mislead
                an owner into not making dispositions of his property
                inter vivos the expectant heir could be debarred from
                setting up his right when it does unquestionably
                vest in him. In other words, the principle of estoppel
                remains untouched by this statement.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

                17. The property i.e. ‘A’ schedule, was not the
                ancestral property of Shri Chandran. Shri Chandran
                would have acquired rights over the same only if his
                father had died intestate. He was, thus, only an heir
                apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere
                spes successionis ineffective to convey any right. By
                the mere execution of release deed, in other words,
436                                                        [2025] 11 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


                 in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This
                 is for the simple reason that the transferor, namely,
                 the father of the appellants did not have any right at
                 all which he could transfer or relinquish. However,
                 if his conduct was such that he could be estopped
                 then the execution of the release deed would imperil
                 his right and therefore cast an irremovable shadow
                 on the claim of the appellants as well unless we find
                 merit in other submissions of Shri Siddharth Iyer,
                 learned counsel for the appellants.”
       7.6. Turning to Ex.D-16 (14.09.1967), it is a registered deed by
            which defendant no. 3 relinquished all his rights, title and
            interest in favour of the father and the then coparceners, and
            contemporaneously received seven items of property. Execution
            was admitted in the pleadings; defendant no. 3 entered the
            box and accepted the deed; and the instrument was exhibited.
            The courts below treated Ex.D-16 with unwarranted scepticism.
            The Trial Court discounted it, broadly on “not acted upon” and
            recital-based reasoning. The High Court, while accepting that
            the deed partook the character of an instrument of partition for
            stamp purposes, declined to give effect to it on the footing that
            proper valuation and stamp duty were not demonstrated and
            that, in any case, it had not been acted upon. That approach
            is unsustainable for multiple reasons.
       7.7. Firstly, the deed is registered and was admitted in evidence;
            no timely, specific objection on stamp duty was pressed to a
            logical conclusion at the stage of marking, and the instrument
            having been received in evidence, its admissibility on that
            score cannot be re-agitated at the appellate stage. Secondly,
            even if one were to regard Ex.D-16 through the lens of a family
            arrangement, the law leans strongly in favour of upholding
            such settlements among close relations where consideration
            has passed and possession has followed. Here, there is both
            consideration and unequivocal admission of execution. Thirdly,
            the “acted upon” objection is misplaced on the facts and in
            principle. The record shows consistent, post-1967 conduct
            aligning with the break-away of defendant no. 3: he did not
            assert coparcenary incidents thereafter; the subsequent family
            arrangement of 11.02.1972 proceeded between plaintiff no. 1
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                       437

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


          and defendant no. 5; and the revenue course and dealings
          which we shall discuss while considering the palupatti are plainly
          inconsistent with defendant no. 3 continuing as a coparcener.
          Where execution is admitted, consideration is shown, and later
          conduct corroborates severance, courts ought not to defeat a
          registered relinquishment by demanding proof of superadded
          formalities.
     7.8. We therefore disapprove the principal reasons furnished by
          the Trial Court and the High Court. The Trial Court erred in
          treating “non-mention” in a later document and an asserted want
          of “acting upon” as fatal to Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 despite the
          admissions and presumptions that attached to them. The High
          Court compounded the error by invoking stamp characterisation
          to withhold effect from Ex.D-16 after admitting it in evidence and
          after acknowledging its tenor, and by failing to appreciate that
          the deeds carried their own operative force and were reinforced
          by subsequent conduct.
     7.9. On the cumulative appraisal of record, we hold that Ex.D-15
          severed plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary with effect from
          09.11.1956 and bars any claim by him to the joint family estate.
          Moreover, we also hold that Ex.D-16 severed defendant no. 3
          from the coparcenary with effect from 14.09.1967 and bars any
          claim by him to the joint family estate. In consequence, as on
          the death of the propositus in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary
          comprised only plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5. This legal
          position will govern the computation of the partitionable estate
          and the working of shares that we take up under Issue III.

8.   Issue II - Whether the “palupatti” proves disruption of the joint
     family and the parties’ subsequent separate possession and
     enjoyment (collateral use).
     8.1. The plaintiffs deny that there was any partition or disruption
          of the joint family and contend that the writing described as
          the palupatti is an unregistered partition deed that cannot be
          looked at for any purpose. Defendant no. 5 asserts that Ex.D-17
          records a family arrangement which contains an unequivocal
          declaration of severance of status between plaintiff no. 1 and
          defendant no. 5 after the earlier releases by plaintiff no. 2 and
438                                                           [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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             defendant no. 3, that the arrangement was acted upon in fact,
             and that even if it is unregistered it is admissible for the limited
             collateral purposes of proving disruption of joint status and
             explaining the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment.
       8.2. An unregistered partition deed, including the palupatti in the
            present case, may be relied upon for the limited collateral
            purposes of proving severance of the joint family status and title,
            explaining the nature of possession, recording the arrangement
            made thereunder, and evidencing the parties’ subsequent
            conduct as was observed by this Court in various judgements
            such as Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama3, Yellapu
            Uma Maheswari v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao4 and K.G.
            Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa5. The same has been clearly
            expounded by this Court in Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa6 in
            the following paras:
                    “9.4. It is required to be noted that the deed dated
                    23-4-1971, under which the suit property had gone/
                    devolved in favour of Krishnappa, was reduced in
                    writing before the panchayat and panchas, and the
                    same was signed by the village people/panchayat
                    people and all the members of the family including
                    even the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff disputed that
                    the partition was not reduced in writing in the form of
                    document Ext. D-4, on considering the entire evidence
                    on record and even the deposition of the plaintiff
                    (cross-examination), he has specifically admitted that
                    the oral partition had taken place in the year 1971.
                    He has also admitted that he has got the share which
                    tallies with the document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4).
                    Execution of the document/partition deed/Palupatta
                    dated 23-4-1971 has been established and proved
                    by examining different witnesses. The High Court has
                    refused to look into the said document and/or consider



3   (2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13.
4   (2015) 16 SCC 787 at Para 16.
5   (2004) 12 SCC 189 at Para 14.
6   (2019) 6 SCC 409.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                         439

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


                document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4) solely on the
                ground that it requires registration and therefore as
                it is unregistered, the same cannot be looked into.
                However, as observed by this Court in Kale [Kale v.
                Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119] that
                such a family settlement, though not registered,
                would operate as a complete estoppel against the
                parties to such a family settlement. In the aforesaid
                decision, this Court considered its earlier decision
                in S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai [S.
                Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973)
                2 SCC 312] in which it was observed as under: (S.
                Shanmugam Pillai case [S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K.
                Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312] , SCC pp.
                319 & 321, paras 13 & 22)
                “13. Equitable, principles such as estoppel, election,
                family settlement, etc. are not mere technical rules of
                evidence. They have an important purpose to serve
                in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of
                the law is to secure justice. In the recent times in
                order to render justice between the parties, courts
                have been liberally relying on those principles. We
                would hesitate to narrow down their scope.
                ***
                22. As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s
                Family Charities case [T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family
                Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797] ,
                that if a person having full knowledge of his right as
                a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which
                settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents
                at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go
                back on that agreement when reversion actually
                falls open.”
                9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N. [Subraya
                M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705 : (2016) 4
                SCC (Civ) 163] even without registration a written
                document of family settlement/family arrangement
                can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining
440                                                           [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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                 the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the
                 parties. In the present case, as observed hereinabove,
                 even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that
                 the oral partition had taken place on 23-4-1971 and
                 he also admitted that 3 to 4 panchayat people were
                 also present. However, according to him, the same
                 was not reduced in writing. Therefore, even accepting
                 the case of the plaintiff that there was an oral partition
                 on 23-4-1971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-4-
                 1971, to which he is also the signatory and all other
                 family members are signatory, can be said to be a
                 list of properties partitioned. Everybody got right/
                 share as per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the
                 same even can be used as corroborative evidence
                 as explaining the arrangement made thereunder
                 and conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts
                 and circumstances of the case, the High Court has
                 committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into
                 and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated
                 23-4-1971.”
       8.3. We have perused the original Ex.D-17 and its schedule
            Ex.D 17(a) as they stand on the trial record. Plaintiff no. 1
            admitted his signature, which was marked in evidence as Ex.D 6.
            The signatures of defendant no. 5 and the mother were also
            marked. The writing bears the attestation of panchayatdars
            and was written by the village accountant. At the stage of
            production, the Trial Court permitted Ex.D-17 and Ex.D-17(a)
            to be marked for collateral purpose. The surrounding materials
            from 1972 onwards are consistent with that position. There
            are mutation and revenue entries that refer to the post-1972
            arrangement and to the earlier releases. Revenue records,
            including RTCs and index extracts, stand separately in the
            names of plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 for the very survey
            numbers that Ex.D-17(a) allots to them. Separate residence
            and separate cooking from 1972 were admitted. Plaintiff no. 1
            independently mortgaged lands that fell to his share. Plaintiff
            no. 1 independently acquired and alienated property after 1972.
            In 2014, plaintiff no. 1 executed a relinquishment in favour
            of the municipal authority and independently monetised the
            transaction through transfer of development rights. The lands
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                             441

            P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


            allotted under Ex.D-17(a) lie in different villages and no survey
            number is common between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5.
            This bears upon the objection based on the absence of partition
            by metes and bounds.
     8.4. The governing principles in such cases are well settled. Under
          Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought about by an
          unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise, and a
          writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the fact
          of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent
          possession. The same was laid down by a 3 Judge Bench of
          this Court in Kalyani v. Narayanan7 in the following paras:
                   “18. One thing is crystal clear that Ex. P-1 is not a
                   deed of partition in the sense it does not purport to
                   divide the property amongst various coparceners by
                   metes and bounds. However, in Hindu law qua joint
                   family and joint family property the word “partition” is
                   understood in a special sense. If severance of joint
                   status is brought about by a deed, a writing or an
                   unequivocal declaration of intention to bring about
                   such disruption, qua the joint family, it constitutes
                   partition (see Raghavamma v. Chenchamma [AIR
                   1964 SC 136 : (1964) 2 SCR 933 : (1964) 1 SCA
                   593] ). To constitute a partition all that is necessary
                   is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention
                   by a member of a joint family to separate himself
                   from the family. What form such intimation, indication
                   or representation of such interest should take would
                   depend upon the circumstances of each case. A
                   further requirement is that this unequivocal indication
                   of intention to separate must be to the knowledge of
                   the persons affected by such declaration. A review
                   of the decisions shows that this intention to separate
                   may be manifested in diverse ways. It may be by
                   notice or by filing a suit. Undoubtedly, indication or
                   intimation must be to members of the joint family
                   likely to be affected by such a declaration.”


7   (1980) Supp. SCC 298.
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       8.5. Moreover, a family arrangement recorded in writing, when
            relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held
            and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for
            that limited collateral use. The same was observed by this
            Court in Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh8 as
            follows:
                   “28. The validity of the assignment was however
                   questioned by the appellants on the ground that
                   the first two agreements were not registered. The
                   submission is untenable. Section 17(1) of the
                   Registration Act, 1908 insofar as it is relevant,
                   requires under clause (b) thereof, registration of
                   “non-testamentary instruments which purport or
                   operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
                   whether in present or in future, any right, title
                   or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the
                   value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in
                   immovable property”. Sub-section (2) of Section 17
                   creates exceptions to the mandatory requirements of
                   Sections 17(1)(b) and (c). One of the exceptions
                   made in Section 17(2) of the Registration Act,
                   1908, is clause (i). This exception pertains to “any
                   composition deed”. In other words, all composition
                   deeds are exempt from the requirement to be
                   registered under that Act [ See Govind Ram v.
                   Madan Gopal, 72 IA 76 : AIR 1945 PC 74, 76] . The
                   composition deed in this case was a transaction
                   between the members of the same family for
                   the mutual benefit of such members. It is not the
                   appellants’ case that the agreements required
                   registration under any other Act. Apart from this,
                   there is the principle that courts lean in favour of
                   upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing
                   the same on technical or trivial grounds particularly
                   when the parties have mutually received benefits
                   under the arrangement [ See Kale v. Dy. Director
                   of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976


8   (2006) 1 SCC 148.
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          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


                SC 807] . Both the courts below had concurrently
                found that the parties had enjoyed material benefits
                under the agreements. We have ourselves also
                rescrutinised the evidence on record on this aspect
                and have found nothing to persuade us to take
                a contrary view. Furthermore, in this case the
                agreements had merged in the decree of the Court
                which is also excepted under sub-section (2)(vi) of
                Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 [ “17. (2)(vi)
                any decree or order of a court except a decree or
                order expressed to be made on a compromise and
                comprising immovable property other than that which
                is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding;”] .”
     8.6. In our considered opinion, the reality of disruption is tested by
          a cumulative assessment of conduct that includes separate
          possession, separate cultivation, separate residence,
          independent dealings with the lands allotted, and revenue
          records that consistently reflect such separation. Where the
          allotted lands are situated in different villages with distinct survey
          numbers, an insistence on further partition as a precondition to
          infer disruption misdirects the inquiry, because the determinative
          question is whether the joint status stood severed and the
          subsequent enjoyment was separate.
     8.7. Tested on these principles, Ex.D-17 qualifies for collateral use.
          It records the post-release arrangement between the only
          surviving coparceners at the material time, namely plaintiff no.
          1 and defendant no. 5. It bears admitted signatures and the
          attestation of village elders. It was marked by the Trial Court for
          collateral purposes. The long and consistent course of conduct
          that followed confirms the reality of disruption on 11.02.1972.
          The parties lived separately and cooked separately. They
          cultivated distinct survey numbers in different villages. Plaintiff
          no. 1 dealt with his lands as owner, including mortgages and
          later transactions. The municipal relinquishment and the transfer
          of development rights in 2014 were undertaken by plaintiff no. 1
          alone. This cumulative matrix corroborates that the family ceased
          to be joint from 11.02.1972 and that each branch thereafter held
          and enjoyed separately what Ex.D-17(a) allotted.
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       8.8.   The approach of the Trial Court and the High Court does not
              withstand scrutiny. The Trial Court declined to act on Ex.D-17
              on the footing that it was unregistered and not acted upon and
              it read the mutation entry as if it were based on inheritance
              or consent rather than on the palupatti. That approach is
              erroneous. The writing was expressly marked for collateral
              purposes and registration was not a bar on that plane. The
              insistence on division by metes and bounds ignored the
              undisputed position that the allotted lands are in different
              villages with no overlap of survey numbers and it overlooked
              the longstanding separate possession reflected in the revenue
              records. The Trial Court further misread the mortgage record
              by assuming the participation of defendant no. 5 where the
              document and the bank notices show plaintiff no. 1 alone acting
              as owner. The High Court affirmed the Trial Court’s observation
              without independently framing and deciding the points that
              arose and without engaging with the cumulative materials.
              It therefore did not correct the Trial Court’s misdirection on
              the collateral use of Ex.D-17 and on the legal effect of the
              established course of conduct.
       8.9.   We therefore hold that Ex.D-17, read with Ex.D-17(a), is
              admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes of proving
              that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance of joint
              status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 and that
              each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the properties
              allotted under Ex.D-17(a). We clarify that Ex.D-17 is not treated
              as a conveyance that creates or extinguishes rights by itself.
              Our conclusion rests on the severance of status and on the
              character of subsequent possession and enjoyment as borne
              out by the writing and the long course of conduct.
       8.10. Therefore, two consequences follow and will be worked out
             while fixing shares. Properties acquired after 11.02.1972 do
             not form accretions to a subsisting coparcenary and fall to the
             acquirer’s separate estate, subject to any proven joint purchase.
             Daughters, who were not coparceners at the material time,
             do not obtain a coparcenary share by virtue of a disruption
             that took place before 2004. The computations will be made
             under Issue III and the half share of defendant no. 6 in the
             jointly purchased items will be safeguarded.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                        445

          P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


9.   Issue III - Consequential determination of the partitionable pool,
     fractional shares, and directions.
     9.1. Having upheld Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 as valid releases and
          having accepted Ex.D-17, read with Ex.D-17(a), for the collateral
          purposes of severance and subsequent separate enjoyment,
          the partitionable estate must be identified and the precise
          shares determined. The family hotchpot for partition shall
          comprise Schedule A together with items 1 to 16 of Schedule
          C. Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C shall stand outside
          the family pool. Between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6,
          Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C shall be held in equal
          parts, and nothing in this judgment shall dilute the half share
          of defendant no. 6 therein.
     9.2. The fractional computation over the partitionable pool follows
          the notional partition under the unamended Section 6 of the
          Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as on the death of Pilappa in 1969.
          On that date, the coparcenary then subsisting for Schedule A
          consisted of Pilappa, plaintiff no. 1, and defendant no. 5, since
          plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3 had earlier executed Ex.D 15
          and Ex.D-16 and thereby stood outside the coparcenary. A
          notional partition at that point would allot 1/3 to Pilappa, 1/3 to
          plaintiff no. 1, and 1/3 to defendant no. 5. Pilappa’s 1/3 would
          then devolve by succession among his seven children who
          were alive at the time, namely plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5,
          and the five daughters, with plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3
          taking nothing by virtue of their binding releases which expressly
          extended to the ancestral and the self-acquired properties of
          Pilappa. Each of the seven children would therefore take 1/7
          out of Pilappa’s 1/3, thereby getting 1/21 each, so that plaintiff
          no. 1 and defendant no. 5 augment their respective 1/3 with
          a further 1/21.
     9.3. On the findings recorded above, the partitionable pool consists
          of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C. Over this pool,
          plaintiff no. 1 shall take 8/21, defendant no. 5 shall take 8/21,
          and each of the five daughters’ branches shall take 1/21, with
          the predeceased daughter’s 1/21 to be worked out in favour
          of defendant no. 2 as representing her estate. Plaintiff no. 2
          and defendant no. 3 take no share by reason of Ex.D-15 and
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              Ex.D-16. Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C do not enter
              the hotchpot. They stand in equal moieties of defendant no. 5
              and defendant no. 6.
10. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
11. The judgment and decree dated 30.08.2005 in RFA No. 750 of
    1994 and the preliminary decree dated 19.08.1994 in O.S. No. 146
    of 1987 are set aside. A fresh preliminary decree is substituted in
    the following terms:
       I.     Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are declared valid and binding releases.
              Ex.D-17 read with Ex.D-17(a) is held admissible for the collateral
              purposes of establishing severance of joint status with effect from
              11.02.1972 and explaining the nature of subsequent separate
              possession and enjoyment.
       II.    The partitionable pool shall consist of Schedule A and items 1
              to 16 of Schedule C. Shares over this pool are fixed as follows:
              plaintiff no. 1 at 8/21, defendant no. 5 at 8/21, and each of
              the five daughters’ branches at 1/21, with the predeceased
              daughter’s 1/21 to be given effect in favour of defendant no. 2
              as representing her estate. Plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3
              take none.
       III.   Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C are excluded from the
              hotchpot. Defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 shall hold these
              in equal halves.
       IV.    Any deposits, lease receipts, or other accretions referable to
              Schedule B or item 17 of Schedule C and presently in court
              or traceable through the lessee shall be apportioned equally
              between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6, subject to just
              allowances, in the final decree proceedings. Mesne profits, if
              any, pertaining to Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C
              shall be determined in accordance with law in the final decree
              proceedings.
12. The Trial Court shall draw the final decree by metes and bounds
    in conformity with this judgment. It shall demarcate the shares over
    Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C and shall separately
    give effect to the equal moieties of defendant no. 5 and defendant
    no. 6 in Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C. Any pendente lite
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                      447

             P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.


     alienations touching Schedule B or item 17 of Schedule C shall abide
     these declarations and be considered, if required, in the final decree
     proceedings without disturbing the equal halves.
13. There shall be no order as to costs.
14. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain