NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST & ANR.versusCLIFFORD D SOUZA ETC. ETC.

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 177 : 2025 INSC 440

                  New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr.
                                 v.
                     Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 1796-1828 of 2024)
                                 03 April 2025
            [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High
       Court dismissing writ petitions by the appellants challenging the
       order passed by the District Judge quashing the order of the Estate
       Officer raising demand against the respondents.

                                  Headnotes†
       Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 18, 52 – Public Premises (Eviction
       of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 – ss.7(1), 7(3), 9 –
       Limitation period – Effect of acknowledgement in writing –
       License fee revised for the land allotted to the respondents
       by issuance of Notification – Demand raised for realising the
       arrears of licence fee – Respondents-licensees challenged the
       notification – Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the
       writ petitions holding that the licence fee could be revised
       retrospectively and upheld the notification – Writ appeals
       thereagainst pending – Issuance of demand notices to the
       respondents, to which they objected – Issuance of notice
       u/s.7(3) of the PP Act by the Estate Officer of the appellant –
       Not satisfied by the reply of the respondents, the Estate
       Officer passed an order u/s.7(1) granting time to make the
       payment failing which it would be recovered as land revenue –
       Respondents then filed an appeal – District Judge set aside
       the demand holding the proceedings u/s.7(1) as barred by
       time – Writ petitions by the appellant, dismissed by the High
       Court – Correctness:
       Held: Once the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be
       applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act – As per s.18
       where liability is acknowledged in respect of any property or
       right, a fresh limitation may be computed from the time when the


* Author
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       acknowledgment was so signed – Clause (a) of the explanation
       to s.18 declares that an acknowledgment would be sufficient for
       various reasons to be stated therein, which includes the time for
       payment has not yet come as one of the reasons – On facts,
       the respondents were throughout alleging that the time had not
       come as the appeals were pending before the Division Bench –
       This acknowledgement was given in response to the demand by
       appellant made well within the limitation of 3 years – Appellant
       as such would be entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation
       taking benefit of s.18 – Respondents’ challenge was only to the
       retrospective application of the revised tariff – No denial to pay
       nor the amount disputed – Intra-court appeals at the instance of
       the respondents were pending, the High Court ought not to have
       proceeded with the hearing of the writ petition – It should have
       awaited the outcome of the pending intra-Court appeals and then
       should have decided the writ petition – Respondents had been
       resisting the demand only on the basis of the pendency of the
       appeals – Objection was taken by respondents only to delay the
       payment of the dues of the revised tariff – Respondents ought not
       to have benefitted out of the technical objection raised by them
       regarding the limitations when they were themselves bound by
       the decision of the Single Judge and had no other objection or
       denial to the demand except that of the pending appeals before
       the Division Bench – Thus, the impugned order set aside – Writ
       petitions of the appellants to be restored before the High Court to
       be heard after the decision in the intra-court appeals filed by the
       respondents. [Paras 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19]

                               Case Law Cited
       New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram [1976] Supp. 1
       SCR 87 : (1976) 3 SCC 407 : AIR 1976 SC 1637 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Limitation Act, 1963; Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
       Occupants) Act, 1971.

                               List of Keywords
       Allotment of land; License fee; Revision of license fee; Demand
       notice; Payment recovered as land revenue; Acknowledgement of
       debt; Revised tariff; Retrospective application of tariff.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                        179

      New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


                           Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 1796-1828
      of 2024
      From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2019 of the High Court
      Karnataka at Bengaluru in WP Nos. 4398, 4431, 1358, 3903,
      3905-3919, 4403, 4404, 4433, 4434, 4430, 4436, 4399, 4406,
      4427, 4429, 4432, 4435, 4437 and 4428 of 2018

                        Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellants:
      Yatindra Singh, Sr. Adv., Arvind Gupta, Mohit Bidhuri, Kanav
      Bhardwaj, Mrs. Suman Sharma, Ms. Mansi Sharma.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      Vikas Singh, Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, Sr. Advs., Varun Singh,
      Ms. Kajal S Gupta, Ms. Deepeika Kalia, Ms. Somesa Gupta, Mudit
      Gupta, Kuriakose Varghese, Ms. Anshika Bajpai, Ms. Tissy Annie
      Thomas, M/s. Kmnp Law.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

      Vikram Nath, J.

1.    The appellants New Mangalore Port Trust 1 has assailed the
      correctness of the judgment and order dated 22.11.2019 passed
      by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru dismissing a bunch
      of writ petitions preferred by NMPT assailing the correctness of
      the judgment and order dated 15.03.2017 passed by the District
      Judge allowing the appeal of the respondents and quashing the
      order of the Estate Officer of NMPT raising demand against the
      respondents.
2.    The facts in brief relevant for proper adjudication of these appeals
      are summarised hereunder:
      2.1. NMPT allotted land to the respondents (hereinafter referred
           to as Licensees) for loading and unloading goods subject to


1    NMPT
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            payment of licence fee which is to be revised every five years
            with the approval of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP).
       2.2. Allotment to the respondent for the licensees had been made
            in the year 2003. By notification dated 20.06.2005 licence fee
            was revised w.e.f. February, 2002. Thereafter, the next revision
            was notified on 23.07.2010 approving the revision of licence
            fee w.e.f. 20.02.2007 again for a period of five years.
       2.3. Pursuant to the said revision, demand was raised for realising the
            arrears of licence fee for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010
            i.e. the date of the notification. Beginning March, 2011, the
            Assistant Estate Manager/Estate Officer issued demand notice
            to all the Licensees. The Licensees challenged the notification
            dated 23.07.2010 before the High Court by way of writ petitions
            filed in the year 2011-2012 primarily on the ground that it was
            not permissible to revise the licence fee retrospectively. The
            learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 28.06.2013 dismissed
            the bunch of writ petitions holding that the licence fee could
            be revised retrospectively and upheld the notification dated
            23.07.2010.
       2.4. Aggrieved by the same the Licensees preferred writ appeals
            before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court at
            Bengaluru. These group of appeals are still pending however
            without any interim orders.
       2.5. After the judgment of the Single Judge dated 28.06.2013,
            the Assistant Estate Manager issued a demand notice on
            15.01.2015, copy whereof is filed as Annexure P-5. It would also
            be relevant to mention that there are other notices also issued
            but the notice dated 15.01.2015 is specifically mentioned as
            there is a reply given to it by the Licensees. The notice dated
            15.01.2015 is reproduced hereunder:-
                                 “FINAL NOTICE
                 No.30/44/2015/EBL.1/TAMP
                 To                                       Date: 15.01.2015
                 M/s Export Trade Link Agencies
                 Lal Bagh
                 MANGALORE – 575 003
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                          181

     New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


                Sir,
                Sub: Payment of difference in Licence fee
                on account of revision of Scale of Rate w.e.f.
                20.02.2007
                Ref:
                1)     TAMP ORDER G NO.184 dated 23.07.2010.
                2)     T.O. letter even No.dtd/07.11.2014
                Please refer to the letter cited above, wherein
                it was requested to remit the difference of
                licence fee/penal licence fee including Service
                Tax amounting to Rs.55,32,234/- on account of
                revision of SoR w.e.f. 20.02.2007, But you have
                not remitted the said amount.
                Hence you are once again requested to
                make necessary arrangement for remittance
                of difference in Licence Fee and Service Tax
                within 15 days from the date of receipt of this
                letter failing which penal interest @ 13% shall
                be payable from the due date till the payment
                is received and action for recovery of dues will
                be initiated as per law.
                Thanking you
                                                 Yours faithfully
                                                Sd/- 15.01.2015
                                   Asstt. Estate Manager (Gr.I)”
     2.6. The Licensees responded to the same vide letter dated
          04.02.2015 and objected to the demand raised on the ground
          that as the issue is still pending before the Division Bench
          of the High Court, no question arises for the payment of the
          difference in licence fee for the period 20.02.2007 till 23.07.2010.
          The same would prejudice their case. The question whether
          licence fee could have been revised with retrospective effect
          and recovered was still to be decided by the High Court in the
          pending writ appeal. It was thus requested that the NMPT may
          not demand the difference in licence fee for the period prior to
          23.07.2010 till such time the appeal is not decided. The said
          communication dated 04.02.2015 is reproduced hereunder: -
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       “The Asst. Estate Manager (Gr.I)
       New Mangalore Port Trust,
       Mangalore,
       Sir,
       Subject: Writ Petition No.36972/2011, order
       dated 28.06.2013 of Hon’ble High Court of
       Karnataka
       Ref: i) Payment of difference licence fee on
       account of revision of scale of rates w.e.f.
       20.02.2007, on the basis of Tamp order No.
       G184, dated: 23.07.2010.
       ii) Your Letter bearing No.3/44/2015/EBL.1/
       TAMP, dated 15.01.2015.
       With reference to the above said subject, we
       would like to inform you that we had challenged
       the TAMP order dated: 23.07.2010, before the
       Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore by
       filing the writ petition No.34541 & 34784/211
       and the said writ petition was dismissed on
       28.06.2013 by the Hon’ble High Court of
       Karnataka, Bangalore. We have challenged
       the order dated:28.06.2013 passed in the writ
       petition by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
       Bangalore before the division bench by filing the
       writ appeal no.4400 & 4401/2013, the said writ
       appeal was posted on 10.11.2014 for preliminary
       hearing/admission and the Hon’ble Court after
       hearing the matter by the council appearing
       for our company and by the council appearing
       for New Mangalore Port Trust the appeal was
       admitted by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka
       on 10.11.2014, therefore the above said subject
       matter i.e. the notification dated: 23.07.2010
       (TAMP) is under challenge before the Hon’ble
       High Court and the Court has already admitted
       the matter the said subject matter pending before
       the Hon’ble High Court therefore immediately the
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         183

      New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


                 question doesn’t arise for payment of difference
                 license fees to be paid to you as per your letter, it
                 will prejudice our case since we are not liable to
                 pay the difference license fees with retrospective
                 effect, whether we are liable to pay or not that
                 question has to be decided by the court in the
                 pending writ appeal.
                 Therefore, we are requesting you to not to
                 demand difference license fees amount with
                 retrospective effect as per the TAMP order, dated
                 23.07.2010, during the pendency of the appeal
                 before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
                 Bangalore and the question of remittance of
                 money demanded by you as per you Letter,
                 dated 15.01.2015 for a sum of Rs.5,73,833/-
                 present does not arise, since appeal is pending
                 before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka,
                 Bangalore.”
     2.7. The Assistant Estate Manager Grade-1 was also nominated as
          Estate Officer under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
          Occupants) Act, 1971.2 The Estate Officer vide communication
          dated 12.08.2015 gave a notice under sub-section (3) of section
          7 of the PP Act to the Licensees calling upon them to show cause
          on or before thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice
          why an order requiring to pay the said arrears of rent together
          with simple interest should not be made. The Licensees again
          came up with their reply on 07.09.2015 taking up the same
          defence that their writ appeal was pending before the Division
          Bench of the Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru and till such
          time it is not decided, any demand would prejudice their case.
          The question of demanding the difference of license fee for
          the period prior to 23.07.2010 was yet to be decided by the
          Division Bench in the pending writ appeal.
     2.8. Since the response is the same as given in the earlier reply
          dated 04.02.2015 we are not reproducing the same. The Estate


2   The PP Act
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             Officer again issued a notice dated 15.02.2016 granting them
             three weeks further time to show cause and it further stated that
             the compound interest at the rate of 9% (nine percent) would
             also be payable under the statutory provisions. This notice
             was also replied on 25.02.2016 by the Licensees resisting any
             demand during the pendency of the writ appeal citing the same
             reasons as given earlier.
       2.9. The Estate Officer not satisfied with the reply and noting the
            fact that there was no stay granted in the pending writ appeals
            proceeded to pass an under section 7(1) of the PP Act granting
            a month’s time to make the payment failing which it would be
            recovered as land revenue.
       2.10. The Licensees preferred a miscellaneous appeal under section
             9 of the PP Act before the District Judge at Mangalore. The
             District Judge clubbed all the appeals and decided the same
             vide judgment dated 15.03.2017, allowing all the appeals
             holding that the proceedings under section 7(1) was barred
             by time and accordingly, set aside the demand. Aggrieved
             by the aforesaid judgment of the District Judge, the NMPT
             filed writ petitions before the High Court which have since
             been dismissed by the impugned judgment giving rise to the
             present appeals.
3.     We have heard Mr. Yatindra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
       for the appellant and on behalf of the respondents Shri Vikas Singh
       and Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, learned senior counsels, and have
       perused the material on record.
4.     The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant are briefly
       summarised hereunder:
       a)    The licensees did not raise the plea of limitation in their reply
             to the show cause notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act. For
             the first time they raised it in the appeal. Under the PP Act no
             limitation is prescribed for passing an order under Section 7(1).
       b)    The judgment in the case of NDMC vs. Kalu Ram,3 although
             wrongly decided holding that there would be limitation of three
             years applicable to recovery proceedings under the PP Act,


3    (1976) 3 SCC 407
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     New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


           but without going into that question in view of the facts of the
           present case, the proceedings for recovery under the PP Act
           were within the limitation period of three years. This submission
           is based upon Section 18 of the Limitation Act. It is submitted
           that the respondent, in writing, had acknowledged the debt
           vide their reply dated 04.02.2015 to the demand notice dated
           15.01.2015 and therefore the limitation would stand extended
           up to 03.02.2018.
     c)    Admitted facts and admitted documents can be relied upon to
           argue a question of law before this Court even if not raised before
           the Courts below. The submission is that though the benefit of
           Section 18 of the Limitation Act was not claimed specifically
           before the Court below, but in view of the admitted facts based
           on admitted documents, this Court may consider extending the
           benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Once this benefit
           is extended, the limitation for recovery of arears of rent would
           extend up to 03.02.2018 and even beyond in view of further
           acknowledgement of the debt in response to the show cause
           notice and reply given by the respondents on 07.09.2015 and
           25.02.2016 for a further period of three years.
     d)    The Division Bench and the High Court held the recovery
           proceedings to be barred by limitation taking the date of
           notification of the revised tariff i.e. 23.07.2010 as the cause of
           action for the recovery of arrears. After excluding the period
           during which interim order was operating i.e. 1 year and 293
           days, the limitation would extend up to 11.05.2015 but as the
           show cause notice was issued on 21.08.2015, it was beyond
           the prescribed period of limitation.
     e)    The respondents challenged the notification of revised tariff
           dated 23.07.2010 by way of several petitions before the learned
           Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, in which interim order
           was also passed. The said bunch of petitions was dismissed on
           28.06.2013. Aggrieved by the same, respondent preferred intra-
           court appeals which were admitted and are still pending before
           the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. Throughout
           in their correspondence to the various demands and the show
           cause notices, the only defence taken by the respondents was
           that the demand should not be pressed at this stage as it would
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            prejudice their case pending in the appeal before the Division
            Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The tenor of the defence is
            clear. Then subject to the outcome of the appeals, the demand
            could be raised if the respondents failed.
       f)   It is further submitted that in view of the specific stand taken in
            their replies, the respondents cannot now urge that the recovery
            proceedings were barred by limitation.
       g)   In view of the admitted position that the intra-court appeals
            are pending before the Division Bench of the High Court, this
            Court may consider setting aside the quashing of the recovery
            proceedings on the ground of limitation and may remand the
            proceedings before the High Court to be clubbed with the pending
            appeals and both the matters may be decided simultaneously. If
            the intra-court appeals of the respondents are allowed and the
            revision of tariff retrospectively is set aside, that is the notification
            dated 23.07.2010, to the extent that its retrospective application is
            set aside, automatically the writs filed by the appellant before the
            High Court would stand dismissed. However, if the respondents’
            appeals are dismissed by the Division Bench, then the writ
            petition filed by the appellant before the High Court, deserves
            to be allowed and the respondents would be liable to pay the
            arears of rent along with admissible interest.
       h)   Lastly, it was submitted that the respondents were well aware
            of the revision of the tariff and thus would have realised the
            enhanced tariff. If they succeed on this technical ground, they
            would be guilty of unjust enrichment.
       i)   On the above submissions, learned senior counsel prayed that
            the appeals be allowed after setting aside the impugned order
            of the High Court.
5.     Mr. Vikas Singh and Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, learned senior
       counsels appearing for the respondents, vehemently submitted
       that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. None of the arguments
       advanced by the appellant are tenable in law. Their arguments are
       summarised hereunder:
       a)   The appellant, having failed to raise the plea of acknowledgment
            and extension of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation
            Act either before the Estate Officer, the District Judge or the
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                         187

     New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


           High Court and not even in the pleadings before this Court,
           cannot raise this plea during the course of oral arguments.
           The submission relating to applicability of Section 18 of the
           Limitation Act deserves to be rejected outright.
     b)    The question of limitation would be a mixed question of law
           and fact and, as such, a party seeking benefit of an extension
           provision should specifically plead and lead evidence in support
           of their submissions. In the absence of any such pleading before
           any of the forum, no benefit can be extended to the appellants
           seeking applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
     c)    The communication dated 04.02.2015 never admitted the
           liability/debt. In fact, it clearly denied the liability/demand on
           the ground that there could be no retrospective revision of
           tariff. It is, thus, wrong on the part of the appellant to argue
           that the communication dated 04.02.2015 acknowledged the
           liability/debt.
     d)    The demands raised prior to 12.08.2015 were not under any
           statutory provision. These demands were being raised by the
           lessor to the lessee. The statutory authority under the PP Act for
           the first time, issued show cause notice on 12.08.2015, which
           admittedly was beyond a period of three years if the benefit of
           section 18 of the Limitation Act is not extended. Had there been
           a notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act prior to 11.05.2015
           to which a reply had been given by the respondents may be
           for deferment of the demand in view of the pending appeal
           before the Division Bench, it could be urged on behalf of the
           appellant that they were entitled to the benefit of Section 18 of
           the Limitation Act. There being no such show cause notice prior
           to 11.05.2015, any proceedings for recovery would be barred
           by law. Both the notices under Section 7(3) dated 12.08.2015
           and the order passed under Section 7(1) on 21.07.2016 were
           beyond the prescribed period of limitation and, thus, proceedings
           have been rightly quashed by the District Judge as confirmed
           by the High Court.
     e)    It may be true that the Assistant Estate Manager also happened
           to be the Estate Officer under the PP Act, it cannot be presumed
           that rather no benefit can be extended to the appellant that the
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             previous notices issued by the Assistant Estate Manager could
             be treated to be notice under the provisions of the PP Act.
       f)    For all the reasons recorded above, the submission is that the
             appeals deserve to be dismissed.
6.     Having considered the submissions and having perused the material
       on record, we now proceed to deal with the respective arguments.
7.     Common argument raised on behalf of both sides is to the effect
       that objections had not been taken at the right time and at the initial
       stage. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that in reply to
       the show cause notice under section 7(3) of the PP Act, no objection
       regarding the plea of limitation had been taken. However, in the
       appeal, ground for limitation was taken for the first time. Similarly
       on behalf of the respondents, it was submitted that the plea of
       section 18 of Limitation Act was not raised right up to the stage of
       filing the appeal before this Court, but it was taken only during the
       course of arguments. As the facts and the material on record, i.e.
       the correspondences between the parties, are not in dispute, we are
       rejecting the said submission of both the sides and thus would be
       dealing with the plea of limitation also.
8.     The District Judge had allowed the appeal of the respondents and
       quashed the demand notice on the finding that it was barred by
       limitation. Taking the date of cause of action to be 23.07.2010,
       and after excluding the period during which there was an interim
       order operating in the writ petition pending before the Single Judge
       filed by the respondents, the limitation of 3 years would expire on
       11.05.2015. The said limitation of 3 years is provided under Article
       52 to the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The High Court also took
       the same view and accordingly held that the proceedings under the
       PP Act having been initiated by issuance of notice for the first time
       on 12.08.2015 the same would be barred by limitation. It also placed
       reliance on the judgement of this Court in the case of New Delhi
       Municipal Committee vs. Kalu Ram.4 In the absence of Kalu Ram
       (supra), the Limitation Act would not apply because the PP Act does
       not explicitly incorporate it. While Section 9 of the PP Act provides a
       limitation period for filing appeals, Section 7 thereof contains no such
       provision. However, Kalu Ram clarifies that the Limitation Act does


4    AIR 1976 SC 1637
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     New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


     apply to proceedings under the PP Act. On behalf of the appellants,
     it was briefly argued that Kalu Ram (supra) was incorrectly decided
     and required to be revisited by a larger Bench, but this was raised
     merely as a passing reference.
9.   On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted that in view
     of the admitted facts that no notice was issued under the PP Act
     by the Estate Officer prior to 11.5.2015, the impugned proceedings
     under section 7 of the PP Act were rightly held to be barred by law.
10. In effect, both sides agree that the Limitation Act will apply to the
    proceedings under the PP Act. The respondents cannot argue that
    only section 3 of the Limitation Act along with the limitation provided
    under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply and
    not section 18 of the same Act. Once the Limitation Act applies, all
    its provisions will be applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act.
    It is true that the plea of benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act
    was not raised before the High Court and therefore not considered
    but nevertheless, as we have already rejected the objection of the
    respondents that the arguments relating to the benefits of section 18
    of Limitation Act may not be considered by this Court, we proceed
    to deal with the same and analyze as to whether the benefit could
    or could not be extended to the appellant as claimed.
11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to reproduce
    section 18 of the Limitation Act:
           “Effect of acknowledgment in writing.
           (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period
           for a suit or application in respect of any property or right,
           an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property
           or right has been made in writing signed by the party
           against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any
           person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh
           period of limitation shall be computed from the time when
           the acknowledgment was so signed.
           (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is
           undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when
           it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian
           Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents
           shall not be received.
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          Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
          (a)   an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it
                omits to specify the exact nature of the property or
                right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery,
                performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is
                accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform
                or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set
                off, or is addressed to a person other than a person
                entitled to the property or right,
          (b)   the word “signed” means signed either personally or
                by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and
          (c)   an application for the execution of a decree or order
                shall not be deemed to be an application in respect
                of any property or right.”
12. Section 18 of the Limitation Act is very clear that where liability is
    acknowledged in respect of any property or right, a fresh limitation
    may be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so
    signed. Clause (a) of the explanation to Section 18 declares that an
    acknowledgment would be sufficient for various reasons to be stated
    therein, which includes the time for payment has not yet come as
    one of the reasons. In the present case this reason squarely applies.
    The respondents were throughout alleging that the time had not been
    come as the appeals were pending before the Division Bench. This
    acknowledgement was given in response to the demand by the lessor
    (appellant) made well within the limitation of 3 years. The lessor as
    such would be entitled to the benefit of extension of limitation taking
    benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
13. The respondents have vehemently argued that this point had never
    been raised before any of the forum below nor in the pleadings
    before this Court. However, the fact remains that the communication
    dated 04.02.2015 is not disputed by the respondents. There is
    no dispute on the contents either of the said communication. If
    that be so, under admitted position, and in view of Clause (a) of
    explanation to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgment
    of the liability stands established. Thus, the limitation would extend
    to 03.02.2018.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                           191

      New Mangalore Port Trust & Anr. v. Clifford D Souza Etc. Etc.


14. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents that they
    never admitted the liability, rather they had specifically denied it.
    This submission is based on the ground that the revised tariff vide
    notification dated 23.07.2010 had been challenged before the High
    Court with respect to its retrospective application. This submission
    of the respondents is of no help to them. The respondents do not
    dispute the revised tariff under the notification dated 23.07.2010.
    Their challenge was only to the retrospective application of the
    same. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition filed by the
    respondents against which an intra-court appeal before the Division
    Bench of the Karnataka High Court was filed and is still pending.
    There are no interim orders in the said appeal. The respondents
    had been objecting to the demand on the ground of pendency of
    this intra-court appeal. As such there was no denial to pay nor the
    amount was disputed. The respondents were bound by the notification
    dated 23.07.2010 till such time it was set aside by any Court of law.
    Having failed before the Single Judge, the respondents, were liable
    to comply with the notification dated 23.07.2010.
15. At the time of the filing of the writ petition by the appellants before the
    High Court, the intra-court appeals preferred by the respondents were
    already pending. The learned Single Judge could have considered
    deferring the hearing of the writ petition till the disposal of the intra-
    court appeals as the outcome of the intra court appeals would have
    a direct bearing on the writ petition filed by the appellants.
16. Once the issue relating to retrospective applicability of revised tariff
    has been upheld by the learned Single Judge and the writ petitions
    filed by the respondents were dismissed, against which intra-court
    appeals at the instance of the respondents were pending, the High
    Court ought not to have proceeded with the hearing of the writ petition.
    Rather, it should have awaited the outcome of the pending intra-
    Court appeals relating to retrospective application of the notification
    dated 23.07.2010. Subject to the final outcome of the said intra-court
    appeals, the writ petition should have been decided. This was all the
    more necessary for the High Court in view of the consistent stand
    taken by the respondents that the demands raised by the appellant
    vide various notices issued prior to 12.08.2015 or thereafter may be
    deferred awaiting the outcome of the appeals.
192                                                           [2025] 5 S.C.R.

                               Supreme Court Reports


17. The respondents were well aware that they had lost from the Single
    Judge as their petitions had been dismissed but still, they had been
    resisting the demand only on the basis of the pendency of the appeals
    before the Division Bench. This objection was taken only to delay the
    payment of the dues of the revised tariff. The respondents therefore
    ought not to have benefitted out of the technical objection raised by
    them regarding the limitations when they were themselves bound by
    the decision of the learned Single Judge and had no other objection
    or denial to the demand except that of the pending appeals before
    the Division Bench.
18. In the above facts and circumstances, we are not entering into the
    other arguments advanced by the parties. We are restoring the writ
    petition of the appellants to be heard after the decision in the intra-court
    appeals. In case the appeals are allowed by the Division Bench then
    there would no question of any recovery retrospectively. The demands
    would be liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents fail in
    their appeals, they would be liable to pay the demand in accordance
    to law along with interest admissible under law.
19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order of
    the High Court and restore the writ petitions before the High Court
    to be heard after disposal of the pending intra-court appeals filed
    by the respondents.

       Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain