Supreme Court of India
MIHIR RAJESH SHAHversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1288
- Decided
- 6 November 2025
- Disposal
- Directions issued
Holding
The Court held that under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS 2023, the arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing in a language he understands (or orally if writing is impracticable), with the written copy supplied within a reasonable time and at least two hours before remand, and that non‑compliance renders the arrest and remand illegal.
Summary
The appellant, Mihir Rajesh Shah, was arrested for a fatal hit‑and‑run involving his BMW, but the police failed to provide him with a written copy of the grounds of arrest as required by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The High Court upheld the arrest despite this procedural lapse, prompting the Supreme Court to examine whether the grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing before or immediately after arrest in all offences, including those under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and whether non‑compliance vitiates the arrest even in exceptional circumstances. The Court held that the arrestee must be informed of the grounds in writing in a language he understands, or orally if writing is impracticable, and that a written copy must be supplied within a reasonable time and at least two hours before the remand hearing. Failure to meet this requirement renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to liberty. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of, with interim bail relief continued for the appellants.
Issues considered
- Whether the grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing to an accused before arrest or forthwith after arrest in every case, including offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
- Whether non‑compliance with the requirement to furnish grounds of arrest, even in exceptional or exigent circumstances, vitiates the arrest under Section 47 of the BNSS 2023 (formerly Section 50 of the CrPC).
Legislation cited
Headnote
291 : 2025 INSC 1288 Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025) 06 November 2025 [B.R. Gavai, CJI and Augustine George Masih,* J.] Issue for Consideration Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an offence under Penal Code, 1860 now of certain exigencies it will not be possible to furnish the grounds of arrest either before arrest or immediately after arrest, the arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023). Headnotes†
Subjects
Grounds of arrestMandatory furnishing of grounds of arrestArticle 22(1) constitutional safeguardWritten communication of arrest groundsLanguage understood by arresteeArticle 21 right to life and libertyArrest illegal if procedural safeguard breachedSection 47 of BNSS 2023Section 50 of CrPC 1973
Judgment
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 291 : 2025 INSC 1288
Mihir Rajesh Shah
v.
State of Maharashtra and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025)
06 November 2025
[B.R. Gavai, CJI and Augustine George Masih,* J.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an offence
under Penal Code, 1860 now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
would it be necessary to furnish grounds of arrest to an accused
either before arrest or forthwith after arrest; whether, even in
exceptional cases, where on account of certain exigencies it will not
be possible to furnish the grounds of arrest either before arrest or
immediately after arrest, the arrest would be vitiated on the ground of
non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC
1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023).
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.22(1) – Constitutional mandate of –
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.50 – Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.47 – Whether in each and every
case, even arising out of an offence under Penal Code, 1860
now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 would it be necessary to
furnish grounds of arrest to an accused either before arrest
or forthwith after arrest:
Held: Constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds
of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including
offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023) – The grounds of arrest
must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language
he/she understands – In case(s) where, the arresting officer/
person is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing
on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally – The said grounds be
communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case
at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand
proceedings before the magistrate – In case of non-compliance,
the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and
the person will be at liberty to be set free – The requirement of
* Author
292 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest, in the light of
and u/Art.22(1) of the Constitution of India, is not a mere formality
but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard included in Part III
of the Constitution under the head of Fundamental Rights – Thus,
if a person is not informed of the grounds of his arrest as soon as
maybe, it would amount to the violation of his fundamental rights
curtailing his right to life and personal liberty u/Art.21, rendering
the arrest illegal. [Paras 56, 40]
Constitution of India – Art.22(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s.50 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 –
s.47 – Whether, even in exceptional cases, where on account of
certain exigencies it will not be possible to furnish the grounds
of arrest either before arrest or immediately after arrest, the
arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-compliance with
the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC 1973 (now Section
47 of BNSS 2023):
Held: Non-supply of grounds of arrest in writing to the arrestee
prior to or immediately after arrest would not vitiate such arrest on
the grounds of non-compliance with the provisions of s.50 of the
CrPC 1973 (now s.47 of BNSS 2023) provided the said grounds
are supplied in writing within a reasonable time and in any case two
hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the magistrate
for remand proceedings – In cases where the police are already in
possession of documentary material furnishing a cogent basis for
the arrest, the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the
arrestee on his arrest – However, in exceptional circumstances such
as offences against body or property committed in flagrante delicto,
where informing the grounds of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered
impractical, it shall be sufficient for the police officer or other person
making the arrest to orally convey the same to the person at the
time of arrest – Later, a written copy of grounds of arrest must be
supplied to the arrested person within a reasonable time and in no
event later than two hours prior to production of the arrestee before
the magistrate for remand proceedings – The remand papers shall
contain the grounds of arrest and in case there is delay in supply
thereof, a note indicating a cause for it be included for the information
of the magistrate – Two-hour threshold before production for remand
strikes a judicious balance between safeguarding the arrestee’s
constitutional rights u/Art.22(1) and preserving the operational
continuity of criminal investigations. [Paras 52-54]
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 293
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
Constitution of India – Art.22(1) – Constitutional mandate under,
not a mere procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard
in the form of fundamental rights – Intent and purpose of the
constitutional mandate, explained – Mode of communicating
the grounds of arrest to serve the intended purpose – Art.22(1)
not to be read in a restrictive manner:
Held: Mere communication of the grounds in a language not
understood by the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional
mandate under Article 22 of the Constitution of India – Failure to
supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee
renders the constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the
personal liberty of the person as guaranteed under Article 21 and
22 of the Constitution of India – To achieve the intended objective
of the constitutional mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution
of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested
person in each and every case without exception and the mode
of the communication of such grounds must be in writing in the
language he understands. [Paras 42-46]
Constitution of India – Arts.22(1), 21 – Constitutional mandate
of – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.50 – Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.47 – Appellant-accused
challenged the legality of his arrest in a case when a BMW
car driven by him at a high speed collided violently with the
complainant’s scooter leading to his wife succumbing to the
severe injuries – Appellant contended that the grounds of
arrest were not furnished in writing as mandated by Art.22(1)
of the Constitution of India and s.47 of BNSS 2023 equivalent
to s.50 of CrPC 1973 – High Court despite the acknowledgment
of this procedural lapse, upheld the validity of arrest due to
the Appellant’s conscious awareness of the gravity of the
offence, supported by substantial evidence and the Appellant’s
evasion of arrest, justifying custody despite the missing
written grounds:
Held: The requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds
of arrest, in the light of and u/Art.22(1) of the Constitution of India,
is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional
safeguard included in Part III of the Constitution under the head
of Fundamental Rights – Thus, if a person is not informed of the
294 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
grounds of his arrest as soon as maybe, it would amount to the
violation of his fundamental rights curtailing his right to life and
personal liberty u/Art.21, rendering the arrest illegal – Petition not
entertained on merits, notice was issued only to settle the issues
to bring about clarity thereon – In connected cases, by way of
ad interim relief, the Appellants were directed to be released on
bail during pendency of these Appeals, the same shall continue.
[Paras 40, 59, 60]
Constitution of India – Art.22(1) – Constitutional mandate of –
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.50 – Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.47 – Constitutional mandate and
statutory provisions giving effect to the constitutional mandate
in Article 22 of the Constitution of India; jurisprudential
developments and impact of arrest on a person, discussed.
[Paras 17-31]
Case Law Cited
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others [2023] 12 SCR 714 :
(2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi
[2024] 6 SCR 666 : (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State
of Haryana and Another [2025] 2 SCR 424 : (2025) 5 SCC 799;
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another [2014] 8 SCR 128 :
(2014) 8 SCC 273; Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others
[1994] 3 SCR 661 : (1994) 4 SCC 260; Suhas Chakma v. Union
of India and Others [2024] 10 SCR 1769 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3031; Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 381; Manubhai
Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others [2012] 8 SCR 993 :
(2013) 1 SCC 314; Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India and
Others [1981] 2 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 427 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Penal Code, 1860; Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
List of Keywords
Grounds of arrest; Necessary to furnish grounds of arrest to an
accused; Informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory
in all offences; Grounds of arrest to be communicated in writing; In
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 295
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
the language arrestee understands; Right to life and personal liberty
under Article 21 of Constitution of India; Arrest illegal; Article 22(1)
of Constitution of India; Section 50 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Section 47 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2195 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CRWP Nos. 3533 of 2024
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2189 and 2190 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.)
No. 8704 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Shri Singh, Ms. Tusharika Mattoo, Siddharth Satija, Abhinav Sekhri,
Amicus Curiaes.
Advs. for the Appellant:
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Vikram Chaudhri, Sr. Advs.,
Siddharth Sharma, Jay Bhardwaj, Ms. Disha Bajaj, Rishi Bhuta,
Ms. Ishika Chauhan, Rishi Sehgal, Nikhil Jain, Ms. Arveen Sekhon,
Ms. Muskaan Khurana, Karl P. Rustomkhan, Vaibhav Jagtap,
Ashish Pandey, Shubham Saxena, Anmol Goyal, Pushkar Dwivedi,
Akshit Chauhan.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha
Pande, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Vinayak Aren, Amlaan Kumar,
Jatin Dhamija, Naveen Kumar Bhardwaj.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Augustine George Masih, J.
1. These Appeals being Criminal Appeal No.2195 of 2025, Criminal
Appeal No.2189 of 2025 and Criminal Appeal No.2190 of 2025
were originally filed as Special Leave Petitions where leave was
296 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
granted vide Order dated 22.04.2025. Since, in all these Appeals
similar questions of law are involved, they are being decided by
this common judgment. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.8704
of 2025 was tagged with the above-mentioned matters vide Order
dated 02.06.2025.
2. The main issue as raised by the Appellants in these Appeals is the
violation of the Appellants’ right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution
of India and Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“CrPC 1973”) now Section 47 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (“BNSS 2023”) as the appellants assert that they were not
informed of grounds of their arrest in writing.
3. For convenience, Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025 is taken as
the lead case. The facts in a nutshell are that on 07.07.2024, a
white BMW car, driven at a high speed, collided violently with
the complainant’s scooter from behind. The force of the impact
propelled both the complainant and his wife onto the car’s bonnet,
whereby the complainant was thrown to the side, and tragically, his
wife became ensnared between the vehicle’s front left wheel and
bumper. Notwithstanding this grievous state, the driver, alleged
to be Mihir Rajesh Shah, the Appellant herein, persisted in his
reckless flight, dragging the victim, thereafter absconding without
rendering assistance or reporting the incident to authorities. The
victim succumbed to the severe injuries sustained in this collision, as
medically confirmed, while the complainant sustained minor injuries.
FIR No. 378/2024 was registered at Worli Police Station under the
relevant provisions of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS 2023”),
and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Initial investigative steps included
the identification of the offending vehicle through CCTV footage, and
the discovery near Kalanagar Junction Flyover of the damaged BMW
alongside Rajrishi Rajendra Singh Bindawat and Rajesh Shah, father
of Mihir Rajesh Shah (hereinafter, “Appellant”). Arrests soon followed,
with co-accused Rajrishi Rajendra Singh Bindawat being taken into
custody on the same day and Mihir Rajesh Shah being apprehended
on 09.07.2024. The evidence collected firmly established the Appellant
as the driver at the material time, including CCTV footage capturing
his presence at the wheel, consumption of alcohol shortly before the
incident, an attempt to alter his appearance, and use of a Fastag
registered in his name, amongst other incriminating particulars.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 297
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
4. The remand proceedings saw the Appellant being produced before
the Judicial Magistrate First Class with initial police custody extending
subsequently into judicial custody; a course contested on the grounds
that the grounds of arrest were not furnished in writing as mandated
by Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 47 of BNSS
2023 equivalent to Section 50 of CrPC 1973.
5. The Appellant’s challenge against the legality of arrest was ultimately
considered by the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition
No. 3533 of 2024 wherein, vide Judgment dated 25.11.2024, the
High Court of Bombay, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of this
procedural lapse, upheld the validity of arrest due to the Appellant’s
conscious awareness of the gravity of the offence, supported by
substantial evidence and the Appellant’s evasion of arrest, thereby
justifying custody despite the missing written grounds. The Appel-
lant approached this Court challenging the Judgment of Bombay
High Court contending that grounds of arrest as mandated under
Section 47 of BNSS 2023 were not informed to him in writing.
6. This Court, while considering the Special Leave Petition recorded
that the Court is not inclined to entertain the petition on its merits and
issued notice only to the extent of considering the question of law/
legal position. In connected cases, being Criminal Appeal No. 2189
of 2025 and Criminal Appeal No. 2190 of 2025, this Court vide Order
dated 22.04.2025, has granted ad interim relief and directed the Ap-
pellants to be released on bail during pendency of these Appeals.
In Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8704 of 2025 vide Order
dated 02.06.2025, ad interim relief was also granted to the Petitioner
therein directing his release on bail. On 13.12.2024, Mr. Shri Singh,
learned counsel, who was present in the Court was appointed as
Amicus Curiae to assist this Court in this matter.
7. Then, while granting leave on 22.04.2025, this Court formulated the
following questions of law for consideration:
(a) Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an
offence under Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC 1860”) now
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS 2023) would it be
necessary to furnish grounds of arrest to an accused either
before arrest or forthwith after arrest, and
(b) Whether, even in exceptional cases, where on account
of certain exigencies it will not be possible to furnish the
298 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
grounds of arrest either before arrest or immediately after
arrest, the arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC
1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023).
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submits that the
action of the Respondent of arresting the Appellant without informing
the grounds of arrest is in gross violation of the constitutional protection
and mandate of Article 21 and Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India and Section 47 of BNSS 2023. He substantiates his contention
relying upon the decision of this Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union
of India and Others1, contending that this Court has clearly held
that to meet the requirement of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India, the mode of conveying the grounds of arrest must necessarily
be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose and therefore it
must be furnished to the arrestee in writing as a matter of course.
9. Reliance is also placed upon the decision of this Court in Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)2, wherein while dealing with
the issue of communication of grounds of arrest to the arrestee in
the offences related to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
(“UAPA”), this Court relying upon Pankaj Bansal (supra) reiterated
that the grounds of arrest shall be furnished to the person arrested
under UAPA or any other offence in writing without any exception
at the earliest.
10. He further relies upon the decision of this Court in Vihaan Kumar v.
State of Haryana and Another3, wherein it was held that the
requirement of informing a person arrested, of grounds of arrest
is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India and it must be conveyed in such a mode and method so as to
achieve the object of the constitutional safeguard. He contends that
Article 22 of the Constitution of India does not differentiate between
offences under BNS 2023 (earlier IPC 1860) or offences under any
other special statute such as UAPA, thereby claiming violation of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 47 of BNSS
2023 by the Respondent. He, therefore, prays for the arrest to be
declared illegal and the Appellant to be set at liberty.
1 (2024) 7 SCC 576 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244
2 (2024) 8 SCC 254
3 (2025) 5 SCC 799 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 299
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
11. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent-State
submits that the mode of communication of grounds of arrest is not
specified in the provision of Section 47 of BNSS 2023. The reliance
on the decisions in the cases of Pankaj Bansal (supra) and Prabir
Purkayastha (supra), is misplaced as both the cases pertain to
special statutes and the facts therein are not similar to the present
case. It is argued that the mandate of Article 22(1) is to inform the
grounds of arrest to the arrestee and there is no specific statutory
mandate to provide such grounds in writing. The Respondent while
supporting the Judgment of the High Court of Bombay contends that
while informing grounds of arrest to the arrestee is mandatory, the
mode thereof is not specified, and hence, the Appellant has been
arrested in consonance with law and by following all procedural
safeguards.
12. Learned Amicus Curiae submits that the grounds of arrest must
be communicated to the arrested person in all cases without any
exception regardless of the nature of offences i.e. offences under
BNS 2023 (IPC 1860) or under any special statute such as UAPA
etc. irrespective of the mode of conveying/ communication specified
or not in the statute. Reliance is placed upon Pankaj Bansal (supra)
and Prabir Purkayastha (supra) for submitting that even the special
statutes do not provide for an exception from informing grounds of
arrest.
13. Further, regarding the mode of informing the grounds of arrest, learned
Amicus Curiae submits that Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India
as well as the procedural law under BNSS 2023 (CrPC 1973) do not
make it mandatory to provide such grounds in writing to the arrestee.
He submits that as long as the remand court or any other court is
convinced that the grounds of arrest have been duly communicated,
the mandate under Article 22(1) and BNSS 2023 would stand
satisfied. This Court in Pankaj Bansal (supra) observed that ideally
grounds of arrest should be informed in writing, however, in Vihaan
Kumar (supra) it was acknowledged that it might not be practical to
provide grounds of arrest to an accused in each and every case in
writing and thus clarified that there is no mandate to communicate
the grounds of arrest in writing. Nevertheless, for investigations
under special statutes such as Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) or UAPA, this Court has specifically held that
such grounds of arrest be communicated in writing. The decisions in
300 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
cases of Pankaj Bansal (supra) and Prabir Purkayastha (supra)
need to be read harmoniously with Vihaan Kumar (supra) which
provides as a general rule that grounds of arrest are not mandated
to be communicated in writing.
14. On the aspect of timeframe within which grounds of arrest must
be supplied to the arrested person, he submits that there is no
straightjacket formula regarding the timeframe within which grounds
of arrest must be communicated/supplied to the arrested person. The
law provides that the grounds of arrest ought to be communicated at
the time of arrest or at the earliest possible instance. The grounds of
arrest must be provided forthwith i.e. within a reasonable time so as
to allow the arrested accused an effective opportunity to consult a
legal practitioner and be sufficiently prepared to oppose remand. The
reasonable time would depend on the facts of each case; however,
the grounds must be provided prior to the remand hearing.
15. Learned Amicus Curiae rests his submissions by stating that there
can be no doubt that non-communication of the grounds of arrest to
the arrested person amounts to the violation of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India, entitling the arrestee to be released from the
custody. However, there can be no absolute rule that if an arrest is
found to be contrary to law, all investigative procedures linked to the
arrest must be deemed to have been vitiated. The effect of failure to
communicate grounds of arrest would have to be seen in the context
of proceedings when such an objection is raised and the nature of
investigation conducted after the arrest of the accused.
16. Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, learned Amicus
Curiae and on perusal of the material on record, we find it apposite
that prior to undertaking and answering the aforementioned issues,
it is imperative to delve into the constitutional mandate and statutory
provisions relatable to informing of grounds of arrest to the arrested
person as well as the existing jurisprudence as developed by this
Court while dealing with such provisions.
17. The genesis of informing the grounds of arrest to a person flows from
the Constitutional safeguard provided in Article 21 of the Constitution
of India, which reads “No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.
The expression ‘personal liberty’ has been given a wide meaning
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 301
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
through various judicial pronouncements. One of which is that
personal liberty includes procedural safeguards from the abuse of
power by the State agencies and scrutiny of the actions of the State.
18. Article 22 of the Constitution of India further strengthens the protection
of personal liberty of a person by providing that a person arrested
must be informed of the grounds of his arrest at the earliest and
should not be detained without informing him of such grounds. Article
22 reads as follow:
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain
cases.—(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained
in custody without being informed, as soon as may be,
of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the
right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner
of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody
shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a
period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to
the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be
detained in custody beyond the said period without the
authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply—
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy
alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under
any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise
the detention of a person for a longer period than three
months unless—
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who
are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed
as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the
expiration of the said period of three months that there
is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise
the detention of any person beyond the maximum
302 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
period prescribed by any law made by Parliament
under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the
provisions of any law made by Parliament under
sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order
made under any law providing for preventive detention,
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be,
communicate to such person the grounds on which the
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making
any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose
facts which such authority considers to be against the
public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe—
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or
classes of cases in which, a person may be detained
for a period longer than three months under any law
providing for preventive detention without obtaining
the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with
the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may
in any class or classes of cases be detained under
any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board
in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).”
19. The Constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22 of the
Constitution of India has been effectuated by the legislature by
incorporating Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS
2023) which puts into force the procedural mandate providing for
the protection of the personal liberty of the person so arrested.
Section 47 of BNSS 2023 casts a duty on the police officer or other
person arresting any person without a warrant shall communicate
him the grounds of arrest, which is reproduced herein below:
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 303
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
“47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of
arrest and of right to bail.––(1) Every police officer or
other person arresting any person without warrant shall
forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence
for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
(2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any
person other than a person accused of a non-bailable
offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is
entitled to be released on bail and that he may arrange
for sureties on his behalf.”
20. Section 50A of the CrPC 1973 now Section 48 of BNSS 2023 was
further added to extend the scope of such protection by casting a
duty upon the person arresting to inform such grounds of arrest to
his friend, relative or any other person nominated by arrested person.
Section 48 of BNSS 2023 reads as follows:
“48. Obligation of person making arrest to inform
about arrest, etc., to relative or friend.–– (1) Every
police officer or other person making any arrest under this
Sanhita shall forthwith give the information regarding such
arrest and place where the arrested person is being held
to any of his relatives, friends or such other persons as
may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person
for the purpose of giving such information and also to the
designated police officer in the district.
(2) The police officer shall inform the arrested person of
his rights under sub-section (1) as soon as he is brought
to the police station.
(3) An entry of the fact as to who has been informed of the
arrest of such person shall be made in a book to be kept
in the police station in such form as the State Government
may, by rules, provide.
(4) It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before whom such
arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that the
requirements of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) have
been complied with in respect of such arrested person.”
21. After having discussed the constitutional mandate and statutory
provisions giving effect to the constitutional mandate in Article 22
304 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the Constitution of India, let us now consider the jurisprudence
developed by this Court with respect to furnishing of grounds of
arrest through its decisions.
22. In Pankaj Bansal (supra), this Court while dealing with the issue
of furnishing grounds of arrest under Section 19(1) of PMLA has
underscored that Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that
no arrested person shall be detained without being informed of the
grounds of such arrest at the earliest opportunity. The manner in
which such grounds are to be communicated must be efficacious
and substantive which must fulfil the essential objective and mandate
of the constitutional provisions. It was further held that there exists
no plausible justification as to why a written copy of the grounds of
arrest ought not be provided to the arrestee as a standard procedural
requirement without any exception.
23. This Court has reached the above conclusion based on the proposition
that mere oral communication of such grounds, in the absence of
any written document, renders the compliance susceptible to factual
disputes which often result into conflicting claims between the
arrested person and the investigating agency. This conflict results
in jeopardizing the integrity of the arrest process and thereby giving
an opportunity to the accused person to claim an immediate release.
This situation may be obviated by furnishing the grounds of arrest
in writing. Apart from the practical difficulties, furnishing grounds of
arrest in writing also results into effective compliance of the mandate
provided under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The relevant
portion of the decision in Pankaj Bansal (supra) is reproduced herein:
“38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of
the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who
is arrested shall be detained in custody without being
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such
arrest. This being the fundamental right guaranteed to
the arrested person, the mode of conveying information
of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful
so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be noted
that Section 45 PMLA enables the person arrested under
Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates
that unless the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are
satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to grant of
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 305
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that,
firstly, the court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity
to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the application for
release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and,
secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence while
on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for
the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which
the authorised officer arrested him/her under Section 19
and the basis for the officer’s “reason to believe” that he/
she is guilty of an offence punishable under the 2002 Act.
It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these
facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove
before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe
that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the
relief of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of
arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and
Section 19 PMLA, is meant to serve this higher purpose
and must be given due importance.
*** *** ***
42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy
of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished
to the arrested person as a matter of course and without
exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this
would be the advisable course of action to be followed as
a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of
arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by
such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in
a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested
person against the word of the authorised officer as to
whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this
regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar
as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims that
witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of
arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that
is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document.
Non-compliance in this regard would entail release of the
arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji v.
306 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State [(2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]. Such a
precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence
thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written
grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer
in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person
under due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the
debatable ipse dixit of the authorised officer.
43. The second reason as to why this would be the proper
course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying
such information being given to the arrested person.
Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the
arrested person of why he/she is being arrested but also to
enable such person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter,
present a case before the court under Section 45 to seek
release on bail, if he/she so chooses. In this regard, the
grounds of arrest in V. Senthil Balaji v. State [(2024) 3 SCC
51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1], are placed on record and we find
that the same run into as many as six pages. The grounds
of arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj
Bansal and Basant Bansal have not been produced before
this Court, but it was contended that they were produced
at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier,
this did not serve the intended purpose. Further, in the
event their grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it
would be well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or
Basant Bansal to record and remember all that they had
read or heard being read out for future recall so as to avail
legal remedies. More so, as a person who has just been
arrested would not be in a calm and collected frame of
mind and may be utterly incapable of remembering the
contents of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to him/
her. The very purpose of this constitutional and statutory
protection would be rendered nugatory by permitting the
authorities concerned to merely read out or permit reading
of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and
detail, and claim due compliance with the constitutional
requirement under Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate
under Section 19(1) PMLA.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 307
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
44. We may also note that the grounds of arrest recorded
by the authorised officer, in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA,
would be personal to the person who is arrested and
there should, ordinarily, be no risk of sensitive material
being divulged therefrom, compromising the sanctity and
integrity of the investigation. In the event any such sensitive
material finds mention in such grounds of arrest recorded
by the authorised officer, it would always be open to him to
redact such sensitive portions in the document and furnish
the edited copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested
person, so as to safeguard the sanctity of the investigation.
45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and
purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate
of Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of
the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest
is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course
and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High
Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India [2017
SCC OnLine Del 12108] and the Bombay High Court
in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India [2016
SCC OnLine Bom 9938 : (2017) 1 AIR Bom R (Cri) 929],
which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct
law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that
ED›s investigating officer merely read out or permitted
reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and
left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As
this form of communication is not found to be adequate
to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of
the Constitution and Section 19(1) PMLA, we have no
hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping
with the provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA. Further, as
already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of ED in
proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second
ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in
relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance
as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the
arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand
to the custody of ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody,
cannot be sustained.”
308 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
24. In Prabir Purkayastha (supra), of which, one of us was a member
(B.R. Gavai, J., as he then was), this Court reiterated the principle
laid down in the above judgment, while dealing with offences under
UAPA and held that any individual arrested for alleged commission
of offences under the UAPA or any other offence for that matter, has
both a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed in writing such
grounds of arrest. The Court further held that a copy of such written
grounds must be furnished to the arrested person at the earliest
without any exception observing that the communication provided
under Article 22 and Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of
BNSS 2023) is not a mere procedural formality but a vital safeguard
with the ultimate objective to enable the arrested person to effectively
consult legal aid and be prepared to raise objections in remand
hearing and apply for his/her bail. The right to life and personal liberty,
safeguarded under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, stands
as the paramount fundamental right. Accordingly, infringement of
these constitutional protections commands rigorous judicial scrutiny
and strict enforcement.
25. It was said that any breach of the constitutional safeguards provided
under Article 22 would vitiate the lawfulness of arrest and subsequent
remand and entitle the arrested person to be set at liberty. The
relevant portion in Prabir Purkayastha (supra) is reproduced herein:
“19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the court
that any person arrested for allegation of commission of
offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter
any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory
right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing
and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be
furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and
without exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing
to the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary
and sacrosanct inasmuch as this information would be the
only effective means for the arrested person to consult his
advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek
bail. Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting
the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
20. The right to life and personal liberty is the most
sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed under Articles
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 309
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Any attempt to
encroach upon this fundamental right has been frowned
upon by this Court in a catena of decisions. In this regard,
we may refer to the following observations made by this
Court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala [(2000) 8 SCC 590 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 42] : (SCC p. 593, para 7)
‘7. The life and liberty of an individual is so sacrosanct
that it cannot be allowed to be interfered with except
under the authority of law. It is a principle which has
been recognised and applied in all civilised countries.
In our Constitution Article 21 guarantees protection of
life and personal liberty not only to citizens of India
but also to aliens.’
Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental right,
guaranteed by Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution
of India, would have to be dealt with strictly.
21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest
flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and
any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the
process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge-
sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the
illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time
of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police
custody remand to the accused.
*** *** ***
28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India regarding the communication
of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the
constitutional provisions require that the “grounds” of
“arrest” or “detention”, as the case may be, must be
communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this
important facet of the fundamental right as made by the
Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply
to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is
concerned.
310 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the
requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or
the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested
in connection with an offence or a person placed under
preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and
22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot
be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this
constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would
lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal,
as the case may be.”
26. Subsequently, in Vihaan Kumar (supra), this Court underscored that
a failure to comply with the requirement of informing the grounds of
arrest soon after the arrest would render the arrest illegal. The Court
referred to the above-mentioned decisions of this Court and observed
that although the ideal mode of communication of grounds of arrest
is to provide such grounds in writing, there is no such statutory
requirement to provide such grounds in writing. The Court noted that
it may not be practical to communicate grounds of arrest in writing
in every situation, but if such a course is followed, the controversy
about non-compliance will not arise at all.
27. It was further observed that to ensure the effective implementation
of the constitutional mandate in Article 22, the law further requires
such grounds to be effectively communicated not only to the detainee/
arrestee but also to their friends, relatives or any other nominated
person as envisaged in Section 50A of CrPC 1973 (now Section 48
of BNSS 2023). The legislative intent behind the incorporation of
Section 50A of CrPC 1973 is to ensure that those in a position to
act, i.e. secure legal representation, initiate the process for bail, are
empowered to do so without any delay, thereby safeguarding the
fundamental rights of the arrested person as enshrined in Article 21
of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of Vihaan Kumar
(supra) is reproduced herein:
“11. The view taken in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India
[(2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] was reiterated
by this Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[(2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573]. In paras 28
and 29, this Court held thus: (Prabir Purkayastha case,
SCC p. 278)
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 311
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
‘28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the
communication of the grounds is exactly the identical.
Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the
‘grounds’ of ‘arrest’ or ‘detention’, as the case may be,
must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation
to this important facet of the fundamental right as
made by the Constitution Bench while examining the
scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would
ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution
of India insofar as the requirement to communicate
the grounds of arrest is concerned.
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating
that the requirement to communicate the grounds
of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a
person arrested in connection with an offence or a
person placed under preventive detention as provided
under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of
India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under
any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional
requirement and statutory mandate would lead to
the custody or the detention being rendered illegal,
as the case may be.’
(emphasis supplied)
*** *** ***
16. An attempt was made by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the first respondent to argue that after his
arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody,
and now a charge-sheet has been filed. His submission
is that now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant
to the order taking cognizance passed on the charge-
sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great respect to
the learned Senior Counsel, will amount to completely
nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once
it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation
of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore,
continued custody of such a person based on orders of
remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge-sheet and order
312 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se
unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of
the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most
important safeguards provided under Article 22.
*** *** ***
N. Kotiswar Singh, J. (supplementing)— I had the benefit
of going through the draft opinion of my esteemed Brother
Hon›ble Mr Justice Abhay S. Oka and I concur with the
analysis and conclusions arrived at. However, I wish to
add a few lines in supplement to the aforesaid opinion.
2. The issue on the requirement of communication of
grounds of arrest to the person arrested, as mandated under
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, which has also
been incorporated in the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 under Section 19 thereof has been succinctly
reiterated in this judgment. The constitutional mandate
of informing the grounds of arrest to the person arrested
in writing has been explained in Pankaj Bansal v. Union
of India [(2024) 7 SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] so
as to be meaningful to serve the intended purpose which
has been reiterated in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT
of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC 254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573].
The said constitutional mandate has been incorporated
in the statute under Section 50CrPC (Section 47 of the
BNSS). It may also be noted that the aforesaid provision
of requirement for communicating the grounds of arrest, to
be purposeful, is also required to be communicated to the
friends, relatives or such other persons of the accused as
may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested person for
the purpose of giving such information as provided under
Section 50-ACrPC. As may be noted, this is in the addition
of the requirement as provided under Section 50(1)CrPC.
3. The purpose of inserting Section 50-ACrPC, making
it obligatory on the person making arrest to inform about
the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons nominated
by the arrested person, is to ensure that they would be
able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure the
release of the arrested person as permissible under the
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 313
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
law. The arrested person, because of his detention, may
not have immediate and easy access to the legal process
for securing his release, which would otherwise be available
to the friends, relatives and such nominated persons by
way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release
of the detained person on bail at the earliest. Therefore,
the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the
detenue, and in addition to his relatives as mentioned above
is not merely a formality but to enable the detained person
to know the reasons for his arrest but also to provide the
necessary opportunity to him through his relatives, friends
or nominated persons to secure his release at the earliest
possible opportunity for actualising the fundamental right
to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Hence, the requirement of communicating
the grounds of arrest in writing is not only to the arrested
person, but also to the friends, relatives or such other
person as may be disclosed or nominated by the arrested
person, so as to make the mandate of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution meaningful and effective failing which, such
arrest may be rendered illegal.”
28. Before we delve into analysing the provisions of law and jurisprudential
developments by this Court, we find it quintessential to discuss the
impact of arrest on an individual. The arrest of an individual invariably
impacts not only the person arrested himself, but also the persons
associated with him, i.e. family, friends, relatives, etc., affecting their
psychological balance and overall social well-being. This Court has
on several occasions underscored that there is a stigma attached to
arrest which impairs the reputation and the standing of an individual
in society. The stigma attached to arrest undermines a person’s social
dignity and results into consequences that reverberate beyond the
individual but also extend to their social circle.
29. The impacts of arrest are multidimensional and are not only limited
to societal impact but also extend to the physical and mental health
of the person. Mental health issues like depression due to custodial
confinement can be aggravated by inadequate and overcrowded
conditions prevalent in prisons. Such conditions severely impinge
upon the fundamental rights of the arrested person and curtail his
dignity and personal liberty.
314 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
30. This Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another4,
observed that arrest results in embarrassment, restricts freedom,
and leaves permanent scars. Lawmakers and the police are aware
of this. The police and lawmakers are at odds, and it appears
that the police have not learned the lesson that is implied in and
reflected in the CrPC 1973 (now BNSS 2023). Despite long years
of independence, it still maintains its colonial image and is primarily
viewed as an instrument of oppression and harassment, and it is
undoubtedly not regarded as a friend of the public.
31. In Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others5, this Court while
framing guidelines regarding the rights of an arrested person has
observed that the existence of a power to arrest and the justification
to use such power are two different aspects. The person making
arrest must be able to justify the arrest with reasons apart from his
power to do so. Arrest of a person can cause irreversible damage
to his reputation in the society as well as his self-esteem, therefore,
arrest cannot be made in a routine manner. The Police Officer making
an arrest must be cautious while arresting a person and ought to
satisfy himself after a reasonable investigation to justify the person’s
complicity and also the effect as well as the need of arrest. This
Court has further observed that except in heinous offences, arrest
must be avoided.
32. Having perused the jurisprudential developments and impact of arrest
on a person, let us now consider the issues at hand.
33. The mandate contained in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India
is unambiguous and clear in nature, it provides that the arrested
person must be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as they
can be. It further provides that the arrested person has the right to
defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice. This
constitutional mandate has been effectuated by the legislature in
Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023) which
provides that an arrested person shall be forthwith communicated
with the grounds of his arrest.
34. The objective enshrined in Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India
for furnishing grounds of arrest stems from the fundamental principle
4 (2014) 8 SCC 273 : AIR 2014 SC 2756
5 (1994) 4 SCC 260
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 315
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
of providing opportunity to a person to allow him to defend himself
from the accusations that are levelled against him leading to his
arrest. The salutary purpose of informing the grounds of arrest is to
enable the person to understand the basis of his arrest and engage
legal counsel to challenge his arrest, remand or seek bail and/or
avail of any other remedy as may be available to him/her under law.
35. It is pertinent to note that the arrested person must be given early
access to legal assistance to enable him to defend himself and
oppose the remand. The early access to legal counsel becomes
a quintessential object to ensure that the personal liberty of the
arrested person is protected. This Court in Suhas Chakma v. Union
of India and Others6 while emphasizing on the need of pre-litigation
assistance has directed that the “Guidelines on Early Access to Justice
at Pre-arrest, Arrest and Remand Stage Framework” as framed by
the National Legal Services Authority, are to be diligently pursued.
The guidelines provide for legal assistance to the arrested person at
the stage before remand. The remand advocate shall interact with
the arrestee with the objective to inform him about the allegations
against him and the grounds being put by the prosecution for
seeking remand. The guidelines also provide for making available the
translated copy of documents to the arrested person in the language
he/she understands. The purpose of securing legal assistance before
remand is not merely symbolic, but it is to ensure that the accused
is afforded an effective opportunity to oppose the prayer for police
custody and to place before the magistrate any circumstances that
may warrant refusal or limitation of such custody. If the accused is
not represented through a Counsel, he/she should be made aware
that he/she is entitled for legal aid. As far as possible, it shall be
ensured that every accused person is represented by an advocate,
if he is not able to avail such assistance, he should be given free
legal aid. A three-judge Bench of this Court in Ashok v. State of
Uttar Pradesh7 held that an accused who is not represented by an
advocate is entitled for free legal aid at all material stages starting
from remand.
36. This statutory safeguard of legal assistance stands also reinforced by
Section 38 of the BNSS 2023, which confers upon an arrested person
6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031
7 (2025) 2 SCC 381 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3580
316 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the right to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, albeit
not throughout its course. The object of this provision is to ensure
meaningful access to legal assistance at the earliest stage, so that
the advocate, once informed, may effectively exercise the rights
available in law, including representation during remand proceedings
and invocation of the right to seek bail.
37. Section 167 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 187 of BNSS 2023) while
dealing with remand provides for a positive mandate on the police
officer to forward the accused to the magistrate before expiry of such
period as fixed under Section 57 CrPC 1973 (now Section 58 of
BNSS 2023) when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four
hours. It further mandates that the magistrate to not authorize the
detention of accused unless he is physically produced before him. The
purpose of this provision mandating the production of accused before
magistrate for exercise of the power of remanding him to custody
under this section is with the dual purpose. First, ensuring physical
presence of the accused and second to afford him an opportunity
to be heard. The intent of this provision is not merely to be heard
at the stage of remand but to be represented by the counsel of his
choice. Thereafter, the duty is cast upon the magistrate to apply his
judicial mind to the material produced before him, hear the accused
or the counsel representing him to determine whether the accused
should be remanded to police custody or should be detained at
all within the parameters prescribed in Section 167 of CrPC 1973
(Section 187 of BNSS 2023). The magistrate is not acting as a post
office simply putting a stamp of approval to the remand papers as
presented before him. In Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat
and Others8 this Court held that it is obligatory on the part of the
magistrate to satisfy himself whether the materials placed before
him justify such a remand.
38. These above discussed principles embody the manifestation of the
constitutional safeguard sought to be achieved in Article 22 of the
Constitution of India which is that the arrested person must be well
equipped with the information not only about his arrest but the reasons
and grounds thereof prior to his production before the magistrate
so as to enable him to effectively defend himself and oppose the
police and judicial custody and even press for bail. The obligation to
8 (2013) 1 SCC 314
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 317
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
inform the grounds of arrest to the arrestee is thus, not just a mere
procedural formality, instead it flows from the fundamental right of
personal liberty which sets the further course for protection from
the oppressive restrictions imposed upon the free movement in the
society of an arrestee during remand.
39. A plain reading of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India shows that
the intent of the constitution makers while incorporating the provisions
was not to create any exceptional circumstances, instead it reads as
“No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest….”, it
casts a mandatory unexceptional duty on the State to provide the
arrested person with the grounds of such arrest with the objective
to enable that person to be able to defend himself by consulting
a legal practitioner of his choice. This mandate of Article 22 (1) is
notwithstanding any exception. This Court has made it explicit that
the constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not statute-specific and
it is grounded in fundamental right of life and personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore making it applicable
to all offences including those under the IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).
40. The requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds of
arrest, in the light of and under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India, is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional
safeguard which has been included in part III of the Constitution under
the head of Fundamental Rights. Thus, if a person is not informed
of the grounds of his arrest as soon as maybe, it would amount to
the violation of his fundamental rights thereby curtailing his right to
life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
rendering the arrest illegal.
41. Another aspect, which flows from the above discussion and merits
consideration is the mode of informing grounds of arrest to the arrested
person to effectively serve the intended purpose of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India. This Court, as observed above, had held that it
would not be ideal to read out the grounds of arrest to a person who
is arrested, as he may not be in the frame of mind to remember the
contents of grounds that are read out to him. The Court underscored
that if the authorities are permitted to read out the grounds and claim
compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate, the very
purpose of the constitutional protection would be nugatory.
318 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
42. As mentioned above, it has been held while dealing with the mode
of communicating the grounds of arrest so as to serve the intended
purpose of the constitutional mandate that the language used in
Article 22(1) and 22(5) regarding communication of the grounds is
identical and therefore the interpretation of Article 22(5) shall ipso
facto apply to Article 22(1). The grounds of arrest must be furnished
in writing, in order to attend the true intended purpose of Article 22(1).
Reference at this stage may be made to the Constitution Bench
Judgment of this Court in Harikisan (supra) wherein while dealing
with the Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in the context of
the right of a detainee to be made aware of the grounds of arrest,
it has been held that the same should be furnished in a language
which he can understand and in a script which he can read, if he is
a literate person. The relevant portion thereof reads thus:
“7. It has not been found by the High Court that the appellant
knew enough English to understand the grounds of his
detention. The High Court has only stated that ‘he has
studied up to 7th Hindi standard, which is equivalent to 3rd
English standard’. The High Court negatived the contention
raised on behalf of the appellant not on the ground that
the appellant knew enough English, to understand the
case against him, but on the ground, as already indicated,
that the service upon him of the Order and grounds of
detention in English was enough communication to him
to enable him to make his representation. We must,
therefore, proceed on the assumption that the appellant
did not know enough English to understand the grounds,
contained in many paragraphs, as indicated above, in order
to be able effectively to make his representation against
the Order of Detention. The learned Attorney-General
has tried to answer this contention in several ways. He
has first contended that when the Constitution speaks of
communicating the grounds of detention to the detenue,
it means communication in the official language, which
continues to be English; secondly, the communication
need not be in writing and the translation and explanation
in Hindi offered by the Inspector of Police, while serving
the Order of Detention and the grounds would be enough
compliance with the requirements of the law and the
Constitution; and thirdly, that it was not necessary in the
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 319
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
circumstances of the case to supply the grounds in Hindi.
In our opinion, this was not sufficient compliance in this
case with the requirements of the Constitution, as laid
down in clause (5) of Article 22. To a person, who is not
conversant with the English language, service of the Order
and the grounds of detention in English, with their oral
translation or explanation by the police officer serving them
does not fulfil the requirements of the law. As has been
explained by this Court in the case of State of Bombay v.
Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951 SCC 43 : (1951) SCR
167] clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds of
his detention should be made available to the detenue
as soon as may be, and that the earliest opportunity of
making a representation against the Order should also be
afforded to him. In order that the detenue should have that
opportunity, it is not sufficient that he has been physically
delivered the means of knowledge with which to make
his representation. In order that the detenue should be in
a position effectively to make his representation against
the Order, he should have knowledge of the grounds of
detention, which are in the nature of the charge against
him setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the
authorities attribute to him. Communication, in this context,
must, therefore, mean imparting to the detenue sufficient
knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of
Detention is based. In this case the grounds are several,
and are based on numerous speeches said to have been
made by the appellant himself on different occasions and
different dates. Naturally, therefore, any oral translation
or explanation given by the police officer serving those
on the detenue would not amount to communicating the
grounds. Communication, in this context, must mean
bringing home to the detenue effective knowledge of the
facts and circumstances on which the Order of Detention
is based.
8. We do not agree with the High Court in its conclusion
that in every case communication of the grounds of
detention in English, so long as it continues to be the
official language of the State, is enough compliance
with the requirements of the Constitution. If the detained
320 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
person is conversant with the English language, he will
naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of
the charge against him and the facts and circumstances
on which the order of detention is based. But to a person
who is not so conversant with the English language, in
order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the
detenue must be given the grounds in a language which
he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if
he is a literate person.”
43. Further, the above judgment has been reiterated and followed
by this Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India and
Others9 where it has been reaffirmed that grounds of detention must
be communicated to the detenu in writing in a language which he
understands.
44. On perusal of the above two judgments, it turns out that mere
communication of the grounds in a language not understood by
the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional mandate under
Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The failure to supply such
grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the
constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the personal liberty of
the person as guaranteed under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution
of India. The objective of the constitutional mandate is to place the
person in a position to comprehend the basis of the allegations
levelled against him and it can only be realised when the grounds are
furnished in a language understood by the person, thereby enabling
him to exercise his rights effectively.
45. From the catena of decisions discussed above, the legal position which
emerges is that the constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India is not a mere procedural formality but a
constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights. The intent
and purpose of the constitutional mandate is to prepare the arrested
person to defend himself. If the provisions of Article 22(1) are read
in a restrictive manner, its intended purpose of securing personal
liberty would not be achieved rather curtailed and put to disuse.
The mode of communicating the grounds of arrest must be such
that it effectively serves the intended purpose as envisioned under
9 (1981) 2 SCC 427
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 321
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
the Constitution of India which is to enable the arrested person to
get legal counsel, oppose the remand and effectively defend himself
by exercising his rights and safeguards as provided in law. The
grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrestee in such a manner
that sufficient knowledge of facts constituting grounds is imparted
and communicated to the arrested person effectively in a language
which he/she understands. The mode of communication ought to be
such that it must achieve the intended purpose of the constitutional
safeguard. The objective of the constitutional mandate would not
be fulfilled by mere reading out the grounds to the arrested person,
such an approach would be antithesis to the purpose of Article 22(1).
There is no harm in providing the grounds of arrest in writing in the
language the arrestee understands, this approach would not only
fulfil the true intent of the constitutional mandate but will also be
beneficial for the investigating agency to prove that the grounds of
arrest were informed to the arrestee when a challenge is made to
the arrest on the plea of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.
46. This Court is of the opinion that to achieve the intended objective
of the constitutional mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person
in each and every case without exception and the mode of the
communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language
he understands.
47. It would not be out of context now to refer to an obligation which has
been imposed on a person making arrest, as provided under Section
50A read in relation to Section 50 of the CrPC 1973 (now Section
48 and 47 of BNSS 2023 respectively), to inform the arrestee of
his right to indicate his relative, friend or such other person for the
purpose of giving information with regard to his arrest. Simultaneously,
a duty has also been cast on the person making arrest to forthwith
thereafter inform of such arrest with reasons and the place where
the arrested person is being held to the such indicated person.
The police officer/person making any arrest shall make an entry of
the fact as to who has been informed of such an arrest in a book
to be kept in the police station. Further protection in this regard is
reflected when a duty has been cast on the magistrate to satisfy
himself, when the arrestee is produced before him, that the above
requirement stands complied with. This requirement is in addition to
the rights of an arrestee to be made aware of the grounds of arrest.
322 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
48. The second issue which requires consideration is when grounds of
arrest are not furnished either prior to arrest or immediately after the
arrest, would it vitiate the arrest for non-compliance of the provisions of
Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023) irrespective
of certain exigencies where furnishing such grounds would not be
possible forthwith.
49. It is by now settled that if the grounds of arrest are not furnished
to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance will result in breach
of the constitutional and statutory safeguards hence rendering the
arrest and remand illegal and the person will be entitled to be set at
liberty. The statute is silent with regard to the mode, nature or the time
and stage at which the grounds of arrest has to be communicated.
Article 22 says ‘as soon as may be’ which would obviously not mean
prior to arrest but can be on arrest or thereafter. The indication is
as early as it can be conveyed. There may be situations wherein it
may not be practically possible to supply such grounds of arrest to
the arrested person at the time of his arrest or immediately.
50. It may so happen that in the presence of a police officer a cognizable
offence is being committed and the factual matrix presents a tangible
and imminent risk of the suspect absconding or committing further
offence(s). For instance, in a case involving a murder being committed
in front of a police officer, it may not be possible for the officer to
provide the grounds of arrest in writing before the arrest or forthwith
on the arrest to the accused. A rigid insistence upon informing of
written ground(s) of arrest before or at the time of effecting the arrest
or immediately thereafter may result into police officer not being able
to discharge their duty and responsibility efficiently and effectively.
The constitutional safeguards, valuable as they are, cannot be
interpreted in a manner so as to allow it to metamorphose into a
procedural impediment that handicaps the law enforcing agencies in
due lawful discharge of their duties. Therefore, a balance between
compliance of the constitutional as also the statutorily mandated
safeguards on the one hand vis-a-vis the effective discharge of
lawful statutory law enforcement duties and responsibilities cast
upon the State agencies must be struck.
51. Supplanting the above situation, there may be a case wherein the
Investigating Officer has sent a notice for appearance of the accused
to join the investigation under Section 41A of CrPC 1973 (now Section
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 323
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
35(3) to 35(6) of BNSS 2023) pursuant to which the accused has
joined the investigation. The Investigating Officer, after perusal of
material available before him and/or on interrogating the accused,
makes up his mind that the arrest of the accused person is required
for further investigation or has other reason(s) for arrest, in such
cases, since the accused is under the supervision of the Investigating
Agency and there exists no apprehension of him absconding, it
becomes incumbent upon the Police Officer to supply the grounds
of arrest in writing on arresting the accused person. This can also be
followed, for instance, in cases involving offences which are primarily
based on documentary evidence/records, economic offences such
as under PMLA where the grounds of arrest in writing be furnished
to the arrested person on arrest simultaneously.
52. We thus hold, that, in cases where the police are already in
possession of documentary material furnishing a cogent basis for
the arrest, the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the
arrestee on his arrest. However, in exceptional circumstances such
as offences against body or property committed in flagrante delicto,
where informing the grounds of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered
impractical, it shall be sufficient for the police officer or other person
making the arrest to orally convey the same to the person at the
time of arrest. Later, a written copy of grounds of arrest must be
supplied to the arrested person within a reasonable time and in no
event later than two hours prior to production of the arrestee before
the magistrate for remand proceedings. The remand papers shall
contain the grounds of arrest and in case there is delay in supply
thereof, a note indicating a cause for it be included for the information
of the magistrate.
53. The above indicated lower limit of two hours minimum interval
before the production is grounded in the functional necessity so
that the right as provided to an arrestee under the Constitution and
the statute is safeguarded effectively. This period would ensure
that the counsel has adequate time to scrutinize the basis of arrest
and gather relevant material to defend the arrestee proficiently and
capably while opposing the remand. Any shorter interval may render
such preparation illusory, thereby resulting in non-compliance of the
constitutional and statutory mandate. The two-hour threshold before
production for remand thus strikes a judicious balance between
324 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
safeguarding the arrestee’s constitutional rights under Article 22(1)
and preserving the operational continuity of criminal investigations.
54. In view of the above, we hold with regard to the second issue that
non supply of grounds of arrest in writing to the arrestee prior to or
immediately after arrest would not vitiate such arrest on the grounds
of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 50 of the CrPC
1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023) provided the said grounds
are supplied in writing within a reasonable time and in any case two
hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the magistrate
for remand proceedings.
55. It goes without saying that if the abovesaid schedule for supplying
the grounds of arrest in writing is not adhered to, the arrest will be
rendered illegal entitling the release of the arrestee. On such release,
an application for remand or custody, if required, will be moved along
with the reasons and necessity for the same, after the supply of the
grounds of arrest in writing setting forth the explanation for non-supply
thereof within the above stipulated schedule. On receipt of such an
application, the magistrate shall decide the same expeditiously and
preferably within a week of submission thereof by adhering to the
principles of natural justice.
56. In conclusion, it is held that:
i) The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds
of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including
offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023);
ii) The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the
arrestee in the language he/she understands;
iii) In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to
communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after
arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be communicated
in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two
hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings
before the magistrate.
iv) In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and
subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person
will be at liberty to be set free.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 325
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
57. After having come to the above conclusion, it is pertinent to note that
the provision of law under Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (Section 47 of
BNSS 2023) does not provide for a specific mode of or time frame
for communication of the grounds of arrest to the person arrested.
This Court in Prabir Purkayastha (supra), held that the grounds of
arrest be conveyed to the arrestee in writing in all offences at the
earliest, which means it need not be given at the time of arrest but
within a reasonable time thereafter, for offences under all the statutes,
which period would be as has been laid down above in this order.
58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding
requirement mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest
for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as
engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective
manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the
administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal
discipline therefore demand that this procedure as affirmed above
shall govern arrests henceforth.
59. In Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025, while issuing notice, this Court
had clarified that the Court is not inclined to entertain the petition
on its merits, and notice was issued only to settle the issues to
bring about clarity thereon, with that having been reached the same
stands disposed of.
60. As far as the Criminal Appeal No. 2189 of 2025 and Criminal Appeal
No. 2190 of 2025 are concerned, this Court while granting leave on
22.04.2025 had by way of ad interim relief directed the Appellants
to be released on bail during pendency of these Appeals, the same
shall continue. However, the prosecution may move an application
for remand or custody, if required, along with the reasons and
necessity for the same, after the supply of the grounds of arrest in
writing to the accused, before the magistrate if the case has not been
committed for trial and in case the trial having commenced before
the Trial Court as the case may be.
61. The Appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
62. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
63. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8704 of 2025 was tagged with
these Appeals and the Petitioner was granted an ad interim relief
326 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
directing his release on bail vide Order dated 02.06.2025. Since
there being no update with regard to effecting of service upon the
Respondent nor any reply has been filed, the ad interim relief shall
continue, and the petition be listed before an appropriate bench after
obtaining the orders on the administrative side from the Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India.
64. We acknowledge and appreciate the constructive assistance rendered
by the learned Amicus Curiae and the learned Counsels for the
parties to this Court.
65. We direct the Registry to send one copy of this judgment to all the
Registrar Generals of the High Courts and the Chief Secretaries of
all the States and Union Territories.
Result of the case: Appeals disposed of; SLP (Criminal) No. 8704
of 2025 be listed before an appropriate bench
after obtaining the orders on the administrative
side from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Grounds of arrest"Sign in to search