MANISH YADAVversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

                [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1497 : 2025 INSC 151

                             Manish Yadav
                                    v.
                     State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 333 of 2025)
                               22 January 2025
              [Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       The appellant herein has sought to quash proceedings for the
       offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506, Penal
       Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(r),3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of
       the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
       Atrocities) Act, 1989.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376, 323, 504 and 506 – Scheduled
       Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
       1989 – Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) – Allegation
       that appellant befriended the complainant and established
       physical relations with her – Later, appellant began assaulting
       complainant and used derogatory caste-based slurs, imputing
       that he will not marry her – FIR was registered – Charge-sheet
       was filed – Appellant sought quashing of criminal proceedings:
       Held: In the instant case, the complainant had agreed to indulge
       in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own
       desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage
       made by the appellant – Therefore, while the present case may
       involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an
       inherently false promise to marry – Based on the circumstances, it
       cannot be concluded that the appellant obtained the complainant’s
       consent to engage in a physical relationship under the pretext of
       a false promise of marriage – Admittedly, the appellant himself
       had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married,
       but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured
       a job – Therefore, while the prosecution story primarily rests on
       the fact that the appellant had lured the complainant to develop


* Author
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    physical relations with him on the promise to marry her in future,
    this very statement of the complainant suggests the contrary – The
    complainant’s act of declining the appellant’s proposal of marriage
    shows that it was not the appellant who failed to stand firm upon
    his promise if any such promise was made by the appellant at
    any point in time – Thus, the theory put forth by the prosecution
    in the charge-sheet that the appellant induced the complainant
    to indulge in physical relations under a false promise of marriage
    is neither corroborated nor established by the best evidence
    available on record, which is in the form of the statement of the
    complainant recorded u/s.164 CrPC – Moreover, in her statement,
    the complainant did not stated that she was maligned or abused
    by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Therefore,
    the ingredients of the offences alleged under the SC/ST Act,
    against the appellant are ex-facie not made out – The instant
    case appears to be one where a consensual physical relationship
    between two adults has turned sour due to certain intervening
    events – Hence, allowing the prosecution of the appellant for the
    offences would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law
    and nothing else – Thus, proceedings sought to be taken against
    the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.376, 323, 504 and
    506, IPC and ss.3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
    Act are quashed. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]

                            Case Law Cited
    Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 909 : (2005)
    1 SCC 88 – relied on.
    Uday v. State of Karnataka [2003] 2 SCR 231 : (2003) 4 SCC 46;
    Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [2013] 6 SCR 544 : (2013) 7
    SCC 675 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
    Penal Code, 1860; Scheduled Castes and the Schedules Tribes
    (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure,
    1973.

                            List of Keywords
    Intimate relations; False promise of marriage; Breach of promise;
    Physical relationship; Proposal of marriage; Rape; Relationship
    turned sour.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                        1499

                    Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.


                                           Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       333 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2024 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Allahabad in CRA No. 227 of 2024

                                      Appearances for Parties
       Nikhil Sharma, Abhinav Srivastav, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Advs. for
       the Appellant.
       Shaurya Sahay, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Advs. for the Respondents.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                                  Order

       Mehta, J.

1.     Heard.
2.     Leave granted.
3.     The appellant through this appeal by special leave seeks to assail the
       order dated 30th August, 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature
       at Allahabad,1 whereby, it partially allowed the Criminal Appeal No.
       227/2024 preferred by the appellant, who had sought to question the
       legality and validity of the order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by
       learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Gazipur2 in Special Sessions Trial
       No. 760 of 2023, summoning the appellant and his father, Rajnath
       Yadav, to face trial for the offences punishable under Sections 376,
       323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 and Sections
       3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and
       the Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19894.
4.     The High Court vide Impugned Order dated 30th August, 2024, had
       partly allowed the criminal appeal, by quashing the summoning order
       issued by the trial Court against the father of the appellant, namely,


1    Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.
2    Hereinafter, referred to as ‘trial Court’.
3    Hereinafter, referred to as, ‘IPC’.
4    Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC/ST Act.’
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       Rajnath Yadav and upholding the summoning order issued against
       the appellant. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.
5.    Notice of the present special leave petition was served on respondent
      No. 2 i.e., the complainant/victim5, but no one has appeared on her
      behalf.
6.    The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant befriended
      the complainant over a social media website, namely Instagram,
      which quickly bloomed into a romantic relationship. The appellant
      allegedly promised the complainant that he would marry her and they
      would live together as husband and wife. Under the pretence of the
      said promise of marriage, the appellant established physical relations
      with the complainant frequently at different places viz. Gazipur,
      Banaras, etc. On account of the repeated physical relations, the
      complainant conceived in December, 2022 and the appellant forced
      her to undergo an abortion by taking medication. Subsequently, the
      appellant began assaulting her and used derogatory caste-based
      slurs, imputing that he would not marry her since he was a Yadav,
      but she belonged to a lower caste. Following a complaint from the
      complainant with these allegations, an FIR6 dated 5th August, 2023,
      came to be registered against the appellant under Sections 376,
      313, 323, 504, 506, IPC and Sections 3(1)(d), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST
      Act at the P.S. Kotwali, District Gazipur. After investigation, a charge
      sheet for the aforementioned offences was filed against the appellant,
      while leaving out the offence under Section 313 IPC.
7.    The trial Court, vide order dated 24th August, 2023, summoned the
      appellant and his father for the aforesaid offences, which stands
      partially affirmed by the High Court(supra).
8.    We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned
      counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel representing the
      State of Uttar Pradesh and have gone through the material placed
      on record.
9.    At the outset, we may note that the complainant is a major girl and
      was working at a Diagnostic Centre in Varanasi when she came
      in contact with the appellant on the social media website, namely,
      Instagram.


5    Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Complainant’.
6    Crime No. 387 of 2023.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1501

                  Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.


10. It will be germane to reproduce the statement of the complainant
    recorded during the course of investigation under Section 164 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737 which provides the substratum
    of allegations set out against the appellant in the case at hand, and
    the same reads as follows: -
             “Date: 09.08.2023
             Victim’s Name: X.X.X.
             X.X.X. stated under oath that she met Manish Yadav, son
             of Rajnath Singh, on Instagram in January 2022. Their
             friendship started with a message from Manish, which
             eventually led to mutual liking and in-person meetings. In
             May 2022, Manish called her to meet at his friend’s place,
             where he behaved inappropriately with her. Despite her
             reservations about engaging in a physical relationship,
             she trusted him and had feelings for him. Manish later
             forced himself on her multiple times. In September 2022, X.
             X. X... moved to Varanasi for work, while Manish relocated
             to Prayagraj. He would visit her in Varanasi and engage
             in physical relations without her consent. By December
             2022, she discovered she was pregnant. Manish made
             her take medication to terminate the pregnancy. When
             visiting, he would suggest eloping to get married,
             but she insisted on waiting until he secured a job.
             During this period, X. X. X. cousin, Vatika, came to live
             with her. Manish occasionally became abusive, verbally
             and physically, during his visits. In February 2023, X. X. X.
             witnessed Manish and Vatika in an inappropriate situation.
             Although Manish apologized after a confrontation, he
             continued his relationship with Vatika. To retaliate, Χ.Χ.Χ..
             mentioned a friend named Ajay to make Manish jealous.
             Manish then questioned her character and refused to
             marry her, saying he wouldn’t marry someone with whom
             he had been intimate.
             X. X. X. visited Manish’s home and informed his father,
             who initially appeared understanding. However, when she
             tried to follow up, his father dismissed her rudely. Manish
             continued to exploit her under the pretence of marriage,


7   For short, ‘CrPC’.
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          eventually abandoning her. When she confronted him
          about his past relationships with other girls, Manish
          demanded Rs. 50 lakh as a condition for marriage.
          X.X.X. concluded that she had nothing further to add.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

11. As per the case set out by the prosecution, the appellant allegedly
    forced himself upon the complainant on multiple occasions, however
    on going through the aforesaid statement rendered by the complainant
    on oath, we find that she had herself admitted that despite her
    reservations about engaging in a physical relationship with the
    appellant, she trusted him and had feelings for him.
12. Furthermore, as per the prosecution case, in September, 2022, the
    complainant moved to Varanasi for work, whereas the appellant
    relocated to Prayagraj. Despite that, the appellant continued to visit
    her in Varanasi and engaged in physical relations with the complainant,
    allegedly without her consent. In December, 2022, the complainant
    discovered that she had become pregnant and thereupon, the
    appellant forced her to take medications in order to terminate the
    pregnancy. However, the theory put forth by the complainant regarding
    the appellant forcing her to terminate the pregnancy has not been
    established, and thus, the offence under Section 313 IPC, stands
    dropped from the chargesheet.
13. The complainant further stated that later on, her cousin Vatika had
    also come to reside with her. She alleged that in February, 2022, she
    saw the appellant and Vatika engaged in an inappropriate position.
    In retaliation, she befriended a person, namely, Ajay to make Manish
    jealous. Thereafter, Manish cast aspersions on her character and
    refused to marry her stating that he was not willing to marry someone
    with whom he had been intimate once.
14. In our opinion, it is clearly discernible that both the appellant
    and the complainant were major and thus, both were competent
    enough to make rational decisions. As per the statement of the
    complainant(supra), their initial physical relations were consensual in
    nature, and without there being any promise of marriage being offered
    by the appellant. While it can be said that initially the relationship
    between the complainant and appellant had developed on the basis
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1503

                Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.


     of mutual attraction and affection, the same cannot by any stretch
     of imagination fall within the ambit of a relationship flowing from a
     promise to marry.
15. The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of ‘consent’ in cases where
    sexual intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has been
    well established through a catena of judgments by this Court. In Uday
    v. State of Karnataka8, this Court acquitted the accused based on the
    reasoning that the prosecutrix, a mature college student, consented
    to sexual intercourse with the accused of her own free will. The Court
    found that she was fully aware of the consequences of her actions
    and held that her consent was not based on any misconception of
    fact. In Uday(supra), the Court noted that:
            “21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial
            opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given
            by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person
            with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that
            he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said
            to be given under a misconception of fact. A false
            promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We
            are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that
            there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether
            consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is
            voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception
            of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down
            by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial
            mind while considering a question of consent, but
            the court must, in each case, consider the evidence
            before it and the surrounding circumstances, before
            reaching a conclusion, because each case has its
            own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the
            question whether the consent was voluntary, or was
            given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh
            the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is
            on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient
            of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)


8   (2003) 4 SCC 46.
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16. This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana9,
    while discussing the nature of the ‘consent’ in cases where sexual
    intercourse occurs on the promise of marriage, distinguished between
    a mere ‘breach of promise’ and ‘not fulfilling a false promise’. The
    Court held as follows:
            “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
            or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
            Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
            deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
            good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
            between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
            this, the court must very carefully examine whether the
            accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or
            had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise
            to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls
            within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a
            distinction between the mere breach of a promise,
            and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court
            must examine whether there was made, at an early
            stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
            and whether the consent involved was given after
            wholly understanding the nature and consequences
            of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where
            the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
            account of her love and passion for the accused, and
            not solely on account of misrepresentation made to
            her by the accused, or where an accused on account
            of circumstances which he could not have foreseen,
            or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
            her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases
            must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted
            for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the
            intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had
            clandestine motives.
            ​​24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
            evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at
            the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
            whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.


9   (2013) 7 SCC 675
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1505

                 Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.


             There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
             having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
             victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances.
             The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a
             future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
             from the evidence available, does not always amount to
             misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning
             of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an
             immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called
             into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in
             entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless
             the court is assured of the fact that from the very
             beginning, the accused had never really intended to
             marry her.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

17. Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar,10 the Court acquitted
    and set aside the conviction of the accused while holding that while
    there was a breach of promise to marry, it was not a case of false
    promise to marry. The relevant extract is produced hereinunder:
             “35. The remaining question is whether on the basis
             of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible
             to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention
             of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false
             promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused
             did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the
             predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual
             intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him
             as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence
             which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable
             doubt that the accused had no intention to marry
             her at all from the inception and that the promise he
             made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances
             emerging from the prosecution evidence establish
             this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12
             that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry
             her but his father and others took him away from


10   (2005) 1 SCC 88.
1506                                                         [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


           the village would indicate that the accused might
           have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry
           which did not materialise on account of the pressure
           exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of
           breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false
           promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations
           of this Court in Uday case[(2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC
           (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2 Scale 329] at para 24 come to the
           aid of the appellant.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

18. Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is clearly discernible
    that in the present case, the complainant had agreed to indulge in
    intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires
    and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the
    appellant. Therefore, while the present case may involve a breach of
    promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise
    to marry. Based on the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that
    the appellant obtained the complainant’s consent to engage in a
    physical relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage.
19. Admittedly, during his visit to Varanasi, the appellant himself had
    asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it
    was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job.
    Therefore, while the prosecution story primarily rests on the fact that
    the appellant had lured the complainant to develop physical relations
    with him on the promise to marry her in future, this very statement
    of the complainant suggests the contrary. The complainant’s act of
    declining the appellant’s proposal of marriage shows that it was not
    the appellant who failed to stand firm upon his promise if any such
    promise was made by the appellant at any point in time.
20. Thus, the theory put forth by the prosecution in the chargesheet
    that the appellant induced the complainant to indulge in physical
    relations under a false promise of marriage is neither corroborated
    nor established by the best evidence available on record, which
    is in the form of the statement of the complainant recorded under
    Section 164 CrPC.
21. Moreover, in her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single
    word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1507

                Manish Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.


     for belonging to a particular caste. Therefore, we are of the firm view
     that the ingredients of the offences alleged under the SC/ST Act,
     against the appellant are ex-facie not made out from the highest
     allegations as set out in the charge sheet.
22. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the present
    case appears to be one where a consensual physical relationship
    between two adults has turned sour due to certain intervening events.
    Hence, allowing the prosecution of the appellant for the offences
    mentioned above would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process
    of law and nothing else.
23. Resultantly, the summoning order dated 24th August, 2023 passed by
    learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act Gazipur, and all the proceedings
    sought to be taken thereunder against the appellant for the offences
    punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506, IPC and Sections
    3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act deserve to be,
    and are hereby quashed. Thus, the impugned order is set aside.
24. The appeal is allowed, accordingly.
25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan