M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.versusSURESH CHAND JAIN & ANR.

             [2023] 10 S.C.R. 1155 : 2023 INSC 649                          1155


  M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                            A
                                      v.
                   SURESH CHAND JAIN & ANR.
           (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5263 of 2023)
                              JULY 26, 2023
                                                                            B
         [J. B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
       Constitution of India:
       Art. 136 – Special Leave to appeal – Order passed by the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-NCDRC in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction u/s.58(1)(a)(iii) – Petition
                                                                            C
seeking special leave to appeal u/Art. 136 – Entertainability of,
when remedies available by way of writ petition u/Arts. 226 and
227 before the High Court – Held: Remedy of appeal to this Court
is available only with respect to the orders passed by the NCDRC in
exercise of its powers conferred by s. 21(a)(i) of the 1986 Act and
s. 58(1)(a)(i) or s. 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act – Both the Acts provide   D
for the remedy of appeal to this Court only with respect to the orders
which are passed by the NCDRC in its original jurisdiction or as
the court of first instance (original orders) and no further appeal
lies against the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise
of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction – Thus, the petition should
                                                                            E
not be adjudicate on merits – Petitioner to avail remedy either u/
Art.226 or u/Art. 227 before the High Court – Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 – ss. 17, 19 – Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
       Art. 136 – Special leave to appeal under – Scope and grant
of – Discussed.
                                                                            F
       Disposing of the petition, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 A plain reading of the provisions of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection
Act, 2019, respectively would indicate that the remedy of appeal
to this Court is available only with respect to the orders passed
by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-                     G
NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i)
of the Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. In
other words, both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal to
this Court only with respect to the orders which are passed by
the NCDRC in its original jurisdiction or as the court of first
                                                                            H
                                 1155
1156            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A     instance (original orders) and no further appeal lies against the
       orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate
       or revisional jurisdiction. [Para 17][1162-D-F]
              1.2 In the instant case, the appeal before the NCDRC was
       against the order passed by the State Consumer Disputes
 B     Redressal Commission under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Act 1986.
       Such appeal to the NCDRC was maintainable, as provided under
       Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. As per Section 23 of the Act
       1986, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the NCDRC in
       exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i), may prefer
       an appeal against such order to this Court. Therefore, an appeal
 C     against the order passed by the NCDRC to this Court would be
       maintainable only in case the order is passed by the NCDRC in
       exercise of its powers conferred under Section 21(a)(i) of the Act
       1986. No further appeal to this Court is provided against the
       order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred
 D     under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. There is no provision for
       filing any further appeal against the order passed on the appeal
       filed against the order of the SCDRC. In such circumstances, the
       petitioner has come before this Court under Article 136 of the
       Constitution. [Para 18][1162-F-H; 1163-A]
              1.3 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant special
 E     leave to appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances.
       The question of law of general public importance or a decision
       which shocks the conscience of the Court are some of the prime
       requisites for the grant of special leave. The provisions of Article
       136 of the Constitution as such are not circumscribed by any
 F     limitation. But when the party aggrieved has alternative remedy
       to go before the High Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction or
       supervisory jurisdiction as the case may be, this Court should
       not entertain petition seeking special leave thereby short-circuit
       the legal procedure prescribed. The limitation, whatever, they
       be are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It
 G     being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
       exercised sparingly and with caution and only in very exceptional
       situations. The power will only be used to advance the cause of
       justice and its exercise will be governed by well-established

 H
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1157
           SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR.

principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional       A
powers. [Para 24][1165-F-H]
      1.4 In view of the aforesaid, this petition should not be
adjudicated on merits. The petitioner must be asked to first go
before the jurisdictional High Court either by way of a writ
application under Article 226 of the Constitution or by invoking        B
the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High Court
adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of
the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special
leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution. [Para 38][1172-G-H]                                       C
      Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited 2022
      INSC 573 – relied on.
      Pritam Singh v. State 1950 SCC 189 : 1950 SCR 453;
      Murtaza and Sons and Another v. Nazir Mohd. Khan
      and Others (1970) 3 SCC 876; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills              D
      Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal (1955)
      1 SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65; Ujagar Singh and
      Another v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 4 SCC
      530; S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees’
      Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and              E
      Another (1986) 2 SCC 624 : [1986] 2 SCR 126;
      Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi and Others, 1993 Supp
      (3) SCC 389 : [1993] 2 SCR 938; The State of Bombay
      v. M/s Ratilal Vadilal and Bros. (1961) 2 SCR 367;
      Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma AIR
      1965 SC 1595 : [1965] SCR 366; L. Chandra Kumar                   F
      v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 : [1997] 2 SCR
      1186 – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
1950 SCR 453                      referred to            Para 19
(1970) 3 SCC 876                  referred to            Para 19        G
(1955) 1 SCR 941                  referred to            Para 20
1979) 4 SCC 530                   referred to            Para 21
[1986] 2 SCR 126                  referred to            Para 22

                                                                        H
1158             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A     [1993] 2 SCR 938                       referred to              Para 23
       (1961) 2 SCR 367                       referred to              Para 25
       [1965] SCR 366                         referred to              Para 32
       [1997] 2 SCR 1186                      referred to              Para 32
              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
 B     (Civil) No. 5263 of 2023.
              From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2023 of the National
       Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in FA No. 376
       of 2016.
              D. Varadarajan, Rajat Khattry, Abhay Kumar, Shagun Ruhil, Advs.
 C     for the Petitioner.
              S. K. Verma, Ahmad Ibrahim, Ms. Akanksha Verma Chandok,
       Janmejay Verma, Rajesh Singh Chauhan, Anil Kumar Singh, Advs. for
       the Respondents.
              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 D            J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:
              1. This petition seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
       Constitution is at the instance of M/s Universal Sompo General Insurance
       Company Limited, Original appellantbefore the National Consumer
       Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the NCDRC’) in the First
 E     Appeal No. 376 of 2016 by which the NCDRC dismissed the appeal
       filed by the petitioner herein thereby affirming the order passed by the
       State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the
       SCDRC’) of Delhi, holding that the respondent No. 1 /complainant was
       entitled to receive the claim amount and appropriate compensation from
       the petitioner and its joint venture partner viz. Allahabad Bank (respondent
 F
       No. 2) for the goods stolen from the premises in question.
              FACTUAL MATRIX
              2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent
       Bank, acting as an intermediary issued a Standard Fire and Special Perils
       Policy dated 05.12.2011 in favour of the complainant through the petitioner
 G
       herein. Similarly, a Burglary Insurance Policy was also issued in favour
       of the complainant dated 08.12.2011. Boththe policies covered a sum of
       Rs.50 lakh for the risk of fire and burglary. The policies were for the
       period between 25.11.2011 and 24.11.2012.
              3. By way of letter dated 28.03.2012, the complainant informed the
 H     respondent Bank that the construction of his new premises at Bawana,
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1159
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Delhi had been completed and he had transferred his stock to the above          A
premises situated in Bawana from the premises situated in Rajgarh Ext.,
Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and Bhagirath Palace, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. In this
letter the complainant had also instructed the Bank to inform the petitioner.
      4. The respondent Bank acknowledged the aforesaid intimation
and claims to have informed the petitioner by way of letter dated               B
31.03.2012. The Bank claims to have also forwarded the letter dated
28.03.2012 of the complainant to the petitioner.
       5. On 29.06.2012, a theft took place at the Bawana premises and
for that FIR No. 213/2012 was lodged on 30.06.2012 at the PS Bawana.
Both, the petitioner and the Bank were also informed about the theft. A         C
surveyor was appointed by the petitioner to inspect the premises and on
01.07.2012, a formal complaint was lodged by the complainant with the
petitioner.
       6. After the theft, the complainant informed that a fire had also
broken out in the premises at Bawana on 18.10.2012, and the status
                                                                                D
report in that regard was issued by the fire department. Subsequently,
the complainant filed claims for both,theft and fire amounting to Rs. 49
lakh. The petitioner repudiated the theft claim vide letter dated 22.08.2013
and the fire claim was closed on account of non-submission of documents
by the complainant.
       7. On 03.06.2013, the complainant aggrieved by the inaction on           E
the part of the petitioner approached the SCDRC, Delhi under Section
17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, ‘the Act 1986’), by
way of Complaint No. 357/2013. He prayed for his claim of Rs. 49 lakh
to be processed along with compensation of Rs. 20 lakh and interest at
the rate the respondent Bank was charging from the complainant, with            F
costs of the complaint.
       8. By order dated 18.03.2016, the SCDRC partly allowed the
complaint holding that the petitioner and the respondent bank were
jointly and severally liable for the deficiencies in providing services to
the complainant and the complainant was entitled to be compensated              G
for the theft of goods worth Rs. 41,31,180/- @12 % interest per annum
from the date of the claim. The petitioner and the bank were also
directed to pay Rs. 2 lakh to the complainant towards compensation
for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in providing services.
The petitioner was further directed to finalise the fire claim of Rs. 4
lakh of the complainant.                                                        H
1160             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A            9. The petitioner herein feeling aggrieved with the order passed
       by the SCDRC challenged the same before the NCDRC by filing the
       First Appeal No. 376 of 2016 under Section 19 of the Act 1986.The
       petitioner prayed before the NCDRC to set aside the SCDRC’s order in
       exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and grant costs against the complainant
       in favour of the petitioner.
 B
              10. By order dated 16.01.2023, the First Appeal filed by the
       petitioner herein came to be dismissed.
             11. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is here
       before this Court with the present petition, seeking special leave to appeal
 C     under Article 136 of the Constitution.
              DISCUSSION
              12. In the course of the hearing of this matter, manyfold contentions
       were raised on either side. However, the moot question that falls for our
       consideration is whether we should entertain this petition seeking special
 D     leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution directly against the
       order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or
       relegate the petitioner to avail the remedy of filing a writ petition under
       Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition invoking supervisory
       jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227 of the
       Constitution?
 E
             13. Before, we proceed to answer the aforesaid question, we
       must look into the few relevant provisions of the Act 1986.
             14. Section 21(a) of the Act 1986 is titled ‘Jurisdiction of the
       National Commission’. The same reads thus:
 F            “21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. - Subject to
              the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall
              have jurisdiction —
              (a)to entertain —
                 (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services
 G               and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one
                 crore; and
                 (ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;….”
             15. Section 23 of the Act 1986 provides for an ‘Appeal’. The
       same reads thus:
 H
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1161
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      “23. Appeal.-Any person, aggrieved by an order made by the              A
      National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by
      sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 21, may prefer an appeal
      against such order to the Supreme Court within a period of
      thirty days from the date of the order:
      Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal                 B
      after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied
      that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that
      period:
      Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required to
      pay any amount in terms of an order of the National Commission          C
      shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person
      has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that
      amount or rupees fifty thousand, whichever is less.”
                                                  (Emphasis Supplied)
       16. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stood repealed on
                                                                              D
20.07.2020 (Section 106, the Act 1986) and the Consumer Protection
Act, 2019 (for short, ‘the Act 2019’) came into force. In the instant
case, the complaints were instituted under the Act 1986.However, we
must highlight the relevant provisions of the Act 2019, which are par
imateria to the provisions of the Act 1986.
      “58. Jurisdiction of National Commission. – (1) Subject to              E
      the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall
      have jurisdiction—
      (a) to entertain—
      (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid
                                                                              F
      as consideration exceeds rupees ten crore:
         Provided that where the Central Government deems it
      necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it
      deems fit;
      (ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of            G
      goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore
      rupees;
      (iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;
      (iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority;……..
                Xxx                       xxx                     xxx         H
1162             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A            67. Appeal against order of National Commission. - Any
              person, aggrieved by an order made by the National
              Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause
              (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 58, may
              prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme Court
 B            within a period of thirty days from the date of the order:
                 Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal
              after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied
              that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that
              period:
 C               Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required
              to pay any amount in terms of an order of the National
              Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless
              that person has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the
              manner as may be prescribed.”
 D             17. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act 1986
       and Act 2019, respectively would indicate that the remedy of appeal to
       this Court is available only with respect to the orders passed by the
       NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i) of the
       Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. In other words,
       both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal to this Court only with
 E
       respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its original
       jurisdiction or as the court of first instance (original orders) and no further
       appeal lies against the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise
       of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
               18. Adverting to the case at hand, the appeal before the NCDRC
 F
       was against the order passed by the SCDRC under Section 17(1)(a)(i)
       of the Act 1986. Such appeal to the NCDRC was maintainable, as
       provided under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. As per Section 23 of
       the Act 1986, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the NCDRC
       in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i), may prefer an
 G     appeal against such order to this Court. Therefore, an appeal against the
       order passed by the NCDRC to this Court would be maintainable only in
       case the order is passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers
       conferred under Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986. No further appeal to
       this Court is provided against the order passed by the NCDRC in exercise
 H     of its powers conferred under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. There
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1163
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

is no provision for filing any further appeal against the order passed on           A
the appeal filed against the order of the SCDRC. In such circumstances,
the petitioner has come before this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
    SCOPE AND GRANT OF SPECIAL LEAVE UNDER
ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION                                                     B
       19. This Court has held in Pritam Singh v. State reported in1950
SCC 189 : 1950 SCR 453 at p. 459: “Generally speaking this Court
will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and
special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has
been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient             C
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against”. It
was also said in that case that the view that once an appeal has been
admitted by special leave the entire case is at large and that the appellant
is free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which
could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be
                                                                                    D
urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the
preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for. This principle was
stated, it is true, in a criminal case but it is of as much significance in civil
cases as in the trial of criminal appeals. [See: Murtaza and Sons and
Another v. Nazir Mohd. Khan and Others reported (1970) 3 SCC
876].                                                                               E
      20. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton
Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in
(1955) 1 SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65 made the following observations:
       “7. … It is not possible to define with any precision the
                                                                                    F
       limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
       vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in
       article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in
       the nature and character of the power itself. It being an
       exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
       exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and                 G
       extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter
       the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that
       can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom
       and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that
       itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power                H
1164            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A           will only be used to advance the cause of justice, and that its
             exercise will be governed by well established principles which
             govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is,
             however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion
             that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court
             or tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair
 B
             deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like
             the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the
             way of the exercise of this power because the whole intent
             and purpose of this article is that it is the duty of this Court to
             see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by
 C           decisions of Courts and tribunals because certain laws have
             made the decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and
             conclusive. …”
                                                           (Emphasis supplied)
             21. In Ujagar Singh and Another v. State (Delhi Administration)
 D     reported in (1979) 4 SCC 530,Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the
       Bench observed as under:
             “1. … There is hardly a case, civil or criminal, which does
             not raise some question of law or the other. But no question
             of law of general public importance is involved in these
             petitions. It is time that it was realised that the jurisdiction of
 E
             this Court to grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in
             very exceptional circumstances. A question of law of general
             public importance or a decision which shocks the conscience
             of the Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of
             special leave. … ”
 F                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
             22. In the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees’
       Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and Another,
       (1986) 2 SCC 624, this Court observed in para 6 as under:
             “6.The Union has directly come to this Court in appeal against
 G           the said order of the Industrial Court without first approaching
             the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution
             for the purpose of challenging the said order. The powers of
             this Court under Article 136 are very wide but as clause (1)
             of that article itself states the grant of special leave to appeal
             is in the discretion of the court. Article 136 is, therefore, not
 H
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1165
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      designed to permit direct access to this Court where other              A
      equally efficacious remedy is available and where the question
      is not of public importance….”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)
      23. This Court in Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi and Others,
reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 389 observed in para 16 as under;               B

      “16. It is true that the finality clause contained in Section
      245-I does not and cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High
      Court under Article 226 or the jurisdiction of this Court under
      Article 32 or under Article 136, as the case may be. But that
      does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Court in the appeal         C
      preferred directly in this Court is any different than what it
      would be if the assessee had first approached the High Court
      under Article 226 and then come up in appeal to this Court
      under Article 136. A party does not and cannot gain any
      advantage by approaching this Court directly under Article              D
      136, instead of approaching the High Court under Article
      226. This is not a limitation inherent in Article 136; it is a
      limitation which this Court imposes on itself having regard to
      the nature of the function performed by the Commission and
      keeping in view the principles of judicial review….”
                                                                              E
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)
       24. Thus, what is discernible from the aforesaid decisions of this
Court is that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant special leave
to appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances. The question
of law of general public importance or a decision which shocks the            F
conscience of the Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of
special leave. The provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution as such
are not circumscribed by any limitation. But when the party aggrieved
has alternative remedy to go before the High Court, invoking its writ
jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction as the case may be, this Court
should not entertain petition seeking special leave thereby short-circuit     G
the legal procedure prescribed. The limitation, whatever, they be are
implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an
exceptional and overriding power, naturally it hasto be exercised sparingly
and with caution and only in very exceptional situations. The power will
only be used to advance the cause of justice and its exercise will be         H
1166             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A     governed by well-established principles which govern the exercise of
       overriding constitutional powers.
            25. Almost six decades back, this Court speaking through M.
       Hidayatullah, J. in the case of the State ofBombay v. M/s Ratilal Vadilal
       and Bros., reported in (1961) 2 SCR 367 observed as under:
 B
              “3. … We have frequently noticed that all the remedies which
              are open to an appellant are not first exhausted before moving
              this Court. Ordinarily, this Court will not allow the High Court
              to be bypassed in this manner, and the proper course for an
              appellant is to exhaust all his remedies before invoking the
 C            jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. …”
                                                              (Emphasis supplied)
               26. We shall now look into a very recent pronouncement of this
       Court in the case of Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private
 D     Limited reported in 2022 INSC573. In the said case,the appellant had
       booked a flat in the project floated by the respondent. The appellant paid
       the entire amount of consideration but the respondent did not hand over
       the flat within the time stipulated in the agreement. Therefore, the appellant
       filed a consumer complaint before the SCDRC on 10.08.2013, alleging
       deficiency of service on the part of the respondent. The SCDRC allowed
 E
       the complaint filed by the appellant vide its order dated 16.10.2020. The
       SCDRC directed the respondent to hand over the flat to the possession
       of the appellant subject to their meeting the requirements. The SCDRC
       further directed the respondent to pay compensation for the deficiency
       of service of the respondent in the form of nine per cent simple interest
 F     till the date of delivery of the flat in possession of the appellant.
              27. The appellant filed an execution and contempt petition against
       the respondent since he did not comply with the order of the SCDRC.
       Vide its order dated 12.03.2021, the SCDRC directed the respondent to
       produce the details of bank accounts or properties for the purpose of
 G     attaching the same and to implement the order passed by the SCDRC.
             28. The respondent filed an appeal before the NCDRC. On
       30.03.2021, the NCDRC stayed the order of SCDRC subject to the
       deposit of the cost of entire flat along with nine per cent interest on the
       amount paid till date in the Registry of the SCDRC.
 H
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1167
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

       29. The respondent, being aggrieved against the order of NCDRC          A
filed a writ petition before the High Court, challenging the order passed
by the NCDRC. Before the High Court the respondent contended that
the NCDRC ought not to have directed the respondent, the builder, to
deposit the entire cost of the apartment along with the compensation
awarded by the SCDRC. The High Court stayed the order of National
                                                                               B
Commission, vide its order dated 25.05.2021. The said stay order was
issued subject to the condition that the respondent is to deposit with the
State Commission fifty per cent of the amount directed to be deposited
by way of interest towards compensation, within four weeks from the
date of stay order issued by the High Court.
                                                                               C
       30. In the meantime, the NCDRC passed the final order, confirming
the order passed by the State Commission, vide its order dated 09.12.2021.
The respondent also filed a writ petition before the High Court, challenging
the final order passed by the NCDRC. The High Court, in this petition,
also granted interim stay vide its order dated 22.12.2021. Against this
order the appellant filed an SLP before this Court. This Court vide its        D
order dated 21.03.2022 directed the High Court to decide the jurisdictional
issue under Article 227 of the Constitution against the order passed by
the NCDRC on or before 18.04.2022 and intimate the outcome to this
Court. The High Court vide its order dated 31.03.2022 held that the writ
petition before the High Court against the order of NCDRC was                  E
maintainable. This order was challenged by the appellant before this
Court.
      31. The appellant submitted the following before this Court:
      (a)    Against the order of NCDRC, a petition before the High
             Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not                F
             maintainable.
      (b)    Only appeal is maintainable before this Court against the
             order of NCDRC as per the provisions of the Consumer
             Protection Act.
      (c)    Without exhausting the appellate remedy, the High Court           G
             ought not to have entertained the petition under Article 227
             of the Constitution.
      (d)    The High Court ought not to have stayed the order passed
             by the NCDRC in the limited jurisdiction available under
             Article 227 of the Constitution.                                  H
1168               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A           32. The respondent submitted the following before this Court:
             (a)     The provisions of the Act 2019 do not have appeal provisions
                     against the order of NCDRC passed in exercise of appellate/
                     revisional jurisdiction and therefore writ petition under
                     Article 226 or petition under Article 227, as the case may
 B                   be, is maintainable before the High Court against the order
                     of NCDRC.
             (b)     For the aforesaid purpose the respondent relied on the
                     following judgments:
                     •     Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N.
 C                         Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595; and
                     •     L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3
                           SCC 261.
              33. This Court considered the question for its decision as to whether
       against the order passed by the NCDRC in an appeal under Section
 D
       58(1)(a)(iii) of the Act 2019, petition before the High Court under the
       Article 227 of Constitution of India would be maintainable.
             34. After due analysis of the provisions of the Act 2019, which
       are parimateria to the provisions of the Act 1986, this Court in Ibrat
       Faizan (supra) held as under:
 E
             “11.….Therefore, an appeal against the order passed by the
             National Commission to this Court would be maintainable only
             in case the order is passed by the National Commission in
             exercise of its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or
             under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act. No further appeal
 F
             to this Court is provided against the order passed by the
             National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred under
             Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv) of the 2019
             Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be
             available to the aggrieved party against the order passed by
 G           the National Commission in an appeal under Section
             58(1)(a)(iii) or Section 58(1)(a)(iv) would be to approach the
             concerned High Court having jurisdiction under Article 227
             of the Constitution of India.”
                         xxx                      xxx                     xxx
 H
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1169
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      14.….while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the              A
      Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the
      rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court
      has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the
      parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be
      exercised.”
                                                                             B
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
       35. In Ibrat Faizan (supra), this Court took notice of its earlier
decision in the case of Associated Cement (supra), wherein, a Constitution
Bench held as under:
      “9. … Special matters and questions are entrusted to them              C
      for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts
      one common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals
      are “constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as
      distinguished from purely administrative or executive
      functions”, (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh,               D
      1955 1 SCR 267 at p. 272: (AIR 1954 SC 520 at p. 522).
      They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and
      finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted
      to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is
      regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and
      exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that            E
      procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow
      may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach
      adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially
      the same, and there is no essential difference between the
      functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in         F
      the case of tribunals, it is the State’s inherent judicial power
      which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it
      is the State’s inherent judicial function which they discharge.
      Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential
      attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of
      policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers          G
      mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that
      does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate
      measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and
      functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of
      adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between                 H
1170      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A     parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt
       to describe exhaustively the features which are common to
       the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct
       and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which
       is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they
       discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers
 B
       which inherently vest in a sovereign State.
                  Xxx                     xxx                     xxx
       44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute
       with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which
       it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to
 C
       define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case
       as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the
       authority can be truly described as judicial functions or
       judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is
       sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the
 D     State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more
       contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy
       between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the
       judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal
       within the meaning of Art. 136. Such a power of adjudication
       implies that the authority must act judicially and must
 E
       determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts
       on the materials before it and by application of the relevant
       law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be
       exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this
       test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential
 F     that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute
       or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power
       of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a
       private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under S. 10A of the
       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a
       tribunal within Art. 136. It matters little that such a body or
 G
       authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The
       Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the
       trappings of a Court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
       vests an authority acting under S. 10A of the Act with many
       of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are
 H     not tribunals.
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1171
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Art. 227 of the                 A
      Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the
      same meaning as in Art. 136.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
      36. Having regard to the aforesaid, this Court in Ibrat Faizan
                                                                             B
(supra) observed as under:
       ”12. … Therefore, the National Commission can be said to
      be a ‘Tribunal’ which is vested by Statute the powers to
      determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending
      parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them.
                                                                             C
      Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision,
      it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial
      powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a
      ‘Tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of
      the Constitution of India. …”
                                                                             D
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)
      37. This Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), while explaining the
importance of approaching the High Court, more particularly when a
remedy is available by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution or by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
                                                                             E
(supervisory jurisdiction) observed as under:
      “12.….Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its
      powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view
      of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party
      before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the
                                                                             F
      Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party
      approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition
      under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
                 Xxx                      xxx                    xxx
      13. Now so far as the remedy which may be available under              G
      Article 136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it
      cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by
      special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
      may be too expensive and as observed and held by this Court
      in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy
                                                                             H
1172             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 10 S.C.R.


 A            can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective.
              Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the
              Constitution of India before the concerned High Court is
              provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right
              of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a
              complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a
 B
              lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under
              Article 136 of the Constitution.
                         Xxx                       xxx                      xxx
              14.1. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of
 C            the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case
              of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97,
              which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the
              recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment
              Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29).
              Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of
 D            the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the
              parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the
              Constitution. It goes without saying that even while
              considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition
              under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
 E            has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence
              under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while
              granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article
              227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the
              National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the
              rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the
 F            Constitution of India.”
                                                              (Emphasis supplied)
              38. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the
       conclusion that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must
 G     ask the petitioner herein to first go before the jurisdictional High Court
       either by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution
       or by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court
       under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High Court
       adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of the
       parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special leave petition,
 H     seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. 1173
  SURESH CHAND JAIN AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      39. We take notice of the order passed by this Court dated                   A
29.03.2023 which reads thus:
       “2. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the impugned
       judgment and order, subject to deposit of 50 per cent of the
       awarded amount in this Court.”
       40. However, in the aforesaid context, it is also necessary for us          B
to look into the office report dated 03.07.2023, which reads thus:
       “It is further submitted that Dr. S.K. Verma, Advocate for
       respondent no.1 has on 28.06.2023 filed an application for
       release of deposited amount made by the Petitioner. However,
       the same is defective as original property papers are not filed.            C
       Also, the documents relating to valuation of property are not
       filed as in the lease papers the amount mentioned is Rs.
       6,30,000/-. Hence, the amount was not disbursed to the
       respondent no.1.”
       41. It appears from the aforesaid that the complainant was not in           D
a position to withdraw the fifty per cent amount deposited by the petitioner
herein. It further appears that the amount deposited by the petitioner
herein is still with the Registry of this Court. Since we are not entertaining
this petition on merits, we direct the Registry to refund the amount to the
petitioner after due and proper verification.                                      E
       42. In the result, this petition is disposed of with liberty to the
petitioner to approach the jurisdictional High Court and challenge the
order passed by the NCDRC, in accordance with law.
       43. It is needless to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion
on the merits of the case. The merits of the case shall be looked into by          F
the jurisdictional High Court.

Nidhi Jain                                                 Petition disposed of.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

                                                                                   G




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