M/S S.R.S. TRAVELS BY ITS PROPRIETOR K.T. RAJASHEKARversusTHE KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION WORKERS & ORS.

                 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 262 : 2025 INSC 152

       M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar
                                 v.
        The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
                         Workers & Ors.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 2181-2182 of 2025)
                              06 February 2025
            [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as regards the constitutional validity of the Karnataka
       Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act,
       2003 repealing the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act,
       1976 particularly given that the 1976 Act had earlier been upheld
       by this Court; and whether u/s.68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act read
       with r. 56 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, the state
       and regional transport authorities can lawfully delegate the power
       to grant contract carriage permits to the Secretary or whether such
       power must remain with the multi-member authorities due to its
       quasi-judicial character.

                                  Headnotes†
       Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law
       (Amendment) Act, 2003 – s.3 – Karnataka Contract Carriages
       (Acquisition) Act, 1976 – Validity of repealing Act – Power of
       the legislature to repeal an Act – Presidential assent for repeal
       statute, if required – KCCA Act designed to bring privately
       operated contract carriages under State control in order
       to serve the public interest and to implement the Directive
       Principles of State Policy – However, over the ensuing
       decades, urbanization intensified, public transport demand
       grew, and it became increasingly evident that the restrictive
       regime established by the KCCA Act was contributing to an
       artificial scarcity of public transport services, particularly in
       rural and semi-urban areas – In response, the Legislature
       exercised its plenary power by enacting the 2003 Act which
       repealed the KCCA Act – Constitutional validity of repealing
       Act:

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             263

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

     Held: s.3 of the 2003 Act which repeals the KCCA Act, is
     constitutional, and State Legislature rightly exercised its power
     to repeal the Act – Power to repeal a law is coextensive with the
     power to enact it – Repeal was not an arbitrary act of legislative
     whim but was backed by a clear statement of objects and
     reasons that identified the deficiencies in the existing regulatory
     framework and the necessity to liberalize the transport sector –
     This Court’s decisions affirming the constitutional validity of an
     Act, do not bind the Legislature from modifying or repealing
     a statute when subsequent developments warrant a change
     in policy – It cannot be said that repeal should have required
     fresh presidential assent – Repeal statute does not recreate
     the legal framework anew but rather extinguishes the earlier
     Act’s operative provisions – Repeal statute is not subject to the
     same procedural requirements as an original enactment when
     it comes to the need for fresh assent, provided that the repeal
     falls within the legislative competence of the State – 2003
     Repeal Act is rooted in the practical realities of modern transport
     policy – Repeal of the KCCA Act was thus a deliberate policy
     decision aimed at fostering a more dynamic and responsive
     transport framework – Legislature may, subject to constitutional
     limitations, repeal any law it has enacted – Repeal does not alter
     or contradict the judicial interpretation of the 1976 Act; rather, it
     reflects a conscious legislative choice to adapt to new economic
     and social conditions – Rationale underlying the 2003 Repeal Act
     is sound and consistent with the principles of legislative power.
     [Paras 10, 11, 13-18]

     Motor Vehicles Act 1988 – ss.68(3)(b), 96 – Karnataka Motor
     Vehicle Rules, 1989 – rr.55, 56 – Delegation of power to grant
     permit – Under s.68(5) of the MV Act, rw r.56 of the 1989
     Rules, State Transport Authority-STA and Regional Transport
     Authorities-RTA, if can lawfully delegate the power to grant
     contract carriage permits to the Secretary or such power to
     remain with the multi-member authorities due to its quasi-
     judicial character:
     Held: State Transport Authority possesses the power to delegate
     its functions u/s.68(5) of the MV Act read with r.56(1)(d) of the
     KMV Rules – Secretary of the STA is empowered to grant non-
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       stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist,
       and temporary permits) in accordance with s.68(5) and r. 56(1)
       (d), subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed therein –
       1988 Act unambiguously confers upon the transport authorities,
       the power to delegate its functions provided that rules are framed
       u/s.96 – Even if it is accepted that the grant of permits has a quasi-
       judicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law
       that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute
       expressly provides for such delegation – s.68(5) read with r. 56(1)
       (d) makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the transport
       authority to delegate certain routine permit functions – Exclusion of
       stage carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all
       permit functions are inherently non-delegable – STA is entrusted
       with a wide range of responsibilities under the Motor Vehicles Act,
       and its workload necessitates delegation to ensure timely service
       delivery – Secretary, being a high-ranking officer with substantial
       expertise in transport administration, is well equipped to handle
       routine permit applications – Practical impact of not allowing
       delegation would be to overload the transport authority with routine
       functions, potentially causing undue delays and inefficiencies –
       Power of the State Transport Authority to delegate the issuance
       of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its
       Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of s.68(5) and
       r.56(1)(d) – Delegation is a rational and necessary administrative
       measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit
       applications without undermining the oversight function of the
       STA – Power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact,
       and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both
       legislative intent and practical necessity – High Court’s reasoning
       on the non-delegability of permit-granting power is flawed –
       Impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation
       power set aside. [Paras 20-30]

                                 Case Law Cited
       State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978] 1 SCR 641 : AIR
       1978 SC 215; Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka AIR 1990
       SC 2072; Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka [1990] 1
       SCR 614 : (1990) 2 SCC 562; Newtech Promoters & Developers
       Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [2021] 9 SCR
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                                265

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

     909 : (2021) 18 SCC 1; Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha [1962]
     Supp. 3 SCR 70 : AIR 1962 SC 1073 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law
     (Amendment) Act, 2003; Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition)
     Act, 1976; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Karnataka Motor Vehicle
     Rules, 1989; Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950; Constitution
     of India; General Clauses Act, 1897.

                              List of Keywords
     Contract carriages; Contract carriage permits; Stage Carriage;
     Stage carriage permits; State Transport Authority; Regional
     Transport Authority; State Transport Corporation; Artificial scarcity of
     public transport; Liberalize public transport; Private bus operators;
     Presidential assent; Permit-granting power; Repeal statute;
     Entry 42 of List III; “Secretary alone” approach; Private operators
     in the contract carriage; Fresh Presidential assent; Quasi-judicial
     functions; Secretary; State Transport Officer; Delegated power;
     Repealing the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976;
     Delegate power to grant contract carriage permits to Secretary;
     Validity of repealing Act; Power of the legislature to repeal an
     Act; Presidential assent for repeal statute, if required; Privately
     operated contract carriages under State control; Public interest;
     Directive Principles of State Policy; Public transport; Rural and
     semi-urban areas; Plenary power; Subsequent developments;
     Repeal statute; Legislative competence of State; Practical realities
     of modern transport policy; Policy decision; Grant of non-stage
     carriage permits; Contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary
     permits; Principle of administrative law.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2181-2182
     of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.03.2011 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 5466 of 2004 and WA No.
     60 of 2005
     With
     Civil Appeal Nos. 1985-2153 and 2154-2180 of 2025
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                           Appearances for Parties
       Ms. Kiran Suri, Col Balasubramaniyam, Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Advs.,
       Amith S.J., Ms. Vidushi Garg, Dr. (Mrs. ) Vipin Gupta, Mrs. T S
       Shanthi, Ms. Sneha Irine Kachhap, Sanjeev Kumar, Narendra
       Kumar, D. L. Chidananda, Hruday Pavan, Revanta Solanki, Advs.
       for the Appellant.
       Devadatt Kamat, Col Balasubramaniam, Ms. Kiran Suri,
       Shanthakumar V. Mahale, Sr. Advs., Ms. Abha R. Sharma, V.
       N. Raghupathy, Harsh Pandey, Hruday Bajentri, Ms. Anuradha
       Mutatkar, Mrs. T S Shanthi, Narendra Kumar, Ms. Sneha Irine
       Kachhap, Sanjeev Kumar, Anil Kumar, Amith S.J., Ms. Vidushi
       Garg, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Ms. Mrinal Pande, Ms. S. Anuradha
       Bhat, Harisha S.R., Ranvir Singh, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam,
       Advs. for the Respondent.

                    Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Vikram Nath, J.

1.     Delay, if any, is condoned.
2.     Leave granted.
3.     These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated
       28.03.2011 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.A. No. 5466 of
       2004 and connected matters. In view of the multiple appeals that
       have been filed, there is a need to clarify the array of parties in the
       respective SLPs:
       I.     SLP (C) Nos. 27833-27834 of 2011: Filed by private bus
              operators.
       II.    SLP (C) Nos. 32499-525 of 2011: Filed by the Karnataka State
              Road Transport Authority (STA).
       III.   SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012: Filed by the Karnataka State
              Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), a corporation constituted
              under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950.1


1    The 1950 Act
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                           267

          M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
     The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

      For clarity of reference in this judgment:
      •       The Private Bus Operators and the Karnataka State Road
              Transport Authority will be referred to collectively as “the
              Appellants.”
      •       The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation will be referred
              to as “the Respondent Corporation” or “KSRTC.”
4.    The facts leading to the present appeals are as follows:
      4.1. Enactment of the 1976 Act (Karnataka Contract Carriages
           (Acquisition) Act, 1976 2 ) – The 1976 Act was enacted with
           the objective of acquiring privately operated contract carriages
           to curb their alleged detrimental operation in the State and to
           bring them under public control. Under the 1976 Act, once these
           contract carriages were acquired, all corresponding permits
           as well as certificates of registration stood vested in the State
           Government. Subsequently, the State Government transferred
           these vehicles and permits to State-owned Road Transport
           Corporations, notably including the KSRTC.
      4.2. The Act was challenged but upheld by this Court in State
           of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy3 and later reaffirmed
           in Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka.4 In these
           decisions, the Supreme Court recognized that the 1976 Act’s
           purpose was to further the Directive Principles of State Policy
           under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution and did not infringe
           any fundamental rights or constitutional principles.
      4.3. MV Act Enactment: In 1988, the Motor Vehicles Act, 19885 was
           enacted by the Parliament. This Act contains several provisions
           relevant to the present matter: Section 2(7) defines “Contract
           carriage” and Section 2(40) defines “Stage Carriage.” Moreover,
           Section 68 deals with transport authorities; in particular, Section
           68(2) provides for the composition of the State Transport
           Authority6 and the Regional Transport Authority,7 mandating


2    The KCCA Act
3    AIR 1978 SC 215
4    AIR 1990 SC 2072
5    MV Act
6    STA
7    RTA
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              that each include a Chairman with judicial experience along
              with other members—up to four for the STA and up to two for
              the RTA. Section 68(3)(b) empowers the STA to perform the
              duties of the RTA, and Section 68(5) enables both authorities,
              under rules made pursuant to Section 96, to delegate their
              powers and functions to any other authority or person subject
              to prescribed restrictions.
       4.4. On 1 July 1989, the Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 8
            were enacted. Under Rules 55 and 56 of these Rules, the RTA
            and STA were empowered to delegate their powers to their
            secretaries, including the authority to grant contract carriage
            permits. Furthermore, on 27 February 1990, the constitutionality
            of the KCCA Act was challenged on the ground of repugnancy.
            In Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka,9 this Hon’ble
            Court upheld the constitutionality of the KCCA Act, holding that
            there is no inconsistency or repugnancy between the KCCA
            Act and the MV Act.
       4.5. In the subsequent decades, transport policy in Karnataka
            underwent shifts due to rising demand for public transport
            services, rapid urbanization, and the perceived inability of
            government-run corporations alone to meet commuter needs.
            Over time, committees such as the Tax Reforms Commission
            observed that strict limitations on private contract carriages had
            contributed to an artificial scarcity of public transport options. It
            was noted that in many rural and semi-urban areas, a shortage
            of KSRTC-run buses compelled travellers to rely on private
            goods vehicles, tractors, or other sub-optimal modes of travel,
            raising concerns of safety and inconvenience.
       4.6. Enactment of the 2003 Repeal Act (Karnataka Act No.
            9 of 2003) – Responding to these developments, the State
            Legislature passed the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation
            and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003. 10 Among
            other amendments (notably to taxation laws), Section 3 of the
            2003 Repeal Act repealed the 1976 KCCA Act. According to


8    KMV Rules
9    (1990) 2 SCC 562
10   The 2003 Repeal Act or Karnataka Act No.9 of 2003
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                       269

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

           the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the 2003
           Act, the legislative intent was to liberalize public transport,
           encourage private operators, and address “woeful shortages”
           in passenger services. The Legislature believed that removing
           the KCCA Act’s prohibitions would enable better competition,
           expanded services, and ultimately greater passenger comfort.
     4.7. Challenge Before the High Court of Karnataka – After 2003,
          private bus operators began applying for contract carriage
          permits under the more liberal regime. In some instances,
          Secretaries of the STA or RTAs granted these permits, relying
          on purported delegations under Rule 56. Meanwhile, KSRTC
          and its employees’ federation filed various writ petitions
          challenging (a) the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act and
          (b) the power of the Secretaries to grant permits. They argued
          that the 1976 Act, having been upheld by the Supreme Court,
          could not be repealed without fresh Presidential assent, and
          contended that awarding permit-granting power which was
          quasi judicial to a single officer ought to remain vested only
          in multi-member bodies.
     4.8. In a judgment and order dated 17 November 2004 in W.P. No.
          40339/2004 and related matters, the Single Judge of the High
          Court held that Rules 55 and 56 of the KMV Rules are null and
          void as ultra vires the MV Act, and that the delegation of the
          power to issue contract carriage and stage carriage permits, as
          well as to perform the functions of the STA/RTA, to the Secretary
          is not permissible. On 16 December 2004, the Learned Single
          Judge of the High Court ruled that the repeal of the KCCA
          Act by Act No. 9/2003 is unconstitutional. Citing the decisions
          in Ranganatha Reddy (Supra) and Vijayakumar Sharma
          (Supra), the Judge observed that the State Government lacks
          the authority to repeal an Act that has received the President’s
          assent. Since the KCCA Act falls under Entry 42 of the
          Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Act
          No. 9/2003 was required to be sent for the President’s assent.
          It further noted that, by repealing the KCCA, the objective of
          the State Transport Undertaking could not be achieved, and
          that the issue could have been resolved by granting additional
          permits to the State Transport Corporation.
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       4.9. Reference to Division Bench – Ultimately, appeals (W.A. Nos.
            5466/2004, 60/2005, and connected matters) were placed before
            a Division Bench. The Division Bench consolidated multiple
            challenges to the 2003 Repeal Act, as well as the dispute about
            whether the Secretary, STA could lawfully grant permits.
       4.10. Vide order dated 28.03.2011, the Division Bench of the High
             Court gave the following findings with respect to the main issues
             in these matters:
            •    Constitutional Validity of the 2003 Repeal Act – The
                 Division Bench upheld the constitutionality of repealing the
                 1976 Act. It reasoned that the Legislature had plenary power
                 to repeal a statute if it fell within its legislative domain. The
                 bench also noted that since the 1976 Act had been validly
                 enacted under Entry 42 of List III (Concurrent List), the State
                 Government was equally competent to repeal it, without
                 requiring a fresh reference to the President for assent.
                 The Court disagreed with the contention that repealing an
                 Act previously upheld by the Supreme Court amounted to
                 “overruling” the Supreme Court. Once the 1976 Act had
                 been constitutionally affirmed, the Legislature’s power to
                 modify or repeal it remained unimpaired, subject only to
                 not violating fundamental or constitutional rights.
            •    Delegation of Permit-Granting Power to the Secretary –
                 The Division Bench, however, rejected the argument that
                 the STA (or RTA) could delegate contract carriage permit
                 issuance to the Secretary. It held that permit-granting
                 under Chapter V is a quasi-judicial function requiring
                 collective adjudication or at least decision-making by the
                 statutory authority itself. The High Court thus invalidated
                 the relevant portion of the KMV Rules (Rule 56) or, more
                 precisely, the manner in which the STA had invoked it.
                 The Division Bench concluded that the “Secretary alone”
                 approach improperly bypassed the multi-member scheme
                 envisaged by the MV Act.
       4.11. Aggrieved by the Division Bench’s order dated 28.03.2011, the
            private bus operators and the Karnataka STA; and the KSRTC,
            filed Special Leave Petitions before this Court, leading to the
            present appeals with the following main contentions:
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             271

          M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
     The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

             •      SLP (C) Nos. 27833-27834 of 2011: Filed by private bus
                    operators, challenging the High Court’s ruling that prohibits
                    delegation of permit-granting powers to the Secretary, STA/
                    RTA. These appellants accept the High Court’s decision
                    upholding the validity of the 2003 Repeal Act.
             •      SLP (C) Nos. 32499-525 of 2011: Filed by the Karnataka
                    State Road Transport Authority (STA), similarly challenging
                    the portion of the judgment that disallows delegation
                    to the Secretary. STA supports the validity of the 2003
                    Repeal Act.
             •      SLP (C) Nos. 25787-956 of 2012: Filed by the Karnataka
                    State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC), primarily
                    disputing the High Court’s conclusion that repealing the
                    1976 Act is constitutional. It wants the 2003 Repeal Act
                    declared invalid but concurs with the High Court that the
                    Secretary, STA/RTA, cannot grant or renew permits under
                    delegated power.
5.    Before we delve into the specific controversies arising in these
      appeals, it would be instructive to first set out the relevant legal
      provisions that govern the issues at hand. A clear understanding of
      these enactments is vital to appreciate the two principal questions
      that fall for our consideration.

      I.     Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976
             Purpose and Scope- Enacted with the objective of acquiring
             privately operated contract carriages that were perceived to
             be functioning contrary to public interest. Once acquired, the
             vehicles, permits, and certificates of registration vested in the
             State Government, which, in turn, transferred them to state-
             owned road transport corporations such as KSRTC.
             Judicial Endorsement – The 1976 Act was upheld by this
             Court in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy11 and later
             reaffirmed in Vijayakumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka.12
             These decisions recognized that the statutory objective,


11   AIR 1978 SC 215
12   (AIR) 1990 SC 2072
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              furthering the Directive Principles under Article 39(b) and (c) of
              the Constitution, did not violate any fundamental or constitutional
              rights.
              Subsequent Development- By virtue of Section 3 of the
              Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law
              (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka Act No. 9 of 2003), the 1976
              Act stood repealed, which is one of the core issues challenged
              in these proceedings.

       II.    Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and (Amendment) Act,
              2003
              Statement of Objects and Reasons – The Legislature observed
              a shortage of passenger transport services, especially in rural
              and semi-urban areas, and took the view that permitting private
              operators in the contract carriage sector would help meet rising
              demand. Section 3 of this enactment repealed the 1976 Act,
              thereby removing existing curbs on private contract carriage
              operation and paving the way for a more liberalized regulatory
              regime.
              Legislative Competence – Enacted under the same legislative
              field (Entry 42, List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution)
              that empowered the original 1976 Act. The Division Bench of
              the High Court held that there was no requirement of fresh
              Presidential assent for the repeal, and it affirmed that the State
              Legislature was competent to affect such a repeal.

       III.   Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
              Chapter V: Control of Transport Vehicles
              Section 66: No owner can use or permit the use of a transport
              vehicle without a valid permit.
              Section 68(3): Enumerates the powers and functions of the
              STA and RTA, including the grant of various permits.
              Section 68(5): Permits the STA or RTA, “if authorised by the
              Rules made under Section 96,” to delegate any of its powers or
              functions to any other authority or person, subject to prescribed
              conditions.
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          273

          M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
     The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

            Chapter VI: Special Provisions Relating to State Transport
            Undertakings (for completeness) – While primarily not at
            issue in these appeals, Chapter VI establishes procedures for
            formulating schemes granting exclusive rights to State Transport
            Undertakings. This chapter was relevant in the earlier era when
            nationalization of routes was prevalent; however, the main focus
            here is on whether the 1976 Act’s approach (acquiring contract
            carriages) could be rescinded by the 2003 repeal.
      IV.   Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
            Rule 54: Governs the manner in which the STA and the RTA
            conduct their business, including guidelines for meetings,
            quorums, and decision-making.
            Rule 56: Delegation of Powers by the STA- Rule 56(1)(d):
            Allows the STA to delegate its power to grant “a permit other
            than a stage carriage permit” to the Chairman, the Secretary,
            or an officer not below the rank of Regional Transport Officer.
            The High Court construed this provision to mean that, while
            the Rules contemplated delegation, the question remained
            whether such delegation extended to quasi-judicial functions
            (like granting contract carriage permits) or was confined to
            purely administrative powers.
6.    In light of the foregoing factual matrix and the contentions urged
      before us, the following principal issues arise for determination:
      I.    Validity of the 2003 Repeal Act: Whether the 2003 Repeal
            Act repealing the KCCA Act is constitutionally valid, particularly
            given that the 1976 Act had earlier been upheld by this Court.
      II.   Delegation of Power to Grant Permits: Whether, under
            Section 68(5) of the MV Act, read with Rule 56 of the KMV
            Rules, the STA and RTAs can lawfully delegate the power to
            grant contract carriage permits (and related permits) to the
            Secretary, or whether such power must remain with the multi-
            member authorities due to its quasi-judicial character.
7.    The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, Mr. Devadatt Kamat
      and Ms.Kiran Suri advanced the following main submissions:
      7.1. Express Provision in the MV Act and KMV Rules: The
           Appellants rely on Section 68(5) of the MV Act, which provides
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            that the STA and any RTA, if authorised under rules made
            pursuant to Section 96 of the MV Act, may delegate their powers
            and functions subject to prescribed restrictions. They further
            highlight Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, which expressly
            permits the STA to delegate its power to grant a permit other
            than a stage carriage permit to the Chairman, Secretary, or any
            officer not below the rank of a Regional Transport Officer. This
            statutory scheme clearly distinguishes between stage carriage
            permits (non-delegable) and other permits (delegable).
       7.2. Consistency with Legislative Intent: The Appellants contend
            that the MV Act was designed to confer broad administrative
            discretion on the STA and RTAs. They argued that the power
            to delegate, as provided in Section 68(5) of the MV Act, was
            meant to ensure administrative efficiency in routine matters
            like the issuance of contract carriage permits. They maintained
            that the legislative intent was not to require that every decision
            be taken by a full, multi-member board but rather to facilitate
            expeditious processing of permit applications in cases that
            do not involve the complex considerations inherent in stage
            carriage permits.
       7.3. Practical Necessity and Administrative Efficiency: The
            Appellants argued that in practice, the STA is inundated with
            diverse functions and that delegating routine permit issuance to
            the Secretary, a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise
            in transport matters, ensures timely and efficient service.
            They further contended that such delegation is a common
            administrative practice not only in Karnataka but also in several
            other States, where similar delegation mechanisms have been
            effectively implemented.
       7.4. Reconciliation of Divergent Judicial Approaches: The
            Appellants noted that the High Court, in its earlier judgments,
            appeared to split the issue. In one instance, the learned Single
            Judge held that the grant of permits is quasi-judicial and cannot
            be delegated, while in another, it recognized that delegation
            is permissible if rules are framed under Section 96 of the MV
            Act. The Appellants argued that the latter view reflects the
            true statutory scheme. They submitted that by incorporating
            amendments to the KMV Rules (notably, the inclusion of
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                        275

          M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
     The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

             Section 96), the State has unambiguously affirmed its intention
             to delegate routine functions, such as the issuance of contract
             carriage permits, to the Secretary.
      7.5. Delegation Does Not Subvert Judicial Oversight: It is
           submitted that even if the power to grant permits were
           quasi-judicial, such functions can be delegated provided the
           enabling statute expressly permits it. The Appellants have relied
           on the recent decision in Newtech Promoters & Developers
           Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,13 to
           support the view that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated
           when done so in accordance with statutory provisions. The
           Appellants stress that the delegation in this instance is limited
           to contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits,
           matters that are routine and do not necessitate the full weight
           of collective adjudication. This is entirely consistent with the
           legislative scheme of the MV Act and the KMV Rules.
      7.6. Operational Practicalities and the Necessity of Delegation:
           The Appellants submit that requiring the entire STA or RTA
           to sit on routine permit applications would be impractical and
           could lead to delays in service delivery. They argue that the
           Secretary, being a competent and experienced officer, is fully
           capable of exercising the delegated power without compromising
           the statutory framework. Such delegation is vital for the smooth
           functioning of the transport regulatory system.
8.    The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Corporation, Col.
      Balasubramanian, has advanced the following arguments on behalf
      of the KSRTC:
      8.1. On the Invalidity of Section 3 of the 2003 Act (Repeal of
           the 1976 Act): KSRTC contends that the KCCA Act was in
           force for 27 years during which no contract carriage permits
           were issued by the STA or RTA, and that alternative transport
           services adequately served the public interest. They argue that
           the 1976 Act, enacted under Entry 42 and with Presidential
           assent, created exclusive rights for KSRTC, and its repeal was
           a deliberate statutory measure that should not be overturned.


13   (2021) 18 SCC 1
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       8.2. Incompatibility of the 2003 Act with Constitutional
            Requirements: The learned Senior Counsel contends that the
            2003 Act repeals the 1976 Act by invoking Entry 57 of List II
            (taxation on vehicles), which deals with a matter entirely distinct
            from acquisition. Since the parent 1976 Act was enacted under
            Entry 42 and with Presidential assent, its repeal or amendment
            should likewise be affected under the same constitutional
            basis. The State Legislature’s attempt to repeal it indirectly via
            a taxation measure violates the constitutional scheme and is
            thereby ultra vires.
       8.3. Undermining of Judicial Precedents and Public Policy: The
            Respondent Corporation argues that the Division Bench erred
            by ignoring the constitutional provisions under which the 1976
            Act was enacted. Repealing the 1976 Act not only nullifies
            the binding decisions of this Court in State of Karnataka v.
            Ranganatha Reddy (Supra) and Vijayakumar Sharma v.
            State of Karnataka but also frustrates the statutory purpose
            of curbing the misuse of contract carriage permits. Moreover,
            the repeal undermines the public interest by removing a crucial
            mechanism that ensured that private operators did not convert
            contract carriage permits into an avenue for operating stage
            carriages, thus protecting both the KSRTC’s statutory monopoly
            and the traveling public.
       8.4. Financial and Operational Impact on KSRTC: It is further
            submitted that, pursuant to the 1976 Act, KSRTC had acquired
            approximately 200 contract carriage buses, compensated the
            private owners, and absorbed their employees—thereby creating
            a statutory right and a long-established operational framework.
            The abrupt repeal imposed an undue financial and operational
            burden on KSRTC, jeopardizing its economic viability and
            contravening the very objectives for which the 1976 Act was
            enacted.
       8.5. On the Non-Delegability of the Power to Issue Permits:
            The Respondent Corporation concurs with the High Court’s
            holding that the power to grant Contract Carriage Permits is a
            quasi-judicial function, expressly vested in the STA or the RTA
            as composite bodies. The relevant provisions of the MV Act,
            particularly Sections 68, 69, and 74, together with Rule 56 of
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          277

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

           the KMV Rules clearly indicate that the power to issue such
           permits is intended to be exercised by a multi-member body
           and not by a single officer.
     8.6. Inadmissibility of Delegation to a Single Officer: It is submitted
          that delegation of the permit-granting power to the Secretary
          (or any prescribed officer) is contrary to the statutory scheme.
          Such a delegation would effectively replace the collective
          decision-making process with the unilateral discretion of a
          single official, thereby defeating the purpose of the quasi-judicial
          function entrusted to the STA/RTA. The learned Senior Counsel
          emphasizes that the legislative mandate, as enshrined in Section
          68(2) of the MV Act, requires that the STA be comprised of a
          Chairman (with judicial or appellate experience) and not more
          than three other members. No provision in the enabling Act
          permits the vesting of such critical power in a sole officer.
     8.7. Excessive Delegation and Its Consequences: It is further
          asserted that the amended Rules, particularly the amendments
          made on 18.07.2005 under the rule-making power invoked under
          Section 96 of the MV Act, have excessively delegated the power
          to the Secretary, amounting to a de facto rewriting of Sections
          68 and 96 of the MV Act. Such excessive delegation is not only
          inconsistent with the statutory structure but also impermissible
          under the General Clauses Act, 1897, which mandates that the
          exercise of rule-making power must be strictly confined to the
          framework provided by the parent Act.
     8.8. Legislative Intent and Judicial Oversight: The Respondent
          Corporation further contends that the legislative intent was
          unambiguously to vest the power of granting Contract Carriage
          Permits in a body of high-ranking officials, whose collective
          judgment is essential to ensure transparency and prevent
          arbitrary decisions. The delegation of this power to the Secretary,
          an officer whose duties and responsibilities are otherwise
          circumscribed, is therefore contrary to both the letter and the
          spirit of the MV Act and the KMV Rules.
     8.9. Post-Judgment Developments (Ancillary Submissions):
          Subsequent to the repeal of the 1976 Act, there has been a
          resurgence of misuse wherein private operators, under the guise
          of Contract Carriage Permits, have operated their vehicles as
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            stage carriages. This misuse has led to seizures, penalties, and
            significant financial losses to the State and KSRTC.
       8.10. State Policy Shifts and Recent Developments: It is further
             submitted that recent policy measures, such as the nationalization
             of routes (as per the Gazette Notification dated 07.03.2019) and
             the introduction of schemes like the “Shakthi Scheme” providing
             free bus services to women, further underscore the necessity
             for a robust, state-controlled transport framework. These
             developments accentuate the adverse impact of repealing the
             1976 Act and the detrimental effect of delegating quasi-judicial
             powers to a single officer on the efficiency and accountability
             of the state transport system.
9.     We shall now be dealing with each of the issues that arise before us.

       ISSUE I- VALIDITY OF THE 2003 REPEAL ACT
10. It is a well-settled principle that the power to repeal a law is coextensive
    with the power to enact it. In this context, the KCCA Act was enacted
    under Entry 42 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and it
    received the assent of the President of India. The KCCA Act was
    designed to bring privately operated contract carriages under state
    control in order to serve the public interest and to implement the
    Directive Principles of State Policy, notably under Article 39(b) and
    (c). However, over the ensuing decades, the transport landscape in
    Karnataka underwent significant changes—urbanization intensified,
    public transport demand grew, and it became increasingly evident that
    the restrictive regime established by the KCCA Act was contributing
    to an artificial scarcity of public transport services, particularly in rural
    and semi-urban areas.
11. In response to these evolving circumstances, the Legislature exercised
    its plenary power by enacting the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation
    and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (hereinafter, the 2003
    Repeal Act), which repealed the KCCA Act. The repeal was not an
    arbitrary act of legislative whim but was backed by a clear statement
    of objects and reasons that identified the deficiencies in the existing
    regulatory framework and the necessity to liberalize the transport
    sector. The intention was to dismantle the statutory monopoly that
    the KCCA Act had created for the KSRTC and to open the door for
    private operators to address the burgeoning public transport needs.
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                        279

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

12. The Preamble to 2003 Repeal Act reads as follows:
           “An Act further to amend the Karnataka Motor Vehicles
           Taxation Act, 1957 and to repeal the Karnataka Contract
           Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976.
           Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Karnataka
           Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 35 of
           1957) and to repeal the Karnataka Contract Carriages
           (Acquisition) Act,1976 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1976) for the
           purposes hereinafter appearing;”
     Moreover, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this act reads
     as follows:
           “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
           (As appended to at the time of Introduction)
           It is considered necessary to amend the Karnataka Motor
           Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1957) and
           to repeal the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition)
           Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1976) to give effect to
           the proposals made in the Budget Speech and matters
           connected therewith.”
13. The contention advanced by the Respondent Corporation (KSRTC)
    that repealing the KCCA Act is unconstitutional because it effectively
    overrules the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ranganatha Reddy
    (Supra) and Vijayakumar Sharma (Supra) fails to recognize the
    dynamic nature of legislative policy. Those Supreme Court decisions
    merely affirmed the constitutional validity of the KCCA Act at the time
    of its enactment; they do not bind the Legislature from modifying
    or repealing a statute when subsequent developments warrant a
    change in policy. Moreover, the argument that the repeal should
    have required fresh presidential assent is misplaced. A repeal statute
    does not recreate the legal framework anew but rather extinguishes
    the earlier Act’s operative provisions; it is not subject to the same
    procedural requirements as an original enactment when it comes to
    the need for fresh assent, provided that the repeal falls within the
    legislative competence of the State.
14. Furthermore, the 2003 Repeal Act is rooted in the practical realities of
    modern transport policy. Contemporary challenges, such as increasing
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       demand for public transport services, congestion in urban areas, and
       the need for efficient service delivery, necessitated a more flexible
       regulatory regime. The legislative history and the Statement of Objects
       and Reasons attached to the 2003 Repeal Act make it clear that
       the Legislature intended to remedy the inefficiencies of the past by
       introducing competition into the transport sector. The repeal of the
       KCCA Act was thus a deliberate policy decision aimed at fostering
       a more dynamic and responsive transport framework rather than an
       attempt to nullify well-established judicial pronouncements.
15. Additionally, it has been held on various instances by this Court
    that a Legislature may, subject to constitutional limitations, repeal
    any law it has enacted. In Ramakrishna v. Janpad Sabha,14 it
    has been emphatically held that if the Legislature has the power to
    enact a law on a particular subject, it equally possesses the power
    to repeal that law. The relevant paras of this judgement have been
    reproduced hereunder:
             “13. It must however be observed that merely because
             the legislature is empowered under this entry to constitute
             local authorities and vest them with powers and jurisdiction
             it would not follow that these local bodies could be vested
             with authority to levy any and every tax for the purpose of
             raising revenue for the purposes of local administration.
             They could be validly authorised to raise only those taxes
             which the province could raise under and by virtue of the
             relevant entries in the Provincial Legislative List. This
             is on the principle that the province could not authorise
             local bodies created by it to impose taxes which it itself
             could not directly levy for the purposes of the Provincial
             Government. Now comes the question whether the
             Provincial Legislature was competent, by legislation, to
             discontinue the levy of the tax by effecting a repeal of the
             taxing provision contained in the Local Self Government
             Act of 1920. There is no doubt that the general principle
             is that the power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co
             extensive with its power to enact such law, as would be
             seen from the following passage in the judgment by Lord


14   AIR 1962 SC 1073
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                           281

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

           Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General
           for the Dominion [(1896) AC 348 at p. 366] :
           “Neither the Parliament of Canada nor the Provincial
           Legislatures have authority to repeal statutes which they
           could not directly enact.”
           But obviously it application in particular instances would
           be controlled by express constitutional provision modifying
           the same. We have such a provision in the case on hand
           in Section 143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
           In the context the relevant words of the sub-section could
           only mean “may continue to be levied if so desired by the
           Provincial Legislature” which is indicated by or is implicit
           in the use of the expression “may” in the clause “may be
           continued until provision to the contrary is made by the
           Federal Legislature”. This would therefore posit a limited
           legislative power in the province to indicate or express
           a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the
           exercise of this limited power the province desires to
           discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant
           statute the repeal would be effective. Of course in the
           absence of legislation indicating a desire to discontinue
           the tax, the effect of the provision of the Constitution
           would be to enable the continuance of the power to levy
           the tax but this does not alter the fact that the provision
           by its implication confers a limited legislative power to
           desire or not to desire the continuance of the levy subject
           to the overriding power of the Central Legislature to put
           an end to its continuance and it is on the basis of the
           existence of this limited legislative power that the right of
           the Provincial Legislature to repeal the taxation provision
           under the Act of 1920 could be rested. Suppose for
           instance, a Provincial Legislature desires the continuance
           of the tax but considers the rate too high and wishes it to
           be reduced and passes an enactment for that purpose, it
           cannot be that the legislation is incompetent and that the
           State Government must permit the local authority to levy
           tax at the same rate as prevailed on 1-4-1937, if the latter
           desired the continuance of the tax. If such a legislation
           were enacted to achieve a reduction of the rate of the duty,
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          “its legislative competence must obviously be traceable
          to the power contained in the words” may continue to be
          levied in Section 143(2) of the Government of India Act.
          If we are right so far it would follow that in the exercise
          of this limited legislative power the Provincial Legislature
          would also have a right to legislate for the continuance
          of the tax provided, if of course, the other conditions
          of Section 143(2) are satisfied viz. (1) that the tax was
          one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the
          purposes of a local area at the commencement of Part
          III of the Government of India Act, (2) that the identity of
          the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit
          the tax is to be utilised and the purposes for which the
          utilisation is to take place continue to be the same, and
          (3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence
          in any manner altered, so that it continues to be same
          tax. If as we have held earlier there is a limited legislative
          power in the province to enact a law with reference to the
          tax levy so as to continue it, the validity of the Act of 1949
          which manifested the legislative intent to continue the tax
          without any break the legal continuity being established
          by the retrospective operation of the provision, has to
          be upheld.”
16. The KCCA Act was enacted under Entry 42 (Acquisition and
    requisition of property), and its repeal by the 2003 Repeal Act was
    effected under Entry 57 of List II, which deals with taxation—a subject
    area where the State has independent legislative competence. The
    repeal does not alter or contradict the judicial interpretation of the
    KCCA Act; rather, it reflects a conscious legislative choice to adapt
    to new economic and social conditions.
17. In view of these considerations, the rationale underlying the 2003
    Repeal Act is sound and consistent with the principles of legislative
    power. The arguments advanced by the Respondent Corporation,
    that the repeal would amount to an impermissible overruling of
    prior Supreme Court decisions, that it violates the requirement of
    presidential assent, or that it is otherwise beyond the legislative
    competence of the State, are untenable. The legislative intent, as
    clearly articulated in the 2003 Repeal Act, was to improve public
    transport services and to rectify the shortcomings of the earlier
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                         283

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

     regulatory regime. Accordingly, we hold that Section 3 of the Karnataka
     Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act,
     2003, which repeals the KCCA Act, is constitutional. The KSRTC
     challenging the repeal on these grounds have failed to establish any
     defect in the exercise of the Legislature’s power.
18. In view of the foregoing analysis, we concur with the view taken by
    the Division Bench of the High Court on this issue. We hold that
    Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain
    Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which repeals the KCCA Act,
    is constitutional, and the State Legislature has rightly exercised its
    power to repeal the Act.

     ISSUE II- DELEGATION OF POWER TO GRANT PERMITS
19. The next issue before us is whether the STA has the power to delegate
    its functions, specifically, the issuance of contract carriage, special,
    tourist, and temporary permits, to its Secretary. In this regard, the
    statutory framework provides clear guidance.
20. Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 states:
           “The State Transport Authority and any Regional Transport
           Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under
           Section 96, may delegate such of its powers and functions
           to such authority or person subject to such restrictions,
           limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the
           said rules.”
     This provision unambiguously confers upon the STA and RTA the
     power to delegate its functions provided that rules are framed under
     Section 96 of the Act. In the present context, the delegation in
     question concerns the grant of permits that are not stage carriage
     permits. This is further clarified in Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules,
     which reads as follows:
           “56. DELEGATION OF POWERS BY STATE TRANSPORT
           AUTHORITY:
           1. The State Transport Authority may, by a general or
           special resolution recorded in its proceedings, delegates:-
           (d) its power to grant a permit other than a stage carriage
           permit on an application made to the Chairman or Secretary
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          or any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department not below
          the rank of a Regional Transport Officer with reference to
          the notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 69.”
21. The language of Rule 56(1)(d) explicitly differentiates between the
    grant of stage carriage permits, which involve complex and inherently
    quasi-judicial considerations, and other types of permits that are
    essentially administrative in nature. The fact that only the grant of
    stage carriage permits is excluded from delegation underscores
    the Legislature’s intention: routine and time-sensitive permits such
    as contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits can be
    efficiently processed through delegation to a competent officer like
    the Secretary, thereby ensuring that administrative functions are not
    unduly delayed by the need for a full board’s involvement.
22. The Respondents argue that permit-granting is a quasi-judicial
    function that must be exercised solely by the composite body of
    the STA or RTA, as such functions require deliberation by multiple
    high-ranking officials, ensuring that decisions are made with due
    consideration and dissenting opinions. They contend that delegating
    this power to a single officer would undermine the judicial character
    of the decision-making process. However, this argument does not
    withstand if we have a closer analysis of the statutory provisions.
23. Firstly, even if one accepts that the grant of permits has a quasi-
    judicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law
    that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute
    expressly provides for such delegation. Here, Section 68(5) of the
    MV Act, coupled with the specific language of Rule 56(1)(d) of the
    KMV Rules makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the STA
    to delegate certain routine permit functions. The exclusion of stage
    carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all permit
    functions are inherently non-delegable; rather, it reflects a calibrated
    approach that distinguishes between complex adjudicatory functions
    and routine administrative tasks.
24. Secondly, from a practical standpoint, the STA is entrusted with a
    wide range of responsibilities under the Motor Vehicles Act, and its
    workload necessitates delegation to ensure timely service delivery.
    The Secretary, being a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise
    in transport administration, is well equipped to handle routine permit
    applications. The delegation mechanism is not a blank check for
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             285

          M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
     The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

      arbitrary decision-making; it operates within the boundaries and
      conditions prescribed by the enabling rules framed under Section
      96 of the MV Act. This ensures that, while administrative efficiency
      is achieved, there remains adequate oversight and accountability
      through the broader STA framework.
25. Moreover, the High Court’s reasoning in this regard appears to have
    conflated the inherent quasi-judicial nature of certain decisions with
    the broader statutory power of delegation. The High Court held that
    because permit-granting is quasi-judicial, it cannot be delegated to
    a single officer. However, this view fails to recognize that delegation
    does not remove judicial oversight from the process. Instead, it merely
    streamlines routine functions that do not require the full deliberative
    process of the STA. In Newtech Promoters & Developers
    (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., 15 this Court has affirmed that even
    quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the statute provides for
    it and if appropriate safeguards are in place. The relevant paras of
    this judgement are reproduced hereunder:
             “114. It is a well-established principle of interpretation of
             law that the court should read the section in literal sense
             and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any
             canon of construction permit the court to read the section
             in such a manner as to render it to some extent otiose.
             Section 81 of the Act positively empowers the Authority to
             delegate such of its powers and functions to any member
             by a general or a special order with an exception to make
             regulations under Section 85 of the Act. As a consequence,
             except the power to make regulations under Section 85 of
             the Act, other powers and functions of the Authority, by a
             general or special order, if delegated to a Single Member
             of the Authority is indeed within the fold of Section 81 of
             the Act.
             115. The further submission made by the learned counsel
             for the promoters that Section 81 of the Act empowers
             even delegation to any officer of the Authority or any other
             person, it is true that the Authority, by general or special
             order, can delegate any of its powers and functions to be


15   (2021) 18 SCC 1
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          exercised by any member or officer of the Authority or any
          other person but we are not examining the delegation of
          power to any third party. To be more specific, this Court
          is examining the limited question as to whether the power
          under Section 81 of the Act can be delegated by the
          Authority to any of its member to decide the complaint
          under Section 31 of the Act. What has been urged by the
          learned counsel for the promoters is hypothetical which
          does not arise in the facts of the case. If the delegation
          is made at any point of time which is in contravention
          to the scheme of the Act or is not going to serve the
          purpose and object with which power to delegate has
          been mandated under Section 81 of the Act, it is always
          open for judicial review.
          116. The further submission made by the learned counsel
          for the appellants that Section 81 of the Act permits the
          Authority to delegate such powers and functions to any
          member of the Authority which are mainly administrative
          or clerical, and cannot possibly encompass any of the core
          functions which are to be discharged by the Authority, the
          judicial functions are non-delegable, as these are the core
          functions of the Authority. The submission may not hold
          good for the reason that the power to be exercised by the
          Authority in deciding complaints under Section 31 of the
          Act is quasi-judicial in nature which is delegable provided
          there is a provision in the statute. As already observed,
          Section 81 of the Act empowers the Authority to delegate
          its power and functions to any of its members, by general
          or special order.”
26. Lastly, the practical impact of not allowing delegation would be to
    overload the STA with routine functions, potentially causing undue
    delays and inefficiencies in the permit-issuance process. Such delays
    could disrupt the balance of public transport service delivery, which
    the Legislature clearly sought to improve by liberalizing the regime
    for non-stage carriage permits. In this light, the delegation of routine
    permit-granting powers is not only legally permissible but is also
    necessary to meet the practical demands of an evolving transport
    sector.
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          287

        M/s S.R.S. Travels by its Proprietor K.T. Rajashekar v.
   The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers & Ors.

27. In view of the above analysis, we conclude that the power of the
    STA to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist,
    and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the
    statutory provisions of Section 68(5) of the MV Act, and Rule
    56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989. The delegation is a rational
    and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and
    efficient processing of permit applications without undermining
    the oversight function of the STA. Consequently, we reject the
    Respondents’ arguments and hold that the High Court’s reasoning
    on the non-delegability of permit-granting power is flawed. The
    power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact, and any
    decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both legislative
    intent and practical necessity.
28. In view of the discussions and analysis above, we hold that:
     (a)   Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and
           Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003, which repeals
           the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976,
           is constitutional.
     (b)   The State Transport Authority (STA) possesses the power
           to delegate its functions under Section 68(5) of the MV Act,
           as expressly provided by the statute and further clarified
           by Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules.
29. Consequently, we direct that the appeals of the respondent corporation
    (KSRTC) are dismissed, while the appeals filed by the private bus
    operators and the Karnataka State Road Transport Authority are
    allowed.
30. The impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation
    power of the STA are set aside, and it is confirmed that the Secretary
    of the STA is empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits
    (including contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits)
    in accordance with Section 68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of
    the KMV Rules, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed
    therein.
31. The appropriate authorities are directed to take all necessary measures
    to implement the above findings and ensure that the delegation of
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       permit-granting power is exercised in a manner consistent with the
       statutory provisions and the objectives of efficient public transport
       administration.
32. All pending applications are disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain