Supreme Court of India
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD.versusM/S. ABHYUDAYA GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 1223
- Decided
- 23 November 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the question of novation is a matter for the arbitral tribunal and the High Court was not entitled to decide it, so the application under Section 11(6) was maintainable and the High Court's dismissal was set aside.
Summary
M/s Meenakshi Solar Power Pvt. Ltd. entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with M/s Abhyudaya Green Economic Zones Pvt. Ltd. and its promoters to acquire a solar power project, later executing a Tripartite Agreement and an addendum involving a financier. Disputes arose and the appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the SPA, filing an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an arbitrator. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the SPA had been novated by the Tripartite Agreement, thereby extinguishing the arbitration clause. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by deciding the issue of novation at the Section 11(6) stage, as such questions fall within the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, allowed the appeal, and appointed a former Supreme Court judge as sole arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
Issues considered
- Whether the Share Purchase Agreement was novated by the Tripartite Agreement, thereby extinguishing the arbitration clause.
- Whether a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act may decide the issue of novation or must refer it to the arbitral tribunal.
- Whether the application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) was maintainable in view of the alleged novation.
Legislation cited
Subjects
arbitrationnovationSection 11(6)arbitration clauseshare purchase agreementtripartite agreementappointment of arbitratorSupreme Court
Judgment
756 [2022]
SUPREME COURT 8 S.C.R. 756
REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD.
v.
M/S. ABHYUDAYA GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD.
AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8818 of 2022)
B
NOVEMBER 23, 2022
[B. R. GAVAI AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: s. 11(6) – Appointment
of arbitrator – Novation of contract – Effect of – Appellant entered
C into a share purchase agreement (SPA) with respondent No.1 as
also respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (promoters of respondent No.1) to
buy the power project of respondent No.1 – Respondent Nos. 2 and
3 agreed to sell 100% ownership of respondent No. 1 and appellant
agreed to purchase 100% Equity and Preference Shares of
respondent no. 1 by taking over the loans of respondent No. 1 and
D paying the balance amount to sellers-respondent Nos. 2 and 3 –
Thereafter, a tripartite agreement entered into by the appellant
through its affiliate-respondent No. 4 with respondent no. 2 and 3 –
Tripartite Agreement recorded execution of SPA and payment made
to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in terms of the SPA – An addendum to
E SPA also signed whereby respondent No. 4 agreed to remit certain
amounts to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to regularise the loan and facilitate
the transfer of the project company – However, disputes arose
between the parties – In terms with the arbitration clause under the
SPA, application s.11(6)by the appellant for appointment of an
arbitrator – High Court dismissed the application on the ground of
F novation of contract between the parties – On appeal, held: High
Court not right in dismissing the petition u/s. 11(6) by giving a finding
on novation of the Share Purchase Agreement between the parties
as the said aspect would have a bearing on the merits of the
controversy between the parties – Thus, it must be left to the
G arbitrator to decide on the said issue also – Impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside – Former
judge of the Supreme Court of India appointed as sole arbitrator to
adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt.
H Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 267 : [2008] 13 SCR 638; SBP &
756
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 757
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD.
Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Vidya A
Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1
: 2021 (6 ) JT 460; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs.
NCC Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 896; Union of India
vs. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. (1960) 1 SCR 493, Young
Achievers vs. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. (2013)
B
10 SCC 535 : [2013] 2 SCR 252; M.B.S Impex Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation
(2020) 5 ALD 185; Damodar Valley Corporation vs.
K.K. Kar (1974) 1 SCC 141: [1974] 2 SCR 240 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference C
[1960] 1 SCR 493 referred to Para 12.5
[2013] 2 SCR 252 referred to Para 12.5
[2008] 13 SCR 638 referred to Para 14 (a)
D
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688 referred to Para 14 (a)
[1974] 2 SCR 240 referred to Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8818
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2021 of the High Court E
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Arbitration Application No.55
of 2020.
Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., S.V.S. Chowdary, Yelamanchili
Shiva Santosh Kumar, Rudrajit Ghosh, Tarun Gupta, Abhishek Sharma,
Advs. for the Appellant. F
D. Narendra Naik, Talha Abdul Rahman, N. Shaz Khan, Harsh
Vardhan Kediya, Bilal A. Khan, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NAGARATHNA, J. G
Leave granted.
2. This Civil Appeal has been filed by assailing the impugned
judgment and order dated 12.02.2021 passed by the High Court of
Judicature for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Arbitration
H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A Application No. 55 of 2020 whereby the High Court dismissed the
application filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1996’, for the sake of
convenience) filed by the appellant herein.
3. The appellant herein- M/s. Meenakshi Solar Power Pvt. Ltd. is
B engaged in the business of producing power through running and operating
thermal/solar/hydro power plants. The respondent No.1 – M/s.
Abhyudaya Green Economic Zones Pvt. Ltd. is the owner of 4.128
MW Solar PV Power Project located in 20 acres at Kummera Village,
Chevella Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Telangana. Respondent Nos. 2
and 3 are promoters and 100% shareholders of respondent No.1 Company.
C Respondent No. 4- M/s. Meenakshi Power Pvt. Ltd. is an affiliate of
the appellant herein and is a proforma respondent in the present case
while the other three respondents are the contesting respondents.
4. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that the power
project of respondent No.1 herein is generating power and has a twenty-
D year Power Purchase Agreement with Telangana State Southern Power
Distribution Company Limited. The power project was partly financed
by Corporation Bank, Film Nagar Branch, Hyderabad in the form of a
Term Loan vide Account No. 560821000017646 and partly financed by
M/s. IFCI Venture Capital Funds Limited (hereinafter referred to as
E ‘IFCI Venture Capital’) in the form of 14,68,000 Optionally Convertible
Debentures of Rs.100/- each at par aggregating to Rs.14,68,00,000/-
(Rupees Fourteen Crore Sixty-Eight Lakhs Only) under a Venture Capital
Fund for Schedule Castes. Since it was difficult for respondent No.1 to
service the debt availed from the financial institutions, respondent Nos.
2 and 3 its promoters, decided to sell the said power project. The appellant
F herein showed interest in buying the said power project and therefore
entered into a Share Purchase Agreement dated 24.09.2018 with
respondent Nos.1 to 3 wherein respondent Nos. 2 and 3 agreed to sell
100% ownership of respondent No.1 Company comprising all of its assets
including land, buildings, plant, equipment along with continuity of the
G Power Purchase Agreement signed with Telangana State Southern
Power Distribution Company Limited as a going business entity, for an
irrevocably frozen Purchase Price of Rs. 29 Crores (Rupees Twenty-
Nine Crores). The appellant herein agreed to purchase 100% Equity
Shares and 100% Preference Shares of respondent No.1 Company by
way of taking over the loans of respondent No.1 Company and paying
H
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 759
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]
the balance amount to the sellers i.e., respondent Nos. 2 and 3 towards A
net equity value.
5. Subsequently, a Tripartite Agreement was entered into by the
appellant herein through its affiliate i.e., respondent No.4 (party of the
third part) with respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (party of the second part) and
IFCI Venture Capital (party of the first part) on 03.04.2019 recording B
the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement dated 24.09.2018 and
payment of Rs. 50 lakhs (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) to respondent Nos. 2 and
3 in terms of the said Share Purchase Agreement.
6. Thereafter, an addendum to the Share Purchase Agreement
was signed on 10.04.2019 between respondent Nos.1 to 3 and respondent C
No.4 wherein the latter agreed to remit an amount of Rs. 1.65 Crores to
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to regularize the loan with the Corporation Bank
and facilitate the transfer of the project company.
7. Disputes arose between the appellant and the respondents and
the appellant herein filed an application before the Commercial Court, D
City Civil Court, Hyderabad vide COP No.27 of 2020 under Section 9 of
the Act of 1996, seeking to restrain the respondents from alienating their
shares in the Company. The Commercial Court was pleased to grant an
ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from alienating their
shares vide order dated 19.06.2020.
E
8. The appellant herein sent a letter dated 22.06.2020 invoking
the arbitration clause as a means of dispute resolution in terms of Clause
10 of the Share Purchase Agreement and called upon respondent Nos.
1 to 3 to settle the disputes through arbitration. The appellant herein
appointed one Dr. P.V. Amarnadha Prasad, Engineer and Techno Legal
Consultant, Hyderabad as its arbitrator and vide such letter requested F
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to appoint their nominee arbitrator and to constitute
an Arbitral Tribunal of three members to adjudicate upon the dispute
between the parties. On receiving no response to the aforesaid notice,
the aggrieved appellant herein filed an application under Section 11(6) of
the Act of 1996 which came to be dismissed vide impugned judgment G
and order passed by the High Court.
9. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the aforesaid application, the
appellant has approached this Court by way of the present appeal.
10. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel
duly instructed by her instructing counsel, appearing for the appellant H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A herein and Sri D. Narendra Naik, learned counsel for the respondent
Nos.1 to 3 and perused the material on record.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant stated that the High
Court has grossly erred in dismissing the application under Section 11(6)
of the Act of 1996 and that the judgment and order passed by the High
B Court needs consideration by this Court. The submissions of learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant are summarised as under:
11.1 That the High Court erred in giving a finding of implied/
deemed novation while adjudicating on an application under
Section 11 of the Act of 1996 and failed to comprehend the
C nature of limited judicial intervention under the said provision.
11.2 That the High Court erred in venturing to examine
complicated questions of facts and documents and has
essentially performed the function of an Arbitral Tribunal
before whom novation ought to have been pleaded and
D proved as a preliminary issue in case the same arose.
11.3 That the High Court has failed to examine the ingredients
for novation and has given an erroneous finding in that
regard by superficially dealing with the said issue. The High
Court failed to comprehend that the Tripartite Agreement
E was entered into with the sole purpose and intent to act as
a recovery mechanism for IFCI Venture Capital and cannot
by any stretch of imagination be called as an act to substitute
and novate the Share Purchase Agreement dated
24.09.2018.
F 11.4 That the High Court failed to consider that the Tripartite
Agreement and the Addendum to the Share Purchase
Agreement was for a limited purpose of satisfying IFCI
Venture Capital as regards the dues payable and the same
cannot be said to have substituted the Share Purchase
Agreement. Both the Tripartite Agreement and the
G Addendum make no mention to novate or substitute the
Share Purchase Agreement dated 24.09.2018. There are
clauses being substituted or subsequent modification of
clauses between the Share Purchase Agreement when
viewed alongside with the Tripartite Agreement.
H
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 761
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]
11.5 It is reiterated that the Tripartite Agreement with the IFCI A
Venture Capital was meant only to protect the interests of
the financier so that it does not act coercively against
respondent No.1. The Tripartite Agreement had no clauses
in it to deal with the inter-se rights and obligations of appellant
herein and its affiliate respondent No.4 and respondent Nos.
B
1 to 3 and was therefore incapable of substituting the Share
Purchase Agreement dated 24.09.2018.
11.6 That the High Court erred in not attempting to appreciate
the composite intention of both the parties, the nature and
purpose of the commercial transaction, the documents and
material on record, the conduct and correspondence of the C
parties.
12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1
to 3 supported the judgment and order passed by the High Court and
contended that no interference of this Court is required. The submissions
of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 to 3 are epitomized as D
under:
12.1 That the appellant herein failed miserably in making
complete payment of the purchase of shares from
respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and in fulfilling its obligation before
the expiry of the Share Purchase Agreement i.e., as on E
10.11.2018, when the Share Purchase Agreement lapsed
and stood terminated by operation of Clause 8 of the Share
Purchase Agreement.
12.2 That a fresh Tripartite Agreement was entered into, after
four months from the date when the Share Purchase
Agreement stood terminated, with an intention to help the F
appellant to recover an amount of Rs.50 lakhs paid by it to
the respondents. Pursuant to the Tripartite Agreement, an
Addendum was entered into between the parties wherein it
was agreed that the consideration for sale of the power
project shall be remitted within timelines stipulated under G
the terms and conditions of the Tripartite Agreement. The
Addendum makes no mention of the compliance with any
term of the Share Purchase Agreement dated 24.09.2018
and rightly so since the Tripartite Agreement executed on
03.04.2019 had novated the same.
H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A 12.3 That the Share Purchase Agreement and the Tripartite
Agreement are two distinct and independent agreements
executed between completely different parties with different
terms and conditions, however the subject matter i.e., the
sale consideration and the number of shares being
transferred are the same in both the agreements. The
B
Tripartite Agreement has superseded the Share Purchase
Agreement. The substantial shift from terms, conditions and
timelines in the Share Purchase Agreement show that the
parties departed from the same to the Tripartite Agreement
and the Share Purchase Agreement stood novated.
C 12.4 That the High Court has acted completely within its
jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 and has not
stepped into the role of an Arbitral Tribunal. Reference to
Vidya Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2
SCC 1 was made in this regard. The respondents further
D relied on Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. NCC Ltd. 2022
SCC OnLine SC 896 to hold that there is no bar under the
Act of 1996 for a Court to look beyond the bare existence
of the arbitration clause to cut the deadwood. The High
Court in the present case was well within its jurisdiction in
examining the existence of the Arbitration agreement and
E by arriving at a conclusion that the Share Purchase
Agreement was novated and superseded by the Tripartite
Agreement.
12.5 That the arbitration clause being a part/component of Share
Purchase Agreement falls within it and perishes along with
F it and the Tripartite Agreement provides for no provision
for arbitration. The High Court was right in holding that
owing to novation, the invocation of arbitration under Share
Purchase Agreement was untenable. This Court has clearly
set out the principle that an agreement will be novated with
G the introduction of new parties by mutual agreement. The
respondents relied on the case of Union of India vs.
Kishorilal Gupta and Bros. (1960) 1 SCR 493, Young
Achievers vs. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. (2013)
10 SCC 535and M.B.S Impex Pvt. Ltd. vs. Minerals
and Metals Trading Corporation (2020) 5 ALD 185.
H
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 763
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]
12.6 That the High Court has rightly comprehended the intention A
behind the two agreements and the contention of the
appellant that the Tripartite Agreement was a recovery
mechanism is untrue and thus unsustainable. Moreover, the
Tripartite Agreement governing the transaction makes no
mention of the lapsed Share Purchase Agreement
B
intentionally. The appellant was replaced by respondent No.4
in the Tripartite Agreement and IFCI Capital Venture was
added as a party and was also given a right to invoke the
agreement. Thus, the Tripartite Agreement is a completely
different and new agreement between different parties
containing different terms and conditions and does not have C
an arbitration clause.
13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties, the following points would arise for our consideration:
(a) Whether the judgment and order of the High Court calls
for any interference or modification by this Court? D
(b) What order?
14. The plea taken by the respondent herein is that owing to
novation of share purchase agreement, the arbitration clause no longer
existed so as to resolve the dispute between the parties through arbitration.
On the other hand, the plea of the appellant is that there was no such E
novation of the share purchase agreement and the arbitration clause
was very much available and hence, the High Court ought to have referred
the matter to arbitration. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the
following dicta of this Court:
a) In National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt.
F
Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 267, a Bench of this Court elucidating
on SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC
618 has identified and segregated the issues that could be
considered in an application filed under Section 11(6) of the
Act of 1996 into three categories. They are enumerated as
under: G
(i) issues which the Chief Justice or his designate is
bound to decide;
(ii) issues which he can also decide, that is, issues which
he may choose to decide or leave it to the Arbitral
Tribunal to decide; and H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A (iii) issues which would be left to the Arbitral Tribunal to
decide, and thereafter had enumerated them as
under:
“22.1. The issues (first category) which the Chief
Justice/his designate will have to decide are:
B (a) Whether the party making the application has
approached the appropriate High Court.
(b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and
whether the party who has applied under
Section 11 of the Act, is a party to such an
C agreement.
22.2. The issues (second category) which the Chief
Justice/his designate may choose to decide (or leave
them to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are:
D (a) Whether the claim is a dead (long-barred)
claim or a live claim.
(b) Whether the parties have concluded the
contract/transaction by recording satisfaction
of their mutual rights and obligation or by
receiving the final payment without objection.
E
22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief
Justice/his designate should leave exclusively to the
Arbitral Tribunal are:
(i) Whether a claim made falls within the
F arbitration clause (as for example, a matter
which is reserved for final decision of a
departmental authority and excepted or
excluded from arbitration).
(ii) Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration.”
G 15. As far as the issues in the first category are concerned, the
Chief Justice or his designate is bound to decide. With regard to the
issues falling under the second category, when they are raised in an
application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the Chief Justice or
his designate may decide them or may leave it open with a direction to
H the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the same. But if the Chief Justice or his
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 765
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]
designate chooses to examine the issue and decides it, the Arbitral Tribunal A
cannot re-examine the same issue. As far as the issues which arise in
the third category are concerned, they have to be dealt with exclusively
by the Arbitral Tribunal such as excepted or excluded matters. It would
also include merits of any claim involved in arbitration.
16. In Vidya Drolia (supra), it has been further observed in B
relation to the aforesaid three categories in Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.
(supra). The first category of issues, namely, whether the party has
approached the appropriate High Court, whether there is an arbitration
agreement and whether the party who has applied for reference is party
to such agreement would be subject to a more thorough examination in C
comparison to the second and third categories/issues which are
presumptively, save in exceptional cases, for the arbitrator to decide. In
the first category, the question or issues are relating to whether the cause
of action relates to action in personam or rem; whether the subject-
matter of the dispute affects third-party rights, have erga omnes effect,
requires centralised adjudication; whether the subject-matter relates to D
inalienable sovereign and public interest functions or by necessary
implication non-arbitrable as per mandatory statutes. On the other hand,
issues relating to contract formation, existence, validity and non-
arbitrability would be connected and intertwined with the issues underlying
the merits of the respective disputes/claims. They would be factual and E
disputed and for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide.
17. Further, this Court observed that the court at the referral stage
can interfere only when it is manifest that the claims are ex facie time-
barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute. In the context of issue
of limitation period, it should be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal for F
decision on merits. Similar would be the position in case of disputed “no-
claim certificate” or defence on the plea of novation and “accord and
satisfaction”.
18. It would be also useful to refer to another decision of this
Court in Damodar Valley Corporation vs. K.K. Kar(1974) 1 SCC 141 G
wherein it has been observed as under:
(1) an arbitration clause is a collateral term of a contract as
distinguished from its substantive terms; but nonetheless it
is an integral part of it;
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.
A (2) however comprehensive the terms of an arbitration clause
may be, the existence of the contract is a necessary
condition for its operation; it perishes with the contract;
(3) the contract may be non est in the sense that it never came
legally into existence or it was void ab initio;
B (4) though the contract was validly executed, the parties may
put an end to it as if it had never existed and substitute a
new contract for it solely governing their rights and liabilities
thereunder;
(5) in the former case, if the original contract has no legal
C existence, the arbitration clause also cannot operate, for
along with the original contract, it is also void; in the latter
case, as the original contract is extinguished by the
substituted one, the arbitration clause of the original contract
perishes with it; and
D (6) between the two falls many categories “of disputes in
connection with a contract, such as the question of
repudiation, frustration, breach, etc. In those cases, it is the
performance of the contract that has come to an end, but
the contract is still in existence for certain purposes in respect
of disputes arising under it or in connection with it. As the
E contract subsists for certain purposes, the arbitration clause
operates in respect of these purposes.
Even if the performance of the contract has come to an end, the
contract can still be in existence for certain purposes in respect of disputes
arising under it or in connection with it.
F 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that High Court
was not right in dismissing the petition under Section 11(6) of the Act of
1996 filed by the appellant herein by giving a finding on novation of the
Share Purchase Agreement between the parties as the said aspect would
have a bearing on the merits of the controversy between the parties.
G Therefore, it must be left to the Arbitrator to decide on the said issue
also. Hence, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
has to be set-aside.
20. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby
H quashed and set aside.
M/S. MEENAKSHI SOLAR POWER PVT. LTD. v. M/S. ABHYUDAYA 767
GREEN ECONOMIC ZONES PVT. LTD. [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.]
21. As requested before this Court for appointment of a sole A
Arbitrator, Hon. Sri Justice R. Subhash Reddy, Former Judge, Supreme
Court of India, [email id – rsubhashreddy5157@gmail.com] is appointed
as the sole Arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties. The
Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the learned sole
Arbitrator.
B
22. All contentions of both sides are left open to be raised by the
respective parties before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with law.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the
above terms.
C
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
D
E
F
G
H
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