Holding

A second quashing petition that raises no new grounds is not maintainable and amounts to an impermissible review of the earlier order, which the High Court cannot effect under s.482 CrPC.

Summary

The complainant filed Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019 alleging offences under several sections of the IPC against the accused. The accused first filed a quashing petition under s.482 CrPC, which the High Court dismissed. Six months later they filed a second quashing petition on the same grounds, and the High Court allowed it, effectively quashing the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the second petition was impermissible because it raised no new grounds and amounted to a review of the earlier order, which is barred by s.362 CrPC. It further ruled that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under s.482 cannot override the specific bar on review, and set aside the High Court’s order, restoring the criminal complaint.

Issues considered

Whether a second quashing petition under s.482 CrPC is maintainable when it relies on the same grounds as a previously dismissed petition.
Whether the High Court can review its own earlier order using its inherent jurisdiction, in view of the bar under s.362 CrPC.
Whether the inherent jurisdiction under s.482 CrPC can override specific procedural bars in the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 362, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120, s. 193, s. 34, s. 406, s. 418, s. 420, s. 423, s. 468, s. 469

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether a second quashing petition u/s.482 CrPC would be maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.193, 406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 1973 – s.482 – Complainant preferred criminal complaint no.1828 of 2019 against accused-respondents before the IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate for the offences punishable u/ss.193, 406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 r/w 34 and 120 of IPC – In the said complaint, summons came to

Subjects

Quashing of criminal complaintFirst quashing petitionSecond quashing petitionSection 482 of CrPCInherent jurisdiction of High CourtRepeated invocation of inherent jurisdiction of High Court u/s.482 CrPC

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1451 : 2025 INSC 888

M.C. Ravikumar
v.
D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3122 of 2025)
23 July 2025
[Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether a second quashing petition u/s.482 CrPC would be
maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised
even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.193, 406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 r/w
34 and 120 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 –
Complainant preferred criminal complaint no.1828 of 2019
against accused-respondents before the IX Metropolitan
Judicial Magistrate for the offences punishable u/ss.193,
406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 r/w 34 and 120 of IPC – In the
said complaint, summons came to be issued against all the
accused persons vide order dated 27.04.2019 – The accused-
respondents filed the first quashing petition before the High
Court seeking the quashing of the aforesaid complaint – The
said petition came to be dismissed by the High Court – The
accused-respondents after 6 months preferred a second
quashing petition seeking the quashing of the very same
complaint – The High Court allowed the second quashing
petition and quashed entire proceedings of criminal complaint
no. 1828 of 2019 filed by the appellant-complainant – Whether
the order passed by the High Court was justified:
Held: 1. The impugned order passed by the High Court is unjustified
on the face of the record. [Para 17]
2. The submission advanced by the accused-respondents that the
second quashing petition came to be filed based on new grounds/
pleas, is not tenable on the face of it – From the bare perusal of the
record, it is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such

* Author
1452 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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grounds/pleas which were unavailable to the accused-respondents
at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. [Para 12]
3. The order passed by the High Court in the second quashing
petition amounted to review (plain and simple) of the earlier
order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the High Court in the
first quashing petition, since there was admittedly no change in
circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became available to the
accused-respondents, after passing of the order of dismissal in the
first quashing petition – The order passed by the High Court is in
gross disregard to all tenets of law as s.362 CrPC expressly bars
review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to
correct some clerical or arithmetical error. [Para 14]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Repeated invocation
of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482:
Held: It is settled that it is not open to an accused person to
raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 CrPC, though all such pleas
were very much available to him even at the first instance – There
is no sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition
u/s.482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case – However, the onus
to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting
entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the
person filing the said petition. [Para 13]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Whether High
Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction u/s.482
CrPC override a specific bar laid down by the other provisions
of CrPC:
Held: This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while
exercising their inherent jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC cannot override
a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say
that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision
under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited
Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP & Anr. [2023] 14 SCR. 55 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399; Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and
Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr. [1990] 1 SCR 788 : (1990) 2 SCC
437 – relied on.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1453

M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Quashing of criminal complaint; First quashing petition; Second
quashing petition; Section 482 of CrPC; Inherent jurisdiction of
High Court; Repeated invocation of inherent jurisdiction of High
Court u/s.482 CrPC.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3122 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP No. 16241 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
R. Venkataraman, Apoorva Singhal, Tanuj Agarwal, Md. Ashfaq.
Advs. for the Respondents:
M. Yogesh Kanna, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Raghunatha
Sethupathy B, Manoj Kumar A., Vinayaga Vignesh I, Vasu Kalra.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The instant appeal has been filed against final judgment and order
dated 13th September, 20221 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Madras2 in quashing petition3 filed by the respondents herein4. Vide

1 Hereinafter, referred to as “impugned order”.
2 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
3 Criminal Original Petition No. 16241 of 2022.
4 Hereinafter, referred to as “accused-respondents”.
1454 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the impugned order, the High Court allowed the quashing petition
and quashed the criminal complaint5 filed by the appellant herein6
against the accused-respondents for the offences punishable under
Sections 193, 406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 read with 34 and 120 of
Indian Penal Code, 18607 before the learned IX Metropolitan Judicial
Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai.

Factual Background: -
4. Facts in nutshell, relevant and essential for disposal of the appeal
are noted hereinbelow.
4.1. The complainant has been engaged in travels and finance
business for several years. During 2005-2008, the complainant
entered into some loan transactions with the accused-
respondents who were engaged in the business of money
lending. To secure the said loan transactions, the complainant
gave the original deeds of several of his properties situated
at Thanjavur and Chennai to the accused-respondents. An
agreement of sale came to be executed between C. Natrajan
(respondent No. 2) and the complainant in respect of a flat8 and
a portion of plot9 situated at Adyar, Chennai on 25th April, 2008.
4.2. Thereafter, on 23rd May, 2008, a tripartite agreement came to be
executed between the complainant, one R.R. Vasudevan and
D.S. Velmurugan (respondent no. 1). Under the said agreement,
R.R. Vasudevan paid Rs. 79,00,000/- to respondent No. 1,
which was actually payable to the complainant. Thereafter,
the complainant cleared of the remaining outstanding amount
pertaining to the loan transactions totaling Rs. 1,65,98,000/-
and having made such payment, he requested the accused-
respondents to return the original deeds given as security
against the loan amount. Since the accused-respondents

5 Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019.
6 Hereinafter, referred to as “complainant” or “appellant-complainant.
7 For short “IPC”.
8 Flat No. 10 having plinth area of 935 sq. ft., First Floor, 2nd Main Road, Rams Flat, Adyar, Gandhi Nagar,
Chennai.
9 3/87 undivided share of land measuring larger extent of 4 Grounds and 895 sq. ft. under Survey No. 42
Part, Block No. 36, Kottur Village, Plot No. 126 Part, situated at Old Door No. 83, 2nd Main Road, Gandhi
Nagar, Adyar, Chennai.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1455

M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.

failed to respond to the aforesaid request, the complainant
was constrained to issue legal notice dated 30th August, 2011
to them, seeking return of the original documents.
4.3. It is alleged that after the receipt of the aforesaid notice,
respondent No. 1 executed a sham sale deed in respect of the
complainant’s property situated at Thanjavur, which was given
as security against the loan amount. On coming to know of the
said fraudulent transaction, the complainant filed a complaint
on 22nd November, 2011 with the Crime Branch, Chennai after
procuring orders of the High Court. The said complaint came
to be registered as Crime No. 193 of 2012. The police filed
closure report in the said case and the same was accepted
by Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai vide order
dated 23rd September, 2013. The revision petition10 filed by the
complainant was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated
24th October, 2013 and the special leave petition11 against the
said order of the High Court was dismissed by this Court vide
order dated 7th January, 2015, with an observation that in the
event, the complainant chose to pursue appropriate remedies,
the observations of the High Court may not prejudice the same.
In pursuance of the said order of this Court, the complainant
filed yet another Criminal Complaint No. 41 of 2015 before
Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Thanjavur against respondent No. 1
and the co-accused persons. However, the quashing petition12
filed by respondent No. 1 and other co-accused persons seeking
quashing of Criminal Complaint No. 41 of 2015 was allowed by
the High Court vide order dated 9th March, 2020.
4.4. In the meantime, one P. Jothikumar13 filed Civil Suit No. 79 of
2018 before the High Court seeking a money decree to the tune
of Rs. 1,24,62,000/- in respect of the amount allegedly loaned by
him to the complainant. The said suit was filed by exhibiting the
original documents of the flat, which as per the complainant were
actually handed over to the accused-respondents as security.

10 Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 1305 of 2013.
11 Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1042 of 2014.
12 Criminal Original Petition (MD) Nos. 13228 of 2015 and 19634 of 2016.
13 Accused No. 4 in Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019.
1456 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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4.5. Being aggrieved, the complainant preferred Criminal Complaint
No. 1828 of 2019 before the IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate,
Saidapet, Chennai against the accused-respondents and P.
Jothikumar (accused No. 4) for the offences punishable under
Sections 193, 406, 418, 420, 423, 468, 469 read with 34 and
120 of IPC. In the said complaint, summons came to be issued
against all the accused persons vide order dated 27th April, 2019.
4.6. The accused-respondents filed the first quashing petition 14
before the High Court seeking the quashing of the aforesaid
complaint. The said petition came to be dismissed by the High
Court vide speaking order dated 22nd December, 2021. The
accused-respondents after waiting for 6 months preferred a
second quashing petition15 before the High Court seeking the
quashing of the very same complaint i.e., Criminal Complaint
No. 1828 of 2019.
4.7. The High Court vide final judgment and order dated 13th
September, 2022 allowed the second quashing petition and
quashed entire proceedings of Criminal Complaint No. 1828
of 2019 filed by the appellant-complainant. The said order of
High Court is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal by
special leave.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant-complainant: -
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-complainant,
vehemently and fervently argued that the High Court fell in grave
error while allowing the second quashing petition filed by the accused-
respondents which was based on the very same grounds/pleas which
were taken in the first quashing petition. He urged that there was
no change in circumstances and there existed no new ground for
entertaining the second quashing petition.
6. Learned counsel urged that the impugned order tantamounts to
review of the previous order passed by a co-ordinate bench of the
High Court which is impermissible in view of the bar prescribed under
Section 362 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 197316 (Corresponding

14 Criminal Original Petition No. 14186 of 2019.
15 Supra Note 3.
16 For short “CrPC”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1457

M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.

to Section 403 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 202317).
He contended that the High Court, while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Corresponding to Section 528
BNSS) cannot be allowed to review an earlier order as the same is
expressly barred by Section 362 CrPC.
On these grounds, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-complainant implored this Court to accept the appeal and
set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.

Submissions on behalf of the accused-respondents: -
7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-
respondents vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant. He urged that
the High Court has rightly quashed the criminal complaint initiated by
the complainant by adverting to the fact that there existed change in
circumstances since a similar complaint filed by the complainant in
respect of property situated at Thanjavur already stands quashed.
He urged that the present case is a classic example of abuse of
criminal machinery by the complainant.
8. Learned counsel argued that the impugned order passed by the
High Court does not amount to review of the order passed by the
co-ordinate bench in the first quashing petition, since the second
quashing petition was filed raising different grounds/pleas which were
not effectively raised in the first quashing petition. He urged that the
High Court has the power to exercise its inherent jurisdiction at any
stage of criminal proceedings in order to prevent abuse of law and
manifest injustice and exercise of such power cannot be termed to
be in violation of the provisions of Section 362 CrPC.
9. He lastly urged that the inter se dispute between the parties is purely
civil in nature and the admitted allegations can in no circumstance
give rise to criminal prosecution. The criminal proceedings have
been initiated against the accused-respondents with the sole intent
of harassing them.
On these grounds, learned counsel appearing on behalf of accused-
respondents urged that the order passed by the High Court is

17 For short “BNSS”.
1458 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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unassailable in law as well as facts and implored the Court to dismiss
the appeal.

Discussion and Analysis: -
10. We have heard the submissions advanced at the bar and have gone
through the impugned order and material placed on record.
11. The short question that arises for our consideration is “Whether
a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC would be
maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised
even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition?”
12. At the outset, we may like to note that the submission advanced by
the learned counsel for the accused-respondents that the second
quashing petition came to be filed based on new grounds/pleas, is
not tenable on the face of it. From the bare perusal of the record, it
is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such grounds/
pleas which were unavailable to the accused-respondents at the
time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. The failure of the
accused-respondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was
tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first
quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said
accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would
amount to seeking review on pre-existing material.
13. This Court in catena of judgments has held that it is not open to
an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC, though all such pleas were very much available to him even
at the first instance. We may hasten to add that there is no sweeping
rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482
CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. However, the onus to show
that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment
of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the
said petition. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the observations
made by this Court in the case of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of
UP & Anr.18, which are extracted below for ready reference:-

18 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1459

M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.

“11. …… Though it is clear that there can be no blanket
rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would
not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open
to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other,
by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very
much available even at the first instance. Permitting the
filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious
accused to effectively stall the proceedings against
him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing
one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such
abuse of process cannot be permitted.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

14. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the High
Court in the second quashing petition amounted to review (plain and
simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the
High Court in the first quashing petition, since there was admittedly
no change in circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became
available to the accused-respondents, after passing of the order of
dismissal in the first quashing petition. The order passed by the
High Court is in gross disregard to all tenets of law as Section 362
CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing
of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error.
15. This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while
exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot
override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to
say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision
under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. To fortify the
aforesaid conclusion, we may gainfully refer to the observations
made by this Court in the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee
and Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr.19, the relevant portions whereof
are quoted below for ease of reference:

19 (1990) 2 SCC 437.
1460 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706, this Court
held that Section 561A preserves the inherent power of
the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to
prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure
the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore
exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation
prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent
jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case the facts
and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent
application were clearly different from what they were at
the time of the earlier application. The question as to the
scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court
vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not
concluded by this decision.
7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be
invoked to override bar of review u/s 362. It is clearly
stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 50 that
the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised
for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the
Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power
cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be
done on account of the bar under other provisions of
the Code. The court is not empowered to review its
own decision under the purported exercise of inherent
power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in
effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration
of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred
in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling
reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.”
(Emphasis supplied)

16. In the instant case, the quashing by the High Court of a similar
complaint, i.e., Criminal Complaint No. 41 of 2015 filed by the
complainant against the accused-respondents in respect of properties
situated at Thanjavur vide order dated 9th March, 2020 was an event
that happened well before the dismissal of the first quashing petition
under Section 482 CrPC and the said ground/plea was manifestly
available to the accused-respondents while seeking adjudication of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1461

M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors.

the first quashing petition. That being the situation, the accused-
respondents were not at liberty to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court raising the aforesaid ground/plea at a later point of
time by filing the second quashing petition.
17. As an upshot of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding
that the impugned order passed by the High Court is unjustified on
the face of the record and cannot be affirmed. Hence, the impugned
order dated 13th September, 2022 passed by the High Court in
Criminal Original Petition No. 16241 of 2022 is quashed and set
aside. As a result, thereof, the Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019
filed by the appellant-complainant against the accused-respondents is
restored to the file of the learned IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate,
Saidapet, Chennai.
18. Needless to say, that all the defences available to the accused-
respondents shall remain open to be raised before the appropriate
forum at the proper stage without being prejudiced by this order or
the orders passed by the High Court.
19. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan