Holding

The limitation period begins when the party becomes aware of the award's filing, not when a formal notice is served, making the Section 17 application filed on 10 November 2022 timely.

Summary

The appellant, representing the estate of her deceased husband, obtained an arbitral award on 31 May 2022 directing the respondents to pay a sum with interest. The award could not be released because the respondents had not paid the arbitrator's fees, leading the District Judge to order payment of the balance fees on 21 September 2022 and to indicate that the award would be furnished thereafter. The appellant filed a Section 17 application on 10 November 2022 seeking a judgment according to the award, which the trial and High Courts dismissed as premature, holding that the 30‑day limitation for filing objections began on 18 November 2022 when a formal notice of filing the award was served. The Supreme Court examined whether "notice" under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 requires a formal court notice or merely the parties' awareness of the award's existence. Relying on several precedents, the Court held that awareness of the award, as indicated by the 21 September 2022 order, suffices as notice, so the limitation period expired on 20 October 2022. Consequently, the appellant's Section 17 application was timely, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' orders.

Issues considered

When does the limitation period for filing objections to an arbitral award under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 commence under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
What constitutes "notice" of filing an award under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 – a formal court notice or mere awareness of the award's existence?

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 14, s. 17, s. 30
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 119(b)

Subjects

Application under Section 17Arbitration Act, 1940Judgment according to awardPremature filingLimitation for filing objectionsNotice of filing awardAwareness of awardArbitrator's feesSection 14(2) notice requirement

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 81 : 2025 INSC 24

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025)
03 January 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the time for filing an application under Section 17, Arbitration
Act, 1940 commences when the party seeking to challenge the
award receives a formal notice of the making of the award, or from
the date such party is aware of the existence of the award.

Headnotes†
Arbitration Act, 1940 – ss.17, 14(2) – Award to be signed and
filed – Judgment in terms of award – Limitation Act, 1963 –
Article 119(b) of the First Schedule – 30 days period for filing
objections to the award – Start of limitation, when – Appellant
filed application u/s.17 on 10.11.2022 for pronouncement of
the judgment in terms of the award – Dismissed by Trial Court
holding that the application was premature as it was filed before
the expiry of the 30 days period for filing objections to the
award, reckoned from 18.11.2022, when formal notice of the
Award was said to have been received by the respondent –
Order upheld by High Court – Correctness:
Held: The date of receiving a copy of the award is not the
requirement of Section 14(2), but merely awareness that it is
available to the parties – Respondent had notice of filing of the
award due to the order dated 21.09.2022, wherein the District
Court directed the respondents to hand over the balance fee to
the arbitrators, following which the award shall be furnished –
Thus, respondent was fully aware of the making of the Award
by 21.09.2022, for the law does not require a formal notice of
the making of the Award, as against knowledge/notice of the
Award – District Court and the High Court erred in holding that the
limitation for filing objections was still running when the appellant
filed the application under Section 17 on 10.11.2022 – The formal
* Author
82 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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date of notice of filing of the award on the respondents, that is,
18.11.2022 holds no significance as they were made sufficiently
aware of the award’s filing on 21.09.2022 itself – The court directing
the respondents to clear the fees was a clear intimation about
its filing – Limitation expired on 20.10.2022 – Thus, appellant’s
application seeking pronouncement of judgment in terms of the
award was valid and well beyond the period for filing objections to
the award – Impugned order set aside. [Paras 18, 14, 2, 19, 20]

Words and Phrases – ‘notice’; ‘service of notice’ – Arbitration
Act, 1940 – ss.14, 17 – Award to be signed and filed – Judgment
in terms of award – Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 119(b) of the
First Schedule – 30 days period for filing objections to the
award – Limitation to start running from when:
Held: The limitation for filing objections to the award is 30 days,
and is governed by Article 119(b) of the First Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 – The trigger for the limitation to start running
specified therein is the date of service of notice of the filing of the
award – Further, Section 14(2) requires that the court of relevant
jurisdiction should give notice to the concerned parties when an
award is filed – From a plain reading of the provisions, it appears
that the parties need to be notified of the filing of award – While
Art.119(b) of the Limitation Act requires that there be a ‘service
of notice’ for the limitation to start running, Section 14(2) merely
states that court ‘give notice’ to the parties – The precise form of
what constitutes as a ‘notice’ of filing the award is unspecified –
However, interpreted reasonably, what must be required is that the
parties come to know about the existence of the award so that any
objections to it may be filed – What appears from the usage of the
word ‘notice’ is that the parties merely reach a state of awareness
about the award and plan their next steps accordingly, and not the
imposition of another procedural step. [Paras 14, 15]

Case Law Cited
Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna
Ningashetti [1962] 2 SCR 551 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 75; Ch.
Ramalinga Reddy v. Superintending Engineer [1994] Supp. 6 SCR
266 : (1999) 9 SCC 610; Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan
[1993] 3 SCR 1028 : (1993) 3 SCC 445; Indian Rayon Corporation
Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 231 : (1988)
4 SCC 31; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v C.K. Ahuja [1995] 2 SCR
65 : 1995 Supp 1 SCC 744 – relied on.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 83

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

Deo Narain Choudhury v. Shree Narain Choudhury [2000] Supp.
4 SCR 307 : (2000) 8 SCC 626 – referred to.

List of Acts
Arbitration Act, 1940; Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.

List of Keywords
Application under Section 17, Arbitration Act, 1940; Application
to pronounce judgment according to the award; Premature;
Limitation for filing objections to the award; Limitation to start
running; Formal notice of the making of the award; Formal notice
of the Award; Filing of the award; Formal date of notice of filing
of the award; Date of receiving a copy of the award; Awareness
about the award; Existence of the award; Knowledge/notice of the
Award; Arbitrator’s fees; Balance fee to the arbitrators; ‘notice’;
‘service of notice’.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.03.2024 of the Gauhati
High Court in CRP No. 138 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Ms. Madhusmita Bora, Pawan Kishore Singh, Dipankar Singh,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Debojit Borkakati, Mrs. Anuradha Gayeen Saikia, Advs. for the
Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant’s husband secured an award in his favour on 31.05.2022
under the Arbitration Act, 1940, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’.
84 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Application under Section 17 of the Act was filed by the appellant on
10.11.2022 to pronounce the judgment according to the award, was
dismissed by the Trial and the High Courts on the ground that the
said application is premature as it was made before the expiry of the
30 days period, reckoned from 18.11.2022, when formal notice of the
Award is said to have been received by the respondent. The question
for consideration is whether the time for filing a Section 17 application
commences when the party seeking to challenge the award receives
a formal notice (18.11.2022) of the making of the award, or from the
date such party is aware of the existence of the award. In fact, this
issue is no more res-integra. Following certain precedents of this
Court, we have allowed the appeal having found that the respondent
was fully aware of the making of the Award (by 21.09.2022), for the
law does not require a formal notice of the making of the Award,
as against knowledge/notice of the Award. Before considering the
relevant provisions of the Act, precedents, submissions for drawing
our conclusions, the short facts of the case are necessary:
3. Facts: The appellant’s husband was the sole proprietor of a firm
M/S S.R. Engineering Construction, which had secured a work order
bearing CA No. CWE/TEZ/8 in 1987-1988 from the respondents. The
work order was governed by the general conditions of contract, of
which Cl. 70 contained an arbitration clause. The agreement involved
the firm constructing a permanent ‘armament section’ at Tezpur. The
firm completed the work and raised a bill for the same on 18.01.1993.
However, as the respondents did not make the payment,the appellant
was compelled to request for arbitration to resolve the dispute. The
respondents declined and thus the appellant filed an application before
the Delhi High Court seeking the appointment of an arbitrator which
was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Another application by the
appellant before the Addl. District Judge, Delhi met the same fate,
and it was only on 26.08.2019 that the appellant’s application under
Section 20 was allowed and an arbitrator was appointed by the District
Judge, Sonitpur by an order in T.S. (Arb.) Case No. 19/2003. The
appellant’s husband passed away during the course of the arbitral
proceedings and she came to represent him as his legal heir.
4. Finally, the arbitrator heard the parties and made an award dated
31.05.2022 in favour of the appellant and directing the respondents
to pay a sum of Rs. 1,33,47,268.92/- with an interest of 9% p.a. till
realization.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 85

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

5. Despite proceedings culminating in an award, it could not be published
as the respondents had not cleared its dues towards the arbitrator’s
fees. The appellant felt compelled to file an application before the
District Judge, Sonitpur under Section 381 of the 1940 Act, seeking
a direction to the respondents to clear its part of the arbitrator’s fees.
6. The District Judge, Sonitpur passed an order on 21.09.2022 directing
the respondents to clear the said dues of Rs. 47,212.33/-. The order
further stated that upon the clearance of the dues, a copy of the
award shall be furnished to both the parties.
7. It is an admitted fact that the appellant received the copy of the
award on 22.09.2022. Notably, the respondents had neither cleared
the balance share of the arbitrator’s fees nor did they collect the
award by the above-mentioned date. In fact, they deposited a cheque
towards the balance payment for the fees only on 18.11.2022, after
which it received the notice of filing the award on the same date.
8. On 10.11.2022, the appellant filed an application under Section 17
of the 1940 Act bearing no. Misc.(J) No. 61/2022 before the District
Judge, Sonitpur, seeking pronouncement of judgment according to
the arbitral award.
9. The District Court dismissed the appellant’s application filed under
Section 17 vide order dated 23.11.2022, holding it to be premature
filed even before the limitation for filing objections to the award could
expire. According to the court, the limitation began only on 18.11.2022
when the formal notice of the award was received by the respondent
and the application to pronounce judgment according to the award
was filed only on 10.11.2022 when the limitation period of 30 days
was still running at the said point of time.
10. Questioning the above referred order, the appellant filed a Civil
Revision Petition No. 138/2022 under Section 115, Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 before the High Court. By way of the impugned
order impugned before us, the High Court dismissed the revision and

1 38. Disputes as to arbitrator’s remuneration or costs.- (1) If in any case an arbitrator or umpire
refuses to deliver his award except on payment of the fees demanded by him, the Court may, on an
application in this behalf, order that the arbitrator or umpire shall deliver the award to the applicant on
payment into Court by the applicant of the fees demanded, and shall after such inquiry, if any, as it thinks
fit, further order that out of the money so paid into Court there shall be paid to the arbitrator or umpire by
way of fees such sum as the Court may consider reasonable and that the balance of the money, if any,
shall be refunded to the applicant.
86 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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upheld the District Court’s order. The High Court also held that the
application for pronouncing the judgment according to the Award was
filed during the subsistence of the period for objections by treating
18.11.2022 as the date as ‘notice of filing the award’. It referred to
the text of Sections 14 and 17 of the 1940 Act as well as Article 119
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 to hold that only a formal
notice issued by a court will satisfy the requirement of Section 14(2).
11. Submissions: We have heard the submissions of the counsels for
both the parties. Ms. Madhusmita Bora, counsel for the appellant
submitted that when the District Judge decided the application under
Section 38 on 21.09.2022 and directed the respondents to pay the
balance fees of the arbitrator, the said date becomes the date of
‘notice of filing the award.’ That is the date when the limitation of
30 days for filing objections to an award as per Article 119(b) began
to run and it expired on 20.10.2022. It is only after the limitation
expired that the appellant filed the application under Section 17
on 10.11.2022,since no objections were filed by the respondents
during the said period. It was further argued that the respondents
never raised the plea that they had not received ‘notice of award’,
their only plea was that they did not receive the ‘copy of the award’.
11.1 The Ld. Counsel further submitted that the essential requirement
of Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act is that the award-debtor
merely has to have information that the award has been filed.
She relies on Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath
Somanna Ningashetti,2 where this court held that for Section
14(2), communication of information may not necessarily take
the form of a formal notice, and that intimation by some means
is sufficient compliance. This communication may be oral and
not necessarily in writing, and to support this contention she
places reliance on Deo Narain Choudhury v. Shree Narain
Choudhury.3 She further relied on Ch. Ramalinga Reddy v.
Superintending Engineer,4 wherein this court had noticed that
while sub-section (1) of Section 14 required a written notice,
the text of sub-section (2) did not. Hence, the order dated

2 [1962] 2 SCR 551 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 75
3 [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 307 : (2000) 8 SCC 626
4 [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 266 : (1999) 9 SCC 610
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 87

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

21.09.2022 was valid ‘notice of award’ as it sufficiently conveyed
to the respondents about the award’s existence.
12. On the other hand, Mr. Debojit Borkakati, counsel for the respondents
submitted that both the High Court and the District Court were correct
in taking the starting point of limitation to be on 18.11.2022. It is on
this date that the respondents received a notice of the award from
the District Court, and therefore filed an objection to the award under
Section 30 on 22.11.2022. It was argued that what the law requires
is to be done in that manner, and Section 14(2) was only satisfied
when the respondents received a formal notice of the award. The
mere direction to pay the balance fees of the arbitrator cannot
be taken to be a formal notice that the award is filed. The text of
Section 14(2) is very specific in its requirements, and if any other
legal event is taken to be sufficient compliance with the provision,
its text will be rendered otiose.
12.1 It was further submitted that the intention of Section 14(2) is
to enable the award-debtor to apprise himself of the award’s
contents, so as to file any objections effectively. Hence, the intent
of the provision cannot be ignored and mere communication
about the existence of the award cannot be a compliance with the
provision. In any case, even if the order dated 21.09.2022 is to
be considered, it merely states that the respondents are required
to clear the balance fees of the arbitrator, following which the
award may be published. That is, the order itself envisages that
the payment of fees per se shall not satisfy the requirements of
Section 14(2), and the court has to take the legal step of notifying
the parties of its filing. Accordingly, a formal notice was issued
by the court on 18.11.2022, confirming the argument advanced.
Further, he argued that if the appellant’s interpretation is allowed,
the legal event which constitutes as ‘notice of the filing of award’
will vary from case to case, which does not seem to the intention
behind Section 14(2).
13. We have given our thoughts to the facts of the case and have
carefully considered the submissions of the parties.
14. Analysis: In our view, the respondents had notice of filing of the
award due to the order dated 21.09.2022, wherein the District
Court had directed the respondents to hand over the balance fee
to the arbitrators, following which the award shall be furnished.
88 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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The respondents were completely aware of this direction, which
sufficiently states that clearing the fees will result in the court notifying
the filing of award. The limitation for filing objections to the award
is 30 days, and is governed by Article 119(b) of the First Schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963. The trigger for the limitation to start
running specified therein is the date of service of notice of the filing
of the award. Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act requires that the court
of relevant jurisdiction should give notice to the concerned parties
when an award is filed. The texts of both these provisions along with
Section 17 are reproduced here for convenience:
14.1 Article 119(b), Schedule I of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as under:

Description of application Period Time from which
of period begins to run
limitation
[…] […] […] […]
119. Under the Arbitration Act,
1940 (10 of 1940),—
(a) for the filing in court Thirty The date of service
of an award; Days. of the notice of the
making of the award;
(b) for setting aside Thirty The date of service
an award or getting Days. of the notice of the
an award remitted for filing of the award
reconsideration.
[…] […] […] […]
14.2 Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are extracted
herein below:
“14. Award to be signed and filed–
(1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their
award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing
to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of
the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the
arbitration and award.
(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any
party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming
under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 89

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the
arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of
filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it,
together with any depositions and documents which may
have been, taken and proved before them, to be filed in
Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the
parties of the filing of the award.
(3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case
under clause (b) of section 13, the Court, after giving
notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce
its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to,
and shall form part of, the award.
17. Judgment in terms of award.- Where the Court sees
no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred
to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award,
the Court shall, after the time for making an application
to set aside the award has expired, or such application
having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment
so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall
lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in
excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. From a plain reading of the provisions, it appears that the parties need
to be notified of the filing of award. While Art. 119(b) of the Limitation
Act requires that there be a ‘service of notice’ for the limitation to
start running, Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act merely states that court
‘give notice’ to the parties. The precise form of what constitutes as
a ‘notice’ of filing the award is unspecified. However, interpreted
reasonably, what must be required is that the parties come to know
about the existence of the award so that any objections to it may
be filed. What appears from the usage of the word ‘notice’ is that
the parties merely reach a state of awareness about the award and
plan their next steps accordingly, and not the imposition of another
procedural step.
16. In our view, the appellant’s submissions are correct insofar as they
rely on this court’s decision in Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti
(supra). Therein, while a partition suit was underway between the
90 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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parties, an arbitral award came to decide the disputes partly. The
suit was adjourned asking the parties to apprise themselves of the
award, and this was taken as a sufficient compliance of Section 14(2)
of the 1940 Act. It was held that the term ‘notice’ in this provision
nowhere excluded its informal expressions. Furthermore, if the literal
interpretation is taken and limitation is paused until a formal notice is
issued, the Court held, would allow a party otherwise aware of the
award to sit over it and delay filing objections. This would undercut
the speedy intent governing arbitration. Similarly, the decision in
Ramalinga Reddy (supra) allowed the mere receipt of information
by the award-debtor’s pleader as valid compliance with the text of
Section 14(2). As is discernible from the texts of sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 14, the notice is under sub-section (2) need not
be a written one.
17. Apart from the authorities cited by the appellant, this Court has
otherwise clarified that Section 14(2) merely functions to apprise the
parties about the existence of the award. In Food Corporation of India
v. E. Kuttappan,5 the communication of the filing of an award to the
parties’ pleaders was taken to be sufficient notice for Section 14(2).
It was reasoned that what is required is that the party comes to know
about the decision for/against it, and there was no insistence of a
specific form in the 1940 Act. The pleader acts as an agent of the party
and his awareness is sufficient for the parties to access and scrutinise
the contents of the award. Even if a formal notice is issued thereafter,
it is at best an act of court which cannot disturb rights accrued in law.
This is squarely applicable to the case before us, wherein the order
dated 21.09.2022 precisely laid out that the award is available, and the
only formality withholding the respondent’s access to it is clearance
of the arbitrator’s fees. While a formal notice of filing of the award
was only issued on 18.11.2022, applying this decision to the facts
this case, it does not take away from the fact that the respondents
were well aware of the award’s filing on 21.09.2022 itself. Similarly,
the decision in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co.
(P) Ltd.6 clarifies that the only objective of Section 14(2) is that the
parties are aware of the award’s existence and suggests that this a
substantive compliance. If this were to be a procedural stipulation,

5 [1993] 3 SCR 1028 : (1993) 3 SCC 445
6 [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 231 : (1988) 4 SCC 31
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 91

Krishna Devi @ Sabitri Devi (Rani) M/s S.R. Engineering
Construction v. Union of India & Ors.

the party intending to file objections can insist of technicalities like
the mode of notice, and use those unfairly to gain time.
18. As far as the respondents’ contention of taking the date of receiving
the copy of the award is concerned, it is taken to be an impermissible
departure from Section 14(2)’s text. This Court in Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd. v C.K. Ahuja7 has laid down that what this provision requires is
that parties simply become aware of the filing of the award. In the
said case, the Supreme Court had referred a dispute to arbitration
and its registry had issued a notice to both parties about the filing of
the award. The award-holder, however, relied on the much later date
of a formal notice to calculate limitation for filing objections to the
award. Relying on the authorities discussed above, it was held that
the date of receiving a copy of the award is not the requirement of
Section 14(2), but merely awareness that it is available to the parties.
This holding signifies that the parties have to take steps to scrutinise
the award themselves as soon as it becomes accessible and they
are aware of its accessibility. We find that the interpretation in this
decision is in line with the intent of the 1940 Act, which is designed
to resolve disputes at a quick pace. Any contrary interpretation will
give a licence to the award-debtor to delay the arbitration by insisting
on procedural nuances despite of being aware that an award exists
and that its contents are accessible to it.
19. Applying these principles to the fact of this case, it is seen that
both the District Court and the High Court fell into error that the
limitation for filing objections was still running when the appellant
filed an application under Section 17 of the Act on 10.11.2022. The
formal date of notice of filing of the award on the respondents, that
is, 18.11.2022 holds no significance as they were made sufficiently
aware of the award’s filing on 21.09.2022 itself. The court directing
the respondents to clear the fees was a clear intimation about its
filing. Holding otherwise would not only be departing from precedents
of this Court, but also allowing the respondents to take advantage of
their own inaction. Hence, the limitation is to be treated as expired on
20.10.2022, and the appellant’s application seeking pronouncement
of judgment in terms of the award was valid and well beyond the
period for filing objections to the award.

7 [1995] 2 SCR 65 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 744
92 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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20. Conclusion: In light of the above, we allow the present appeal and
set aside the order dated 27.03.2024 passed by the High Court in
Civil Revision Petition No. 138/2022.
21. In facts and circumstances there shall be a direction that the District
Judge, Sonitpur, Tezpur, to take up and dispose of the Misc. (J) 61
of 2022 as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of
five months from the date of receipt of this judgment.
22. There shall be no order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey