KARUPPUDAYARversusSTATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDI TRICHY & ORS.

                 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1381 : 2025 INSC 132

                         Karuppudayar
                               v.
       State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
                      Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.
                 (Criminal Appeal No(s). 496-497 of 2025)
                               31 January 2025
           [B.R. Gavai* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the incident in question occurred at a place which can be
       termed to be a place within public view; whether the allegations in
       the FIR constitute an offence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under
       Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
       (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

                                  Headnotes†
       Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
       Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) – “any
       place within public view” – As per the complainant when he
       was in his office the accused came there for an enquiry from
       the complainant however, on not being satisfied, he started
       abusing him in the name of his caste and insulted him –
       Thereafter, his colleagues came there, pacified the accused
       and took him away – Allegations in the FIR, if made out a case
       that the offence was committed in public view:
       Held: No – To be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be
       open where the members of the public can witness or hear the
       utterance made by the accused to the victim – If the alleged offence
       takes place within the four corners of the wall where members
       of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
       taken place at a place within public view – Even as per the FIR,
       the incident took place within the four corners of the chambers of
       the complainant – His colleagues arrived at the scene after the
       occurrence of the incident – Since the incident did not take place
       at a place which can be termed to be a place within public view,
       the offence would not come under the provisions of either Section


* Author
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    3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act – Allegations in the FIR
    even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety do not
    prima facie constitute an offence either u/s.3(1)(r) or under s.3(1)(s)
    of the SCST Act – Impugned judgment set aside – Chargesheet
    and all proceedings pursuant thereto quashed and set aside – Code
    of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482. [Paras 11, 14, 15, 18, 21]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Power under, to
    be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest
    of rare cases – Discretion – Exercise of:
    Held: Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
    to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
    made in the FIR or the complaint – However, the court would be
    justified in exercising its discretion if the case falls under any of
    the clauses carved out by this Court in Paragraph 102 in the case
    of Bhajan Lal – Present case falls under the first category, listed
    in Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal – Impugned judgment
    dismissing the petitions filed by the Appellant u/s.482, set aside –
    Chargesheet and all proceedings pursuant thereto quashed and
    set aside. [Paras 17, 18, 21]

                              Case Law Cited
    Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Another [2020] 9 SCR
    593 : (2020) 10 SCC 710; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan
    Lal and Others [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC
    335 – relied on.
    Swaran Singh and Others v. State through Standing Counsel and
    Another [2008] 12 SCR 132 : (2008) 8 SCC 435 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
    Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
    Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                             List of Keywords
    Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and
    Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; “any place
    within public view”; Caste name; Four corners of the wall; Members
    of the public not present; Quashing; Clauses carved out in the case
    of Bhajan Lal; Chargesheet, proceedings quashed.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1383

       Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
                  of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
     496-497 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2024 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRLOP (MD) No. 6676 of
     2022 and CRLMP (MD) No.4621 of 2022

                        Appearances for Parties
     Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Ms. Ankeeta Appanna, Siddhant Yadav,
     Advs. for the Appellant.
     Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Siddhant Singh,
     Danish Saifi, Advs. for the Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment

     B.R. Gavai, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeals challenge the judgment and final order dated
     28th February 2024 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676 of
     2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (MD) No.4621 of 2022
     passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras
     at Madurai.
3.   By way of the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the petitions
     filed by the Appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
     Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”) wherein the Appellant has
     prayed to call for records relating to proceedings in Spl.S.C.No.7 of
     2022 pending before the I-Additional District and Sessions Judge
     (PCR), Tiruchirappalli and to quash the same.
4.   The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as under:
     4.1 The prosecution story is that on 2nd September 2021 the
         Appellant approached the Respondent No. 3 (Mr. Ravikumar,
         Revenue Inspector) in order to inquire regarding the status of
         a petition filed in the name of Appellant’s father concerning
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             inclusion of Appellant’s father’s name in the patta1 for the land
             situated in Natham UDR, Sembarai village.
     4.2 A quarrel developed between Appellant and Respondent No.
         3 whereby the Appellant abused Respondent No.3 by using
         his caste name in the Revenue Divisional Office, Lalgudi,
         Tiruchirappalli.
     4.3 Consequently, Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before the
         Respondent No. 2 (Sub-Inspector of Police, Lalgudi Police
         Station, Trichy) and case being Crime No. 676 of 2021 was
         registered against the Appellant for the offences punishable
         under Sections 294(b) and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
         (hereinafter, “IPC”) read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of
         the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
         Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, “SC-ST Act”).
     4.4 After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was
         filed by the Respondent No.1 (Investigating Officer/Deputy
         Superintendent of Police) in the court of Judicial Magistrate,
         Lalgudi, Tiruchirappalli and the case was committed to the
         Sessions Court.
     4.5 As a result of the same, a case being Spl. S.C. No. 7 of 2022
         was initiated against the Appellant before the I-Additional District
         and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli (hereinafter, “trial
         court”).
     4.6 Aggrieved by the initiation of criminal proceedings so also the
         trial, the Appellant filed petitions under Section 482 of CrPC
         before the High Court to call for the records relating to Spl.
         S.C. No. 7 of 2022 and to quash the same.
     4.7 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the impugned
         judgment and final order, held that no prejudice would be caused
         to Appellant if he is subjected to trial and dismissed his petitions.
     4.8 Aggrieved thereby, the present appeals arise by way of special
         leave.


1   ‘Patta’ is a government issued document which contains various details such as landowner’s name, land
    survey number, type of land, location of land, etc. that validates the ownership of land.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       1385

       Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
                  of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

5.   We have heard Smt. Vanshaja Shukla, the leaned counsel appearing
     on behalf of the Appellant and Shri Sabarish Subramanian, the
     learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents.
6.   Smt. Vanshaja Shukla submitted that the learned Single Judge of the
     High Court has grossly erred in rejecting the petition of the Appellant.
     She submits that even taking the allegations in the FIR at its face
     value, the ingredients to constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)
     (r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act are not made out. She, therefore,
     submits that the learned Single Judge of the High Court ought to
     have exercised his jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and
     quashed the proceedings.
7.   As against this, Shri Sabarish Subramanian, learned counsel for the
     Respondents submits that upon detailed investigation a charge-sheet
     was filed by the then Investigating Officer (Respondent No.1 herein).
     Learned Single Judge of the High Court, on a perusal of the charge-
     sheet, found that no case for quashing of the proceedings was made
     out. He, therefore, submits that no interference is warranted in the
     facts and circumstances of the present case.
8.   For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer
     to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act,
     which read thus:
           “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1)
           Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or
           a Scheduled Tribe,--
           (a)   ……………………………………………………………
           (a)   ……………………………………………………………

                          xxx          xxx          xxx
           (r)   intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
                 humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
                 Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
           (s)   abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
                 Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within
                 public view;”
9.   A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for
     constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the
     accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
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     member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
     within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section
     3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses
     any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste
     name in any place within public view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up for
    consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and
    others v. State through Standing Counsel and another2. This
    Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and
    another3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal
    position as under:
            “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
            intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to
            be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for
            consideration before this Court in the judgment reported
            as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008)
            8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had
            drawn distinction between the expression “public place”
            and “in any place within public view”. It was held that
            if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in
            a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
            someone from the road or lane outside the boundary
            wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the
            public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside
            a building, but some members of the public are there
            (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an
            offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This
            sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below
            in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at
            p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para
            15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a
            building, but some members of the public are there (not
            merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence
            since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under :
            (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)


2   (2008) 8 SCC 435
3   (2020) 10 SCC 710
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       1387

       Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
                  of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

                “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
                Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
                Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
                when he stood near the car which was parked
                at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this
                was certainly a place within public view, since
                the gate of a house is certainly a place within
                public view. It could have been a different matter
                had the alleged offence been committed inside
                a building, and also was not in the public view.
                However, if the offence is committed outside
                the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house,
                and the lawn can be seen by someone from
                the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the
                lawn would certainly be a place within the public
                view. Also, even if the remark is made inside
                a building, but some members of the public
                are there (not merely relatives or friends) then
                also it would be an offence since it is in the
                public view. We must, therefore, not confuse
                the expression “place within public view” with
                the expression “public place”. A place can be a
                private place but yet within the public view. On
                the other hand, a public place would ordinarily
                mean a place which is owned or leased by the
                Government or the municipality (or other local
                body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of
                the State, and not by private persons or private
                bodies.” (emphasis in original)”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place
    should be open where the members of the public can witness or
    hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged
    offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members
    of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken
    place at a place within public view.
12. If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face value,
    what is alleged is as under:
     That on 2nd September 2021, while the complainant was engaged
     in his office doing his duty, the accused came to the office in the
1388                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


     morning in order to enquire about the petition given by him already
     to the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding entering the name of his
     father in the ‘patta’. On such enquiry being made, the complainant
     informed the accused that the said petition has been sent to the
     Taluk office, Lalgudi and that appropriate action would be taken after
     receipt of the reply from the Taluk Office, Lalgudi. It is alleged that
     at that stage, the accused asked the complainant as to what caste
     he belongs to and stated that the complainant belongs to ‘Parayan’
     caste. Thereafter, the accused stated that, “if you people are appointed
     in Government service you all will do like this only…”. Thereafter,
     he scolded the complainant calling his caste name and insulted
     him using vulgar words. The further allegation is that thereafter the
     colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused
     and took him away.
13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it would reveal
    that what is alleged is that when the complainant was in his office
    the accused came there; enquired with the complainant; not being
    satisfied, started abusing him in the name of his caste; and insulted
    him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came there,
    pacified the accused and took him away.
14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has taken
    place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant.
    The other colleagues of the complainant arrived at the scene after
    the occurrence of the incident.
15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the incident
    has not taken place at a place which can be termed to be a place
    within public view, the offence would not come under the provisions
    of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act.
16. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in
    the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others4.
    The law as laid down therein by this Court has been consistently
    followed.
            “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
            relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
            the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series


4   (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          1389

       Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
                  of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

           of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
           power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
           Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
           reproduced above, we give the following categories of
           cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
           exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
           court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
           may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
           and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
           rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
           kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
           (1)   Where the allegations made in the first information
                 report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
                 their face value and accepted in their entirety do
                 not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
                 a case against the accused.
           (2)   Where the allegations in the first information report
                 and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
                 do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
                 investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
                 of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
                 within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
           (3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
                 or complaint and the evidence collected in support
                 of the same do not disclose the commission of any
                 offence and make out a case against the accused.
           (4)   Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
                 a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
                 cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
                 a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
                 contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
           (5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
                 are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
                 basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
                 a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
                 proceeding against the accused.
           (6)   Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
                 of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
1390                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


                (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
                institution and continuance of the proceedings and/
                or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
                the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
                the grievance of the aggrieved party.
          (7)   Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
                with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
                maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
                wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
                to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
          103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
          the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
          exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that
          too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be
          justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability
          or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
          FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
          powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
          to act according to its whim or caprice.”
17. No doubt, that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is required
    to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in
    the rarest of rare cases. It is equally settled that the court will not
    be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
    genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the
    complaint. However, the court would be justified in exercising its
    discretion if the case falls under any of the clauses carved out by
    this Court in Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)
18. We find, as already observed herein, that the allegations made in
    the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
    in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an offence either
    under Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act.
    We are of the considered view that the case would fall under the
    first category, listed by this Court in Paragraph 102 in the case of
    Bhajan Lal (supra).
19. On a perusal of the order of the High Court, we find that the High
    Court has not at all considered this aspect of the matter though it
    was strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioner before the High
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                     1391

         Karuppudayar v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent
                    of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

     Court (Appellant herein) that the allegations made in the FIR do not
     make out a case that the offence is committed in public view. The
     High Court did not even deal with the said contention, leave aside
     considering the same.
20. In that view of the matter, we find that the present appeals deserve
    to be allowed.
21. In the result, we pass the following order:
     (i)     The appeals are allowed.
     (ii)    The judgment and final order dated 28th February 2024 in
             Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676 of 2022 and Criminal
             Miscellaneous Petition (MD) No.4621 of 2022 passed by the
             learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras at Madurai
             is quashed and set aside.
     (iii) The charge-sheet in Special S.C. No. 7 of 2022 on the file of
           I Additional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli
           and all proceedings pursuant thereto shall stand quashed and
           set aside.
22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey