Holding

The allotment of the reserved forest land to the Chavan family and its subsequent sale to RRCHS was illegal, violating Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, and the doctrines of desuetude and public trust do not apply.

Summary

The case concerned 11.89 ha of land in Kondhwa Budruk, Pune, notified as Reserved Forest under the Indian Forest Act, 1878, which was later allotted to the Chavan family in 1998 for agricultural purposes without Central Government approval under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The Chavan family subsequently sold the land to Richie Rich Cooperative Housing Society (RRCHS) for residential construction, and environmental clearance was obtained, prompting a petition challenging the legality of the allotment and subsequent transactions. The Supreme Court examined whether the land remained forest land, whether the Divisional Commissioner and State Government were justified in the allotment, and whether doctrines of desuetude and public trust applied, also assessing RRCHS's status as a bona‑fide purchaser and entitlement to alternate land. The Court held that the land continued to be a Reserved Forest, that the allotment and sale violated Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, and that the doctrines of desuetude and public trust were inapplicable. Consequently, the environmental clearance was quashed, the allotment declared illegal, possession ordered to be transferred to the Forest Department, and special investigation teams were directed to examine similar illegal allocations across the country.

Issues considered

As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land
As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether the State Government was justified in accepting the said recommendation
As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable to the facts of the present case
As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona fide purchaser of the subject land
As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment of alternate piece of land in view of the order passed by this Court in In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land Maharashtra”
As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case

Legislation cited

Headnote

1382 : 2025 INSC 701 In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land Maharashtra [(I.A. No. 2079 of 2007, I.A. No(s). 2301-2302 of 2008, I.A. No(s). 3044-3045 of 2011, I.A. No. 254946 of 2023 and I.A. No. 39711 of 2024) In (Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995) With (Writ Petition Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the subject land is a Forest Land; whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of C family and as to whether the State Government was justified in accepting the said recommendation; whether

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1382 : 2025 INSC 701

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest
Land Maharashtra
[(I.A. No. 2079 of 2007, I.A. No(s). 2301-2302 of 2008,
I.A. No(s). 3044-3045 of 2011, I.A. No. 254946 of 2023 and
I.A. No. 39711 of 2024)
In
(Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995)
With
(Writ Petition (C) No. 301 of 2008)
With
(I.A. No. 9108 of 2024)
In
(Writ Petition (C) No. 301 of 2008)]
In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad
v.
Union of India & Ors.
15 May 2025
[B.R. Gavai,* CJI, Augustine George Masih and
K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the subject land is a Forest Land; whether
the Divisional Commissioner was justified in recommending
the allotment of subject land in favour of C family and as to
whether the State Government was justified in accepting the
said recommendation; whether the doctrine of desuetude and
the doctrine of public trust would be applicable to the facts of the
case; whether the Housing Society could be said to be bona fide
purchaser of the subject land; and whether the Housing Society
would be entitled to allotment of alternate piece of land.

Headnotes†
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – s.2 – Restriction on the
dereservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest
purpose – Certain land notified as a reserved forest under the
1878 Act, and a portion was de-reserved but remaining land
of village Kondhwa Budruk in District Pune continued to be
forest land – Different parcel of land acquired from C family
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1383

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

and as an alternative for their resettlement, subject land
allotted to family for cultivation on Eksaali-yearly basis, which
was never renewed – In 1988, C family applied for permanent
release of subject land – Recommendation of the Divisional
Commissioner to allot the entire land in favour of C and no
necessity to obtain prior approval of Central Government –
Thereafter, Minister of Revenue, State Government on advise
by the legal department sanctioned the allotment to C –
Issuance of allotment order by the Collector – Thereafter, the
Divisional Commissioner granted permission to C family to
sell land to promoter of the Housing Society for residential
purposes – Allotment of reserved forest land to private persons
for construction of buildings in violation of 1980 Act – Legality:
Held: Allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land of village
Kondhwa Budruk in District Pune for agriculture purposes in 1998
and subsequent permission given for its sale in favour of Housing
Society totally illegal – Said land was notified as Reserved Forest
and which reservation continues to be so till date – Nothing on
record to show that land was permitted to be used by State for
any non-forest purposes prior to 1980 – After the 1980 Act came
into effect, no forest land could be de-reserved without the prior
approval of the Central Government, also the Forest land could not
be assigned either by way of lease or any other mode to any private
person without the approval – Opinion given by Law Department,
the order approving allotment in favour of the family issued by State
Government, and the order of allotment by the Collector took place
well after directions were issued by Supreme Court – Decision of the
State Government of allotting the land and implementing the same
by the Collector not sustainable in law – Furthermore, the doctrine
of desuetude not applicable – Subject land has continuously been
recorded as ‘Reserved Forest’ in forest records – Forest Authorities
through a number of communications had requested Revenue
Authorities to correct the revenue entries and transfer the land to
the Forest Department – It cannot be said that notification issued
under 1878 Act has been put to disuse for a long time – Nothing
on record to show that a practice contrary to the provisions of
the Act was being applied – Also, the Minister for Revenue and
Divisional Commissioner gave a total go-bye to the doctrine of public
trust – Furthermore, entries in revenue records do not confer title
to property – Much prior to actual allotment of land in the favour of
the Housing Society, C family had already entered into transactions
with builders – Housing Society could not be said to be a bonafide
purchaser of the subject land – C family was only set up as a front
1384 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

for the benefit of the Developers – Agricultural land of C family
was acquired, was being misused by the developers as a pretext
for grabbing the valuable piece of Forest Land for the purposes
of commercial development – Transactions between the Housing
Society and C family totally illegal and contrary to the conditions on
which the land was allotted to C family – Housing Society not entitled
to allotment of alternative piece of land, as that would amount to
granting a premium to Housing Society for illegalities committed by
them – Allotment of the subject land to C family in blatant disregard
to the provisions of the law as well as the directions issued by this
Court from time to time, as also ignoring the communications of the
Forest Department that the said land could not be allotted inasmuch
as, the same was classified as a Forest Land – In view thereof,
the environmental clearance granted to Housing Society illegal and
is quashed and set aside – Possession of the land, reserved as
Forest Land, and are in possession of Revenue Department, to be
handed over to Forest Department – Special Investigation Teams to
be constituted to examine if any of the reserved Forest Land in the
possession of the Revenue Department has been allotted to any
private individuals/institutions for the purpose other than the forestry
purpose – Government to take steps to take back the possession of
such land and handover the same to the Forest Department, and in
case, taking back not in the larger public interest, the governments to
recover the cost of the said land from the allottees and use the said
amount for development of forests – Special Teams to ensure that all
such transfers take place within the stipulated period and such land
to be used only for the purpose of afforestation – Forest Act, 1878.
[Paras 20-22, 24, 28, 37, 38, 43, 44, 47, 52, 64, 71, 73, 77, 90, 91, 95]

Doctrines – Doctrine of desuetude – Applicability:
Held: For applicability of the doctrine of desuetude, the statute must
not only be required to be in disuse for long duration but instead
a contrary practice must also be prevalent. [Para 42]

Case Law Cited
State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and Others, 1985 INSC 126 :
[1985] Supp. 1 SCR 345 : (1985) 3 SCC 643 – held inapplicable.
Municipal Corporation for City of Pune and anr v. Bharat Forge
Co. Ltd. and Ors., 1995 INSC 181 : [1995] 2 SCR 716 : (1995)
3 SCC 434; State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik
and Ors., 1982 INSC 78 : [1983] 1 SCR 655 : (1982) 3 SCC
519; Cantonment Board, MHOW and Anr v. M.P. State Road
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1385

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

Transport Corpn., 1997 INSC 401 : [1997] 3 SCR 813 : (1997) 9
SCC 450; Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited v. Union of India and
Others, 2012 INSC 305 : [2012] 7 SCR 644 : (2012) 11 SCC 1;
In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land
Maharashtra, I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 in WP(C) No.202 of
1995 dt 9th September 2024; Ambica Quarry Works v. State of
Gujarat and Ors., 1986 INSC 267 : [1987] 1 SCR 562 : (1987)
1 SCC 213; Nature Lovers Movement v. State of Kerala, 2009
INSC 371 : [2009] 4 SCR 687 : (2009) 5 SCC 373; Suraj Bhan
and others v. Financial Commissioner and Ors., 2007 INSC 424 :
[2007] 5 SCR 155 : (2007) 6 SCC 186; P. Kishor Kumar v. Vittal
K. Patkar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1483; In Re: T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors., 2024 INSC 178 : [2024]
3 SCR 187 : (2025) 2 SCC 641 – referred to.

List of Acts
Forest Act, 1878; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.

List of Keywords
Reserved forest; Nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and
builders; Eksaali; Environmental clearance; Reserved forest land;
Forged Gazette Notification; Prior approval by Central Government;
Non-forest purposes; Doctrine of desuetude; Protection and
conservation of forest; Bona fide purchaser; Illegal transactions;
Doctrine of public trust; Non-forestry purposes; Afforestation; Forest
Land; Allotment of alternate piece of land; Village Kondhwa Budruk
in District Pune; Special Investigation Teams.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Under Article 32 of The
Constitution of India
I.A. No. 2079 of 2007, I.A. No(s). 2301-2302 of 2008, I.A. No(s). 3044-
3045 of 2011, I.A. No. 254946 of 2023 and I.A. No. 39711 of 2024
In
Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995
With
Writ Petition (C) No. 301 of 2008 and I.A. No. 9108 of 2024 In
Writ Petition (C) No. 301 of 2008
1386 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
K. Parameshwar, Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Dr. Abhishek Manu
Singhvi, Dhruv Mehta, Yashraj Singh Deora, Sr. Advs., M.V. Kunda,
Ms. Kanti, Ms. Raji, Srinivas Patil, Ms. Chitransha Singh Shikarwar,
Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, M/s. Plr Chambers And Co., Syed Mehdi
Imam, T. Harish Kumar, Priyesh Mohan Srivastava, Ms. Anupama
Dhurve, Ms. Sonal K Chopra, M/s. Mitter & Mitter Co., M/s. Lawyer
S Knit & Co.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, K. M. Nataraj,
A.S.Gs., Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A.A.G., Shiv Mangal Sharma,
Vaibhav Srivastava, Ajay Agarwal, A.A.Gs., Pitambar Acharya,
Advocate General, Vivek Jain, D.A.G., Shekhar Naphade, Aniruddha
Joshi, Ravindra Kumar, Mrs. Ruchi Kohli, Dr. Monika Gusain, Sr.
Advs.,, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Gurmeet Singh
Makker, Chinmoy Khaladkar, B. K. Pal, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Ms. Aditya Krishna, Ms.
Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Shuvodeep Roy, Deepayan Dutta,
Saurabh Tripathi, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Raj Kishor Choudhary,
Shibashish Misra, Manav Sabharwal, K. L. Janjani, Naresh K.
Sharma, Ms. A. Sumathi, Jai Prakash Pandey, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari,
K. V. Vijayakumar, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Ms. Divya Roy, Tarun Johri,
Radha Shyam Jena, Ajit Pudussery, Ashok Mathur, M/s. Parekh &
Co., M/s. K J John And Co, V. Balachandran, S. C. Birla, Ram Swarup
Sharma, T. Mahipal, Umesh Bhagwat, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin, H. S.
Parihar, Ms. Baby Krishnan, P. R. Ramasesh, Ms. Adviteeya, Rakesh
K. Sharma, P. N. Gupta, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Mahesh Agarwal,
Nilay Gupta, E. C. Agrawala, Kuldip Singh, Ms. Bina Madhavan, Ms.
Pratibha Jain, Rajat Joseph, Gopal Prasad, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, S..
Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ranjan Mukherjee, Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan,
M/s. Arputham Aruna And Co, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Raj Kumar Mehta,
Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, Rajeev Singh,
Mrs. Kanchan Kaur Dhodi, Surya Kant, E. C. Vidya Sagar, M/s.
M. V. Kini & Associates, Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Kamal Mohan Gupta,
Prashant Kumar, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Kanisk Mor, Mrs.
Shweta Sand, Raju Sonkar, P. Parmeswaran, Ms. Sujata Kurdukar,
Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Bhavanishankar V. Gadnis, A. Venayagam
Balan, Vishwanath Gadnis, Sudarsh Menon, Ramesh Babu M. R.,
Vikrant Singh Bais, Shiva Pujan Singh, Ms. Charu Mathur, Rajiv
Mehta, Ejaz Maqbool, Rajesh, M/s. Corporate Law Group, Lakshmi
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1387

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

Raman Singh, Ms. K. V. Bharathi Upadhyaya, Sufyan Hasan, Ms.
Hema Malik, T. N. Singh, Rajendra Sahu, C. L. Sahu, Ms. Hema
Sahu, Manmohan Sharma, Rishabh Sahu, Ms. Sumita Hazarika,
Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Abhishek Chaudhary, B V Deepak, Gopal
Singh, T. V. George, Krishnanand Pandeya, Neeraj Shekhar,
Ujjwal Ashutosh, Rajesh Kumar Maurya, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair,
Rajesh Singh, Mrs. Rekha Pandey, Mohd. Irshad Hanif, Punit Dutt
Tyagi, Rathin Das, Ratan Kumar Choudhuri, Sudhir Kulshreshtha,
Himanshu Shekhar, Parth Shekhar, Shubham Singh, Youkteshwari
Prasad, Mukesh Kumar Verma, Mata Prasad Pathak, Vijay Singh,
Ms. Ambali Vedasen, Ayush Gupta, Rishabh Jain, Chandrakant
Siddarkar, Rajmani Mohanty, Somyadeep Chatterjee, Rajiv Ranjan,
Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Sushma Suri, Sudhir Kumar Gupta, A. N.
Arora, Irshad Ahmad, G. Prakash, E. M. S. Anam, Mrs. Bina Gupta,
P. V. Yogeswaran, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Ms. Malini Poduval, Ms.
C. K. Sucharita, Ms. Binu Tamta, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Ms. Aditya Krishna,
Adarsh Dubey, M. Yogesh Kanna, Vikash Singh, Abhishek Atrey,
Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Chinmoy Chaitanya, Dhaval Mehrotra, Binay
Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Neha Das, Shivam Saksena,
Vikas Bharti, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Subhasish Mohanty, Mr Rahul
Jain, Sabarish Subramanian, Naveen Kumar, V. N. Raghupathy,
Raghavendra M. Kulkarni, Venkata Raghu Mannepalli, M/s. D.S.K.
Legal, Ms. Shibani Ghosh, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Saurabh
Rajpal, Amogh Bansal, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Ms. Pallavi Langar, Rajeev
Kumar Dubey, Saurabh Singh Chauhan, M/s. Cyril Amarchand
Mangaldas, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Milind Kumar,
Mohit Paul, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. Manika Tripathy, Ms.
Ankita Sharma, Arjun D Singh, Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda,
Sharanagouda Patil, Jyotish Pandey, Yash, Ms. Adarsh Nain, Guntur
Pramod Kumar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Dhruv Yadav, Amrish Kumar,
Ms. Purnima Krishna, M.f. Philip, Karamveer Singh Yadav, Togin
M. Babichen, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Raghav Sharma, Jagdish
Chandra Solanki, S.s. Rebello, Suhasini Sen, Gaurang Bhushan,
Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Ms. Tannu, Yuvarj Nandal, Sunil Kumar
Verma, Prakash Kumar Singh, Ms. Seita Vaidyalingam, Kumar
Anurag Singh, Anando Mukherjee, Shwetank Singh, Ms. Anzu. K.
Varkey, Ms. Astha Sharma, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Sujit Kumar Mishra,
Aldanish Rein, Kunal Mimani, Ms. Shraddha Chirania, Nishanth Patil,
M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, Ajay Marwah, Ravindra S. Garia,
Karan Sharma, Ms. Sugandha Anand, Avijit Mani Tripathi, T.K. Nayak,
Vikas Bansal, Deeptakirti Verma, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Chirag M.
1388 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Shroff, Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vivek Jain, Sudeep Kumar, Ms.
Manisha, Ms. Rupali, Ms. Rani Mishra, Pukhrambam Ramesh
Kumar, Karun Sharma, Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Ms. Rajkumari
Divyasana, Venkata Raghuvamsy D., Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ashiwan
Mishra, Kamlendra Mishra, Somesh Chandra Jha, Tarun Bajaj, Ms.
Ruchira Goel, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Ms. Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey,
Parth Awasthi, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Tarun Gupta, Sameer
Abhyankar, Rahul Kumar, Aakash Thakur, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi,
P. S. Sudheer, Sunny Choudhary, Siddhartha Jha, Naved Anwar,
Gurrick Jassar, Naveen .N, N. Nagan Pillai, M/s. V. Maheshwari & Co.,
Mayank Aggarwal, Sanjeev Kumar, Shovan Mishra, Ashutosh Kumar
Sharma, Naveen Kumar, P. K. Manohar, Vinod Sharma, Ms. Surbhi
Mehta, Rajeev Singh, Ms. Parul Shukla, Abhishek Pandey, Prashant
Kumar Umrao, Arun K. Sinha, Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Shakti Singh, B.
K. Pal, James P. Thomas, S. Gowthaman, A. Karthik, Rajiv Kumar
Choudhry, Anurag Tandon, Akshay Amritanshu, Hariom Yaduvanshi,
Arjun Yaduvanshi, Ms. S. Harini, Avi Dhankhar, Vansmani Tripathi,
Ms. Aahana Jaiswal, Ms. Drishti Rawal, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay, Ms.
Drishti Saraf, Omanakuttan K. K., Ajit Sharma, Yuvrajsinh C. Solanki,
Lareb Habib Ansari, Kanchan Kumar, Ms. Shalini Kaul, Sunil Kumar
Sharma, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Neha Singh, Siddharth Sharma,
Raj Bahadur Yadav, Uday Prakash Yadav, Raghav Sharma, Sughosh
Subramanium, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Ms. Suhasini Sen, S. S. Rebello,
Samir Ali Khan, Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Irshad Khan, Sachin Patil,
Shubhranshu Padhi, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Alim Anvar, Ms. Anu K
Hoy, Santhosh K, Nishit Agrawal, Krishna Ballabh Thakur, Ms. Aruna
Gupta, Ms. K. Enatoli Sema, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. Chubalemla
Chang, Prang Newmai, Shishir Deshpande, Yusuf, Mrs. Pragya
Baghel, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Raghvendra Kumar, Sravan
Kumar Karanam, Abhiram Bannur, Ms. Shireesh Tyagi, Anant Mann,
Lakshmeesh S. Kamath, Gopal Balwant Sathe, Sarvam Ritam Khare,
Shyam Gopal, Salvador Santosh Rebello, Ms. Suhasini Sen, Raghav
Sharma, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Harish Pandey, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Anuj
Srinivas Udupa, Krishna Kant Dubey, Piyush Beriwal, Neeraj Kumar
Sharma, Ms. Mrinal Elker Mazumdar, Shashwat Parihar, Mukesh
K Verma, Vinayak Sharma, Raman Yadav, Shreekant Neelappa
Terdal, Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Dinesh Chandra Pandey, Saurabh Rajpal,
Ashzad Mubarak, Himinder Lal, Ms. Shruti Jose, Kaushik Choudhury,
Aravindh S., Aadithya Aravindh, Mrs. Kirti Renu Mishra, Atul Sharma,
Anirudh Sanganeria, Shrey Kapoor, Ms. Anne Mathew, Yash S. Vijay.
Applicant-in-person.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1389

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 3*
II. FACTUAL POSITION ............................................................ 3*
a. Background ................................................................... 3*
b. Actions of the State Government ............................... 6*
c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS .................. 9*
d. Proceedings before this Court ................................... 10*
III. SUBMISSIONS ....................................................................... 15*
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION .......................................... 19*
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ............................................. 20*
a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land. ..... 20*
b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was
justified in recommending the allotment of subject
land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether
the State Government was justified in accepting the
said recommendation. ................................................... 25*
c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be
applicable to the facts of the present case. ....................... 38*
d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona
fide purchaser of the subject land. ............................. 42*
e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment
of alternate piece of land in view of the order passed
by this Court in In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed
Buildings in Forest Land Maharashtra”. ......................... 52*
f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. ................................................................. 57*
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 85*

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1390 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, CJI

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present matter is a classic example as to how the nexus
between the Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Builders can result in
the conversion of precious Forest Land for commercial purposes
under the garb of resettlement of people belonging to the backward
class from whose ancestors, agricultural land was acquired for public
purpose.

II. FACTUAL POSITION
2. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details, giving rise to present
proceedings are as under:

a. Background
2.1 An area admeasuring 32 Acres 35 Gunthas at Survey No. 20
of Village Kondhwa Budruk in Pune District was notified as
a Reserved Forest under the provisions of Section 34 of the
Indian Forest Act, 1878 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1878
Act”) vide Notification dated 1st March 1879.
2.2 A portion of the land admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas was
de-reserved by the State Government vide Notification dated
5th January 1934.
2.3 It is pertinent to note that no further orders for de-reservation
were passed post 1934. As a result of which the remaining
area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas, which was numbered as
Survey No.20-A and subsequently renumbered as Survey
No.21 of Village Kondhwa Budruk remained to be a Forest
Land (hereinafter referred to as “the subject land”).
2.4 During the 1960s, a different parcel of land in Survey No.37 of
Kondhwa Budruk belonging to one ‘Chavan Family’ was acquired
by the State Government for the purposes of construction of
“Dr. Bandorwala Leprosy Hospital”.
2.5 It appears from the record that no compensation was paid to
the ‘Chavan Family’. As such, a request was made by them
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1391

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

for allotment of the subject land as an alternative for their
resettlement.
2.6 It further appears from the record that in response to the request
made by the ‘Chavan Family’, the Tehsildar, Haveli vide his
communication dated 13th May 1968, released the subject land
to the ‘Chavan Family’ for cultivation for a period of one year.
The subject land was allotted on “Eksali” (yearly) basis for the
year 1968-69.
2.7 The said allotment was accepted by the ‘Chavan Family’. The
members of the ‘Chavan Family’ had also given an undertaking
to the Mamlatdar, Taluka-Haveli, District Pune. The relevant
part of the said undertaking reads thus:
“I accept and agree that the said assessment is
allotted to me under the provision of Bombay Land
Revenue Code 1879 and rules thereunder and shall
be subjected to following terms and conditions.
1. That, no part of the said land shall be leased
out, mortgaged, sold, excavated or no lien shall
be created by me (the term includes self, heirs,
executers, assignees, administrators) without prior
written approval of the Collector.
2. That, I will handover the possession of the land to
any person nominated by the Collector without any
hassle on or before 15/12/1967.
3. That, I will not use the said assessment for any
purpose other than cultivation.
4. That, I do not have any right of the trees standing
on the land and I will behave as per the rules annexed
herewith.”
2.8 It is pertinent to note that a perusal of the record would reveal
that the said Eksali (yearly) lease was never renewed thereafter.
2.9 It further appears from the record that on 22nd March 1969, the
State Government took a decision that the Forest Land given
on lease for cultivation on Eksali basis should be permanently
released for cultivation to the Eksali leaseholders after
de-reservation.
1392 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

2.10 It appears that in pursuance of this resolution, the ‘Chavan
Family’ made an application for permanent release of the
subject land in the year 1988.
2.11 It is relevant to note that in the meanwhile, the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as, “the 1980
FC Act”) came into force with effect from 25th October 1980.
Under the provisions of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act, no
Forest Land could be de-reserved or used for any non-forest
purposes without the permission of the Central Government.

b. Actions of the State Government
2.12 A perusal of the record would reveal that there was a lot of
inter-departmental correspondence between the different
authorities. It appears that the District Collector vide his letter
dated 19th June 1991 found that the members of the ‘Chavan
Family’ were cultivating only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas and,
therefore, recommended that the said area which was under
actual cultivation be allotted to them in view of the Government
Resolution dated 22nd March 1969. He further recommended
that the possession of the remaining land be handed over to
the Forest Department.
2.13 However, surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide his
recommendation to the State Government dated 30th November
1994, though, specifically recorded that as per the Collector’s
report, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were in cultivation
only in 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, recommended allotment of the
entire subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’. It is further surprising
to note that the Divisional Commissioner also observed that
there is no necessity to obtain the prior approval of the Central
Government for allotment of the said land. It is also surprising
to note that the Divisional Commissioner also noted that the
subject land was a Reserved Forest.
2.14 It appears that thereafter the file was pending before the State
Government. At that stage, the then Minister for Revenue
opined that the said land was granted by the Government
for Agricultural purpose and that the applicants (the ‘Chavan
Family’) were using the said land continuously for such purpose
and, therefore, the provisions of the 1980 FC Act were not
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1393

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

applicable in the said case. He therefore sought legal advice
on the point from the Law and Judiciary Department of the
Government of Maharashtra. This could be gathered from
the reply given by the Deputy Secretary to the Government,
Revenue and Forest Department dated 8th April 2008 to the
Central Empowered Committee (“CEC” for short) in response
to certain queries.
2.15 It would further appear that thereafter on 27th July 1998,
the Deputy Secretary to Government, Law and Judiciary
Department, gave his opinion that there is no necessity for
obtaining prior sanction of the Government of India if the
Forest Land is already broken up and acquired before coming
into force of the 1980 FC Act. Accordingly, the Minister for
Revenue, the Government of Maharashtra sanctioned the
allotment of the subject land and an order came to be issued
by the Government of Maharashtra vide Memorandum dated
4th August 1998 to that effect.
2.16 In pursuance to the order passed by the State Government, the
Collector issued an order of allotment of land on 28th August
1998. The said allotment, however, was subject to certain
conditions. It will be relevant to refer to Condition Nos. 2, 4,
5 and 7 of the said allotment order dated 28th August 1998,
which read thus:
“2) The allottee shall not be entitled to mortgage,
donate, sell, partition or exchange in any other
manner without the prior permission of the
District Collector, Pune. Similarly, shall not sell
or transfer the said land or any part thereof.

xxx xxx xxx
4) The allotee shall not lease the aforesaid land
granted to him to any other person.
5) It is necessary for the allottee to bring the said
land under cultivation within a period of two
years from the date of this order.

xxx xxx xxx
1394 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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7) The said land shall be used for agricultural
purposes. Except agriculture, it shall not be
used for any other purpose.”

c. Acquisition and Construction by RRCHS
2.17 It would further appear from the record that immediately after
the land was allotted, the Divisional Commissioner vide order
dated 30th October 1999 granted permission to the ‘Chavan
Family’ to sell the land in question to one Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande, the Chief Promotor of Richie Rich Cooperative
Housing Society Limited (“RRCHS” for short) for residential
purposes.
2.18 However, a perusal of the material on record would reveal that
much prior to the said permission or even much prior to the
actual allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’, the
transactions were entered into by the members of the ‘Chavan
Family’ with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief Promoter,
RRCHS. We will be referring to those documents when we
discuss the rival submissions.
2.19 The District Collector, Pune thereafter vide order dated 8th
July 2005 granted permission for use of the subject land for
Non-Agricultural purposes i.e. for construction of the residential
buildings.
2.20 On 27th February 2006, the Pune Municipal Corporation issued
a Commencement Certificate and sanctioned the Building Plan.
2.21 Thereafter, on 3rd July 2007, the Ministry of Environment
and Forest (MoEF) granted environmental clearance for
construction of “Raheja Richmond Park”, a Residential,
Shopping and IT Complex.

d. Proceedings before this Court
2.22 After noticing the aforesaid aspects, one Nagrik Chetna
Manch filed I.A. No. 2079-2080 of 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 202 of 1995 before this Court challenging the allotment
of Reserved Forest Land to private persons and its use for
construction of multi-storeyed buildings in violation of the
1980 FC Act.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1395

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

2.23 In the said proceedings, this Court vide order dated 23 rd
November 2007, directed the CEC to enquire into the matter
and submit its report.
2.24 In pursuance to the orders passed by this Court, the CEC
started conducting enquiries into the matter and held various
meetings. When the CEC started conducting enquiries, various
queries were made to the State Government. The Revenue
and Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra issued
a notice dated 2nd July 2008 to the RRCHS and one of the
members of the ‘Chavan Family’ thereby informing them about
the Government’s decision to review the Government Order
dated 4th August 1998 vide which the land was allotted to the
‘Chavan Family’.
2.25 It would further appear that the Forest Department issued a
notice to the RRCHS dated 4th July 2008, notifying the RRCHS
that the possession of the subject land was required to be taken
back. Aggrieved thereby, the RRCHS filed I.A. No.2301-2302
of 2008 in I.A. No.2079 of 2007 praying for impleadment as
well as challenging the aforementioned notices dated 2nd July
2008 and 4th July 2008.
2.26 The said RRCHS also filed a writ petition being Writ Petition
(Civil) No.301 of 2008, praying for the following reliefs:
“(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ order or direction under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India for quashing the notice
dated 2.7.2008 bearing no. Land-3408/1025/
PKP 935/Part 2/J-5, issued by the State
Government; and/or
(b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ order or direction under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India for quashing the notice
dated 4.7.2008 bearing no. 57 of 2008-09,
issued by the Forest Department, Government
of Maharashtra; and/or
(c) Pass such other of further orders as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
1396 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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2.27 After an elaborate enquiry, the CEC submitted its report dated
27th November 2008 and recommended thus:
i) the allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land in Survey
No.21 (old Survey No.20A) Kondhwa Bk in District Pune
for agriculture purposes and subsequent permission given
for its sale in favour of M/s Richie Rich Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. and construction of buildings should
be cancelled.
ii) the area should be restored back as forest;
iii) the senior functionaries and officers of the Government of
Maharashtra responsible for the allotment/use of the said
Reserve Forest land in violation of the provision of the
FC Act and this Hon’ble Court’s order dated 12.12.1996
should be prosecuted for criminal breach of trust and other
provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is imperative that
amongst others the then Revenue Minister, Maharashtra,
who approved the land allotment along with the then
Divisional Commissioner, Pune who granted the permission
for the sale of the land in favour of private person for the
construction of buildings, Mr. Ashok Khadse, the then
Deputy Conservator of Forests, Pune who has issued “No
Objection Certificate” not only in this case but in many
other cases facilitating illegal use of the forest land for
private gains and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Developer,
who entered into various Development Agreements for
purchase and use of the Reserve Forest for construction
of buildings are prosecuted.
iv) Mr. Khadse who is presently under suspension should
not be reinstated without obtaining permission of this
Hon’ble Court;
v) the Chairman, Central Empowered Committee may be
authorized to constitute a multi disciplinary “Special
Investigation Team” to examine the details of all the Reserve
Forest under the administrative control of the Revenue
Department in Pune and which have been allotted/allowed
to be used in the past without obtaining approval under
the FC Act. All such allotment/uses should be treated as
null and void and the Government of Maharashtra should
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1397

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

be directed to cancel all such orders. State functionaries/
officers who are found to be responsible for allotment/use
of the forest land in all such cases, should be prosecuted
for criminal breach of trust; and
vi) the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra should be
directed to ensure immediate compliance of this Hon’ble
Court’s order dated 22.9.2006 in IA No.1483 regarding
transfer of forest land in charge of the Revenue Department
to the Forest Department. Till the entire exercise is
completed, he should be directed to file fortnightly Action
Taken Report before the Hon’ble Court as well as the CEC.”
2.28 Subsequent reports have been filed by the CEC on 1 st
November 2010 and 14th August 2013.
2.29 I.A. Nos. 3044-45 of 2011 are filed by one Greenfield
Cooperative Housing Society (“GCHS” for short) praying for
impleadment in the matter and for quashing of the order dated
29th September 2008 by which the Divisional Commissioner,
Pune had cancelled the permission to sell by virtue of which the
GCHS had purchased the land from the original leaseholder.
2.30 I.A. No.254946 of 2023 for directions has been filed by RRCHS
contending that the Gazette Notification dated 9th March 1944
did not show the subject land as the Forest Land and, therefore,
prayed for disposal of the present proceedings in view of the
said Gazette Notification.
2.31 I.A. No.39711 of 2024 has been filed by the State to place on
record the original Gazette Notification dated 9th March 1944. It
was contended by the State that the Gazette Notification dated
9th March 1944 placed by RRCHS was a fabricated document.
2.32 This Court, therefore, vide order dated 9th May 2024, directed
enquiry to be conducted by the Additional Director General of
State CID, Pune. The Additional Director General of State CID,
Pune conducted an enquiry and submitted his report on 16th
August 2024 pointing out therein that the Gazette Notification
dated 9th March 1944 placed by the RRCHS was a forged one
and not genuine one.
2.33 That is how the present proceedings have reached this stage.
1398 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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III. SUBMISSIONS
3. We have heard Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel
(Amicus Curiae) ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda, Ms. Kanti, Ms.
Raji Gururaj and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned counsel. We have also
heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the RRCHS and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the GCHS and Shri Aniruddha Joshi,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
4. Shri K. Parameshwar submitted that the allotment of the Forest
Land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in flagrant breach of the orders of
this Court and the provisions of the 1980 FC Act. He submits that
though the record would clearly reveal that the subject land was
recorded as a Forest Land, the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan
Family’ in flagrant violation of the law. He submits that the record
would reveal that the ‘Chavan Family’ was only a front, while, in
fact, the allotment was made by the State Government in favour of
a Builder. He submits that the record would reveal that much prior
to 1998 when the land was actually allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan
Family’, the ‘Chavan Family’ had already entered into a deal with Mr.
Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS.
5. The learned Amicus submits that in the present case it would clearly
reveal that the then Revenue Minister and the then Divisional
Commissioner of Pune had acted in total breach of the doctrine of
public trust and misused their power to aid the illegal activities of the
Builder. The learned Amicus further submits that, considering for a
moment that the allotment of the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan
Family’ was legal, it is clear that the subsequent allocation thereof
in favour of RRCHS was totally in contravention of the conditions
on which the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. He further
submits that the record would reveal that the subject land was in
fact used for the purposes of plantation.
6. The learned Amicus, therefore, would submit that this Court should
accept the report of the CEC and set aside the allotment in favour
of the ‘Chavan Family’.
7. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
the subject land was not used as a Forest Land for a long period.
It is submitted that the land in question was allotted to the ‘Chavan
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1399

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

Family’ in lieu of compensation for acquisition of their land. It is
submitted that the subject land lost its character as a Forest Land
on account of non-use of it for a long time for the said purpose. It
is therefore submitted that in view of the doctrine of desuetude, the
subject land no longer remained a Forest Land and, therefore, the
allotment of the subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was
totally valid in law. In this respect, he relied on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Municipal Corporation for City of Pune and
another v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. and others1
8. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the RRCHS
is the bona fide purchaser of the subject land from the ‘Chavan
Family’. It is submitted that the records viz., the revenue records as
well as the Final Regional Plan of Pune Region would show that
the land in question was shown in a Public/Semi Public Zone which
could be used for residential purposes. It is submitted that the Final
Regional Plan of Pune Region was published in accordance with
the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966, which is a complete code in itself. It is submitted that since
the subject land was not shown in a green zone, the RRCHS was
the bona fide purchaser and, therefore, it cannot be penalized for
purchasing the said land.
9. An alternative submission made by the learned Senior Counsel
is that, as held by this Court in In Re: “Construction of Multi
Storeyed Buildings in Forest Land Maharashtra2”, the RRCHS
should be allotted an alternate piece of land inasmuch as the land
allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in lieu of their land acquired by
the Government.
10. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Amicus, in rejoinder, submitted that
the doctrine of desuetude would not be applicable to the facts of
the present case. He relied on the following judgments of this Court
in this regard:
(i) State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik
and Others3;

1 1995 INSC 181 : (1995) 3 SCC 434
2 I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 etc. dated 9th September 2024
3 1982 INSC 78 : (1982) 3 SCC 519
1400 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(ii) Cantonment Board, MHOW and Another v. M.P. State
Road Transport Corpn.4; and
(iii) Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited v. Union of India
and Others5

IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
11. In the background of these submissions, the following points arise
for consideration:
a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land;
b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in
recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of the
‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether the State Government
was justified in accepting the said recommendation;
c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be
applicable to the facts of the present case;
d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be bona fide
purchaser of the subject land;
e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment
of alternate piece of land in view of the order passed by
this Court in In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed
Buildings in Forest Land Maharashtra”6;
f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present
case.

V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

a. As to whether the subject land is a Forest Land.
12. A perusal of the Gazette Notification dated 1st March 1879 would
reveal that it declares the lands described in the Schedule annexed
thereto to be Reserved Forest in the Poona Collectorate. The said

4 1997 INSC 401 : (1997) 9 SCC 450
5 2012 INSC 305 : (2012) 11 SCC 1
6 I.A. No.2771-2772 of 2009 in WP(C) No.202 of 1995 etc. dated 9th September 2024
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1401

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

Notification has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by
Section 34 of the 1878 Act. A perusal of the Schedule thereto would
reveal that the land in Village Kondhwa Budruk having survey No.
20, admeasuring an area of 32 Acres and 35 Gunthas (13.27 ha)
has been included in the said Schedule. Subsequently, by way of
Notification issued on 5th January 1934, it was declared that out of
the said area in Survey No.20, an area admeasuring 3 Acres and
20 Gunthas would cease to be a Reserved Forest. As such, after
deforestation of 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas, the balance area of 29
Acres and 15 Gunthas (11.89 ha) continued to be notified as a
Reserved Forest. The said area of 29 Acres and 15 Gunthas was
numbered as Survey No.20-A, which was subsequently renumbered
as Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk.
13. A perusal of the records of the Forest Department would reveal that
the said area continued to be shown as notified ‘Reserved Forest’.
14. However, in the records maintained by the Revenue Department,
the said area of Survey No.21 Kondhwa Budruk has been recorded
as “Government Grazing Ground”.
15. It will be relevant to note that in order to clear this anomaly, the
officers of the Forest Department have addressed number of letters
to the Collector, Pune for rectification of the revenue records, which
are as under:
(i) Letter dated 18.3.1991 from Deputy Conservator of
Forests, Pune to District Collector, Pune.
(ii) Letter dated 5.1.1994 from the Deputy Conservator
of Forests to the Tahsildar, Haveli.
(iii) Letter dated 9.7.1998 from the Range Forest Office
to the Tahsildar, Haveli
(iv) Letter dated 29.7.1998 from the Deputy Conservator
of Forests to the Collector, Pune
(v) Letter dated 10.9.1998 from the Range Forest Officer
to the Tahsildar, Haveli
(vi) Letter dated September, 1998 from the Deputy
Conservator of Forests to the Collector, Pune.
(vii) Letter dated 11.9.1998 from the Deputy Conservator
of Forests to the Collector, Pune.
1402 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(viii) Letter dated 17.12.1998 from the Deputy Conservator
of Forests to the Collector, Pune
16. Not only this, but the perusal of the communication dated 26th August
1994, addressed by the District Collector, Pune to the Executive
Engineer (Estd.), Maharashtra State Electricity Board (“MSEB” for
short) would reveal that it is reserved as a “Forest Land”. It is to be
noted that the MSEB had sought allotment of this land for construction
of High-Tension Sub-Station. While refusing the said request, the
Collector, Pune informed the MSEB vide letter dated 26th August
1994 as under:
“In reference to your above letter please note that the
land referred by you is reserved as “Forest Land” as per
the Indian Forest Rules, 1897 vide circular No. 24F dt. 1st
March, 1879 and amended in 1890. Hence same cannot
be allotted to you. The application is therefore filed.”
17. It is further relevant to note that the Collector, Pune while forwarding
the request of the ‘Chavan Family’ to the State Government vide
communication dated 19th June 1991, referred to the said land as
“Government Forest Land”. However, noting that the ‘Chavan Family’
was in cultivation of the land admeasuring 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas,
he recommended allotment of the said land to the ‘Chavan Family’.
He also recommended that the possession of the remaining land
be handed over to the Forest Department. In the said letter, the
Collector noted thus:
“S.No.20 is reserved for afforestation. As per the Govt.
notification No. AS/36/13//14032 dt 5.01.1934 (Pg 175)
the rights for cultivation of the area admeasuring 3 Acres
20 Gunthas out of S.No.20A have been allotted to Shri
Chauhan family for which the Forest Dept has given their
consent. The Forest Department has requested for the
possession of the remaining land i.e. 29 Acres 15 Gunthas
since reserved for Forest only.”
18. It could thus be seen that the though the Collector recorded that
Survey No. 20 was reserved for afforestation, he recommended the
allotment of the land admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Gunthas to ‘Chavan
Family’. While doing so, he recorded “No Objection” of the Forest
Department. We will be referring to the said aspect subsequently
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1403

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

inasmuch as the said “No Objection given by one of the Forest
Officers, was subsequently cancelled by the Forest Authorities.
19. Surprisingly, the Divisional Commissioner vide his communication
dated 30th November 1994, addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and
Forest Department, noticing the stand taken by the Collector, Pune,
recommended the entire land be allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’. It
is further to be noted that in the said communication, the Divisional
Commissioner also specifically recorded that the ‘Chavan Family’
was in illegal possession of the land after 1969.
20. After the 1980 FC Act came into effect, no Forest Land could have
been de-reserved without the permission of the Central Government.
It is to be noted that though the reliance is placed by the RRCHS
on the Gazette Notification dated 9th March 1944 to contend that
the said subject land was de-reserved, on an enquiry conducted by
the Additional Superintendent of Police State CID under the orders
of this Court, the said Gazette Notification is found to be fabricated.
21. It would thus be amply clear from the record that the said land was
notified as early as in 1879 as Reserved Forest and which reservation
continues to be so till date.

b. As to whether the Divisional Commissioner was justified in
recommending the allotment of subject land in favour of the
‘Chavan Family’ and as to whether the State Government
was justified in accepting the said recommendation.
22. Having held that the subject land is a reserved Forest Land, the next
question that would be required to be considered is as to whether
the said land could have been allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’.
23. It will be relevant to refer to Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act (as it
originally exists, without amendment), which reads thus:
“2. Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use
of forest land for non-forest purpose.— Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force in a State, no State Government or other authority
shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central
Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the
expression “reserved forest” in any law for the time
1404 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

being in force in that State) or any portion thereof,
shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be
used for any non-forest purpose;
(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be
assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private
person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any
other organization not owned, managed or controlled
by Government.
(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be
cleared of trees which have grown naturally in that land
or portion, for the purpose of using it for reafforestation].
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section “non-
forest purpose” means the breaking up or clearing of
any forest land or portion thereof for—
(a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil-
bearing plants, horticulture crops or medicinal plants;
(b) any purpose other than reafforestation, but does not
include any work relating to or ancillary to conservation,
development and management of forests and wildlife,
namely, the establishment of check-posts, fire lines,
wireless communications and Construction of fencing,
bridges and culverts, dams, waterholes, trench marks,
boundary marks, pipelines or other like purposes.”
24. It would thus be clear that after the 1980 FC Act was brought into
effect, no State Government or any other authority, unless there is
prior approval by the Central Government, could have directed any
Reserved Forest or any portion thereof to cease to be under the status
of “reserved” or any forest land or any portion thereof to be used for
any non-forest purposes. Nor could it have assigned any forest land or
any portion thereof, by way of lease or otherwise to any private person
or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organization.
25. Reliance is placed by the RRCHS on the judgment of this Court in the
case of State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi and Others7. The legal

7 1985 INSC 126 : (1985) 3 SCC 643
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1405

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

opinion given by the Deputy Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department,
Government of Maharashtra also relies on the said judgment.
26. No doubt that in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra), this Court
held that if an area had already been dug up and mining operations
were carried on prior to coming into force of the 1980 FC Act, the
State Government, for continuing the said lease for the purposes
of mining, shall not need prior approval of the Central Government.
It has been held that though it would be necessary to seek prior
approval of the Central Government for starting mining operations
on a virgin area, it would not be necessary to seek such approval
for the purposes of carrying out mining operations in a forest area
which is broken up or cleared before the commencement of the
1980 FC Act.
27. We find that even on facts, the said judgment would not be applicable.
There is no order permitting the subject land to be used for non-forest
purposes by any of the competent authorities. A reliance is sought
to be placed on the letter issued by the Tehsildar, Taluka Haveli
dated 13th May 1968, thereby informing the ‘Chavan Family’ about
its decision to lease the subject land on “Eksali” basis for the year
1968-69. However, it is to be noted that the said lease was only for
a period of one year. It is further to be noted that while accepting
the said yearly lease, the ‘Chavan Family’ has given an undertaking
that they will hand over the vacant and peaceful possession on
15.12.1967 (sic) i.e. prior to 1980.
28. In any case, nothing is placed on record to show that the land was
permitted to be used by the State for any non-forest purposes prior
to 1980. In any event, since the lease deed was valid only for one
year, after the 1980 FC Act came into effect, in view of the restrictions
imposed in clause (iii) of Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act, the forest
land could not have been assigned either by way of lease or any
other mode to any private person unless there was prior approval
of the Central Government.
29. In the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and
Others8, this Court while distinguishing the judgment in the case of
Banshi Ram Modi (supra) observed thus:

8 1986 INSC 267 : (1987) 1 SCC 213
1406 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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“15. The rules dealt with a situation prior to the coming
into operation of 1980 Act. The “1980 Act” was an Act
in recognition of the awareness that deforestation and
ecological imbalances as a result of deforestation have
become social menaces and further deforestation and
ecological imbalances should be prevented. That was
the primary purpose writ large in the Act of 1980. Therefore
the concept that power coupled with the duty enjoined
upon the respondents to renew the lease stands eroded
by the mandate of the legislation as manifest in 1980
Act in the facts and circumstances of these cases.
The primary duty was to the community and that duty
took precedence, in our opinion, in these cases. The
obligation to the society must predominate over the
obligation to the individuals.

*** *** ***
18. The aforesaid observations have been set out in detail
in order to understand the true ratio of the said decision
in the background of the facts of that case. It is true that
this Court held that if the permission had been granted
before the coming into operation of the 1980 Act and the
forest land has been broken up or cleared, clause (ii) of
Section 2 of 1980 Act would not apply in such a case. But
that decision was rendered in the background of the facts
of that case. The ratio of any decision must be understood
in the background of the facts of that case. It has been
said long time ago that a case is only an authority for
what it actually decides, and not what logically follows
from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem) [(1901)
AC 495] . But in view of the mandate of Article 141 that
the ratio of the decision of this Court is a law of the land,
Shri Gobind Das submitted that the ratio of a decision
must be found out from finding out if the converse was
not correct. But this Court, however, was cautious in
expressing the reasons for the said decision in State
of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi [(1985) 3 SCC 643]. This
Court observed in that decision that the result of taking
the contrary view would be (SCC p. 648, para 10) that
while the digging for purposes of winning mica can go
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1407

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

on, the lessee would be deprived of collecting felspar or
quartz which he may come across while he is carrying on
mining operations for winning mica. That would lead to an
unreasonable result which would not in any way subserve
the object of the Act. There was an existing lease where
mining operation was being carried on and what was
due by incorporation of a new term was that while
mining operations were being carried on some other
minerals were available, he was giving right to collect
those. The new lease only permitted utilisation or
collection of the said other minerals.
19. In the instant appeals the situation is entirely different.
The appellants are asking for a renewal of the quarry
leases. It will lead to further deforestation or at least it will
not help reclaiming back the areas where deforestations
have taken place. In that view of the matter, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the ratio of
the said decision cannot be made applicable to support
the appellants' demands in these cases because the facts
are entirely different here. The primary purpose of the
Act which must subserve the interpretation in order to
implement the Act is to prevent further deforestation.
The Central Government has not granted approval.
If the State Government is of the opinion that it
is not a case where the State Government should
seek approval of the Central Government, the State
Government cannot apparently seek such approval
in a matter in respect of which, in our opinion, it has
come to the conclusion that no renewal should be
granted.”
[Emphasis supplied]

30. It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal terms held that
the obligation to society must predominate over the obligation to the
individuals. This Court held that in the case of Banshi Ram Modi
(supra), there was an existing lease where mining operations were
being carried on and what was due by incorporation of a new term
was that while mining operations were being carried on some other
minerals were available, he was given right to collect those. This
1408 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Court observed that, however, in Ambica Quarry Works (supra), the
situation is entirely different. The appellants therein were asking for a
renewal of the quarry leases. It would lead to further deforestation or
at least it will not help reclaiming back the areas where deforestations
have taken place. The Court, therefore, observed thus:
“20. In that view of the matter and the scheme of the Act, in
our opinion, the respondents were right and the appellants
were wrong. All interpretations must subserve and
help implementation of the intention of the Act. This
interpretation, in our opinion, will subserve the predominant
purpose of the Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]

31. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms held that taking
into consideration the Scheme of the Act, all interpretations which
subserve and help implementation of the intention of the Act i.e. the
protection of the forests must be accepted.
32. It would further be apposite to note that this Court in the present
proceedings had an occasion to consider the judgments in the cases
of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) and Ambica Quarry Works (supra).
In the order dated 12th December 1996, this Court observed thus:
“4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with a
view to check further deforestation which ultimately results
in ecological imbalance; and therefore, the provisions
made therein for the conservation of forests and for
matters connected therewith, must apply to all forests
irrespective of the nature of ownership or classification
thereof. The word “forest” must be understood according
to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all
statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as
reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of
Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term
“forest land”, occurring in Section 2, will not only include
“forest” as understood in the dictionary sense, but also
any area recorded as forest in the Government record
irrespective of the ownership. This is how it has to be
understood for the purpose of Section 2 of the Act.
The provisions enacted in the Forest Conservation Act,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1409

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

1980 for the conservation of forests and the matters
connected therewith must apply clearly to all forests so
understood irrespective of the ownership or classification
thereof. This aspect has been made abundantly clear in
the decisions of this Court in Ambica Quarry Works v.
State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] , Rural Litigation
and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1)
SCC 504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996
(Supreme Court Monitoring Committee v. Mussoorie
Dehradun Development Authority [ WP (C) No 749 of
1995 decided on 29-11-1996] ). The earlier decision of
this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi Ram Modi [(1985) 3
SCC 643] has, therefore, to be understood in the light of
these subsequent decisions. We consider it necessary to
reiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions
of this Court to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception
of any State Government or authority. This has become
necessary also because of the stand taken on behalf of
the State of Rajasthan, even at this late stage, relating
to permissions granted for mining in such area which
is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court. It is
reasonable to assume that any State Government which
has failed to appreciate the correct position in law so far,
will forthwith correct its stance and take the necessary
remedial measures without any further delay.
5. We further direct as under:
I. General
1. In view of the meaning of the word “forest”
in the Act, it is obvious that prior approval
of the Central Government is required for
any non-forest activity within the area of
any “forest”. In accordance with Section 2
of the Act, all on-going activity within any
forest in any State throughout the country,
without the prior approval of the Central
Government, must cease forthwith. It is,
therefore, clear that the running of saw mills of
any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and
1410 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

mining of any mineral are non-forest purposes
and are, therefore, not permissible without prior
approval of the Central Government. Accordingly,
any such activity is prima facie violation of the
provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
Every State Government must promptly ensure
total cessation of all such activities forthwith.”
[Emphasis supplied]

33. A perusal of the aforesaid observation of this Court in the present
proceedings would reveal that this Court after considering the
judgment in Banshi Ram Modi (supra) has in unequivocal terms
held that in accordance with Section 2 of the Act, all on-going activity
within any forest in any State throughout the country, without the prior
approval of the Central Government, must be ceased immediately.
It can thus clearly be seen that this Court has in unequivocal terms
overruled what was held in Banshi Ram Modi (supra).
34. It is thus amply clear that for permitting any non-forest activity within
the area of any “forest”, it was necessary to have prior approval of
the Central Government. It has unequivocally been directed that
all on-going activity within any forest in any State throughout the
country, without the prior approval of the Central Government, must
cease forthwith. This Court specifically directed that running of saw
mills of any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and mining of
any mineral are non-forest purposes and they are not permissible
without prior approval of the Central Government.
35. It is further to be noted that this court in the case of Nature Lovers
Movement v. State of Kerala9 has observed thus:
“52. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the following
terms:
(1) ………………………………………………...
(2) After the enforcement of the 1980 Act,
neither the State Government nor any
other authority can make an order or issue

9 2009 INSC 371 : (2009) 5 SCC 373
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1411

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

direction for dereservation of reserved
forest or any portion thereof or permit use
of any forest land or any portion thereof
for any non-forest purpose or assign any
forest land or any portion thereof by way
of lease or otherwise to any private person
or to any authority, corporation, agency
or organisation not owned, managed or
controlled by the Government except after
obtaining prior approval of the Central
Government.
(3) Conclusion D recorded by the High Court in
para 103 of the impugned judgment is legally
unsustainable and is set aside.
(4) As and when the State Government
decides to assign 10,000 ha of forest land to
unauthorised occupants/encroachers, it shall
do so only after obtaining prior approval of the
Central Government and the latter shall take
appropriate decision keeping in view the object
of the 1980 Act and the guidelines framed for
regularisation of encroachments on forest land.”
[Emphasis supplied]

36. The legal position, therefore, has been clarified by this Court in
the case of Nature Lovers Movement (supra) after considering
the earlier judgments reiterating the position that neither the State
Government nor any other authority can make an order or issue a
direction for de-reservation of reserved forest or any portion thereof or
permit use of any forest land or any portion thereof for any non-forest
purpose. Neither is it permissible to assign any forest land or any
portion thereof by way of lease or otherwise to any private person
or to any authority, corporation, agency or organization not owned,
managed or controlled by the Government except after obtaining
prior approval of the Central Government.
37. It is further to be noted that in the present case, the opinion given
by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Law and Judiciary
Department was on 27th July 1998. The order approving allotment of
1412 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was issued by the Government
of Maharashtra on 4th August 1998 and the order of allotment by the
Collector was passed on 28th August 1998. It is thus clear that all
these events have taken place well after the directions were issued
by this Court on 12th December 1996 in the present proceedings.
38. It is thus clear that the Deputy Secretary to the Government of
Maharashtra had totally erred in relying on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) by ignoring the
observations made by this Court in the case of Ambica Quarry
Works (supra) and specific directions issued by this Court in the
present proceedings. For that very said reason, the decision of the
State Government of allotting the land and implementing the same
by the Collector is not at all sustainable in law. In that view of the
matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the allotment of the
land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ vide orders dated 4th August
1998 and 28th August 1998 is not sustainable in law.

c. As to whether the doctrine of desuetude would be applicable
to the facts of the present case.
39. An argument is sought to be raised on behalf of the RRCHS that the
doctrine of desuetude would be applicable to the facts of the present
case. Let us test the correctness of the said argument.
40. Reliance in this respect is sought to be placed on behalf of the RRCHS
on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bharat Forge Co. Ltd.
(supra). In the said case, the liability of the respondents therein to
pay octroi to the Municipal Corporation was under consideration. It
was sought to be argued that since the 1918 Notifications had not
been implemented, they stood repealed ‘quasily’ by the time new
Octroi Rules came to be framed in 1963 and, in fact, they were
applied to realize octroi from the respondents. In this background,
this Court observed thus:
“34. Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does not
appear to have been used so far to hold that any statute
has stood repealed because of this process, we find no
objection in principle to apply this doctrine to our statutes
as well. This is for the reason that a citizen should know
whether, despite a statute having been in disuse for long
duration and instead a contrary practice being in use, he
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1413

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

is still required to act as per the “dead letter”. We would
think it would advance the cause of justice to accept the
application of doctrine of desuetude in our country also.
Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed, there is
need for its implantation, because persons residing in free
India, who have assured fundamental rights including what
has been stated in Article 21, must be protected from their
being, say, prosecuted and punished for violation of a law
which has become “dead letter”. A new path is, therefore,
required to be laid and trodden.
35. In written submissions filed on behalf of respondents,
it has been stated that the theory of desuetude can have
no application to the facts of the present case, since the
challenge by the respondents is to the levy and calculation
under the 1963 Schedule, and not to the rates enforced
since 1918. This submission has been characterised
as “most important”. As to this we would observe that
if Notification of 1818 were to prevail despite 1918
Notifications, the fact that some changes were made in
the Schedule in 1963 has no legal bearing on the question
under examination. The theory of desuetude has been
pressed into service by the appellant only to take care
of relevant 1918 Notifications. If those notifications can
be said to stand eclipsed, the fact that changes were
made in the rates etc. in 1963 cannot stand in the way of
application of the theory of desuetude.”
41. It could thus be seen that the Court observed that the doctrine of
desuetude would apply to our statutes as well for the reason that
a citizen should know whether, despite a statute having been in
disuse for long duration and instead a contrary practice being in
use, he is still required to act as per the “dead letter”. It has been
observed that it would advance the cause of justice to accept the
application of doctrine of desuetude in our country as well. The
Court observed that in view of the fundamental rights enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a citizen must be protected
from being prosecuted and punished for violation of a law which has
become “dead letter”.
42. However, it is clear from the aforesaid observations that for
applicability of the doctrine of desuetude, the statute must not only
1414 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

be required to be in disuse for long duration but instead a contrary
practice must also be prevalent.
43. We fail to understand as to how the said doctrine of desuetude would
be applicable in the facts of the present case.
44. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the RRCHS that though
the subject land was shown as Reserved Forest Land, as far back
as in 1879, it was not used as a Forest Land for a long period
and therefore it ceased to be Reserved Forest Land. We fail to
appreciate such a submission. The subject land has continuously
been recorded as ‘Reserved Forest’ in the Forest Records. Not
only that, as we have already reproduced hereinabove, the Forest
Authorities through a number of communications had requested the
Revenue Authorities to correct the revenue entries and transfer the
land to the Forest Department. In any case, this Court in the case of
Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited (supra) has correctly laid down
the legal position as under:
“201. From the above, the essentials of the doctrine of
desuetude may be summarised as follows:
(i) The doctrine of desuetude denotes a principle
of quasi-repeal but this doctrine is ordinarily
seen with disfavour.
(ii) Although the doctrine of desuetude has been
made applicable in India on few occasions but
for its applicability, two factors, namely, (i)
that the statute or legislation has not been
in operation for a very considerable period,
and (ii) the contrary practice has been
followed over a period of time must be clearly
satisfied. Both ingredients are essential and
want of any one of them would not attract
the doctrine of desuetude. In other words, a
mere neglect of a statute or legislation over a
period of time is not sufficient but it must be firmly
established that not only the statute or legislation
was completely neglected but also the practice
contrary to such statute or legislation has been
followed for a considerably long period.”
[Emphasis supplied]
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1415

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

45. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the doctrine of
desuetude is ordinarily seen with disfavour. It has also been held that
although this doctrine has been made applicable in India on a few
occasions, however, for its applicability, two factors are necessary,
namely, (i) that the statute or legislation has not been in operation
for a very considerable period, and (ii) the contrary practice has
been followed over a period of time. It has been held that, not one
but, both the conditions must be available to attract the applicability
of the said doctrine of desuetude.
46. In the present case, the legislative history would clearly show that,
right from 1878, when the 1878 Act was enacted, under Section 34
of the said Act, the law with regard to protection and conservation
of forest has been consistently evolving more and more in favour
of protection of forests.
47. We do not find any substance in the argument that the Notification
dated 1st March 1879 issued under Section 34 of the 1878 Act has
been put to disuse for a long time. In any case, nothing has been
brought on record to show that a practice contrary to the provisions
of the said Act was being applied. In that view of the matter, such
an argument has to be heard only to be rejected.

d. As to whether the RRCHS could be said to be a bona fide
purchaser of the subject land.
48. It is sought to be urged on behalf of the RRCHS that they are the
bona fide purchaser of the subject land in question. It is submitted
on behalf of the RRCHS that the land in question was reflected as
revenue land. It is submitted that the Final Regional Plan of Pune
Region, which has statutory force, had shown the subject land as
municipal land. It is further submitted that even prior to that in the
Pune Regional Plan implemented on 17th May 1976, the land in
question was included in the agricultural zone. As such, by no stretch
of imagination, the RRCHS could have known that the subject land
was Forest Land and not Revenue Land. It is further stated that
even the revenue record pertaining to the subject land had shown
the possession of the ‘Chavan Family’ over the said land. It is,
therefore, submitted that the RRCHS, which is a bona fide purchaser
of the land in question, could not be faulted with and penalized for
no fault of theirs.
1416 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

49. As already stated herein above, the subject land was allotted to
the ‘Chavan Family’ by the Tehsildar, Haveli on 13th May 1968
on Eksali (yearly) lease for the year 1968-69. Not only that, the
‘Chavan Family’ had given an undertaking to the Mamlatdar, Haveli
to surrender the said land prior to completion of one year. The
‘Chavan Family’ had further given an undertaking that the said
land would not be put to any other use except for the agricultural
purposes. It is further pertinent to note that after the grant of lease
for one year, there has been no renewal of the said lease, although
the names of the ‘Chavan Family’ do appear in the 7/12 extracts
of revenue records.
50. This Court in the case of Suraj Bhan and others v. Financial
Commissioner and Others10 has held as follows:
“9. ….. It is well settled that an entry in revenue records
does not confer title on a person whose name appears in
record-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue
records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e.
payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred
on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property
is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil
court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh [(1993) 4 SCC
403 : AIR 1994 SC 1653] ). As already noted earlier, civil
proceedings in regard to genuineness of will are pending
with the High Court of Delhi. In the circumstances, we see
no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High
Court in the writ petition.”
51. Recently, this Court in the case of P. Kishor Kumar v. Vittal K.
Patkar11 has also observed thus:
“13. …. mutation in revenue records neither creates nor
extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value
on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour
mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question.”
52. It is well-settled law that the entries in the revenue record do not
confer a title to the property.

10 2007 INSC 424 : (2007) 6 SCC 186
11 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1483
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1417

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

53. It would further appear from the record that after the lease was
not renewed in 1969, for a period of about 20 years, the members
of the ‘Chavan Family’ kept silent. It appears that only in the year
1988, they started moving the authorities for allotment of land in
lieu of compensation. However, much prior to the actual allotment
of land in their favour, they had already entered into transactions
with the Builders. A perusal of the record would reveal that one Mr.
Rajesh Shah had filed a civil suit, being Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998
for permanent injunction against Mr. Raghunath Shripati Chavan
and others. In the said suit, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief
Promoter of the RRCHS, was also made a party respondent. The
other members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were also made respondents.
In the said suit, Mr. Rajesh Shah had claimed that he had purchased
75% share of the subject land from some of the co-owners of the
said land. The said co-owners had executed the Development
Agreement dated 16th February 1995 and had granted development
rights as well as executed Power of Attorney to the plaintiff along
with one Mr. Yogesh Kariya. In the said proceedings, Mr. Aniruddha
P. Deshpande, Chief Promoter of the RRCHS had filed an affidavit
dated 28th August 1998, wherein it was stated that the owners/
holders of the said land had executed the Development Agreement
dated 25th July 1992 and thereafter the Supplementary Agreement
dated 23rd June 1995 in his favour and that the possession of the
said property to the extent of their share had been delivered to him.
He had also placed on record the copies of the General Power of
Attorney dated 22nd June 1995 and 12th February 1996 executed by
one Mr. Kesu Hari Chavan and others in his favour.
54. It will be relevant to reproduce Para 2 of the Affidavit dated 28th
August 1998 filed by Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief Promoter,
RRCHS in Civil Suit No. 1023 of 1998, which reads thus:
“2. It is submitted that the owners/holders of the suit
property Shri Abu G. Chavan, Sarubai S. Chavan,
Pandurang Bhau Chavan, Kesu Hari Chavan, Dattatraya
R. Chavan, Narayan Nana Chavan, Rakhmabai Vithal
Chavan and others have executed Development
agreement 25/7/92 and thereafter supplementary
agreement dated 23/6/95 in favour of this applicant. The
said owners have also delivered the possession of the
suit property to the extent of their share to this applicant.
1418 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

As such this applicant is in possession of the suit property
to the extent of the undivided share of the above owners.
In view of the said fact this applicant is necessary party
to the suit. It is submitted that if any order is passed in
the suit the same may seriously affect the right of this
applicant and the applicant may suffer irreparable loss and
hardship. The orders passed in the suit may also lead to
multiplicity of litigation as such it is necessary that this
third party may be added as the Defendant to the suit.
If this applicant is added as the necessary party to the
suit no hardship or injustice will be caused either to the
plaintiff or the Defendant, on the contrary this applicant
may suffer irreparable loss and hardship, hence in the
interest of justice this applicant may please be added
as the necessary party to the suit. The details of this
applicant is as under:
SHRI ANIRUDDH P. DESHPANDE
AGE : 37 YEARS, OCC : BUSINESS
RESIDING AT : 66/2, APEKSHA,
OPPOSITE LAW COLLEGE,
PUNE 411 004.”
55. It is further to be noted that another suit being Civil Suit No.1364
of 1998 was filed by one Mr. Raju Shivaji Bhonsale and another
challenging the allotment of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’.
In the said suit also, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, Chief Promoter
of the RRCHS was made a party respondent. Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande had also filed an affidavit dated 14th February 2005 in
the said suit inter alia stating therein that during 1995 Mr. Chavan
and others had granted the Development Rights in his favour.
56. It is further to be noted that the members of the ‘Chavan Family’
had entered into Development Agreement with Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande on 18th August 1998.
57. It is further to be noted that an order approving the allotment of the
land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’ was passed by the Government
vide order dated 4th August 1998, whereas the actual allotment of
land by the Collector is by order dated 28th August 1998.
58. It is relevant to note that in the civil suit filed by Mr. Rajesh Shah, a
Compromise Pursis dated 29th August 1998 was filed by the members
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1419

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

of the ‘Chavan Family’, Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande and Mr. Rajesh
Shah, which reads thus:
“i) the members of the Chavan family (allottees of the
said land) and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande (Chief
Promoter of the Richie Rich Co-operative Housing
Society) admit, agree and confirm that (a) the
Development Agreement dated 16.2.1995 pertaining
to the said land has been executed by the three
members of the Chavan family in favour of Mr. Rajesh
Shah and Mr. Yogesh Kariya, and (b) the possession
of the said property was delivered to Mr. Rajesh Shah
and Yogesh Shah to the extent of shares of owners
executing the agreement.
ii) the Agreement dated 25.7.1992 and the Supplementary
Agreement dated 23.6.1995 and Agreement dated
16.2.1995 executed by the other owners in favour
of Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande is also valid and
subsisting and that the possession of the said property
has been given to him to the extent of shares of the
owners executing the said agreement.
iii) the said land is exclusively in the joint possession
of Mr. Rajesh Shah, Mr. Yogesh Kariya, Raghunath
Chavan and Aniruddha P. Deshpande.
iv) an Agreement has been reached between Mr. Rajesh
Shah and Aniruddha P. Deshpande that out of the said
land Mr. Shah and Mr. Kariya shall be entitled to an
area of 8 acres and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande shall
be entitled to the balance area. They shall be deemed
to be in possession of the respective area; and
v) Mr. Raghunath Chavan and other 19 members of
Chavan family have agreed to sell/grant development
rights for the respective area to Mr. Rajesh Chavan
and Mr. Yogesh Kariya and Mr. Aniruddha P.
Deshpande.”
59. On the very same date i.e., 29th August 1998, after recording the
Compromise Pursis, the said civil suit being Civil Suit No. 1023 of
1998 came to be disposed of.
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Supreme Court Reports

60. We ask a question to ourselves as to whether the short span within
which the decision was taken by the Government to allot the land in
favour of the ‘Chavan Family’, the actual allotment of the land to the
‘Chavan Family’ by the Collector and the disposal of the suit in terms
of the compromise on the very next day, is merely a coincidence.
61. It is further to be noted that the allotment order dated 28th August 1998,
specifically prohibited the ‘Chavan Family’ in view of conditions (2)
and (4), reproduced hereinabove, from mortgaging, donating, selling,
partitioning or exchanging in any other manner, or allotting the said
land on lease to any other person without the prior permission of the
District Collector. The allotment order further mandated the ‘Chavan
Family’ to bring the said land under cultivation within a period of two
years from the date of the allotment. It further prohibited the said
land from being used for any other purpose than agricultural purpose.
62. In the light of these glaring facts, can it be said that the RRCHS is
a bona fide purchaser? The records amply speak for themselves.
63. It is amply clear that though the Eksali (yearly) lease expired in
1969, the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were silent for a period
of almost 20 years. Things started moving only in 1988. During the
said period, much before the allotment could be done, the members
of the ‘Chavan Family’ had already started negotiating the deals
with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter of RRCHS
and Mr. Rajesh Shah. The files were moving at different levels from
1991 to 1998, culminating in the final allotment in the year 1998. In
the meantime, all the Development Rights in the land already stood
transferred either to Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande, the Chief Promoter
of the RRCHS or to Mr. Rajesh Shah. For the said purpose, not
only had some of the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ entered into
a Development Agreement, but they had also executed Power of
Attorney in favour of said Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande surrendering
their entire rights in his favour.
64. In that view of the matter, we find no substance in the argument
that the RRCHS was a bona fide purchaser of the subject land. The
facts point out that the ‘Chavan Family’ was only set up as a front
for the benefit of the Developers. The fact that the agricultural land
of the ‘Chavan Family’ was acquired, was being misused by the
Developers as a pretext for grabbing the valuable piece of Forest
Land for the purposes of commercial development. For doing so,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1421

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

even the status of a person who belongs to backward class was
being misused.

e. As to whether the RRCHS would be entitled to allotment of
alternate piece of land in view of the order passed by this
Court in In Re: “Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra”.
65. An alternate submission made on behalf of the RRCHS is that
since they are the bona fide purchaser of the subject land from the
members of the ‘Chavan Family’, they would be entitled to allotment
of an alternate piece of land as has been done by this Court in I.A.
No.2771 of 2009.
66. The facts in the present case and the facts in I.A. No.2771 of 2009 are
totally different. In the said case (i.e. I.A. No.2771 of 2009), the State
had illegally taken possession of the land belonging to the predecessor-
in-title of the applicants therein. Not only that, but the said land was
given to the Armament Research Development Establishment Institute
(“ARDEI” for short), which was a unit of Defence Department of the
Union of India. There was no acquisition proceeding. The applicants
therein fought right from the Trial Court to this Court and succeeded
in getting a decree for possession of the land. When they put the
decree in execution, the ARDEI opposed the same contending therein
that an Armament Defence establishment was constructed thereon.
67. Faced with this situation and realizing its mistake, the State
Government allotted another piece of land in lieu of the land which
was already given in possession of the ARDEI. However, the record
subsequently revealed that the land which was allotted to the
applicants therein was notified as a Forest Land.
68. The Court noted the following special circumstances in the said case:
(i) “That the applicants had succeeded upto this Court
and as such, they cannot be denied the benefits of
the decree passed in their favour;
(ii) That the action of the State Government in encroaching
upon the land of a citizen was itself illegal;
(iii) The State Government ought to have taken due
precautions before allotting an alternate piece of land
to the applicants;
1422 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(iv) That the land which was notified as a Forest Land
could not have been allotted;
(v) That the State ought to have allotted a land, which
had a clear title and also had a marketable value; and
(vi) That after the proceedings had reached finality in
favour of the petitioners/applicants, the matter was
lingering in the Court for almost 15 years.”
69. In the aforesaid factual scenario, this Court passed the order dated
23rd July 2024, which is as under:
“8. We, therefore, direct the State Government to come
with a clear stand:
i. As to whether another piece of equivalent land
will be offered to the petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or
ii. As to whether adequate compensation would
be paid to the petitioner(s)/applicant(s); or
iii. As to whether the State Government
proposes to move the Central Government for
denotification of the said land as forest land.”
70. Thereafter, the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Forest
Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai tendered an undertaking before
this Court, agreeing to allot an alternate piece of land in favour of
the applicants therein. Accepting the said undertaking, this Court
passed the order dated 9th September, 2024, which is as under:
“7. We accept the undertaking and take it on record.
However, in addition, we direct that the Collector, Pune
shall personally ensure that the alternate land admeasuring
24 acres 38 guntas out of Survey No.7 situated at Mouje
Yewalewadi, Tq. Haveli, District Pune would be measured
and demarcated and thereafter peaceful and vacant
possession of the said land would be handed over to the
applicants/petitioners.
8. It is needless to state that if any encroachments are
there on the said land, the same shall be removed prior
to the said land being handed over to the applicants/
petitioners.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1423

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

9. Insofar as the modification to be issued under Section
37 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 for changing the land use in question from Private/
Semi-Private to Residential is concerned, we direct that
the said procedure shall be completed within a period of
three months from today.
10. It is further directed that all the formalities for conveying
the title of the said land in favour of the applicants/
petitioners shall be completed within a period of six weeks
from today.”
71. That is not the case here. The RRCHS knowing very well that the
land was a Forest Land had entered into transactions with the
members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much prior to the land even being
allotted in their favour. The transactions between the RRCHS and
the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were totally illegal and contrary
to the conditions on which the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan
Family’. As per the conditions of allotment, the land or any part
thereof could not have been transferred by the ‘Chavan Family’ to
anyone without the prior permission of the District Collector. The
land was required to be brought under cultivation within a period
of two years from the date of the allotment and that the land or
any part thereof was not to be used for any other purpose than
the agricultural purpose.
72. As already discussed hereinabove, the RRCHS through Mr. Aniruddha
P. Deshpande had already entered into transactions with the
members of the ‘Chavan Family’ much before the land was allotted
in their favour. The members of the ‘Chavan Family’ had given the
developmental rights as well as executed Power of Attorney in favour
of said Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande even prior to the allotment of
land in their favour. As discussed hereinabove, immediately on the
next day on which the land was allotted in favour of the ‘Chavan
Family’, the suit with regard to the subject property was compromised
between Mr. Rajesh Shah, plaintiff and Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande.
It is thus clear that the case of the RRCHS, in no way, bears any
resemblance to the case in I.A.No. 2771 of 2009.
73. The RRCHS through Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande had, with open
eyes, entered into illegal transactions with the members of the
‘Chavan Family’. If a direction, as sought by the applicant-RRCHS
1424 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

is issued, it will amount to granting a premium to the RRCHS for
the illegalities committed by them.
74. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the said
submission.

f. As to whether the doctrine of public trust would be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present
case.
75. That leaves us with the issue with regard to the doctrine of public trust.
76. Recently, this Court in the case of In Re: T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others12 had an occasion to
consider the importance of doctrine of public trust in the environmental
matters. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of
this Court:
“151. The importance of the ‘Public Trust’ doctrine in
environmental and ecological matters has been explained
by this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath.
This Court has elaborately referred to various articles and
the judgments on the issue to come to a conclusion that
the ‘public trust’ doctrine is a part of the law of the land
in the following paragraphs:
“23. The notion that the public has a right to
expect certain lands and natural areas to retain
their natural characteristic is finding its way into
the law of the land. The need to protect the
environment and ecology has been summed
up by David B. Hunter (University of Michigan)
in an article titled An ecological perspective
on property : A call for judicial protection of
the public’s interest in environmentally critical
resources published in Harvard Environmental
Law Review, Vol. 12 1988, p. 311 is in the
following words:

12 2024 INSC 178 : (2025) 2 SCC 641
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1425

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

“Another major ecological tenet is that the
world is finite. The earth can support only
so many people and only so much human
activity before limits are reached. This
lesson was driven home by the oil crisis of
the 1970s as well as by the pesticide scare
of the 1960s. The current deterioration of
the ozone layer is another vivid example of
the complex, unpredictable and potentially
catastrophic effects posed by our disregard
of the environmental limits to economic
growth. The absolute finiteness of the
environment, when coupled with human
dependency on the environment, leads
to the unquestionable result that human
activities will at some point be constrained.
‘Human activity finds in the natural world
its external limits. In short, the environment
imposes constraints on our freedom;
these constraints are not the product
of value choices but of the scientific
imperative of the environment’s limitations.
Reliance on improving technology can
delay temporarily, but not forever, the
inevitable constraints. There is a limit to
the capacity of the environment to service
… growth, both in providing raw materials
and in assimilating by-product wastes
due to consumption. The largesse of
technology can only postpone or disguise
the inevitable.’
Professor Barbara Ward has written of this
ecological imperative in particularly vivid
language:
‘We can forget moral imperatives. But
today the morals of respect and care
and modesty come to us in a form we
1426 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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cannot evade. We cannot cheat on DNA.
We cannot get round photosynthesis.
We cannot say I am not going to give a
damn about phytoplankton. All these tiny
mechanisms provide the preconditions of
our planetary life. To say we do not care
is to say in the most literal sense that “we
choose death”.’
There is a commonly-recognized link
between laws and social values, but to
ecologists a balance between laws and
values is not alone sufficient to ensure a
stable relationship between humans and
their environment. Laws and values must
also contend with the constraints imposed
by the outside environment. Unfortunately,
current legal doctrine rarely accounts for
such constraints, and thus environmental
stability is threatened.
Historically, we have changed the
environment to fit our conceptions of
property. We have fenced, plowed and
paved. The environment has proven
malleable and to a large extent still is.
But there is a limit to this malleability, and
certain types of ecologically important
resources — for example, wetlands and
riparian forests — can no longer be
destroyed without enormous long-term
effects on environmental and therefore
social stability. To ecologists, the need
for preserving sensitive resources does
not reflect value choices but rather is the
necessary result of objective observations
of the laws of nature.
In sum, ecologists view the environmental
sciences as providing us with certain laws
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1427

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

of nature. These laws, just like our own
laws, restrict our freedom of conduct and
choice. Unlike our laws, the laws of nature
cannot be changed by legislative fiat; they
are imposed on us by the natural world. An
understanding of the laws of nature must
therefore inform all of our social institutions.”
24. The ancient Roman Empire developed a
legal theory known as the “Doctrine of the Public
Trust”. It was founded on the ideas that certain
common properties such as rivers, seashore,
forests and the air were held by Government in
trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of
the general public. Our contemporary concern
about “the environment” bear a very close
conceptual relationship to this legal doctrine.
Under the Roman law these resources were
either owned by no one (res nullious) or by every
one in common (res communious). Under the
English common law, however, the Sovereign
could own these resources but the ownership
was limited in nature, the Crown could not
grant these properties to private owners if the
effect was to interfere with the public interests
in navigation or fishing. Resources that were
suitable for these uses were deemed to be
held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of
the public. Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law,
University of Michigan — proponent of the
Modern Public Trust Doctrine — in an erudite
article “Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law : Effective Judicial Intervention”, Michigan
Law Review, Vol. 68, Part 1 p. 473, has given
the historical background of the Public Trust
Doctrine as under:
“The source of modern public trust law
is found in a concept that received much
attention in Roman and English law —
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the nature of property rights in rivers,
the sea, and the seashore. That history
has been given considerable attention in
the legal literature, need not be repeated
in detail here. But two points should
be emphasized. First, certain interests,
such as navigation and fishing, were
sought to be preserved for the benefit
of the public; accordingly, property used
for those purposes was distinguished
from general public property which the
sovereign could routinely grant to private
owners. Second, while it was understood
that in certain common properties — such
as the seashore, highways, and running
water — ‘perpetual use was dedicated to
the public’, it has never been clear whether
the public had an enforceable right to
prevent infringement of those interests.
Although the State apparently did protect
public uses, no evidence is available that
public rights could be legally asserted
against a recalcitrant government.”
25. The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests
on the principle that certain resources like air,
sea, waters and the forests have such a great
importance to the people as a whole that it would
be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of
private ownership. The said resources being
a gift of nature, they should be made freely
available to everyone irrespective of the status in
life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government
to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the
general public rather than to permit their use
for private ownership or commercial purposes.
According to Professor Sax the Public Trust
Doctrine imposes the following restrictions on
governmental authority:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1429

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

“Three types of restrictions on governmental
authority are often thought to be imposed
by the public trust : first, the property
subject to the trust must not only be used
for a public purpose, but it must be held
available for use by the general public;
second, the property may not be sold, even
for a fair cash equivalent; and third the
property must be maintained for particular
types of uses.”
26. The American law on the subject is primarily
based on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
People of the State of Illinois, [146 US 387
(1892) : 36 L.Ed. 1018]. In the year 1869 the
Illinois Legislature made a substantial grant of
submerged lands — a mile strip along the shores
of Lake Michigan extending one mile out from
the shoreline — to the Illinois Central Railroad.
In 1873, the Legislature changed its mind and
repealed the 1869 grant. The State of Illinois
sued to quit title. The Court while accepting the
stand of the State of Illinois held that the title
of the State in the land in dispute was a title
different in character from that which the State
held in lands intended for sale. It was different
from the title which the United States held in
public lands which were open to preemption
and sale. It was a title held in trust — for the
people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the water, carry on commerce over
them and have liberty of fishing therein free from
obstruction or interference of private parties.
The abdication of the general control of the
State over lands in dispute was not consistent
with the exercise of the trust which required
the Government of the State to preserve such
waters for the use of the public. According to
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Professor Sax the Court in Illinois Central [146
US 387 : 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892)] “articulated a
principle that has become the central substantive
thought in public trust litigation. When a State
holds a resource which is available for the free
use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental
conduct which is calculated either to relocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties”.
2 7 . I n G o u l d v. G r e y l o c k R e s e r v a t i o n
Commission, [350 Mass 410 (1966)] the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
took the first major step in developing the
doctrine applicable to changes in the use of
lands dedicated to the public interest. In 1886
a group of citizens interested in preserving
Mount Greylock as an unspoiled natural forest,
promoted the creation of an association for the
purpose of laying out a public park on it. The
State ultimately acquired about 9000 acres,
and the legislature enacted a statute creating
the Greylock Reservation Commission. In the
year 1953, the legislature enacted a statute
creating an Authority to construct and operate
on Mount Greylock an Aerial Tramway and
certain other facilities and it authorised the
Commission to lease to the Authority any portion
of the Mount Greylock Reservation. Before the
project commenced, five citizens brought an
action against both the Greylock Reservation
Commission and the Tramway Authority. The
plaintiffs brought the suit as beneficiaries of
the public trust. The Court held both the lease
and the management agreement invalid on the
ground that they were in excess of the statutory
grant of the authority. The crucial passage in
the judgment of the Court is as under:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1431

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

“The profit-sharing feature and some
aspects of the project itself strongly suggest
a commercial enterprise. In addition to the
absence of any clear or express statutory
authorization of as broad a delegation of
responsibility by the Authority as is given
by the management agreement, we find
no express grant to the Authority or power
to permit use of public lands and of the
Authority’s borrowed funds for what seems,
in part at least, a commercial venture for
private profit.”
Professor Sax’s comments on the above-quoted
paragraph from Gould decision are as under:
“It hardly seems surprising, then, that
the court questioned why a State should
subordinate a public park, serving a
useful purpose as relatively undeveloped
land, to the demands of private investors
for building such a commercial facility.
The court, faced with such a situation,
could hardly have been expected to have
treated the case as if it involved nothing
but formal legal issues concerning the
State’s authority to change the use of a
certain tract of land…. Gould, like Illinois
Central, was concerned with the most overt
sort of imposition on the public interest
: commercial interests had obtained
advantages which infringed directly
on public uses and promoted private
profits. But the Massachusetts court
has also confronted a more pervasive, if
more subtle, problem — that concerning
projects which clearly have some public
justification. Such cases arise when, for
example, a highway department seeks to
take a piece of parkland or to fill a wetland.”
1432 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. In Sacco v. Development of Public Works,
[532 Mass 670], the Massachusetts Court
restrained the Department of Public Works
from filling a great pond as part of its plan to
relocate part of State Highway. The Department
purported to act under the legislative authority.
The court found the statutory power inadequate
and held as under:
“the improvement of public lands
contemplated by this section does not
include the widening of a State highway.
It seems rather that the improvement of
public lands which the legislature provided
for … is to preserve such lands so that
they may be enjoyed by the people for
recreational purposes.”
29. In Robbins v. Deptt. of Public Works, [244
NE 2d 577], the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts restrained the Public Works
Department from acquiring Fowl Meadows,
“wetlands of considerable natural beauty …
often used for nature study and recreation” for
highway use.
30. Professor Sax in the article (Michigan Law
Review) refers to Priewev v. Wisconsin State
Land and Improvement Co., [93 Wis 534 (1896)],
Crawford County Lever and Drainage Distt. No.
1, [182 Wis 404], City of Milwaukee v. State, [193
Wis 423], State v. Public Service Commission,
[275 Wis 112] and opines that “the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin has probably made a more
conscientious effort to rise above rhetoric and
to work out a reasonable meaning for the public
trust doctrine than have the courts of any other
State”.
31. Professor Sax stated the scope of the public
trust doctrine in the following words:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1433

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

“If any of the analysis in this Article makes
sense, it is clear that the judicial techniques
developed in public trust cases need not
be limited either to these few conventional
interests or to questions of disposition of
public properties. Public trust problems are
found whenever governmental regulation
comes into question, and they occur in a
wide range of situations in which diffused
public interests need protection against
tightly organized groups with clear and
immediate goals. Thus, it seems that
the delicate mixture of procedural and
substantive protections which the courts
have applied in conventional public trust
cases would be equally applicable and
equally appropriate in controversies
involving air pollution, the dissemination
of pesticides, the location of rights of way
for utilities, and strip mining of wetland
filling on private lands in a State where
governmental permits are required.”
32. We may at this stage refer to the judgment
of the Supreme Court of California in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, [33 Cal 3d 419]. The case is popularly
known as “the Mono Lake case”. Mono Lake
is the second largest lake in California. The
lake is saline. It contains no fish but supports
a large population of brine shrimp which feed
vast numbers of nesting and migrating birds.
Islands in the lake protect a large breeding
colony of California gulls, and the lake itself
serves as a haven on the migration route for
thousands of birds. Towers and spires of tura
(sic) on the north and south shores are matters
of geological interest and a tourist attraction. In
1940, the Division of Water Resources granted
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Supreme Court Reports

the Department of Water and Power of the City
of Los Angeles a permit to appropriate virtually
the entire flow of 4 of the 5 streams flowing
into the lake. As a result of these diversions,
the level of the lake dropped, the surface area
diminished, the gulls were abandoning the
lake and the scenic beauty and the ecological
values of Mono Lake were imperilled. The
plaintiffs environmentalist — using the public
trust doctrine — filed a law suit against Los
Angeles Water Diversions. The case eventually
came to the California Supreme Court, on a
Federal Trial Judge’s request for clarification
of the State’s public trust doctrine. The Court
explained the concept of public trust doctrine in
the following words:
“‘By the law of nature these things are
common to mankind — the air, running
water, the sea and consequently the shores
of the sea.’ (Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1)
From this origin in Roman law, the English
common law evolved the concept of the
public trust, under which the sovereign
owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and
the lands lying beneath them as trustee of
a public trust for the benefit of the people.’”
The Court explained the purpose of the public
trust as under:
“The objective of the public trust has
evolved in tandem with the changing
public perception of the values and
uses of waterways. As we observed in
Marks v. Whitney, [6 Cal 3d 251], ‘[p]
ublic trust easements (were) traditionally
defined in terms of navigation, commerce
and fisheries. They have been held to
include the right to fish, hunt, bathe,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1435

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

swim, to use for boating and general
recreation purposes the navigable waters
of the State, and to use the bottom of the
navigable waters for anchoring, standing,
or other purposes. We went on, however,
to hold that the traditional triad of uses —
navigation, commerce and fishing — did
not limit the public interest in the trust
res. In language of special importance to
the present setting, we stated that ‘[t]he
public uses to which tidelands are subject
are sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs. In administering
the trust the State is not burdened with
an outmoded classification favouring one
mode of utilization over another. There is a
growing public recognition that one of the
important public uses of the tidelands —
a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust — is the preservation of those lands in
their natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific study, as
open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life, and which favourably affect the
scenery and climate of the area.’
Mono Lake is a navigable waterway. It
supports a small local industry which
harvests brine shrimp for sale as fish
food, which endeavour probably qualifies
the lake as a ‘fishery’ under the traditional
public trust cases. The principal values
plaintiffs seek to protect, however, are
recreational and ecological — the scenic
views of the lake and its shore, the purity of
the air, and the use of the lake for nesting
and feeding by birds. Under Marks v.
Whitney, [6 Cal 3d 251], it is clear that
1436 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

protection of these values is among the
purposes of the public trust.”
The Court summed up the powers of the State
as trustee in the following words:
“Thus, the public trust is more than an
affirmation of State power to use public
property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the State to
protect the people’s common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only
in rare cases when the abandonment of
that right is consistent with the purposes
of the trust….”
The Supreme Court of California, inter alia,
reached the following conclusion:
“The State has an affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever feasible.
Just as the history of this State shows
that appropriation may be necessary for
efficient use of water despite unavoidable
harm to public trust values, it demonstrates
that an appropriative water rights system
administered without consideration of
the public trust may cause unnecessary
and unjustified harm to trust interests.
(See Johnson, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
233, 256-57/; Robie, Some Reflections
on Environmental Considerations in
Water Rights Administration, 2 Ecology
L.Q. 695, 710-711 (1972); Comment,
33 Hastings L.J. 653, 654.) As a matter
of practical necessity, the State may
have to approve appropriations despite
foreseeable harm to public trust uses.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1437

In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

In so doing, however, the State must bear
in mind its duty as trustee to consider the
effect of the taking on the public trust (see
United Plainsmen v. N.D. State Water
Cons. Comm’n, [247 NW 2d 457 (ND
1976)] at pp. 462-463, and to preserve, so
far as consistent with the public interest,
the uses protected by the trust.”
The Court finally came to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs could rely on the public trust doctrine
in seeking reconsideration of the allocation of
the waters of the Mono basin.
33. It is no doubt correct that the public trust
doctrine under the English common law
extended only to certain traditional uses such
as navigation, commerce and fishing. But the
American Courts in recent cases have expanded
the concept of the public trust doctrine. The
observations of the Supreme Court of California
in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d 419] clearly show
the judicial concern in protecting all ecologically
important lands, for example fresh water,
wetlands or riparian forests. The observations of
the Court in Mono Lake case, [33 Cal 3d 419] to
the effect that the protection of ecological values
is among the purposes of public trust, may
give rise to an argument that the ecology and
the environment protection is a relevant factor
to determine which lands, waters or airs are
protected by the public trust doctrine. The Courts
in United States are finally beginning to adopt
this reasoning and are expanding the public trust
to encompass new types of lands and waters. In
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, [108 S.Ct.
791 (1988)] the United States Supreme Court
upheld Mississippi’s extension of public trust
doctrine to lands underlying non-navigable tidal
areas. The majority judgment adopted ecological
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concepts to determine which lands can be
considered tide lands. Phillips Petroleum case,
[108 S.Ct. 791 (1988)] assumes importance
because the Supreme Court expanded the public
trust doctrine to identify the tide lands not on
commercial considerations but on ecological
concepts. We see no reason why the public trust
doctrine should not be expanded to include all
ecosystems operating in our natural resources.
34. Our legal system-based on English common
law-includes the public trust doctrine as part of
its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all
natural resources which are by nature meant
for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is
the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters,
airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The
State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect
the natural resources. These resources meant
for public use cannot be converted into private
ownership.
35. We are fully aware that the issues presented
in this case illustrate the classic struggle
between those members of the public who would
preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open
lands in their pristine purity and those charged
with administrative responsibilities who, under
the pressures of the changing needs of an
increasingly complex society, find it necessary
to encroach to some extent upon open lands
heretofore considered inviolate to change. The
resolution of this conflict in any given case is for
the legislature and not the courts. If there is a law
made by Parliament or the State Legislatures the
courts can serve as an instrument of determining
legislative intent in the exercise of its powers
of judicial review under the Constitution. But in
the absence of any legislation, the executive
acting under the doctrine of public trust cannot
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In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

abdicate the natural resources and convert
them into private ownership, or for commercial
use. The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of
the natural resources, the environment and the
ecosystems of our country cannot be permitted
to be eroded for private, commercial or any other
use unless the courts find it necessary, in good
faith, for the public good and in public interest
to encroach upon the said resources.”
152. This Court in unequivocal terms has held that the
executive acting under the doctrine of public trust cannot
abdicate the natural resources and convert them into
private ownership, or for commercial use. The aesthetic
use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the
environment and the ecosystems of our country cannot
be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any
other use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith,
for the public good and in public interest to encroach upon
the said resources.
153. The law with regard to the importance of the ‘public
trust’ doctrine in ecological/environmental matters has
further been evolved and expanded by this Court in
subsequent judgments. In the case of Association for
Environment Protection v. State of Kerala11, this Court
has referred to some of the judgments which followed the
law laid down in the case of Kamal Nath (supra), which
are as under:
“6. In M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam
Sahu, [(1999) 6 SCC 464], the Court applied
the public trust doctrine for upholding the order
of the Allahabad High Court which had quashed
the decision of Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika
permitting appellant M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. to
construct an underground shopping complex in
Jhandewala Park, Aminabad Market, Lucknow,
and directed demolition of the construction
made on the park land. The High Court had
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noted that Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika had
entered into an agreement with the appellant for
construction of shopping complex and given it
full freedom to lease out the shops and also to
sign agreement on its behalf and held that this
was impermissible. On appeal by the builders,
this Court held that the terms of agreement were
unreasonable, unfair and atrocious. The Court
then invoked the public trust doctrine and held
that being a trustee of the park on behalf of the
public, the Nagar Mahapalika could not have
transferred the same to the private builder and
thereby deprived the residents of the area of the
quality of life to which they were entitled under
the Constitution and municipal laws.
7. In Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P., [(2006)
3 SCC 549], this Court again invoked the public
trust doctrine in a matter involving the challenge
to the systematic destruction of percolation,
irrigation and drinking water tanks in Tirupati
Town, referred to some judicial precedents
including M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath [M.C. Mehta
v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388], M.I. Builders
(P) Ltd., [(1999) 6 SCC 464], National Audubon
Society [National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court, 658 P 2d 709 : 33 Cal 3d 419 (1983)] and
observed : (Intellectuals Forum case, [(2006) 3
SCC 549], SCC p. 575, para 76)
“76. … This is an articulation of the
doctrine from the angle of the affirmative
duties of the State with regard to public
trust. Formulated from a negatory angle,
the doctrine does not exactly prohibit
the alienation of the property held as a
public trust. However, when the State
holds a resource that is freely available
for the use of the public, it provides for
a high degree of judicial scrutiny on any
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In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

action of the Government, no matter how
consistent with the existing legislations,
that attempts to restrict such free use.
To properly scrutinise such actions of
the Government, the courts must make
a distinction between the Government’s
general obligation to act for the public
benefit, and the special, more demanding
obligation which it may have as a trustee
of certain public resources….”
(emphasis in original)

8. In Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel
Martins, [(2009) 3 SCC 571 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ)
877], this Court was called upon to consider whether
the appellant was entitled to block the passage to the
beach by erecting a fence in the garb of protecting
its property. After noticing the judgments to which
reference has been made hereinabove, the Court
held : (SCC pp. 614-15 & 619, paras 53-55 & 65)
“53. The public trust doctrine enjoins upon
the Government to protect the resources
for the enjoyment of the general public
rather than to permit their use for private
ownership or commercial purposes. This
doctrine puts an implicit embargo on the
right of the State to transfer public properties
to private party if such transfer affects
public interest, mandates affirmative State
action for effective management of natural
resources and empowers the citizens to
question ineffective management thereof.
54. The heart of the public trust doctrine
is that it imposes limits and obligations
upon government agencies and their
administrators on behalf of all the people
and especially future generations. For
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example, renewable and non-renewable
resources, associated uses, ecological
values or objects in which the public has
a special interest (i.e. public lands, waters,
etc.) are held subject to the duty of the
State not to impair such resources, uses
or values, even if private interests are
involved. The same obligations apply to
managers of forests, monuments, parks,
the public domain and other public assets.
Professor Joseph L. Sax in his classic
article, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resources Law : Effective Judicial
Intervention’ (1970), indicates that the
public trust doctrine, of all concepts known
to law, constitutes the best practical and
philosophical premise and legal tool for
protecting public rights and for protecting
and managing resources, ecological values
or objects held in trust.
55. The public trust doctrine is a tool for
exerting long-established public rights
over short-term public rights and private
gain. Today every person exercising his
or her right to use the air, water, or land
and associated natural ecosystems has
the obligation to secure for the rest of us
the right to live or otherwise use that same
resource or property for the long-term and
enjoyment by future generations. To say it
another way, a landowner or lessee and
a water right holder has an obligation to
use such resources in a manner as not
to impair or diminish the people's rights
and the people's long-term interest in that
property or resource, including downslope
lands, waters and resources.
***
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In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

65. We reiterate that natural resources
including forests, water bodies, rivers,
seashores, etc. are held by the State
as a trustee on behalf of the people and
especially the future generations. These
constitute common properties and people
are entitled to uninterrupted use thereof.
The State cannot transfer public trust
properties to a private party, if such a
transfer interferes with the right of the
public and the court can invoke the public
trust doctrine and take affirmative action
for protecting the right of people to have
access to light, air and water and also for
protecting rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests
and associated natural ecosystems.”
154. The importance of the doctrine of ‘public trust’ has
further been emphasized in the case of Tata Housing
Development Company Limited v. Aalok Jagga (2020) 15
SCC 784 to which one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a party.”
77. In the present case, it appears that the then Minister for Revenue
and the then Divisional Commissioner had totally given a go-bye to
the doctrine of public trust. The facts appearing on the record are
glaring.
78. As already discussed hereinabove, as per the order of the Tehsildar,
Haveli, the land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ on Eksali
(yearly) lease and as per the undertaking of the ‘Chavan Family’ the
possession of the land was to be returned on the expiry of the one
year and there has been no further renewal. It further appears that
thereafter the members of the ‘Chavan Family’ were in deep slumber.
79. From the records, it appears that one Mr. R.S. Chauhan, a retired
Police Inspector, residing in Pune and others, for the first time,
started agitating their rights on 4th August 1988. They had addressed
communications dated 4th August 1988, 30th August 1988 and 27th
December 1990 for allotment of subject land on permanent basis
for cultivation in lieu of their land at Survey No. 37, acquired for
Kondhwa Leprosy Hospital.
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80. It appears that thereafter for the first time the Collector, Pune on 19th
June 1991 recommended the permanent allotment of the subject
land to the ‘Chavan Family’ only insofar as 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas
are concerned. The Collector, Pune specifically observed that the
‘Chavan Family’ had the cultivation rights from 1969 only on 3 Acres
and 20 Gunthas, whereas the rest of the land was reserved for
village animal feeding. The Collector, Pune, therefore, recommended
allotment of only 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas to the ‘Chavan Family’
and also recommended that possession of rest of the land should
be handed over to the Forest Department.
81. It is to be noted that the office of the Collector, Pune on 26th August
1994, rejected the request of the Executive Engineer, MSEB for
establishment of High-Tension Sub-Station on the ground that the
land in question was reserved as “Forest Land”.
82. The Divisional Commissioner in his letter dated 30th November
1994 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department,
Mantralaya noted that the Collector, Pune had opined that the
‘Chavan Family’ was entitled only to 3 Acres and 20 Gunthas. He
also recorded the objection of the Forest Department to the effect
that the Forest Department had asked for possession of the subject
land for the purposes of afforestation.
83. In spite of noticing all of these facts, the Divisional Commissioner
recommended that the entire subject land of 11 Hectare 89 Are be
granted to the ‘Chavan Family’. Thereafter the matter remained
pending at the level of the State Government.
84. The then Minister for Revenue considered the proposal and came
to a conclusion that the provisions of the 1980 FC Act were not
applicable to the present case. However, he decided to seek the
opinion of the Law and Judiciary Department of the Government
of Maharashtra. The Deputy Secretary to Government, Law and
Judiciary Department on 27th July 1998, relying on the judgment
of this Court in the case of Banshi Ram Modi (supra) opined
that the permission of the Government of India is not necessary.
While doing so, he specifically ignored the specific judgment of
this Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works (supra) and the
direction of this Court dated 12th December 1996 in the present
proceedings.
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In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

85. Almost within a week thereafter, i.e. on 4 th August 1998, the
Government of Maharashtra issued an order allotting the land in
favour of the ‘Chavan Family’. A corrigendum thereto, vide order
dated 13th August 1998, specifically provided that the allotment of
land was specifically for “Agricultural purpose”. The Collector, Pune
thereafter within a short span, i.e. on 28th August 1998, allotted the
subject land in favour of the ‘Chavan Family’.
86. The alarming speed with which the events took place from July to
August 1998 speaks volumes.
87. As already discussed hereinabove, though the ‘Chavan Family’ had
already entered into transactions with Mr. Aniruddha P. Deshpande,
the Chief Promoter of the RRCHS, they transferred the land in favour
of RRCHS on 19th December 1998. This is again done in breach of
the allotment order of 28th August 1998. The Divisional Commissioner
thereafter vide order dated 30th October 1999, permitted the sale of
the subject land to the RRCHS on payment of 75% of the price fixed
by the Collector, Assistant Director, Town Planning Department, Pune.
88. It is to be noted that though the powers for grant of permission are
with the Collector, it is the Divisional Commissioner who exercised
the said powers for reasons best known to him. Thereafter the
District Collector granted permission for use of the subject land for
Non-Agricultural purposes on 8th July 2005.
89. It is to be noted that all this has been done in the teeth of various
communications of the Forest Department since 1991 requesting the
Revenue Department to transfer the land to the Forest Department.
It was also brought to the notice of the Revenue Authorities by the
Forest Department that a plantation had already been carried out
on the subject land in the year 1995-96.
90. In the light of these glaring facts, we have no hesitation in holding
that the then Minister for Revenue, Government of Maharashtra and
the then Divisional Commissioner, Pune have acted totally in breach
of public trust to illegally cause gain to private individuals at the cost
of sacrificing precious Forest Land.
91. In the conclusion, we have no hesitation to hold that the allotment
of the subject land to the ‘Chavan Family’ was in blatant disregard
to the provisions of the law inasmuch as it was violative of
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Section 2 of the 1980 FC Act as well as the directions issued by
this Court from time to time. We also hold that the allotment of
the subject land was made, ignoring the communications of the
Forest Department which had insisted that the said land could
not be allotted inasmuch as, the same was classified as a Forest
Land. We also have no hesitation to hold that the then Minister
for Revenue and the then Divisional Commissioner, Pune have
given a total go-bye to the doctrine of public trust inasmuch as,
valuable forest land was allotted to the ‘Chavan Family’ de hors
the provisions of the law.
92. While hearing this matter, another glaring issue has come to the
notice of the Court. It has been noticed that a vast stretch of the
land which is notified as ‘Forest Land’ is still in possession of the
Revenue Department. Such a situation creates many complexities as
is evident in the present matter. The Revenue Department, despite
resistance from the Forest Department, allotted the land to private
individuals/institutions for non-forestry purposes. This, in turn, reduced
the vital green cover. We, therefore, find that it is necessary that a
direction needs to be issued to all the State Government and the
Union Territories to hand over the possession of the lands which
are recorded as ‘Forest Land’ and which are in possession of the
Revenue Department to the Forest Department.
93. The report of the CEC would also reveal that there is material to
show that many of the Forest Lands have been allotted to private
individuals/institutions for non-forestry purposes. Any such allotment
after 12th December 1996, i.e., the date on which the directions
were given by this Court in the present proceedings, would not be
sustainable in law.
94. It would, therefore, be imperative that wherever it is possible to take
back the possession of such land, the State/Union Territory should
do so and hand over the possession to the Forest Department for
forestry purposes. However, if on account of such lands already
being converted for non-forest activities, it is found that taking back
the possession of the land would not be in the larger public interest,
then the States/Union Territories should recover the cost of the land
from such individuals/institutions and use the said amount for the
purpose of afforestation, restoration and conservation.
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In Re: Construction of Multi Storeyed Buildings
in Forest Land Maharashtra

VI. CONCLUSION
95. We, therefore, dispose of the Interlocutory Applications and the Writ
Petition in the following terms:
(i) We hold that the allotment of 11.89 ha of Reserve Forest land
in Survey No.21 (old Survey No.20A) Kondhwa Budruk in
District Pune for agriculture purposes on 28th August 1998 and
subsequent permission given for its sale in favour of RRCHS
on 30th October 1999 was totally illegal;
(ii) We further hold that Environmental Clearance granted by the
MoEF on 3rd July 2007 to RRCHS is illegal and is accordingly
quashed and set aside;
(iii) Since the State of Maharashtra has recalled the communication
dated 4th August 1998 approving the allotment of the subject
land to the ‘Chavan Family’, we uphold the same;
(iv) We direct that the possession of the subject land, which is
reserved as a Forest Land, but is in possession of the Revenue
Department, should be handed over to the Forest Department
within a period of three months from today;
(v) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all the States and the
Administrators of all the Union Territories to constitute Special
Investigation Teams for the purpose of examining as to whether
any of the reserved Forest Land in the possession of the Revenue
Department has been allotted to any private individuals/institutions
for any purpose other than the forestry purpose;
(vi) The State Governments and the Union Territories are also
directed to take steps to take back the possession of the land
from the persons/institutions in possession of such lands and
handover the same to the Forest Department. In case, it is
found that taking back the possession of the land would not
be in the larger public interest, the State Governments/Union
Territories should recover the cost of the said land from the
persons/institutions to whom they were allotted and use the
said amount for the purpose of development of forests; and
(vii) We further direct the Chief Secretaries of all the States and the
Administrators of all the Union Territories to constitute Special
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Teams to ensure that all such transfers take place within a
period of one year from today. Needless to state that hereinafter
such land should be used only for the purpose of afforestation.
96. Before we part with this judgment, we place on record our deep
appreciation for Shri K. Parameshwar, learned Senior Counsel,
ably assisted by Mr. M.V. Mukunda, Ms. Kanti, Ms. Raji Gururaj
and Mr. Shreenivas Patil, learned counsel, for rendering valuable
assistance to this Court as Amicus Curiae. We also place on record
our appreciation for the efforts put in by Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,
Shri Shekhar Naphade and Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the parties.

Result of the case: Writ petition and interlocutory applications
disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain