HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITEDversusSHAILENDRA BHATNAGAR

                           [2022] 3 S.C.R. 107                              107


               HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED                                  A
                                   v.
                   SHAILENDRA BHATNAGAR
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3001 of 2022)
                           APRIL 20, 2022                                   B
       [VINEET SARAN AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
       Consumer Protection Act, 1986: s. 14(1) – Defect in respect
of safety features of a vehicle – Award of punitive damages – On
facts, non-deployment of air bags in the car at the time of accident
resulting in injuries to the complainant – Award of compensation            C
by fora below – On appeal, held: Fora below rightly relied on the
principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of the manufacturer
as regards defect in the airbag system, having regard to the nature
of the collision and took the view that expert evidence was not
necessary – They highlighted that there was significant damage to
the front portion of the vehicle – Ordinarily a consumer while              D
purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume that the same would
be deployed whenever there is a collision from the front portion of
the vehicle – Deployment of the airbags ought to have prevented
injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularly
in the front seat – Consumer is not meant to be an expert in physics        E
calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based on velocity
and force – Thus, no error in the findings of the two fora as regards
there being defect in the vehicle – As per the statute, the direction
could be for replacement of defective goods as also punitive
damages – In the facts of the case, direction for replacement of the
vehicle is justified and the fact that the consumer has got the car         F
repaired on insurance money would not impact the quantum of
damages, which is partly punitive in nature – Failure to provide an
airbag system which would meet the safety standards to be subject
to punitive damages – Thus, the decision of the National Commission
not interfered with – Sale of Goods Act, 1930 – ss. 2(7), 16.               G
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 Vehicles are goods within the meaning of Section
2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and they carry implied
conditions as to their fitness. That is a statutory mandate and
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                                  107
108            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     that mandate also operates in respect of goods, whose defect is
      subject of proceeding in a consumer complaint under the
      Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In the complaint, it has been
      pleaded that the respondent had relied on the safety features of
      the vehicle projected by the manufacturer. In such a situation,
      the limitation will run from the day the defect surfaces in a case.
B
      There is no way by which the nature of defect complained against
      could be identified in normal circumstances at an earlier date,
      before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature of
      the vehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was represented
      by the manufacturer by implication. The National Commission’s
C     view is broadly based on the principle incorporated in Section 16
      of the 1930 Act. The defect in this case ought to be treated to
      have had surfaced on the date of the accident itself. [Para 7]
      [115-F-H; 116-A-B]
           1.2 The question on privity of contract was raised on the
D     ground that the dealer was not impleaded as a party and there
      was no contract between the appellant and the respondent
      consumer. This issue was rightly rejected by both the fora.
      [Para 8][116-H; 117-A]
            1.3 There are findings of the two fora about the defect in
E     the product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with
      front airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did not
      deploy. The accident caused injuries to the respondent. The
      appellant referred to various portions from the owner’s manual
      to contend that the impact of the collision was not sufficient to
      activate the sensor which in turn would have resulted in
F     deployment of the airbags. The State Commission relied on the
      principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of the
      manufacturer as regards defect in the airbag system, having
      regard to the nature of the collision. The National Commission
      affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of the
G     damaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. In
      such circumstances, both the said fora took the view that expert
      evidence was not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannot
      be faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts. [Para 9]
      [117-B-D]

H
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                           109
                   BHATNAGAR

      1.4 Ordinarily a consumer while purchasing a vehicle with          A
airbags would assume that the same would be deployed whenever
there is a collision from the front portion of the vehicle (in respect
of front airbags). Both the fora, in their decisions, have highlighted
the fact that there was significant damage to the front portion of
the vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to have prevented
                                                                         B
injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularly
in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert in
physics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based
on velocity and force. In such circumstances, there is no error in
the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in the
vehicle. [Para 10][117-E-G]                                              C
      1.5 This is a case where the 1986 Act was applicable and
Section 14 of the said statute lays down the reliefs which may be
granted. The directions as per the statute, could be for
replacement of defective goods as also punitive damages. The
appellant have also taken a point that so far as replacement of          D
the vehicle is concerned, there was no substantive direction and
no discussion either. The operative part of the order suffers from
a shortcoming on this count, but that is not fatal. On a composite
reading of the directions, it is found that such direction was made.
The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in
the Order of the State Commission. A direction for replacement           E
of the vehicle is justified in the facts of this case. The direction
for replacement of the vehicle would not be treated as non-est
having regard to the State Commission’s Order. The fact that the
consumer has got the car repaired on insurance money would
not impact the quantum of damages, which is partly punitive in           F
nature in this case. [Para 11][117-H; 118-A-C]
      1.6 The damages awarded against the appellant may have
gone beyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and may
not represent the actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms.
But the provision of Section 14 of the 1986 Act permits awarding         G
punitive damages. Such damages can be awarded in the event
the defect is found to have the potential to cause serious injury
or major loss to the consumer, particularly in respect of safety
features of a vehicle. The manufacturer should be under strict

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110            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     and absolute liability in respect of the latter. Compensation in
      the form of punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect.
      [Para 13][118-F-H; 119-A]
             1.7 In the instant case, the impact of the collision was such
      that it would have been reasonable for the respondent to assume
B     that there would have been deployment of the airbags. The safety
      description of the goods fell short of its expected quality. The
      content of the owners’ manual does not carry any material from
      which the owner of a vehicle could be alerted that in a collision of
      this nature, the airbags would not deploy. Purchase decision of
      the respondent-complainant was largely made on the basis of
C     representation of the safety features of the vehicle. The failure
      to provide an airbag system which would meet the safety standards
      as perceived by a car-buyer of reasonable prudence should be
      subject to punitive damages which can have deterrent effect. And
      in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of the
D     manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no
      specific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim
      of damages of this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality
      thereof could be open to legal scrutiny. [Para 14][119-D-G]
             1.8 If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits any
E     of the statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section
      14 of the Act, it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of
      the Forum to pass directions irrespective of the fact as to whether
      specifically certain reliefs have been claimed or not, provided
      that facts make out foundations for granting such reliefs. In any
      event, it is within the jurisdiction of the said forum to mould the
F     reliefs claimed to do effective justice, provided the relief comes
      within the stipulation of Section 14(1) of the Act. The relief granted
      to the respondent comes within the statutory framework. The
      decision of the National Commission is not interfered with. The
      reasoning of the Commission or the operative part of the order
G     awarding damages are not perverse. The directions issued against
      the appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the National
      Commission cannot be said to have failed the test of
      proportionality. The subject-defect is found to be of such nature
      that the provisions relating to punitive damages ought to be
      attracted against the appellant. [Para 15][119-H; 120-A-D]
H
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                                     111
                   BHATNAGAR

       Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others (2003) 2 SCC                            A
       274 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499; Sangita Arya and
       Others v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and
       Others (2020) 5 SCC 327; Jitendra Khimshankar
       Trivedi and Others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others
       (2015) 4 SCC 237 : [2015] 2 SCR 120; M.C. Mehta
                                                                                   B
       and Another v. Union of India and Others (1987) 1
       SCC 395 : [1987] 1 SCR 819 – referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499              referred to                Para 12
(2020) 5 SCC 327                     referred to                Para 12            C

[2015] 2 SCR 120                     referred to                Para 12
[1987] 1 SCR 819                     referred to                Para 13
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3001
of 2022.                                                                           D
     From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2021 of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in First Appeal
No.850 of 2020.
     Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Gaurang Kanth, Ms. Shivani Kher,
Chandan Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.                                            E

       Ms. Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta, Advs. for the Respondent.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
                                                                                   F
       1. Leave granted.
       2. The appellant are manufacturers of vehicles and the present
appeal arises out of a complaint made by the respondent concerning
defect in a vehicle, particularly in relation to its safety features originating
from the appellant, of the model Creta 1.6 VTVT SX+. The vehicle
                                                                                   G
came with two front airbags. Purchase of the vehicle was made on 21st
August 2015. It met with an accident on the Delhi-Panipat highway on
16th November 2017 resulting in substantial damage to its RH front pillar,
RH front roof, side body panels, front RH door panels and LH front
wheel suspension. The initials RH and LH appears to be used as short
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112             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     forms of Right Hand and Left Hand sides of the vehicle. At that point of
      time, the complainant (being the respondent herein), his mother and
      daughter were in the vehicle. The airbags of the vehicle did not deploy
      at the time of collision. The complainant suffered head, chest as also
      dental injuries. He attributes such injuries to non-deployment of airbags
      at the time of accident. The appellant themselves obtained an investigation
B
      report which has been referred to as SRS report. The remarks and
      conclusion of the said SRS Investigation Report, as it appears from pages
      53 and 54 of the paperbook were:-
            “Remarks:
C           •      Vehicle found with major damage on RH front pillar, RH
                   Side body panels and LH front wheel suspension.
            •      Under ride & Angular impact found on the RH Front Pillar,
                   Roof and Front RH Door panel.
            •      Grazing damages found on the RH side panels due to the
D                  scratch against truck while moving towards left.
            Findings:
            •      No crash info recorded in SRSCM, hence no air bags
                   deployed.
E           •      No impact damage observed on both side chassis members,
                   damages found away from impact sensors.
            •      Vehicle found completely dismantled and mid-repair
                   condition during inspection.
            Conclusion:
F
            •      The major impact to the vehicle from RH pillar resulted in
                   under ride and angular condition.
            •      Both front chassis member found unaffected by the frontal
                   impact, hence no impact sensed by the front impact sensors
G                  and not triggered any signal to SRSCM (No crash info
                   recorded in SRSCM for frontal impact).
            •      After thorough study, it is confirmed that the condition was
                   not met for the air bag deployment, hence no air bags
                   deployed. The air bag system was working proper at the
                   time of accident.
H
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                              113
          BHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

      Accident description:                                                 A
      •     As per customer verbatim, while he was driving at 100 kmph
            speed on Gannaur highway. A front going truck applied
            sudden brake, his car hit to the truck from the right side to
            the left rear corner of the Truck. Further his car scratched
            against the truck while moving towards left side of the road    B
            and finally hit to some stones on the left front wheel and
            vehicle stopped.”
                                                   (quoted verbatim)
       3. The Delhi State Consumer Redressal Commission, in a
complaint raised by the respondent, upheld his claim. The main theme of     C
his complaint was that the main reason for his purchase decision of the
model was because of its safety features including the airbags and the
injury was suffered by him because of non-deployment of the airbags.
The State Commission granted relief to the following effect:-
      “19. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the present    D
      consumer complaint, we direct the opposite party to:
      a. Compensate the complainant an amout of Rs.2,00,000/- for
      medical expenses and loss of income.
      b. Compensate the complainant an amount of Rs.50,000/- for
                                                                            E
      mental agony.
      c. Pay to the complainant an amount of Rs.50,000/- as cost of
      litigation.
      20. The aforesaid payment shall be made by opposite party within
      two months from the date of this order by way of demand draft.        F
      Failure of opposite party in paying the said amount in stipulated
      period will attract an interest of 7% per annum from the date of
      default. Furthermore, failure in replacing the vehicle of the
      appellant will also attract an interest of 7% per annum of the
      value of the vehicle from the date of default.”
                                                                            G
       4. The appellant preferred appeal before the National Consumer
Dispute Redressal Commission (“National Commission”). The National
Commission dismissed the appeal sustaining the compensation awarded
by the State Commission. The Order of the National Commission, which
was passed on 5th January 2021, is under appeal before us. Neither the
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114            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     State Commission nor the National Commission accepted the justification
      sought to be made by the appellant referring to the said investigation
      report, having regard to the fact of non-deployment of the airbags. It has
      been, inter-alia, held by the National Commission:-
            “11.... Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Opposite Party submitted
B           that the airbags deploy only when there is severe impact of force
            and airbags may not deploy if the vehicle collides with objects like
            poles and trees, when full force of the impact is not delivered to
            the sensors. Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the
            SRS Investigation report dated 01.12.2017 clearly stated that the
            impact of the accident was such that the minimum threshold force
C           required for the deployment of the airbags was not delivered to
            the front sensors installed in the engine compartment and hence,
            the airbags did not deploy. No expert evidence was produced by
            the Respondent to substantiate any manufacturing defect. The
            Complainant contended that he purchased the car for its safety
D           features highlighted by the Manufacturer, but the airbags did not
            function when required, due to which he sustained serious injuries
            as can be seen from the medical prescriptions and bills furnished
            by the Complainant. The impact/force required for triggering the
            front airbags was not made known to the Complainant. Nowhere
            has the minimum threshold force been quantified and this defence
E           can never be refuted. Highlighting safety features including airbags
            while selling the car and not elaborating and disclosing the threshold
            limits for their opening is by itself an unfair trade practice.
            Complainant, however, had filed photographs of the accidental
            car. Major damage to RH front pillar, RH front roof, side body
F           panels front RH door panels and LH front wheel suspension is
            seen in the photographs of the car. Without forceful impact, the
            car would not have been so badly damaged. The accident was a
            major accident in which the entire deriver side of the car, the side
            part and even the front mirror of the car got smashed and broken.
            The impact of the accident was so intense that the front bumper
G           grill, dash board and the radiator got totally damaged. The State
            Commission rightly observed “that expert evidence need not be
            relied upon where the facts speak for themselves. This is a case
            of Res Ipsa Loquitur where the photographs of the damaged
            vehicle placed on record clearly show the impact of the accident
H           on the vehicle.”
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                                  115
          BHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

       5. One of the points argued on behalf of the appellant by Mr.            A
Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior advocate, is that the order for
replacement of the vehicle ought not to have been passed. The respondent
had not asked for replacement of the vehicle as part of the reliefs claimed
before the State Commission. He has otherwise questioned legality of
the decisions of the two fora citing certain clauses from the owner’s
                                                                                B
manual. His argument on this count has been that if force generated by
the collision is lesser than a certain degree, there would not be deployment
of the airbags. Thus, there was no defect in the security system according
to him. He also highlighted that impact of the accident was from the side
and it was not a frontal hit.
       6. It is the case of the appellant that the airbag deployment depends    C
on a number of factors including vehicle speed, angle of impact, density
and stiffness of vehicles or objects which the vehicle hits in the collision.
The vehicle is designed to deploy the front airbags only when an impact
is sufficiently severe and when the impact angle is less than 30 degrees
from the forward longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Mr. Ahmadi has               D
submitted that the front airbags are not intended to deploy if the impact
is from the side or in cases of rear impact or roll over crashes. He has
referred to a variety of circumstances in a collision which may not result
in deployment of the airbags. He has cited the investigation report to
which we have already referred to.
                                                                                E
       7. Before the Commission, point of limitation was also taken and
the appellant wanted the limitation to run from the date of purchase of
the vehicle and not the date of the accident. This objection on
maintainability has been rightly rejected by both the State Commission
and the National Commission. We do not find any error in the view of
the respective Commissions on this point. Vehicles are goods within the         F
meaning of Section 2(7) of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and they carry
implied conditions as to their fitness. That is a statutory mandate and
that mandate also operates in respect of goods, whose defect is subject
of proceeding in a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986. In the complaint, it has been pleaded that the respondent had        G
relied on the safety features of the vehicle projected by the manufacturer.
In such a situation, the limitation will run from the day the defect surfaces
in a case. There is no way by which the nature of defect complained
against could be identified in normal circumstances at an earlier date,
before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature of the
                                                                                H
116            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     vehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was represented by the
      manufacturer by implication. The National Commission’s view is broadly
      based on the principle incorporated in Section 16 of the 1930 Act. The
      defect in this case ought to be treated to have had surfaced on the date
      of the accident itself. We quote below the provisions of Section 16 of
      The Sale of Goods Act, 1930:-
B
            “16. Implied conditions as to quality or fitness.— Subject to
            the provisions of this Act and of any other law for the time being
            in force, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
            or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a
            contract of sale, except as follows:—
C
            (1)Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to
            the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
            so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment,
            and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the
            seller’s business to supply (whether he is the manufacturer or
D           producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall
            be reasonably fit for such purpose:
            Provided that, in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified
            article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied
            condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
E
            (2)Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals
            in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or
            producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall
            be of merchantable quality:

F           Provided that, if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be
            no implied condition as regards defects which such examination
            ought to have revealed.
            (3)An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a
            particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
G           (4)An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty
            or condition implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.”
             8. The question on privity of contract was also raised before the
      State as also the National Commission and from the decision under appeal
      we find that this point was raised on the ground that the dealer was not
H     impleaded as a party and there was no contract between the appellant
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                                  117
          BHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

and the respondent consumer. This issue was rejected by both the                A
consumer fora. No argument has been advanced before us on this point
and we do not find any error in the reasoning of the National Commission
on this point.
       9. There are findings of the two fora about the defect in the product
sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front airbags and        B
there was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy. The accident
caused injuries to the respondent. The appellant referred to various
portions from the owner’s manual to contend that the impact of the
collision was not sufficient to activate the sensor which in turn would
have resulted in deployment of the airbags. We would not like to revisit
the facts on which findings have been returned by the two fora against          C
the appellant. The State Commission relied on the principle of Res Ipsa
Loquitur to affix the liability of the manufacturer as regards defect in
the airbag system, having regard to the nature of the collision. The National
Commission affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of the
damaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. In such               D
circumstances, both the aforesaid fora took the view that expert evidence
was not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannot be faulted as
being unreasonable, in the given facts.
       10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the
National Commission. We would like to add here that ordinarily a                E
consumer while purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume that
the same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from the front
portion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the fora, in their
decisions, have highlighted the fact that there was significant damage to
the front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to have
prevented injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle,             F
particularly in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert in
physics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based on
velocity and force. In such circumstances, we do not find that there is
any error in the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in
the vehicle.                                                                    G
      11. We shall now turn to the reliefs granted by the State
Commission and upheld by the National Commission. The first point
argued in this regard is that there was no prayer in the petition for
replacement of the vehicle. This is a case where the 1986 Act was
applicable and Section 14 of the said statute lays down the reliefs which       H
118             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     may be granted. The directions as per the statute, could be for replacement
      of defective goods as also punitive damages. The appellant have also
      taken a point that so far as replacement of the vehicle is concerned,
      there was no substantive direction and no discussion either. The operative
      part of the order suffers from a shortcoming on this count, but that is not
      fatal. On a composite reading of the directions, we find from paragraph
B
      20 of the Order of the State Commission that such a direction was made.
      The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in the Order
      of the State Commission. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending
      for a reasonably long period of time, we have ourselves applied our mind
      on this issue and our view is that a direction for replacement of the
C     vehicle is justified in the facts of this case. The direction for replacement
      of the vehicle would not be treated as non-est having regard to paragraph
      20 of the State Commission’s Order. The fact that the consumer has got
      the car repaired on insurance money would not impact the quantum of
      damages, which is partly punitive in nature in this case.
D            12. Three cases arising out of motor accident claims were cited
      before us. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others. [(2003) 2 SCC
      274], it was held that there is no restriction that the Tribunal or Court
      cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. Two
      other authorities were cited before us, by Ms. Tamta, learned counsel
      for the respondent, being the cases of Sangita Arya and Others v.
E     Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others [(2020) 5 SCC
      327] and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others v. Kasam Daud
      Kumbhar and Others [(2015) 4 SCC 237]. These two cases lay down
      the principle of just and reasonable compensation that may be paid. The
      ratio of these authorities, however, do not directly apply in the facts of
F     this case.
             13. The damages awarded against the appellant may have gone
      beyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and may not represent
      the actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms. But the provision of
      Section 14 of the 1986 Act permits awarding punitive damages. Such
G     damages, in our view, can be awarded in the event the defect is found to
      have the potential to cause serious injury or major loss to the consumer,
      particularly in respect of safety features of a vehicle. For instance,
      defective safety feature in a vehicle has to be distinguished from a
      dysfunctional “courtesy light”. The manufacturer should be under strict
      and absolute liability in respect of the latter. Compensation in the form of
H
     HYUNDAI MOTOR INDIA LIMITED v. SHAILENDRA                                   119
          BHATNAGAR [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect. We also refer to the          A
principles detailing the factors guiding quantification of liability laid down
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta and
Another v. Union of India and Others [(1987) 1 SCC 395]. In this
case it has been opined:-
       “32. We would also like to point out that the measure of                  B
       compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding
       paragraph must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of the
       enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent
       effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater
       must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm
       caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the                C
       hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.”
       14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the death
of an individual and injuries to several others in an industrial accident.
But in our opinion, in the subject dispute also the same principle can be
extended. We are dealing with a case where in a collision, the airbags           D
did not deploy. The complainant, driving the vehicle, suffered substantial
injuries as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that it
would have been reasonable for the respondent to assume that there
would have been deployment of the airbags. The safety description of
the goods fell short of its expected quality. The content of the owners’         E
manual does not carry any material from which the owner of a vehicle
could be alerted that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would not
deploy. Purchase decision of the respondent-complainant was largely
made on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle.
The failure to provide an airbag system which would meet the safety
standards as perceived by a car-buyer of reasonable prudence, in our             F
view, should be subject to punitive damages which can have deterrent
effect. And in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of the
manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no specific
exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim of damages of
this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality thereof could be         G
open to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in
this case. That question doesn’t arise here.
       15. If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits any of the
statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section 14 of the Act,
it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of the Forum to pass          H
120                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     directions irrespective of the fact as to whether specifically certain reliefs
      have been claimed or not, provided that facts make out foundations for
      granting such reliefs. In any event, it is within the jurisdiction of the said
      forum to mould the reliefs claimed to do effective justice, provided the
      relief comes within the stipulation of Section 14(1) of the Act. We find
      that the relief granted to the respondent comes within the statutory
B
      framework. We accordingly do not want to interfere with the decision
      of the National Commission. We do not find the reasoning of the
      Commission or the operative part of the order awarding damages to be
      perverse. We do not need the aid of the ratio of the three authorities
      cited before us pertaining to motor accident claim to sustain the decision
C     under appeal. We are also of the view that the directions issued against
      the appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the National
      Commission cannot be said to have failed the test of proportionality. We
      hold so as we find the subject-defect to be of such nature that the
      provisions relating to punitive damages ought to be attracted against the
      appellant.
D
            16. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Interim order passed in
      this matter shall stand dissolved.
              17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
              18. There shall be no order as to costs.
E
      Nidhi Jain                                                    Appeal dismissed.




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