Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s conviction and sentence are legally sustainable because the evidence establishes his participation in a criminal conspiracy, and the summoning under Section 319 CrPC was proper.

Summary

The appellant, an Assistant Superintendent of Jail, was alleged to have facilitated a private vehicle ride for two police constables escorting an undertrial prisoner, during which two unidentified youths attacked the constables with red chilli powder, a knife and a kirpan, attempting to free the prisoner. The prosecution proved the appellant's role through the consistent testimony of one injured constable (PW 2) and corroborating medical and documentary evidence, despite other witnesses turning hostile. The appellant challenged his conviction on three grounds: lack of direct evidence, improper summoning under Section 319 CrPC, and insufficiency of a single eyewitness to sustain a conspiracy charge under Section 120B IPC. The Court held that the power under Section 319 CrPC is valid even when the accused was not named in the FIR, and that circumstantial evidence and a reliable single eyewitness can establish conspiracy. It affirmed that the appellant’s conduct—arranging the vehicle, being present at the scene, and failing to intervene—demonstrated his active participation in the conspiracy, justifying the convictions and sentences. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' orders.

Issues considered

Whether the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 307, 353, 332, 225, 186, 120B IPC and Section 25 Arms Act are legally sustainable.
Whether the trial court could validly summon the appellant under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure despite his initial exclusion from the FIR.
Whether the testimony of a single eyewitness, supported by circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 193, s. 319
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 186, s. 225, s. 307, s. 332, s. 353

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the order of conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offences u/ss.307, 353, 332, 225, 186, and 120B IPC and s.25 of the Arms Act, 1959 by the courts below was legally sustainable. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.307, 353, 332, – Criminal conspiracy – Prosecution case that Head Constables-PW 1 and PW 2 escorted undertrial prisoner from one place to another for the court proceedings – Appellant- Jail official accompanied them, and after court, suggested the constables to return in a private vehicle

Subjects

criminal conspiracyundertrial prisonercourt proceedingsconstablesunidentified youthshandcuffedsummontestimonypreliminary investigationcontinuous chain of incriminating circumstancesidentification of the accusedmedical evidenceinjured witnessrule of lawcustody of prisonersassistant superintendent of jailjail officialsinstitutional trustconstitutional democracycustodial officershighest standards of integritylegal delinquencygrave institutional and moral breach

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 690 : 2025 INSC 957

Gurdeep Singh
v.
The State of Punjab
(Criminal Appeal No. 705 of 2024)
11 August 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the order of conviction and sentence of the
appellant for the offences u/ss.307, 353, 332, 225, 186, and 120B
IPC and s.25 of the Arms Act, 1959 by the courts below was
legally sustainable.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.307, 353, 332, 225, 186, and 120B – Arms
Act, 1959 – Criminal conspiracy – Prosecution case that Head
Constables-PW 1 and PW 2 escorted undertrial prisoner from
one place to another for the court proceedings – Appellant-
Jail official accompanied them, and after court, suggested
the constables to return in a private vehicle driven by PW 10,
who was known to him – They all sat in the vehicle along with
the two unidentified youths who occupied the rear seat and
when the vehicle stopped, the youths threw red chilli powder
at the constables, stabbed them, and attempted to help the
undertrial to escape, however he failed as was handcuffed –
Alarm raised, the appellant and the two youths fled and the
prisoner was caught – Trial court convicted and sentenced
all accused, including the appellant who was summoned later
u/s.319 CrPC, for the offences u/ss.307, 353, 332, 225, 186,
and 120B and s.25 of the 1959 Act – High Court upheld the
said order – Interference with:
Held: Conviction and sentence imposed commensurate with
the appellant’s culpability and call for neither reduction nor
interference – Findings recorded by the courts below based on
cogent reasoning and unimpeachable evidence – Considering the
nature and gravity of the offence committed by the appellant, and
more so, keeping in view his position as Assistant Superintendent

* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 691

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

of Jail, a role that demands the highest standards of integrity,
responsibility and adherence to the rule of law, thus, no mitigating
factor to warrant any leniency in sentence – Detailed, consistent,
and credible testimony of the head constable-injured escort
officer, clearly implicates the appellant – In light of this direct
and incriminating evidence, the trial court rightly exercised its
jurisdiction u/s.319 Cr.P.C to summon the appellant – Prosecution
convincingly established the existence of a prior concert of action
between the appellant and the assailants – All incidents form a
continuous chain of incriminating circumstances that point toward
his complicity in the conspiracy – Appellant’s conduct was not
peripheral but integral to the execution of the plan to facilitate
the escape of the undertrial – His behaviour before, during, and
after the incident establishes his culpability u/s.120B, thus, his
conviction for the substantive offences with the aid of s.120B
legally sustainable – Partial hostility of PW 1 regarding the
identification of the accused, does not undermine the testimony of
PW 2 who remained firm, consistent, and unshaken on all material
particulars – His account of the events further corroborated by
medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances – His status
as injured witness further enhances the reliability of his version –
In the absence of any evidence of prior enmity or other animus,
and the appellant being PW.2’s superior officer, theory of false
implication appears inherently implausible – Prosecution evidence
clearly demonstrates that the attack on the police escort team
was not a spontaneous occurrence, but a carefully orchestrated
plan – Appellant’s conduct during and after the incident wholly
inconsistent with that of a law-abiding officer, rather, reveals the
mindset of a conspirator attempting to evade accountability –
Prosecution rightly characterized entire episode as premeditated
conspiracy, in which appellant played a key role. [Paras 16.1,
16.2, 17.4, 18.7, 18.8, 19-21]
Police – Police /Jail Officials – Accountability – Elucidation –
When public functionaries betray the institutional trust,
the consequences are profound and far-reaching – In a
constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, custodial
officers must be held to the highest standards of integrity –
Role of the police/jail official demands the highest standards
of integrity, responsibility and adherence to the rule of law –
Any deviation amounts not only to legal delinquency, but to
a grave institutional and moral breach. [Para 20]
692 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Case Law Cited
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3 SCC
92; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR
79 : (2005) 11 SC 600; Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India [1993] 3
SCR 543 : (1993) 3 SCC 609; Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI [2009]
12 SCR 682 : (2009) 8 SCC 1; Paulmeli v. State of Tamil Nadu
[2014] 6 SCR 420 : (2014) 13 SCC 90; Rajesh Yadav v. State of
UP [2022] 16 SCR 967 : (2022) 12 SCC 200; Goverdhan v. State
of Chhattisgarh [2025] 1 SCR 657 : (2025) 3 SCC 378; Vadivelu
Thevar v. State of Madras [1957] 1 SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614 :
1957 Cri LJ 1000; Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan [2003] Supp.
1 SCR 633 : (2003) 6 SCC 397; Kuna v. State of Odisha [2017]
11 SCR 179 : (2018) 1 SCC 296 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Arms Act, 1959; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Criminal conspiracy; Undertrial prisoner; Court proceedings;
Constables; Unidentified youths Handcuffed; Summon; Testimony;
Preliminary investigation; Continuous chain of incriminating
circumstances; Identification of the accused; Medical evidence;
Injured witness; Rule of law; Custody of prisoners; Assistant
Superintendent of Jail; Jail officials; Institutional trust; Constitutional
democracy; Custodial officers; Highest standards of integrity; Legal
delinquency; Grave institutional and moral breach.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
705 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.05.2023 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRAS No. 4900 of 2014

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
A K Walia, Divyadeep Walia, Ms. Debjani Das Purkayastha, Rajiv
Kataria, M/S. Delhi Law Chambers.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Karan Sharma, Mohit Siwach.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 693

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
04.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh1 in CRA-S-4900-SB-2014, whereby the High Court upheld
the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 31.10.2014 rendered
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Bathinda2, in
S.C. No. 55 of 10.09.2011, against the appellant / accused. The
particulars of the conviction and sentence are as under:

Offence for which Sentence awarded
convicted
Section 307 r/w Section Rigorous Imprisonment for three years
120B IPC and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to
undergo further RI for two months
Section 225 r/w Section Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and
120B IPC a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo
further RI for two weeks
Section 186 r/w Section Rigorous Imprisonment for two months
120B IPC and a fine of Rs.200/-, in default to
undergo further RI for one week
Section 332 r/w Section Rigorous Imprisonment for two years and
120B IPC a fine of Rs.1,500/-, in default to undergo
further RI for one and half months
Section 353 r/w Section Rigorous Imprisonment for one and half
120B IPC years and a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default
to undergo further RI for one month
Section 120B IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for three years
and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to
undergo further RI for two months

All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 For short, “the Sessions Court”
694 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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2. The case of the prosecution is that on 30.11.2010, the Station House
Officer, Police Station City Rampura, received information that Head
Constables Harjit Singh (PW.2) and Hardial Singh (PW.1) had been
admitted to Civil Hospital, Rampura, in an injured condition. Upon
reaching the hospital and obtaining medical opinion, regarding their
fitness to give a statement, the Station House Officer recorded the
statement of Head Constable Harjit Singh.
2.1. According to Head Constable Harjit Singh, on that day, he,
along with Head Constable Hardial Singh, was escorting
undertrial prisoner Kuldeep Singh @ Deepi from Ludhiana to
Talwandi Sabo for court proceedings in connection with FIR
No. 59 dated 31.05.2008 by bus. The appellant, Gurdeep
Singh, Assistant Superintendent of Central Jail, Ludhiana,
also accompanied them. After attending court, while they were
waiting at the main gate of the court complex, the appellant
suggested that they travel back in a Tata Qualis bearing
Registration No. PB-19L-8750 which was parked outside and
allegedly belonged to persons known to him from Barnala.
Despite initial hesitation, the Head Constables agreed based
on his assurance. The appellant sat in the front seat with the
driver; the two Head Constables and accused Kuldeep Singh
sat in the middle row, while two young men (aged around
20 - 25 years) occupied the rear seat. On reaching near village
Kutiwal, the appellant asked the driver to stop for a while to
answer the call of nature. When the driver slowed down the
vehicle, the two men in the back, threw red chilli powder into
the eyes of the Head Constables. One of them then stabbed
Head Constable Hardial Singh in the shoulder with a knife,
while the other picked up a kirpan and struck Harjit Singh on
the head. Harjit Singh attempted to defend himself with his
carbine, but was still injured. The assailants attempted to help
the accused Kuldeep Singh escape; however, he failed, as
he was handcuffed and chained to the complainant’s belt. On
raising an alarm, members of the public gathered, causing the
two assailants and the appellant to flee. The injured were then
taken to Civil Hospital, Rampura, by the driver of the vehicle,
Balwinder Singh (PW.10). Accordingly, the crime was alleged
to have been committed by Kuldeep Singh, in connivance
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 695

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

with the appellant and the two unknown assailants, with the
intention to facilitate escape from custody and to eliminate the
escorting officers.
3. Based on the statement given by Head Constable Harjit Singh, FIR
No. 65 of 2010 was registered for the offences under sections 307,
353, 332, 225, 186, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 and
Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. Accused Maan Singh @ Mana
was declared a proclaimed offender on 22.04.2011. At the stage
of preliminary investigation, the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Circle Maur, in his enquiry report dated 03.01.2011, declared the
appellant innocent. Subsequently, the case against the accused
Kuldeep Singh and Baldev Singh, was committed to the Sessions
Court, vide order dated 27.08.2011. After committal, charges were
framed against the accused for the offences under Sections 307,
186, 332, 353, 225 and 120B IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
4. During trial, on an application moved by the prosecution under
Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19734 the appellant was
summoned as an additional accused, as per order dated 06.07.2012,
and his case was committed to the Sessions Court on 26.03.2014.
He also pleaded innocence and alleged false implication.
5. The prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses and marked
exhibits and material objects collected during the course of
investigation. On the side of the defence, DW1 to DW3 witnesses
were examined and Exs.D1 to D4 documents were marked. After
trial, the Sessions Court by judgment dated 31.10.2014, convicted
all the accused and sentenced them for the offences as referred
to above.
6. Challenging the aforesaid judgment, the appellant filed Criminal
Appeal No. S-4900-SB-2014 which was dismissed by the High
Court, along with the appeal preferred by the accused Baldev Singh
@ Dev, by the judgment dated 04.05.2023. Feeling aggrieved, the
appellant is before this Court by way of the present appeal.

3 For short, “IPC”
4 For short, “Cr.P.C”
696 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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7. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the concurrent findings
of conviction recorded by both the Sessions Court and the High
Court as being legally unsustainable and factually erroneous. It was
contended that the appellant has been falsely implicated without
any cogent or reliable evidence connecting him either to the alleged
occurrence or to the alleged conspiracy with the co-accused.
7.1. It was submitted that the entire prosecution case rested
solely on the testimony of PW.2, the complainant, who was
admittedly an interested witness. In his cross-examination,
PW.2 admitted that as per police rules, he was not permitted
to escort an undertrial prisoner in a private vehicle, and that
disciplinary action was liable to be taken against him for this
lapse. Therefore, in an attempt to shield himself, he allegedly
twisted the version and shifted the blame onto the appellant
by claiming that it was on the appellant’s suggestion that they
boarded the said vehicle.
7.1.1. Furthermore, the other two material witnesses – PW.1
(Hardial Singh), the escorting officer, and PW.10
(Balwinder Singh), the vehicle driver – were declared
hostile and did not support the prosecution’s case.
In particular, PW.10 who was present throughout
the alleged occurrence, completely resiled from his
earlier statement, thereby casting serious doubt on the
prosecution version.
7.2. The learned counsel emphasized that no overt act was attributed
to the appellant. The sole allegation was that he had suggested
to use a particular vehicle for convenience. There was no
evidence to show that the appellant had either facilitated the
presence of the assailants in the vehicle or had participated in
any act of violence. No injury was attributed to him. His mere
presence at the scene, without any criminal conduct or prior
meeting of minds with the assailants, cannot sustain a charge
of conspiracy under Section 120B IPC.
7.3. It was further submitted that there was no reliable, sufficient,
or legal evidence to support the charge of criminal conspiracy
against the appellant. The case was based purely on conjecture
and surmise, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 697

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

Consequently, the conviction under section 120 B IPC is liable to
be set aside and the conviction for other offences based solely
on the application of Section 120B IPC is also unsustainable.
7.4. The learned counsel also submitted that the charge under
Section 307 IPC was wholly untenable, particularly in the
absence of any injury being declared grievous or dangerous
to life. The theory of red chilli powder being thrown into the
eyes of the complainant was neither supported by forensic
or medial evidence, nor corroborated by PW.3 (Doctor), the
medical witness. No traces of chilli powder were found in the
vehicle or on the clothes of the complainant or other witnesses.
Moreover, the prosecution case, at its core, is one of an
attempted escape from custody by the undertrial prisoner,
not an attempt to murder. These aspects were ignored by the
Courts below, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
7.5. It was further submitted that DW.3 (Gurmeet Singh), Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Maur, who conducted a detailed
preliminary enquiry, had categorically ruled out the involvement
of the appellant in any criminal conspiracy and found him to be
innocent. The appellant was not named in the original charge
sheet, and was subsequently summoned under Section 319
Cr.P.C on the basis of vague allegations and without any fresh
or additional incriminating material, having emerged during
trial. The summoning order dated 05.07.2012, was passed
mechanically and without due application of mind. The High
Court also erred in failing to examine the legality and correctness
of this summoning order, while disposing of the appeal.
7.6. It was further pointed out that both courts below erroneously
referred to the appellant as a police officer and as a supervisory
official of the complainant, whereas he was an official of the
Jail Department, deputed for a distinct purpose. This factual
mischaracterization has led to manifest injustice and vitiated
the approach adopted by the courts below.
7.7. Lastly, it was submitted that the appellant is a government
servant with 35 years of unblemished service, and the conviction
has resulted in harsh consequences including the forfeiture of
his pensionary benefits.
698 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7.8. In view of the foregoing, the learned counsel submitted that
the concurrent judgement of conviction passed against the
appellant, are perverse and deserve to be set aside.
8. The learned counsel for the State / respondent opposed the appeal
and submitted that the conviction of the appellant is well-founded
and supported by sufficient oral and circumstantial evidence. It was
contended that the appellant, though an official of the Jail Department,
played an active role in facilitating the commission of the offence by
deliberately selecting a vehicle that enabled the assailants to launch an
assault on the complainant and attempt to free the undertrial prisoner.
8.1. It was further contended that the appellant persuaded the
victims to board a vehicle in which two persons were already
present along with the driver – all of whom were known to the
appellant. Acting upon the appellant’s instructions, the vehicle
was stopped at a pre-designated location, whereupon the
assailants carried out the attack. Notably, no injury was inflicted
upon the appellant, suggesting his collusion. Despite hearing
the cries for help, the appellant neither intervened nor made
any effort to assist the victims. Rather, he absconded from the
scene along with the accused persons and subsequently failed
to report back or accompany the injured to the civil hospital,
Rampura. Furthermore, he did not make any statement before
the police, nor he examine or cite any independent witness
from the vicinity who could support his version of events.
8.2. The learned counsel submitted that the overall conduct of the
appellant including his failure to act during the violent assault,
which involved the use of deadly weapons and red chilli powder,
reveals his conscious participation in the criminal conspiracy. His
behaviour was inconsistent with that expected of a government
officer, and instead indicated deliberate alignment with the
assailants’ objective.
8.3. It was also emphasized that there existed no motive or reason
for the complainant or the injured eyewitnesses – who were
police officials themselves – to falsely implicate the appellant.
The testimony of PW.1 Hardial Singh, an injured eyewitness,
stood corroborated by the version set out in the FIR and by the
deposition of PW.2 Harjit Singh, the complainant and another
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 699

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

injured eyewitness. Their consistent narratives, coupled with the
testimony of PW.7 Sukhchain Singh, the investigating officer,
established the integrity of the prosecution case.
8.4. With respect to the charge under Section 307 IPC, it was
submitted that the nature of the assault, the weapons used,
and the intent to incapacitate the complainant, even if injuries
were not ultimately grievous, attracted the ingredients of an
attempt to commit murder. The use of red chilli powder in the
eyes of the victims, especially in the context of a custodial
escort operation, clearly demonstrated intent to commit a
serious and premeditated offence.
8.5. The learned counsel further argued that the appellant’s
summoning under Section 319 Cr.P.C., was lawful and based
on the clear and incriminating testimony of the complainant
during the course of trial, which revealed the appellant’s
active participation in the offence. The mere exoneration of the
appellant during the police investigation did not preclude the
trial Court from invoking its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.,
as the court is not bound by the opinion of the Investigating
Officer and is competent to summon any person against whom
evidence emerges during the course of trial.
8.6. In view of the above, it was urged that the findings of guilt
recorded by the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court, were
based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record and
do not warrant any interference by this Court.
8.7. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the appeal is
devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
9. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the materials
available on record.
10. It is not in dispute that originally, the appellant was not named in
the FIR and that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Maur, had opined that he was not
involved in the offence. However, during the course of trial, based
on the evidence that emerged, the prosecution filed an application
under Section 319 Cr.P.C., pursuant to which the appellant was
summoned as an accused.
700 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

11. To establish the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution
examined fifteen witnesses and also exhibited various documents,
including the First Information Report, statements recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., medical reports, and seizure memos, as well as
material objects collected during the course of investigation through
the witnesses. In defence, the appellant examined three witnesses
as DW.1 to DW.3, and relied upon four documents, marked as
Exhibits D1 to D4.
12. At the outset, it would be appropriate to briefly survey the material
evidence led by both sides.
12.1. PW.1 Hardial Singh deposed that on 30.11.2010, he, along
with Head Constable Harjit Singh was assigned the duty of
escorting undertrial accused Kuldeep Singh for production
before the Court of Sh. L.K.Singla, SDJM, Talwandi Sabo.
The accused was taken to Court by bus and the appellant
also accompanied them in the same bus. At about 2.30 pm,
after conclusion of the court proceedings, PW.1 and Head
Constable Harjit Singh were standing at the main gate of the
court complex. At that time, the appellant informed them that
a Qualis vehicle was parked nearby, and he personally knew
the persons sitting inside it, who were travelling to Barnala.
The appellant suggested PW.1 and Harjit Singh to travel in
that vehicle up to Barnala. On the appellant’s assurance,
they agreed and boarded the vehicle. According to PW.1,
the appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat; PW.1,
Head Constable Harjit Singh, and accused Kuldeep Singh
sat on the middle seat, while two other persons were seated
at the rear. When the vehicle reached near village Dhadda
on the main highway, the appellant asked the driver to stop
the vehicle, stating that he wanted to attend a nature call. As
soon as the vehicle stopped, accused Kuldeep Singh and the
two persons seated in the rear seat attacked PW.1 and Harjit
Singh. Red Chilli powder was thrown into their eyes; one of
the rear occupants assaulted PW.1 with a knife on his back,
and the other struck Harjit Singh below the head with a kirpan.
Upon raising alarm, some people gathered at the scene, at
which point the appellant, and the other two assailants fled
from the spot. But, accused Kuldeep Singh was unable to
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 701

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

escape, as he was handcuffed and tied with a belt of Head
Constable Harjit Singh. Thereafter, PW.1 and Harjit Singh were
taken to Civil Hospital, Rampura by the vehicle driver. PW.1
further stated that PW.7 Sukhchain Singh the Investigating
officer, recorded his and Harjit Singh’s statements. He stated
that the incident was the result of a conspiracy hatched by
Kuldeep Singh and others. However, in his deposition, PW.1
identified only accused Kuldeep Singh and did not identify the
other assailants. To this extent, he was treated as a hostile
witness and he was subjected to cross-examination by the
prosecution. During cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that
Kuldeep Singh had referred to one of the two other assailants
as Mana Singh during their conversation.
12.2. PW.2 Harjit Singh, Head Constable, deposed that on
30.11.2010, he along with Head Constable Hardial Singh
(PW.1) had brought undertrial accused Kuldeep Singh @
Deepi to be produced before the Court of Sh. L.K.Singla,
SDJM, Talwandi Sabo in connection with FIR No. 59 dated
31.05.2008 under sections 341, 323, 148 and 149 IPC. The
journey to Talwandi Sabo was undertaken by bus. After
production in Court, around 2.30 pm., as they reached the
main gate of the court complex, the appellant met them and
suggested that they return to Barnala in a Qualis vehicle
bearing Regn. No. PB 19C 8750. The appellant informed
them that the persons seated in the said vehicle were known
to him and that, it was headed towards Barnala. Although
PW.2 initially expressed a preference to return by the same
bus, the appellant insisted, claiming that he had accompanied
them earlier in the same bus. Thereafter, the appellant took
the front passenger seat beside the driver, while PW.2, PW.1,
and accused Kuldeep Singh occupied the middle seat. Two
unknown persons were seated on the rear side of the vehicle.
PW.2 further deposed that during the journey, accused
Kuldeep Singh and the appellant conversed and referred
to one of the rear occupants as ‘Manna’. After they passed
village Kutianwali, the appellant asked the driver to stop the
vehicle that he wanted to attend a call of nature. As soon as
the vehicle stopped, the two rear seat occupants threw red
702 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

chilli powder into the eyes of PW.1 and PW.2. One of them
inflicted a knife blow to the shoulder of PW.1, and the other
attacked PW.2 with a small sword (Kirpan). PW.2 managed
to partially shield himself with his carbine, which deflected
the blow, but caused injury to his forehead. Upon raising an
alarm, the appellant and the two assailants fled the scene.
The attackers also attempted to help accused Kuldeep Singh
escape. Whileso, Kuldeep Singh scuffled with the escorting
officers in an attempt to flee custody, but ended in vain.
Ultimately, PW.1 and PW.2 were taken to the Civil Hospital,
Rampura, in the same Qualis vehicle, and accused Kuldeep
Singh remained with them at that time.
12.2.1. PW.2 categorically stated that the incident was a result
of a conspiracy between accused Kuldeep Singh and
the appellant to facilitate the former’s escape from
lawful custody. His statement was recorded by the
Police as Ex. PW2/A. In his supplementary statement,
PW. 2 named the two other accused as Maan Singh
and Baldev Singh, and during trial, he identified
both accused Kuldeep Singh and Baldev Singh.
PW.2 also stated that on the day of the occurrence,
when they saw Kuldeep Singh in the Central Jail,
Ludhiana, he was in the company of the appellant,
and all of them including appellant came to Talwandi
Sabo by bus, although the appellant had no official
connection with their duty. He admitted that as per
police regulations, the custody of the undertrial was
their sole responsibility, and it was improper to travel
with the inmate in a private vehicle accompanies by
strangers. He further admitted that they did not inform
any senior officer about their decision to travel with the
appellant, nor did they question the appellant about his
presence in Talwandi Sabo. PW.2 further admitted that
he could not identify the specific person who threw the
red chilli powder into their eyes. However, he denied
the defence suggestion that the incident occurred
due to a quarrel following excessive consumption of
liquor or that there was any collusion between him,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 703

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

PW.1 and the appellant to orchestrate the escape of
Kuldeep Singh. He stoutly denied having made any
false statement before the police.
12.3. PW.3 Dr. R.P. Singh, Medical Officer at Civil Hospital,
Rampura, deposed that on 30.11.2010, he medically examined
Head Constable Hardial Singh (PW.1) and found the following
injuries:
(1) Incised wound measuring 1 ½ cm x ½ cm on the back, just
below the neck; margins were clean cut with fresh bleeding
present
(2) Redness of both eyes.
According to the doctor, both injuries were simple in nature
and of probable duration within 12 hours. He opined that injury
no.1 was caused by a sharp-edged weapon, whereas injury
no.2 could have been caused by a blunt object.
12.3.1. On the same day, PW.3 also examined Head Constable
Harjit Singh (PW.2) and recorded the following injuries:
(1) Incised wound measuring 1 cm x ½ cm on the
forehead, located just below the hairline, with
clean-cut margins and fresh bleeding.
(2) Abrasion on the back of the left elbow joint,
reddish in colour
(3) Redness of both eyes.
He opined that all three injuries 1,2 and 3 were simple
and of probable duration within 12 hours. Injury no.1
was caused by a sharp weapon, while injuries 2 and
3 were caused by blunt force.
PW.3 further deposed that upon an application
moved by Sub Inspector Sukhchain Singh regarding
the fitness of the victims for making statements, he
certified that both were fit to make statements.
During cross examination, PW.3 stated that redness
of eyes could be due to multiple causes, including
excessive alcohol consumption, and he did not detect
704 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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any specific contents of chilli powder in the victims’
eyes. He acknowledged that all injuries were simple
and none was dangerous to life.
12.4. PW.5 Ravinder Sharm, Junior Assistant in the office of the
District Transport Office, deposed that he produced the official
record pertaining to the Qualis vehicle bearing Regn. No.
PB 19C 8750. As per the said record, on 29.01.2009, the
Registration Certificate of the said vehicle was transferred in
the name of Karamjit Kaur W/o. Kuldeep Singh, residence of
Ward No.16, Barnala.
12.5. PW.7 Sukhchain Singh, who was serving as the Station
House Officer, Police Station Balianwali during the relevant
time, deposed that upon receipt of information regarding
the incident on 30.11.2010, he, along with police party,
proceeded to the Civil Hospital, Rampura. After obtaining
medical opinion regarding the fitness of the injured persons,
he recorded the statements of PW.1 Hardial Singh and PW.2
Harjit Singh. Based on their statements, the FIR (Ex.PW7/
C) was registered. He further deposed that he took into
possession a blood-stained woolen shirt and a vest from Head
Constable Hardial Singh. He also described the subsequent
steps of investigation, including the arrest of accused Kuldeep
Singh @ Deepi, the recovery of the Qualis vehicle, and the
preparation of a rough sketch of the scene of occurrence. He
also deposed regarding the arrest of accused Baldev Singh
on 23.02.2011, and other follow-up procedures undertaken
in the course of investigation. Additionally, he stated that on
the same day i.e., 30.11.2020, Head Constable Harjit Singh
produced one carbine along with 35 cartridges, one handcuff,
and the custody warrant pertaining to accused Kuldeep Singh
@ Deepi.
12.6. PW.10 Balwinder Singh deposed that he was the driver of
the Qualis vehicle bearing Regn. No. PB19 C 8750 which
was owned by Dial Singh @ Daya Singh. He stated that
he used to regularly park the said vehicle at the taxi stand
near Court Chowk, Barnala. According to his testimony, on
30.11.2010 at about 11.30 am, two Sikh men, hired his vehicle
for travel to Talwandi Sabo. He specifically stated that those
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 705

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

individuals were not police officials, and further deposed that
he had no personal knowledge regarding the incident. In view
of the apparent contradiction between his version and the
prosecution case, the prosecution sought to declare him a
hostile witness, alleging that he was suppressing the truth,
and obtained permission to cross-examine him. However,
even during cross-examination, PW.10 denied all material
suggestions and did not support the prosecution case.
12.7. DW.1 Balbir Singh, employed as a Fitter in the Record
Room of the Central Jail, Ludhiana, deposed that he was
conversant with the official records maintained in the jail. He
produced in evidence the notice issued to Superintendent,
Central Jail, Ludhiana, by the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo, requiring the production of the
accused Kuldeep Singh on 30.11.2010. The said notice was
marked as Ex. D1.
12.8. DW.2 Hardev Singh, who was working as Naib Reader,
produced the enquiry report dated 03.01.2011 prepared by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Maur, which was exhibited
as Ex.DW2 /A. He admitted during cross examination that he
was not posted in the office of the DSP at the relevant point
and had no personal knowledge of the facts of the case. His
deposition was based solely on the contents of the record
available with him.
12.9. DW.3 Gurmeet Singh, the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
deposed that he had conducted an enquiry into the incident
and had recorded the statements of the appellant as well as
the driver of the vehicle. Based on the facts verified during
the enquiry, he concluded that the appellant was innocent.
According to his findings, the appellant neither attacked
the policy party nor had any connection with the accused
persons. He further stated that the appellant’s presence at
Talwandi Sabo on the date of the incident was pursuant to
a notice issued by the Court to the Superintendent, Central
Jail, Ludhiana, and that, the Superintendent deputed the
appellant to attend court proceedings on 30.11.2010. During
cross-examination, DW.3 admitted that he could not recall
the date and time when he visited the spot of the occurrence.
706 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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12.10. Ex. D2 (dated 27.11.2010) - reply to notice and Ex. D3 (dated
29.11.2010) - letter are issued by the Superintendent, Central
Jail, Ludhiana, addressed to the Divisional Judicial Magistrate,
Talwandi Sabo, regarding the non-production of accused
Kuldeep Singh @ Deepi before the Court on earlier dates.
13. In light of the oral testimonies and the documentary evidence brought
on record, we shall now proceed to examine whether the judgment of
conviction and sentence rendered by the Sessions Court, as affirmed
by the High Court, is legally sustainable and warrants interference
insofar as the appellant is concerned.
14. As already indicated, the prosecution examined as many as 15
witnesses, of whom, the principal witnesses are PW.1 (Hardial
Singh), P.W.2 (Harjit Singh) and PW.10 (Balwinder Singh). PW.1, a
member of the escort party, narrated the sequence of events relating
to the assault and attempted escape of undertrial prisoner Kuldeep
Singh. However, he turned hostile to the extent of not identifying
any of the accused, including the appellant, except Kuldeep Singh.
PW.10, the driver of the vehicle and an alleged eyewitness, also
turned hostile and denied any knowledge of the incident. As a result,
the prosecution case primarily hinges on the testimony of PW.2, the
complainant and injured escort officer, on whose statement the FIR
was registered by PW. 7, the Investigating Officer.
15. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant are threefold:
Firstly, the appellant had been declared innocent by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Maur, during the preliminary inquiry, and
therefore, his subsequent summoning under Section 319 Cr.P.C
was unjustified; Secondly, there was no overt act attributed to the
appellant nor was there any reliable, sufficient, or legally admissible
evidence to establish his involvement in a criminal conspiracy
under Section 120B IPC. It was contended that in the absence of
concrete proof of conspiracy or any direct role in the assault or
escape attempt, the conviction under Section 120B as well as for
the substantive offences alleged to have been committed pursuant
to the conspiracy is liable to be set aside. Thirdly, the prosecution’s
case rests solely on the testimony of PW.2, an allegedly interested
witness, whereas other key witnesses either turned hostile, or failed
to identify the appellant, thereby rendering the evidence insufficient
to sustain conviction.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 707

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

16. The first contention – that the appellant was declared innocent
during the preliminary investigation – cannot be sustained in law.
In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab5, the Constitution Bench of
this Court authoritatively interpreted the scope and ambit of Section
319 Cr.P.C., holding that even a person not named in the FIR or
chargesheet can be summoned to face trial if evidence recorded
during the course of trial indicates his involvement in the offence.
The Court emphasized that the opinion of the investigating agency is
merely tentative and cannot override the Court’s independent judicial
assessment based on trial evidence. It further underscored that the
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C is judicial in nature, independent of
the police’s conclusions. For better appreciation, the relevant portion
of the judgment is extracted below:
“117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:
Questions (i) and (iii)
– what is the stage at which power under Section 319
Cr.P.C. can be exercised?
AND
– Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1)
Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and
includes the evidence collected during investigation or
the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded
during trial?
Answer
117.1. In Dharam Pal case, the Constitution Bench has
already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence
can be taken against a person not named as an accused
but against whom materials are available from the papers
filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such
cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr.P.C. and
the Sessions Judge need not wait till ‘evidence’ under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning
an additional accused.

5 (2014) 3 SCC 92
708 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two
expressions that have to be taken note of i.e., (1)
Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing
of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a
pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202
Cr.P.C, and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the
inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials
coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can
be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in
the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an
accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of
the chargesheet.
117.3. In view of the above position the word ‘evidence’
in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and
not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Question (ii) – Whether the word “evidence” used in
Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested
by cross-examination or the court can exercise the
power under the said provision even on the basis of
the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the
witness concerned?

Answer
117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319
Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is
only summoned to face the trial and in such an event
under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against
such person is to commence from the stage of taking
of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence
against the accused proposed to be summoned to be
tested by cross-examination.
Question (iv) – What is the nature of the satisfaction
required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section
319(1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is
satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood
be convicted?
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 709

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

Answer
117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the
accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if
he had been an accused when the Court initially took
cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction
that will be required for summoning a person under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for framing
a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction
for summoning the original accused and a subsequent
accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have
already commenced against the original accused and it
is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed
against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning
of an accused will result in delay of the trial - therefore
the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused
(original and subsequent) has to be different.
Question (v) – Does the power under section 319 Cr.P.C.
extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the
FIR but not charge sheeted or who have been discharged?

Answer
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though
named in the FIR but has not been charge sheeted or
a person who has been discharged can be summoned
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence
it appears that such person can be tried along with the
accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an
accused who has been discharged is concerned the
requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be
complied with before he can be summoned afresh.”
16.1. In the present case, the detailed, consistent, and credible
testimony of PW.2, Harjit Singh, the injured escort officer,
clearly implicates the appellant. His deposition categorically
establishes that the appellant facilitated the use of a private
vehicle – in which the assailants were already present – and
deliberately orchestrated a stop at a vulnerable location under
a false pretext, thereby enabling the assault and escape
attempt. In light of this direct and incriminating evidence, the
710 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 319
Cr.P.C to summon the appellant to face trial.
16.2. The appellant’s prior exoneration during the preliminary
investigation, cannot invalidate the judicial findings recorded
on the basis of substantive trial evidence. Even the deposition
of DW.3, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who conducted
the preliminary inquiry, fails to inspire confidence. His testimony
does not disclose the date, time, or precise details of the spot
inspection, thereby casting doubt on the thoroughness and
credibility of the investigation. Accordingly, the appellant’s
reliance on such vague and unsubstantiated findings is wholly
misplaced.
17. As regards the second limb of the appellant’s contention, it is well
established that the offence of criminal conspiracy under section
120B IPC, by its very nature, is seldom capable of being proved by
direct evidence. Being a clandestine agreement between two or more
persons to commit an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means,
conspiracy is typically established through circumstantial evidence,
patterns of conduct, and the cumulative interferences drawn from
the interactions of the accused persons.
17.1. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu 6, this Court
underscored that conspiracy is inherently covert and rarely
leaves behind direct traces. Its existence can be inferred from
the surrounding facts and circumstances, the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the occurrence, and the
manner in which the crime unfolds. It was further held that
every conspirator need not commit an overt act to be held
liable, the agreement itself constitutes the offence. What is
required is a concert of purpose and unity of design. It was also
emphasized that conspiracy is an independent offence and may
be punishable even if the substantive offence contemplated by
the conspirators does not ultimately materialize. The following
paragraphs are pertinent in this regard:
“97. Mostly, conspiracies are proved by
circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is

6 (2005) 11 SC 600
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 711

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

seldom an open affair. Usually, both the existence
of the conspiracy and its objects have to be
inferred from the circumstances and the conduct
of the accused (per Wadhwa, J. in Nalini case [(1999)
5 SCC 253 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 691] at p. 516). The
well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence
is that each and every incriminating circumstance
must be clearly established by reliable evidence and
“the circumstances so proved must form a chain of
events from which the only irresistible conclusion
about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn
and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible”
(Tanviben Pankajkumar case [Tanviben Pankajkumar
Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 1004] , SCC p. 185, para 45). G.N. Ray,
J. in Tanviben Pankajkumar [Tanviben Pankajkumar
Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 1004] observed that this Court should not
allow suspicion to take the place of legal proof.”
17.2. Similarly, in Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India7, it was reiterated
that conspiracy is a continuing offence, which begins with
the formation of the unlawful agreement and continues until
the common objective is either achieved or abandoned. The
court clarified that the crime is complete with the agreement
itself and that no overt act is necessary to sustain a conviction
under Section 120B IPC. The relevant paragraphs of the said
decision are usefully extracted below:
“10. In Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain
Maniyar v. State of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC
443 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 477 : (1981) 3 SCR 68] it was
held that for an offence under Section 120-BIPC,
the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the
conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be
done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved
by necessary implication. In Noor Mohammad Mohd.
Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra [(1970) 1 SCC

7 (1993) 3 SCC 609
712 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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696 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 274 : (1971) 1 SCR 119] it
was held that Section 120-BIPC makes the criminal
conspiracy as a substantive offence which offence
postulates an agreement between two or more persons
to do or cause to be done an act by illegal means. If the
offence itself is to commit an offence, no further steps
are needed to be proved to carry the agreement into
effect. In R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration [(1963) 1
SCR 253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 805]
it was further held that it is not necessary that each
member of a conspiracy must know all the details
of the conspiracy. In Shivanarayan Laxminarayan
Joshi v. State of Maharashtra [(1980) 2 SCC 465 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 493] this Court emphasized that a
conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is
impossible to adduce direct evidence of the same.
The offence can be only proved largely from the
inferences drawn from acts or illegal omission
committed by the conspirators in pursuance of
a common design.”
17.3. In Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI8, the Court again affirmed
that due to the covert nature of conspiracies, courts must
necessarily look to the overall circumstances, the acts of
the accused, and the coherence of their conduct to infer a
conspiracy. The presence of a common intention and the
coordinated acts of multiple persons can give rise to a legitimate
inference of an unlawful agreement. The relevant paragraphs
read as under:
“Criminal conspiracy
113. Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence.
It is punishable independent of other offences; its
ingredients being:
(i) an agreement between two or more persons.
(ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing
to be done either

8 (2009) 8 SCC 1
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 713

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

(a) an illegal act;
(b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by
illegal means.
It is now, however, well settled that a conspiracy
ordinarily is hatched in secrecy. The court for the
purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the
said offence has been committed or not may take
into consideration the circumstantial evidence.
While however doing so, it must bear in mind that
meeting of the minds is essential; mere knowledge
or discussion would not be. As the question has been
dealt with in some detail in Criminal Appeal No. 76
of 2004 (R. Venkatakrishnan v. CBI [(2009) 11 SCC
737] ), it is not necessary for us to dilate thereupon
any further.”
….
116. In K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [(2005)
12 SCC 631 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 686] this Court
held: (SCC pp. 636-38, paras 11 & 13)
“11. Section 120-A IPC defines ‘criminal
conspiracy’. According to this section when two
or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not
illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is
designated a criminal conspiracy. In Major E.G.
Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 :
(1962) 2 SCR 195] Subba Rao, J., speaking
for the Court has said: (AIR p. 1778, para 31)
‘31. … The gist of the offence is an agreement to
break the law. The parties to such an agreement
will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the
illegal act agreed to be done has not been done.
So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence
that all the parties should agree to do a single
illegal act. It may comprise the commission of
a number of acts.’
***
714 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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13. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of minds
of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or
an act by illegal means is the first and primary
condition and it is not necessary that all the
conspirators must know each and every detail
of the conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that
every one of the conspirators takes active part in
the commission of each and every conspiratorial
acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators
can be inferred by necessary implication. In most
of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by
the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy
is seldom an open affair. The existence of
conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced
from the circumstances of the case and the
conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy.
While appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy,
it is incumbent on the court to keep in mind
the well-known rule governing circumstantial
evidence viz. each and every incriminating
circumstance must be clearly established by
reliable evidence and the circumstances proved
must form a chain of events from which the
only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of
the accused can be safely drawn, and no other
hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The
criminal conspiracy is an independent offence in
the Penal Code. The unlawful agreement is sine
qua non for constituting offence under the Penal
Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy
consists of the scheme or adjustment between
two or more persons which may be express or
implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere
knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would
not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of
conspiracy shall continue till the termination of
agreement.”
(See also P.K. Narayanan v. State of Kerala
[(1995) 1 SCC 142 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 215] .)”
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 715

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

Thus, it is crystal clear that the offence of criminal conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence, nor is it necessary that all
conspirators participate in every stage of the commission of the
offence. What is material is the existence of a prior agreement –
express or implied – to commit an unlawful act, or a lawful act
by unlawful means. Once such agreement is established, even
by way of inference from circumstantial evidence, the legal
consequences under Section 120B IPC follow.
17.4. In the present case, the prosecution has convincingly
established the existence of a prior concert of action between
the appellant and the assailants. The use of a private vehicle
associated with the appellant, the involvement of unidentified
persons, the stop at a scheduled location under a false pretext,
and the appellant’s conspicuous inaction during the violent
assault – despite being in a position of official authority – all
form a continuous chain of incriminating circumstances that
point toward his complicity in the conspiracy. His deliberate
inaction, lack of any injuries, and subsequent disappearance
from the scene further reinforce the inference of his active role.
The appellant’s conduct was not peripheral but integral to the
execution of the plan to facilitate the escape of the undertrial
Kuldeep Singh. His behaviour before, during, and after the
incident establishes his culpability under section 120B IPC.
Accordingly, his conviction for the substantive offences with
the aid of Section 120B IPC is legally sustainable.
18. The third submission, which seeks to undermine the prosecution’s
case on the basis of hostile witnesses or minor inconsistencies, does
not merit acceptance. As already noted, the prosecution case rests
substantially on the testimony of PW.2 – the complainant and police
escort – whose version remained consistent and unshaken. Although
PW.1, another member of the police escort team, corroborated
portions of PW.2’s narrative, he turned hostile insofar as identification
of the accused persons other than Kuldeep Singh is concerned. It
is a settled proposition of law that the evidence of a prosecution
witness is not to be discarded in toto merely because the witness
has turned hostile. Courts are entitled to rely upon any portion of
such testimony which is found to be credible and corroborated by
other evidence on record.
716 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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18.1. In Paulmeli v. State of Tamil Nadu9, the case involved the
conviction of multiple accused under Section 302 IPC despite
several prosecution witnesses turning hostile. The trial Court,
and subsequently the High Court, relied upon consistent parts
of their testimony, which this Court affirmed. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted below for better appreciation:
“20. Paulmeli (PW 2) has supported the case of
the prosecution so far as the present appellants are
concerned. He was declared hostile when he did
not name the other accused, who stood acquitted
by the courts below and there could be no difficulty
to accept his deposition to that extent.
21. This Court in Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P.
[(2012) 5 SCC 777] while dealing with the issue
held : (S CC pp. 786-87, para 23)
“23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence
of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto
merely because the prosecution chose to treat him
as hostile and cross-examine him. The evidence
of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or
washed off the record altogether but the same can
be accepted to the extent that their version is found
to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.’
[Vide Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana [(1976)
1 SCC 389 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 7], Rabindra Kumar
Dey v. State of Orissa [(1976) 4 SCC 233 : 1976
SCC (Cri) 566], Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka
[(1980) 1 SCC 30 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 59] and Khujji v.
State of M.P. [(1991) 3 SCC 627 : 1991 SCC (Cri)
916] (SCC p. 635, para 6)]”
22. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra
[(1996) 10 SCC 360, this Court held that evidence
of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if
spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused
but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and

9 (2014) 13 SCC 90
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 717

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

that portion of the evidence which is consistent with
the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied
upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court
in Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [(2007)
13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] , Subbu
Singh v. State [(2009) 6 SCC 462 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1106] , C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. [(2010) 9
SCC 567 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1402] and Himanshu
v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2011) 2 SCC 36 : (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 593] . Thus, the law can be summarised
to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness
cannot be discarded as a whole, and the relevant
parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be
used by the prosecution or the defence.”
18.2. Similarly, in Rajesh Yadav v. State of UP10, this Court observed
that the hostility of a witness does not completely efface their
testimony from the evidentiary record. The Court emphasized
that even partially reliable hostile testimony may serve as the
basis for conviction, provided it is corroborated or otherwise
trustworthy. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
“84. In the instant case, some of the material
witnesses i.e. B. Kamal (PW 86) and R. Maruthu
(PW 51) turned hostile. Their evidence has been
taken into consideration by the courts below strictly in
accordance with law. Some omissions, improvements
in the evidence of the PWs have been pointed out by
the learned counsel for the appellants, but we find
them to be very trivial in nature.
85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are
some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies,
the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After
exercising care and caution and sifting through the
evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration
and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion
as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient
to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance

10 (2022) 12 SCC 200
718 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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should not be attached to omissions, contradictions
and discrepancies which do not go to the heart
of the matter and shake the basic version of the
prosecution’s witness. As the mental abilities of a
human being cannot be expected to be attuned
to absorb all the details of the incident, minor
discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements
of witnesses. Vide Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972)
3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] , State of U.P. v.
M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505 : 1985 SCC (Cri)
105] , Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of
Gujarat [(1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728] ,
State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash [(2007) 12 SCC
381 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 411] , Prithu v. State of H.P.
[(2009) 11 SCC 588 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1502], State
of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar [(2009) 9 SCC 626 : (2010)
1 SCC (Cri) 88] and State v. Saravanan [(2008) 17
SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580] .”
18.3. In Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh11, where several
witnesses had turned hostile and the delay in recording the
statement of the key eyewitnesses was highlighted, this Court
reiterated that hostile testimony must be carefully sifted –
usable portions may be retained, while tainted segments are
to be discarded. Applying that principle, the Court ultimately
modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Part I of Section
304 IPC, relying on consistent portions of the testimony of the
deceased’s mother. The relevant paragraphs are extracted
below:
“93. However, it is also to be noted that merely
because the witnesses turn hostile does not
necessarily mean that their evidence has to be thrown
out entirely and what is supportive of the prosecution
certainly be used. In Gangadhar Behera v. State of
Orissa [Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002)
8 SCC 381 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 32] , it was observed
as following : (SCC pp. 392-93, para 15)

11 (2025) 3 SCC 378
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 719

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

“15. To the same effect is the decision in State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 277 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 886] and Lehna v. State of Haryana [(2002) 3
SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 526]. Stress was laid by
the appellant-accused on the non-acceptance of
evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend
about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution
case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing,
false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable.
Even if a major portion of the evidence is found to
be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove
guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a
number of other co-accused persons, his conviction
can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to
separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can
be separated from the grain, it would be open to the
court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact
that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove
guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular
material witness or material particular would not ruin
it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India
and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has not
received general acceptance nor has this maxim
come to occupy the status of the rule of law. It is
merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that
in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and
not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely
involves the question of weight of evidence which
a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,
but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule
of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [1957
SCC OnLine SC 42 : AIR 1957 SC 366] ) Merely
because some of the accused persons have been
acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so
far as direct testimony went, was the same does not
lead as a necessary corollary that those who have
been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always
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open to a court to differentiate the accused who
had been acquitted from those who were convicted.
(See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [1955 SCC
OnLine SC 16 : AIR 1956 SC 460].) The doctrine
is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole
body of the testimony were to be rejected, because
a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in
some aspect, it is to be feared that administration
of criminal justice would come to a dead stop.
Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery
to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it
has to be appraised in each case as to what extent
the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely
because in some respects the court considers the
same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the
testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow
as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in
all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted
with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound
rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972)
3 SCC 751 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] and Ugar Ahir v.
State of Bihar [1964 SCC OnLine SC 90 : AIR 1965
SC 277] .) An attempt has to be made to, as noted
above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the
grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it
is not feasible to separate the truth from falsehood,
because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up,
and in the process of separation an absolutely new
case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential
details presented by the prosecution completely from
the context and the background against which they
are made, the only available course to be made
is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee
Ariel v. State of M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 560] and Balaka
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC 511 : 1975
SCC (Cri) 601] .) As observed by this Court in State
of Rajasthan v. Kalki [(1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 721

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

(Cri) 593] normal discrepancies in evidence are
those which are due to normal errors of observation,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due
to mental disposition such as shock and horror
at the time of occurrence and those are always
there however honest and truthful a witness may
be. Material discrepancies are those which are not
normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts
have to label the category to which a discrepancy
may be categorised. While normal discrepancies do
not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material
discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted
recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar [(2002)
6 SCC 81 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220]. Accusations
have been clearly established against the appellant-
accused in the case at hand. The courts below have
categorically indicated the distinguishing features in
evidence so far as the acquitted and the convicted
accused are concerned.”
94. To the same effect it was held in Raja v. State of
Karnataka [(2016) 10 SCC 506 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 158]
as follows : (SCC p. 516, para 32)
“32. That the evidence of a hostile witness in all
eventualities ought not stand effaced altogether
and that the same can be accepted to the
extent found dependable on a careful scrutiny
was reiterated by this Court in Himanshu
[Himanshu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2
SCC 36 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] by drawing
sustenance of the proposition amongst others
from Khujji v. State of M.P. [(1991) 3 SCC 627 :
1991 SCC (Cri) 916] and Koli Lakhmanbhai
Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1999) 8 SCC
624 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 13]. It was enounced
that the evidence of a hostile witness remains
admissible and is open for a court to rely on the
dependable part thereof as found acceptable
and duly corroborated by other reliable evidence
available on record.”
722 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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95. We are also mindful of the position of law that the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it
cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the
defence. However, in the present case, in spite of the
untruthful and evasive testimony of the neighbours, the
prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt and the false plea of the appellants
only strengthens the case of the prosecution.”
These decisions reaffirm the legal principle that a hostile
witness’s testimony need not be discarded in its entirety and
that the Court must carefully evaluate whether portions of
such evidence are credible and corroborated.
18.4. It is equally well settled that the testimony of a single
eyewitness, if found trustworthy and credible, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras12,
this Court held that if the sole witness is of a sterling quality
and inspires confidence, a conviction can be safely based
upon such testimony. The following paragraphs are pertinent
in this regard:
“…Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has
categorically laid it down that “ no particular number
of witnesses shall in any case be required for the
proof of any fact.” The legislature determined, as long
ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration
of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary
for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular
number of witnesses. In England, both before and
after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
there have been a number of statutes as set out in
Sarkar’s I Law of Evidence -9th Edition, at pp. 1 100
and 1 101, forbidding convictions on the testimony
of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not
insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the
general rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above.
The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that
“ Evidence has to be weighed and not counted”. Our

12 (1957) SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 723

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact
that administration of justice may be hampered if a
particular number of witnesses were to be insisted
upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed
in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside
those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence,
where determination of guilt depends entirely on
circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to
insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the
testimony of a single witness only could be available
in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here
that the discretion of the presiding judge comes
into play. The matter thus must depend upon the
circumstances of each case and the quality of the
evidence of the single witness whose testimony has
to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony
is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is
no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused
person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused
person may be proved by the testimony of a single
witness, the innocence of an accused person may
be established on the testimony of a single witness,
even though a considerable number of witnesses may
be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for
the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound
and well- established rule of law that the court is
concerned with the quality and not with the quantity
of the evidence necessary for, proving or disproving a
fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context
may be classified into three categories, namely:
(1) Wholly reliable.
(2) Wholly unreliable.
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the first category of proof, the court should have
no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it
may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single
witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion
of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In
724 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty
in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category
of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and
has to look for corroboration in material particulars by
reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is
another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses.
Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a
single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of
witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly
encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations
may arise and do arise where only a single person
is available to give evidence in support of a disputed
fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such
a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is
reliable and free from all taints which tend to render
oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty
to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain
many precedents where the court had to depend
and act upon the testimony of a single witness in
support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to
this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences
or of the testimony of an approver; both these are
cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very
nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime.
But, where there are no such exceptional reasons
operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict,
if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness
is entirely reliable.
We have, therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon
the testimony of the first witness, which is the only
reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.”
18.5. The above principle has been reiterated in Chittar Lal v.
State of Rajasthan13, where the Court upheld a conviction
under Section 302 IPC based on the credible and convincing
evidence of a single eyewitness, notwithstanding certain
inconsistencies and lack of corroboration. The Court held that

13 (2003) 6 SCC 397
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 725

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

if the witness is otherwise reliable and his testimony inspires
confidence, a conviction is legally sustainable. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
“7. … Evidence of the person whose name did not
figure in the FIR as witness does not perforce become
suspect. There can be no hard-and-fast rule that the
names of all witnesses, more particularly eyewitnesses
should be indicated in the FIR. As was observed by
this Court in Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan
[(2001) 6 SCC 296 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1095] mere
non-mention of the name of an eyewitness does not
render the prosecution version fragile. The information
was not lodged by an eyewitness. Mental condition
of a person whose father has lost his life inevitably
gets disturbed. Explanation offered by witnesses
for non-mention of PW 3’s name is plausible.
Additionally, it is to be noted that in the present case
the statement of PW 3 was recorded on the same
day of incident, immediately after the investigation
process was set into motion. Therefore, the plea
that PW 3’s testimony is doubtful lacks substance.
The other plea was that conviction should not have
been made on the basis of a single witness, PW 3’s
testimony. This plea is equally without essence. The
legislative recognition of the fact that no particular
number of witnesses can be insisted upon is amply
reflected in Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”). Administration of
justice can be affected and hampered if number of
witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom
that a crime has been committed in the presence of
one witness, leaving aside those cases which are
not of unknown occurrence where determination of
guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If
plurality of witnesses would have been the legislative
intent, cases where the testimony of a single witness
only could be available, in number of crimes the
offender would have gone unpunished. It is the quality
of evidence of the single witness whose testimony
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has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility and
reliability. If the testimony is found to be reliable,
there is no legal impediment to convict the accused
on such proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of
evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving
a fact. This position has been settled by a series of
decisions. The first decision which has become locus
classicus is Mohd. Sugal Esa Mamasan Rer Alalah v.
R. [AIR 1946 PC 3 : 1946 All LJ 100] The Privy
Council focused on the difference between English
law where a number of statutes make conviction
impermissible for certain categories of offences on
the testimony of a single witness and Section 134
of the Evidence Act. The view has been echoed
in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [AIR 1957
SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000] , Guli Chand v. State
of Rajasthan [(1974) 3 SCC 698 : 1974 SCC (Cri)
222 : AIR 1974 SC 276] , Vahula Bhushan v. State
of T.N. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 232 : 1989 SCC (Cri)
353 : AIR 1989 SC 236] , Jagdish Prasad v. State of
M.P. [1995 SCC (Cri) 160 : AIR 1994 SC 1251] and
Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar [(1996) 1 SCC 614 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 188].
18.6. A similar view was taken in Kuna v. State of Odisha14,
where the Court upheld a conviction solely on the basis of a
trustworthy eyewitness, emphasizing that credible testimony
alone is sufficient in law. The following paragraph is pertinent
in this regard:
“19. That conviction can be based on a testimony of
a single eyewitness if he or she passes the test of
reliability and that it is not the number of witnesses
but the quality of evidence that is important, have
been propounded consistently in Anil Phukan [Anil
Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 : 1993
SCC (Cri) 810], Ramji Surjya [Ramji Surjya Padvi v.
State of Maharashtra, (1983) 3 SCC 629 : 1983 SCC

14 (2018) 1 SCC 296
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 727

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

(Cri) 748] , Patnam Anandam [State of A.P. v. Patnam
Anandam, (2005) 9 SCC 237 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1225]
and Gulam Sarbar [Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar,
(2014) 3 SCC 401 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195] with the
apparent emphasis that evidence must be weighed
and not counted, decisive test being whether it has
a ring of truth and it is cogent, credible, trustworthy
or otherwise.”
18.7. In the present case, although the appellant was not officially
assigned to the escort duty undertaken by PW.1 and PW.2 on
30.11.2010, he was admittedly present at the court complex
on the relevant day. The partial hostility of PW. 1 regarding
the identification of the accused, does not undermine the
testimony of PW.2 who remained firm, consistent, and
unshaken on all material particulars. His account of the
events is further corroborated by medical evidence and the
surrounding circumstances. His description of the presence of
unknown individuals, the seating arrangement in the vehicle,
the appellant’s inexplicable deviation from the designated
route, and the subsequent attack by those individuals, is
both detailed and coherent. As already discussed, conviction
can rest on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, provided the
Court finds it trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence.
PW.2’s evidence in the present case satisfies this threshold.
His status as an injured witness further enhances the reliability
of his version.
18.8. The defence suggestion that PW.2 had a motive to falsely
implicate the appellant is wholly unsubstantiated. In the
absence of any evidence of prior enmity or other animus, and
considering that the appellant was PW.2’s superior officer,
the theory of false implication appears inherently implausible.
19. Thus, the prosecution evidence clearly demonstrates that the attack
on the police escort team was not a spontaneous occurrence, but
a carefully orchestrated plan. The appellant, holding the post of
Assistant Superintendent of Jail, was fully aware of the security
protocols applicable to undertrial escorts. Instead of upholding
these procedures, he misused his position and familiarity with the
escort personnel to subvert the established norms. He facilitated the
728 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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use of a private vehicle, allegedly owned by an acquaintance, and
persuaded the police officers to board it – himself occupying the
front passenger seat. This was not an innocuous act but indicated
prior arrangement and active complicity.
19.1. Furthermore, the presence of two unidentified persons already
seated in the rear of the vehicle – where the undertrial and
escort officers were also to be accommodated – not only
constituted a grave breach of protocol but was inexplicable
except by the appellant’s active connivance. At an isolated
location, the attack was launched: red chilli powder was thrown,
followed by an assault using a knife and a kirpan. Kuldeep
Singh attempted to escape and was prevented from doing so
only by the handcuffs and the belt secured by the complainant.
Throughout the incident, the appellant neither assisted the
police escort nor resisted the assailants. He remained uninjured
and vanished from the scene of incident thereafter.
19.2. The appellant’s conduct during and after the incident is
wholly inconsistent with that of a law-abiding officer. Rather,
it reveals the mindset of a conspirator attempting to evade
accountability. His role in arranging the vehicle, his suspicious
seating position, the unauthorized presence of outsiders, his
passive stance during the attack, his disappearance thereafter,
and his failure to report the incident together form an unbroken
chain of incriminating circumstances. The prosecution has
rightly characterized the entire episode as a premeditated
conspiracy, in which the appellant played a key role.
20. This Court is compelled to express its strongest condemnation of the
appellant’s conduct. As a public servant entrusted with safeguarding
the rule of law and the custody of prisoners, he did not merely default
in his duties – he actively undermined the justice system. When public
functionaries betray the institutional trust, the consequences are
profound and far-reaching. In a constitutional democracy governed by
the rule of law, custodial officers must be held to the highest standards
of integrity. Any deviation amounts not only to legal delinquency, but
to a grave institutional and moral breach. The findings recorded by
the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court are based on
cogent reasoning and unimpeachable evidence. The appellant has
failed to make out any ground for interference under Article 136 of
the Constitution.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 729

Gurdeep Singh v. The State of Punjab

21. Considering the nature and gravity of the offence committed by the
appellant, and more so, keeping in view his position as an Assistant
Superintendent of Jail – a role that demands the highest standards
of integrity, responsibility and adherence to the rule of law – this
Court finds no mitigating factor to warrant any leniency in sentence.
The conviction and sentence imposed are commensurate with the
appellant’s culpability and call for neither reduction nor interference.
22. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. The appellant shall be
taken into custody forthwith, to undergo the remaining period of
imprisonment as awarded by the trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court. The concerned authorities are directed to ensure the
immediate execution of the sentence. If the fine amount has not yet
been deposited, the same shall be recovered from the appellant
in accordance with law, failing which, he shall undergo the default
sentence as stipulated.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand closed.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain