GOSTHO BEHARI DASversusDIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 653
- Decided
- 28 July 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A court cannot suspend a medical practitioner's licence as a punishment for contempt of court; such disciplinary action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the medical regulator under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.
Summary
The appellant, a registered medical practitioner, was found to have willfully defied demolition orders concerning an unauthorised building extension and was subsequently held in contempt of court, leading the High Court to suspend his licence to practise medicine. The appellant challenged the suspension, arguing that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not empower a court to impose such a professional sanction and that disciplinary action against doctors is exclusively vested in the National Medical Commission under the 2019 Act (and the repealed 1956 Act). The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Contempt Act, noting that its prescribed punishments are limited to imprisonment of up to six months and a fine of up to Rs.2,000, and that no other penalty may be imposed. It further held that the power to punish a medical practitioner for misconduct lies solely with the medical regulator, and that suspension of a medical licence is a punishment foreign to the Contempt Act. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s orders, revived the appellant’s licence, and directed the appellant to complete the remaining demolition work. The appeal was allowed and the pending applications were disposed of without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether suspension of a medical practitioner's licence can be imposed as a punishment for contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the power to punish a registered medical practitioner for misconduct rests exclusively with the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 (and the erstwhile Medical Council Act, 1956).
- Whether the High Court erred in exercising contempt jurisdiction to impose a professional sanction not contemplated by the Contempt Act.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
1174 [2023] 10
SUPREME S.C.R.REPORTS
COURT 1174 : 2023 INSC [2023]
653 10 S.C.R.
A GOSTHO BEHARI DAS
v.
DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.4725 of 2023)
B JULY 28, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : ss. 2, 12 – Contempt of Court
– Punishment for – Appellant unauthorizedly constructed a structure
which deviated the plans sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation
C
– Demolition order passed, however, the same was not carried out
by the appellant – Contempt petition against appellant – Order
passed suspending the appellant’s licence to practice medicine –
On appeal, held: Punishment of suspension of licence could not be
given under the 1971 Act – Power to punish a registered medical
D practitioner for misconduct rest exclusively with the body envisaged
under the 1956 Act and the 2019 Act – Punishment handed down to
the contemnor is entirely foreign to the Act, thus, unsustainable –
Court in awarding such punishment showed complete disregard for
the statutory text of the 1971 Act – Judgment and order by the court’s
below set aside – Licence of the appellant to practice medicine
E
revived – Medical Council Act, 1956 – National Medical
Commission Act, 2019.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the provisions of the National
F Medical Commission Act, 2019 as well as the now repealed,
Medical Council Act, 1956 shows that the power to punish a
registered medical practitioner for “misconduct” rest exclusively
with the body envisaged under this Act. The Act itself provides
for an exhaustive, complete mechanism to revoke the licence of
a registered practitioner for professional misconduct. The same
G may be done after holding an inquiry and complying with the
principles of audi alterum partem. [Para 8][1178-C]
1.2 The punishment handed down to the contemnor is
entirely foreign to the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and, thus,
H
1174
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS v. DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. 1175
unsustainable. The Court, in awarding such punishment showed A
complete disregard for the statutory text of the 1971 Act, which
is abundantly clear in respect of the punishment that can be
imposed thereunder. [Para 20][1182-D]
1.3 A medical practitioner guilty of contempt of Court may
also be so for professional misconduct but the same would depend B
on the gravity/nature of the contemptuous conduct of the person
in question. They are, however, offences separate and distinct
from each other. The former is regulated by the 1971 Act and the
latter is under the jurisdiction of the National Medical
Commission Act, 2019. [Para 21][1182-E] C
1.4 The Division Bench in the impugned judgment did not
consider or discuss this issue nor was any final decision taken by
the Single Judge in the subject contempt proceedings.The
judgment of the court’s below are set aside. The licence of
the appellant, to practice medicine is revived. [Paras 22 and D
25][1182-F; 1183-B]
1.5 The appellant submitted before the High Court that
the requisite demolition has been carried out with the exception
of approximately 250 mm in the rear portion of the concerned
building as, removal of the same would have rendered the E
building, legally constructed, to be unsafe. In respect of the
unauthorized construction that remains, an undertaking be
furnished before the concerned High Court that remedial
construction to safeguard the soundness of the existing
building and the consequent demolishing of the unauthorized
F
construction would be completed within a reasonable time.
[Para 24][1182-G-H; 1183-A]
Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. Emperor 1945 AC
264; C.S. Karnan, In re (2017) 7 SCC 1; Baradakanta
Mishra v. Registrar Orissa High Court (1974) 1 SCC
G
374 : [1974] 2 SCR 282; W.B. Administrative Tribunal
v. SK. Monobbor Hossain (2012) 11 SCC 761; Prashant
Bhushan, In re (2021) 3 SCC 160 : [2020] 8 SCR 510;
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V Dabholkar (1975)
2 SCC 702 : [1976] 1 SCR 306 – referred to.
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference
(2017) 7 SCC 1 referred to Para 14
[1974] 2 SCR 282 referred to Para 15
(2012) 11 SCC 761 referred to Para 16
B [2020] 8 SCR 510 referred to Para 16
[1976] 1 SCR 306 referred to Para 17
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4725
of 2023.
C From the Judgment and Order dated 29.07.2022 of the High Court
of Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri in MAT No. 67 of 2022.
Yashwant Singh, Ms. Deeksha Tripathi, Harshit Goel, Ashish
Kumar Pandey, Ms. Kheyali Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Anwesha Saha, Deborshi Dhar, Salim Ansari, Advs. for the
D Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
E The question this Court must consider, is: –
“Whether the suspension of the Petitioner’s license to practice
medicine is alien to the nature and types of punishment and penalties
specified under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?”
THE FACTS
F
1. The present appeal stands filed against the judgement rendered
by the High Court of Calcutta, (Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri) in MAT No.
67 of 2022, by which it upheld various orders passed by learned single
Judge dated 5th, 11th, 12th and 14th July, 2022 in contempt proceedings
bearing number WPCRC9 of 2022, whereby vide the order dated 11 th
G July, 2022 the Petitioner/Appellant’s licence to practice medicine, was
suspended.
2. Further with the order dated 14th July 2022, while extending the
period of suspension till 19th August 2022, the petitioner was asked to
show cause as to why such suspension be not affected for a period of
H two years.
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS v. DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. 1177
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
3. A perusal of the record reveals that the Appellant had A
unauthorizedly constructed a structure which was in deviation with the
plans sanctioned by the Siliguri Municipal Corporation.1 Respondent No.1
(private party) filed numerous complaints against such unauthorised
construction, but to no avail. Discontented by the non-intervention of the
Commissioner of SMC2, and the SMC3 - appellant herein filed a writ
B
petition before the High Court. Vide order dated 22nd December 2016
passed in W.P No. 11464 (W) of 2016, Respondent No. 3 was directed
to have the construction so made, inspected and submit a report before
the court. On the next date of hearing, that is 19th December 2017 it was
directed that the representation that stood already filed before the
Municipal Corporation dated 2nd August 2007, was to be considered and C
a reasoned order was to be passed thereon.
4. Pursuant to the above direction, an order dated 13th June 2018,
directing the Respondents No. 3 to demolish the unauthorised construction,
was passed. This order however, came to be quashed by the High Court
observing the Commissioner SMC, not to be the competent authority
D
and instead, only the Board of Councillors of the SMC, who could pass
orders for demolition. Subsequently, vide a fresh order dated 25 thJune
2019 the Board of Councillors of SMC while observing the construction
to be unauthorised, ordered its demolition. In furtherance thereto,
Respondent No. 2 passed an order dated 3rd August 2019 directing the
demolition to be carried out. E
5. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner, (Appellant herein) filed
a Writ Petition bearing No. 349/2019 before the High Court of Calcutta
(circuit bench at Jalpaiguri.) The same was disposed of with the
observation that an appeal from the order dated 25 th June 2019, lay
before the Principal Secretary, Urban Development and Municipal Affairs, F
Government of West Bengal. The said authority passed orders on 8 th
January 2020 and 28th July 2020 directing the SMC to take necessary
steps to aid the petitioner in undertaking self- demolition of the
unauthorised construction and, in the event of his failure to do so, directed
that the SMC itself undertakes such steps to do so.
6. Respondent No. 1 then filed a contempt petition in WPA No. G
349 of 2019. It is hereunder that the license to practice medicine, of the
Appellant herein, was suspended.
1
Hereafter, “SMC”
2
Hereafter, Respondents No. 2
3
Hereafter, Respondents No. 3 H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
A LAW ON THE ISSUE AT HAND
7. The grant, regulation and suspension of the licence to practice
medicine is governed by the National Medical Commission Act, 2019. It
facilitates the maintenance of a medical register for India and enforces
high ethical standards in regards of all aspects of medical services. A
B statutory body namely the National Medical Commission looks after the
above-mentioned activities.
8. A perusal of the provisions of this Act as well as the now
repealed, Medical Council Act, 1956 shows that the power to punish a
registered medical practitioner for “misconduct” rest exclusively with
C the body envisaged under this Act. The Act itself provides for an
exhaustive, complete mechanism to revoke the licence of a registered
practitioner for professional misconduct. The same may be done after
holding an inquiry and complying with the principles of audi alterum
partem.
D 9. The instant dispute involves the question as to whether such a
punishment could be handed down under the Contempt of Courts Act,
19714.
10. Contempt of Court is defined in the Act under Section 2(a) :
“2(a). “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal
E
contempt;”
11. Civil contempt, with which the present case concerns itself, is
defined under Section 2(b) which reads as follows:
“2(b). “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience o any judgment,
F decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of an undertaking given to a court;”
12. The punishment for contempt of Court is prescribed under
Section 12 of the Contempt Act, which reads as under:
“12. Punishment for contempt of court.- (1) Save as otherwise
G expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of
court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both:
4
H Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Contempt Act’
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS v. DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. 1179
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment A
awarded may be remitted or on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court.
Explanation.- An apology shall not be rejected merely on the
ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it
bona fide. B
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of
that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect
of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
xx xx xx” C
13. It may be noted that right from the Privy Council onwards,
judicious and sparing use of the power of contempt has been an accepted
proposition. In Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. Emperor5 the
Council had observed-
“… this summary power of punishing for contempt of court should D
be used sparingly and only in serious cases. It is a power which a
Court must of necessity possess; its usefulness depends on the
wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised…”
14. A Bench of seven judges in C.S. Karnan, In re6, had, referring
to various decisions of other jurisdictions, observed E
“63. The authority to punish for contempt of court has always
been exercised by the judiciary from times immemorial [ In one
of the earliest legal pronouncements dealing with the subject,
Justice Wilmot in R. v. Almon, 1765 Wilmot’s Notes 243 : 97 ER
94 explained the philosophy behind the power to punish for F
contempt of court. The passage now a classic exposition runs as
follows : (ER p. 100)”… and whenever men’s allegiance to the
laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most
dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls out for a
more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction
whatsoever; not for the sake of the Judges, as private individuals, G
but because they are the channels by which the King’s justice is
conveyed to the people.”] . The justification for the existence of
that is not to afford protection to individual Judges [ “14. … the
5
1945 AC 264
6
(2017) 7 SCC 1 H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
A law of contempt is not made for the protection of Judges who
may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed
to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.” [Douglas,
J., Craig v. Harney, 1947 SCC OnLine US SC 79, para 14 : 91 L
Ed 1546 : 331 US 367 at p. 376 (1947)]] but to inspire confidence
in the sanctity and efficacy of the judiciary [ “… The object of the
B
discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of court is
not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge,
but to prevent undue interference with the administration of
justice.” [Bowen, L.J. — Helmore v. Smith (2), (1886) 35 Ch D
449 at p. 455 (CA)]] , though they do not and should not flow
C from the power to punish for contempt. They should rest on more
surer foundations. The foundations are—the trust and confidence
of the people that the judiciary is fearless and impartial.”
15. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati J. in
Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Orissa High Court7 (Constitution
D Bench), observed-
“65. … we would like to underscore the need to draw the lines
clear enough to create confidence in the people that this ancient
and inherent power, intended to preserve the faith of the public in
public justice, will not be so used as to provoke public hostility as
E overtook the Star Chamber. A vague and wandering jurisdiction
with uncertain frontiers, a sensitive and suspect power to punish
vested in the prosecutor, a law which makes it a crime to publish
regardless of truth and public good and permits a process of brevi
manu conviction, may unwittingly trench upon civil liberties and
so the special jurisdiction and jurisprudence bearing on contempt
F power must be delineated with deliberation and operated with
serious circumspection by the higher judicial echelons. So it is
that as the palladium of our freedoms, the Supreme Court and the
High Courts, must vigilantly protect free speech even against
judicial umbrage — a delicate but sacred duty whose discharge
demands tolerance and detachment of a high order.”
G
16. In W.B. Administrative Tribunal v. SK. Monobbor
Hossain8, (two-Judge Bench) has observed that the tenor of the dicta
of this Court on the topic (contempt) is crystal clear. The Court has time
7
(1974) 1 SCC 374
H 8
(2012) 11 SCC 761
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS v. DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. 1181
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
and again asserted that the contempt jurisdiction enjoyed by the Courts A
is only for the purpose of upholding the majority of the judicial system
that exists. While exercising this power, the Courts must not be
hypersensitive or swung by emotions but must act judiciously. The principle
of sparing use stood reiterated in Prashant Bhushan, In re9
On the aspect of Punishment under a specified statute B
17. A Bench of seven judges in Bar Council of Maharashtra v.
M.V Dabholkar10 had observed as follows, in respect of the role of
Bar Councils and the powers of disciplinary action vested within them,
as under-
“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicate that the C
constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India is for
one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of
professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council
of India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils therefore
entertain cases of misconduct against advocates. The Bar Councils D
are to safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of advocates.
The Bar Council is a body corporate. The Disciplinary Committees
are constituted by the Bar Council. The Bar Council is not the
same body as its Disciplinary Committee. One of the principal
functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards of professional
conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive complaints against E
advocates and if the Bar Council has reason to believe that any
advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it
shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. A
most significant feature is that no litigant and no member of the
public can straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings F
against an advocate. It is the Bar Council of a State which initiates
the disciplinary proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. This Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 (five-Judge Bench) categorically held that – G
“39. Suspending the licence to practice of any professional like a
lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. when such a professional
9
(2021) 3 SCC 160
10
(1975) 2 SCC 702 H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
A is found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specified
period, is not a recognized or accepted punishment which a court
of record either under the common law or under the statutory law
can impose on a contemner in addition to any of the other
recognized punishments.”
B (emphasis supplied)
19. A reading of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act shows
that the punishment prescribed therein is simple imprisonment, not
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding Rs.2,000/- Sub-Section (2)
reads “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
C being in force” this implies that save and except the punishment provided
in sub-Section (1) no other punishment can be prescribed to a person
guilty of committing contempt of Court.
20. In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation in holding
that the punishment handed down to the contemnor is entirely foreign to
D the Act and, therefore, unsustainable. The Court, in awarding such
punishment showed complete disregard for the statutory text of the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971, which is abundantly clear in respect of
the punishment that can be imposed thereunder.
21. A medical practitioner guilty of contempt of Court may also
E be so for professional misconduct but the same would depend on the
gravity/nature of the contemptuous conduct of the person in question.
They are, however, offences separate and distinct from each other. The
former is regulated by the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and the latter is
under the jurisdiction of the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.
F 22. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment did not consider
or discuss this issue nor was any final decision taken by the Single Judge
in the subject contempt proceedings.
23. The question raised in the instant appeal is answered in the
above terms.
G 24. The appellant has submitted before the High Court that the
requisite demolition has been carried out with the exception of
approximately 250 mm in the rear portion of the concerned building as,
removal of the same would have rendered the building, legally constructed,
to be unsafe. In respect of the unauthorized construction that remains,
we direct that an undertaking be furnished before the concerned High
H
GOSTHO BEHARI DAS v. DIPAK KUMAR SANYAL & ORS. 1183
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
Court that remedial construction to safeguard the soundness of the A
existing building and the consequent demolishing of the unauthorized
construction shall be completed within a reasonable time.
25. Consequently, the judgment of the Court’s below, i.e., the
Division Bench and the orders of the Single Judge, High Court of Calcutta,
(Circuit Bench and Jalpaiguri) in MAT No.67 of 2022 and orders dated B
11th, 12th and 14th of July 2022 are set aside. The licence of the appellant,
to practice medicine is revived.
26. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The pending application(s),
if any, stands disposed of. No costs.
C
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
D
E
F
G
H
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