EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERSversusGOKUL CHANDRA KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS.

                         [2022] 7 S.C.R. 309                               309


      EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS                              A
                                   v.
    GOKUL CHANDRA KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 8990 of 2017)
                       SEPTEMBER 30, 2022                                  B
         [B. R. GAVAI AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.31(7)(a) – Arbitral
award – Interest on arbitral awards – Discretion vested in arbitral
tribunal – Reduction of interest u/Art.142 of the Constitution – Held:
                                                                           C
s.31(7)(a) itself requires interest to be at such rate as the arbitral
tribunal deems reasonable – When a discretion is vested to an arbitral
tribunal to award interest at a rate which it deems reasonable, then
a duty would be cast upon the arbitral tribunal to give reasons as
to how it deems the rate of interest to be reasonable – Further, the
arbitral tribunal would be required to apply its mind to the facts of      D
the case and decide as to whether the interest is payable on whole
or any part of the money and also as to whether it is to be awarded
to the whole or any part of the period between the date on which
the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made
– In the present case, the very conduct of respondent of remaining
                                                                           E
silent for a long period disentitled him for interest during such period
– A party cannot be permitted to derive benefits from its own lapses
– Insofar as rate of interest is concerned, in the present case, the
Arbitrator, without assigning any reasons, awarded interest at the
rate of 18% p.a. for the period during which the proceedings were
pending and also at the same rate after the award was made till the        F
actual payment – Taking into consideration the conduct of the
respondent in delaying proceedings at every stage which led to long
pendency of the dispute, interest at all the three stages, that is pre-
reference period, pendent-lite and post-award period, reduced to
9% p.a. u/Art.142 of the Constitution – Constitution of India –
                                                                           G
Art.142.
      Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. A perusal of clause (a) of subsection (7) of Section
31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would reveal that,
no doubt, a discretion is vested in the arbitral tribunal to include       H
                                309
310           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     in the sum for which the award is made interest, on the whole or
      any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period
      between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date
      on which the award is made. However, it would reveal that the
      section itself requires interest to be at such rate as the arbitral
      tribunal deems reasonable. When a discretion is vested to an
B
      arbitral tribunal to award interest at a rate which it deems
      reasonable, then a duty would be cast upon the arbitral tribunal
      to give reasons as to how it deems the rate of interest to be
      reasonable. Further, the arbitral tribunal would be required to
      apply its mind to the facts of the case and decide as to whether
C     the interest is payable on whole or any part of the money and also
      as to whether it is to be awarded to the whole or any part of the
      period between the date on which the cause of action arose and
      the date on which the award is made. [Para 10][315-B-F]
            2. In the present case, the Arbitrator, without assigning
D     any reasons, has awarded interest at the rate of 18% per annum
      for the period during which the proceedings were pending and
      also at the same rate after the award was made till the actual
      payment. [Para 11][315-F-G]
             3. The very conduct of the respondent of remaining silent
E     for a long period from August 30, 1997 till July 25, 1989 would
      disentitle him for the interest during the said period. Similarly,
      though a decree was passed on 14th February 1990 and the
      respondent was directed to file the original agreement, he took
      no step till 4th February 2000. In the meantime, the 1996 Act
      came into force. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application
F     in the disposed of suit which came to be dismissed on 4th February
      2000. Thereafter, he moved an application before the High Court
      for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the 1996 Act
      which came to be allowed on 15th October 2001. It could thus be
      seen that for a period of almost ten years, the respondent was
G     again in silent mode. Had he filed the original agreement
      immediately after the decree was passed on 14th February 1990,
      the arbitration proceedings would have commenced and concluded
      immediately thereafter. As such, the Arbitrator was not justified
      in awarding interest for the period from 14th February 1990 to

H
 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS v. GOKUL CHANDRA                 311
               KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS.


4th February 2000. A party cannot be permitted to derive benefits         A
from its own lapses. Further, though after the commencement of
the 1996 Act, the respondent could not have moved an application
in the disposed suit, he chose to do so and only after dismissal of
the said application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, did he
move an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section
                                                                          B
11 of the 1996 Act before the High Court, which was allowed on
15th October 2001. Therefore the respondent would not be
entitled for interest for the period from 14th February 1990 to
15th October 2001. [Paras 12, 13 and 14][316-A-F]
       4. Present case is a fit case wherein this Court needs to
exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India        C
to reduce the rate of interest. Taking into consideration the
conduct of the respondent in delaying the proceedings at every
stage which led to a long pendency of the dispute, though it will
not be in the interest of justice to interfere with the principal
award, this is a fit case wherein the interest at all the three stages,   D
that is pre-reference period, pendente lite and post-award period,
requires to be reduced. As a result, the respondent would not be
entitled to any interest for the period between 30th August 1977
and 25th July 1989 and for the period between 14th February
1990 and 4th February 2000. In respect of the remaining period
at all the three stages, that is pre-reference period, pendente lite      E
and post-award period, the respondent would be entitled to
interest at the rate of 9% per annum. [Paras 20 and 21][319-D-
G]
      Rajendra Construction Co. v. Maharashtra Housing &
      Area Development Authority and Others (2005) 6 SCC                  F
      678 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 582; Krishna Bhagya Jala
      Nigam Ltd. v. G. Harischandra Reddy and Another
      (2007) 2 SCC 720 : [2007] 1 SCR 698; and Mcdermott
      International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others
      (2006) 11 SCC 181 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 409 – relied                G
      on.
      Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited v. Governor, State of
      Orissa Through Chief Engineer (2015) 2 SCC 189 :
      [2014] 14 SCR 1029; Delhi Airport Metro Express
                                                                          H
312             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A           Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (2022)
            SCC OnLine SC 549 – referred to.
                               Case Law Reference
      [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 582                  relied on             Para 7
      [2007] 1 SCR 698                         relied on             Para 7
B
      [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 409                  relied on             Para 7
      [2014] 14 SCR 1029                       referred to           Para 10
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8990
      of 2017.
C           From the Judgment and Orders dated 18.04.2012 of the High
      Court of Orissa at Cuttack in ARBA No.25 of 2007.
           Sibo Sankar Mishra, Debabrata Dash, Niranjan Sahu, Umakant
      Mishra, Advs. for the Appellants.
           Ashok Panigrahi, Nabab Singh, Ms. Nikita Jaydevan,
D
      Ms. Geetanjali Das Krishnan, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            B. R. GAVAI, J.
             1. The appellants have challenged the judgment dated 18 th April
E     2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Orissa in
      Arbitration Appeal No. 25 of 2007, thereby dismissing the appeal filed
      by the appellants.
            2. The facts in brief giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
            The respondent was awarded the contract for construction of 3
F     kilometers missing link on NH-6 from Kanjipani to Kuntala on
      16th December 1971. The work was to be completed within one year
      that is before 15 th December 1972. The contract amount was
      Rs.4,59,330/-. However, the work could not be completed by the stipulated
      date and it was completed only on 30th August 1977, by which date, the
G     respondent was already paid an amount of Rs.3,36,465/-.
             3. The respondent, on 25th July 1989, issued a notice to the appellant
      regarding his claim. The said notice was replied to by the appellant on
      10 th August 1989 stating therein that, as against the claim of
      Rs.3,34,744/-, the respondent had been paid an amount of
      The respondent thereafter filed a suit being O.S. No. 206 of 1989
H
 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS v. GOKUL CHANDRA                     313
        KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]


before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar                A
(hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”) under Section 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, “the 1940 Act”) seeking reference of
the dispute to arbitration. By order of the trial court dated 14th February
1990, the suit was decreed in favour of the respondent and he was
directed to file the original F-2 agreement in the court for referring the
                                                                              B
dispute to arbitration. However, the respondent did not file the original
F-2 agreement as directed. In the meantime, the 1940 Act was repealed
and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the 1996 Act”)
came into force.
       4. The respondent thereafter filed an application in the disposed
of suit before the trial court, praying for appointment of an arbitrator      C
under the provisions of the 1996 Act. The same was rejected by the trial
court vide order dated 4th February 2000 for lack of jurisdiction. The
respondent thereafter moved an application being MJC No. 36 of 2000
under Section 11 of the 1996 Act before the High Court for appointment
of an arbitrator. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide order      D
dated 15th October 2001, allowed the said application and appointed Shri
S.K. Mohanty, former Judge of the same High Court as the Arbitrator.
       5. On 15 th March 2002, the respondent filed his claim of
Rs.1,45,28,198/- under 15 heads of claim and demanded 19.5% interest
from 1st April 1976 to 15th March 2002. The learned Arbitrator, vide          E
award dated 24th August 2004, awarded a sum of Rs.9,20,650/- in respect
of head Nos. 1 to 14. The learned Arbitrator also awarded interest
pendente lite with effect from 1st April 1976 to the date of the award at
the rate of 18% per annum which came to Rs. 46,90,000/-. The learned
Arbitrator further directed the future interest to be paid at the rate of
18% per annum on the total of the aforesaid two amounts till actual           F
payment. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed a petition being
Arbitration Petition No. 153 of 2004 before the Court of District Judge,
Cuttack under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the award.
The same was rejected by an order dated 25th July 2007. Being aggrieved
thereby, the appellants filed an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act      G
before the High Court. The same was also dismissed vide the impugned
judgment. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
      6. We have heard Shri Sibo Sankar Mishra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Ashok Panigrahi, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
                                                                              H
314             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A            7. Shri Mishra submitted that the learned Arbitrator has grossly
      erred in awarding interest for the period from 1977 to 1989 inasmuch as
      the respondent was in deep slumber for a period of twelve years and did
      not take any step for raising his claim. It is further submitted that the
      learned Arbitrator has also erred in awarding interest for the period from
      the year 1990 to 2000 inasmuch as, though vide decree dated 14th February
B
      1990, the respondent was directed to file the original F-2 agreement for
      referring the dispute to arbitration, the respondent did nothing in that
      regard. It is further submitted that the interest awarded at the rate of
      18% per annum is totally unreasonable. It is submitted that the interest
      amount of Rs.46,90,000/- is almost five times that of the main award
C     amount of Rs.9,20,650/-. He relies on the judgment of this Court in the
      cases of Rajendra Construction Co. v. Maharashtra Housing & Area
      Development Authority and Others1, Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam
      Ltd. v. G. Harischandra Reddy and Another 2 and Mcdermott
      International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others3 in support
      of the proposition that the exorbitant amount of interest awarded by the
D
      Arbitrator and upheld by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
      would be contrary to the interest of justice.
             8. Shri Panigrahi, on the contrary, submitted that there is no reason
      to interfere with the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator,
      which has been concurrently upheld by the District Judge as well as the
E     High Court. He submitted that in view of the provisions of sub-section
      (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act, which has been construed by a three-
      Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Hyder Consulting (UK)
      Limited v. Governor, State of Orissa Through Chief Engineer4, no
      interference would be warranted in the present case.
F           9. Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act reads as under:
            “31. Form and contents of arbitral award.
                   …………………
            (7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so
G           far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral
            tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made

      1
        (2005) 6 SCC 678
      2
        (2007) 2 SCC 720
      3
        (2006) 11 SCC 181
H     4
        (2015) 2 SCC 189
    EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS v. GOKUL CHANDRA                   315
           KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]


        interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any     A
        part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between
        the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which
        the award is made.”
       10. The provisions of Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act fell for
consideration before this Court in many cases including in the cases of        B
Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited (supra) and Delhi Airport Metro
Express Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation5. A perusal
of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act would
reveal that, no doubt, a discretion is vested in the arbitral tribunal to
include in the sum for which the award is made interest, on the whole or
any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between         C
the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the
award is made. However, it would reveal that the section itself requires
interest to be at such rate as the arbitral tribunal deems reasonable.
When a discretion is vested to an arbitral tribunal to award interest at a
rate which it deems reasonable, then a duty would be cast upon the             D
arbitral tribunal to give reasons as to how it deems the rate of interest to
be reasonable. It could further be seen that the arbitral tribunal has also
a discretion to award interest on the whole or any part of the money or
for the whole or any part of the period between the date of cause of
action and the date on which the award is made. When the arbitral
tribunal is empowered with such a discretion, the arbitral tribunal would      E
be required to apply its mind to the facts of the case and decide as to
whether the interest is payable on whole or any part of the money and
also as to whether it is to be awarded to the whole or any part of the
period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date
on which the award is made.                                                    F
       11. A perusal of the award as also the judgment and order of the
District Judge as well as the High Court would reveal that no such exercise
has been done. The learned Arbitrator, without assigning any reasons,
has awarded the interest at the rate of 18% per annum for the period
during which the proceedings were pending and also at the same rate            G
after the award was made till the actual payment.
      12. The undisputed position is that though final measurement was
done on 30st August 1977, for a period of twelve years, i.e., till 25th July

5
    2022 SCC OnLine SC 549                                                     H
316             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     1989, the respondent did not take any step to raise his claim. It is only on
      that date, i.e., 25th July 1989, the respondent issued a notice to the
      appellants regarding his claim. As such, the very conduct of the
      respondent for remaining silent for such a long period would disentitle
      him for the interest during the said period.
B            13. Similarly, though a decree was passed on 14th February 1990
      and the respondent was directed to file the original agreement, he took
      no step till 4th February 2000. In the meantime, the 1996 Act came into
      force. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application in the disposed of
      suit which came to be dismissed on 4th February 2000. Thereafter, he
      moved an application being MJC No. 36 of 2000 before the High Court
C     for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the 1996 Act which
      came to be allowed on 15th October 2001. It could thus be seen that for
      a period of almost ten years, the respondent was again in silent mode.
      Had he filed the original agreement immediately after the decree was
      passed on 14th February 1990, the arbitration proceedings would have
D     commenced and concluded immediately thereafter. As such, the learned
      Arbitrator was not justified in awarding interest for the period from
      14th February 1990 to 4th February 2000. A party cannot be permitted to
      derive benefits from its own lapses.
             14. It is further to be noted that, though after the commencement
E     of the 1996 Act, the respondent could not have moved an application in
      the disposed suit, he chose to do so and only after dismissal of the said
      application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, did he move an application
      for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the 1996 Act before
      the High Court, which was allowed on 15th October 2001. We therefore
      find that the respondent would not be entitled for interest for the period
F     from 14th February 1990 to 15th October 2001.
            15. That leaves us with the rate of interest awarded by the learned
      Arbitrator which has been upheld by the District Judge and the High
      Court. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this
      Court in the case of Rajendra Construction Co. (supra):
G
            “30. The question then remains as to interest. The appellant had
            claimed interest in the suits. The arbitrator awarded interest at
            the rate of 18 per cent per annum on the principal amount from
            the date of the suits to the date of awards and also from the date
            of the awards to the date of payment or up to the date of decrees,
H
 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS v. GOKUL CHANDRA                      317
        KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]


      “whichever is earlier”. This Court has dealt with the power of the       A
      arbitrator to award interest for (i) pre-reference period (Executive
      Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C.
      Budharaj [(2001) 2 SCC 721] ); (ii) pendente lite (Secy.,
      Irrigation Deptt., Govt. of Orissa v. G.C. Roy [(1992) 1 SCC
      508] ); and (iii) post-award period (Hindustan Construction Co.
                                                                               B
      Ltd. v. State of J&K [(1992) 4 SCC 217] ). In Bhagawati Oxygen
      Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 462 : AIR 2005
      SC 2071 : JT (2005) 4 SC 73] , one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) had
      an occasion to consider the relevant decisions on the power of
      the arbitrator to award interest at all the three stages. It was held
      that the arbitrator had power to award interest. Keeping in view         C
      the facts and circumstances of the present case that the contract
      was entered into in 1987, the work was completed in 1990 after
      extension granted by MHADA and the arbitrator passed awards
      in 1995, it would be proper, equitable and in the interest of justice
      if we reduce the rate of interest to 10 per cent per annum.”
                                                                               D
       16. This Court, after referring to the earlier decisions on the power
of the Arbitrator to award interest at all the three stages that is pre-
reference period, pendente lite and post award period, found that, in
the facts and circumstances of the said case, it would be proper, equitable
and in the interest of justice to reduce the rate of interest to 10% from
18% per annum.                                                                 E

      17. This Court, in the case of Mcdermott International Inc., has
observed thus:
      “154. The power of the arbitrator to award interest for pre-award
      period, interest pendente lite and interest post-award period is not     F
      in dispute. Section 31(7)(a) provides that the Arbitral Tribunal
      may award interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the
      whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the
      period between the date on which the cause of action arose and
      the date on which award is made i.e. pre-award period. This,
      however, is subject to the agreement as regards the rate of interest     G
      on unpaid sums between the parties. The question as to whether
      interest would be paid on the whole or part of the amount or
      whether it should be awarded in the pre-award period would
      depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
      Arbitral Tribunal in this behalf will have to exercise its discretion    H
318            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A           as regards (i) at what rate interest should be awarded; (ii) whether
            interest should be awarded on the whole or part of the award
            money; and (iii) whether interest should be awarded for the whole
            or any part of the pre-award period.
            155. The 1996 Act provides for award of 18% interest. The
B           arbitrator in his wisdom has granted 10% interest both for the
            principal amount as also for the interim. By reason of the award,
            interest was awarded on the principal amount. An interest thereon
            was up to the date of award as also the future interest at the rate
            of 18% per annum.
C           156. However, in some cases, this Court has resorted to exercise
            of its jurisdiction under Article 142 in order to do complete justice
            between the parties.
            157. In Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. [(2003) 8 SCC 593] this Court
            upheld the arbitration award for payment of money with interest
D           at the rate of 18% p.a. by the respondent to the appellant. However,
            having regard to the long lapse of time, if award is satisfied in
            entirety, the respondent would have to pay a huge amount by way
            of interest. With a view to do complete justice to the parties, in
            exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of
            India, it was directed that the award shall carry interest at the
E           rate of 6% p.a. instead and in place of 18% p.a.
            158. Similarly in Mukand Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
            Ltd. [(2006) 9 SCC 383 : (2006) 4 Scale 453], while this Court
            confirmed the decision of the Division Bench upholding the modified
            award made by the learned Single Judge, the Court reduced the
F           interest awarded by the learned Single Judge subsequent to the
            decree from 11% per annum to 7½ % per annum observing that
            7½ % per annum would be the reasonable rate of interest that
            could be directed to be paid by the appellant to the respondent for
            the period subsequent to the decree.
G           159. In this case, given the long lapse of time, it will be in
            furtherance of justice to reduce the rate of interest to 7½ %.”
             18. It could thus be seen that while exercising the jurisdiction
      under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court has reduced the
      rate of interest to 7.5% per annum.
H
 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (R AND B) AND OTHERS v. GOKUL CHANDRA                        319
        KANUNGO (DEAD) THR. HIS LRS. [B. R. GAVAI, J.]


      19. Again, in the case of Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd.                   A
(supra), this Court, while reducing the rate of interest, observed thus:
         “11. On the merits of the claims made by the contractor we find
         from the impugned award dated 25-6-2000 that it contains several
         heads. The arbitrator has meticulously examined the claims of
         the contractor under each separate head. We do not see any reason       B
         to interfere except on the rates of interest and on the quantum
         awarded for letting machines of the contractor remaining idle for
         the periods mentioned in the award. Here also we may add that
         we do not wish to interfere with the award except to say that
         after economic reforms in our country the interest regime has
         changed and the rates have substantially reduced and, therefore,        C
         we are of the view that the interest awarded by the arbitrator at
         18% for the pre-arbitration period, for the pendente lite period
         and future interest be reduced to 9%.”
        20. Noticing the similarity between the aforesaid cases and the
present case, we find that the present case is also a fit case wherein this      D
Court needs to exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India to reduce the rate of interest. As already discussed hereinabove,
taking into consideration the conduct of the respondent in delaying the
proceedings at every stage which led to a long pendency of the dispute,
we are of the view that, though it will not be in the interest of justice to     E
interfere with the principal award, this is a fit case wherein the interest
at all the three stages, that is pre-reference period, pendente lite and
post-award period, requires to be reduced.
         21. In the result, we partly allow the appeal and pass the following
order:                                                                           F
         (i) The respondent would not be entitled to any interest for the
             period between 30th August 1977 and 25th July 1989 and for
             the period between 14th February 1990 and 4th February 2000;
         (ii) In respect of the remaining period at all the three stages, that
              is pre-reference period, pendente lite and post-award period,      G
              the respondent would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9%
              per annum.
      22. We are informed that the execution proceedings are still
pending. The parties shall submit their calculation before the Executing
                                                                                 H
320              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     Court in accordance with what has been held by us hereinabove within
      a period of one month from the date of this judgment. The Executing
      Court would quantify the amount in accordance with the aforesaid
      directions within a period of one month thereafter. The appellants shall
      make the payment of the amount as determined by the Executing Court
      within a period of one month thereafter.
B
            23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the
      above terms. No order as to costs.

      Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                 Appeal partly allowed.
      (Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)
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