ECGC LIMITEDversusMOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV

                        [2022] 2 S.C.R. 155                           155


                         ECGC LIMITED                                 A
                                v.
                  MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV
                     (I.A. No. 99210 of 2021)
                                In                                    B

                  (Civil Appeal No. 1842 of 2021)
                      FEBRUARY 15, 2022
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
                                                                      C
       Consumer Protection Act: Applicability of 1986 and 2019 Act
– In the instant case, Complainant was awarded a contract by the
Government of Iraq – Grievance of the complainant was that the
payment for invoices issued for the work done under the contract
was suspended – Thus, relief was sought before the National
Commission by filing a complaint under the Consumer Protection        D
Act, 1986 which was allowed – In the instant appeal, the question
for consideration is whether the appeal would be governed under
the 1986 or 2019 Act – Held: s.67 of 2019 Act states that no appeal
shall be entertained unless the person has deposited 50 percent of
the amount required to be paid – Whereas under the 1986 Act, unless   E
50 percent of the amount or 50 thousand, whichever is less, is
deposited, appeal is not entertained – Repeal of enactment does
not affect any right acquired or accrued under the enactment so
repealed or affect any legal proceeding in respect of such right –
When lis commences, all rights get crystallized and no clog upon a
likely appeal can be put unless the law make express or implied       F
implication – Hence, onerous condition of 50 percent of the amount
awarded shall not be applicable to complaints filed prior to the
commencement of the 2019 Act – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.6.
      Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.
      AIR 1957 SC 540 : [1957] SCR 488 – followed.                    G

      Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya
      Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 221 : [1953] SCR 987 –
      relied on.

                                                                      H
                               155
156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.
      AIR 1931 Cal. 100; State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme
      General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 980
      : [1960] SCR 640; Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v.
      Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur AIR 1967
      SC 344; M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. The State of
B
      Assam & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 724 : [1969] SCR 261; K.
      Raveendranathan Nair & Anr. v. Commissioner of
      Income Tax & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 355 : [2017]
      11 SCR 389; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat &
      Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 175 : [1975] 3 SCR 220; Gujarat
C     Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of
      the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 468 :
      [1999] 2 SCR 895; Ramesh Singh & Anr. v. Cinta Devi
      & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 142 : [1996] 2 SCR 1036; M/s
      Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh Yashwant Singh & Ors.
      (1992) 1 SCC 428 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 305;
D
      Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.
      (2011) 6 SCC 739 : [2011] 4 SCR 838; Newtech
      Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP &
      Ors 2021 SCC On Line SC 1044; Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd.
      v. State of Punjab & Ors. 2019 SCC On Line SC 1228;
E     Sri Satya Nand Jha v. Union of India & Ors. 2016 SCC
      OnLine Jhar 23 M/s. Indian Oil Corporation v. Orissa
      Sales Tax Tribunal, CTC & Ors. 2009 SCC OnLine
      Ori 353; Manohar Infrastructure and Constructions
      Private Limited v. Sanjeev Kumar Sharma & Ors. Civil
      Appeal No. 7098 of 2021 with Ors. decided on
F
      7.12.2021; Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash
      Associates Ltd. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 225; New India
      Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC
      840 [1976] 2 SCR 266; Videocon International Limited
      v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2015) 4
G     SCC 33 : [2015] 3 SCR 1; Maria Cristina De Souza
      Sodder & Ors. v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto & Ors.
      (1979) 1 SCC 92; Harihar Polyfibres v. Regional
      Director, ESI Corporation (1984) 4 SCC 324 : [1985]
      1 SCR 712; Spring Meadows Hospital & Anr. v. Harjol
      Ahluwalia & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 39 : [1998] 2 SCR
H
          ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                      157


     428; Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees’ State                 A
     Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579 : [2007]
     6 SCR 139; K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob & Ors.
     (2020) 14 SCC 126 : [2019] 14 SCR 928; 29 M/s.
     Dream Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. No.
     13431 of 2015 etc. decided on 18.4.2016 – referred
                                                                    B
     to.
                     Case Law Reference
[1953] SCR 987               relied on               Para 8
[1957] SCR 488               followed                Para 10
                                                                    C
[1960] SCR 640               referred to             Para 11
AIR 1967 SC 344              referred to             Para 12
[1969] SCR 261               referred to             Para 13
[2017] 11 SCR 389            referred to             Para 15
                                                                    D
[1975] 3 SCR 220             referred to             Para 16
[1999] 2 SCR 895             referred to             Para 16
[1996] 2 SCR 1036            referred to             Para 17
[1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 305      referred to             Para 17
                                                                    E
[2011] 4 SCR 838             referred to             Para 18
[1976] 2 SCR 266             referred to             Para 27
[2015] 3 SCR 1               referred to             Para 28
(1979) 1 SCC 92              referred to             Para 28
                                                                    F
[1985] 1 SCR 712             referred to             Para 29
[1998] 2 SCR 428             referred to             Para 29
[2007] 6 SCR 139             referred to             Para 29
[2019] 14 SCR 928            referred to             Para 29
                                                                    G
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. No.99210 of 2021
in Civil Appeal No. 1842 of 2021.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.01.2021 of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Consumer
Complaint No.2778 of 2018.
                                                                    H
158              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A           K. K. Venugopal, AG, Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv., Naval Sharma,
      Saket Satapathy, Rohan Batra, Ms. Sonali Malik, Chinmayee Prasad,
      Harsh Vardhan Arora, Dhruv Sethi, Advs. for the Appellant.
            Nidesh Gupta, Sr. Adv., Devesh Tripathi, Faraz Anees,
      Mukeshwarnath Dubey, Ms. Janpreet Kaur, Ms. Vriti Gujral, Madhav
B     Gupta, Ms. Payal Swarup, Ms. Pooja Sharma, Ms. Meera Hasan,
      Praveen Swarup, Advs. for the Respondent.
             The Order of the Court was passed by
             HEMANT GUPTA, J.
             1. The present appeal is directed against an order passed by the
C     National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission 1 whereby the
      appellant herein was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 265.01 Crores along
      with interest @ 10% p.a. from 19.9.2016 within a period of three months.
      In case of failure to deposit the said amount, the awarded amount would
      carry compensation in the form of simple interest @ 12% p.a. The
D     appellant has filed an application (IA No. 99210 of 2021) ex abundanti
      cautela to entertain the appeal as per the provisions of the Consumer
      Protection Act, 19862. It is the said application which is being decided by
      the present order.
            2. The complainant was awarded a contract for construction of
      rain water drainage, heavy sewerage and municipal road system by the
E
      Government of Basra, Iraq. The complainant obtained two specific
      contracts (Letter of Credit Comprehensive Risks Policies) by paying a
      sum of 10,38,03,912/- as premium to the appellant. The grievance of
      the complainant was that the payment for invoices issued for the work
      done under the contract was suspended. Later, the contract also was
F     withdrawn by the Government of Basra owing to some internal conflict.
      The appellant herein rejected the insurance claim of the complainant
      and thus relief was sought before the National Commission by filing a
      complaint under Section 21(a)(i) of the 1986 Act. The said complaint
      was allowed on 27.1.2021.
G           3. The question now being examined here is as to whether the
      present appeal would be governed under the Consumer Protection Act,
      20193 or under the erstwhile 1986 Act.

      1
        National Commission
      2
        For short, the ‘1986 Act’
H     3
        For short, the ‘2019 Act’
                ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                          159
                         [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

        4. In terms of Section 67 of the 2019 Act, no appeal against the      A
order of National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court
unless the person has deposited fifty per cent of the amount required to
be paid. Whereas, under the 1986 Act, by virtue of a proviso inserted
vide Central Act 62 of 2002 w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the condition was that no
appeal shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless the person who
                                                                              B
is required to pay the amount deposits fifty per cent of the amount or
fifty thousand, whichever is less. The two provisions read thus:



                                                                              C




                                                                              D

        5. Learned Attorney General appearing for the appellant submitted
that the appeal has been preferred under Section 23 of the 1986 Act and
not under the 2019 Act which came into force from 20.7.2020. It was
stated that the condition of deposit of 50% of the amount is more onerous     E
than what was provided under the 1986 Act. Therefore, keeping in view
the principle that the law which is applicable at the time of initiation of
the lis would be applicable, the provisions of 1986 Act would govern the
present appeal and not the provisions of 2019 Act. The appellant has
deposited 50,000/- vide demand draft in terms of second proviso to
Section 23 of the 1986 Act while exercising its right of appeal under the     F
1986 Act. Hence, the present appeal be heard on merits.
       6. The learned Attorney General inter alia argued that Section
107 of 2019 Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 18974
unequivocally operate against any question of retrospectivity. Sub-Section
(2) of Section 107 of 2019 Act does not change the legal position as          G
mentioned under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. To appreciate
the argument, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and Section 107 of
the 2019 Act are reproduced hereunder:

4
    For short, the ‘General Clauses Act’                                      H
160            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A           “Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
            6. Effect of Repeal. - Where this Act, or any Central Act or
            Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals
            any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless
            a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
B           (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
            repeal takes effect; or
            (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or
            any thing duly done or suffered thereunder; or

C           (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued
            or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
            (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
            of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
            (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect
D           of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture
            or punishment as aforesaid;
            and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
            instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture
            or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation
E           had not been passed.
                       xx                          xx                       xx
            Section 107 of the 2019 Act
            107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.
F           (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken
            or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby
            repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions
            of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the
            corresponding provisions of this Act.
G           (3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not
            be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6
            of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of
            repeal.”
            7. Sub-section (2) of Section 107 of the 2019 Act protects the
H     actions taken under the 1986 Act insofar as such actions are not
               ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                            161
                        [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

inconsistent with the provisions of 2019 Act. Such actions shall be deemed     A
to have been undertaken as per the corresponding provisions of 2019
Act. Sub-section (3) contemplates that the particular matters in sub-
section (2) shall not prejudice or affect the general application of Section
6 of the General Clauses Act with regard to the effect of repeal. Referring
to clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it was argued that
                                                                               B
unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right,
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed. Further, Clause (e) stipulates that the repeal
shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect
of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment which may be imposed as if the repealing Act or the                 C
Regulation has not been passed. It was thus argued that the repeal of
enactment does not affect any right acquired or accrued under the
enactment so repealed or affect any legal proceeding in respect of such
a right. Such effect was to be construed only when a different intention
appears from the repealing statute. It was thus argued that the right to
                                                                               D
file an appeal under the 1986 Act has accrued in favour of the appellant
in terms of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act and that no different
intention is discernable from the repealing Act.
       8. To support the above arguments, the learned Attorney General
has relied upon Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court
reported as Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors.5                 E
which was approved by this Court in a judgment reported as Hoosein
Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.6. In
Hoosein Kasam Dada, Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.R. Das speaking for the
Bench with Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.C. Mahajan was examining a matter
consequent to the amendment on 25.11.1949 by the Central Provinces             F
and Berar Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act (Act 57 of 1949)
amending the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The
proviso to Section 22(1) of the 1947 Act prior to the amendment as
enacted provided that no appeal against an order of assessment shall be
entertained unless it was satisfied that such amount of tax or penalty or
both as the appellant may admit to be due from him has been paid.              G
The amending act contemplated that no appeal shall be entertained unless
an appeal is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the

5
    AIR 1931 Cal. 100
6
    AIR 1953 SC 221                                                            H
162             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     tax, with penalty, if any, in respect of which the appeal has been
      preferred. Therefore, there was change in the condition of preferring
      an appeal from the amount admitted to be due by the assessee than the
      payment of the tax and penalty of in respect of which an appeal has
      been preferred.
B            9. It may be relevant to mention that the Court also noticed the
      argument of the learned counsel for the State that until actual assessment
      is made, there can be no lis and therefore, no right of appeal can accrue
      before that date. The Court observed that when assessee files a return,
      the lis may not immediately arise. The authority may assess the return
      under Section 11 of the 1947 Act, but if the authority is not satisfied as to
C     the correctness of the return and call for evidence, a controversy arises.
      In the aforesaid case, the sales tax return was filed on 28.11.1947 and a
      notice by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was issued on
      25.1.1949 i.e. prior to the amendment. This Court held as under:
            “8. The above decisions quite firmly establish and our decisions
D           in Janardan Reddy v. State [(1950) SCR 941] and in Ganpat
            Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. [(1952) SCJ 564]
            uphold the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of
            procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal
            from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal
E           becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in,
            and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. In the language
            of Jenkins, C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Shaik bin Andu to disturb
            an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure.
            Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express
            enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with
F           or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed
            unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or
            necessary implication.
            9. …. In our view the above observation is apposite and applies to
            the case before us. The true implication of the above observation
G           as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the
            pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if
            the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or
            necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal
            continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old
H           law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support
     ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                               163
              [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for   A
the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old
law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of
appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision
preventing the exercise of that right. The argument that the
authority has no option or jurisdiction to admit the appeal unless it
                                                                        B
be accompanied by the deposit of the assessed tax as required by
the amended proviso to Section 22(1) of the Act overlooks the
fact of existence of the old law for the purpose of supporting the
pre-existing right and really amounts to begging the question. The
new proviso is wholly inapplicable in such a situation and the
jurisdiction of the authority has to be exercised under the old law     C
which so continues to exist. The argument of Sri Ganapathy Aiyer
on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted.
10. Finally, Sri Ganapathy Aiyer faintly urges that until actual
assessment there can be no “lis” and, therefore, no right of appeal
can accrue before that event. There are two answers to this plea.       D
Whenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to
that proposition by another a “lis” arises. It may be conceded,
though not deciding it, that when the assessee files his return a
“lis” may not immediately arise, for under Section 11(1) the
authority may accept the return as correct and complete. But if
the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness of the return      E
and calls for evidence, surely a controversy arises involving a
proposition by the assessee and an opposition by the State. The
circumstance that the authority who raises the dispute is himself
the Judge can make no difference, for the authority raises the
dispute in the interest of the State and in so acting only represents   F
the State. It will appear from the dates given above that in this
case the “lis” in the sense explained above arose before the date
of amendment of the section. Further, even if the “lis” is to be
taken as arising only on the date of assessment, there was a
possibility of such a “lis” arising as soon as proceedings started
with the filing of the return or, at any rate, when the authority       G
called for evidence and started the hearing and the right of appeal
must be taken to have been in existence even on those dates. For
the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and
relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not
the decision itself.”                                                   H
164               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            10. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench in a judgment reported
      as Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors.7 approved
      the judgment in Hoosein Kasam Dada, though the issue was in respect
      of right of appeal to the Federal Court under the Government of India
      Act, 1935. The argument was that the appellant had a right to file an
      appeal as the suit, out of which the proceedings arose before this Court,
B
      was filed on 22.4.1949. Hence, he had acquired a vested right to appeal
      to the Federal Court which has since been replaced by the Supreme
      Court. It was the said argument which was accepted by the Constitution
      Bench when the following principles were delineated:
               “23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly
C              emerge:
               (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second
               appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected
               by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.

D              (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a
               substantive right.
               (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all
               rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto
               till the rest of the career of the suit.
E              (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter
               the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from
               the date the lis commences and although it may be actually
               exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is
               to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution
F              of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the
               date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
               (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a
               subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary
               intendment and not otherwise.
G              24. In the case before us the suit was instituted on April 22, 1949,
               and on the principle established by the decisions referred to above
               the right of appeal vested in the parties thereto at that date and is
               to be governed by the law as it prevailed on that date, that is to
               say, on that date the parties acquired the right, if unsuccessful, to
      7
H         AIR 1957 SC 540
               ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                                165
                        [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         go up in appeal from the sub-court to the High Court and from the         A
         High Court to the Federal Court under the Federal Court
         (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 read with clause 39 of
         the Letters Patent and Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil
         Procedure provided the conditions thereof were satisfied. The
         question for our consideration is whether that right has been taken
                                                                                   B
         away expressly or by necessary intendment by any subsequent
         enactment. The respondents to the application maintain that it has
         been so taken away by the provisions of our Constitution.”
       11. In a three-Judge Bench judgment reported as State of Bombay
v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. & Anr.8, the argument
which arose for consideration was that the court fees payable on the               C
memorandum of appeal would be as on the date of filing of the suit and
not as per the amendment in the Court Fees Act, 1870 by Bombay Act
12 of 1954. The court fee on the memorandum of appeal was thus held
to be payable as was applicable prior to the amendment of the Act. This
Court held as under:                                                               D
         “12. It is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this
         Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that
         an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction
         thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of
         procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an         E
         enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so
         expressly or by necessary intendment.”
       12. The Constitution Bench in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur9 was considering a matter
where the date on which sales tax returns were filed was not disclosed.            F
In the absence of the date of filing of the return, this Court held as under:
         “9. The decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada’s case, 1953 SCR 987:
         (AIR 1953 SC 221), proceeded on the ground that when a lis
         commences, all rights get crystallised and no clog upon a likely
         appeal can be put, unless the law was made retrospective,                 G
         expressly or by clear implication. From the record of this case,
         we cannot say when the lis commenced, and unless it can be
         proved conclusively that it was before the amendment of the law,

8
    AIR 1960 SC 980
9
    AIR 1967 SC 344                                                                H
166                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A              the rule in Hoosein Kasam Dada’s case, 1953 SCR 987: (AIR
               1953 SC 221), cannot apply. There is no averment that right of
               appeal had vested, and has been wrongly taken away.”
             13. In another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court reported
      as M/s. Hardeodas Jagannath v. The State of Assam & Ors. 10,
B     none of the previous judgments were referred to and thus, it prima
      facie appears to have taken a somewhat different view than what was
      held in the earlier Constitution Bench judgments. But if examined closely,
      the said judgment is not taking any contrary view and is in line with the
      earlier judgments of this Court. The issue was about an amendment
      dated 1.4.1958 in the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 requiring deposit of
C
      assessed tax and penalty as condition of filing of appeal. The assessee
      had filed half yearly returns for periods ending on 30.9.1956, 31.3.1957
      and 30.9.1957 respectively. The premises of the assessee were
      searched on 6.3.1959 and the account books etc. were seized. A notice
      for reassessment was issued on 4.4.1959 under Section 19A of the
D     Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. It was in this background, this Court held
      as under:
               “9. It was contended that the amendment came into force with
               effect from April 1, 1958 and it cannot be given retrospective
               effect so as to apply to assessment periods ending on September
E              30, 1956, March 31, 1957 and September 30, 1957. We are unable
               to accept this argument as correct because the assessments for
               these three periods were completed after the amending Act came
               into force i.e., after April 1, 1958. The appeals against the
               assessments were also filed after the amendment. It is therefore
               not correct to say that the amending Act has been given a
F
               retrospective effect and the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes
               was therefore right in asking the appellant to comply with the
               provisions of the amended Section 30 of the Act before dealing
               with the appeals.”
             14. Since the returns were filed prior to the amendment but the
G
      notice for reassessment was issued after the Amending Act came into
      force, therefore, in view of the Hoosein Kasam Dada, the provisions
      of the Amending Act alone would be applicable and that is what has
      been held by this Court.

      10
H          AIR 1970 SC 724
             ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                              167
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      15. In a judgment reported as K. Raveendranathan Nair & Anr.             A
v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.11, it has been held that the
relevant date for paying the court fee would be when the proceedings
were initiated in the lowest court and not when the appeal was preferred
before the High Court in view of the amendment in the Kerala Court
Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.
                                                                               B
        16. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.12, a four-
Judge Bench of this Court held that since the authority entertaining appeal
has a jurisdiction to dispense with the compliance of requirement to deposit
the amount of property tax, it is not onerous as discretion was vested
with the appellate court. In another judgment reported as Gujarat Agro
                                                                               C
Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahmedabad & Ors.13, the judgment in Anant Mills was followed.
       17. This Court in a judgment reported as Ramesh Singh & Anr.
v. Cinta Devi & Ors.14 held that an appeal under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 contemplating deposit of twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty
                                                                               D
per cent of the amount whichever is less will not be applicable to the
claim applications filed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Similar is the
view of another Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as M/s
Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh & Ors.15 wherein
the right of appeal conferred under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could
not be said to be taken away after repeal of such Act by the Motor             E
Vehicles Act, 1988.
       18. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent submitted that the amendment is procedural in nature and
thus always retrospective. Reliance was placed upon Thirumalai
Chemicals Limited v. Union of India & Ors.16. It was averred that              F
procedure includes the manner and form of filing of appeal, pre-deposit
and limitation. The right of appeal is a statutory right which can be taken
away by express provision of law, therefore, the conditions on which an
appeal would lie is also within the legislative competence.
                                                                               G
11
   (2017) 9 SCC 355
12
   (1975) 2 SCC 175
13
   (1999) 4 SCC 468
14
   (1996) 3 SCC 142
15
   (1992) 1 SCC 428
16
   (2011) 6 SCC 739                                                            H
168                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A             19. We find that the reliance on Thirumalai Chemicals Limited
      may not be correct asthis Court held that Section 49 of FEMA does not
      seek to withdraw or take away the vested right of appeal in cases where
      proceedings were initiated prior to repeal of FERA on 01.06.2000 or
      after. The said judgment in fact held that liberal provision of condonation
      of delay as provided in the new Act would be applicable. It was held as
B
      under:
                 “28. Above discussion will clearly demonstrate that Section 49 of
                FEMA does not seek to withdraw or take away the vested right
                of appeal in cases where proceedings were initiated prior to repeal
                of FERA on 01.06.2000 or after. On a combined reading of Section
C               49 of FEMA and Section 6 of General Clauses Act, it is clear that
                the procedure prescribed by FEMA only would be applicable in
                respect of an appeal filed under FEMA though cause of action
                arose under FERA. In fact, the time limit prescribed under FERA
                was taken away under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
D               19 and the Tribunal has been conferred with wide powers to
                condone delay if the appeal is not filed within forty-five days
                prescribed, provided sufficient cause is shown. Therefore, the
                findings rendered by the Tribunal as well as the High Court that
                the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond
                the date prescribed under FERA is not a correct understanding of
E               the law on the subject.
                29. We, therefore, hold that the Appellate Tribunal can entertain
                the appeal after the prescribed period of 45 days if it is satisfied,
                that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the
                said period. We are therefore inclined to set aside the orders passed
F               by the Tribunal and the High Court and remit the matter back to
                the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law on
                the basis of the findings recorded by us…”
             20. Mr. Gupta also referred to the three-Judge Bench judgment
      of this Court reported as Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt.
G     Ltd. v. State of UP & Ors.17 wherein pre-deposit was required to be
      made while filing an appeal under the Real Estate (Regulation and
      Development) Act, 2016. The said judgment is not applicable as while
      framing the statute, Section 43(5) contemplating pre-deposit was part of

      17
H          2021 SCC On Line SC 1044
            ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                                169
                     [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the initially enacted provision. Similarly, another judgment reported as        A
Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Ors.18 is also in respect of
right of appeal on pre-deposit which was enacted originally in the Punjab
Value Added Tax Act.
       21. The learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon
Division Bench judgments in Sri Satya Nand Jha v. Union of India &              B
Ors.19 and M/s. Indian Oil Corporation v. Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal,
CTC & Ors.20. It is to be noted that the Orissa High Court in Indian Oil
Corporation was in fact considering the reverse proposition wherein
condition of pre-deposit of 50% of the deposited amount of tax was
deleted. The writ petition was filed by the assessee to challenge the
notice issued by the State to deposit 50% of the deposited amount after         C
the amendment. The Division Bench held as under:
       “24. The Apex Court time & again held that right of appeal is a
       substantive right, but how the appeal is to be decided is a matter
       of procedure. The rules of procedure are intended to advance
       justice & not to defeat it. “Procedural law is intended to facilitate    D
       & not to obstruct the course of substantive justice.” (vide Hoosein
       Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P., AIR 1953 SC
       221; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry; AIR 1957
       SC 540; M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC
       91 : AIR 1978 SC 484; Harcharan v. State of Haryana, (1982)              E
       3 SCC 408 : AIR 1983 SC 43; & Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing
       Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 659 : AIR
       2003 SC 2434).
       25. In the instant case, as the provision of the pre-deposit condition
       for entertaining the appeal has been deleted prior to entertaining       F
       the appeal being a procedural matter, the amendment would apply
       retrospectively. The instant case is squarely covered by the
       Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lakshmi Rattan
       Engineering Works Ltd. (supra).”
      22. The High Court of Jharkhand in Sri Satya Nand Jha was                 G
dealing with the amendment in Section 35 of the Central Excise Act,
1944 by Section 105 of the Finance Act, 2014 prescribing that 7.5% or

18
   2019 SCC On Line SC 1228
19
   2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 2323
20
   2009 SCC OnLine Ori 353                                                      H
170                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                                  [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     10% of the duty demand or penalty levied is to be deposited. In the said
      case, the pre-amended provision was that if the appellate authority on
      being satisfied that the deposit of the duty demanded or penalty levied
      would cause undue hardship, then the condition of pre-deposit could be
      dispensed with. But subsequent to the amendment, 7% of the duty
      assessed and 10% of the penalty levied was made mandatory to be
B
      deposited. It may be noticed that the second proviso clarified that the
      provisions of the amended Section 35 shall not be applied to the stay
      applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to
      the commencement of the Finance Act, 2014. Therefore, the issue arising
      in the said case was of legality and validity of the pre-deposit and not the
C     retrospectivity of the said provision.
             23. Mr. Gupta has relied upon the judgment of this Court in
      Manohar Infrastructure and Constructions Private Limited v.
      Sanjeev Kumar Sharma & Ors.21 in which the dispute was that the
      NCDRC had granted stay subject to deposit of the entire decretal
D     amount. No argument was raised or decided for retrospectivity of
      Section 51 of the 2019 Act but the question raised was whether the
      NCDRC could direct such deposit of the entire decretal amount pending
      appeal though the statute prescribes pre-deposit of 50% of the amount
      in dispute.
E           24. It was contended that the consumer protection legislation is a
      beneficial legislation, therefore, the interpretation which benefits the
      consumer should be preferred as held by this Court in Neena Aneja &
      Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.22.
             25. It is to be noted that in Neena Aneja, this Court held that right
F     to forum is not an accrued right. Section 6(e) of the General Clauses
      Act protects the pending legal proceeding for enforcement of the accrued
      right from the effect of repeal; it does not mean the legal proceeding at
      a particular forum was saved from the effect of repeal. This Court found
      that there was no express intention in the repealing enactment that all
      pending cases would stand transferred to the fora created under 2019
G     Act. This Court held as under:
                “78. Having stated the above position, we need to harmonize it
                with the principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued

      21
           Civil Appeal No. 7098 of 2021 with Ors. decided on 7.12.2021
      22
H          2021 SCC OnLine SC 225
     ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                                171
              [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

right, as discussed in Part C of this judgement. Simply put, while       A
Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending
legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right from
the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal
proceedings at a particular forum are saved from the effects
from the repeal. The question whether the pending legal
                                                                         B
proceedings are required to be transferred to the newly created
forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed,
this Court in New India Assurance (supra) and Maria
Christina (supra) has held that forum is a matter pertaining to
procedural law and therefore the litigant has to pursue the legal
proceedings at the forum created by the repealing act, unless a          C
contrary intention appears. This principle would also apply to
pending proceedings, as observed in Ramesh Kumar
Soni (supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur (supra) and Sudhir G
Angur (supra). In this backdrop, what is relevant to ascertain is
whether a contrary intent to the general rule of retrospectivity
                                                                         D
has been expressed under the Act of 2019 to continue the
proceedings at the older forum.
79. Now, in considering the expression of intent in the repealing
enactment in the present case, it is apparent that there is no express
language indicating that all pending cases would stand transferred
to the fora created by the Act of 2019 by applying its newly             E
prescribed pecuniary limits. In deducing whether there is a contrary
intent, the legislative scheme and procedural history may provide
a relevant insight into the intention of the legislature.
          xx                         xx                      xx
                                                                         F
84. … The legislature cannot be attributed to be remiss in not
explicitly providing for transfer of pending cases according to the
new pecuniary limits set up for the fora established by the new
law, were that to be its intention. The omission, when contextualized
against the statutory scheme, portends a contrary intention to
protect pending proceedings through Section 107(2) of the Act of         G
2019. This intention appears likely, particularly in light of previous
decisions of the NCDRC which had interpreted amendments that
enhanced pecuniary jurisdiction, with prospective effect. The
NCDRC, in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd., Consumer Case No. 286 of 2000                  H
172             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            (NCDRC) construed amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the
             pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from
             15 March 2003 as prospective by relying on its earlier decision
             in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr. Manoj Ramachandran,
             Revision Petitions Nos. 400 to 402 of 1993, where the NCDRC
             held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction
B
             are prospective in nature [albeit on a reliance of the principle
             in Dhadi Sahu (supra)]. Parliament would be conscious of this
             governing principle and yet chose not to alter it in its application to
             the consumer fora.”
             26. Having said so, this Court held that serious hardship would be
C     caused to the consumers if the cases already instituted before National
      Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission were required to be
      transferred to the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. Thereafter,
      the proceedings instituted before the commencement of 2019 Act would
      continue before the fora corresponding to the provisions under the 1986
D     Act.
             27. Reliance was also placed upon judgment of this Court reported
      as New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra23 wherein the
      change in forum was said to be covered under procedural law. In the said
      referred judgment, there was change of forum of filing of a claim application
E     under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 from that of a civil suit. It was held that
      change of forum would apply retrospectively. It was held that claimant
      have a vested right of action and not of forum. Such is not the question
      posed before us in the present appeal.
            28. The change of forum and period of limitation have been held
      to be procedural law even in the judgments reported in Videocon
F     International Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India24,
      and Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder & Ors. v. Amria Zurana
      Pereira Pinto & Ors.25.
           29. Mr. Gupta has also relied upon Harihar Polyfibres v.
      Regional Director, ESI Corporation26, Spring Meadows Hospital &
G     Anr. v. Harjol Ahluwalia & Anr. 27, Kishore Lal v. Chairman,

      23
         (1975) 2 SCC 840
      24
         (2015) 4 SCC 33
      25
         (1979) 1 SCC 92
      26
         (1984) 4 SCC 324
H     27
         (1998) 4 SCC 39
             ECGC LIMITED v. MOKUL SHRIRAM EPC JV                                  173
                      [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

Employees’ State Insurance Corpn.28 and K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K.                    A
Jacob & Ors.29 to contend that in respect of beneficial legislations, the
interpretation which support the intention of law should be accepted.
      30. In Harihar Polyfibres, this Court was examining the scope
of expression wages in the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. It
was held that the Act in question was a beneficial legislation and thus            B
any ambiguous expression was bound to receive a beneficial construction.
The present dispute is not of any ambiguity, therefore principles laid
down in this case are not applicable.
       31. In Spring Meadows Hospital, this Court held that the definition
clause of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the 1986 Act is wide enough to include            C
not only the person who hires the services but also the beneficiary of
such services. Thus, both the parents of the child as well as the child
would be consumer under the 1986 Act to claim compensation under the
Act. In Kishore Lal, this court held that the definition of ‘consumer’ in
the 1986 Act is apparently wide enough and encompasses within its fold
not only the goods but also the services, bought or hired for consideration.       D
In K.H. Nazar, the question was, whether a rocky land which was used
for quarrying purposes can be treated as a “commercial site”, thus exempt
from the purview of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. We are not
concerned with interpretation to be given to a clause in the statute as in
the judgments referred to by the respondents but only with the effect of           E
substitution of a provision than earlier provisions.
       32. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in M/s. Dream
Castle & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.30 dealing with amended Section
35 of the Central Excise Act by Finance Act No. 2 of 2014 held that
when the unamended condition gave only a chance or hope for an assessee            F
to get a total waiver at the discretion of the Appellate Authority, the
same cannot be equated to a vested right or stated to be retrospective,
unless it is definitely shown that the amended condition is more onerous
than the unamended condition. It was held as under:
       “54. Therefore, it is well settled that the right of appeal is a creature   G
       of statute and the legislature is well within its competence to impose
       conditions for the exercise of such a right subject only to the

28
   (2007) 4 SCC 579
29
   (2020) 14 SCC 126
30
   W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 etc. decided on 18.4.2016                                H
174              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            restriction that the conditions so imposed are not so onerous as to
             amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost
             illusory.
                       xx                         xx                       xx
             59. Therefore, if one condition that was already available in the
B            statute for the exercise of a right of appeal, is merely replaced by
             another condition, the same cannot be said to be retrospective,
             unless it is definitely shown that the amended condition is more
             onerous than the unamended condition. When the unamended
             condition gave only a chance or hope for an assessee to get a
C            total waiver at the discretion of the Appellate Authority, the same
             cannot be equated to a vested right. A mere chance of convincing
             the Appellate Authority to exercise the discretion for the grant of
             a total waiver is no vested right. The amendment, in our considered
             view, did not take away a right vested, but merely made a chance
             divested. What has now gone, is not the right, but the chance or
D            hope. Therefore, the first contention of the learned Senior counsel
             for the petitioner is liable to be rejected.”
            33. There is another line of judgments taking a view that right of
      appeal is a creation of statute and the legislature is competent to determine
      the conditions on which an appeal would lie. These are not the cases of
E     amending or repeal of a statute, therefore, such judgments are not
      applicable to the questions arising in the present application.
             34. In view of the binding precedents of the Constitution Bench
      judgments referred to above, we hold that onerous condition of payment
      of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints
F     filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act. Therefore, the I.A. is
      allowed.


      Devika Gujral                                              Application allowed.

G




H