Holding

The Supreme Court held that Schott India's rebate schemes and agreements do not constitute abuse of dominant position and, because the CCI’s investigation was procedurally defective due to denial of cross‑examination, the appeals are dismissed and the lower order affirmed.

Summary

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleged that Schott Glass India abused its dominant position in the neutral glass tubing market by offering volume‑based target rebates, functional "no‑Chinese" rebates, a long‑term supply agreement with its joint‑venture Schott Kaisha, and by allegedly tying clear and amber tubes. The CCI imposed a penalty and cease‑and‑desist order, which Schott India challenged before the Competition Appellate Tribunal and later before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined each alleged abuse – the target‑rebate scheme, the functional rebate, the long‑term agreement, alleged tying, and the need for an effects‑based harm analysis – and found that the rebates were uniformly applied, objectively justified, and did not foreclose competition, while the long‑term agreement did not constitute a margin squeeze. The Court also held that the CCI’s investigation was procedurally defective because Schott India was denied cross‑examination of key witnesses, violating natural justice. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower tribunal’s order, dismissed the appeals, and upheld the finding that no abuse of dominance occurred.

Issues considered

Whether the target‑discount scheme of Schott India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing under Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002.
Whether the functional‑discount/"no‑Chinese" scheme (including the later Trade‑Mark Licence Agreement) imposes unfair or discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b).
Whether the Long‑Term Tubing Supply Agreement (LTTSA) with Schott Kaisha results in a margin‑squeeze prohibited by Section 4(2)(e).
Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d).
Whether an effects‑based (harm) analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section 4, and whether it was omitted in the present case.
Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of cross‑examination and breaches of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Competition Act, 2002s. 19(4)(l), s. 27(b), s. 36(2), s. 4(2)(a), s. 4(2)(b), s. 4(2)(c), s. 4(2)(d), s. 4(2)(e)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration I. Whether providing exclusionary volume based discounts, imposing contractual terms, refusing supply etc. will amount to abuse of dominant position? II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme (including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act? III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a margin- squeeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act? IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act? V.

Subjects

Dominant positionTying or bundlingTarget (volume) rebatesAbuse of dominanceUntested statementsMargin squeezeStatements not subjected to cross examinationsFunctional discountEffects‑based analysisNatural justice

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1316 : 2025 INSC 668

Competition Commission of India
v.
Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014)
13 May 2025
[Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
I. Whether providing exclusionary volume based discounts,
imposing contractual terms, refusing supply etc. will amount
to abuse of dominant position?
II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme
(including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair
or discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and
Section 4(2)(b) of the Act?
III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a margin-
squeeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act?
IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes,
thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act?
V. Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential
component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act., and, if
so, whether it was omitted in the present case?
VI. Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are
vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches
of natural justice?

Headnotes†
Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance –
Whether target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts to
discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of
Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act – The rebate
structure applied uniformly to all purchasers based solely on
volume thresholds, irrespective of buyer identity – Thus not
in contravention of provisions of Competition Act:

* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1317

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Held: It is an undeniable fact that Schott India holds a dominant
position in the Neutral Glass Tubing market in India – As per
Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Act, an abuse of dominant
position arises only where a dominant enterprise (i) impose
unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions, (ii) limit production or
technical development, (iii) block others from the market, (iv) force
a buyer to accept an unrelated product or obligation, or (v) use
power in one market to muscle into, or protect, another – Thus
applying different prices only becomes abusive when it lacks an
objective commercial justification or when equivalent customers
cannot obtain the same terms – The rebate ladder introduced
by Schott was directly proportional to the aggregate tonnage of
Neutral Glass Clear (“NGC”) and Neutral Glass Amber (“NGA”)
collected within the financial year by the customer – Every
customer who reached a slab, whether by one purchase order
or by several, obtained the corresponding allowance on the
entire year’s turnover — The rebate therefore rose mechanically
with volume and with nothing else – identity of the buyer was
irrelevant – While larger buyers like Schott Kaisha availed higher
rebates due to greater offtake, no evidence showed denial of
similar rebates to similarly placed customers – Moreover, reliance
is placed on the untested declarations of five converters alleging
that Schott Kaisha received “special” terms – Those statements,
taken ex parte and never subjected to cross-examination, thus
cannot be relied upon – Therefore, the target-discount scheme
of Schott India is not in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and
4(2)(b) of the Act. [Paras 10, 31, 33, 38, 39]

Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance –
Functional Discount / “No-Chinese” Scheme – Whether
Unfair or Discriminatory under Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b)
of the Competition Act, 2002 – the functional rebate and its
successor agreements are not unfair or discriminatory as
the rebate terms remained consistent across similarly placed
converters, with no price discrimination:
Held: The uniform 8% functional rebate was granted to converters
that met three objective and commercially justifiable conditions: (i)
fulfilling a purchase plan to ensure furnace stability; (ii) refraining
from using certain Chinese tubing due to quality concerns (a
condition later withdrawn); and (iii) complying with traceability and
fair-pricing obligations – Each condition is therefore objectively
1318 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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connected with the legitimate aim, patient safety and brand
integrity, and is proportionate to it – Ledgers for FY 2008-09 to
FY 2011-12, collated by COMPAT, discloses no instance in which
two converters performing the same function received different net
prices – The rebate terms remained consistent across similarly
placed converters, with no price discrimination – The only variation
was credit timing which was commercially rational and not violative
of Section 4(2)(a) –– Every converter prepared to assume the same
traceability and quality-promotion obligations received exactly the
same economic consideration – Therefore, the functional rebate
and its successor agreements therefore do not offend either Section
4(2)(a) or Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Act. [Paras 40, 41, 45]

Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – The
Long-Term Tubing Supply Agreement (LTTSA) between Schott
India and Schott Kaisha resulted into a market squeeze,
prohibited by Section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act, 2002 –
As Schott India is absent downstream; the wholesale-to-retail
spread left rivals with sustainable margins; and the market
exhibited neither exit nor price elevation – Thus, LTTSA does
not contravene Section 4(2)(e) of the Act:
Held: It is alleged that impugned LTTSA enabled Schott India
to foreclose independent converters by compressing the margin
between their input cost and the downstream selling price of Schott
Kaisha – Three essential condition should be met in for a margin
squeeze - (i). The respondent must itself operate downstream; (ii).
The wholesale-to-retail spread must be insufficient for an equally
efficient competitor; and (iii). The compression must threaten
competitive harm – In the present case Schott India did not operate
in the downstream market for converted glass containers, which
was served by Schott Kaisha, a separate company in which the
global Schott AG holds fifty per cent stakes, the balance being
with the Kaisha promoters, with no board overlap, no common
management, and separate audited accounts – Moreover, there
is no evidence established that equally efficient independent
converters were foreclosed or operated at a loss – There is no
demonstrable squeeze of rivals’ margin, as there is no evidence
that equally efficient rivals were forced into losses – Financial
data from nine independent converters show positive EBITDA
throughout the LTTSA period, with seven improving in both volume
and margins – Accordingly, none of the three cumulative conditions
for a margin squeeze were met. [Paras 48-53]
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1319

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Schott
India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching
Section 4(2)(d) of the Competition Act:
Held: Section 4(2)(d) of the Act is attracted only where a dominant
enterprise, (i). supplies two distinct products, (ii). makes the
supply of the tying product conditional upon acceptance of the tied
product, and (iii). thereby forecloses competitors in the tied-product
market — In the instant case, NGA and NGC are not economically
distinct products, but rather alternative specifications drawn from
the same continuous-melt furnace, with customer demand dictated
by downstream pharmaceutical requirements – Even assuming as
arguendo, NGA and NGC were separate, no coercive condition was
proven – Alleged tying of both the products was based on witness
statements in which no opportunity of cross examination was granted
and an outdated circular, both of weak evidentiary value – No contract,
invoice, or purchase record demonstrated forced bundling – Thus, it
is not proved NGA and NGC are not independent products and the
converters were never compelled to buy both the products moreover
no foreclosure was demonstrated – In these circumstances, the
essential elements of Section 4(2)(d) of the Act are not proved as
NGA and NGC are not independent products. [Paras 54, 55, 56, 58]

Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Whether an effects-based (harm)
analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section
4 of the Act, and, if so, whether it was omitted in the present
case – That the CCI, having relied on untested statements and
pre-2009 correspondence, Undertook no credible assessment
of harm – The omission of a proper harm analysis vitiates the
CCI’s order in limine:
Held: Section 4 of the Act prohibits the abuse of dominance – Abuse
is conduct that distorts the competitive process or harms consumers –
The statute therefore contemplates two logically separate findings: (i).
that the impugned practice falls within one of the descriptive clauses
(a)–(e) of sub-Section (2), and (ii). that it results in, or is likely to result
in, an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) – The
majority ruling of the CCI professed to have analysed effects yet
adduced no economic evidence of price increases, output restriction
or foreclosure – However, after compiling converter sales, EBITDA
and price data for FY 2007-08 to FY 2011-12, it was found (i) that all
independent converters expanded output and margins, and (ii) that
pharmaceutical buyers paid identical or higher prices for containers
1320 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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from the joint-venture than from other converters – The CCI, having
relied on untested statements and pre-2009 correspondence,
Undertook no credible assessment of harm; and that, on the evidence
marshalled by the COMPAT, converter growth, stable downstream
prices, absence of foreclosure – No appreciable adverse effect on
competition is shown. [Paras 59, 64, 66]

Competition Act, 2002 – s.36 – Whether the investigation
and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of cross-
examination and allied breaches of natural justice:
Held: Section 36(2) of the Act incorporates the Code of Civil
Procedure’s guarantees, including the right to “examine witnesses
on oath” and to test them in cross-examination, Regulation 41(5) of
the 2009 General Regulations obliges the DG or the CCI to grant
that opportunity whenever it is “necessary or expedient” — In this
case, the DG relied extensively on statements from converters
commercially adverse to Schott India, by circulating questionnaires,
recording their statements and “surfing the worldwide web”, no
independent verification was attempted – The CCI adopted the same
material without independent scrutiny – In short, uncorroborated
testimony is the foundation of every adverse inference by the
DG and CCI against Schott India – Schott India had repeatedly
requested cross-examination, both in writing and orally, but the
CCI rejected the request on technical grounds, ignoring the
substantive right – If the CCI had allowed cross-examination, two
courses were open: (i). either the allegations would have crumbled
under questioning, or (ii). a tested evidentiary record would have
emerged on which a reasoned decision, whichever way, could rest.
Cross-examination would have revealed that several converters
had, during the period in question, expanded output, raised prices
independently of Schott India – The findings of CCI are not legally
sustainable and are contrary to natural justice – COMPAT correctly
allowed the appeal filed by Schott India, as CCI’s refusal to let
Schott India cross-examine the converter-witnesses was a material
infraction. [Paras 68, 69, 73, 75]

Case Law Cited
Rajasthan Cylinders v. Union of India [2018] 12 SCR 495 : (2020)
16 SCC 615; Indian National Shipowners’ Association v. ONGC,
(2019) SCC OnLine CCI 26; Competition Commission of India v.
Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd. [2018] 1 SCR 232 : (2018) 4
SCC 316; Raymond Woollen Mills Limited and Another v. Director
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1321

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

General (Investigation and Registration) and Another [2008] 8 SCR
1002 : (2008) 12 SCC 73; State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery
Dealer Etc. [1977] 3 SCR 233 : (1977) 2 SCC 777; Andaman
Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II
(2016) 15 SCC 785 – relied upon.
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. CCI, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11229 –
relied upon.
British Airways plc v. Commission, (Court of Justice of the
European Union in Case C-95/04 P, dated 15 March 2007);
Telia Sonera Sverige AB v. Konkurrensverket, (Court of Justice
of the European Union, Case C-52/09, judgment dated 17
February 2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European
Communities, (General Court of the European Union, Case
T-201/04, judgment dated 17 September 2007); Intel Corporation
Inc. v. European Commission, (Case C-413/14 P, judgment of 6
September 2017) – relied upon.

List of Acts
The Competition Act, 2002; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Dominant position; Tying or bundling; Target (volume) rebates;
Abuse of dominance; Untested statements; Margin squeeze;
Statements not subjected to cross examinations.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.04.2014 of the Competition
Appellate Tribunal, Delhi in AP No. 91 of 2012
With
Civil Appeal No. 9998 of 2014

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
AN Haksar, Amit Sibal, Sr. Advs., Saurabh S Sinha, Ms. Chitra Y
Parande, Gautam Prabhakar, Mrigank Prabhakar, Arjun Krishnan,
Anand S Pathak, Shashank Gautam, Ms. Sreemoyee Deb,
Ms. Anubhuti Mishra, Soham Goswami, Ms. Nandini Sharma,
1322 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Ms. Anisha Bothra, Ms. Aashana Manocha, Abhijeet Singh,
Saksham Dhingra, Rishabh Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Percival Billimoria, A N Haksar, Sr. Advs, Mahesh Agarwal, Rahul
Goel, Ms. Anu Monga, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Victor Das,
Himanshu Saraswat, Yash Jain, Ms. Aditi Sharma, Ms. Kriti Khatri,
Ms. Rachita Sood, Tushar Bathija, E. C. Agrawala, Arjun Krishnan,
Saurabh Sinha, Ms. Chitra Y Parande, Gautam Prabhakar, Mrigank
Prabhakar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. India’s economic ascent rests on a delicate but decisive equilibrium.
On the one hand, markets must remain contestable: no undertaking
may extinguish rivalry by stratagems foreign to fair, merit-based
competition. On the other hand, genuine achievement whether
expressed in scale, efficiency or technological advance, must be
rewarded and not punished, for it is the impetus for investment,
innovation and consumer welfare. The Competition Act, 20021, is
the charter that secures both pledges. It equips the Competition
Commission of India with wide-ranging powers of inquiry and remedy,
yet it permits intervention only where hard evidence shows that
the impugned conduct has caused, or is likely to cause, a demand
rigorous fact-finding, adversarial testing of testimony and, above all,
an effects-based appraisal that balances commercial justification
against proven harm. Preserving this symmetry between discipline
and encouragement is essential if the statute is to nurture robust
rivalry while sustaining the confidence of domestic and global investors
who increasingly view India as a premier destination for enterprise
and innovation.

I. Background of the Case
2. These statutory appeals, preferred under Section 53T of the Act,
challenge a common order dated 2 April 2014 passed by the

1 In short, the “Act”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1323

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Competition Appellate Tribunal2 in Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012.
Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014 has been filed by the Competition
Commission of India3. Civil Appeal No. 9998 of 2014 has been filed
by Kapoor Glass India Pvt. Ltd.4. In both the matters, Schott Glass
India Pvt. Ltd.5 is the contesting respondent.
3. The proceedings have their genesis in an information lodged on 25
May 2010 by Kapoor Glass under Section 19 of the Act. Kapoor Glass
alleged that Schott India, then the principal domestic manufacturer
of neutral USP-I borosilicate glass tubing, had abused its dominant
position by offering exclusionary volume-based discounts, imposing
discriminatory contractual terms, and, on occasions, refusing supply.
4. Forming a prima-facie opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act, CCI
directed the Director General (Investigation)6 to inquire into the matter.
The DG’s report dated 14 March 2011 concluded that Schott India
had violated Section 4 of the Act. After hearing the parties, CCI by
majority order dated 29 March 2012 levied a penalty equal at a rate
of 4 per cent of Schott India’s average of 3 years turnover equivalent
to about Rs 5.66 crores and also issued a cease-and-desist order
against Schott India from doing any discriminatory practices to any
of the converters.
5. Schott India challenged that order before COMPAT by Appeal No. 91
of 2012. Kapoor Glass also preferred a separate appeal by Appeal
No. 92 of 2012 seeking a broader relief and reiterating its refusal-
to-supply grievance. By the impugned order COMPAT:
a) allowed Schott India’s appeal, annulled the penalty, and held
that the evidentiary material did not establish any abuse of
dominant position; and
b) dismissed Kapoor Glass’s appeal with costs of ₹ 1,00,000/-.
6. Vide these appeals, CCI seeks revival of its original order and Kapoor
Glass supports CCI on the liability of Schott India but contends that
COMPAT erred in refusing effective relief and in discounting the

2 In short, “COMPAT”
3 In short, “CCI”
4 In short, “Kapoor Glass”, the original informant
5 In short, “Schott India”
6 In short, “DG”
1324 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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alleged “mixing risk”. Schott India, the contesting respondent herein,
on the other hand, defends the COMPAT decision in its entirety.

II. A Primer on the relevant Competition Law principles:
7. Before moving ahead, we believe it would be helpful to briefly explain
the chief statutory provision and certain competition-law principles that
recur throughout these appeals and are key to understand this case.
8. Section 4 of the Act is at the heart of the present dispute. It has
been reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:
“Section 4 – Abuse of dominant position.
(1) No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position.
(2) There shall be an abuse of dominant position under
sub-section (1) if an enterprise or a group—
(a) directly or indirectly imposes unfair or discriminatory—
(i) condition in purchase or sale of goods or service; or
(ii) price in purchase or sale (including predatory
price) of goods or service;
(b) limits or restricts —
(i) production of goods or provision of services or
market therefor; or
(ii) technical or scientific development relating to
goods or services, to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of
market access in any manner;
(d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts;
(e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to
enter into, or protect, another relevant market.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
(a) “dominant position” means a position of strength
enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1325

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

which enables it to (i) operate independently of competitive
forces prevailing in the relevant market, or (ii) affect its
competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its
favour;
(b) “predatory price” means the sale of goods or provision
of services at a price below cost, as may be determined by
regulations, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate
competitors;
(c) “group” shall have the same meaning as assigned to
it in clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 5.”
9. A bare perusal shows that the provision has two moving parts. First,
it forbids only abuse, not dominance as such. Secondly, it gives five
illustrations of the abuse of dominant position which are (i) price or
contract discrimination, (ii) limiting output, (iii) blocking entry, (iv)
tying or bundling, and (v) leveraging power from one market into
another. If a dominant firm engages in any one of these practices,
and cannot justify it as a legitimate business response to competition,
the conduct is prohibited.
10. Section 4, sub-Section (1) of the Act states that “no enterprise or
group shall abuse its dominant position.” Thereafter, sub-Section
(2) then lists, in clauses (a) to (e), the aforementioned five ways in
which abuse may occur. Put shortly, an enterprise may not
(i) impose unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions,
(ii) limit production or technical development,
(iii) block others from the market,
(iv) force a buyer to accept an unrelated product or obligation, or
(v) use power in one market to muscle into, or protect, another.
11. Apart from Section 4 of the Act, in order to aid comprehension of the
discussion that follows, we are outlining the relevant competition-
law concepts that recur throughout the pleadings and the analysis
that follows:
(i) Relevant market: Competition is measured within a field large
enough that buyers can, at a reasonable cost, turn to alternative
suppliers. In the present dispute, two layers of trade must be
kept distinct yet viewed together:
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• Upstream market – the manufacture and sale of neutral
USP-I borosilicate glass tubing, whether clear or amber.
• Downstream market – the sale of pharmaceutical
containers—ampoules, vials, cartridges and syringes—
made by converters.
The first market supplies the raw material; the second transforms
it into finished goods. Because the output of the upstream market
is the indispensable input of the downstream market, the two
are conventionally described as “upstream” and “downstream”
respectively.
(ii) Dominant Position: A firm is dominant when its economic
strength lets it act largely on its own terms. A town with a single
water utility, or a manufacturer whose patented device has no
practical substitute, offers the everyday picture. Dominance is
lawful; the question is how the power is used.
(iii) Volume or “Target” Discounts: These are price reductions
that grow purely with the quantity a buyer takes over an agreed
period. For example, a supermarket chain that orders ten
thousand sacks of rice may pay less per sack than a corner shop
that orders ten. Such scale rebates are benign when offered to
every purchaser on identical volume thresholds.
(iv) Functional discounts: Sometimes the buyer performs an
extra function—say, warehousing, local advertising, or after-
sales service. A seller may repay a buyer for performing that
extra task like storing stock, advertising the brand, or providing
repairs. Airlines, for example, pay travel agents a commission
for marketing flights. If the rebate merely covers the cost of
that task and is open to any buyer willing to do the same,
competition law is usually satisfied.
(v) Margin squeeze: A vertically integrated supplier sells an essential
input to rivals and also competes with them downstream. If it
keeps the input price high and its own downstream price low,
equally efficient rivals may be left with an unsustainable margin.
Telecom operators that control not only broadband network but
also sell retail internet access provide the classic example.
(vi) Tying or bundling: Where a supplier insists that customers
accept product A as a pre-condition for buying product B, it is
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1327

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

tying; where A and B are sold only as a package, it is bundling.
The practice becomes abusive if the supplier wields dominance
in product A to force unwanted sales of B, thereby foreclosing
choice.
(vii) Mixing risk: In the instant case, there is an allegation that certain
converters might blend premium Schott tubing with cheaper
imports and still market the containers as wholly premium. If true,
the practice could endanger patients and tarnish the reputation
of high-quality suppliers. Whether that risk existed, and how
Schott India responded, will be examined in due course.
(viii) Procedural fairness: Even in an inquisitorial setting, the parties
must see and test the evidence against them. Cross-examination
of a witness is a recognised, though not in every case, an
indispensable safeguard. A serious denial of that opportunity
can itself undermine the findings of the adjudicating body.
Having explained these basic concepts pertaining to the matter, we
shall now proceed to detail the material facts of the case and the
determinations made at each previous stage of the proceedings.

III. Factual Matrix
12. Schott India, the first respondent, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Schott Glaswerke Beteiligungs-GmbH, which in turn is wholly owned
by Schott AG of Mainz, Germany. Its Jambusar plant in Gujarat,
acquired in 1998 from Bharat Glass Tubes, manufactures neutral
borosilicate tubing in the following three grades: Fiolax-clear (for
export and domestic sale), Neutral Glass Clear7 and Neutral Glass
Amber8.
13. Neutral borosilicate tubing constitutes the upstream market; converters
re-heat and form that tubing into ampoules, vials, cartridges and
syringes, which comprise the downstream market and are supplied
to pharmaceutical undertakings. Of the five Indian tube-makers that
existed prior to 1998, all except Schott India and Triveni Glass (now
Nipro-Triveni) had exited by 2010 and the balance of demand was
met by imports from Germany, Japan, Italy and, at the low-end, China.

7 In short, “NGC”
8 In short, “NGA”
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14. In May 2008, a Schott group company entered into a joint-venture
with Kaisha Manufacturers, creating Schott Kaisha Pvt. Ltd.9, the
country’s largest converter. Schott Kaisha is neither a subsidiary
nor a division of Schott India, but it purchases a substantial share
of the latter’s annual melt.
15. Discount architecture and agreements: To secure economies of
scale and steady furnace utilisation, Schott India offered two rebate
schemes:
a. Target (volume) rebates: slabbed discounts, credited quarterly,
rising with aggregate annual purchases of NGC and NGA; and
b. Functional rebates: an eight-per-cent allowance extended
to converters that (i) met annual purchase plans, (ii) refrained
from using Chinese tubing, and (iii) adhered to “fair-pricing”
commitments in their container sales.
16. Long-Term Tubing Supply Agreement10: In 2008 Schott India and
Schott Kaisha executed a three-year agreement under which the
converter agreed to source at least eighty per cent of its requirements,
approximately thirty per cent of Schott India’s capacity, in consideration
of a price concession over the slab rate, a three-year price freeze
and priority dispatch in periods of tight supply.
17. On 20 May 2009, the principal abuse-of-dominance provisions of
the Act were brought into force. On 25 May 2010, Kapoor Glass, a
Mumbai converter, lodged an information alleging, inter alia, that:
(i) The target-rebate structure coerced loyalty and tied clear and
amber tubes;
(ii) The functional rebate and its successor Trade-Mark Licence
Agreement11 foreclosed the use of lower-priced Chinese tubes;
(iii) The LTTSA conferred on Schott Kaisha an unmatchable cost
advantage; and
(iv) Schott India had rationed supplies to independent converters
whilst fully meeting Schott Kaisha’s demands.

9 In short, “Schott Kaisha”
10 In short, “LTTSA”
11 In short, “TMLA”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1329

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

18. Acting on a prima-facie opinion under Section 26 (1) of the Act, CCI
directed the DG to investigate. In a report dated 14 March 2011, the
DG gave the following findings:
(i) Schott India enjoyed a market share exceeding sixty per cent
and was dominant in the upstream market;
(ii) The combined effect of the target rebates, functional rebates
and the Long-Term Agreement was to foreclose rival suppliers,
attracting clauses (a), (b) and (e) of Section 4(2) of the Act;
(iii) Aggregating NGC and NGA purchases for rebate purposes
amounted to tying, offending clause (d); and
(iv) Selective supply curtailments denied market access to certain
converters, invoking clause (c).
19. On 29 March 2012, the majority of the Commission substantially
endorsed the DG’s analysis. The Economic Member of the
Commission dissented on the discount issues and gave various
relevant findings which would be important for the discussions that
follow. The majority, however, reasoned that:
(i) The volume-based “target” rebates, the trademark-linked
“functional” rebates, and the LTTSA, taken together, “tilted the
playing field” in favour of Schott Kaisha and foreclosed effective
competition in the upstream market;
(ii) The aggregation of clear and amber tubing for the purpose of
achieving higher rebate slabs operated, in effect, as a tying
arrangement; and
(iii) The temporary curtailment of supplies to certain converters
reinforced the exclusionary strategy.
Having concluded that the conduct attracted Clauses (a) through (e)
of Section 4 (2) of the Act, the CCI:
(i) Directed Schott India to cease and desist from the impugned
practices with immediate effect; and
(ii) Levied a monetary penalty calculated at four per cent of the
company’s average turnover for the three preceding financial
years, amounting to ₹ 5.66 crore.
1330 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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20. Schott India and Kapoor Glass appealed the matter to COMPAT
by way of Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012. The COMPAT gave the
following finding in the impugned order:
(i) Appeal of Schott India allowed: The evidence against the
company rested “for the most part on statements never subjected
to cross-examination”; on that footing COMPAT found no proof
of discriminatory rebates, margin squeeze or tying. It pointed
out that, barring one exception, every converter had grown its
output after 2009, a fact at odds with the charge of foreclosure.
(ii) All sanctions annulled: The penalty of one per cent of turnover
and the attendant cease-and-desist directives were quashed
in toto.
(iii) Appeal of Kapoor Glass dismissed with costs: Kapoor
Glass’s prayer for wider relief was rejected and costs of ₹
1,00,000 were imposed.
(iv) Serious procedural lapse recorded: COMPAT remarked that
the CCI’s refusal to let Schott India cross-examine the converter-
witnesses was a material infraction that gravely weakened the
probative worth of their allegations.
21. In the present appeals against the COMPAT’s order, the parties seek
the following reliefs:
(i) CCI seeks reinstatement of its original order and penalty,
contending that COMPAT misread the evidence and overstated
the impact of the procedural lapse.
(ii) Kapoor Glass, aligning with CCI on liability, argues that COMPAT
further erred in downplaying the alleged “mixing” of Schott and
Chinese tubes.
(iii) Schott India, being the main respondent, supports the COMPAT’s
decision in full, submits that its rebates were open to all
converters on equal quantitative terms, and renews its objection
that denial of cross-examination fatally tainted the CCI’s process.

IV. Arguments Advanced
22. Mr. Amit Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-CCI, has
advanced the following main arguments:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1331

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

A. Schott India’s unquestioned dominance: It is submitted that
during the investigation period, Schott India supplied more than
sixty per cent of neutral USP-I borosilicate tubing, controlled
the only large-scale domestic melt tanks and possessed clear
technological and capacity advantages. On any accepted test,
it occupied a dominant position in the upstream market.
B. Loyalty-inducing “target” rebates: It is argued that the
annual-slab rebate scheme penalised converters who failed to
meet their forecast: a single below-target month dragged the
entire year’s purchases into a lower tier, clawing back earlier
discounts. Converters therefore dared not split orders with
alternative suppliers, while Schott Kaisha, by reason of volume,
always secured the maximum twelve-per-cent rebate. Such
discrimination, Counsel contends, is in violation of clause (a)
of Section 4(2) of the Act.
C. Exclusionary functional rebates and the LTTSA: Schott
Kaisha’s LTTSA locked in eighty per cent of its requirements for
three years, guaranteed price freezes and monthly “functional”
bonuses and gave it delivery priority. It is submitted that this
package, unavailable to others, further foreclosed rivals and
breached clauses (a), (b) and (e).
D. Tying of clear and amber tubes: Discounts were calculated on
the combined quantity of clear and amber tubing. Because Schott
India held over ninety per cent of amber tubes, indispensable
for light-sensitive formulations, converters had little choice but
to buy clear tubes from it as well. The appellants characterise
this as a tie-in contrary to clause (d).
E. Margin squeeze on independent converters: It is argued that
the preferential input price to Schott Kaisha enabled it either
to sell containers below the cost level sustainable by equally
efficient converters or to harvest abnormal margins, squeezing
rivals out of the downstream market in violation of clauses (a)
and (e).
F. Selective refusals to supply: Instances were cited where
converters who sourced even modest volumes elsewhere found
their subsequent Schott allocations curtailed or delayed. It is
argued that such conduct amounts to denial of market access
under clause (c).
1332 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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G. “Mixing” rationale a façade: It is submitted that the assertion
that Chinese tubes might be secretly mixed with Schott tubes
is speculative; no concrete incident was proven. The quality
argument therefore serves only to cloak an exclusivity obligation.
H. Procedural lapse not fatal: Finally, it is contended that
Regulation 41(5) vests discretion in the CCI to refuse cross-
examination. The converters’ statements, although not tested
orally, were corroborated by documentary evidence, rebate
circulars, purchase data and the LTTSA. The absence of cross-
examination, it is argued, cannot outweigh this substantive
proof of abuse.
I. The learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following case
laws in support of their arguments:
(i) Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India
and another12,
(ii) Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of
India Ltd.13,
(iii) Competition Commission of India v. Fastway Transmission
Pvt. Ltd.14,
(iv) K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984) 1 SCC 43
(v) Transmission Corporation v. Sri Rama Krishna Rice Mills15,
(vi) United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV v.
Commission16,
(vii) Irish Sugar plc, Commission Decision IV/34.621
(viii) HOV SVZ/MCN, Commission Decision IV/33.941
23. Shri A.N. Haksar, learned Senior Counsel for Kapoor Glass, has
rendered similar submissions to CCI but has also made the following
additional points:

12 (2017) 8 SCC 47
13 (2010) 10 SCC 744
14 (2018) 4 SCC 316
15 (2006) 3 SCC 74
16 Case 27/76, EUCJ
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1333

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

A. Two-decade exclusionary course of conduct. Kapoor
Glass’s purchase orders for Schott tubes were first rebuffed
in 2000. From that moment, nine years before Section 4 of
the Act came into force, Schott India treated Kapoor Glass as
a non-customer while continuing to serve other converters,
thereby laying the ground for Schott Kaisha’s later entry. The
chronological record (1996-2010) filed in evidence is said to
reveal a pre-meditated plan to freeze Kapoor Glass out of both
upstream and downstream trade
B. Espionage and intimidation tactics. Kapoor Glass’s internal
paperwork surfaced in Schott India’s possession; key employees
were poached; and Schott Kaisha’s managing director reportedly
“gloated” that Kapoor Glass had been finished (letter of 23
Jan 2010). These incidents, Kapoor Glass submits, show that
upstream dominance was reinforced by unlawful means and by
threats to converters who awarded job-work to Kapoor Glass.
C. Absolute refusal to supply means abuse under Section
4(2)(c) of the Act. The boycott began in 2000, years before
the 2002 label episode deployed by Schott India as an after-
the-fact excuse. Any private trade-mark grievance expired
with limitation; competition law requires proportionality, not a
perpetual embargo by the sole large-scale amber-tube supplier.
D. Persistent mix-up hazard. Kapoor Glass maintains that a
real and present danger existed of converters mis-labelling
containers by “mixing” premium Schott tubes with lower-grade
imports. The LTTSA and the functional rebate, it is submitted,
were devised not to protect quality but to immunise Schott
Kaisha from price rivalry on the pretext of that hazard; COMPAT,
in discounting the risk, ignored contemporaneous complaints
from Ranbaxy, Cadila and other buyers.
E. Quantum of penalty. Finally, Kapoor Glass submits that the
four-per-cent turnover penalty originally imposed by the CCI was
conservative, given both the duration of the abuse (2008-2012)
and the deterrence objective set out in Section 27(b). It prays
for reinstatement of the penalty and for broader behavioural
remedies.
F. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following
precedents apart from those relied on by the Counsel for CCI:
1334 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(i) Voltas Ltd. v. Union of India17,
(ii) Coal India Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India18,
(iii) Samir Agarwal v. Competition Commission of India19,
24. Mr. Percival Billimoria, learned Senior Counsel, for the respondent-
Schott India, has advanced the following main arguments:
A. Reliance on un-tested statements vitiates the case: It is
submitted that the Director-General’s report, and consequently
the majority order of the CCI, rest almost entirely on
questionnaires and witness statements procured from a handful
of converters openly adverse to Schott India. None of those
deponents was offered for cross-examination despite the
respondent’s repeated requests. That denial, by itself, renders
the evidentiary foundation infirm and justified the COMPAT’s
rejection of the findings.
B. Volume (or “target”) rebates are legitimate and non-
discriminatory: The impugned discount ladder rewarded only
the quantity actually lifted in a financial year; every converter,
large or small, moved up the scale on identical tonnage slabs.
Differential outcomes reflected differential volumes, not the
identity of the purchaser. Such scale rebates, it is argued, are
standard commercial practice and have been treated as lawful
in the CCI’s own earlier decisions.
C. The LTTSA is objectively justified: Neutral USP-I tubing is
produced in continuous-fire tanks that run at about 1600 °C
and requires extremely high investment. To finance capacity
expansion Schott India sought a three-year, eighty-per-cent
offtake commitment from its then largest customer, Schott
Kaisha. The modest extra rebate and price-freeze granted in
return are submitted to be a normal quid pro quo for assured
purchase and not an exclusionary device.
D. Functional rebate covered additional services, not loyalty:
Converters who wished to emboss the “Schott” mark on the

17 (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 498
18 (2023) 10 SCC 345
19 (2021) 3 SCC 136
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1335

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

finished container had to meet traceability and marketing
obligations and bore the associated costs. The functional
allowance merely reimbursed those outlays and was open
to any converter prepared to undertake the same function. It
neither required exclusivity nor penalised the use of rival tubing.
E. No margin squeeze was possible or shown: Schott India
does not operate in the downstream market. Schott Kaisha sold
ampoules and vials at prices comparable to, and in many cases
higher than, rival converters. The latter’s own sales volumes and
EBITDA margins rose in the period under enquiry, facts extracted
by the Economic Member and by COMPAT. With margins intact
and output expanding, foreclosure is conceptually impossible.
F. No tying or bundling of clear and amber tubes: NGC and
NGA tubing emerge from the same tank; converters order each
variant in the proportion demanded by their pharmaceutical
customers. The rebate scheme merely aggregated annual
purchases of both variants to compute the slab. Nothing in
the contracts obliged a converter to buy clear tubes as a pre-
condition to obtaining amber (or vice-versa).
G. “Mixing risk” furnished a bona-fide rationale for the no-
Chinese clause later withdrawn: Documentary evidence from
Ranbaxy and other pharma demonstrated that some suppliers
were passing off low-quality imports as premium containers.
The temporary restriction on Chinese tubing, in force only until
March 2010, protected patient safety and Schott’s reputation;
converters were always free to source from Nipro-Triveni or
any approved foreign manufacturer.
H. Absence of competitive harm: No converter exited the
business; imports held a double-digit share; Nipro-Triveni
expanded capacity; and pharmaceutical buyers enjoyed
stable or declining container prices. The respondent submits
that Section 4 of the Act targets only conduct that harms
the competitive process, not vigorous rivalry that benefits
downstream customers.
I. The learned Senior Counsel for Schott India has placed the
following case laws on record in their submissions:
(i) CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra),
1336 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(ii) Voltas Ltd. (supra),
(iii) Coal India Ltd. (supra),
(iv) Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI (supra),
(v) Rajasthan Cylinder & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India20,
(vi) Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. CCI21,

V. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
25. Having carefully examined the material on record, the submissions
of the parties and the orders of the Court below, we are of the view
that the appeals present the following issues for adjudication:
I. Whether the target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts
to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of
Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act.
II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme
(including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair or
discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and Section
4(2)(b) of the Act.
III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a margin-
squeeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.
IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes,
thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act.
V. Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential
component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act., and, if so,
whether it was omitted in the present case.
VI. Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are
vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches of
natural justice.

VI. ANALYSIS
26. At the outset, we must clarify that unless the context expressly
indicates otherwise, every factual recital or numerical datum herein

20 (2020) 16 SCC 615
21 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11229
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1337

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

is drawn from, or corresponds verbatim with, the findings of fact
recorded in the DG’s Investigation Report and thereafter relied
on, adopted, or reiterated in substance by the CCI and/or by the
COMPAT. Before dealing with each of the aforementioned issues, it
is essential to ascertain the contours of the relevant market in the
present dispute. The evidence placed by the DG and accepted, in
substance, by the CCI, discloses that converters treat NGC tubes
and NGA tubes as distinct and non-interchangeable inputs. The
physicochemical attributes of NGA are required where the packed
drug is photo-sensitive, whereas NGC is preferred when no such
protection is demanded. No party has pointed us to any functional
substitute capable of meeting the identical pharmaceutical standard.
We accordingly identify two discrete upstream product markets:
NGC and NGA. Each of them feeding the downstream market for
containers (ampoules, vials, cartridges, syringes) fabricated from
the respective tube.
27. As to geographic scope, the record shows that converters located
across the country source tubes from the same limited set of
manufacturers. The transport cost is marginal compared with the
value of the product, import barriers are uniform nationally, and
pharmaceutical end-buyers impose identical quality specifications
regardless of State. Those considerations, noted both by the DG
and by the CCI, warrant treating India as a single geographic market
for present purposes.
28. Having decided on the relevant market, we next examine Schott India’s
position in the same. Market-share data culled from statutory filings
and sales declarations show that Schott India supplied approximately
61 per cent of NGC+NGA in 2008-09, rising to over 80 per cent in
2009-10. These findings have been endorsed by the DG, CCI and the
COMPAT. The only domestic rival of any consequence, Nipro-Triveni,
hovered in low double digits, while imports, mainly from China, were
constrained both by price sensitivity at the high end and by quality
reservations among major pharmaceutical companies.
29. Market share of the respondent is reinforced by economic strength.
Schott India draws upon the financial and technological resources of
the global Schott group, whose consolidated turnover exceeded €2.8
billion and workforce 17,500 during the period under review. That
scale secures favourable raw-material procurement and sustained
R&D, advantages that smaller rivals cannot replicate easily. The
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firm’s vertical integration amplifies its clout. Through its 50 per cent
participation in the downstream JV, Schott Kaisha, Schott India enjoys
a guaranteed outlet for roughly one-third of its tube output, while
simultaneously influencing a leading converter’s sourcing decisions.
The CCI recorded that the JV was at the material time the largest
Indian ampoule producer.
30. Finally, as has been observed by the COMPAT, countervailing buyer
power is conspicuously absent in the relevant market. Converters,
barring the JV, are fragmented and purchase volumes that are
individually modest; the evidence shows they are “heavily dependent”
on Schott India because many pharma customers insist upon its
branded tubing to meet USP-I neutrality requirements.
31. Therefore, weighed cumulatively under Section 19(4) of the Act,
factors in the present case such as commanding and persistent market
share, economic and technological superiority, vertical integration,
high entry barriers and weak buyer power, lead us to the undeniable
conclusion that Schott India holds a dominant position in each of the
two identified upstream markets during the period relevant to these
appeals. With market definition and dominance thus determined, we
turn to the specific allegations of abuse, taking them seriatim under
the issues framed earlier.

Issue I - Whether the target-discount scheme of Schott
India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in
contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act.
32. A perusal of Section 4(2)(a) of the Act implies that an abuse arises
only where a dominant enterprise “directly or indirectly imposes
unfair or discriminatory…price in purchase or sale”. As the words
“unfair or discriminatory” import a comparative enquiry, it must first
be established that transactions which are materially equivalent
have been accorded materially different treatment. If the challenged
differentiation rests on an objective commercial justification, or if it
is open on identical terms to every purchaser similarly placed, the
price cannot be stigmatised as abusive. In British Airways plc v
Commission (Court of Justice of the European Union in Case
C-95/04 P, dated 15 March 2007), it was observed that dominant
firm must not “favour or disfavour” trading partners. However, the
court further held that applying different prices only becomes abusive
when it lacks an objective commercial justification or when equivalent
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1339

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

customers cannot obtain the same terms. In other words, if the
differentiation “rests on an objective commercial justification, or if it
is open on identical terms to every purchaser similarly placed,” the
conduct is not condemned under Article 102 (c) TFEU. The relevant
paras where these observations have been made are as follows:
“68. It follows that in determining whether, on the part of an
undertaking in a dominant position, a system of discounts
or bonuses which constitute neither quantity discounts
or bonuses nor fidelity discounts or bonuses within the
meaning of the judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche constitutes
an abuse, it first has to be determined whether those
discounts or bonuses can produce an exclusionary effect,
that is to say whether they are capable, first, of making
market entry very difficult or impossible for competitors of
the undertaking in a dominant position and, secondly, of
making it more difficult or impossible for its co-contractors
to choose between various sources of supply or commercial
partners.
69. It then needs to be examined whether there is an
objective economic justification for the discounts and
bonuses granted. In accordance with the analysis carried
out by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 279 to
291 of the judgment under appeal, an undertaking is at
liberty to demonstrate that its bonus system producing an
exclusionary effect is economically justified.
70. With regard to the first aspect, the case-law gives
indications as to the cases in which discount or bonus
schemes of an undertaking in a dominant position are not
merely the expression of a particularly favourable offer on
the market, but give rise to an exclusionary effect.”
33. In the present case, the record shows that, for the relevant period,
Schott India circulated a single rebate ladder applicable to all
converters. Four slabs of 2%, 5%, 8% and 12% were triggered
exclusively by the aggregate tonnage of Neutral Glass Clear and
Neutral Glass Amber collected within the financial year. Every
customer who reached a slab, whether by one purchase order or by
several, obtained the corresponding allowance on the entire year’s
turnover. The rebate therefore rose mechanically with volume and
1340 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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with nothing else; identity of the buyer was irrelevant. All converters
were informed of the thresholds in advance, and none has suggested
that any hidden concessions existed outside the ladder.
34. Differential outcomes certainly occurred as Schott Kaisha, by reason
of an offtake exceeding three thousand tonnes per annum, habitually
captured the 12% step, whereas smaller converters realised lower
steps. Yet such divergence mirrors the inequality of quantities,
not unequal treatment of like quantities. The appellants have not
demonstrated that any converter lifting an equivalent tonnage to
Schott Kaisha was refused an identical 12 % abatement.
35. Moreover, the technical realities of borosilicate production reinforce
the commercial logic of the scheme. Furnace tanks operate at
temperatures around 1600°C and cannot be cyclically shut down
without inflicting catastrophic refractory damage. Stable, high-volume
orders are therefore indispensable for efficient utilisation and for
amortising the very substantial capital employed. A volume-contingent
rebate transmits a share of those scale economies downstream, to
the ultimate benefit of pharmaceutical customers. Such an objectively
grounded incentive cannot be condemned as “unfair”.
36. It must also be noted that there is no evidence that the slab mechanism
foreclosed alternative suppliers or throttled output in order to attract
Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Act. On the contrary, uncontested data placed
by the Economic Member of the Commission and reproduced by
the COMPAT record that, between 2007-08 and 2011-12, every
major converter other than the informant increased both the tonnage
purchased from Schott India and the tonnage sourced from imports
or Nipro-Triveni. Container prices to pharma companies remained
broadly stable. These market facts are inconsistent with the argument
of exclusion or limitation.
37. The appellants nevertheless submit that the quarterly crediting of
rebates created a “retroactive claw-back” risk which deterred dual
sourcing. This argument is not persuasive. Quarterly settlement
was adopted to ease cash-flow: it neither penalised nor rewarded
purchases from rival mills; it simply reconciled the running total
with the pre-declared annual ladder. No contractual term prohibited
converters from buying elsewhere, and several did so without suffering
discrimination.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1341

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

38. Finally, reliance is placed on the untested declarations of five
converters alleging that Schott Kaisha received “special” terms.
Those statements, taken ex parte and never subjected to cross-
examination, cannot displace the documentary rebate circulars that
bind the company, nor alter the legal test that only unequal pricing
for equal transactions contravenes Section 4(2)(a) of the Act.
39. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the slabbed target-rebate
scheme:
(i) employs a neutral, volume-based criterion applicable to all
purchasers alike;
(ii) is objectively justified by demonstrable efficiency considerations;
and
(iii) has not been shown to restrict rival output, limit imports or
distort downstream prices.
The charge of abuse under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 4(2) of the
Act fails and Issue I is answered in the negative.

Issue II - Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese”
scheme (including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair
or discriminatory conditions under Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b)
of the Act.
40. It is apparent from the records that Schott India, at the commencement
of FY 2007-08 (vide the Sale–Purchase Agreement), introduced a
uniform “functional rebate” scheme. For each of the three financial
years 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10, a converter that (i) met its
annual purchase plan, (ii) refrained from processing Chinese tubing,
and (iii) complied with traceability-cum-“fair-pricing” obligations
became entitled to a flat rebate of 8 per cent on the invoiced value
of NGC, NGA and Fiolax tubes. With effect from 1 April 2010, the
quantum of the allowance remained unchanged, but the qualifying
conditions were restated in a Trade-mark Licence Agreement (TMLA)
paired with a Marketing-Support Agreement. Execution of the TMLA
conferred a royalty-free right to emboss the “SCHOTT” mark on
finished containers and in exchange the converter accepted limited
inspection rights and furnished a bank guarantee of ₹ 70 lakh to guard
against misuse. Only one converter chose to execute the TMLA; all
others continued on list price plus the ordinary target-rebate ladder.
1342 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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41. As already observed in the previous section, to attract Section 4(2)(a)
of the Act, it must be shown that transactions which are equivalent
in every commercially relevant respect are nevertheless subject to
dissimilar conditions. The purchase ledgers for FY 2008-09 to FY
2011-12, collated in the COMPAT’s own table, disclose no instance in
which two converters performing the same function received different
net prices. The rate (8 per cent) was invariant; the only divergence
lay in the timing of credit, monthly for the joint-venture converter and
annual for the others. That scheduling preference is rationally tied
to the joint-venture’s rolling audit cycle and to its undisputed order
volume, which averaged 30 per cent of the Jambusar melt. It must
be emphasized that differential timing, unaccompanied by differential
rates, does not amount to price discrimination.
42. The appellants contend that the three qualifying conditions themselves
are exclusionary. Therefore, it is necessary to address each in turn.
First, the purchase-plan requirement secures furnace utilisation in
a continuous-fire technology whose tanks cannot be cyclically idled
without grave damage; the DG in fact accepted the objective necessity
of load stability. Secondly, the temporary “no-Chinese” stipulation
rested upon contemporaneous chemical-analysis certificates showing
alkali-release values above the USP-I threshold in certain Chinese
tubes and was withdrawn altogether on 31 March 2010. Thirdly,
the inspection right extends solely to verifying tubing origin and is a
standard incident of trade-mark licensing, as observed by the minority
Member in CCI’s order after surveying comparative jurisprudence.
Each condition is therefore objectively connected with the legitimate
aim, patient safety and brand integrity, and is proportionate to it.
43. The allegation of a market-restrictive effect under Section 4(2)(b)
(i) of the Act fares no better. Nipro-Triveni’s share of neutral tubing
rose from 12 per cent in 2008 to 14 per cent in 2009. Imports of
NGC increased from 620 tonnes to 1000 tonnes during the same
interval. Two new container plants, Parenteral Glass and SVM
Glass, commenced commercial production in 2011 sourcing mixed
tubes. In the Downstream market, total output of ampoules and vials
expanded by 38 per cent between FY 2008 and FY 2012, while the
median EBITDA margin of independent converters improved from
11.4 per cent to 13.7 per cent. Therefore, practices coincident with
increasing volumes, new entry and rising profitability cannot plausibly
be branded capacity-restrictive.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1343

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

44. The specific objections of the appellants stand answered by the
evidence on record. The Rs.70 lakh guarantee is payable only upon
adjudicated trade-mark abuse and no converter asserts having
suffered any deduction. Several converters imported Chinese tubes
for un-branded lines during 2009-10 and merely waived the functional
rebate, demonstrating the voluntariness of the arrangement. The
right of inspection is pre-announced, confined to stock verification,
and of brief duration.
45. Therefore, in conclusion, every converter prepared to assume
the same traceability and quality-promotion obligations received
exactly the same economic consideration; the ancillary conditions
are objectively justified; and the evidence shows no foreclosure
of rivals or suppression of output. The functional rebate and its
successor agreements therefore do not offend either Section 4(2)(a)
or Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Act. Issue II is answered in the negative.

Issue III - Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a
margin-squeeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.
46. Having settled the relevant markets and Schott India’s dominance
upstream, we next examine the impugned LTTSA and the allegation
that it enabled Schott India to foreclose independent converters by
compressing the margin between their input cost and the downstream
selling price of Schott Kaisha.
47. The facts are not in dispute that under the LTTSA which Schott
Kaisha undertook, for three financial years commencing 1 April 2008,
it would source at least eighty per cent of its aggregate requirement
of neutral tubing, clear, amber and Fiolax, from Schott India. In
consideration, it received (i) a two-percentage-point rebate over the
public slab, (ii) a freeze of base prices till 31 March 2011, and (iii)
priority despatch in periods of constrained furnace capacity. It must
be emphasized that no purchaser other than Schott Kaisha sought
or was denied comparable terms.
48. Section 4(2)(e) of the Act proscribes the use of a dominant position
in one relevant market “to enter into, or protect, another relevant
market.” The classical manifestation of this is the alleged margin-
squeeze: a vertically integrated firm fixes the wholesale input price
so high, and its own downstream price so low, that downstream
rivals, though equally efficient, cannot earn a viable margin. Three
cumulative conditions must therefore be shown:
1344 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(i) The respondent must itself operate downstream;
(ii) The wholesale-to-retail spread must be insufficient for an equally
efficient competitor; and
(iii) The compression must threaten competitive harm.
These conditions have been laid down elaborately in the case of
TeliaSonera Sverige AB v Konkurrensverket (Court of Justice of
the European Union, Case C-52/09, judgment dated 17 February
2011) in the following paras:
“31. A margin squeeze, in view of the exclusionary effect
which it may create for com petitors who are at least as
efficient as the dominant undertaking, in the absence of any
objective justification, is in itself capable of constituting an
abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU (see, to that
effect, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, paragraph 183).
32. In the present case, there would be such a margin
squeeze if, inter alia, the spread between the wholesale
prices for ADSL input services and the retail prices for
broad band connection services to end users were either
negative or insufficient to cover the specific costs of the
ADSL input services which TeliaSonera has to incur in
order to supply its own retail services to end users, so
that that spread does not allow a com petitor which is as
efficient as that undertaking to compete for the supply of
those services to end users.
33. In such circumstances, although the competitors may
be as efficient as the dominant undertaking, they may be
able to operate on the retail market only at a loss or at
arti ficially reduced levels of profitability.
34. It must moreover be made clear that since the
unfairness, within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, of
such a pricing practice is linked to the very existence of
the margin squeeze and not to its precise spread, it is in
no way necessary to establish that the wholesale prices
for ADSL input services to operators or the retail prices
for broadband connection services to end users are in
themselves abusive on account of their excessive or
predatory nature, as the case may be (Deutsche Telekom v
Commis sion, paragraphs 167 and 183).”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1345

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

49. No downstream participation by Schott India- Schott India
manufactures tubing only; it neither converts nor sells containers.
The downstream entity, Schott Kaisha, is a separate company in
which the global Schott AG holds fifty per cent stakes, the balance
being with the Kaisha promoters. The record discloses no board
overlap, no common management, and separate audited accounts.
Section 4 of the Act may of course reach a group; but leverage
still demands proof that the upstream entity used its dominance to
enter or protect the downstream market. Mere supply to a related
undertaking is insufficient.
50. No demonstrable squeeze of rivals’ margin- The allegation
rests on a price differential: for FY 2009-10 the net LTTSA price
was approximately 5 per cent below the slab price paid by other
converters. A gap is not a squeeze unless the downstream price of
the integrated converter leaves an equally efficient rival in deficit.
The only downstream data before the authorities are the audited
financials of nine converters reproduced in COMPAT Annex III.
Those figures show that, during the entire period of the LTTSA, every
independent converter recorded positive EBITDA, and seven of the
nine improved both tonnage and margin year-on-year. The price lists
of Ranbaxy and Cadila, produced by Kapoor Glass, further show
that Schott Kaisha’s ampoules and vials were quoted at or above
the prices of its rivals. On that evidence the COMPAT was right in
holding that an equally efficient converter could, and did, operate
profitably notwithstanding the LTTSA.
51. Absence of foreclosure effects- Section 19(3) of the Act requires
consideration of actual or potential effects on competition. Imports
of clear and amber tubing rose from 11 per cent to 18 per cent of
domestic consumption during the enquiry window; Nipro-Triveni
doubled its melt capacity; no converter exited. The structure and
conduct indicators thus refute any suggestion of market foreclosure.
52. Even if a differential was established, the LTTSA is objectively
explained. Neutral tubing is produced in continuous tanks that
cannot be banked without physical damage and a guaranteed
eighty-per-cent offtake for three years permitted Schott India to run
the furnace at optimal throughput, unlock economies of scale and
justify a €25-million rebuild. Courts have repeatedly recognised such
“take-or-pay” commitments as legitimate where the pro-competitive
efficiencies outweigh any restrictive tendency.
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53. Therefore, in our considered opinion, all three limbs of a margin-
squeeze fail. Schott India is absent downstream; the wholesale-to-retail
spread left rivals with sustainable margins; and the market exhibited
neither exit nor price elevation. What remains is a commercially
rational bulk-purchase rebate, available in principle to any converter
willing to match Schott Kaisha’s volumes and planning horizon. We
therefore hold that the LTTSA does not contravene Section 4(2)(e)
of the Act, and the finding of CCI on this head cannot be sustained.
Issue III is answered in the negative.

Issue IV - Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC
tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act.
54. Section 4(2)(d) of the Act is attracted only where a dominant
enterprise:
• supplies two distinct products,
• makes the supply of the tying product conditional upon
acceptance of the tied product, and
• thereby forecloses competitors in the tied-product market.
The aforementioned conditions have been echoed in the landmark
case of Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European
Communities (General Court of the European Union, Case
T-201/04, judgment dated 17 September 2007) in the following
paragraph:
“15. In order to determine whether the conduct of the
dominant undertaking constitutes abusive tying, the
Commission is entitled to base its finding on the following
factors: first, the tying and tied products are two separate
products; second, the undertaking concerned is dominant
in the market for the tying product; third, the undertaking
concerned does not give customers a choice to obtain
the tying product without the tied product; and fourth,
the practice in question forecloses competition. The
Commission also takes into account the fact that the tying
is not objectively justified. Such justification may not be
inferred from the advantages arising from the fact that
tying ensures a uniform presence of the product on the
market. Such a result cannot be allowed to be imposed
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1347

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant position by
means of tying Since the list of abusive practices set out
in the second paragraph of Article 82 EC is not exhaustive,
bundling by an undertaking in a dominant position may
also infringe Article 82 EC where it does not correspond
to the example given in Article 82(d) EC. Accordingly, in
order to establish the existence of abusive bundling, the
Commission is entitled to rely on Article 82 EC in its entirety
and not exclusively on Article 82(d) EC.”
55. Therefore, in the instant case, the threshold question is whether
NGA and NGC are, in economic terms, separate products. Both
variants are drawn from the same continuous-melt furnace; NGA
achieves its amber hue solely by the addition of iron oxide to the
common batch. Converters order whichever variant the downstream
pharmaceutical customer specifies, there being no independent
demand for NGA unconnected with that photo-sensitivity requirement.
On that uncontested evidence, it can be inferred that the two grades
are best regarded as alternative specifications of one input rather
than as independent products.
56. Assuming arguendo that they are distinct, Schott India’s share
exceeded 90 per cent in NGA and averaged above 60 per cent in
NGC during the enquiry window; dominance is therefore present in
each alleged product market and the enquiry must turn to coercion.
The CCI relied on three witness statements asserting that Schott
India “insisted” on purchases of both grades, and on a circular dated
18 August 1999 stating that quantity rebates were “applicable only on
mix purchases of clear and amber”. Those materials are inadequate
for four reasons:
(i) The deponents, Kishore Industries, Adit Containers and Mak
Ampoules, were not offered for cross-examination despite Schott
India’s repeated requests; COMPAT has already held that the
denial of that opportunity materially weakens the evidentiary
value of their allegations.
(ii) The circular dated 20.05.2009 predates the commencement of
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act by nearly a decade and therefore
cannot ground liability for the period covered by these
proceedings.
1348 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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(iii) No converter produced a purchase order, invoice or contract
clause making the supply of NGA contingent upon an order for
NGC. The only linkage is that, for the purpose of computing
volume rebates, annual tonnages of both grades are aggregated;
any converter remains free to purchase a single grade at
the published list price. Recognised commentary treats such
aggregation as a multi-product volume discount, not tying.
(iv) The minority opinion of the Economic Member assembled
converter sales data for FY 2007-08 to FY 2011-12 and found
that every converter increased output while imports, especially
of NGC, rose steadily. None of rival tube makers exited the
business. The indispensable element of foreclosure is therefore
absent.
57. Objective justification, even if coercion was made out, is evident.
NGA and NGC draw from a common furnace operating at 1600°C.
Sharp month-to-month swings in the ratio jeopardise furnace integrity.
Aggregating the two grades when calculating rebates, as Schott
India explained and the CCI recorded, smooths demand and secures
continuous load. Manufacturing efficiency is a legitimate business
consideration and has not been shown to harm consumers.
58. In these circumstances, the essential elements of Section 4(2)(d)
of the Act are not proved as NGA and NGC are not independent
products; converters were never compelled to buy both; no foreclosure
was demonstrated; and, in any event, the rebate design is objectively
justified. The finding of tying cannot therefore stand, and Issue IV
is answered in the negative.

Issue V - Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential
component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act, and, if so,
whether it was omitted in the present case.
59. Section 4 of the Act does not per se prohibit dominance; it prohibits
the abuse of dominance. Abuse, by definition, is conduct that distorts
the competitive process or harms consumers. The statute therefore
contemplates two logically separate findings:
(i) that the impugned practice falls within one of the descriptive
clauses (a)–(e) of sub-Section (2), and
(ii) that it results in, or is likely to result in, an appreciable adverse
effect on competition (“AAEC”).
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1349

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

To collate the second enquiry into the first would equate description
with proscription and convert the provision into a strict-liability offence.
60. We believe that three legislative signposts in the Act make the
“effects requirement” explicit. Firstly, the Preamble records that
the Act is enacted “to prevent practices having adverse effect on
competition” (emphasis supplied). Secondly, a dominant position
is defined in the Explanation to Section 4 of the Act as power that
enables the enterprise “to affect … the relevant market in its favour”;
the inquiry is purposeless unless the decision-maker asks whether
the challenged conduct has in fact been exercised to that effect.
Thirdly, Section 19(4)(l) of the Act obliges the CCI, in analysing
dominance, to consider the “relative advantage, by way of contribution
to economic development,” thereby recognising that conduct which
enhances consumer welfare may co-exist with market power and
should not be condemned.
61. The legislative history of the Act confirms the requirement. The
Raghavan Committee Report (2000), which is the blueprint for
the Act, framed the “key questions for adjudication on abuse of
dominance” in terms that are unmistakably effects-orientated:
“How will the practice harm competition? Will it deter entry? Do
consumers benefit from lower prices and greater availability?”.
Parliament adopted that approach and nowhere does the enacted
text suggest an irrebuttable presumption. This Court has also rejected
rigid deeming rules even where the statute expressly presumes harm.
In Rajasthan Cylinders v. Union of India22, this Court held that
the “presumption” of AAEC in Section 3(3) of the Act is rebuttable.
A fortiori, a presumption that is not even expressed in Section 4 of
the Act cannot be treated as conclusive. The relevant para from this
judgement has been reproduced hereunder:
“75. We may also state at this stage that Section 19(3)
of the Act mentions the factors which are to be examined
by CCI while determining whether an agreement has an
appreciable adverse effect on competition under Section 3.
However, this inquiry would be needed in those cases which
are not covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (3) of
Section 3. Reason is simple. As already pointed out above,

22 (2020) 16 SCC 615
1350 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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the agreements of nature mentioned in sub-section (3) are
presumed to have an appreciable effect and, therefore, no
further exercise is needed by CCI once a finding is arrived
at that a particular agreement fell in any of the aforesaid
four categories. We may hasten to add, however, that
agreements mentioned in Section 3(3) raise a presumption
that such agreements shall have an appreciable adverse
effect on competition. It follows, as a fortiorari, that the
presumption is rebuttable as these agreements are
not treated as conclusive proof of the fact that it would
result in appreciable adverse effect on competition. What
follows is that once CCI finds that case is covered by one
or more of the clauses mentioned in sub-section (3) of
Section 3, it need not undertake any further enquiry and
burden would shift upon such enterprises or persons,
etc. to rebut the said presumption by leading adequate
evidence. In case such an evidence is led, which dispels
the presumption, then CCI shall take into consideration
the factors mentioned in Section 19 of the Act and to see
as to whether all or any of these factors are established.
If the evidence collected by CCI leads to one or more or
all factors mentioned in Section 19(3), it would again be
treated as an agreement which may cause or is likely
to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition,
thereby compelling CCI to take further remedial action in
this behalf as provided under the Act. That, according to
us, is the broad scheme when Sections 3 and 19 are to
be read in conjunction.”
62. Comparative jurisprudence is in accord with these principles. Article
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union23, the
principal template for Section 4 of the Act, has been read by the Court
of Justice of the European Union as demanding a concrete appraisal
of effects. In Intel Corporation Inc. v. European Commission (Case
C-413/14 P, judgment of 6 September 2017), the Court affirmed
that allegedly exclusionary conduct may be condemned only after
the decision-maker has balanced its likely anti-competitive impact
against any demonstrated efficiencies that accrue to consumers,

23 In short ,”TFEU”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1351

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

a test already articulated in the Commission’s 2009 Guidance on
Article 102. Because the Commission had omitted that balancing
exercise, its decision was annulled. The ruling underscores that
merely classifying conduct under a descriptive label is insufficient;
net competitive harm must be shown before liability can attach.
63. The CCI’s own decisions acknowledge as much. In Indian National
Shipowners’ Association v. ONGC24, the CCI undertook a “fairness
or reasonableness test” and exonerated the respondent upon finding
objective necessity. Similarly, in Excel Crop Care (supra), it was
held that an administrative body cannot, consistently with Article 14
of the Constitution, apply an effects test in some cases yet disclaim
the power in others; such selective deployment is the antithesis of
equal treatment. The relevant paras of this judgement have been
reproduced hereunder:
“110. Moreover, in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa
[Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1969) 2 SCC
627: AIR 1970 SC 253], this Court made the following
observations: (SCC p. 630, para 8)
“8. … An order imposing penalty for failure to
carry out a statutory obligation is the result of
a quasi-criminal proceeding and penalty will
not ordinarily be imposed unless the party
obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of
law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or
dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of
its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed
merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether
penalty should be imposed for failure to perform
a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of
the authority to be exercised judicially and on a
consideration of all the relevant circumstances.
Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the
authority competent to impose the penalty
will be justified in refusing to impose penalty,
when there is a technical or venial breach of
the provisions of the Act or where the breach

24 2019 SCC OnLine CCI 26
1352 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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flows from a bona fide belief that the offender
is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by
the statute.”
(emphasis supplied)

111. It should be noted that any penal law imposing
punishment is made for general good of the society. As a
part of equitable consideration, we should strive to only
punish those who deserve it and to the extent of their
guilt. Further, it is well-established by this Court that the
principle of proportionality requires the fine imposed must
not exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining
the object pursued. In Coimbatore District Central Coop.
Bank v. Employees Assn. [Coimbatore District Central
Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669: (2007)
2 SCC (L&S) 68], this Court has explained the concept
of “proportionality” in the following manner: (SCC p. 678,
paras 18-19)
“18. “Proportionality” is a principle where the
court is concerned with the process, method or
manner in which the decision-maker has ordered
his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at
a decision. The very essence of decision-making
consists in the attribution of relative importance
to the factors and considerations in the case.
The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in
focus true nature of exercise—the elaboration
of a rule of permissible priorities.
19. De Smith states that “proportionality” involves
“balancing test” and “necessity test”. Whereas
the former (“balancing test”) permits scrutiny of
excessive onerous penalties or infringement of
rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of
relevant considerations, the latter (“necessity
test”) requires infringement of human rights to
the least restrictive alternative.”
In consonance of established jurisprudence, the
principle of proportionality needs to be imbibed
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1353

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

into any penalty imposed under Section 27 of
the Act. Otherwise excessively high fines may
over-deter, by discouraging potential investors,
which is not the intention of the Act. Therefore,
the fine under Section 27(b) of the Act should be
determined on the basis of the relevant turnover.
In light of the above discussion a two-step
calculation has to be followed while imposing
the penalty under Section 27 of the Act.”
64. Turning to the present record, the majority ruling of the CCI professed
to have analysed effects yet adduced no economic evidence of
price increases, output restriction or foreclosure. By contrast, the
CCI’s minority Member, after compiling converter sales, EBITDA
and price data for FY 2007-08 to FY 2011-12, found (i) that all
independent converters expanded output and margins, and (ii) that
pharmaceutical buyers paid identical or higher prices for containers
from the joint-venture than from other converters. The data thus
falsify any allegation of competitive harm.
65. The learned Counsel for CCI urged that Section 4(2) of the Act is a
“deeming provision”, ipso facto condemning the listed practices. The
submission cannot stand. The very case on which Counsel relied,
Fast Way Transmission (supra), did not consider, still less decide,
the present question. The Court was there concerned with a licensee
that had already infringed statutory broadcast conditions. Moreover,
Section 32 of the Act empowers the CCI to investigate conduct outside
India only where such conduct “has, or is likely to have, AAEC in
India”. It would be absurd to demand an effects analysis for foreign
conduct yet dispense with it for domestic conduct; the legislature
cannot be taken to have intended such inconsistency.
66. We therefore hold:
(i) that an effects-based analysis is an obligatory component of
every inquiry under Section 4 of the Act;
(ii) that the CCI, having relied on untested statements and pre-
2009 correspondence, Undertook no credible assessment of
harm; and
(iii) that, on the evidence marshalled by the COMPAT, converter
growth, stable downstream prices, absence of foreclosure – no
appreciable adverse effect on competition is shown.
1354 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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67. The omission of a proper harm analysis vitiates the CCI’s order
in limine. Because each of the alleged abuses has already been
negatived on the facts, the appeals must fail on this additional ground
as well. The COMPAT’s decision to set aside the CCI’s directions
and penalty therefore warrants affirmation. Issue V is answered in
the affirmative with respect to both the questions.

Issue VI - Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order
are vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches
of natural justice.
68. The Act entrusts the DG with inquisitorial powers of great breadth,
but those powers are bounded by the fundamental rule that evidence
adduced against a party must be open to challenge. Section 36(2)
of the Act incorporates the Code of Civil Procedure’s guarantees,
including the right to “examine witnesses on oath” and to test them
in cross-examination, while Regulation 41(5) of the 2009 General
Regulations obliges the DG or the CCI to grant that opportunity
whenever it is “necessary or expedient”. Audi alteram partem is
therefore woven into the statute itself.
69. In the present inquiry, the DG’s “Methodology” shows that he
questioned only nineteen converters identified by the informant as
“major players”, all commercially adverse to Respondent Schott India.
Apart from circulating questionnaires, recording their statements
and “surfing the worldwide web”, no independent verification was
attempted. International suppliers were contacted by e-mail and only
two responded. No converter, friendly or even neutral, to Schott India
was interviewed. The Report thereafter cites those statements as
its primary proof more than twenty times. For example, “the above
stated fact becomes evident from the statements”; “reading/analysis
of the above quoted statements”; “findings: from the statements of
the parties mentioned above”. The CCI adopted the same material
without independent scrutiny. In short, uncorroborated testimony
is the foundation of every adverse inference by the DG and CCI
against Schott India.
70. In its written objections dated 16 May 2011, Schott India squarely put the
CCI on notice that the depositions emanated from “converters openly
conflicted and inimically disposed” and requested the right to cross-
examine each deponent. At the oral hearing the request was reiterated.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1355

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

The CCI refused, reasoning that no “separate application” had been
filed. No attempt was made to weigh necessity or prejudice and it is
clear that the request was rejected on form rather than substance.
71. That refusal disregards various precedents upheld in a catena of
judgement of this Court like Raymond Woollen Mills Limited and
Another vs. Director General (Investigation and Registration)
and Another25 and State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer
Etc.26. In Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central
Excise, Kolkata-II27, this Court made the following observations
regarding the right to cross examination:
“6. According to us, not allowing the assessee to cross-
examine the witnesses by the adjudicating authority though
the statements of those witnesses were made the basis
of the impugned order is a serious flaw which makes
the order nullity inasmuch as it amounted to violation of
principles of natural justice because of which the assessee
was adversely affected. It is to be borne in mind that the
order of the Commissioner was based upon the statements
given by the aforesaid two witnesses. Even when the
assessee disputed the correctness of the statements and
wanted to cross-examine, the adjudicating authority did
not grant this opportunity to the assessee. It would be
pertinent to note that in the impugned order passed by the
adjudicating authority he has specifically mentioned that
such an opportunity was sought by the assessee. However,
no such opportunity was granted and the aforesaid plea
is not even dealt with by the adjudicating authority. As
far as the Tribunal is concerned, we find that rejection
of this plea is totally untenable. The Tribunal has simply
stated that cross-examination of the said dealers could
not have brought out any material which would not be in
possession of the appellant themselves to explain as to
why their ex-factory prices remain static. It was not for
the Tribunal to have guesswork as to for what purposes

25 (2008) 12 SCC 73
26 (1977) 2 SCC 777
27 (2016) 15 SCC 785
1356 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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the appellant wanted to cross-examine those dealers and
what extraction the appellant wanted from them.”
Moreover, in a similar competition matter in Cadila Healthcare Ltd.
(supra), the Delhi High Court held that where findings depend upon
oral statements, denial of cross-examination vitiates the decision. A
statutory discretion to allow or refuse must be exercised judicially
and it must not be defeated by procedural technicalities. The relevant
paras of this judgement are:
“61. This court notices that the CCI had earlier, in the
order, noted that a party can reasonably request for cross
examination of individuals whose testimony can adversely
affect it and that it has to consider the applications made
in such cases, by exercise of discretion.
62. Cadila’s argument that its request was turned down
without adequate reasons, in this court’s opinion is justified.
Regulation 41(5) of the 2009 regulations provides as follows:
“(5) If the Commission or the Director General,
as the case may be, directs evidence by a
party to be led by way of oral submission, the
Commission or the Director General, as the case
may be, if considered necessary or expedient,
grant an opportunity to the other party or parties,
as the case may be, to cross examine the person
giving the evidence.”
63. This court is of the opinion that the discretion, which is
undoubtedly vested with the CCI to permit or refuse cross
examination of a witness, is to be exercised judiciously.
The reason for denial of the request for cross examination
is that the justification given by Cadila is not “satisfactory”
and that the testimony of witnesses who have deposed
and whose cross examination is sought, are not relied
upon in the DG’s report. This court is of the opinion that
such reasons are not germane; mere “dissatisfaction” does
not imply judicious exercise of discretion. As regards the
reliance by the DG in his report is concerned, the grounds
of cross examination are necessarily wider; it is avowedly
to establish whether the witnesses were credible and
whether any part of their statements could be relied on;
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1357

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

furthermore they can be cross examined on relevant facts,
which are not necessarily confined to what they depose
about. Therefore, it is held that CCI erred in refusing to
grant cross examination (to Cadila) of the three witnesses
who had deposed before the DG.”
72. The COMPAT captured the essence of this violation as follows: “total
reliance on the statements of these interested witnesses even without
cross-examination was risky and uncalled for” . The COMPAT added
that the CCI “should not have insisted on a separate application once
the plea was raised in pleadings”. Having so ruled, the COMPAT
proceeded, perhaps over-cautiously, to examine the merits; but it
acknowledged that the evidentiary framework of this matter had been
gravely compromised.
73. The practical consequences of this violation are obvious. Cross-
examination would have revealed that several converters had, during
the period in question, expanded output, raised prices independently
of Schott India, and in some instances sourced tubes from imports,
all facts inconsistent with the foreclosure. It would also have exposed
inconsistencies between written replies and contemporaneous
purchase records. The CCI’s “cherry-picking” of only inculpatory
passages, while ignoring exculpatory statements such as the reply
of Lisa Ampoules (DG Report, Reply to Question 11, Page 902), is
precisely the mischief the law guards against.
74. The CCI stand that it “relied only on data supplied by Schott India”
cannot survive scrutiny. The “data” are summary tables compiled
from the very statements whose reliability was in dispute. Without
the underlying testimony, the tables are meaningless totals. The
edifice therefore collapses unless the testimony passes the test of
adversarial scrutiny. Moreover, the denial was not an innocent lapse
is confirmed by later regulatory reform. In January 2024, Regulation
41(2) was amended to insert an explicit proviso stating that where
the DG relies on oral evidence, he “shall offer” the opposite party an
opportunity to cross-examine. The amendment reflects a legislative
judgment that the right is indispensable and it underscores that the
right existed in substance all along and was ignored here.
75. We therefore record, in emphatic terms, that the proceedings before
the DG and the CCI were procedurally defective in a manner that, by
itself, could have warranted dismissal of the complaint at the threshold.
The fact that the COMPAT and this Court have, for completeness,
1358 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

entered into an effects-based merits analysis does not water down
that conclusion; it merely furnishes an independent foundation for the
same result, ensuring finality should a higher forum take a different
view on procedure. If the CCI had allowed cross-examination, two
courses were open: either the allegations would have crumbled under
questioning, or a tested evidentiary record would have emerged on
which a reasoned decision, whichever way, could rest. By electing to
proceed on untested assertions, the CCI deprived itself of the material
needed for a legally sustainable finding and placed the respondent
under an evidentiary handicap contrary to natural justice. Issue VI
is answered in the affirmative.

VII. Conclusion
76. We have, for completeness, scrutinised each precedent relied upon
by the appellants and the respondents. In our considered opinion, the
factual matrices and statutory settings of these case laws except those
referred to in the body of the judgment differ in material respects from
the controversy before us. Setting out individual distinctions in this
judgement would tax both the length and the clarity of this judgment.
However, we are placing on record that none of the cited authorities
unsettles the reasoning or the conclusions we have reached.
77. For the reasons set out in the foregoing analysis we hold that:
(i) The slabbed target-rebate scheme does not impose unfair or
discriminatory conditions;
(ii) The 8 per cent functional rebate, whether in its original or TMLA
form, is objectively justified and uniformly available;
(iii) The LTTSA with Schott Kaisha neither effects a margin-squeeze
nor forecloses downstream rivals;
(iv) No coercion or tying between NGA and NGC tubes is proved;
(v) An effects-based inquiry is integral to Section 4 of the Act and,
when properly undertaken, discloses no appreciable adverse
effect on competition in the present case; and
(vi) The investigation by the DG is vitiated by the denial of cross-
examination and by reliance upon pre-statute material, a
procedural lapse that would, of itself, have sufficed to invalidate
the impugned findings.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1359

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

78. Competition law is not designed to humble the successful or to clip
the wings of enterprises that have, through industry and innovation,
secured a commanding share of the market. The true purpose of
antitrust laws is to preserve the process of competition, i.e., to ensure
that rivals may challenge the incumbent on the merits, that consumers
enjoy the fruits of efficiency, and that technological progress is not
stifled by artificial barriers. If mere size or success were treated as
an offence, and every dominant firm exposed to sanction without
tangible proof of competitive harm, the law would defeat itself: it
would freeze capital formation, penalise productivity, and ultimately
impoverish the very public it is meant to protect.
79. In today’s global economic climate, prudence is vital. As the United
States and Europe retreat behind their newly-minted trade walls of
protectionist policies to shield their homegrown markets, India’s bid
to emerge as a global centre for manufacturing, life-sciences and
technology will succeed only if regulation rewards scale and intervenes
solely when genuine competitive harm is shown. Heavy-handed
enforcement, divorced from market effects, would discourage the long-
term capital and expertise the economy urgently needs. An effects-
based standard is therefore not a mere procedural nicety. It is both
a constitutional bulwark against arbitrary restraint of lawful enterprise
and a strategic necessity if India is to capture the opportunities that
more protectionist economies are in danger of forsaking. In the result,
Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014 (Competition Commission of India v.
Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd.) and Civil Appeal No. 9998 of 2014 (Kapoor
Glass India Pvt. Ltd. v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd.) are dismissed.
80. The order of the Competition Appellate Tribunal dated 2 April 2014
is affirmed. Having regard to the wholly unsubstantiated nature of
the allegations and the prolonged litigation they have occasioned;
Kapoor Glass shall pay costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs
only) to Schott India within eight weeks from today.
81. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals Rejected.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Gaurav Upadhyay, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)