Supreme Court of India
BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ AND OTHERSversusGOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 3
- Decided
- 1 January 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
The Supreme Court directed that compensation be determined based on the market value prevailing on 22 April 2019, as the SLAO’s earlier shift of the valuation date was beyond its jurisdiction and the delay warranted equitable relief under Article 300‑A.
Summary
The appellants purchased residential plots in Bengaluru between 1995 and 1997, which were later acquired by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) under a preliminary notification dated 29 January 2003. Although possession was taken in 2005, no compensation award was made until a Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) issued an award on 22 April 2019, using guideline values from 2011 and shifting the valuation date from the preliminary notification. The High Court quashed the award for lack of jurisdiction and directed the SLAO to determine compensation as of the preliminary notification date, dismissing the appellants' plea to shift the valuation date. The Supreme Court held that, given the inordinate delay and deprivation of compensation, it was appropriate to direct the SLAO to determine compensation based on the market value as of 22 April 2019, invoking its powers under Article 142. The Court set aside the High Court’s order, allowed the appellants’ writ petition, and ordered a fresh award reflecting the 2019 market value along with all statutory benefits.
Issues considered
- The appropriate date for determining market value of land for compensation – whether it should be the date of the preliminary notification or the date of the award.
- Whether the SLAO had jurisdiction to shift the valuation date to a later year.
- The applicability of Article 300‑A of the Constitution in cases of prolonged delay in compensation.
- The scope of the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 142 to direct a fresh award.
Legislation cited
- Constitution (Forty‑fourth Amendment) Act, 1978
- Constitution of Indias. 300-A
- Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966s. 28
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 4, s. 6
- National Highways Act, 1956s. 3-A
- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
Subjects
Article 300-ARight to propertyLand acquisitionPreliminary notificationCompensationAdequate compensationDeprivation of compensationDisbursal of compensationMarket value of landShifting valuation dateInordinate delayWelfare StateArticle 142Article 226
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 190 : 2025 INSC 3
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others
v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025)
02 January 2025
[B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The Lands of appellants herein were acquired and they were
deprived of their property without paying any compensation for
twenty-two years. For payment of compensation, the appellants
pleaded to shift the date for considering the market value of land as
on the date of the award and not as on the date of the Preliminary
Notification. Whether this Court should direct shifting of the date
for determination of the market value of the land in question of
the appellants.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.300-A – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 –
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 – From
1995 to 1997, appellants herein purchased various residential
sites – On 29.01.2003, a preliminary notification was issued
by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) for acquiring the said lands –
The possession of the appellants’ land was taken over by
Respondent No. 2 (KIADB), however, no award was passed
immediately for such acquisitions – On 22.04.2019, Special
Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) passed an award for payment
of compensation in respect of lands belonging to the erstwhile
land-owners – The Single Judge of the High Court quashed the
award dated 22.04.2019 passed by SLAO – Division Bench of
the High Court dismissed the writ Appeal filed by the appellants
herein – Appellants’ plea to shift the date for considering the
market value of land as on the date of the award and not as
on the date of the Preliminary Notification:
Held: The appellants had purchased the plots in question for
construction of residential houses – Not only have they not been
able to construct, but they have also not been even paid any
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 191
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
compensation for the same – The appellants have been deprived
of their property without paying any compensation for the same
in the said period of last twenty-two years – Though Right to
Property is no more a fundamental right, in view of the provisions
of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, it is a constitutional
right – A person cannot be deprived of his property without him
being paid adequate compensation in accordance with law for the
same – In the instant case, it can clearly be seen that there is
no delay which can be attributed to the appellants in not getting
compensation, but it was on account of the lethargic attitude of
the officers of the State/KIADB that the appellants were deprived
of compensation – Only after the notices were issued in the
contempt proceedings, the compensation was determined by
the SLAO on 22.04.2019 taking guideline values prevailing in
the year 2011 for determining the market value of the acquired
land – The Single Judge of the High Court also does not say that
the determination of compensation to be awarded by shifting of
the date by the SLAO to that of 2011 was unjust but only sets
aside the award on the ground that SLAO had no jurisdiction
to do so – If on account of the inordinate delay in paying the
compensation and thereby depriving the constitutional right to the
appellants under Article 300-A, the land acquisition proceedings
are quashed, the only recourse available to the State/KIADB in
order to save the project will be to now issue a fresh acquisition
notification by invoking the provisions as applicable under the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 which would entail huge
expenditure to the public exchequer – Therefore, in exercise of
power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
this Court finds it appropriate in the interest of justice that the SLAO
be directed to determine the compensation to be awarded to the
appellants herein on the basis of the market value prevailing as
on 22.04.2019 – The appellants shall also be entitled to all the
statutory benefits as are available to them under the 1894 LA Act.
[Paras 49, 50, 54, 55, 57]
Land Acquisition – Compensation – Value of money – Disbursal
of compensation with promptitude:
Held: It cannot be controverted that money is what money buys –
The value of money is based on the idea that money can be
invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of money
192 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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decreases over time due to inflation – What the appellants herein
could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in
2025 – It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination
of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition
of land should be made with promptitude. [Para 48]
Case Law Cited
Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and Others, 1993
INSC 315 : [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44; Vidya
Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, 2020 INSC 23 :
[2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020) 2 SCC 569; Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd.
v. Mast Ram and Others, 2024 INSC 709 : [2024] 9 SCR 443 :
2024 SCC OnLine 2598 – relied on.
Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others Through Power-of-Attorney
Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and
Others, 2012 INSC 503 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 : (2013) 1 SCC 353;
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, 2003 INSC 137 : [2003] 2 SCR 530 :
(2003) 4 SCC 200; Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory
and Others, 2005 INSC 585 : [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005)
13 SCC 477; Haji Saeed Khan and Others v. State of U.P. and
Others (2001) 9 SCC 513; K. Krishna Reddy and Others v. Special
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra
Pradesh, 1988 INSC 265 : [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 853 : (1988)
4 SCC 163 – referred to.
List of Acts
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966; Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013; Land Acquisition Act 1894; National
Highways Act, 1956; Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Article 300-A of Constitution; Right to property; Constitutional
right; Acquisition of land; Preliminary notification; Payment
of compensation; Adequate compensation; Deprivation of
compensation; Disbursal of compensation; Market value of land;
Shifting the date for considering the market value of land; Inordinate
delay in paying the compensation; Welfare State.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 193
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2022 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 678 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
R. Chandrachud, Dhuli Ventaka Krishna, Advs. for the Appellant.
Avishkar Singhvi, A.A.G., Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, Sr. Adv.,
Sharanagouda Patil, Mrs. Supreeta Patil, Jyotish Pandey,
S.S. Rebello, Ms. Deepti Arya, Arzu Paul, Vidur Nair (for M/s. S-legal
Associates), V.N. Raghupathy, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, S.J.
Amith, Mrs. Vani Vyas, Prakhar Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal takes exception to the final judgment and order dated
22nd November 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB)
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, whereby the
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by
the appellants herein against the judgment and order dated 18th April
2022 in Writ Petition No. 1627 of 2021 passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court dismissing their writ petition.
FACTS:
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:
3.1. From 1995 to 1997, the appellants herein purchased various
residential sites at Gottigere Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru
South Taluk, Karnataka vide registered sale deeds and became
absolute owners of their respective sites.
3.2. On 3 rd April 1997, a Framework Agreement (hereinafter,
“FWA”) was executed between Government of Karnataka
(Respondent No. 1) and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise
Ltd. (hereinafter, “NICE”) (Respondent No. 6) envisaging the
194 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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Infrastructure Corridor Project connecting Bengaluru-Mysuru
(hereinafter, “Bengaluru-Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project”
or “BMICP”). As per the FWA, the State Government undertook
to acquire about 13,237 acres of land from private persons and
about 6,956 acres of Government land. In all 20,193 acres of
land was agreed to be conveyed and transferred in favour of
Respondent No. 6 (NICE) for implementation of the BMICP.
3.3. On 14th October 1998, Respondent No. 6 applied to Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter, “KIADB”)
(Respondent No. 2) to make available the lands for the project.
3.4. On 29th January 2003, a preliminary notification was issued by
Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) under sub-section (1) of Section 28
of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966
(hereinafter, “KIAD Act”) for acquiring lands for the BMICP.
Notices were issued under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of KIAD
Act seeking objections from the land-owners. The appellants
also submitted their objections.
3.5. On 5th July 2003, upon consideration of the objections to the
Preliminary Notification, the Final Notification was issued by
Special Deputy Commissioner KIADB (Respondent No. 3).
3.6. On 22nd November 2005, the possession of the appellants’
land was taken over by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) and
subsequently handed over to Respondent No. 6 (NICE) and
its sister concern Nandi Economic Corridor Enterprises Ltd.
(NECE) (Respondent No. 7). However, no Award was passed
immediately for such acquisitions.
3.7. In 2009-10, the land-owners filed Writ Petitions before the
High Court of Karnataka with a prayer to quash the acquisition
notifications insofar as it relates to their lands. In the alternative,
the land-owners sought a direction to the concerned authorities
to allot residential sites of equal dimension.
3.8. Vide judgment and order dated 15th June 2011, a Division
Bench of the High Court held that the acquisition notifications
cannot be quashed at such a belated stage and that there
cannot be any direction for allotment of alternative sites to
the land-owners. In the result, the batch of Writ Petitions
filed by the land-owners were dismissed, however, liberty
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 195
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
was reserved to approach the concerned authorities if any
rehabilitation programme is specifically worked out or if any
welfare programme is generally available.
3.9. On 12th February 2016, in terms of the judgment and order of
the High Court dated 15th June 2011, some of the land-owners
submitted a representation inter-alia to the Government of
Karnataka, KIADB and NICE to frame a rehabilitation scheme
as mandatorily required under the FWA and to allot alternative
sites along with benefits under the scheme at the earliest.
3.10. On non-consideration of their representation, the landowners
filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being W.P. Nos.
49812-49863 of 2016 (LA-KIADB), with a prayer to direct the
State of Karnataka and KIADB to implement the request made
in the representation dated 12th February 2016 at the earliest
3.11. Vide order dated 24th March 2017, a learned Single Judge
of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions filed by the
land-owners by directing the State of Karnataka and KIADB
to consider their representation and pass appropriate orders,
in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
3.12. Alleging non-compliance of the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 24th March 2017, Contempt Petitions being C.C.C.
No. 2434 of 2018 and C.C.C. No. 18-65 of 2019 came to be
filed by the land-owners.
3.13. During the pendency of the Contempt Petitions, the Special
Land Acquisition Officer-1, KIADB (BMICP), Bengaluru
(hereinafter, “SLAO”) (Respondent No. 4), on 22nd April 2019,
passed an Award for payment of compensation in respect of
lands belonging to the erstwhile land-owners. In terms of the
legal opinion given by the Advocate General, Respondent No. 4
decided to postpone the date of Preliminary Notification from
29th January 2003 to the year 2011 and decided to consider
the guideline rates prevailing in the said year and formulate
an award. An amount of Rs. 32,69,45,789/- was, accordingly,
awarded for 11 Acre 1.25 Guntas of land.
3.14. In view of the Award dated 22nd April 2019, a compliance report
along with an endorsement came to be filed by the KIADB in
the contempt proceedings initiated by the land-owners before
196 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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the High Court. Therefore, a Division Bench of the High Court,
vide order dated 27th November 2019, dismissed as withdrawn
the Contempt Petitions with liberty to challenge the endorsement
in accordance with law.
3.15. On 19th June 2019, Respondents No. 6 and 7 (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “Project Proponents”) filed Writ
Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No. 31407
of 2019 before the Karnataka High Court challenging several
Awards passed by the SLAO, including the Award dated 22nd
April 2019. The Project Proponents were aggrieved by the
Award dated 22nd April 2019 inasmuch as, on account of delay
not attributable to them, they are being called upon to pay higher
compensation. It was their contention that the compensation
should be determined on the basis of the market value of land
as on the date of the Preliminary Notification and that the date
could not have been shifted.
3.16. On 5 th January 2021, the erstwhile land-owners filed
impleadment application in the Writ Petitions filed by the
Project Proponents. The appellants herein, thereafter, filed a
substantive Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 on 1st
June 2021. The appellants were aggrieved by the Award dated
22nd April 2019 inasmuch as, even though their lands were
acquired in the year 2003, no compensation for such acquisition
has been disbursed to the appellants despite a lapse of 18
years. It was their contention that the compensation should
be determined as per the current market value of the lands.
3.17. Vide common judgment and order dated 18th April 2022, a
learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru
allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents. The
High Court quashed the Award dated 22nd April 2019 passed
by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO). In view of the decision in the
Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents, the Writ Petition
filed by the appellants herein was disposed of as the same did
not survive for consideration inasmuch as the Award dated 22nd
April 2019 was quashed. Ultimately, the High Court directed the
concerned authorities to pass fresh awards in accordance with
law and after providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity to
the parties as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within
a period of three months.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 197
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
3.18. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed a Writ Appeal
being W.A. No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB). Vide impugned
judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022, the Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal filed by
the appellants herein. Hence, the present appeal by way of
special leave.
4. We have heard Shri R. Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, Shri Atmaram N. S. Nadkarni, learned Senior
Counsel for Respondents No. 6 and 7, Shri Avishkar Singhvi, learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Karnataka
and Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5.
SUBMISSIONS:
5. Shri Chandrachud submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court
erroneously dismissed the Writ Appeal against the judgment and order
of the learned Single Judge of the High Court as “premature”. It is
submitted that the Writ Appeal was not premature as the appellants’
plea to shift the date for considering the market value of land as
on the date of the Award and not as on the date of the Preliminary
Notification was rejected by the learned Single Judge and thus the
issue stood decided against the appellants. It is further submitted that
more than 21 years have passed since the Preliminary Notification
was passed acquiring the appellants lands and they have not received
any compensation yet for the same. Relying on the judgments of this
Court in Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and Others1
and Tukaram Kana Joshiand Others Through Power-of-Attorney
Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and
Others,2 it is submitted that in exceptional cases, the authorities
must be directed to determine compensation on the basis of market
value of the land as on the date of the Award by notionally shifting
the date of the Preliminary Notification. It is lastly submitted that the
compensation be determined as per the provisions contained in the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, “2013 LA Act”)
inasmuch as in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, the provisions of
1 1993 INSC 315 : [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44
2 2012 INSC 503 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 : (2013) 1 SCC 353
198 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter, “1894 LA Act”) have been
made applicable mutatis mutandis for the purposes of determination
and award of compensation. Reliance in this regard was placed by
the learned counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this Court
in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of
Maharashtra and Others.3
6. Per contra, Shri Nadkarni for Respondents No. 6 and 7 submitted
that between 2009 and 2012, the Project Proponents wrote several
letters to Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) requesting for awards to be
passed. It is further submitted that as no awards were passed by
the SLAOs, the Project Proponents were constrained to file Writ
Petition before the High Court seeking direction to pass awards
which was allowed in 2013, thereafter, on non-compliance the Project
Proponents initiated contempt proceedings in 2015 as no awards
were still passed. It was, therefore, submitted that if this Court is
inclined to grant any relief in the form of additional compensation
or direct shifting of date as sought for, it may be seen that there
was no error or delay on part of the Project Proponents, who have
deposited compensation with Respondent No.2 (KIADB) as per the
agreement and therefore any additional liability should fall on the
State Government and/or the KIADB. Relying on the judgment of
this Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory
and Others,4 it is submitted that shifting of date can only take place
in very rare circumstances. It is further submitted that there is no
question of awarding compensation under the 2013 LA Act and a
completely new case has been sought to be made out before this
Court, which was not contended before the learned Single Judge
or Division Bench of the High Court. It is lastly submitted that the
appellants never sought directions to the State Government/SLAO
to pass awards and that steps in that regard were taken only in the
year 2021 which was pursuant to the various proceedings initiated
by the Project Proponents.
7. Shri Singhvi for Respondent No. 1 submitted that the appellants’
claims are premature and speculative, as they have yet to exhaust
remedies available under the ongoing award proceedings. It is further
3 2003 INSC 137 : [2003] 2 SCR 530 : (2003) 4 SCC 200
4 2005 INSC 585 : [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005) 13 SCC 477
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 199
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned
judgment and order, expressly held that the issue of shifting the date
of acquisition notification can only be examined after the award has
been passed by the SLAO. It was, therefore, submitted that present
appeal is untenable at this stage.
8. Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5
submitted that the SLAO passed the Award dated 22nd April 2019,
on the basis of specific opinion tendered by the learned Advocate
General with regard to shifting of the date. It is submitted that the
learned Single Judge of the High Court, upon consideration of the
material placed before it, has quashed the Award and directed
the SLAO to pass fresh awards within a stipulated timeframe. It
is further submitted that pursuant to the directions by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, the SLAO has now passed fresh
awards for the acquired lands and if the appellants are aggrieved
by the compensation awarded, they may take such steps as are
permissible in law. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court should
not interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS:
9. To consider the case of the appellants, it would be appropriate to
refer to the prayer clause of their Writ Petition before the High Court.
The appellants herein had filed Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627
of 2021 (LA-KIADB) with the following prayers:
“WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most respectfully prays
that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ of the same
nature to quash and setting aside the Impugned Award
dated 22.04.2019 passed by the Respondent No. 4
bearing No. LAQ, SR/39 (26B, 10, 13, 14)/1998-99,
39 (30, 31, 37, 38, 40)/2002-03 SLAO-1, produced
at ANNEXURE – A;
b. Consequent to prayer (a) issue a writ of mandamus
or any other writ of the same nature to direct the
Respondents to issue notice to Petitioners for
determining compensation and pass the Award as
200 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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per market value of land closest to date of passing
the Award;
c. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems
fit in the above circumstances of the case, in the
interests of justice and equity.”
10. It is relevant to note that prior to the appellants herein Respondents
No. 6 and 7 (Project Proponents) had also filed Writ Petitions before
the High Court. From a perusal of the judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge dated 18th April 2022, it is clear that the Project
Proponents by way of Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and
W.P. No. 31407 of 2019 had also challenged the awards. Therefore,
in the three writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, a common
question with regard to the legality, validity and correctness of the
Award dated 22nd April 2019 was raised.
11. Before adverting to the findings of the learned Single Judge on the
legality of the Award dated 22nd April 2019, it would be appropriate
to reproduce certain extracts from the Award, as under:
“14. Valuation of land:
In the notification dated: 29/01/2003 issued under
Section 28(1) of the Survey number lands, based on the
above sales figures, the value is Rs. 2,90,532/- per acre
and the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs. Therefore, if
the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs including all other
allowances, this rate will be found to be real and fair.
Accordingly, it was decided and declared the award on
05/07/2018 and submitted for approval.
Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member wrote
a letter vide No. KIADB/CEO&EM/16/2019-20 dated
16/04/2019. Along with the said letter, Government’s
letter and Advocate General’s opinion are attached, it is
suggested to prepare the revised award as per the opinion
given by the Advocate General and submit it for approval.
In this regard, this office letter No. KIADB/BMICP/LAQ(1)/
G.I/01/2019-20 dated 22/04/2019 has been written to the
Special Deputy Commissioner, KIADB (BMICP) seeking
clarification on other issues that there is no scope for
revising the current decision. On 22/04/2019 as per the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 201
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member’s letter No.
KIADB/BMICP/LAQ/CR/31/2013-14 dated 22/04/2019, it
is said that it has been suggested to submit again as per
the Advocate General’s opinion and based on the previous
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases
regarding framing of compensatory rate/award in land
acquisition cases that even for the lands acquired for
BMICP scheme, it has been again instructed to prepare a
revised decision immediately as per the rules and submit it
for the approval of the government. For revising the award
and not considering the preliminary notification, the
Advocate General in his legal opinion dated 16/04/2019
has given the following legal opinion:
“KIADB and the State do not have any choice
but to pass the award which may be passed
taking into account and consideration the
market value of the property as on date.”
As per the opinion given by the present Advocate General,
the award has to be made at current market rate equal to
the current market rate. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in several cases has issued preliminary notification,
final notification and handed over the assets to the Claims
Department, but in the case where no award has been
made for ten years, it is appropriate to pay real and fair
land compensation to the land owners to avoid injustice,
in such cases, the date of preliminary notification should
be changed to the date of handing over the assets to the
Claims Department, which was prevailing on that date. The
order is to create a judgment considering the market rate.
The following civil appeal cases of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court have been perused to form a award in this regard.
1. CA No. 7015-7018/2005 (Competent Authority V/s
Barangore Jute Factory and Others)
2. SLP (Civil) No. 1787473/2004 (State of M.P. V/s
Onkar Prasad Patel)
3. CA No. 965/1979 with CA No. 3325/1984,
2185-87/1980, 2381/1980, SLP No. 12352-53/1984,
202 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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10572-74/1984 and others (Gauri Shankar Gaur and
others V/s State of U.P. and others)
4. CA No. 2739/2000 with Nos. 2737/2000, 2738/2000,
2736/2000 Contempt Petition (C) No. 62/1999
(Haji Saeed Khan and others V/s State of U.P. and
others).
In the above cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
ordered to change the preliminary notification to the date
of handing over of the asset or to an appropriate date
conducive to giving equitable relief in cases where there
is severe delay in adjudication.
Based on the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in the present case, the possession of the land was
handed over on 05/04/2004, 22/11/2005 and 25/11/2005,
if the award is framed considering the guideline rates
of 2011 (sic), it is not possible to give real and fair
compensation to the land owner.
Therefore, with a view to providing real and fair land
compensation to the landowners, it was decided to
postpone the date of preliminary notification to the
year 2011 and decided to consider the guideline rates
prevailing in the said year and formulate an award as
per the legal opinion given by the Advocate General.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. It can thus be seen that the learned Advocate General rendered an
opinion on 16th April 2019, wherein it was stated that while passing the
awards, the market value as on date has to be taken on account of
enormous delay in passing the awards. KIADB forwarded the opinion
to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) and SLAO directing
them to pass the awards as per the opinion. On 22nd April 2019, the
SLAO wrote letters to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP)
raising certain queries with regard to passing of fresh awards and
the compensation to be calculated in view of awards already passed
by them and sent for approval on 3rd November 2018. In response
to the said letters, the CEO of KIADB once again addressed a letter
dated 22nd April 2019, to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP)
and the SLAO instructing them to pass the awards as directed in
the opinion of the learned Advocate General.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 203
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
13. It can further be seen that the opinion of the learned Advocate
General as well as the judgments of this Court referred to in the
Award were the only two factors that were taken into account for the
purpose of passing the Award dated 22nd April 2019, by Respondent
No. 4 (SLAO) by shifting/postponing the date of the Preliminary
Notification to the year 2011 and by considering the guideline rates
prevailing in the said year.
14. Aggrieved by the suo-motu shifting/postponing of the date of the
Preliminary Notification, the Project Proponents, who as a result were
called upon to pay higher compensation, had filed a Writ Petition
before the High Court. The appellants herein filed an impleadment
application in the Writ Petition filed by the Project Proponents so
also a substantive Writ Petition with prayers referred to hereinbefore.
Their grievance was two-fold to quash the Award and to direct
passing of an Award as per market value of land closest to date of
passing the Award.
15. For the common prayer qua quashing of the Award dated
22nd April 2019, it will be profitable to refer to the following paragraphs
of the judgment and order dated 18th April 2022, passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court:
“17.8 A perusal of the impugned awards will indicate that
the opinion of the learned Advocate General as well as
the judgments of the Apex Court referred to in the awards
were the only two factors that were taken into account
for the purpose of passing the awards by the SLAOs. As
stated supra, in so far as the opinion of the learned
Advocate General is concerned, the same with regard
to shifting of the date to reckon the market value of
the land from the date of the preliminary notification
to a later date is concerned, the said opinion was
beyond the scope and ambit of the query put forth
to him and consequently, the said opinion could not
have been made the basis by the SLAOs to pass the
impugned awards.
X—X —X —X —X —X —X
17.10 The second factor/circumstance that has been taken
into account by the SLAOs to shift the date to reckon the
market value of the lands from the date of the preliminary
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notification to a later/subsequent dates is by placing
reliance upon the following decisions of the Apex Court viz.,
a. Competent Authority Vs. Barangor Jute Factory
C/w State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Onkar Prasad
Patel – (2005) 13 SCC 47
b. Gaurishankar Gaur Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh –
(1994) 1 SCC 92; and
c. Haji Saeed Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh –
(2001) 9 SCC 513.
17.11 In this context, it is relevant to state that as can
be seen from the aforesaid decisions as well as various
decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court referred to
supra by both sides, that the market value of the acquired
lands has to be taken as on the date of the preliminary
notification as contemplated under Section 11 of the
L.A. Act, 1894; it has been held that under exceptional
circumstances, where either the Apex Court or High
Courts came to the conclusion that the acquisition
proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed
on account of certain illegalities or infirmities in the
acquisition process/procedure, it was permissible only
for the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under
Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to shift the date to a later/
subsequent date; however,this power to shift the date
is available only to either the Apex Court or the High
Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or
the State Government; in other words, a perusal of
the decisions referred to supra, will indicate that in
cases, where the Apex Court as well as this Court
deemed it necessary to shift the date in order to do
complete and substantial justice, inherent powers of
the Courts were invoked and the dates were shifted in
order to ensure no hardship, loss or prejudice would
be caused to the land losers.
17.12 A perusal of the decisions relied upon by the
SLAOs in the impugned awards referred to supra, will
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 205
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
clearly indicate that in the said cases, the Apex Court has
invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction and powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in the peculiar/
special facts and circumstances obtaining in the said
cases, the Apex Court had shifted the date to reckon the
market value. The SLAOs clearly fell in error in placing
reliance upon the said decisions of the Apex Court for
the purpose of shifting the date from the date of the
preliminary notification without appreciating that the
said shifting of the date by the SLAOs or the State
Government is not legally permissible in law either
under the provisions of the L.A. Act, 1894 or the
KIAD Act or the Rules or by any judicial precedent.
It is also relevant to state that even as per the aforesaid
judgments, shifting of the date from the date of the
preliminary notification to any later/subsequent date has
been done only up to the date of taking possession from
the land losers. In the instant case, the impugned awards
disclose that the SLAOs have shifted the date to a date
subsequent/later to the date of taking possession. Under
these circumstances, it is clear that the impugned awards
purporting to shift the date suffers from several legal and
factual infirmities and illegalities which vitiate the impugned
awards, which deserve to be quashed on this ground also.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
upon appreciation of the material placed on record, was of the
view that insofar as the opinion of the learned Advocate General
with regard to shifting of the date of the preliminary notification to
a later date is concerned, the said opinion was beyond the scope
and ambit of the query put forth to him and consequently, the said
opinion could not have been made the basis by the SLAO to pass
the Award. It is further to be seen that the learned Single Judge
of the High Court after considering the provisions of 1894 LA Act,
KIAD Act and various decisions of this Court, observed that the
market value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the date
of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 11 of
the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
observed that only in exceptional circumstances, where either this
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Court or the High Court comes to the conclusion that the acquisition
proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed on account of
certain illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition process/procedure,
it was permissible only for this Court in exercise of its powers under
Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to shift the date to a later/subsequent date. It was further
observed that this power to shift the date is available only to either
this Court or the High Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs
or the State Government.
17. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge
of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO cannot shift/postpone
the date of preliminary notification. In case, upon appreciation of
the material placed on record if this Court or the High Court, in
exceptional circumstances, came to the conclusion that the acquisition
proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed only then by
exercising inherent powers this Court under Article 32/142 or the
High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India respectively
can shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a later date.
In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the Award dated
22nd April 2019 be quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.
18. Having decided thus, in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project
Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court came to
the conclusion that the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein
before the High Court does not survive for consideration and the
same was, accordingly, disposed of.
19. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed an intra-court appeal
being Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB) before the Division
Bench of the High Court.
20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment and
order dated 22nd November 2022 upon consideration of the material
placed before it, in paragraph 9, observed thus:
“9. Further, the learned Single Judge held that the SLAO has
to determine the compensation as on the date of issuing the
preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 11
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and not to shift the date
to a later/subsequent date. The learned Single Judge has
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 207
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed the
SLAO to reconsider and pass award. The grievance of
the petitioner regarding shifting the date at any later
or subsequent date could be considered only if award
is passed by the SLAO. The SLAO is yet to pass an
award. The grievance raised by the petitioner in this
writ appeal is premature. If the petitioner is dissatisfied
with the award to be passed by the SLAO, liberty is
reserved to the petitioner to raise the grounds urged
in this appeal in the appropriate proceedings before
the appropriate forum. The question of considering the
shifting of date from the date of preliminary notification to
any other date would arise only when the award is passed.
The cause of action arose for the petitioner to raise the
said issue only after the award is passed. The shifting of
the date to a later/subsequent date is available only to the
Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, but not to the SLAO
or State Government…”
(emphasis supplied)
21. It can thus be seen that the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
the Writ Appeal on the ground that the learned Single Judge has
set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed the SLAO to
reconsider and pass award and so the grievance regarding shifting
the date at any later or subsequent date could be considered only
if an award is passed by the SLAO. The Division Bench of the High
Court was, therefore, of the opinion that the grievance sought to
be raised in the writ appeal is premature and that the question of
considering the shifting of date of preliminary notification to any other
date would arise only when the award is passed.
22. In the present appeal, it was sought to be contended by the learned
counsel for the appellants that the Writ Appeal was not pre-mature
inasmuch as the prayer to shift the date for considering the market
value of the land as on the date of the award and not as on the date
of the preliminary notification was rejected by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court and thus the issue stood decided against the
appellants, as a consequence of which the cause of action remained.
23. We are of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for
the appellants is liable to be accepted. We say so because upon
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adjudication of the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents,
the learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion
that the Award dated 22nd April 2019, is liable to be quashed and
set aside and ordered accordingly. However, upon consideration of
the extant position of law, the learned Single Judge further directed
that the SLAO has to determine the compensation as on the date
of issuance of the preliminary notification and not to shift the date to
a later/subsequent date. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the
High Court while exercising inherent powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution quashed and set aside the Award dated 22nd April 2019,
but decided against granting relief to the appellants by shifting/
postponing the date of the preliminary notification to a later/
subsequent date. In our opinion, therefore, the cause of action with
regard to prayer clause (b) of the Writ Petition filed by the appellants
herein still survives for consideration. The Division Bench of the High
Court should have, especially taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances of the present case, at least considered the case of
the appellants herein with regard to said prayer. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd
November 2022, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
liable to be quashed and set aside on this short ground alone. We
order accordingly.
24. Having set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court on the aforesaid ground, we shall
now proceed to examine if the relief sought by the appellants herein
in prayer clause (b) of the Writ Petition referred to hereinbefore is
liable to be granted or not.
25. For the purpose of consideration of the relief sought by the appellants
herein, it will be appropriate to refer to a few judgements of this
Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel
for the parties.
26. In the case of Ram Chand (supra), proceedings were instituted for
quashing the land acquisition proceedings, which had been initiated
between the years 1959 and 1965 by issuance of notifications under
Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act but in which no awards were made
upto the years 1979-80, although the declarations under Section 6
of the 1894 LA Act had been made in the years 1966 and 1969. The
question sought to be answered by this Court in the aforesaid case
was as to if a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/81 at the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 209
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
market rate prevailing twenty years back, will that be in compliance
of the constitutional and statutory mandate. In this regard, this Court
observed thus:
“14. … Ignoring the escalation of the market value of
the lands, especially near the urban agglomeration
or metropolitan cities, will amount to ignoring an
earthquake and courts can certainly take judicial notice
of the said fact. The interest and the solatium, which have
to be paid under the provisions of the Act, are linked with
the market value of the land with reference to the date of
the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the
Act. If a decision had been taken as early as in the year
1966, by issuance of declarations under Section 6, that
the lands belonging to the different cultivators, who
held those lands within the ceiling limit for cultivation,
were needed for public purpose, respondents should
have taken steps for completion of the acquisition
proceedings and payment of compensation at an
early date. In the present cases, unless a justification is
furnished on behalf of the respondents, can it be said that
the statutory power of making an award under Section 11
has been exercised within a reasonable time from the date
of the declaration under Section 6? Due to escalation
in prices of land, more so in this area, during the
preceding two decades, in reality, the market rate,
on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) is a
mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at the time of its
determination in the Award.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case has observed
that the respondents therein should have taken steps for completion
of the acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation at an
early date. It was further observed that due to escalation in prices
of land, more so in the area in question, during the preceding two
decades, in reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification
under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act is a mere fraction of the rate
prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award. This Court,
however, in the aforesaid case was also dealing with a challenge to
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the acquisition proceedings itself. In this regard, this Court observed
thus:
“16. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out
that the petitioners have approached this Court only
after making of the awards, or when awards were to
be made, having waited for more than fourteen years,
without invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32. It is true
that this Court has taken note of delay on the part of
the petitioners concerned in invoking the jurisdiction
of the High Court or of this Court for quashing the
land acquisition proceedings on the ground that the
proceedings for acquisition of the lands in question
have remained pending for more than a decade,
in the cases of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi
[(1975) 4 SCC 285] and Ramjas Foundation v. Union
of India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852].
According to us, the question of delay in invoking the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of this
Court under Article 32, has to be considered along with the
inaction on the part of the authorities, who had to perform
their statutory duties. Can the statutory authority take a
plea that although it has not performed its duty within a
reasonable time, but it is of no consequence because the
person, who has been wronged or deprived of his right,
has also not invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or
of this Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the
relief considered appropriate in the circumstances? The
authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to perform
their duties within a reasonable time, and as such they are
answerable to the Court why such duties have not been
performed by them, which has caused injury to claimants.
By not questioning, the validity of the acquisition
proceedings for a long time since the declarations
were made under Section 6, the relief of quashing the
acquisition proceedings has become inappropriate,
because in the meantime, the lands notified have
been developed and put to public use. The lands are
being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and to
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 211
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a
must in the present set-up. The outweighing public
interest has to be given due weight. That is why this
Court has been resisting attempts on the part of the
landholders, seeking quashing of the acquisition
proceedings on ground of delay in completion of such
proceedings. But, can the respondents be not directed
to compensate the petitioners, who were small cultivators
holding lands within the ceiling limit in and around Delhi,
for the injury caused to them, not by the provisions of the
Act, but because of the non-exercise of the power by the
authorities under the Act within a reasonable time?”
(emphasis supplied)
28. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case observed
that by not questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings
for a long time since the declarations were made under Section 6 of
the 1894 LA Act, the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings has
become inappropriate, because in the meantime, the lands notified
have been developed and put to public use. It was further observed
that the lands are being utilized to provide shelter to thousands and
to implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the
present set-up and that the outweighing public interest has to be
given due weight.
29. Ultimately, this Court in paragraph 27 of the aforesaid case, taking
into consideration the interest of the public, instead of quashing the
proceedings for acquisition, directed that the petitioners therein shall
be paid an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the
rate of 12% per annum, after expiry of two years from August 23, 1974,
till the date of the making of the awards by the Collector, to be
calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in question
on the date of the notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4
of the 1894 LA Act.
30. In the case of Haji Saeed Khan and Others v. State of U.P. and
Others,5 land was acquired for the purposes of construction of a
housing colony under the “Planned Development Scheme” in Village
5 (2001) 9 SCC 513
212 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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Dhimri Pargana, District Moradabad by the Moradabad Development
Authority. The challenge to the land acquisition proceedings before
the High Court in the aforesaid case was dismissed. Aggrieved
thereby, this Court was called upon to adjudicate the lis. This Court,
having regard to the peculiar facts of the aforesaid case, instead
of deciding the matter on merits, suggested to the counsel on both
sides that it would be reasonable in the interests of justice if they
agreed that the market value of the property could be fixed by treating
15th June, 1998, i.e., the date of taking possession as the date of
notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act instead of the
actual date of notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act i.e.,
30th March, 1995. When the suggestion came from the Bench, the
counsel appearing on both sides accepted the suggestion from the
Court. Accordingly, this Court upheld the judgment and order of the
High Court, thereby the land acquisition proceedings were upheld
with modification to the limited extent qua the date of notification
under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act shifted to the date of taking
possession.
31. In the case of Barangore Jute Factory (supra), the subject matter
of the appeals before this Court was the compulsory acquisition of
certain lands by the Central Government by a notification dated 11th
June 1998 under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956
(hereinafter, “NH Act”). The landowners challenged the acquisition
of their land on various grounds before the Calcutta High Court. The
Division Bench of the High Court by a judgment and order dated
7th April 2004, disposed of the writ-petition holding the impugned
notification regarding compulsory acquisition of land to be bad in law,
however, keeping in view the fact that possession of the acquired
land had already been taken by the authorities, the High Court felt
that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the notification.
The High Court also took note of the power of the acquiring authority
to issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land which could
only lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation
payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in view, it ordered
that an additional amount of compensation (calculated at 30% over
and above the above the compensation already determined) be
awarded to the landowners. Aggrieved by the judgment and order
of the Calcutta High Court, three appeals by way of special leave
were filed before this Court. The first by the competent authority qua
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 213
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
validity of acquisition notification, second by the National Highways
Authority of India (hereinafter, “NHAI”) qua award of additional
compensation to the landowners and third by the landowners qua
the acquisition notification not being quashed in spite of having been
declared as illegal.
32. The acquisition of land in the aforesaid case was under the NH Act.
The power to acquire land is contained in Section 3-A of the NH Act.
According to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A of the NH Act, where the
Central Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any land is
required for building, maintenance, management or operation of a
national highway or part thereof, it may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare its intention to acquire such land. Sub-section (2)
of Section 3-A of the NH Act provides that every notification under
sub-section (1) thereof shall give a brief description of land. Under
sub-section (3) of Section 3-A of the NH Act, the competent authority
is required to cause the substance of the notification to be published in
two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language.
The acquisition notification in the aforesaid case was challenged on
the ground that it does not give a brief description of the land sought
to be compulsorily acquired. This Court, upon consideration of the
acquisition notification, observed thus:
“5. …So far as the question whether the impugned
notification meets the requirement of Section 3-A(1) of the
Act regarding giving brief description of land is concerned,
we have already shown that even though plot numbers of
lands in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces
of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever
the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there
is no description as to which portion was being acquired.
Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired,
the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact
of acquisition or to raise any objection about user of the
acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or
to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that
where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a
particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner
alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due
meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to
meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is
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required in such cases is that the acquisition notification
should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired
know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification
in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law.”
33. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case observed
that it is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to
be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner
alone. It can further be seen that this Court held that the acquisition
notification therein failed to meet the statutory mandate and that it
was vague. It was further held that the least that was required was
that the acquisition notification therein should have let the person
whose land was sought to be acquired know what he was going to
lose. It was, therefore, held that the acquisition notification was not
in accordance with law.
34. Having held that the notification regarding acquisition of land was
invalid because it failed to meet the statutory requirements and also
having found that taking possession of the land of the landowners in
the aforesaid case in pursuance to the acquisition notification was not
in accordance with law, the question that arose for the consideration
of this Court was as to what relief can be granted to the landowners.
In that regard, this Court observed thus:
“14. … The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition
of land in the present case was for a project of great
national importance i.e. the construction of a national
highway. The construction of a national highway on the
acquired land has already been completed as informed
to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will
be served by quashing the impugned notification at this
stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that
the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification
for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned
notification being quashed. The consequence of this will
only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land,
the amount of compensation payable to the landowners
may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about
the quantum of compensation payable to the landowners.
Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to
several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 215
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved
in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view
that a better course will be to compensate the landowners,
that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what they have
been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt
this course of action.”
35. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case observed
that the Calcutta High Court rightly observed that the acquisition
of land was for a project of great national importance i.e., the
construction of a national highway. This Court further observed
that the construction of a national highway on the acquired land
had already been completed. It was further observed that no useful
purpose would be served by quashing the acquisition notification at
this stage. Pertinently, this Court observed that the acquiring authority
could always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in
the event the acquisition notification therein was quashed and that the
consequence of that would only be that the amount of compensation
payable to the landowners may be more. Therefore, this Court
observed that the ultimate question would be about the quantum
of compensation payable to the landowners. Having observed so,
this Court held that the better course would be to compensate the
landowners appropriately for what they have been deprived of and
that the interests of justice persuade this Court to adopt that course
of action. The relief, therefore, granted by this Court in the aforesaid
case was molded in the form of paragraph 15, which reads as under:
“15. Normally, compensation is determined as per
the market price of land on the date of issuance of
the notification regarding acquisition of land. There
are precedents by way of judgments of this Court
where in similar situations instead of quashing the
impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of
the notification so that the landowners are adequately
compensated. Reference may be made to:
(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri [(1992)
1 SCC 328]
(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. [(1994) 1 SCC 92]
(c) Haji Saeed Khan v. State of U.P. [(2001) 9 SCC 513]
216 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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In that direction the next step is what should be
the crucial date in the facts of the present case for
determining the quantum of compensation. We feel
that the relevant date in the present case ought to
be the date when possession of the land was taken
by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This
date admittedly is 19-2-2003. We, therefore, direct
that compensation payable to the writ petitioners
be determined as on 19-2-2003, the date on which
they were deprived of possession of their lands.
We do not quash the impugned notification in order
not to disturb what has already taken place by way
of use of the acquired land for construction of the
national highway. We direct that the compensation
for the acquired land be determined as on 19-2-2003
expeditiously and within ten weeks from today and the
amount of compensation so determined, be paid to the
writ petitioners after adjusting the amount already paid by
way of compensation within eight weeks thereafter. The
claim of interest on the amount of compensation so
determined is to be decided in accordance with law
by the appropriate authority. We express no opinion
about other statutory rights, if any, available to the
parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to
exercise the same, if available. The compensation as
determined by us under this order along with other
benefits, which the respondents give to parties whose
lands are acquired under the Act, should be given to
the writ petitioners along with what has been directed
by us in this judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)
36. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case observed
that normally, compensation is determined as per the market
price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding
acquisition of land but there are judgments of this Court where in
similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this
Court shifted the date of the notification so that the landowners are
adequately compensated. This Court directed that compensation
payable to the landowners be determined as on the date when
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 217
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
possession of land was taken by the respondents therein i.e.,
19th February 2003.
37. In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), the land situated in
Village Shirwame, Taluka and District Thane, stood notified under
Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act on 6th June 1964 for establishment
of Ulhas Khore Project i.e., a project for industrial development.
However, no subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter,
and the acquisition proceedings lapsed. The respondent-authorities
therein realised, in 1981, that grave injustice had been done to the
appellants therein and so a fresh notification under Section 4 of
the 1894 LA Act was issued on 14th May 1981. However, no further
proceedings were initiated and therefore, such proceedings also
died a natural death. In the aforesaid case, when the appellants
therein reached this Court, this Court in unequivocal terms observed
that even after the right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen
most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation
can take place only in accordance with “law”, as the said word
has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. In
paragraph 22 of the aforesaid case, this Court observed that the
concerned-State therein came forward with a welcome suggestion
stating that in order to redress the grievances of the appellants
therein, the respondent authorities would notify the land in dispute
under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act and that the market value of
the land in dispute would be assessed as it prevails on the date
on which Section 4 notification is again published in the Official
Gazette.
38. In the aforesaid case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), this Court
observed that the right to property is now considered to be not only
a constitutional or a statutory right but also a “human right”. It was
further observed that human rights are considered in the realm of
individual rights, such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to
shelter and employment, etc. This Court further observed that now,
however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted
dimension and that the right to property is considered very much to
be a part of such new dimension.
39. It would be appropriate to refer to two recent pronouncements of
this Court on the right to property.
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40. This Court, in the case of Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh
and Others,6 while surveying the earlier judgments on the issue,
has observed thus:
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III
of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose
(1953) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1954 SC 92], which could not be
deprived without due process of law and upon just and
fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram
Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right
under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess
a citizen of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly included in Article
300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation
(P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011)
4 SCC (Civ) 414]
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would be
violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right
under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed
on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v.
Darius Shapur Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627], wherein this
Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)
“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained
in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in
6 2020 INSC 23 : [2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020) 2 SCC 569
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 219
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may
interfere with the right of property of a person
by acquiring the same but the same must be for
a public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy
[N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC
517], this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)
“21. If the right of property is a human right
as also a constitutional right, the same cannot
be taken away except in accordance with law.
Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such
right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest
such right, keeping in view of the provisions of
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must
be strictly construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of
U.P. [Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.
(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673], this Court
recognised the right to property as a basic human right in
the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30)
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and
by different political thinkers that some amount
of property right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of
the Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the support
of property. “Property must be secured, else
liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John
Adams. Indeed the view that property itself
is the seed-bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are to flourish, is the
consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
220 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat
[Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp
(1) SCC 596], this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627,
para 48)
“48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits
the powers of the State that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. There has to be no deprivation without
any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other
mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is
no law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction,
and without following due process of law, and depriving
her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property
without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the
judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013)
1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must
comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or
any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a
welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to
itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
[State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 404 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is
now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 221
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
right, but also a human right. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to
shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights
have gained a multi-faceted dimension.
………………
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
[P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 :
1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
41. In the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram and Others,7
this Court observed thus:
“D. Role of the State under Article 300-A of the
Constitution
43. The Right to Property in our country is a net of
intersecting rights which has been explained by this Court
in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 968. A division bench of this Court
identified seven non-exhaustive sub-rights that accrue to
a landowner when the State intends to acquire his/her
property. The relevant observations of this Court under
the said judgment are reproduced below:
“…27.
… Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit
non-exhaustive. These are : i) duty of the State
to inform the person that it intends to acquire
his property - the right to notice, ii) the duty of
the State to hear objections to the acquisition -
the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State
to inform the person of its decision to acquire -
the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of
the State to demonstrate that the acquisition
is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only
for public purpose, v) the duty of the State
7 2024 INSC 709 : [2024] 9 SCR 443 : 2024 SCC OnLine 2598
222 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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to restitute and rehabilitate - the right of
restitution or fair compensation, vi) the
duty of the State to conduct the process of
acquisition efficiently and within prescribed
timelines of the proceedings - the right to
an efficient and expeditious process, and
vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading
to vesting - the right of conclusion…”
[Emphasis Supplied]
This Court held that a fair and reasonable compensation
is the sine qua non for any acquisition process.
44. In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand (2009) 12 SCC 194;
Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC 682
and Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125, this
Court underscored the importance of following timelines
prescribed by the statutes as well as determining and
disbursing compensation amount expeditiously within
reasonable time.
45. The subject land came to be acquired by invoking
special powers in cases of urgency under Section 17(4) of
the 1894 Act. The invocation of Section 17(4) extinguishes
the statutory avenue for the landowners under Section 5A
to raise objections to the acquisition proceedings. These
circumstances impose onerous duty on the State to
facilitate justice to the landowners by providing them with
fair and reasonable compensation expeditiously. The seven
sub-rights of the landowners identified by this Court in
Kolkata Municipal Corporation (supra) are corresponding
duties of the State. We regret to note that the amount of
Rs. 3,05,31,095/- determined as compensation under the
Supplementary Award has not been paid to the landowners
for a period of more than two years and the State of
Himachal Pradesh as a welfare State has made no effort
to get the same paid at the earliest.
46. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra (D) v. State
of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 932 and State of Haryana
v. Mukesh Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 404 that the right to
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 223
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
property is now considered to be not only a constitutional
or statutory right, but also a human right. This Court held
in Tukaram Kana Joshi thr. Power of Attorney Holder v.
M.I.D.C. (2013) 1 SCC 353 that in a welfare State, the
statutory authorities are legally bound to pay adequate
compensation and rehabilitate the persons whose lands
are being acquired. The non-fulfilment of such obligations
under the garb of industrial development, is not permissible
for any welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting
a person and depriving them of their constitutional/human
right.
47. That time is of the essence in determination and
payment of compensation is also evident from this Court’s
judgment in Kukreja Construction Company v. State of
Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2547 wherein it
has been held that once the compensation has been
determined, the same is payable immediately without
any requirement of a representation or request by the
landowners and a duty is cast on the State to pay such
compensation to the land losers, otherwise there would
be a breach of Article 300-A of the Constitution.
48. In the present case, the Government of Himachal
Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively
intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that the
requisite amount towards compensation is paid at the
earliest. The State cannot abdicate its constitutional and
statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by
arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition
proceedings under the MOU signed between the Appellant,
JAL and itself. We find that the delay in the payment
of compensation to the landowners after taking away
ownership of the subject land from them is in contravention
to the spirit of the constitutional scheme of Article 300A
and the idea of a welfare State.
49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken
under the power of eminent domain of the government
much against the wishes of the owners of the land which
gets acquired. When such a power is exercised, it is
224 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part
of the government body to ensure that the owners whose
lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount
as declared by the statutory award at the earliest.
50. The State Government, in peculiar circumstances,
was expected to make the requisite payment towards
compensation to the landowners from its own treasury and
should have thereafter proceeded to recover the same from
JAL. Instead of making the poor landowners to run after
the powerful corporate houses, it should have compelled
JAL to make the necessary payment.”
42. Right to Property ceased to be a Fundamental Right by the Constitution
(Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continues to be a
human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution.
43. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the
procedure established by law.
44. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi (supra) observed that
in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could
not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction
of law. It was further observed that the State being a welfare State
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond
what is provided by the Constitution.
45. Recently, this Court in the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement
Ltd. (supra) observed that the Government as a welfare State
ought to have proactively intervened in the matter with a view
to ensure that the requisite amount towards compensation is
paid at the earliest. It was further observed that the State cannot
abdicate its constitutional and statutory responsibility of payment
of compensation by arguing that its role was limited to initiating
acquisition proceedings. It was, therefore, observed that the delay
in the payment of compensation, in accordance with law, to the
landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land from
them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional scheme
of Article 300-A and the idea of a welfare State.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 225
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
46. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. (supra), this
Court further observed that acquisition of land for public purpose is
undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government
much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets
acquired. It was, therefore, observed that when such a power is
exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the
part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands
get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared
by the statutory award at the earliest.
47. It will also be appropriate for the purpose of the present discussion to
refer to the judgment of this Court, in the case of K. Krishna Reddy
and Others v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II,
LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh,8 specifically in paragraph 12,
observed thus:
“12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and need
of claimants to get compensation here and now. No
matter what it is. The lands were acquired as far back in
1977. One decade has already passed. Now the remand
means another round of litigation. There would be further
delay in getting the compensation. After all money is what
money buys. What the claimants could have bought with
the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps,
not even one half of it. It is a common experience that
the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising
inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms and
utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may
be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian
agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally
depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves
nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no
savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon.
They know no other work. They may even face starvation
unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost
importance that the award should be made without delay.
The enhanced compensation must be determined without
loss of time. The appellate power of remand, at any rate
8 1988 INSC 265 : [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 853 : (1988) 4 SCC 163
226 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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ought not to be exercised lightly. It shall not be resorted
to unless the award is wholly unintelligible. It shall not be
exercised unless there is total lack of evidence. If remand
is imperative, and if the claim for enhanced compensation
is tenable, it would be proper for the appellate court to
do modest best to mitigate hardships. The appellate court
may direct some interim payment to claimants subject to
adjustment in the eventual award.”
48. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have been deprived
of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago. It can also not be
controverted that money is what money buys. The value of money
is based on the idea that money can be invested to earn a return,
and that the purchasing power of money decreases over time due
to inflation. What the appellants herein could have bought with the
compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost
importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of
compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with
promptitude.
49. We find that in the present case, the appellants were required to
knock at the doors of the courts on number of occasions during
the period of last twenty-two years. The appellants have been
deprived of their property without paying any compensation for
the same in the said period of last twenty-two years. As already
discussed hereinabove, the appellants had purchased the plots
in question for construction of residential houses. Not only have
they not been able to construct, but they have also not been even
paid any compensation for the same. As discussed hereinabove,
though Right to Property is no more a fundamental right, in view
of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, it is
a constitutional right. A person cannot be deprived of his property
without him being paid adequate compensation in accordance with
law for the same.
50. In the present case, it can clearly be seen that there is no delay
which can be attributed to the appellants in not getting compensation,
but it was on account of the lethargic attitude of the officers of the
State/KIADB that the appellants were deprived of compensation.
51. Only after the notices were issued in the contempt proceedings,
the compensation was determined by the SLAO on 22nd April 2019
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 227
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
taking guideline values prevailing in the year 2011 for determining
the market value of the acquired land.
52. No doubt that as already observed by us hereinabove, we do not
find any error in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court in holding that the SLAO could not have shifted
the date and it could have been done only by this Court in exercise
of powers under Article 32/142 of the Constitution of India or by the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However,
the learned Single Judge of the High Court instead of relegating the
appellants to again go through the rigors of determination by SLAO,
ought to have exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
to do complete justice. Even the Division Bench of the High Court
on a hyper technical ground has non-suited the appellants.
53. In that view of the matter, we find that it is a fit case wherein this
Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
should direct shifting of the date for determination of the market
value of the land in question of the appellants.
54. If the compensation to be awarded at the market value as of the
year 2003 is permitted, it would amount to permitting a travesty of
justice and making the constitutional provisions under Article 300-A
a mockery.
55. Since the State/KIADB was in deep slumber from 2003 to 2019 and
acted for the first time only after the notices were issued in contempt
proceedings, we find that though SLAO had no power to shift the
date for determination of market value, he had rightly done so. The
learned Single Judge of the High Court also does not say that the
determination of compensation to be awarded by shifting of the date
by the SLAO to that of 2011 was unjust but only sets aside the award
on the ground that SLAO had no jurisdiction to do so.
56. There is another reason for doing so. If on account of the inordinate
delay in paying the compensation and thereby depriving the
constitutional right to the appellants under Article 300-A, the land
acquisition proceedings are quashed, the only recourse available to
the State/KIADB in order to save the project will be to now issue a
fresh acquisition notification by invoking the provisions as applicable
under the 2013 LA Act which would entail huge expenditure to the
public exchequer.
228 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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57. We, therefore, in exercise of power of this Court under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India, find it appropriate in the interest of justice that
the SLAO be directed to determine the compensation to be awarded
to the appellants herein on the basis of the market value prevailing
as on 22nd April 2019. The appellants shall also be entitled to all the
statutory benefits as are available to them under the 1894 LA Act.
This shall be without prejudice to the rights/contentions of either
party, in case they make a reference before an appellate authority,
if they are so aggrieved by the fresh determination of compensation
by the SLAO. We further clarify that, any other award which may
have been passed pursuant to the directions of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court shall stand nullified by this judgment.
58. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 contend that they cannot be imposed with
a liability for this huge additional expenditure. It is their contention
that the delay in determination of compensation and payment of the
same is not attributable to them but is on account of inaction on the
part of the State and KIADB. We clarify that we are not observing
anything about the inter se dispute between the State and KIADB
on the one hand and Respondent Nos.6 and 7 on the other hand,
inasmuch as the same shall be governed by the FWA and/or any
other agreement between them. We only say that Respondent Nos.6
and 7, will be at liberty to take recourse to such remedies as are
available to them in law for redressal of their inter se dispute.
59. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the following terms:
(i) The judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court dated 22nd November 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 678
of 2022 (LA-KIADB) is quashed and set aside;
(ii) The writ petition filed by the appellants herein before the High
Court being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 is allowed;
(iii) The SLAO shall pass a fresh award taking the market value
prevailing as on 22nd April 2019 within a period of two months
from today after hearing the parties;
(iv) The appellants herein shall be entitled to all statutory benefits
as are available to them in law;
(v) The rights of parties to challenge the award in reference, if they
are aggrieved by it, shall remain open; and
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 229
Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others
(vi) As we have not expressed our opinion on the claims, if any,
of Respondent Nos.6 and 7 against the State/KIADB qua the
delay in passing the award by the SLAO, Respondent Nos. 6
and 7 are at liberty to take such steps as are permissible in
law in case they are aggrieved by the award to be passed by
the SLAO.
60. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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