BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA AND GOAversusRAJIV NARESHCHANDRA NARULA & ORS.

                [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1363 : 2025 INSC 1147

                Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa
                                 v.
                Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 12232 of 2025)
                              24 September 2025
               [Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to filing of frivolous complaint against two advocates
       before the Bar Council which took cognizance of the complaint and
       referred the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee for inquiry.

                                   Headnotes†
       Advocates Act, 1961 – s.35 – Punishment of advocates for
       misconduct – Complaint by one against an advocate alleging
       professional misconduct u/s.35, for his role in identifying the
       plaintiff in the consent terms of a civil suit – Judge-Advocate of
       the Bar Council took cognizance of the complaint and referred
       the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee for inquiry – In a
       writ petition, the High Court stayed the order passed by the
       appellant-Bar Council – Challenge to:
       Held: Existence of a jural relationship between the complainant
       and the advocate concerned is a precondition for the invocation
       of disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of “professional
       misconduct” – Since the respondent-advocate was not representing
       the complainant or his predecessor, no justification behind his
       arraignment in the complaint for alleged misconduct within the
       meaning of s.35 – There existed no professional relationship
       between the respondent-advocate and the complainant – His
       prosecution, as being the lawyer of the opposite party in the suit
       before the High Court, highly objectionable, totally impermissible,
       and absolutely uncalled for – Acts attributed to the advocate,
       taken on their face value, cannot be regarded as misconduct –
       Furthermore, recording of reasons to believe that the advocate has
       committed misconduct is a sine qua non before the complaint can be
       referred to the disciplinary committee for inquiry – Order passed by
       the Judge-Advocate, referring the complaint to the DC, is absolutely
       cryptic and laconic for it does not record any satisfaction to the
       effect that the respondent-advocate had committed misconduct

* Author
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    as provided u/s.35 – Order does not even make a bald reference
    to the gist of allegations as set out in the complaint and hence,
    suffers from total non-application of mind and does not satisfy the
    requirements of a valid reference order – In the absence of such
    prima facie satisfaction, the statutory requirement u/s.35 remains
    non-complied, and the order of reference is ex facie in teeth of
    s.35(1), thus, cannot be sustained – Also reference of a complaint
    to DC would have serious consequences on the professional
    career of the lawyer and could tarnish his image and standing in
    the profession – Complaint and all proceedings thereof, quashed
    and set aside – Cost of Rs.50,000/- imposed on the appellant-
    BCMG for entertaining the frivolous complaint and for dragging
    the respondent-advocate to this Court, which would be paid to
    the respondent-advocate. [Paras 32-41]

    Advocates Act, 1961 – s.35 – Punishment of advocates for
    misconduct – Complaint by one against an advocate alleging
    professional misconduct u/s.35, for identifying the deponent
    of the affidavit filed with the chamber summons, and in doing
    so, she purportedly attested to the correctness of the same
    which were found to be false – Appellant-Bar Council directed
    registration of the complaint and referring the same to the
    Disciplinary Committee for undertaking the inquiry – Writ
    petition by the advocate – High Court quashed the complaint –
    Correctness:
    Held: Finding recorded by the High Court that the mere act of
    identifying the deponent in an affidavit filed with the chamber
    summons would not make the advocate responsible for the contents
    of the affidavit, and the allegations set out in the complaint to
    be wholly absurd and untenable, perfectly justified and hence
    unassailable – An advocate, by mere attestation of the affidavit,
    does not become a privy to the contents of the affidavit – Hence,
    ex facie, the complaint filed by the petitioner against the respondent-
    advocate not only bereft of substance but also founded on malicious
    and spiteful insinuations directed against the advocate who merely
    identified the opposite party in an affidavit – Steps taken and order
    passed by the BCMG in directing registration of the complaint
    and in referring the same to the DC for undertaking the inquiry
    illegal on the face of the record, bordering on perversity – It is
    manifestly a case of malicious prosecution of the advocate at the
    behest of the opponent litigant – Impugned order passed by the
    High Court quashing the complaint in writ jurisdiction, does not,
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                             1365

                    Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                     Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

     ex facie, suffer from any infirmity – Complainant and, thereafter,
     the BCMG, caused immeasurable grief and harassment to the
     respondent-advocate – Cost of Rs.50,000/- each imposed on the
     complainant-petitioner, and the Bar Council, which would be paid
     to the respondent-advocate. [Paras 52-57]

                              Case Law Cited
     Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat (1980) Supp.
     SCC 318 - referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Advocates Act, 1961.

                              List of Keywords
     Filing of frivolous complaint against advocates; Bar Council;
     Disciplinary Committee for inquiry; Punishment of advocates for
     misconduct; Professional misconduct; Consent terms of a civil suit;
     Judge-Advocate of the Bar Council; Jural relationship between
     the complainant and the advocate; Professional relationship
     between the advocate and the complainant; Recording of reasons;
     Professional career of the lawyer; Tarnish advocate’s image and
     standing in the profession; Cost of Rs.50,000/-; Affidavit filed with
     the chamber summons; Attestation of affidavit.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 12232 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 04.11.2023 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay in WPL No. 23662 of 2023
     With
     SLP (C) No. 27727 of 2025, and SLP (C) No. 1492 of 2024

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     S.R Singh, Sr. Adv., Dr. Arvind S. Avhad, Rajat Kapoor, Sushil
     Sonkar, Nitin Jain, Yash Tiwari, Praveen Kumar Jha.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Chander Uday Singh, Prasenjit Keswani, Sr. Advs., Rohan Thawani,
     Ms. Pooja Dhar, Ms. Aakriti Vikas, Upmanyu Tewari.
1366                                                                  [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                               Judgment

       Mehta, J.

       Civil Appeal @ SLP (Civil) No (s). 27606 of 2023

1.     Heard.
2.     Leave granted.
3.     The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa1 is before us through this
       appeal by way of special leave assailing the interim order dated
       04th November, 2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
       Bombay2 in Writ Petition (L) No.23662 of 2023, staying the order
       dated 6th July, 2023, passed by the appellant-BCMG in Disciplinary
       Case No. 27 of 2023, which reads as below:
                                             “Exhibit – “A”
               •       After hearing the Complainant and Respondent
                       and after going through the document available on
                       record, according to me, Complainant has made out
                       a case by invoking Jurisdiction under Section 35 of
                       the Advocates Act;
               •       There is a prima facie case made out by the
                       Complainant against the Respondent. Hence, I pass
                       the following Order.

                                               || ORDER ||
                       Complaint is referred to D.C. for further inquiry and
                       disposal in accordance with law.
                                                              Ashish P. Deshmukh
                                                                           Judge
                                                                     06.07.2023”



1    Hereinafter, referred to as the “BCMG”.
2    Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                       1367

                        Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                         Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

4.     By the aforesaid order, the Judge-Advocate took cognizance of
       the complaint and directed reference thereof to the Disciplinary
       Committee3 of the Bar Council for inquiry against respondent No. 1,
       Shri Rajiv Narula4 for alleged professional misconduct referred to
       under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 19615.
5.     The complaint in question was filed by one Khimji Devji Parmar6
       against the respondent-advocate in the year 2022, alleging inter alia
       that he was an heir to one Devji Parmar, who during his lifetime was
       a partner of Dara Nariman Sarkari in a firm functioning in the name
       and style of M/s. Volga Enterprises. Shri Devji Parmar expired in
       the year 2009, on which the complainant inherited his assets and
       liabilities.
6.     The complainant set up a case that one Nusli Randelia was the
       owner of a piece of land bearing CTS Nos. 433 and 438, Old Survey
       No. 30 Hissa No. 4 (P) in Village Valnai, Taluka Malad which he
       leased out to Dara Nariman Sarkari.
7.     Nusli Randelia had also entered into a development agreement with
       the firm M/s. Volga Enterprises, in which Shri Devji Parmar was a
       partner, and in that capacity, he was in possession of the property. A
       suit was instituted by Dara Nariman Sarkari bearing Suit No. 1129 of
       1987 in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, in relation to the above
       land wherein an injunction was granted against Nusli Randelia, as
       well as M/s. Unique Construction, which was also asserting title to
       the suit property.
8.     The suit was dismissed for default on account of the fact that Dara
       Nariman Sarkari had already been impleaded as a party-defendant
       (defendant No. 2) in another similar suit bearing No. 2541 of 1985,
       instituted by M/s Unique Construction, pending before the High
       Court, wherein his rights would be adjudicated. The complainant
       claimed that his father always confided in him that the suit No.2541
       of 1985 was pending, wherein he had the right, title, and interest in
       the capacity of a partner of M/s. Volga Enterprises.



3    For short, “DC”.
4    Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”
5    For short, “the 1961 Act”.
6    Hereinafter, referred to as the “complainant”.
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9.   Shri Devji Parmar, the complainant’s father passed away in 2009,
     upon which he made enquiries about the stage and status of the
     suit, and was shocked to find out that the same had been disposed
     of as settled on Consent Terms. Thereafter, he tried to approach
     Dara Nariman Sarkari, but despite best efforts, he could not trace
     him at his last known address. The complainant also made efforts
     to locate Nusli Randelia, but without any success. Thereupon,
     the complainant contacted his father’s advocate and collected the
     documents pertaining to the suit in question and on a perusal thereof,
     he came to know that M/s. Unique Construction – the plaintiff therein,
     and Nusli Randelia – defendant No. 1, had obtained a consent
     decree without the knowledge and consent of defendant No. 2, i.e.,
     Dara Nariman Sarkari. The complainant continued to search for the
     whereabouts of Dara Nariman Sarkari and eventually came to know
     that he had passed away.
10. As per the complainant, his father was a partner with Dara Nariman
    Sarkari in M/s. Volga Enterprises and, hence, upon the death of
    Dara Nariman Sarkari in 1991, his father, Devji Parmar, became
    entitled to pursue and protect all the rights of the partnership firm
    as the sole surviving partner. Consequent upon the death of Devji
    Parmar, the complainant, along with other heirs of Devji Parmar,
    inherited such rights.
11. The complainant further alleged that during the pendency of the suit,
    there was a sudden change of advocate representing Nusli Randelia.
    One Ms. Sheetal D. Mishra, Advocate (respondent No. 3), filed a
    Vakalatnama on 6th June, 2005, on behalf of Nusli Randelia without
    obtaining a “no-objection” from the erstwhile advocate. Immediately
    upon the Vakalatnama being filed, Consent Terms were arrived at
    between M/s. Unique Construction and Nusli Randelia in the said
    suit, which act was without the knowledge of the erstwhile advocate
    on record, who was personally knowing Nusli Randelia. A consent
    decree was obtained without intimating Dara Sarkari or obtaining
    his signatures on the said Consent Terms.
12. As per the complainant, the respondent-advocate suppressed the
    material fact from the High Court that Dara Nariman Sarkari was a
    party to the suit and that he had not affixed his signatures on the
    Consent Terms. This deliberate omission on part of the Advocate
    representing M/s. Unique Construction, the plaintiff in the suit,
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                     1369

                    Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                     Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

     tantamounted to concealment of material fact whereby the legal
     representatives of Dara Nariman Sarkari and Devji Parmar were
     defrauded and deprived of their rightful share in the suit property.
13. The complainant further averred that the Consent Terms had been
    prepared and filed in the Court without recognition of the rights of
    Dara Nariman Sarkari and M/s. Volga Enterprises in the suit property.
    He also apprehended that the consideration stipulated in the Consent
    Terms never passed on to Nusli Randelia, who might even have
    been impersonated before the Court, and his signatures may also
    be forged and fabricated.
14. According to the complainant, someone other than Nusli Randelia
    may have appeared before the Court to execute the Consent Terms,
    or in all probability, coercion was practiced upon Nusli Randelia, who
    was induced and pressurised to sign the Consent Terms without
    consideration. The complainant also conjectured that Nusli Randelia
    might have been abducted and murdered, as there was neither any
    trace of him nor was any death certificate available.
15. The complainant further alleged that the Advocates arraigned in
    the complaint were complicit to the crime as they were the direct
    beneficiaries of the fraudulent transactions. Based on this complaint,
    the Judge-Advocate of the BCMG proceeded to pass the order dated
    6th July, 2023, reproduced supra.
16. The respondent, Shri Rajiv Narula, filed an affidavit-in-reply to the
    disciplinary complaint, setting up a case that the complaint had
    been filed by suppressing material facts. Various other litigations
    filed by Nusli Randelia in respect of the land in question had been
    decided against him, and having lost in all the legal proceedings,
    Nusli Randelia forged a document purporting to create some rights
    in favour of Dara Sarkari so as to frustrate the Court orders/decrees.
17. Upon coming to know of this fraud, M/s. Unique Construction took
    out a Notice of Motion No. 2903 of 1987, for impounding all the
    documents which they claimed had been fabricated by Nusli Randelia.
18. Consequently, the High Court directed the impounding of all documents
    sought to be relied upon by Nusli Randelia. During the pendency of
    the subject suit before the High Court, negotiations ensued, pursuant
    whereto the disputes were settled and Consent Terms were drawn
    up, under which Nusli Randelia confirmed that he had no right, title,
1370                                                         [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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     or interest in respect of the suit property. Accordingly, the High Court
     accepted the Consent Terms, discharged the receiver appointed on
     the said property, and directed that possession be handed over to
     M/s. Unique Construction.
19. Learned counsel representing the appellant-Bar Council, vehemently
    and fervently contended that the challenge laid to the cognizance order
    was premature and the High Court ought not to have entertained the
    writ petition filed by the respondent-advocate against the interlocutory
    order of reference passed by the Judge-Advocate of the Bar Council
    on the valid complaint filed by Khimji Devji Parmar.
20. It was submitted that at the stage of taking cognizance of a complaint,
    detailed reasons are not required, and a prima facie finding in the
    reference order that there are grounds to proceed against the advocate
    for misconduct would be sufficient for reference of the complaint to
    the DC. Furthermore, the orders passed by the State Bar Council
    are amenable to challenge before the Bar Council of India.
21. He thus urged that the High Court committed patent jurisdictional
    error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondent-advocate
    against the reference order and granting a stay on the proceedings
    before the DC.
22. Per contra, learned counsel representing the respondent-advocate
    fervently contended that the complaint filed by Shri Khimji Devji
    Parmar is, ex facie, mala fide and malicious.
23. The respondent had admittedly not represented the complainant
    and thus, entertaining a complaint filed against the advocate of the
    opposite party is nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law.
24. It was submitted that till date, there is no order recalling or rescinding
    the disputed consent terms recorded in the original suit proceedings,
    and thus, the complaint lacks foundation. Hence, the High Court
    was justified in entertaining the writ petition and granting a stay on
    further proceedings.
25. It was further urged that the order dated 6th July, 2023, whereby the
    complaint was referred to the DC, does not refer to even the barest
    of allegations set out in the complaint filed against the respondent-
    advocate, and only a cryptic satisfaction has been recorded that
    the complainant has made out a case for invoking jurisdiction under
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      1371

                    Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                     Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

     Section 35 of the 1961 Act. When a regulatory body like the Bar
     Council intends to proceed for professional misconduct against an
     enrolled advocate, then it is essential that at least a bare minimum
     discussion of allegations set out in the complaint is made before
     referring the complaint to the DC.
26. On these grounds, learned counsel representing the respondent-
    advocate implored the court to quash the entire proceedings of the
    DC pending before the Bar Council and to dismiss the appeal.
27. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material
    available on record.
28. As the present matter arises from an interim order, under normal
    circumstances, rather than entertaining this Special Leave Petition,
    we would have relegated the parties to pursue the pending writ
    petition before the High Court. However, upon going through the
    pleadings filed by the parties, the materials placed on record, and
    more particularly, the stark and glaring facts set out in the counter-
    affidavit filed by the respondent-advocate, who was sought to be
    prosecuted before the BCMG, this Court is persuaded to invoke its
    jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India for quashing
    the proceedings of the complaint as a whole.
29. It is an admitted case of the parties that the respondent-advocate
    never represented Nusli Randelia, Dara Sarkari, or M/s. Volga
    Enterprises in the suit before the High Court. The respondent-advocate
    had simply identified the plaintiff being the authorized representative
    of M/s. Unique Construction in the Consent Terms, which stand
    undisturbed to date. Thus, by mere identification of the plaintiff, the
    respondent-advocate cannot be held liable to face proceedings under
    Section 35 of the 1961 Act.
30. Indisputably, the Consent Terms taken on record by the High Court
    continue to hold good and have not been recalled or rescinded.
    The role assigned to the respondent-advocate was of identifying the
    plaintiff in these very consent terms. We are, therefore, of the firm
    opinion that no one can be allowed to raise an issue questioning
    the Consent Terms that were arrived at between the plaintiff and
    the defendants.
31. Devji Parmar was not a party to the suit. Had there been any
    semblance of a right or claim of Devji Parmar in the suit property,
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     Nusli Randelia would definitely have sought his impleadment in the
     suit. Not only this, Nusli Randelia never projected that the so-called
     firm M/s. Volga Enterprises had any role to play in the dispute over
     the suit premises.
32. Since the respondent-advocate was not representing the complainant
    or his predecessor Devji Parmar, there was no justification behind
    his arraignment in the complaint for alleged misconduct within the
    meaning of Section 35 of the 1961 Act.
33. We say so for the reason that there existed no professional
    relationship between the respondent-advocate and the complainant.
    His prosecution, as being the lawyer of the opposite party in the suit
    before the High Court, was highly objectionable, totally impermissible,
    and absolutely uncalled for. Ordinarily, the existence of a jural
    relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned
    is a precondition for the invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction on the
    ground of “professional misconduct”.
34. We are of the considered opinion that even if the respondent-advocate
    had actually represented and pleaded the case of the plaintiff-M/s.
    Unique Construction in the suit and had not merely identified the
    plaintiff; that act in isolation could not be termed as misconduct within
    the meaning of Section 35 of the 1961 Act because the acts attributed
    to the advocate, taken on their face value, cannot be regarded as
    misconduct, professional or otherwise.
35. The scheme of Section 35 of the 1961 Act exposits that where a
    complaint is received from the State Bar Council, it must record its
    reasons to believe that any Advocate on its roll has been guilty of
    professional or other misconduct, and only thereafter can the matter
    be referred for disposal to the DC. For ready reference, Section 35
    of the Act is quoted hereinbelow: -
          “35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct. ―(1)
          Where, on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, a State Bar
          Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll
          has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall
          refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
          [(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion
          or on application made to it by any person interested,
          withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                              1373

                    Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                     Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

            committee and direct the inquiry to be made by any other
            disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council.]
            (2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council 4
            shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause
            a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned
            and to the Advocate-General of the State.
            (3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council
            after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate-
            General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of
            the following orders, namely:― (a) dismiss the complaint
            or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of
            the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed;
            (b) reprimand the advocate; (c) suspend the advocate from
            practice for such period as it may deem fit; (d) remove the
            name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
            (4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under
            clause (c) of sub-section (3), he shall, during the period
            of suspension, be debarred from practising in any court
            or before any authority or person in India.
            (5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General
            under sub-section (2), the Advocate-General may appear
            before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
            either in person or through any advocate appearing on
            his behalf.
            [Explanation. ―In this section, [section 37 and section 38],
            the expressions “Advocate-General” and “Advocate-
            General of the State” shall, in relation to the Union territory
            of Delhi, mean the Additional Solicitor General of India.]
                                                    (Emphasis supplied)

36. It would be apposite here to refer to the following observations
    made by this Court in Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of
    Gujarat7, whereby, the State Bar Council’s referral of the complaint
    to the Disciplinary Committee was set aside, for it did not contain
    reasons for the satisfaction of a prima facie case: -


7   (1980) Supp. SCC 318.
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          “It is apparent that a State Bar Council not only receives
          a complaint but is required to apply its mind to find
          out whether there is any reason to believe that any
          advocate has been guilty of professional or other
          misconduct. The Bar Council of a State acts on that
          reasoned belief....
          ...The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional
          code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and
          privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity
          of the profession.
          ... the function of the Bar Council in entertaining
          complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council
          has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of
          misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted
          with such inquiry....”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

37. Thus, recording of reasons to believe that the advocate has committed
    misconduct is a sine qua non before the complaint can be referred
    to the disciplinary committee for inquiry.
38. In the present case, the order passed supra by the Judge-Advocate,
    referring the complaint to the DC, is absolutely cryptic and laconic for
    it does not record any satisfaction to the effect that the respondent-
    advocate had committed misconduct as provided under Section 35
    of the 1961 Act. The order dated 6th July, 2023, does not even
    make a bald reference to the gist of allegations as set out in the
    complaint and hence, the same suffers from total non-application
    of mind. Reference of a complaint of the DC would have serious
    consequences on the professional career of the lawyer and could
    tarnish his image and standing in the profession. Hence a cryptic
    order referring the complaint to the DC without a bare minimum
    discussion of the allegations contained in the complaint would not
    satisfy the requirements of a valid reference order.
39. In the absence of such prima facie satisfaction, the statutory
    requirement under Section 35 remains non-complied, and the order
    of reference is ex facie in teeth of Section 35(1) of the 1961 Act.
    Hence, the same cannot be sustained.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      1375

                       Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                        Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

40. Resultantly, the Complaint No. 27 of 2023 filed by the complainant,
    before BCMG and all proceedings sought to be undertaken in
    furtherance thereof, are hereby quashed and set aside. The pending
    writ petition before the High Court shall stand closed.
41. Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) is imposed on
    the appellant-BCMG for entertaining the frivolous complaint and for
    dragging the respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula to this Court.
    The said cost shall be deposited with the Registry of the Bombay
    High Court within a period of four weeks from today, and thereafter,
    be paid to the respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula.
42. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms.
43. All Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

     SLP (CIVIL) NO (s). of 2025
                              (Diary No(s). 38238 of 2023)
     SLP (CIVIL) NO (S). 1492 OF 2024

44. Delay condoned.
45. These matters are heard along with the above matter, as the legal
    issues raised are common. However, since the factual matrix is
    distinct, we proceed to note the facts of the connected case separately.
46. Both these special leave petitions arise from the Order dated 9th
    August, 2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
    Writ Petition (L) No. 7383 of 2023. By the impugned order, the High
    Court allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1-Ms. Geeta
    Ramanugrah Shastri8, a practicing advocate, and quashed the
    order-cum-report dated 20th September, 2020, and proceedings
    of Disciplinary Case No. 264 of 2017 registered with the BCMG
    (petitioner in SLP (C) No.1492 of 2024).
47. The pith and substance of the allegations set out in the complaint filed
    by Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad9 (petitioner in SLP (C) Diary No. 38238
    of 2023) was that there was a dispute between him and Ismail Yusuf
    Junior College, a State Government Educational Institution, where


8   Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”.
9   Hereinafter, referred to as the “Complainant”.
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     he used to serve as a Lecturer. His services were terminated by the
     college with effect from 1st December, 1993. Thereafter, Shri Bhakad
     commenced practice as an advocate.
48. He instituted suit No. 1204 of 1995 against the college by invoking
    the Original Jurisdiction of the High Court seeking damages to the
    tune of Rs. 43 lakhs from the college. Owing to an increase in the
    pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was transferred from the High Court
    to the City Civil Court, Bombay.
49. The college thereafter filed a chamber summons in the suit seeking
    amendment of its written statement. Certain documents were annexed
    with the chamber summons, which were supported by an affidavit.
50. It is alleged that the advocate on record, Shri N.P. Pandit certified the
    documents filed with the chamber summons as true copies. As per
    the complainant, the respondent-advocate identified the deponent of
    the affidavit filed with the chamber summons, and in doing so, she
    purportedly attested to the correctness of the contents of that affidavit
    and the chamber summons as being of her personal knowledge.
    As per the complainant, the statements set out in the affidavit were
    ultimately found to be false and, therefore, the respondent-advocate,
    by subscribing to the affidavit, had lent support to the false recitals
    and made a false deposition based on the contents of the affidavit.
51. The gravamen of the case, as set out in the complaint, was that
    the respondent-advocate could not have identified signatures of
    the deponent without assuming responsibility for the correctness
    of the statements contained in the body of the affidavit. As per the
    complainant, the deponent of the affidavit made incorrect statements
    and filed false documents, and thus, the advocate who identified the
    deponent by appending signatures on the same would be equally
    responsible for the offences of forgery, perjury, or cheating.
52. The respondent-advocate filed the subject writ petition before the
    High Court, and the High Court, upon consideration of the material
    available on record, held that the respondent-advocate at no point of
    time had sworn any affidavit in the suit, motion, interim application,
    or the chamber summons. The mere act of identifying the deponent
    in an affidavit filed with the chamber summons would not make the
    advocate responsible for the contents of the affidavit. Upon overall
    appreciation of the materials placed on record, the High Court found the
    allegations set out in the complaint to be wholly absurd and untenable.
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                       1377

                    Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v.
                     Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula & Ors.

53. In our considered view, the said finding recorded by the High Court
    is perfectly justified and hence unassailable. An advocate, by mere
    attestation of the affidavit, does not become a privy to the contents
    of the affidavit. Hence, ex facie, the complaint filed by the petitioner,
    Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad, against the respondent-advocate was
    not only bereft of substance but was also founded on malicious
    and spiteful insinuations directed against the advocate who merely
    identified the opposite party in an affidavit.
54. The steps taken and order passed by the BCMG in directing
    registration of the complaint and in referring the same to the DC for
    undertaking the inquiry were illegal on the face of the record, bordering
    on perversity. It is manifestly a case of malicious prosecution of the
    advocate at the behest of the opponent litigant.
55. The impugned order dated 9th August, 2023, passed by the High
    Court quashing the complaint in writ jurisdiction, does not, ex facie,
    suffer from any infirmity. The complainant and, thereafter, the BCMG,
    have caused immeasurable grief and harassment to the respondent-
    advocate.
56. Thus, both the special leave petitions are devoid of merit and are
    dismissed as such.
57. Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) each is imposed
    on the complainant-petitioner Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad, and the
    BCMG. The said cost shall be deposited with the Registry of the
    Bombay High Court within a period of four weeks from today, from
    where the same shall be paid to the respondent-advocate Ms. Geeta
    Ramanugrah Shastri.
58. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Matters disposed of.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain