ARUN BHATIYAversusHDFC BANK & ORS.

                         [2022] 7 S.C.R. 91                              91


                         ARUN BHATIYA                                    A
                                  v.
                       HDFC BANK & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 5204-5205 of 2022)
                         AUGUST 08, 2022                                 B
        [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
                 A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]
       Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Deficiency of service by
bank – Allegation of – Appellant and his father, opened a joint
                                                                         C
Fixed Deposit – The essence of the complaint of the appellant was
that there was a deficiency on the part of the respondent bank in
proceeding to credit the proceeds of a joint FD exclusively to the
account of his father – The State Consumer Dispute Redressal
Commission (SCDRC), declined to entertain the complaint on the
ground that the dispute essentially was between the appellant and        D
his father and did not fulfill the description of a consumer dispute –
SCDRC was of the view that only a civil court was competent to
deal with such a dispute – Appeal was dismissed by the NCDRC –
On appeal, held: A person who avails of any service from a bank
will fall under the purview of the definition of a ‘consumer’ under
                                                                         E
the 1986 Act – As a consequence, it would be open to such a
consumer to seek recourse to the remedies provided under the 1986
Act – There was a manifest error on the part of the SCDRC in declining
to entertain the consumer complaint on merits – The SCDRC had no
justification to relegate the appellant to pursue his claim before a
civil court – The appellant did not, in the proceedings before the       F
SCDRC, raise any claim against his father – Therefore, the SCDRC
was wrong deducing that there was dispute between appellant and
his father – The order of the NCDRC is set aside.
      Allowing the appeals, this Court
      HELD: 1. The present case arises under the 1986 Act,               G
which was enacted to protect the welfare and interest of
consumers. The respondent bank does not dispute that the
appellant, along with his father, opened a joint FD with the bank.
A person who avails of any service from a bank will fall under the
purview of the definition of a ‘consumer’ under the 1986 Act. As         H
                                 91
92            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A    a consequence, it would be open to such a consumer to seek
     recourse to the remedies provided under the 1986 Act. There
     was a manifest error on the part of the SCDRC in declining to
     entertain the consumer complaint on merits. Whether the
     appellant is able to establish his case is a matter which has to be
     decided within the parameters of law as it emerges from the
B
     provisions of the 1986 Act. The essence of the complaint of the
     appellant is that there was a deficiency on the part of the
     respondent bank in proceeding to credit the proceeds of a joint
     FD exclusively to the account of his father. The SCDRC ought to
     have determined whether the complaint related to deficiency of
C    service as defined under the 1986 Act. The SCDRC had no
     justification to relegate the appellant to pursue his claim before a
     civil court. The appellant did not, in the proceedings before the
     SCDRC, raise any claim against his father. Therefore, the SCDRC
     was wrong deducing that there was dispute between appellant
     and his father. Assuming that there was a dispute between the
D
     appellant and his father, that was not the subject matter of the
     consumer complaint. The complaint that there was a deficiency of
     service was against the bank. [Paras 14, 19 & 20][97-B-C; 99-C-
     G]
           Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Sanjay
E          Shankarsa Mamarde (2010) 7 SCC 489 : [2010] 8 SCR
           358; Vodafone Idea Cellular Limited v. Ajay Kumar
           Agarwal (2022) 6 SCC 496 : 2022 (3 ) JT 95 – referred
           to.
                            Case Law Reference
F
     [2010] 8 SCR 358                   referred to           Para 16
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5204-
     5205 of 2022.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2019 of the National
G    Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Review
     Application No. 221 of 2019 in First Appeal No. 2262 of 2018 and Order
     dated 07.05.2019 in First Appeal No. 2262 of 2018.
           Kushagra Pandey, Ms. Ankita Gupta, M. Shaz Khan, Harsh Kedia,

H
             ARUN BHATIYA v. HDFC BANK & ORS.                                  93


Talha Abdul Rahman, Advs. for the Appellant.                                   A
      Arvind Nayar, Sr. Adv., Devmani Bansal, Vikas Kumar, Manish
Paliwal, Manoj Rajpoot, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.                                          B
      1. Leave granted.
      2. The appeals arise from two orders of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission1, namely, (i) an order dated 7 May 2019
by which the NCDRC dismissed the appeal as withdrawn with liberty to
approach the appropriate forum on the request of the counsel for the           C
appellant; and (ii) an order dated 25 July 2019 of the NCDRC dismissing
the application for review.
       3. The appellant instituted a consumer complaint before the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission2 at Lucknow. The case of
the appellant was that he and his father, the fourth respondent, opened a      D
joint Fixed Deposit3 account on 7 January 2016, at the Agra Branch of
the first respondent4. The FD was in the amount of INR 75 lakhs for a
period of 145 days, interest being payable at the rate of 7.5% per annum.
The amount of the FD on maturity was INR 77 lakhs. According to the
appellant, on 31 May 2016, the appellant and his father jointly gave written
                                                                               E
instructions to the respondent bank to renew the joint FD for ten days,
while retaining the joint mode of operation.
       4. On 1 June 2016, appellant’s father travelled to Surat to stay
with his other son, the appellant’s elder brother. The appellant alleges
that on 2 June 2016, his father submitted a letter to the Manager of the
                                                                               F
respondent bank at its Adajan Branch, Surat requesting encashment of
the entire FD amount of INR 77 lakhs to his (the father’s) individual
savings account at Agra. On 3 June 2016, the appellant wrote to the
respondent bank with instructions to not transfer the FD amount to any
individual bank account. However, contrary to the instructions, the
proceeds of the FD were credited to the account of the appellant’s father.     G
On 4 June 2016, the appellant received an email from the respondent

1
  “NCDRC”
2
  “SCDRC”
3
  “FD”
4
  “Respondent bank”                                                            H
94               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A    bank stating that they had credited INR 77 lakhs to the appellant’s
     account. However, the appellant alleges that no such amount was credited
     to his account.
            5. The appellant moved a consumer complaint on the allegation
     that there was a deficiency of service by the respondent bank. The
B    SCDRC, by its judgment dated 24 October 2018, declined to entertain
     the complaint on the ground that the dispute essentially was between the
     appellant and his father and did not fulfill the description of a consumer
     dispute. During the course of its judgment, the SCDRC held that from
     the statement made by both the parties, it was evident that the amount
     had been deposited jointly in the name of the appellant and his father for
C    a period of 145 days, the maturity date being 31 May 2016. While the
     case of the appellant was that upon the maturity of the FD, both the
     appellant and his father had jointly issued a direction to the bank for
     renewing it for a period of ten days, the bank claimed that the FD amount
     was credited to the account of appellant’s father on the request made by
D    the appellant’s father on 31 May 2016. The SCDRC noted the submission
     of the appellant that since the FD amount was deposited in the joint
     name of the appellant and his father, it could not be credited solely into
     the account of the father. The SCDRC was of the view that the dispute
     was primarily between the appellant and his father on the issue of the
     FD amount deposited, and therefore only a civil court was competent to
E    deal with such a dispute. Having recorded the rival submissions, the
     SCDRC relegated the appellant to the remedy of a civil suit before the
     competent forum.
           6. The appellant instituted an appeal against the decision of the
     SCDRC under section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 19865 (as it
F    was then in operation). The appeal which was filed before the NCDRC
     was disposed of on 7 May 2019, in terms of the following order:
             “After some arguments, counsel for the appellant, upon instructions,
             seeks to withdraw the present appeal, with liberty to approach
             the appropriate Forum.
G
             Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to
             the appellant to approach the appropriate Forum.”
           7. The appellant then filed a review application along with an
     affidavit stating that he was present before the NCDRC and had not
     5
H        “1986 Act”
            ARUN BHATIYA v. HDFC BANK & ORS.                                   95
           [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

furnished any instructions to the counsel to withdraw the appeal. The          A
appellant also alleged that the previous counsel had only provided a
truncated copy of the FD document without the reverse, which contained
the terms and conditions of the FD. The application for review has been
rejected on 25 July 2019. The observations of the NCDRC are extracted
below:
                                                                               B
      “It is not at all the case that the impugned order under review had
      been passed because the FD produced was in a truncated form
      or any such fact. The order under review is crystal clear in that it
      had only allowed the counsel for the appellant to withdraw the
      present appeal with liberty to approach the appropriate forum. It
      is also clear from the order that this was done after some arguments     C
      in respect of the appeal had been heard.
      It is as well to mention that earlier, it had been noted in the
      Commission’s order dated 8.1.2019 that there was an issue of
      maintainability of this complaint, as it appeared to be father-son
      dispute and was therefore not in the nature of consumer complaint        D
      for the Consumer Fora.
      In view of the above, I see no reason to review the order dated
      7.5.2019. This review Application No. 221 of 2019 alongwith I.A.
      No. 11513 of 2019 are accordingly dismissed.”
                                                                               E
      8. We have heard Mr Kushagra Pandey, counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant and Mr Arvind Nayar, senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 to 3.
       9. Having set out the rival cases in the manner in which the
consumer complaint was considered by the SCDRC, it becomes apparent            F
that the appellant’s complaint is that there is a deficiency of service on
the part of the respondent bank. Essentially, the case of the appellant is
that:
      (i) The FD was in the joint names of the appellant and his father;
      (ii) Upon the FD maturing for payment, a request was jointly made        G
      at the Agra Branch of the respondent bank for renewing it for ten
      days; and
      (iii) The Bank was not justified in law in entertaining the unilateral
      request of his father for crediting the proceeds to his account.
       On this basis, it has been submitted that there is a clear deficiency   H
of service on the part of the respondent bank.
96             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A           10. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has adverted to
     a communication which was addressed by the appellant to the respondent
     bank, which was received by the bank at 9.35 am on 3 June 2016. By his
     communication, the appellant stated that since the FD representing the
     amount of INR 77 lakhs was to be renewed in terms of the request
     which was submitted on 31 May 2016, the respondent bank ought not to
B
     act on contrary instructions since the amount belonged jointly to the
     appellant and his father. Through the said communication, the appellant
     also instructed the bank to not transfer the FD amount to any single-
     person account. However, it has been submitted that, on 4 June 2016,
     the bank addressed an email to the appellant, in response to the
C    communication dated 3 June 2016 of the appellant, stating that the amount
     of INR 77 lakhs had been credited on 4 June 2016 to the account of the
     appellant. The appellant submits that the statement that the amount was
     credited to his account was palpably incorrect since the money was
     credited in the account of his father contrary to the instructions which
     were jointly issued on 31 May 2016.
D
            11. In a counter filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, it was averred
     that the joint FD in the name of the appellant and his father of INR 75
     lakhs was redeemed on 31 May 2016 and an amount of INR 77 lakhs
     was credited on 31 May 2016 in the account of appellant’s father. It was
     averred that thereafter the appellant approached the respondent bank
E    with a request signed by his father for creating another FD of INR 77
     lakhs. Further, the appellant allegedly informed the respondent bank that
     his father could not have visited the bank personally due to old age and
     ill-health. Based on the representation made by appellant, the respondent
     bank put the FD request in process and debited INR 77 lakhs from the
F    account of appellant’s father. Upon becoming aware of this, appellant’s
     father approached respondent bank with instructions to not book the FD
     request and credit the said amount in his account for his personal use.
     Respondent 1 to 3 allege that the appellant misrepresented the age and
     health of his father to booked the second FD. Therefore, the respondent
     bank credited back INR 77 lakhs in the account of appellant’s father.
G
            12. Respondents 1 to 3 seek to controvert the correctness of the
     claim of the appellant. However, at this stage, the narrow issue before
     the Court is as to whether the consumer complaint was correctly disposed
     of by the SCDRC without going into the merits of the claim of a deficiency
     of service on the ground that the appropriate remedy of the appellant
H    would lie before the civil court.
             ARUN BHATIYA v. HDFC BANK & ORS.                                     97
            [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       13. The main contention of the appellant is that the premature             A
encashment of the FD by respondent bank is in contravention of the
terms and conditions of the joint FD and would amount to a deficiency
of service under Section 2(1)(g) of the 1986 Act. At this point, it is
pertinent to enumerate the relevant terms and conditions relating to the
joint FD:
                                                                                  B
       “In the case of premature encashment, all signatories to the deposit
       must sign the encashment instruction.”
       14. The present case arises under the 1986 Act, which was
enacted to protect the welfare and interest of consumers. It will be
helpful to look at the specific provisions of law relied upon by the appellant.   C
The relevant provision, namely, section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the 1986, reads as
under:
       “(d) “consumer” means any person who, -
       (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has
       been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under         D
       any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of
       such services other than the person who hires or avails of the
       services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and
       partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when
       such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned      E
       person but does not include a person who avails of such services
       for any commercial purposes.
       Explanation – For the purposes of this clause, “commercial
       purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought and
       used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the                F
       purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment”
       15. Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines
‘deficiency’ as:
       “(g) “deficiency” means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming, or
       inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which          G
       is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time
       being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person
       in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;”
      16. A two-judge bench of this Court consisting of Justice D K
Jain and Justice H L Dattu (as the Chief Justice was then) in                     H
98               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A    Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Sanjay Shankarsa
     Mamarde6 observed that the scope of ‘deficiency’ as defined under
     clause 2(1)(g) of the 1986 Act is wide and is to be determined on the
     basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The court
     observed:
B             “20. It is manifest from the language employed in the clause that
              its scope is also very wide but no single test as decisive in the
              determination of the extent of fault, imperfection, nature and
              manner of performance, etc. required to be maintained can be
              laid down. It must depend on the facts of the particular case,
              having regard to the nature of the “service” to be provided.”
C
            17. The expression ‘service’ has been defined in Section 2(1)(o)
     of the 1986 Act as follows:
              (o) “service” means service of any description which is made
              available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the
D             provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing,
              insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy,
              board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment,
              amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but
              does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or
              under a contract of personal service;
E
           18. A bench of this Court in Vodafone Idea Cellular Limited v.
     Ajay Kumar Agarwal7 (of which one of us, Dr Justice DY Chandrachud,
     was part) explained that service of every description will fall within the
     ambit of the definition of ‘services’ under section 2(1)(o) of the 1986
     Act. The relevant extract reads as follows:
F
              “12. The definition of the expression “service” is couched in wide
              terms. The width of statutory language emerges from the manner
              in which the definition is cast. Parliament has used the expression
              “service of any description which is made available to potential
              users”. The definition employs the “means and includes formula”.
G             The means part of the definition incorporates service of “any”
              description. The inclusive part incorporates services by way of
              illustration, such as facilities in connection with banking, finance,
              insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical and other
     6
         (2010) 7 SCC 489
     7
H        (2022) 6 SCC 496.
            ARUN BHATIYA v. HDFC BANK & ORS.                                    99
           [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

      energy, board or lodging and housing construction. The inclusive          A
      part is prefaced by the clarification that the services which are
      specified are not exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression
      “but not limited to”. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the
      rendering of any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a
      contract of personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion
                                                                                B
      only to two specified categories. The initial part of the definition
      however makes it abundantly clear that the expression “service”
      is defined to mean service of any description. In other words, a
      service of every description would fall within the ambit of the
      statutory provision.”
      19. The respondent bank does not dispute that the appellant, along        C
with his father, opened a joint FD with the bank. A person who avails of
any service from a bank will fall under the purview of the definition of
a ‘consumer’ under the 1986 Act. As a consequence, it would be open
to such a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies provided under the
1986 Act.                                                                       D
       20. There was a manifest error on the part of the SCDRC in
declining to entertain the consumer complaint on merits. Whether the
appellant is able to establish his case is a matter which has to be decided
within the parameters of law as it emerges from the provisions of the
1986 Act. The essence of the complaint of the appellant is that there           E
was a deficiency on the part of the respondent bank in proceeding to
credit the proceeds of a joint FD exclusively to the account of his father.
The SCDRC ought to have determined whether the complaint related to
deficiency of service as defined under the 1986 Act. The SCDRC had
no justification to relegate the appellant to pursue his claim before a civil
court. The appellant did not, in the proceedings before the SCDRC,              F
raise any claim against his father. Therefore, the SCDRC was wrong
deducing that there was dispute between appellant and his father.
Assuming that there was a dispute between the appellant and his father,
that was not the subject matter of the consumer complaint. The complaint
that there was a deficiency of service was against the bank.                    G
       21. The appellant instituted an application for review before the
NCDRC categorically stating on affidavit that he had not furnished
instructions to his counsel to apply for withdrawal of the appeal. In this
view of the matter, the NCDRC ought to have entertained the review
and should have set down the appeal for hearing. The NCDRC having               H
failed to do so, we pass the following order:
100              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A            (i) The orders of the NCDRC dated 7 May 2019 and 25 July
                 2019 are set aside. First Appeal No 2262 of 2018 is restored
                 to the file of the NCDRC; and
             (ii) Since the consumer complaint was instituted before the
                  SCDRC in 2016, the entirety of the dispute shall be resolved
B                 on merits by the NCDRC.
             (iii) All the rights and contentions of the parties, including the
                   defence of the appellant on merits, are kept open;
             (iv) The appellant would be at liberty to file an additional affidavit
                  setting out any further defence it has, within a period of four
C                 weeks;
             (v) The NCDRC shall dispose of the appeal within a period of
                 four months of the date on which a certified copy is placed
                 on the record.

D            (vi) Save and except for holding that the consumer complaint is
                  maintainable, no observation has been made by this Court on
                  the merits of the rival contentions.
             22. The appeals are allowed in the above terms.
             23. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
E


      Ankit Gyan                                                    Appeals allowed.
      (Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)


F




G




H