Holding

The conviction under Section 304 Part I is altered to Section 304 Part II because the appellant possessed only knowledge that the injury was likely to cause death, not the intention required for murder.

Summary

The appellant, an agriculturist, struck the deceased with a hoe during a verbal altercation over a pathway, causing a head injury that led to death. The trial court convicted him of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I and sentenced him to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The High Court affirmed this conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the appellant's mental state amounted to "guilty intention" (murder) or merely "guilty knowledge" (culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II), focusing on the nature of the weapon, the single injury inflicted, and the lack of pre‑meditation. It held that the appellant could only be said to have known the injury was likely to cause death, not intended it, and therefore the case did not fall within Clause (3) of Section 300. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Section 304 Part II and the sentence reduced to five years' rigorous imprisonment.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant's act of striking the deceased with a hoe constitutes murder under Section 300(3) of the IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II.
Whether the mental element of the offence is "guilty intention" or merely "guilty knowledge" in the context of a single injury caused by a common agricultural tool.
Whether any of the five exceptions to Section 300 apply, thereby reducing the offence to Section 304 Part I.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 304(1), s. 304(2)

Subjects

culpable homicidemurderSection 304 IPCintention vs knowledgesingle injuryagricultural toolalteration of convictionexception to Section 300mens reacriminal law

Judgment

[2023] 10 S.C.R. 1091 : 2023 INSC 632 1091

ANBAZHAGAN A
v.
THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023)
JULY 20, 2023 B
[B. R. GAVAI AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – Alteration of conviction from s. 304-I to
s.304-II of IPC – Single injury – Prosecution case that appellant
and deceased picked up verbal altercation in regard to the pathway
C
and the appellant had inflicted one blow with a “Hoe”-a
agricultural/gardening tool on the head of the victim-deceased as
a result of which the victim fell unconscious and later died – Trial
Court held appellant guilty for the offence of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder u/s. 304-I of the IPC and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years – High D
Court dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction of the appellant
u/s. 304-I of the IPC – On appeal, held: The difference between the
two parts of s. 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime
of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit
of one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC, while under the second
E
part, the crime of murder is never established at all – Therefore, for
the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable
under the second part of s.304 of the IPC, the accused need not
bring his case within one of the exceptions to s.300 of the IPC –
Looking at the overall evidence on record, it is difficult to come to
the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with F
the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such bodily injury as
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death – The
weapon of offence in the instant case was a common agriculture
tool not a weed axe – The appellant could only be attributed with
the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely
G
to cause the death – It is in such circumstances, the case on hand
does not fall within clause thirdly of s.300 of the IPC – In view of
the principles of law, the conviction of the appellant u/s. 304 Part I
of the IPC is altered to one u/s. 304 Part II of the IPC – For the
altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years. H
1091
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Penal Code, 1860 – ss.299, 300 and 304 Part-II – Single
injury – In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury
is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances
B
justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he
only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty
knowledge, and the offence would be one u/s. 304 Part II of the
IPC.
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 304 Part-I – Applicability of – Section
C 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when
the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300,
but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when
the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
D to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the
case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii)
when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue
but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause
death.
E
Penal Code, 1860 – Intention to kill – Intention to kill is not
the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder – The
intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause
of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder
if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury
F or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the
injury or injuries.
Penal Code, 1860 – s.299 and s.300 – discussed.
Criminal Law – Intent and knowledge – discussed.
G Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Few important principles of law may be summed
up thus:-
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what
offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1093
INSPECTOR OF POLICE

test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in A
doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is
described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act
will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To
illustrate : ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his
revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing
B
him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding
that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though
only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of
murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking
another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’
while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest C
of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and
runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found
to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There
may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the
particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was D
objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section
300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder
although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused E
may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the
act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken
out of the purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any
one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the
event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence
would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within F
Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such
as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It
would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such
as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd G
or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not
any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation
also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence
under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of
H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section
304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person
falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as
described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the
B first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause,
it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect,
therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is
‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there
is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
C (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury
was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of
Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence
would be murder.

D (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes
of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the
clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions
to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher
degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower
E degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury
‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2)
of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the
knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to
cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
F (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished
from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or
greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will
‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to
place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether
G the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to
cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299
of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be
carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section
302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1095
INSPECTOR OF POLICE

the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those A
not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence
on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law
B
to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of
the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails
to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses
of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of
murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section C
299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens
rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant
must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This
ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, D
it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved
circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard
to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent
of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner
of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the
attack. E

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a
culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or
injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death
also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually
been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to F
be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in
the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can
be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the
death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the G
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or
not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had
the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single
injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of
the exceptions applies.
B (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had
guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single
injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done
without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
C unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead
to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would
be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. [Para 60][1127-H;
1128-A-H; 1129-A-H; 1130-A-H; 1131-A-D]
2. Looking at the overall evidence on record, it is difficult
D to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the
deceased with the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such
bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The weapon of offence in the present case is a
common agriculture tool. If a man is hit with a weed axe on the
E head with sufficient force, it is bound to cause, as here, death. It
is true that the injuries shown in the post mortem report are
fracture of the parietal bone as well as the temporal bone. The
deceased died on account of the cerebral compression i.e. internal
head injuries. However, the moot question is – whether that by
itself is sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant intended
F to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death. This
Court is of the view that the appellant could only be attributed
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was
likely to cause the death. It is in such circumstances that this
Court inclined to take the view that the case on hand does
G not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC.
[Para 62][1131-G-H; 1132-A-B]
Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1984 SC 759: [1984]
2 SCC 133; Chamru, Son of Budhwa v. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 652; Willie (William) Slaney v.
H The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 116: [1955]
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1097
INSPECTOR OF POLICE

SCR 1140; Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 A
SCC 245; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC
342; Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1990) Supp SCC
291; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC
444 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633 – relied on.
Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956] B
SCR 363; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601; Virsa
Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 : [1958]
SCR 1495; Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3
SCC 616 : [1981] 3 SCR 839; Jawahar Lal v. State of
Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 159; Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa C
[(2000) 9 SCC 1 : [2000] 2 SCR 1088; Jai Prakash v.
State (Delhi Admin.) (1991) 2 SCC 32 : [1991] 1 SCR
202; Anda v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 148;
State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC
382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601; Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab D
AIR 1964 SC 986 : [1964] SCR 916; Phulia Tudu v.
State of Bihar (2007) 14 SCC 588 : [2007] 9 SCR 997;
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874 :
[1966] Suppl. SCR 230; Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State
of U.P. (2007) 14 SCC 660 : [2007] 13 SCR 727 –
referred to. E

Bhagwant v. Kedari I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202; In re
Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi AIR 1960 AP 141;
Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan AIR 1916 Bom 191
– referred to.
F
Reg. v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 COX CC 55 – referred
to.
Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page
31; Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at
page 41 – referred to. G
Case Law Reference
[1964] SCR 916 referred to Para 22
[1956] SCR 363 referred to Para 23
[1977] 1 SCR 601 referred to Para 34 H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A [1958] SCR 1495 referred to Para 36
[2007] 9 SCR 997 referred to Para 36
[1966] Suppl. SCR 230 referred to Para 40
[1981] 3 SCR 839 referred to Para 45
B (1983) 4 SCC 159 referred to Para 47
[2000] 2 SCR 1088 referred to para 48
[1991] 1 SCR 202 referred to Para 49
AIR 1966 SC 148 referred to Para 51
C
[2007] 13 SCR 727 referred to Para 53
[1977] 1 SCR 601 referred to Para 53
[1984] 2 SCC 133 relied on Para 54
AIR 1954 SC 652 relied on Para 55
D
[1955] SCR 1140 relied on Para 55
(1981) 4 SCC 245 referred to Para 56
(1983) 2 SCC 342 relied on Para 57
(1990) Supp SCC 291 relied on Para 58
E
[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 633 relied on Para 59
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2043 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2019 of the High Court
F of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 193 of 2019.
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M. P. Parthiban, Ms. Priyaranjani
Nagamuthu, R. Sudhakaran, Ms. Shalini Mishra, G. R. Vikash, Bilal
Mansoor, T. Hari Haran Sudhan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Vaidehi Rastogi, Advs. for the
G
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :
1. Leave granted.
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1099
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

2. This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed A
against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Madras dated 04.04.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2019 by
which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein
thereby affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Namakkal in Sessions Case
B
No. 41 of 2017.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein
and his father were put on trial in the Court of the Additional Sessions
Judge, Namakkal in Sessions Case No. 41 of 2017 for the offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short, ‘IPC’). The Trial Court held the appellant herein guilty C
for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in
default of payment of the amount of fine, further rigorous imprisonment
of one year. The co-accused i.e. father of the appellant herein came to D
be acquitted by the Trial Court.
4. The appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment and
order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court went in appeal
before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal affirming
the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence punishable under E
Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
5. At the outset, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant herein, submitted that he is not pressing this
appeal on merits. He submitted that his only endeavour is to persuade
this Court to alter the conviction of the appellant from the offence F
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of
the IPC and reduce the sentence accordingly.
FACTUAL MATRIX
6. It appears from the evidence on record that the appellant is an
agriculturist. He owns agriculture land in a village by name G
Sirukinathupalayam situated in Tamil Nadu. The deceased namely
Balasubramaniam was also an agriculturist and had his own agriculture
land adjacent to the agriculture land of the appellant herein. There was
a pathway leading to the agriculture land of the appellant over which the
deceased had some issues. At the time of the incident, the appellant had
H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A cultivated Cassava plants (Tapoica) which was ready for harvesting.
On 25.10.2015 at around 7 am, the appellant and his father were harvesting
the crop and had also arranged for a lorry for transporting the same
from their field. At around 11 am, the deceased came at the place of the
incident and threatened the driver of the lorry saying he should not drive
his lorry through the pathway leading to the agriculture field of the
B
appellant. At that point of time, the appellant and his father were in their
field. The appellant is said to have asked the driver of the lorry to move
the lorry to his field to load the crop. This was questioned by the deceased
which resulted in a quarrel. It is the case of the prosecution that after
verbal altercation between the appellant and the deceased for quite some
C time, the appellant is alleged to have picked up a “Hoe” (Kalaikottu – in
Tamil, a gardening tool with a small metal blade attached with a wooden
handle used mainly for weeding) & inflicted a single blow on the head of
the deceased as a result of which the deceased fell unconscious and
later died in the hospital.
D 7. The FIR was lodged on 25.10.2015 at 19.30 Hrs. On completion
of the investigation, police filed charge sheet for the offence of murder.
The case was committed to the Court of Sessions as the offence was
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. The Additional Sessions Judge,
Namakkal vide order dated 06.09.2017 framed the following charge:-
E “Whereas the deceased Balasubramaniam has been living
with his wife Baby and family members at Sevalkattu Moolai
near Government High School in Pandamangalam; that the
Al is the son of A2; that both the accused were living in
Poosaripalayam; in Sirukinatrypalayan: both the accused and
the deceased Balasubramaniarn had their agricultural lands
F adjacent to each other’s lands; that there was a pathway
between both these lands and that there has been a prior
enmity for a longtime regarding the ownership of that pathway
between both parties. On 25.10.2015 at 07.30 hrs Al and A2
were loading tapioca cultivated and harvested in their lands
G on to a lorry owned by one Mr. Palanival, having the
registration number TN 33 AF 3114 by parking that lorry on
the disputed pathway. At that time the deceased
Balasubramaniam came there and told them that the lorry
could not be led in and blocked it. Then A2 yelled at the
deceased Balasubramaniam saying “You do not have a
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1101
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

pathway here. You may bring anyone you want” and then Al A
and A2 pushed the deceased Balasubramaniam down and
with an intention to murder him Al had hit the head of the
deceased Balasubramaniam with a “weed removing axe”
(Kalaikothi) while A2 was pelting stones at him whereby the
deceased Balasubramaniam sustained grievous injuries on
B
his head. Balasubramaniam was immediately carried to the
Government Hospital in Velur, then taken to Government
Hospital in Namakkal where he did not respond to treatment
and was declared dead at 05.20 pm. Therefore you the accused
have committed an offense punishable under 302 IPC and
which can be tried by this court. C
I hereby issue an order that both of you Al and A2 should
be tried by this court for the commission of the above offense.”
8. The appellant and the co-accused (father of the appellant)
pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge and claimed to be tried. It
appears that the prosecution examined many witnesses. However, PW D
8 – Chidambaram and PW 9 – Jeeva are the main witnesses being the
eye witnesses to the occurrence. Both the eye witnesses have deposed
that on the date of the incident the appellant herein and the deceased
picked up verbal altercation in regard to the pathway and the appellant is
said to have inflicted one blow with the weapon of offence as enumerated E
above on the head of the deceased leading to his death.
ORAL EVIDENCE
9. PW-8 namely Chidambaram in his examination in chief has
deposed as under:-
F
“I am now residing in Indira Nagar, Thaathaiyangar Patti. I
am working as Lorry Driver. I know the present accused.
About 3 years back I took my lorry to Anbazhagan’s field in
Poosari Palayam for transporting harvest of tapioca.
Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja Manikkam and Jeeva
accompanied me. While Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja G
Manikkam and Jeeva were harvesting the tubers of tapioca
the person belonging to the adjacent field told us that the
lorry should not move any further since he the accused have
a dispute regarding the pathway in which the lorry was on. I
climbed into my lorry. At that time the accused Anbazhagan
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1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A was plucking tapioca in his field. He then asked me to bring
the lorry near his field. I told him about what the neighbor
told me. But as I took my lorry ahead a verbal fight broke out
between Anbazhagan and the neighbor. Then A2 came to that
place. She was yelling too. With the axe M.O.1 in his right
hand, A1 Anbazhagan hit the neighbor on his head. The
B
neighbor suffered injuries on his mouth.”
10. PW-9 namely Jeeva in his examination in chief has deposed
as under:-
“I am now residing in Indira Nagar, Thaathaiyangar Patti. I
C I am a coolie. I know the accused present here. I went to
pluck tapioca tubers in the garden of the accused Anbazhagan
along with Chidambaram, Subramani, Veerasamy, Raja
Manikkam between 07.30 & 08.00 am on 25.10.2015 at
Poosari Palayam. We went inside the field with Anbazhagan
to gather the tubers. When we were clearing the plants after
D gathering the tubers Chidambaram drove the lorry inside the
field. Immediately the deceased Balasubramaniam came
inside. He was shouting at the driver and asked him as to
who gave him the authority to enter inside. He told this to
Anbazhagan. The deceased Balasubramaniam was standing
E on the road. Both the accused present there were gathering
tapioca. Incidentally the accused and the deceased started
getting into a verbal quarrel. We are securing the plucked
tubers. The fight became bigger. Hearing the louder sound
we all came over to the road where the verbal fight was going
on. At that time the accused hit the deceased at his head with
F the wedding axe causing injury. He fell down immediately.”
11. PW-18 Dr. Anbumalar in her examination in chief has state as
under:-
“I am currently working as a Senior Doctor in Namakkal
G Government District Head Hospital. On 26.10.2015, while I
was on duty then the body of one Balasubramaniam (57 years
old) was brought by one Arunagiri, Head constable for post-
mortem examination with permission letter and accordingly
on 26.10.2015 at 2.15 PM, the post- mortem was performed.
The details of the post- mortem examination are as follows –
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1103
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

External injuries respectively, A
There was bleeding from the ear and nose, above the left eye
brow 3×2 cm cut injury. A cut injury measuring 4 × 2 cm was
found on the left forehead. The front skull bone was fractured
on both sides (Both parietal bone).
Internal Inspection Details- B

The skull bone was broken and the inner lining was torn.
Left Side Temporal Bone 7.5 cm. was broken. There was a
blood clot at the base of the skull. The inside of the sprout
was red. Navicular bone was correct. Left ribs 3 and 4 were
fractured.” C
12. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record and more particularly having regard to the genesis
of the occurrence; the manner of assault and the nature of the weapon,
took the view that the case was not one of murder punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC but could be said one of culpable homicide not D
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and
accordingly sentenced the appellant herein.
13. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the Trial
Court was right in holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. E
14. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here
before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
15. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for F
the appellant herein submitted that considering the manner in which the
incident had occurred and the role attributed to the appellant, the conviction
deserves to be altered from Section 304 Part I of the IPC to one under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC. According to the learned senior counsel,
the case does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. All
that can be attributed to the appellant is ‘knowledge’ and ‘not intention’. G

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
STATE
16. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent State on the other hand, submitted that the Trial Court as H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A well as the High Court rightly held the appellant herein guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. According to
the learned counsel, the case is not one falling within the ambit of Section
304 Part II of the IPC. He would submit that the case falls within clause
thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. He submitted that exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC is attracted and therefore, the courts rightly
B
convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304
Part I of the IPC.
ANALYSIS
17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
C and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant
herein for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC
should be further altered to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
18. We have given more than a fair idea as regards the genesis of
D the occurrence and the role attributed to the appellant herein. Dr.
Karthikeyan (PW-15) was examined by the prosecution in his capacity
as the Medical Officer who performed the post mortem of the deceased.
In the post mortem report, the doctor has noted three injuries, (i) cut
injury over 4 x 2 cm on the left eye, (ii) cut injury 4 x 3 cm on the left
forehead, and (iii) 4 x 2 cm contusion around the left eye. The cause of
E death assigned in the post mortem report appears to be shock and
haemorrhage due to head injury.
19. As the only argument canvassed before us is that the case
does not travel beyond culpable homicide as the same falls within the
third part of Section 299 of the IPC, the accused could only be said to
F have knowledge that he is likely by his act to cause death and not the
intention to kill the deceased, we must explain the fine distinction between
the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’.
INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE :-
20. The word “intent” is derived from the word archery or aim.
G
The “act” attempted to must be with “intention” of killing a man.
21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely
proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred
from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res
gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1105
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occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by A
direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances
of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the
intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-
1. The nature of the weapon used.
2. The place where the injuries were inflicted. B
3. The nature of the injuries caused.
4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.
22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC
986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word C
‘intent’. The relevant observations are made by referring to the
observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari,
I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:-
“The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have
metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus D
connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen
perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but
rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-
and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant
motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.”
E
(Emphasis supplied)
23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488,
at page 490, the following observations have been made by
Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-
“6. ...Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, F
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts
a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness
of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and
knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing
more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge.
The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no G
doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the three
ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain
amount of confusion.”
(Emphasis supplied) H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made
by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have
been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage,
as they are very illuminating:-
“The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to
B whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look
into a man’s mind to see what was passing there at any given
time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does
or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide
you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and
C one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a
man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The
consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt
of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew
to be loaded to another’s head, and fire it off, without
intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the
D party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such
an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not
be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have
been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one;
but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by
E intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent
charged?” (Emphasis supplied)

25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision
and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different
F terminologies ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which
is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that
his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that ‘intent’ and
G ‘knowledge’ cannot be equated with each other. They connote different
things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that
from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that
‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ are the same. ‘Knowledge’ will be only one of
the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or
inferring the requisite intent.
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1107
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 A
AP 141, also the distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ is aptly
explained. It is as under:-
“Knowledge and intention must not be confused.
17. … Every person is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his act until the contrary is B
proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a
decision, as to an offender’s intention to inquire what the
- natural and probable consequences of his acts would
be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person,
sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary C
course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted
them could be presumed to have intended those natural
and probable consequences. His offence would fall under
the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C.
18. … A man’s intention has to be inferred from what he D
does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the
intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is
less grave. The degree of guilt depends upon intention and
the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts
proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in
an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary E
course of nature to cause death, but which the - offender
knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge
throws light upon his intention.
19. …Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge,
that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. F
Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts
to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to
bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately
inflicted is more than merely ‘likely to cause death’ but
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, G
the higher degree of guilt is presumed.” (Emphasis supplied)
It has been further observed therein as under:-
“26. …Where the evidence does not disclose that there was
any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was
clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty
under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention
that in order to bring the case under the second part of
sec. 304, I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the
exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable.” (Emphasis
supplied)
B
27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and
murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or
knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act
which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of
culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the
C IPC designedly used the two words ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’, and it
must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between
these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may
result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that
such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is
D not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he
“must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences
would or could follow.” (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1
at page 40).
28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge
E that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act
is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should
ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain
consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean
that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention.
Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the
F consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a
particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages
from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal
Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-
“To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired
G objective; the noun ‘intention’ in the present connexion is
used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees
but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct……..
It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is
also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction,
H and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1109
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

purpose is directed……… Again, a man cannot intend to do a A
thing unless he desires to do it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41
has observed:-
B
“In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the
word “intention” is used to denote the mental attitude of a
man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he
can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to
achieve a particular end at which he aims………… Differing
from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other C
attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal
sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience
to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word
“recklessness”. In each of these the man adopts a line of
conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which D
he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct
may also produce another result which he does not desire. In
this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the
chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if
this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be
criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental E
attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the
harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to
whether it does or does not occur.” (Emphasis supplied)
30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the
IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said F
that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention,
the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be
proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such
and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said
“whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing G
death” it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to
bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly,
when it is said that “whoever causes death by doing an act with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death” it must
be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as
was likely to cause death. H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to
intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide
proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be
proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be
culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the
knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with
B
the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may
result in death.
32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention
in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence
C under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part
II of the IPC?
SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:-
33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of
D ‘culpable homicide’ and ‘murder’, respectively. In terms of Section 299,
‘culpable homicide’ is described as an act of causing death (i) with the
intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an
act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision,
the former part of it emphasises on the expression ‘intention’ while the
E latter upon ‘knowledge’. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however,
of different degrees. The mental element in ‘culpable homicide’, that is,
the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of
intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three
stated manners noted-above, it would be ‘culpable homicide’. Section
F 300 of the IPC, however, deals with ‘murder’, although there is no clear
definition of ‘murder’ in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly
held by this Court, ‘culpable homicide’ is the genus and ‘murder’ is its
species and all ‘murders’ are ‘culpable homicides’ but all ‘culpable
homicides’ are not ‘murders’. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012)
8 SCC 289)
G
34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction
between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:-
“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’
is genus and ‘murder’ is species. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1111
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homicide’ but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable A
homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic
offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of
culpable homicide. The first is what may be called ‘culpable
homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of B
culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as
‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide
of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first
part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of
the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide
and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among C
the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable
homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part
of Section 304.”
(Emphasis supplied)
D
35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section
299 of the IPC. ‘Culpable homicide’ may or may not amount to ‘murder’,
in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a ‘culpable homicide is murder’,
the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the
IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is ‘culpable homicide
not amounting to murder’, punishment would be dealt with under Section E
304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the
cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly,
respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be
necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further
detail. F
36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to
exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine
as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This
Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of G
distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. ‘culpable
homicide’ and ‘murder’ respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of
Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise
if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms
used by the legislature in these sections. This Court observed that the
H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these
provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various
clauses of these sections.
37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the
academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not
B amounting to murder’ has always vexed the courts. The confusion is
caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms
used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn
into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the
keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the
C IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the
points of distinction between the two offences:-

Section 299 Section 300
A person commits Subject to certain exceptions culpable
D culpable homicide if homicide is murder if the act by which the
the act by which the death is caused is done-
death is caused is
done-
INTENTION
(a) with the intention (1) with the intention of causing death; or
E of causing death; or

(b) with the intention (2) with the intention of causing such bodily
of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
injury as is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the
cause death; or harm is caused; or
F (3) with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
KNOWLEDGE
(c) with the (4) with the knowledge that the act is so
G knowledge that the act imminently dangerous that it must in all
is likely to cause death probability cause death or such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, and commits such
act without any excuse for incurring the risk
of causing death or such injury as is
mentioned above.
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1113
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

38. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC corresponds with clauses A
(2) and (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. The distinguishing feature of
the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by
the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar
condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely
to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the B
ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal
health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is
not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing
the bodily injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood
of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to
bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This clause (2) is borne C
out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300 of the IPC.
39. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC does not postulate any
such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling
under clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC can be where the assailant
causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is D
suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart
and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a
result; of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as
the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the
disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or E
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death,
was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC, instead
of the words “likely to cause death” occurring in the corresponding clause
(b) of Section 299 of the IPC, the words “sufficient in the ordinary course
F
of nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a
bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real
and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference
between clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC and clause (3) of Section
300 of the IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from G
the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of
probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of
the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word ‘likely’ in clause
(b) of Section 299 of the IPC conveys the sense of probable as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A injury…..sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean
that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard
to the ordinary course of nature.
40. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the
B intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. The decision in the case of Rajwant Singh v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874, is an apt illustration of this point.
41. The scope of clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC has
been the subject matter of various decisions of this Court. The decision
C in Virsa Singh (supra) has throughout been followed in a number of
cases by this Court. In all these cases the approach has been to find out
whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause the particular injury
was present or not? If such an intention to cause that particular injury is
made out and if the injury is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course
D of nature to cause death, then clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC
is attracted. Analysing clause thirdly and as to what the prosecution
must prove, it was held in Virsa Singh (supra) as under:-
“15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily
injury is present;
E 16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These
are purely objective investigations.
17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it
was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other
F
kind of injury was intended…
18. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further and,
19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type
G just described made up of the three elements set out above
is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.”
(Emphasis supplied)
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1115
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It was further observed as under:- A
“20. … If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face
the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be
shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was
accidental or otherwise unintentional.”
(Emphasis supplied) B

42. Thus, it is clear that the ingredient of clause thirdly is not the
intention to cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be proved
is the intention to cause the particular injury that was present. It is
fallacious to contend that wherever there is a single injury only a case of
culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other circumstances. C
In Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, AIR 1916 Bom 191, it was
observed as under:-
“Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much
more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily
injury the offender intended.” D
(Emphasis supplied)
43. Commenting upon the aforesaid observation of the Bombay
High Court, Justice Bose, in Virsa Singh (supra), held thus:-
“23. … With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked E
up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury,
and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires.
The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though
the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.”
44. As to how the intention is to be inferred even in a case of F
single injury, Justice Bose further held as under:-
“23. … The question is not whether the prisoner intended
to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he
intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If
he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the G
circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course,
the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if
there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the
appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he
intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness,
H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A or intended serious consequences is neither here nor there.
The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not
whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a
particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended
to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of
the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed
B
unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an
opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or
not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound
is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a
totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to
C do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict
the injury in question.
24. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked
up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it
can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
D an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial
scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell
on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the
offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner
did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as
serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend
E to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such
a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The
difference is not one of law but one of fact. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. This question was again considered in Jagrup Singh v. State
F
of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616, by a Bench of this Court consisting of
Justice D.A. Desai and Justice A.P. Sen and following the ratio laid
down in Virsa Singh (supra) it was held as under:-
“6. There is no justification for the assertion that the giving
of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body resulting the
G
death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section
304 Part II of the Code. If a man deliberately strikes another
on the head with a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even
a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he must, in the
H absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption, be
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1117
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

deemed to have intended to cause the death of the victim or A
such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The whole
thing depends upon the intention to cause death, and the case
may be covered by either clause Istly or clause 3rdly. The
nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon
used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed
B
and the circumstances attendant upon the death.”
The aforesaid decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh (supra) has
been strongly relied upon by the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant.
46. However, the learned senior counsel did not seek to rely on C
the observations made in para 6 referred to above in the case of Jagrup
Singh (supra). The learned senior counsel relied on the observations
which we shall refer to hereinafter, but after giving some factual
background in the case of Jagrup Singh (supra). On the fateful evening,
the marriage of one Tej Kaur was performed. Shortly thereafter, the
appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh D
armed with a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed
with lathies emerged suddenly and made a joint assault on the deceased
Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh, PW 10,
Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12. The deceased along
with the three eyewitnesses was rushed to the Rural Dispensary, Rori E
where they were examined at 6 pm by Dr. Bishnoi, PW 3, who found
that the deceased had a lacerated wound 9 cm × 11/2 cm bone deep on
the right parietal region, 9 cm away from the tip of right pinna; margins
of wound were red, irregular and were bleeding on touch; direction of
wound was anterior-posterior. The deceased succumbed to the injuries.
The Doctor who performed an autopsy on the dead body of the deceased F
deposed before the Trial Court that the death of the deceased was due
to cerebral compression as a result of the head injury which was sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the background of
this case, this Court held:-
“14. … In our judgment, the High Court having held that it G
was more probable that the appellant Jagrup Singh had also
attended the marriage as the collateral, but something
happened on the spur of the moment which resulted in the
infliction of the injury by Jagrup Singh on the person of the
deceased Chanan Singh which resulted in his death, manifestly H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A erred in applying Clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the Code.
On the finding that the appellant when he struck the deceased
with the blunt side of the gandhala in the heat of the moment,
without pre-meditation and in a sudden fight, the case was
covered by Exception 4 to Section 300. It is not suggested
that the appellant had taken undue advantage of the situation
B
or had acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, all the
requirements of Exception 4 are clearly met. That being so,
the conviction of the appellant Jagrup Singh, under Section
302 of the Code cannot be sustained.
15. The result, therefore, is that the conviction of the appellant
C
under Section 302 is altered to one under Section 304, Part
II of the Indian Penal Code. For the altered conviction, the
appellant is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a
period of seven years.”
(Emphasis supplied)
D
We have noticed something in the aforesaid observations made
by this Court which, in our opinion, creates some confusion. We have
come across such observations in many other decisions of this Court
over and above the case of Jagrup Singh (supra). What we are trying
to highlight is that in Jagrup Singh (supra), although this Court altered
E the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II, it took shelter of
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. The question is, was there any
need for the Court to take recourse to Exception 4 to Section 300 of the
IPC for the purpose of altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section
304 Part II of the IPC. We say so because there is fine difference
F between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC. Under the first part,
the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the
benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under
the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore,
for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable
under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not
G
bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
47. In Jawahar Lal v. State of Punjab, (1983) 4 SCC 159, also
the accused hit the deceased with a knife blow in front of left side of his
chest and as per the autopsy report the injuries were found sufficient in
an ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court took a view that
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1119
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

the accused could be attributed the knowledge that he was likely to A
cause an injury which was likely to cause death. The relevant paras of
the said judgment is reproduced as under:
“17…….we should also not further dilate on this point in view
of the decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh v. State of
Haryana : 1981 Cri LJ 1136. In that case after referring to B
the evidence, this Court held that the appellant gave one blow
on the head of the deceased with the blunt side of the
gandhala and this injury proved fatal. The Court then
proceeded to examine as to the nature of the offence because
the appellant in the case was convicted for an offence under
Section 302. Undoubtedly, this Court said that there is no C
justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary blow
on a vital part of the body resulting in death must always
necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Part II
of the Code. The Court then proceeded to lay down the D
criteria for judging the nature of the offence. It may be
extracted;
The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death,
and the case may be covered by either clause Firstly or clause
Thirdly. The nature of intention must be gathered from the E
kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of
force employed and the circumstance attendant upon the
death.
18. We may point out that decision in Jagrup Singh’s
Case 1981 Cri LJ 1136 was subsequently followed in Randhir F
Singh @ Dhire v. State of Punjab Decided on September 18,
1981 and in Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab Decided on August
7, 1981 (Criminal Appeal No. 630 of 1981).
19. Having kept this criteria under view, we are of the opinion
that the offence committed by the 1st appellant would not be G
covered by clause Thirdly of Para 3 of Section 300 and
therefore, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. cannot be
sustained.
20. What then is the offence committed by the 1st appellant?
Looking to the age of the 1st appellant at the time of the
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1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A occurrence, the nature of the weapon used, the circumstances
in which one blow was inflicted, the time of the day when the
occurrence took place and the totality of other circumstances,
namely, the previous trivial disputes between the parties, we
are of the opinion that the 1st appellant could be attributed
the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which
B
was likely to cause death. Accordingly, the 1st appellant is
shown to have committed an offence under Section 304, Part
II of the Indian Penal Code and he must be convicted for the
same and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five
years maintaining the sentence of fine.”
C 48. In Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa [(2000) 9 SCC 1 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 1128] the accused had hit the deceased with a danda during a
premeditated gang-fight, resulting in the death of the victim. Both the
trial court and the Bombay High Court convicted the appellant under
Section 302 IPC. This Court, however, converted the conviction to one
D under Section 304 Part II IPC and observed:- (SCC p. 9, para 14)
“14. … When a person hits another with a danda on a vital
part of the body with such a force that the person hit meets
his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused. In
that situation case will fall in Part II of Section 304 IPC as in
E the present case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. In Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Admin.), (1991) 2 SCC 32,
this Court, after an exhaustive review of various decisions, more
particularly, the principles laid down in Virsa Singh’s case (supra),
F concluded as under:-
“18. In all these cases, injury by a single blow was found to
be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances
such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as mentioned above
G only to assess the state of mind namely whether the accused
had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury
i.e. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only
should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there was
no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those
circumstances, the accused could have been barely aware i.e.
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ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1121
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

only had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances A
under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is
felt or at least a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could
not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the
particular result. We may point out that we are not concerned
with the intention to cause death in which case it will be a
B
murder simplicitor unless exception is attracted. We are
concerned under clause 3rdly with the intention to cause that
particular injury which is a subjective inquiry and when once
such intention is established and if the intended injury is found
objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death, clause 3rdly is attracted and it would be C
murder, unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is
attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of ‘intention’ is
not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard
then only it would be reasonable to infer that clause 3rdly is
not attracted and that the accused must be attributed
D
knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause
death in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable
under Section 304 Part II IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
50. In the case of Rajwant Singh (supra), after referring to the E
relevant clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, the following observations
have been made:-
“10. … The mental attitude is thus made of two elements (a)
causing an intentional injury and (b) which injury the
offender has the foresight to know would cause death…. F
11. … For the application of clause three it must first be
established that the injury is caused, next it must be established
objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary
course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to
cause death, one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that G
there was an intention to inflict that very Injury and not some
other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional.
If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder
is established.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 51. In the case of Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC
148, the two relevant Sections 299 and 300 respectively are brilliantly
analysed and the relevant observations are made at page 151 in para 7.
Before we refer to those observations, we would refer to certain
observations made earlier. They are as under:-
B “The offence of culpable homicide involves the doing of an
act (which term includes illegal omissions) (a) with the
intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) with the
knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. If the death is
caused in any of these three circumstances, the offence of
C culpable homicide is said to be committed……. Intention and
knowledge in the ingredients of the section postulate the
existence of a positive mental attitude and this mental condition
is the special mens rea necessary for the offence. The guilty
intention in the first two conditions contemplates the intended
D death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an
injury likely to cause his death. The knowledge in the third
condition contemplates knowledge of the death of the person.
Sec. 300 tells us when the offence is murder and when it is
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Sec. 300 begins
by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide turns
E out into murder which is punishable under sec. 302 and the
exceptions in the same section tell us when offence is not
murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under sec. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of
culpable homicide. The existence of one of four conditions
F turns culpable homicide into murder while the special
exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.” (Emphasis supplied)

52. We will now refer to the relevant observations made in para
G 10 at page 151. They are as under:-
“The third clause views the matter from a general stand-point.
It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The emphasis here is on the sufficiency of the injury in the
H
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1123
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is A
the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature
and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of
such injury is intended the offence is murder. Sometimes the
nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on
which the injury is caused, and sometimes both are relevant.
B
The determinant factor is the intentional injury which must
be sufficient to cause death, that is to say, the probability of
death is not so high, the offence does not fall within murder
but within culpable homicide not amounting to murder or
something less. The illustration appended to the clause 3rdly
reads: C
‘(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound
sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course
of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder,
although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.’
The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in D
the ordinary way of nature is the gist of the clause
irrespective of an intention to cause death. Here again,
the exceptions may bring down the offence to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.” (Emphasis supplied)
53. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P., (2007) E
14 SCC 660, noticed that the academic distinction between ‘murder’
and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ had vividly been brought
out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4
SCC 382, where it was observed as under:-
“…that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and F
application of Sections 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in
focus the key words used in various clauses of the said
sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of sections
299 and 300 of the Code and the drawing support from the
decisions of the court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR
1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818) and Rajwant Singh v. State G
of Kerala, (AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509) speaking
for the court, Justice RS Sarkaria, neatly brought out the
points of distinction between the two offences, which have
been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the court
said that wherever the Court is confronted with the question H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, on the facts of a case, it would be
convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.
The question to be considered at the first stage would be that
the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused
the death of another. Two, if such causal connection between
B
the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second
stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts
to culpable homicide as defined in section 299. If the answer
to this question is in the negative, the offence would be
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under
C the First or Second part of Section 304, depending
respectively, on whether this second or the third clause of
Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the
positive but the cases come within any of the exceptions
enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first
D
part of Section 304 of the Code. It was, however, clarified
that these were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of
the court and not cast-iron imperative.” (Emphasis supplied)
54. In the case of Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC
759,the accused stood in front of the house of the deceased and used
E filthy language against some persons who were unconnected with the
deceased. The deceased came out of his house and told the accused
that he should not use vulgar and filthy language in front of ladies and
asked him to go away. The accused questioned the authority of the
deceased to ask him to leave the place. In the ensuing altercation, the
F accused gave one blow with a knife which landed on the (right) chest of
the deceased which proved to be fatal. This Court came to the conclusion
that the accused could not be convicted under Section 302, but was
guilty under Section 304 Part II. The circumstances which weighed with
this Court were : (i) there was no connection between the accused and
the deceased and the presence of the deceased at the time of the incident,
G was wholly accidental; (ii) altercation with the deceased was on the
spur of the moment and the accused gave a single blow being enraged
by the deceased asking him to leave the place; (iii) the requisite intention
could not be attributed to the accused as there was nothing to indicate
that the accused intended the blow to land on the right side of the chest
H which proved to be fatal.
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1125
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

55. In Chamru, Son of Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A
AIR 1954 SC 652, in somewhat similar circumstances, where there was
exchange of abuses between the two parties both of whom were armed
with lathis, they came to blows and in the course of the fight that ensued,
the accused struck a lathi blow on the head of the deceased which caused
a fracture of the skull resulting in the death. In view of the fact that the
B
accused had given only one blow in the heat of the moment, it was held
that all that can be said was that he had given the blow with the knowledge
that it was likely to cause death and, therefore, the offence fell under
Section 304, Part II of the IPC. In Willie (William) Slaney v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116, there was, as here, a sudden
quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and in the heat of the moment C
a solitary blow with a hockey-stick had been given on the head. The
Court held that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder punishable under Section 304, Part II.
56. In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245, the
accused, without any prior enmity or premeditation, on a short quarrel D
gave a single blow with a dagger which later proved to be fatal. This
Court observed that since there was no premeditation, Part 3 of Section
300 of the IPC could not be attracted because it cannot be said that the
accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately
found to have been inflicted. In the facts and circumstances of that
case, the conviction of the accused was altered from Section 302 to that E
under Section 304 Part II IPC and the accused was sentenced to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for five years.
57. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342, the
accused on the spur of the moment inflicted a knife-blow on the chest of
the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The doctor opined that the F
injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
This Court observed that: (SCC p. 344, para 8):-
“8. … The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a
trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife
and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a G
permissible inference that the appellant at least could be
imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury
which was likely to cause death. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A This Court altered the conviction of the appellant from Section
302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced the accused to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for five years.
58. In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1990 Supp SCC 291,
the accused inflicted single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased.
B The occurrence admittedly had taken place on the spur of the moment
and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor
the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
This Court observed as under: (SCC p. 295, para 14)”-
“14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to
C have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing
death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts
and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened
most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without
premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused
a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention
D to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause
that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the
knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was
likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive
proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased
E with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted
that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature
was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor clause III
of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
F This Court while setting aside the conviction under Section 302
convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
59. We may lastly refer to the decision of this Court in Pulicherla
Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500,
G wherein this Court enumerated some of the circumstances relevant to
finding out whether there was any intention to cause death on the part of
the accused. This Court observed : (SCC pp. 457-58, para 29)
“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal
question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide
H whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1127
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking A
of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of
a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to
altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual
motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be
totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There
B
may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be
criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be
cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the
penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there
was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure
that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are C
not converted into offences punishable under Section 304
Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section
302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally
from a combination of a few or several of the following, among
other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) D
whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked
up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part
of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing
injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel
or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident E
occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the
deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave
and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such
provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x)
whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue F
advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi)
whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.
The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive
and there may be several other special circumstances with
reference to individual cases which may throw light on the G
question of intention.” (Emphasis supplied)
60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid
discussion may be summed up thus:-
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence
the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the
act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in
Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder
even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate : ‘A’ is
bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against
the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.
B
Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’
in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused.
The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1)
of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks
into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his
C bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a
sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly
thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in
holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to
D be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the
act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render
him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury
was caused.

E (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may
fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of
the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out
of the purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any one
of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of
the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would
F be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part
1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as
to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It
would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such
as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
G intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd
or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not
any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation
also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence
under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of
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ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1129
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section A
304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls
within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as
described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first
part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is B
punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect,
therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is
‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there
is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was C
intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly
to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be
murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of D
cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses
of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that
Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of
likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree
of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to E
cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section
300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that
death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an
injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts F
of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of
murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit
of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under
the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all.
Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the G
offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the
IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from
more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater
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1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably
happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself
in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused
had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the
B IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be
carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section
302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those
not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder
when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section
C 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions
are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record,
the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the
case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to
sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge
D this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section
300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would
not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the
IPC.
E (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If
Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must
intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient
could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter
of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the
case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the
F weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree
of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the
circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable
homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries
G sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes
a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused
and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from
the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the
H death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be
ANBAZHAGAN v. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1131
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the A
death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or
not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the B
intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to
him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which
results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under
Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the
exceptions applies. C

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty
intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury
is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances D
justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he
only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty
knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part
II of the IPC.
61. We once again recapitulate the facts of this case. On the E
fateful day of the incident, the father and son were working in their
agricultural field early in the morning. They wanted to transport the crop,
they had harvested and for that purpose they had called for a lorry. The
lorry arrived, however, the deceased did not allow the driver of the lorry
to use the disputed pathway. This led to a verbal altercation between the F
appellant and the deceased. After quite some time of the verbal
altercation, the appellant hit a blow on the head of the deceased with the
weapon of offence (weed axe) resulting in his death in the hospital.
62. Looking at the overall evidence on record, we find it difficult
to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased G
with the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such bodily injury as
was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
weapon of offence in the present case is a common agriculture tool. If a
man is hit with a weed axe on the head with sufficient force, it is bound
to cause, as here, death. It is true that the injuries shown in the post
mortem report are fracture of the parietal bone as well as the temporal H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A bone. The deceased died on account of the cerebral compression i.e.
internal head injuries. However, the moot question is – whether that by
itself is sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant intended to
cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death. We are of the
view that the appellant could only be attributed with the knowledge that
it was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause the death. It is
B
in such circumstances that we are inclined to take the view that the case
on hand does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC.
63. In the aforesaid view of the matter and more particularly bearing
the principles of law explained aforesaid, the present appeal is partly
allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part I of the
C IPC is altered to one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. For the
altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years.

Ankit Gyan Appeal partly allowed.
D

E

F

G

H