Holding

The appellant is deemed a principal employer under Section 2(17) and the conviction and sentence under Section 85(i)(b) are upheld.

Summary

The appellant, Ajay Raj Shetty, who was employed as General Manager/Technical Coordinator of M/s Electriex (India) Ltd., was convicted under Section 85(i)(b) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 for failing to remit ESI contributions that had been deducted from employees' wages. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant qualified as a "principal employer" under Section 2(17) of the Act and whether the conviction and sentence were appropriate. The Court held that the definition of principal employer includes a managing agent or any person responsible for supervision and control, thus the appellant fell within its ambit. It further affirmed that non‑remittance of deducted contributions is punishable under Section 85(a) with a minimum one‑year imprisonment, but the trial court’s lesser sentence under Section 85(i)(b) was permissible under the proviso. The Court rejected the appellant's arguments that he was only a technical coordinator and that the prosecution had not proved his liability. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant qualifies as a "principal employer" under Section 2(17) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
Whether the conviction under Section 85(i)(b) and the sentence imposed are legally justified given the nature of the offence.

Legislation cited

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948s. 2(17), s. 85
Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950s. 10-C2, s. 31-C
Factories Act, 1948
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the conviction of the appellant u/s.85(i)(b), Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 and the sentence awarded is justified. Headnotes† Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – ss.85, 2(17) – Punishment for failure to “Principal employer” – Though deductions towards Employees’ State Insurance contribution were made from the wages of the respondent no.2-Company’s employees but they were not deposited with Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) –

Subjects

Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC)Deduction towards Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) contributionContribution from the wages of the employeesNon-remittance of the contribution deductedGeneral managerPrincipal employerManaging agentOwner/occupierManagerTechnical coordinatorLesser sentenceSick industryBoard for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR)

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1299 : 2025 INSC 500

Ajay Raj Shetty
v.
Director & Anr.
R1: Director
R2: M/s Electriex (I) Ltd.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2036 of 2025)
17 April 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the conviction of the appellant u/s.85(i)(b), Employees’
State Insurance Act, 1948 and the sentence awarded is justified.

Headnotes†
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – ss.85, 2(17) –
Punishment for failure to pay contributions, etc. – “Principal
employer” – Though deductions towards Employees’ State
Insurance contribution were made from the wages of the
respondent no.2-Company’s employees but they were not
deposited with Employees’ State Insurance Corporation
(ESIC) – Appellant-General Manager of the respondent no.2
convicted u/s.85(i)(b) – Appellant, if covered u/s.2(17):
Held: Appellant falls within the ambit of s.2(17) being a ‘managing
agent’ – Despite contributions having been deducted from the
employees’ salaries, they were not deposited with the ESIC –
High Court rightly indicated that non-remittance of the contribution
deducted from the salary of an employee to the ESIC is an offence
u/s.85(a) and punishable u/s.85(i)(a) but the Trial Court had
imposed a lesser sentence as provided u/s.85(i)(b) – This is borne
out by s.85(i)(a) which provides for a sentence of not less than
one year imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-, since the amount
had been deducted from the salaries of the employees and not
paid, which is the fact in the present case, whereas u/s.85(i)(b),
sentence of imprisonment is not less than six months and with
fine of Rs.5,000/- in other cases – Trial Court could have given a
lesser sentence even for an offence u/s.85(i)(a) under the proviso

* Author
1300 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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to s.85(i) – High Court did not feel the necessity to interfere in
the lesser sentence awarded by the Trial Court – Conviction and
sentence not interfered with, fine awarded upheld. [Paras 20, 23]

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – s.2(17) – “Principal
employer” – Interpretation:
Held: The definition of s.2(17) also includes a ‘managing agent’
of the Owner/Occupier in the case of a factory or ‘named as the
manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948 and for ‘any
other establishment’, ‘principal employer’ would include ‘any person
responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment’ –
Therefore, designation of a person is immaterial if such person
otherwise is an agent of the Owner/Occupier or supervises and
controls the establishment in question. [Para 20]

Case Law Cited
Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., Chandigarh v. Gurdial Singh
AIR 1991 SC 1741 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 204; J K Industries
Limited v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers [1996] Supp.
6 SCR 798 : (1996) 6 SCC 665 – distinguished.
ESI Corpn. v. A K Abdul Samad [2016] 2 SCR 150 : (2016) 4 SCC
785 – held inapplicable.
Pentafour Products Ltd. v. Union of India, 2005 SCC Online Mad
841 – referred to.

List of Acts
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948; Factories Act, 1948; Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986; Employees’
State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950.

List of Keywords
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC); Deduction
towards Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) contribution;
Contribution from the wages of the employees; Non-remittance of
the contribution deducted; General manager; Principal employer;
Managing agent; Owner/occupier; Manager; Technical coordinator;
Lesser sentence; Sick industry; Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR).
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1301

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2036 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2023 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRRP No. 164 of 2015

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
P Vishwanath Shetty, Sr. Adv., Shankar Divate, Vaibhav.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Ananya Tyagi, Rohit Sharma, Vipin
Kumar, Jitendra Kumar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant against the Final
Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2023 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’), by which
Criminal Revision Petition No.164 of 2015 filed by the Appellant and
Respondent No.2 has been dismissed.

BRIEF FACTS:
3. M/s Electriex (India) Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent
No.2’ or ‘Company’) was declared as a sick industry by the Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘BIFR’) on 31.10.2001 in Case No.49/2000. On 24.09.2002,
the BIFR ordered for a change in the management of Respondent
No.2. Aggrieved by this Order, Respondent No.2 preferred Appeal
No.340/2002 before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter to referred to as the ‘AAIFR’).
Such appeal was dismissed vide AAIFR’s Order dated 15.01.2003.
Following this, Respondent No.2 filed Writ Petition No.20033/2003
1302 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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before the High Court and it is relevant to note that the Employees’
State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘ESIC’)
was also a party to the said writ petition, wherein the High Court
on 03.03.2008 remanded the matter back to the BIFR to consider
the matter expeditiously keeping in view the the interest of all the
parties concerned and quashed the Orders of BIFR and AAIFR dated
24.09.2002 and 15.01.2003, respectively.
4. On 01.07.2010, BIFR directed the Company to negotiate with the
secured creditors for settlement of their dues. On 01.02.2011,
ESIC officials visited the factory premises of Respondent No.2 to
ascertain and verify about its deductions towards the Employees’
State Insurance (hereinafter to referred to as ‘ESI’) contribution
for the period from 01.02.2010 to 31.12.2010. Pursuant thereto, a
Report was prepared which disclosed that even though deductions
of Rs.8,26,696/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Twenty-Six Thousand Six
Hundred and Ninety-Six) from the wages of Respondent No.2’s
employees were made for the above-mentioned period, the same was
not deposited with the ESIC. In the Report, the authorized signatory
of Respondent No.2 had mentioned the Appellant’s name as the
‘General Manager’ and ‘Principal Employer’ of the Company. On the
basis of the Report, a private complaint was filed by the Respondent
No.1 for offence(s) under Section 85(a)1 of the Employees’ State
Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter to referred to as the ‘Act’) against

1 ‘85. Punishment for failure to pay contributions, etc.—If any person—
(a) fails to pay any contribution which under this Act he is liable to pay, or
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) xxx
(e) xxx
(f) xxx
(g) xxx
he shall be punishable—
(i) where he commits an offence under clause (a), with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years but—
(a) which shall not be less than one year, in case of failure to pay the employee’s contribution which has
been deducted by him from the employee’s wages and shall also be liable to fine of ten thousand rupees;
(b) which shall not be less than six months, in any other case and shall also be liable to fine of five
thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment,
impose a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser term;
(ii) where he commits an offence under any of the clauses (b) to (g) (both inclusive), with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to four thousand rupees, or with
both.’
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1303

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

the Appellant and Respondent No.2 before the Special Court for
Economic Offences, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the “Trial
Court”) namely, CC No.326/2011 on 11.10.2011.
5. The Trial Court on 28.09.2013 convicted the Appellant under
Section 85(i)(b) of the Act and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment
for six months along with a fine of Rs.5000/- (Rupees Five Thousand).
Aggrieved, the Appellant and Respondent No.2 filed Criminal Appeal
No.553/2013, before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bangalore which was subsequently transferred to the Fast Track
Court VI, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Appellate
Court’). The First Appellate Court on 14.11.2014 upheld the order
of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and dismissed
Criminal Appeal No.553/2013. Aggrieved by such Order of the First
Appellate Court, the Appellant and Respondent No.2 filed Criminal
Revision Petition No.164 of 2015 before the High Court.
6. The High Court by the Impugned Order dated 08.12.2023 dismissed
the Revision Petition of the Appellant and Respondent No.2 on
the ground that the evidence on record clearly established that
the Appellant was General Manager and Principal Employer of
Respondent No.2 and it was also established that a contribution
of Rs.8,26,696/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Twenty-Six Thousand Six
Hundred and Ninety-Six) was deducted during the period 01.02.2010
to 31.12.2010 from the employees of Respondent No.2, but not
remitted to the ESIC.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
7. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that the
appointment of the appellant was in July, 2009, to the post of Technical
Coordinator in Respondent No.2. This Court’s attention was also
drawn to the fact that proceedings before the BIFR was instituted
in 2001, long before the Appellant’s appointment and further that
appointment order was not given as the Company was sick and
salary was also not paid. It was also contended that the burden
is on the prosecution to show that the Appellant was appointed as
General Manager, which they have only done by referring to the
Report produced by the ESIC. The Report also cannot be relied upon
as the official who prepared it was not brought before the Court for
the Appellant to cross-examine him.
1304 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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8. It was further submitted that the prosecution lodging case against the
Appellant for contravening Section 85(a) of the Act is erroneous as
there is no such averment, either in the complaint or in the evidence
that it was the Appellant who had deducted the contribution from the
wages of the employees and had failed to deposit the same with
Respondent No.1. The other fact pointed out by the Appellant was that
under Regulation 10-C2 of the Employees’ State Insurance (General)
Regulations, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Regulations’), the
Principal Employer is required to submit Form 01(A) to the ESIC,
but the same was not produced.
9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Appellant paid the entire
dues to the Respondent No.1 after the Impugned Order and at the
time of filing Petition for Special Leave to Appeal before this Court,
hence prayed for his acquittal.
10. With regard to his designation, it is pointed out that in the counter-
affidavit of the Respondent No.2 filed before this Court, Paragraph 5
explicitly provides that the Appellant was working only as a ‘Technical
Coordinator’ in the Company and one Mr. Ajit Hegde was the Principal
Employer of Respondent No.2 at the relevant time.
11. The Appellant raised another leg of argument by contending that the
guilt of the accused has to be kept in mind while imposing liability
under the Act. It was submitted that the Act essentially criminalizes
a civil wrong. This is evident by perusing Regulation 31C3 of the

2 ‘10-C. Intimation regarding change in particulars submitted at the time of registration of factory/
establishment.—The employer in respect of a factory/establishment to which this Act applies and to
whom a code number has already been allotted, shall intimate to the appropriate Regional Office, Sub-
Regional Office, Divisional Office or Branch Office, any change in the particulars furnished in Form 01 at
the time of registration of the factory/establishment within two weeks of such change.’
3 ‘31-C. Damages on contributions or any other amount due, but not paid in time.—If an employer
fails to pay contribution within the periods specified under Regulation 31, or any other amount payable
under the Act, the Corporation may recover damages, not exceeding the rates mentioned below, by way
of penalty:—
Period of delay Maximum rate of damages in per cent per annum
of the amount due
(i) Less than 2 months 5%
(ii) 2 months and above but less than 4 months 10%
(iii) 4 months and above but less than 6 months 15%
(iv) 6 months and above 25%

Provided that the Corporation in relation to a company in respect of which a Resolution Plan has been
sanctioned by the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
may:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1305

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

Regulations, wherein it is provided that the ESIC has the power to
recover unpaid contributions from the defaulting employer by way of a
penalty and it is at the discretion of the ESIC to either waive off such
damages or to reduce the same by up to 50%. This is contingent on
the Company being declared as a ‘sick company’, which Respondent
No.2 was in this case. Therefore, ESIC ought to have adopted a
more liberal approach instead of pressing for criminal prosecution.
12. Learned senior counsel summed up his argument stating that, if at
all the appellant is to be convicted, it can be for a day till the rising
of the Court. He relied on the judgment of this Court in ESI Corpn.
v A K Abdul Samad, (2016) 4 SCC 785.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1:
13. Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 submitted that the Appellant
had a chance to produce documents to show that he was only
a ‘Technical Coordinator’. Furthermore, the High Court made an
observation that the Appellant also had an opportunity to produce
wage-slips or pay-slips to show his status, and the same was not
done. The Appellant also made no efforts to summon any relevant
documents from Respondent No.2.
14. The learned counsel for ESIC also drew the Court’s attention to
a judgment of the Madras High Court in Pentafour Products
Ltd. v. Union of India, 2005 SCC Online Mad 841, wherein the
issue pertained to the applicability of Section 138 of the Negotiable

(a) Waive up to 50 per cent of the damages levied or leviable depending upon merits of the case.
(b) in exceptional hard cases, waive either totally or partially the damages levied or leviable.’
The Proviso above, prior to its substitution [Notification No.N-12/13/1/2016-P&D dated 17-10-2018],
read as under:
‘Provided that the Corporation, in relation to a factory or establishment which is declared as sick industrial
company and in respect of which a rehabilitation scheme has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction, may:
(a) in case of change of management including transfer of undertaking(s) to workers’ cooperative(s) or
in case of merger or amalgamation of sick industrial company with a healthy company, completely waive
the damages levied or leviable;
(b) in other cases, depending on its merits, waive up to 60 per cent damages levied or leviable;
(c) in exceptional hard cases, waive either totally or partially the damages levied or leviable.’
1306 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Instruments Act, 1881 vis-à-vis Sections 22(1)4 and 22A5 of the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986. The Madras
High Court ruled that an order declaring a company sick under the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986 did not
prohibit criminal proceedings against such company, under Sections
22(1) or 22A thereof.
15. It was submitted by learned counsel that the High Court observed
that despite there being sufficient evidence against the Appellant,
he was convicted under Section 85(i)(b) of the Act and not under
Section 85(i)(a) of the Act, thereby giving him a lesser sentence. In
this backdrop, he sought dismissal of the appeal.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.2:
16. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that the Appellant
after completing Engineering course without any industrial experience
joined as ‘Technical Coordinator’ in the Company in July, 2009. He
worked from July, 2009 to April, 2011 with the Company. He was
only a Technical Coordinator and never acted as Principal Employer
nor as General Manager.
17. Learned counsel also submitted that one of the promoters of the
Company is the Principal Employer, namely Mr. Ajit Hegde. It was
further submitted that the Appellant cleared the balance amount of
Rs. 6,86,696/- (Rupees Six Lakhs Eighty-Six Thousand Six Hundred

4 ‘22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.—(1) Where in respect of an industrial company,
an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation
or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25
relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies
Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial
company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the
winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of
the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery
of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in
respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further,
except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.
xxx’
5 ‘22-A. Direction not to dispose of assets.—The Board may, if it is of opinion that any direction is
necessary in the interest of the sick industrial company or creditors or shareholders or in the public
interest, by order in writing, direct the sick industrial company not to dispose of, except with the consent
of the Board, any of its assets—
(a) during the period of preparation or consideration of the scheme under Section 18; and
(b) during the period beginning with the recording of opinion by the Board for winding up of the company
under sub-section (1) of Section 20 and up to commencement of the proceedings relating to the winding
up before the concerned High Court.’
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1307

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

and Ninety-Six) of ESIC dues on 22.12.2023, though he was not the
Principal Employer or General Manager of Respondent No.2 and
counsel submitted that after the BIFR was dissolved by the Central
Government (in 2016), the Company cleared the Provident Fund
Account dues and made a one-time full and final settlement with
all its employees.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
18. The basic point canvassed by the Appellant is that he neither held the
post of General Manager nor was he the ‘Principal Employer’ during
the relevant period. The submission urged was that the liability was on
the Company for making payments to the ESIC, therefore, he could
not be charged, much less convicted, for an offence under the Act.
19. The Trial Court, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court
have returned concurrent findings of fact that the Appellant was liable,
as in the record of Respondent No.2/Company he was described as
General Manager, which could not be controverted by him. Further,
there is also a finding that except for a stand taken before the
authorities/Court, the Appellant was not able to show that he was
not holding such a post or was not designated as General Manager,
on the basis of his appointment letter, pay-slips etc. Moreover, the
Appellant who, be it noted, does not deny that he was under the
employment of Respondent No.2/Company has not disclosed as to
who was/were the person(s) holding such positions during the relevant
period of time, about which he could not have been ignorant. Section
2(17) of the Act, which defines ‘principal employer’, reads as under:
‘(17) “principal employer” means—
(i) in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and
includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier,
the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier,
and where a person has been named as the manager of
the factory under the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948),
the person so named;
(ii) in any establishment under the control of any department
of any Government in India, the authority appointed by
such Government in this behalf or where no authority is
so appointed, the head of the department;
1308 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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(iii) in any other establishment, any person responsible for
the supervision and control of the establishment;’
20. From the above, it is clear that the definition also includes a ‘managing
agent’ of the Owner/Occupier in the case of a factory or ‘named as
the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, 1948’ (hereinafter
referred to as the “Factories Act”) and for ‘any other establishment’,
‘principal employer’ would include ‘any person responsible for the
supervision and control of the establishment’. Therefore, designation
of a person can be immaterial if such person otherwise is an agent
of the Owner/Occupier or supervises and controls the establishment
in question. From the materials available on record, we find that the
Appellant falls within the ambit of Section 2(17) of the Act, being a
‘managing agent’.
21. Before the High Court, two decisions were relied upon by the Appellant
viz. Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., Chandigarh v Gurdial
Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1741 and J K Industries Limited v Chief
Inspector of Factories and Boilers, (1996) 6 SCC 665. In our view,
these are clearly distinguishable. In Gurdial Singh (supra), it was held
that when a factory had an Occupier, who would fall within Section
2(17)(i) of the Act, the Directors of the company concerned could
not be roped in by resorting to Section 2(17)(iii) of the Act, which
was in the nature of a residuary clause. It was laid down that in the
absence of factual proof and of actual position, Directors could not
be treated as owners ipso facto. While holding that the High Court
therein was right in affixing liability on the company, in the event of
an ‘occupier’, the occupier was liable to meet the demand, despite
some other person being named as a ‘manager’. To our mind, J K
Industries Limited (supra) operates in a different field i.e., in the
context of liability under the Factories Act and the interpretation
accorded to, on whom liability falls on under the Factories Act, cannot
be simpliciter accorded also to liability under the Act, as the Act has
specific provisions thereon. Ultimately, the Court concluded:
‘62. To sum up our conclusions are:
(1) In the case of a company, which owns a factory, it
is only one of the directors of the company who can be
notified as the occupier of the factory for the purposes
of the Act and the company cannot nominate any other
employee to be the occupier of the factory;
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1309

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

(2) Where the company fails to nominate one of its
directors as the occupier of the factory, the Inspector of
Factories shall be at liberty to proceed against any one of
the directors of the company, treating him as the deemed
occupier of the factory, for prosecution and punishment in
case of any breach or contravention of the provisions of
the Act or for offences committed under the Act.
…’
(emphasis supplied)

22. Therefore, J K Industries Limited (supra) dealt only with the Factories
Act and do not aid the Appellant in the instant context.
23. Further, the High Court rightly indicated that non-remittance of
the contribution deducted from the salary of an employee to the
ESIC is a offence under Section 85(a) of the Act and punishable
under Section 85(i)(a) of the Act but the Trial Court had imposed a
lesser sentence as provided under Section 85(i)(b) of the Act. This
is clearly borne out by Section 85(i)(a) of the Act which provides
for a sentence of not less than one year imprisonment and fine of
Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand), since the amount had been
deducted from the salaries of the employees and not paid, which
is the fact in the present case, whereas under Section 85(i)(b) of
the Act, sentence of imprisonment is not less than six months and
with fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) in other cases. Of
course, the Trial Court could have given a lesser sentence even
for an offence under Section 85(i)(a) of the Act under the proviso
to Section 85(i) of the Act. Overall, the High Court did not feel the
necessity to interfere in the lesser sentence awarded by the Trial
Court. Thus, we find that the conviction and the sentence does not
require any interference, much less in the present case, where despite
contributions having been deducted from the employees’ salaries,
they were not deposited with the ESIC.
24. In A K Abdul Samad (supra), the question before the Court was as
to whether discretion had been granted only to reduce the sentence
of imprisonment for a term lesser than six months or whether it
encompassed discretion to levy no fine or a fine of less than five
thousand rupees. Answering the said question, the Court held:
1310 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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‘9. In our considered view, the clause “shall also be liable
to fine”, in the context of the Penal Code may be capable
of being treated as directory and thus, conferring on the
court, a discretion to impose sentence of fine also in
addition to imprisonment although such discretion stands
somewhat impaired as per the view taken by this Court
in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar [Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar
v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409: 1999 SCC (L&S)
1299]. But clearly no minimum fine is prescribed for the
offences under IPC nor that the Act was enacted with
the special purpose of preventing economic offences
as was the case in Chern Taong Shang [Chern Taong
Shang v. Commander S.D. Baijal, (1988) 1 SCC 507:
1988 SCC (Cri) 162]. The object of creating offence
and penalty under the Employees’ State Insurance Act,
1948 is clearly to create deterrence against violation
of provisions of the Act which are beneficial for the
employees. Non-payment of contributions is an economic
offence and therefore the legislature has not only fixed a
minimum term of imprisonment but also a fixed amount
of fine of five thousand rupees under Section 85(a)(i)(b)
of the Act. There is no discretion of awarding less than
the specified fee, under the main provision. It is only the
proviso which is in the nature of an exception whereunder
the court is vested with discretion limited to imposition of
imprisonment for a lesser term. Conspicuously, no words
are found in the proviso for imposing a lesser fine than that
of five thousand rupees. In such a situation the intention
of the legislature is clear and brooks no interpretation.
The law is well settled that when the wordings of the
statute are clear, no interpretation is required unless
there is a requirement of saving the provisions from vice
of unconstitutionality or absurdity. Neither of the twin
situations is attracted herein.
10. Hence, the question is answered in favour of the
appellant and it is held that the amount of fine has to be
rupees five thousand and the courts have no discretion to
reduce the same once the offence has been established.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1311

Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director & Anr.

The discretion as per the proviso is confined only in respect
of the term of imprisonment.’
(emphasis supplied)

25. The decision in A K Abdul Samad (supra), thus, is of no help to the
Appellant. While the fine awarded and affirmed by the Courts below is
upheld, we are not convinced to substitute the term of imprisonment
to be operative only for a day till the rising of the Court
26. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.
The Appellant is directed to undergo the sentence after setting off
the period already undergone, if any and pay the fine, if not already
paid, as awarded by the Trial Court. The exemption from surrendering
granted by order dated 18.03.2024 stands withdrawn. The appellant
shall surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks from today.
27. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the Trial Court.
28. No order as to costs.
29. I.A. No.20317/2024 is allowed.
30. I.A. No.20329/2024 is disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

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Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey