AJAY MALIKversusSTATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 118
- Decided
- 29 January 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against Ajay Malik, upheld the discharge of Ashok Kumar, and directed the formation of a committee to consider a legal framework for domestic workers, finding that the High Court had erred in rejecting the quashing petition but was correct on the other points.
Summary
The case arose from FIR No. 60/2017 alleging wrongful confinement, trafficking and conspiracy against Ajay Malik for employing a tribal domestic worker. Malik sought quashing of the criminal proceedings and compounding of the offences, supported by a no‑objection affidavit from the complainant, while the State opposed both and also challenged the discharge of co‑accused Ashok Kumar. The Supreme Court held that the investigating agency failed to establish a prima facie case against Malik under Sections 343, 370 and 120B of the IPC, and therefore the High Court erred in rejecting the quashing petition; the compounding application was correctly rejected as the offences are non‑compoundable. The Court affirmed the High Court’s order discharging Ashok Kumar, finding no direct allegation or mens rea against him. Finally, the Court observed that the existing legal framework inadequately protects domestic workers and directed the Government to constitute a committee to recommend a comprehensive legal regime. Accordingly, Malik’s appeal was allowed, the State’s appeal against Kumar was dismissed, and the matter was remitted for legislative action.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court acted within its powers under Section 482 CrPC in rejecting Ajay Malik’s quashing petition
- Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the compounding application filed by Ajay Malik and supported by the complainant
- Whether the High Court was correct in allowing Ashok Kumar’s criminal revision and discharging him from the proceedings
- Whether the current legal framework in India sufficiently protects the rights of domestic workers
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164, s. 227, s. 320, s. 482
- Code on Wages, 2019
- Constitution of India
- Equal Remuneration Act, 1976
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 343, s. 370
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- Maharashtra Domestic Workers Welfare Board Act, 2008
- Payment of Wages Act, 1936
- Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013
- Social Security Code, 2020
- Tamil Nadu Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Work) Act, 1982
- Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act, 2008
Headnote
Issue for Consideration (1) Whether the High Court acted well within the contours of its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC in rejecting Ajay Malik’s quashing petition; (2) Whether the High Court fell in error in rejecting the Compounding Application moved by Ajay Malik and supported by Court was legally correct in accepting Ashok Kumar’s Criminal Revision, thereby discharging him from the captioned criminal proceedings; (4) Whether the existing legal framework in India sufficiently protects the rights of domestic workers. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 –
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1725 : 2025 INSC 118
Ajay Malik
v.
State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 441 of 2025)
29 January 2025
[Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(1) Whether the High Court acted well within the contours of
its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC in rejecting Ajay
Malik’s quashing petition;
(2) Whether the High Court fell in error in rejecting the Compounding
Application moved by Ajay Malik and supported by the
Complainant;
(3) Whether the High Court was legally correct in accepting
Ashok Kumar’s Criminal Revision, thereby discharging him
from the captioned criminal proceedings;
(4) Whether the existing legal framework in India sufficiently
protects the rights of domestic workers.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – SS.343, 370 and 120B – Correctness of
Rejection – No offence u/s.343 IPC – Allegations u/s.370 IPC
diminished in the statement u/s.164 CrPC – Allegation u/s.120B
IPC speculative:
Held: The High Court erred in rejecting Ajay Malik's quashing
petition – The investigating agency failed to establish a prima
facie case against Ajay Malik for the alleged offences –
The allegations, even if taken as true, did not disclose the
commission of an offence u/s.343 of the IPC, especially given
the High Court's finding of an alternative exit being available to
the complainant – Regarding s.370 of the IPC, the allegations
against Ajay Malik diminished in the complainant's statement
u/s.164 of the CrPC, and her no-objection affidavits consistently
stated she was neither trafficked nor wrongfully confined by
* Author
1726 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
him – The charge under s.120B of the IPC was speculative,
as the material on record showed minimal interaction between
Ajay Malik and co-accused related only to hiring the domestic
worker – The allegations were vague and the complainant's stance
under oath that she was not illegally confined made proceeding
to trial a futile exercise – The case was deemed fit for quashing.
[Paras 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29]
CrPC – S.320 – Rejection of Compounding Application – S.370
IPC not a compoundable offense u/s.320 CrPC:
Held: Ajay Malik sought compounding of the alleged offences
based on the complainant's no-objection affidavit which stated
the parties had amicably settled the dispute – S.320 of the CrPC
lists compoundable offences but s.370 of the IPC is not included
therein, and is therefore a non-compoundable offence – The High
Court rejected the compounding application on this ground, and the
Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning – However, the Court
emphasized that a delicate balance ought to be struck in cases
wherein the parties seek compounding of the offences – Though
well-intentioned, an excessively moralistic order may unnecessarily
prolong criminal proceedings, which have no logical conclusion
and only serve to further distress the parties. [Paras 30, 31, 32]
Criminal Trial – Discharge – Discharge of Ashok Kumar from
criminal proceedings – Upheld in light of mitigating factors –
No substantive justification for his inclusion:
Held: The Court upheld the High Court's decision to allow
Ashok Kumar's criminal revision and discharge him from the criminal
proceedings – Ashok Kumar was not named in the initial FIR but
was added in a supplementary chargesheet u/s.343 and 120B
of the IPC – However, the court took note of several mitigating
circumstances, firstly, there was no direct allegation against him
by the complainant; secondly, his inclusion via a supplementary
chargesheet was lacking substantive justification; and thirdly,
that there exists no evidence to suggest that he ever visited the
premises or was aware and acting in furtherance of any wrongful
confinement of the Complainant – The Court also referenced
its finding from Issue (1) regarding the alternative exit being
available to the complainant, which negated the claim of wrongful
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1727
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
confinement itself – Given the demonstrable lack of mens rea or
direct involvement, the Court found his discharge well-founded
and warranted no interference. [Paras 33, 34, 35, 36]
Domestic Workers – Rights of – Existing legal framework –
insufficient protection of domestic worker’s rights – Committee
to be constituted – Submission of report within 6 months to
introduce a legal framework:
Held: No, the existing legal framework in India does not sufficiently
protect the rights of domestic workers – There have been several
attempts through various bills to regulate their working conditions
and provide social security, but none have materialized into tangible
laws – The court directed the Ministry of Labour and Employment
in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment,
the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry
of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a committee comprising
subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending a legal
framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of the rights
of domestic workers – The committee is to submit a report within
6 months for the Government of India to consider introducing such
a legal framework. [Paras 39, 41, 49, 50, 55]
Case Law Cited
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC
303; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 INSC 217 : [2014]
4 SCR 1012; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3
SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal
Kapoor [2013] 3 SCR 52 : (2013) 3 SCC 330; State of Kerala v.
P. Sugathan and Anr. [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 409 : (2000) 8 SCC
203; Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI [2003] 1 SCR 119 : (2003) 3 SCC
641; Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [1983] 3 SCR 508 : (1983) 4
SCC 141; M.C. Mehta (2) v. Union of India [1988] 2 SCR 530 :
(1988) 1 SCC 471; Nilabati Bahera v. State of Orissa [1993] 2
SCR 581 : (1993) 2 SCC 746; Vishwa Jagriti Mission v. Central
Govt. [2001] 3 SCR 540 : (2001) 6 SCC 577; Aruna Ramachandra
Shanbaug v. Union of India [2011] 4 SCR 1057 : (2011) 4 SCC 454;
Vineet Narain v. Union of India [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 595 : (1998)
1 SCC 226; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] Supp. 3 SCR
404 : (1997) 6 SCC 241 – relied on.
1728 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Books and Periodicals Cited
ILO Report, “Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of
Indian Domestic Workers at Home and Abroad”, 2015; ILO Report,
“Employer practices and perceptions on paid domestic work:
Recruitment, employment relationships, and social protection”,
2023; Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency)
Convention, 1992 (No. 173); Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), and the Equal
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Domestic Workers
Convention, 2011 (No. 189); ILO Guide, “Effective Protection for
Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws”, 2012;
ILO Manual, “Achieving decent work for domestic works”, 2012;
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990; Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1979; The Domestic Workers (Conditions of Employment) Bill of
1959; The House Workers (Conditions of Service) Bill of 1989; The
Housemaids and Domestic Workers (Conditions of Service and
Welfare) Bill, 2004; The Domestic Workers (Registration, Social
Security and Welfare) Bill, 2008; The Domestic Workers (Decent
Working Conditions) Bill of 2015; The Domestic Workers Welfare
Bill 2016; The Domestic Workers (Regulation of Work and Social
Security) Bill, 2017; Kerala Domestic Workers (Regulation and
Welfare) Bill, 2021; Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Payment
of Wages Act, 1936; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015; Code on Wages, 2019; Social Security Code,
2020; Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act of 2008; Tamil
Nadu Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions
of Work) Act, 1982; Maharashtra Domestic Workers Welfare Board
Act, 2008; Constitution of India; Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.
List of Keywords
Wrongful confinement; Wrongful restraint; Human trafficking;
Criminal Conspiracy; Quashing of criminal proceedings; Scheduled
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1729
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
Tribe; Below Poverty Line; Social welfare society; Labour welfare;
Systemic exploitation; Domestic workers; Compounding of offences;
No-objection affidavit; Article 142 of the Constitution of India;
Doctrine of parens patriae; Unorganised workers; Social security;
Domestic labourers.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
441 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2022 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLMA No. 96 of 2018
With
Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Basant R, Sr. Adv., Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ms. Saroj Tripathi,
Ms. Anubha Dhulia, Akshat Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Anubha Dhulia, Akshat Kumar, Prashant Bhushan,
Ms. Ria Yadav, Chandrika Prasad Mishra, Ms. Deveshi Chand,
Ms. Prasashti Singh, Ankit Pandey, Prashant Umrao, Ms. Rashmi
Singh, Ms. Prashasti Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeals arise out of the common First Information
Report No. 60/2017 (Case Crime No. 94/2017) (FIR), which inter alia
contains allegations of wrongful confinement and trafficking of a
female domestic worker—the Complainant.
3. To further clarify, SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022, has been preferred by
the accused Ajay Malik in the FIR, as against the judgment dated
01.09.2022 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (High Court),
whereby Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 96 of 2018 (CMA),
1730 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
seeking the compounding and quashing of the criminal proceedings
initiated against him, was rejected (Ajay Malik’s case). SLP (Crl.)
No. 15131/2024, on the other hand, has been filed by the State of
Uttarakhand, challenging the judgment dated 12.01.2021, in Criminal
Revision No. 173 of 2019, whereby the co-accused Ashok Kumar’s
Revision Application seeking discharge was allowed by the High
Court (Ashok Kumar’s case).
A. Facts
4. Considering that these appeals arise from the same incident, their
factual matrices remain predominantly uniform, with differences
largely being restricted to the differing roles ascribed to Ajay Malik
and Ashok Kumar. It is thus necessary to briefly advert to the facts
that lay the foundation for these appeals.
A. 1 Background to the materialization of the criminal incident
4.1 The Complainant, a resident of Birhipani Nawatoli Bokhi,
Birhipani, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh, belongs to a financially
disadvantaged family from a Scheduled Tribe. In her search for
employment to support her family, she was brought to Delhi in
2009 by her neighbours, Subhash and Mohan Ram, under the
pretext of securing work.
4.2 Upon her arrival in Delhi, the Complainant was handed over to one
Shambhu @ Sambhu Prasad, who reportedly operated an office
at Britannia Chowk, Shakurpur, Delhi. Shambhu claimed to run the
Saint Maryam Placement Services (Regd.), ostensibly showcased
as a social welfare society for Scheduled Tribes (Placement
Agency). Shambhu forcibly deployed the Complainant as a
domestic help/housekeeper in various households, requiring
her to perform tasks such as washing utensils and cleaning. As
a result, she was reportedly sent to multiple locations, including
Karnal, Delhi, Gurgaon, and Kanpur. The Complainant further
alleged in the FIR that Shambhu through the Placement Agency
failed to compensate her for the labour extracted, and instead
misappropriated her earnings. In this regard, the Complainant
also alleged that she was routinely assaulted whenever she
requested remuneration or sought permission to return home.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1731
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
4.3 Ajay Malik recruited the Complainant on 16.10.2016, having
purportedly entered into a written agreement with the
Placement Agency, for her to work as a domestic help at his
official residence. Subsequently, two individuals employed by
Shambhu dropped off the Complainant at Ajay Malik’s home in
Dehradun, Uttarakhand. Ajay Malik at the time was serving as
a Scientist at the Defence Electronics Application Laboratory,
Defence Research and Development Organization under the
Ministry of Defence (DRDO), where he had been employed
since 1988. As a Class-I Officer, Ajay Malik had been allotted
a Type-V Government accommodation, where he resided with
his wife and two children. The alleged incident is said to have
occurred on these premises.
4.4 Ajay Malik, on 22.03.2017, departed from his residence with
his entire family, for official duty concerning the SDR-AR Phase
II L Band Trials at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Kanpur. During
the absence of Ajay Malik and his family, the Complainant
was left behind on the premises, the main entry to which had
been locked. A spare key to the home had been entrusted
to his friend and neighbour, Ashok Kumar, who is alleged to
have visited Ajay Malik’s residence regularly to provide the
Complainant with drinking water and to keep watch on her.
The Complainant has further stated in the FIR that Ajay Malik
had also left a mobile phone with the Complainant to remain
in regular touch with her, using which she was able to contact
the Police Authorities on 29.03.2017, to register a complaint
of wrongful confinement.
A. 2 Registration of the FIR
4.5 Acting on the Complainant’s information, the Police arrived at
Ajay Malik’s residence, and with the assistance of Ashok Kumar,
entered the premises. The Complainant was subsequently
recovered, and the Police prepared a Recovery Memo dated
29.03.2017. Following this, an FIR was lodged on 30.03.2017
against four individuals—Ajay Malik, Mohan Ram, Subhash, and
Shambhu—under Sections 343 and 370 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC), at Police Station Rampur, District Sadar,
Dehradun. On the same day, the Complainant’s statement
was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
1732 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), before the Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Dehradun.
4.6 The investigation commenced, during which the Investigating
Officer recorded witness statements, collected evidence, and
subsequently filed the first Chargesheet against Shambhu on
09.07.2017. A second Chargesheet was filed on 31.12.2017
against the remaining three co-accused, whereby Ajay Malik
specifically was accused of having committed offences under
Sections 343 and 370 read with Section 120B of the IPC. Finally,
the third Chargesheet came to be filed on 22.12.2017 against
Ashok Kumar, who had not been named in the FIR or the initial
complaint, charging him under Sections 343 and 120B of the IPC.
A. 3 Commencement of criminal proceedings
4.7 It is at this juncture that the criminal proceedings against Ajay
Malik and Ashok Kumar commenced separately and may be
traversed as such.
A. 3. 1 Ajay Malik’s case
4.8 Having been Chargesheeted in Case Crime No. 94/2017, Ajay
Malik filed CMA No. 96/2018 under Section 482 of the CrPC
before the High Court in January, 2018, seeking the quashing and
setting aside of the: (i) criminal proceedings initiated against him
through the FIR; (ii) the Chargesheet dated 31.10.2017; and (iii)
the summoning order, passed in Criminal Case No. 5282/2017,
pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun. The
High Court initially vide order dated 25.01.2018, stayed the
trial proceedings in the above-mentioned Criminal Application.
4.9 Subsequently, Ajay Malik on 01.08.2022 moved Compounding
Application No. 532/2022 before the High Court seeking
compounding of the alleged offences under Section 320
of the CrPC. The application was supported by an affidavit
affirmed by the Complainant herself, wherein she provided
that the parties had amicably settled the dispute. She further
deposed that she had no objection, should the offences against
Ajay Malik be compounded and the criminal proceedings against
him be quashed.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1733
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
4.10 That being so, the High Court vide the Impugned Judgment
dated 01.09.2022, firstly rejected Ajay Malik’s compounding
application—observing that a prima facie case under Section
370 of the IPC was made out against him, which is a non-
compoundable offence under the aegis of Section 320 of the
CrPC. Secondly, the High Court also deemed it fit to turn
down Ajay Malik’s main application under Section 482 of the
CrPC on merits, holding that the Chargesheet and witness
testimonies combined made out prima facie allegations of
wrongful confinement against him.
4.11 As a sequel thereto, Ajay Malik has approached this Court.
While issuing notice in Ajay Malik’s case on 26.09.2022, this
Court passed an ex-parte interim order staying his arrest in
connection with the captioned FIR, which operates till date.
A. 3. 2 Ashok Kumar’s case
4.12 Having elucidated the contextual backdrop amid which
Ajay Malik’s appeal arose, we now advert to the facts in
Ashok Kumar’s case. We note, at the cost of repetition, that
the State of Uttarakhand has preferred this appeal against
the order of the High Court discharging him from the criminal
proceedings in Sessions Trial No. 124/2018.
4.13 In this scenario, the Police Authorities, having conducted
further investigation in connection with the captioned FIR
and accompanying complaint, filed Third Charge Sheet No.
93B/2017 against Ashok Kumar under Sections 343 and
120B of the IPC on 22.12.2017. The Magistrate, Dehradun,
took cognizance of the same on 31.01.2018. Aggrieved,
Ashok Kumar preferred a Discharge Application before the
Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, under
Section 227 of the CrPC on 06.08.2018. However, the said
Court, vide order dated 02.03.2019, rejected his Discharge
Application, having found prima facie evidence that he had
held the keys to the residence wherein the Complainant was
wrongfully confined.
4.14 Discontented with the order of the Sessions Court, Ashok Kumar
moved the High Court through Criminal Revision No. 173/2019,
which has been allowed vide the Impugned Judgment dated
1734 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12.01.2021, quashing the criminal proceedings emanating from
the FIR qua him. While doing so, the High Court stressed on
the absence of any specific allegations against him in the FIR
and subsequent recorded statements. More pertinently, the High
Court has also found that Ajay Malik’s residence had two entry/
exit points, with only one being locked—thereby establishing
that the Complainant had the option of egress available to her
at all relevant times.
4.15 Consequently, the Second Additional District Judge, Dehradun,
vide order dated 06.02.2021, dropped the criminal proceedings
against Ashok Kumar in Sessions Trial No. 124/2018. It is in
this factual backdrop that the aggrieved State is before us in
appeal.
B. Contentions
5. Before we formulate the issues that arise for consideration in these
appeals, we may briefly note the contentions forwarded by the parties:
5.1 Mr R. Basant, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf
of Ajay Malik, while praying that the Impugned Judgment be
set aside and the criminal proceedings pending against him be
quashed, submitted as follows:
a) The Complainant’s statement under Section 164 of the
CrPC indicates that she merely requested Ajay Malik if she
could leave his residence, and he responded by requesting
her to remain until alternative arrangements could be made.
No evidence of active wrongful restraint, as is contemplated
under Section 343 of the IPC, is thus presented.
b) A no-objection affidavit filed by the Complainant explicitly
denies any confinement or mistreatment by Ajay Malik,
indicating a lack of grievance against him. This affidavit
should hold significant weight, allowing the Court to
quash proceedings, following the principles evolved in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab1 and Narinder Singh v.
State of Punjab.2
1 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303.
2 Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 INSC 217.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1735
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
c) The interim relief granted by the High Court demonstrates
judicial recognition of Ajay Malik’s case. In fact, decisions
such as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,3 and Rajiv
Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor,4 emphasise the quashing
of frivolous or baseless prosecution.
d) The Complainant’s allegations are linked to prior disputes with
the Placement Agency, and not Ajay Malik, further diminishing
the relevance of the charges registered against him.
5.2 Mr Prashant Bhushan, Learned Counsel, appearing for Ashok
Kumar, adopted the relevant part of the contentions put forth on
Ajay Malik’s behalf and fervently advocated to the correctness
of the Impugned Judgment in discharging Ashok Kumar.
Additionally, he canvassed the following submissions:
a) Ashok Kumar is not only a DRDO Officer with decades of
unblemished service; he also does not have any criminal
antecedents. The only role attributable to Ashok Kumar
in this entire factual scenario is the key he possessed
to Ajay Malik’s residence, which had been provided to
him so that he could keep an eye on the premises in the
absence of the latter.
b) Ashok Kumar is being needlessly harassed for innocently
and innocuously agreeing to keep the aforementioned
keys with him. He was completely unaware of any alleged
wrongful confinement being perpetrated by Ajay Malik. He,
moreover, never went to Ajay Malik’s residence before the
police arrived.
c) Ashok Kumar is also not named in the FIR or the
Complainant’s statement under Section 164 of the CrPC.
The Police have mechanically filed a Supplementary
Chargesheet, roping him in as an accused. In any case,
the ingredients for the offences alleged against him have
not been fulfilled.
3 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] SCR Supp. 3 259.
4 Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330.
1736 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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5.3 Per contra, Ms Anubha Dhulia, Learned Standing Counsel
for the State of Uttarakhand, sought to not only defend the
correctness of the High Court in disallowing Ajay Malik’s
quashing application but also vehemently opposed the
discharge of Ashok Kumar. She, accordingly, advanced the
following contentions:
i. Ajay Malik’s case
a) The Complainant’s FIR details allegations of being locked
in a house for a week, with the key handed over to
Ajay Malik’s associate. Moreover, her statements under
Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC corroborate these
claims, describing the Complainant’s inability to leave
the premises and her limited access to communication.
Additionally, the Recovery Memo records the discovery
of the Complainant confined in a locked flat by Police
Authorities and a video documenting her release. Taken
together, these facts clearly make out the charge of
wrongful confinement against Ajay Malik.
b) The victim belongs to a Below Poverty Line-Scheduled
Tribe family, which highlights the power imbalance
between the Complainant and Ajay Malik. This disparity
raises serious concerns about systemic exploitation, with
legislative intent ensuring these offences remain non-
compoundable under Section 370 of the IPC.
c) The no-objection affidavit relied upon by Ajay Malik
and allegedly affirmed by the Complainant is a mere
reproduction of the former’s Special Leave Petition
before this Court. It thereby lacks credibility, given the
Complainant’s vulnerable status; and potential coercion
or manipulation cannot be ruled out at this stage.
d) Lastly, upholding these charges aligns with social and
moral principles, ensuring accountability for exploitation
and addressing broader societal inequalities. Domestic
workers, who often start working when they are underage,
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by the elite
classes—and most such cases are never reported.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1737
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
ii. Ashok Kumar’s case
a) The Complainant’s FIR mentioned Ashok Kumar by name—
credited as Ajay Malik’s friend—who was responsible
for looking after the Complainant and the premises in
Ajay Malik’s absence. Similarly, her statement under
Section 164 of the CrPC also details the allegations
against Ashok Kumar. The High Court was thus incorrect
in holding that no case was made out against him since
he was not named in these two documents.
b) The Recovery Memo further sheds light as to how when
the Complainant was statedly freed from Ajay Malik’s
residence by Police Authorities, Ashok Kumar was called to
the said premises, having been in possession of the keys
thereof. This fact speaks to the reality that the Complainant
was wrongfully confined in the house, with the sole key
resting with Ashok Kumar, who while being aware of the
Complainant’s confinement, nonetheless elected to let her
remain in that position.
C. Issues
6. We have duly considered the rival submissions of the parties, as
elucidated hereinabove, and carefully perused the material on record.
We find that the following issues need to be analysed:
i. Whether the High Court acted well within the contours of its
powers under Section 482 of the CrPC in rejecting Ajay Malik’s
quashing petition?
ii. Whether the High Court fell in error in rejecting the Compounding
Application moved by Ajay Malik and supported by the
Complainant?
iii. Whether the High Court was legally correct in accepting
Ashok Kumar’s Criminal Revision, thereby discharging him from
the captioned criminal proceedings?
iv. Whether the existing legal framework in India sufficiently protects
the rights of domestic workers?
1738 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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D. Analysis
7. It may be noted at the outset that while evaluating the issues
formulated above, we have taken into consideration the credentials
of both, Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar; the contents of the FIR; the
Complainant’s statements; and her affidavits filed before the High
Court and this Court.
D. 1 Issue No. 1: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s
quashing application
8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary
powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent
the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These
inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other
statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The
conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section
482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases
of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold
the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several
decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts
must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold;
thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before
the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate
the following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with
mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi)
the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably.5
10. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is thus necessary to
examine each of the offences alleged against Ajay Malik to determine
whether a prima facie case has been established and if there is any
justification for quashing the criminal proceedings against him.
5 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1739
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
D. 1. 1 The offences alleged against Ajay Malik
11. The analysis in this regard will address each of the offences
enumerated against Ajay Malik, namely: (i) wrongful confinement
under Section 343 of the IPC; (ii) human trafficking under Section
370 of the IPC; and (iii) criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of
the IPC.
D.1.1.1 Wrongful confinement under Section 343 of the IPC
12. The IPC defines ‘wrongful confinement’ as ‘wrongfully restraining
any person in such a manner so as to prevent that person from
proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits’. Put more simply,
this offence requires the satisfaction of two prongs: (i) the voluntary
restraint of any person; and (ii) the act being done in a manner
such that it prevents the said person from proceeding beyond
circumscribing limits.
13. The State of Uttarakhand in this regard has vehemently contended
that there are several factors militating against Ajay Malik, including
the FIR detailing that he allegedly wrongfully confined the Complainant
at his residence, and the Recovery Memo which enumerates that
the Complainant was locked inside Ajay Malik’s residence, with the
main gate being doubly locked. The specific allegation thus seems
to be that Ajay Malik restricted the Complainant’s movements from
the circumscribed limit of his residence.
14. While this assertion appears plausible, what raises concern for
this Court is the claim that an alternative exit was available to the
Complainant, allowing her to freely enter and exit the premises.
This fact is fortified by the High Court’s findings in the Impugned
Judgment in Ashok Kumar’s case, which held that:
“7. The learned Magistrate did not consider the aspect
of the matter that where the complainant was resided
in the house of Ajay Malik which has two entries, one
entry the lock was put and another entry was free.
Upon consideration of the case record and the document
submitted therewith there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The revisionist was liable
to be discharged under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., which is
quoted hereunder:-
1740 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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“227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record
of the case and the documents submitted therewith,
and after hearing the submissions of the accused and
the prosecution on this behalf, the Judge considers that
there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his
reasons for so doing.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
15. This factual finding aligns with Ajay Malik’s consistent assertion that,
although the main entry to his residence was locked, an alternative
exit remained accessible for the Complainant to use, which has also
been illustrated in the site plan of the subject premises. Furthermore,
even as far as the Recovery Memo is concerned, it seems that the
Police did not inspect or document the existence of this alternate
exit, leaving its availability unverified.
16. Be that as it may, certain additional factual circumstances lend
further support to this conclusion. First, the mobile phone allegedly
left by Ajay Malik with the Complainant, and subsequently recovered
by the police, raises questions about the plausibility of wrongful
confinement. It remains unexplained why Ajay Malik would provide
the Complainant with a means of communication, allowing her to
contact others at will, had he intended to confine her or restrict her
within circumscribed limits. Second, the Complainant had been
issued a temporary pass issued by the DRDO Colony, where Ajay
Malik’s residence is located. The existence of this pass bolsters Ajay
Malik’s claim that the Complainant frequently left the residence and
the colony for errands. Third, the Complainant’s own no-objection
affidavits, explicitly state that she was never wrongfully confined and
that an alternative exit was always accessible to her.
17. On an objective consideration of this uncontroverted material
on record, there can be no other conclusion except to hold that
the allegations, even if accepted to be true, do not disclose the
commission of an offence by Ajay Malik under Section 343 of the
IPC.
D.1.1.2 Trafficking and exploitation under Section 370 of the IPC
18. We now turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section
370 of the IPC, pertaining to the trafficking and exploitation of the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1741
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
Complainant. In this regard, taking into consideration the extenuating
circumstances surrounding this case, this allegation seems to lack
any substantial merit. We say so for the following reasons:
i. The FIR includes allegations of assault and exploitation against
Ajay Malik and the other co-accused. However, a closer
examination reveals that the bulk of the FIR primarily focuses
on two neighbours, Subhash and Mohan Ram, who allegedly
brought the Complainant to Delhi, and Shambhu, who is accused
of persistently harassing the Complainant and exploiting her
vulnerable situation.
ii. In the Complainant’s statement recorded under Section 164
of the CrPC, the allegations against Ajay Malik seemingly
diminish. She instead provides a detailed account of how
her neighbours brought her to Delhi and handed her over
to Shambhu, who subsequently sent her to work in various
cities, withheld her rightful earnings, and consistently denied
her requests to return home. In contrast, the only mention of
Ajay Malik in her statement pertains to his alleged refusal to
send her home until alternative arrangements were made and
his having allegedly locked her in a room. The Complainant
also notes that Ajay Malik had left a mobile phone with her
before leaving for Delhi and maintained regular contact with
her during that time.
iii. The no-objection affidavit submitted by the Complainant before
the High Court as part of Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application,
elucidates that the Complainant has no grievances against
Ajay Malik and unequivocally asserts that she was neither
trafficked nor wrongfully confined by him. She further expresses
her willingness to have all pending criminal proceedings
against Ajay Malik quashed. At the High Court’s request, the
Complainant appeared virtually and reiterated her categorical
stance, confirming that she holds no complaints against Ajay
Malik. The relevant paragraph from the Impugned Judgment
in this case reads as follows:
“10. After having interacted with the complainant/
respondent No. 2 herein through video
conferencing, she had submitted that the present
applicant is not responsible for the act, which was
complained of by her and which finds reference in
1742 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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her statement too, which was recorded under Section
164 of Cr.PC.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
19. Furthermore, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Complainant filed an additional affidavit before this Court as well,
which carries significant weight and warrants our undivided attention.
In this affidavit, she reiterates that she was never wrongfully confined
or trafficked by Ajay Malik and affirms that she was always treated with
dignity and respect. She further states that she is now happily married
with a daughter and has no desire to prolong the embarrassment
caused to Ajay Malik and his family due to the allegations. It is thus
abundantly clear that the Complainant has sought to recant the
entirety of her allegations against Ajay Malik.
20. In this vein, having duly and holistically considered all of these
aspects in toto, we are of the opinion that no prima facie offence
under Section 370 of the IPC qua Ajay Malik has been made out as
well. Not only is there no evidence of neglect or exploitation of the
Complainant by Ajay Malik on record, but her own sworn statements
in denying any abuse must also be given due credence.
21. We deem it important to note that while there may have been
instances suggesting some degree of labour-based exploitation of
the Complainant by Ajay Malik and his family, this is not evident from
the face of the record, and we are not inclined to initiate an inquiry
into this aspect. In any event, such allegations do not constitute an
offense under Section 370 of the IPC, and we cannot conclusively
find Ajay Malik guilty of trafficking and exploitation as defined therein.
However, that being said, this case has prompted us to frame Issue
No. IV, whereby we have elaborately addressed the pressing need
to establish guidelines to safeguard the rights of domestic workers
employed in households across the country.
D.1.1.3 Criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC
22. Finally, we turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section 120B
of the IPC, which deals with punishment for criminal conspiracy. It is
trite law that the principal ingredient of this offence is the agreement
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1743
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
to commit an offence.6 The charge of conspiracy must be explicitly
evidenced, and should be easily discernable in the acts of the
conspiring parties. This Court has also previously held, in no uncertain
terms, that conspiracy cannot be made out without some kind of
physical manifestation of the alleged agreement being established.7
23. As previously noted, Ajay Malik employed the Complainant through
the Placement Agency established by Shambhu for domestic work
at his residence in Dehradun, which she joined on 16.10.2016. She
continued to work there for over five months without any untoward
incident. As per the purported agreement between the Placement
Agency and Ajay Malik, the Complainant’s wages were regularly paid
to her through the Agency. It therefore appears that the only agreement
between Ajay Malik and co-accused Shambhu was the employment
of the Complainant as domestic help at the former’s residence.
24. Furthermore, a thorough review of the material on record does
not indicate any orchestrated arrangement by Ajay Malik with the
co-accused to exploit or confine the Complainant. On the contrary,
the case appears to involve minimal interaction or communication
between Ajay Malik and the co-accused. Any correspondence
between them seems limited strictly to hiring of the Complainant as
a domestic worker at Ajay Malik’s residence. Against this backdrop,
the charge under Section 120B of the IPC qua Ajay Malik is highly
speculative and warrants rejection at the very threshold.
D. 1. 2 Whether quashing would be justified?
25. In light of the conclusions reached regarding each of the offences
alleged against Ajay Malik, it becomes clear that the Investigating
Agency has failed to establish any prima facie case. Since the FIR
has been investigated and a Chargesheet has been filed, the FIR
alone cannot serve as the basis for dismissing Ajay Malik’s claims.
26. Even assuming the FIR is accurate, it does not substantiate the
charges, which appear to have been mechanically transcribed into the
Chargesheet, despite the Investigating Agency having had sufficient
opportunity to gather material evidence. Notably, no element of illegal
6 State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr., (2000) 8 SCC 203.
7 Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641.
1744 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
confinement, trafficking, or criminal conspiracy has been established
against Ajay Malik. Additionally, the Complainant has, under oath, stated
that she was not illegally confined. If this remains her position in Court,
the purpose of proceeding to trial becomes questionable, amounting
to an exercise in futility and a sheer wastage of judicial resources.
27. Based on the foregoing facts, it appears that the Complainant’s primary
grievance lies in the unfair treatment she received from Subhash,
Mohan Ram, and Shambhu. At this juncture, it is important to note
that the allegations against these three co-accused are significantly
more serious and grave, considering that charges have been filed
against them under Sections 370, 373 and 376 of the IPC. The
Placement Agency run by Shambhu could be described as a deceptive
front, supposedly aimed at the welfare of tribal girls, but in reality,
it perpetuates their abuse and exploitation. This dubious operation
seems to be the root cause of the Complainant’s suffering, with Ajay
Malik having been included in the FIR without substantial justification.
28. In this backdrop, it appears to us that the Complainant’s actions were
driven by a fear that should she leave Ajay Malik’s employment, as
she had done in previous jobs in different cities, she would once
again fall under the control of the Placement Agency, which would
subject her to further exploitation and abuse. This fear likely led her
to lodge the complaint as a means of escaping her situation. This
sequence of events aligns with the Complainant’s subsequent and
consistent stance thereafter, in which she asserts that Ajay Malik
and his family did not wrongfully confine or exploit her. Furthermore,
she has expressed a desire for the proceedings against Ajay Malik,
who is a retired senior citizen now, to be quashed.
29. In light of the absence of any prima facie evidence of wrongdoing
by Ajay Malik; the vague and omnibus claims made in the FIR and
subsequently the Chargesheet; and the Complainant’s consistent
stance to compound and settle the dispute, we are unable to concur
with the High Court’s conclusion in the Impugned Judgement, which
otherwise constitutes a fit case for quashing.
D.2 Issue No. 2: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s
Compounding Application
30. We now turn to the second issue in Ajay Malik’s case concerning
the rejection of his compounding application. As stated previously,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1745
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
Ajay Malik had moved a Compounding Application in his pending
petition, based on the strength of the Complainant’s no-objection
affidavit.
31. Section 320 of the CrPC provides for the compounding of offences,
and its appended Schedule lists the various criminal offences that
may be compounded or settled by and between the parties under the
Court’s supervision. In the facts of the instant case, the FIR against
Ajay Malik was registered under Sections 343 and 370 of the IPC.
Incontrovertibly, Section 370 IPC, being a serious offence, does not
find a place on the Schedule attached to Section 320 of the CrPC
and is thus classified as a non-compoundable offence.
32. Although we are inclined to agree with the High Court’s rejection of
Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application owing to the non-compoundable
nature of alleged offences, this issue is nonetheless rendered
academic given our conclusion in the previous issue, where we
have rejected the High Court’s view regarding Ajay Malik’s quashing
application. Therefore, while we may not need to delve into this issue,
it must be underscored that a delicate balance ought to be struck in
cases wherein the parties seek compounding of the offences. Though
well-intentioned, an excessively moralistic order may unnecessarily
prolong criminal proceedings, which have no logical conclusion and
only serve to further distress the parties. Accordingly, the correctness
of the High Court’s decision to disallow Ajay Malik’s Compounding
Application does not require our consideration on merits.
D. 3 Issue No. 3: The State’s challenge to Ashok Kumar’s
discharge
33. Adverting to Ashok Kumar’s case, we shall now consider the merit
of the State’s challenge to the Impugned Judgment therein. At the
cost of repetition, the proceedings herein concern Ashok Kumar,
a neighbor and friend of Ajay Malik. Although Ashok Kumar was
not initially named in the FIR, he was later Chargesheeted by the
Investigating Officer and included as a co-accused. The State is
aggrieved by the High Court’s decision to allow Ashok Kumar’s
Criminal Revision Petition, thereby discharging him from the criminal
proceedings arising from the captioned FIR.
34. It is trite law that the discharge stage acts as a critical filter to
eliminate cases lacking legal merit, sparing the accused from
1746 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
unnecessary proceedings, while ensuring that credible cases
proceed to trial. Thus, discharge under Section 227 of the CrPC
is justified when the material on record fails to disclose a prima
facie case against the accused to proceed for trial. The legislative
spirit behind this provision envisions the rights of the accused being
balanced with public interest, so as to ultimately prevent abuse of
the legal process.
35. The sum of the allegations against Ashok Kumar is that he held the
key to the residence where the Complainant was allegedly wrongfully
confined. While we have already negated the claims of wrongful
confinement against Ajay Malik based on the High Court’s finding
regarding the alternative exit available to the Complainant, certain
additional mitigating circumstances may be observed in the case of
Ashok Kumar. Firstly, there is no direct allegation against him made
by the Complainant herself. Neither the FIR nor the Complainant’s
statements disclose any explicit, illegal act on Ashok Kumar’s part.
Secondly, Ashok Kumar was not named in the original FIR, and
was only added by way of a Supplementary Chargesheet by the
Investigating Officer, seemingly as an after-thought. This hasty
inclusion lacks any substantive justification. Thirdly, while Ashok
Kumar was delivered the keys by Ajay Malik and held them as a
favor to him, there is no evidence to suggest that he ever visited the
premises or was aware and acting in furtherance of any wrongful
confinement of the Complainant.
36. For these reasons, we have no hesitation in upholding the correctness
of the reasoned order of the High Court, in allowing the discharge of
Ashok Kumar from the criminal proceedings. Given the demonstrable
lack of any mens rea or intent on the part of Ashok Kumar, apart
from the lack of any direct involvement, his discharge is well-founded
and warrants no interference by this Court.
D. 4 Issue No. 4: Domestic workers’ lacking legal protection
in India
37. We lastly address the final issue framed by us in these appeals, which
pertains to the rights, protections, and privileges (or lack thereof)
accorded to domestic workers in the Indian milieu. While this broader
issue may only be tangential to the present appeals, we have taken
it upon ourselves to deal with the same in light of the gravity and
nature of the systemic issues we have been presented with.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1747
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
D. 4. 1 Background
38. It is an incontrovertible fact that the demand for domestic workers
has been mounting in India, in consonance with rapid urbanization
and development. According to reports by the International Labor
Organization (ILO)—which is a United Nations agency devoted to
promoting internationally recognized labour and human rights—
domestic workers currently constitute a significant portion of the
unorganised workforce in India,8 with millions of individuals, primarily
women,9 engaged in this sector. Their contributions are indispensable
to urban households, performing tasks such as cooking, cleaning,
caregiving, and other essential services.
39. While any avenues for employment being opened to marginalised
women merit celebration, we are at pains to note that despite their
growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the
most vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Domestic workers often
belong to marginalised communities, such as Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically
Weaker Sections. They are compelled to undertake domestic work
due to financial hardship or displacement, further reinforcing their
vulnerability. That is not to say, however, that we are declaiming
this source of gainful employment that is readily available to women
across all social sub-stratas. On the contrary, we seek to affirm this
important livelihood that is available to so many women, which brings
them one step closer to financial security and the accompanying
independence.
40. Our concerns instead lie with the non-regulation of this crucial labour
sector, which often leads to the aforementioned malignant results.
The same is abundantly evident from the factual circumstances of
the present appeals, wherein the Complainant was tortured and
exploited for several years at the hands of individuals who forcibly
transported her to differing cities, in the promise of a better life
which never materialised. The purported Placement Agency which
employed the Complainant continually leeched her salaries, leaving
her utterly destitute and helpless.
8 ILO Report, “Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of Indian Domestic Workers at Home
and Abroad”, 2015.
9 ILO Report, “Employer practices and perceptions on paid domestic work: Recruitment, employment
relationships, and social protection”, 2023.
1748 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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41. The simple reason for this harassment and rampant abuse, which
seems to be prevalent throughout the country, is the legal vacuum
which exists vis-à-vis the rights and protection of domestic workers.
Indeed, domestic workers in India remain largely unprotected and
without any comprehensive legal recognition. As a result, they
frequently endure low wages, unsafe environments, and extended
hours without effective recourse.
42. Before we discuss the Indian legal experience with domestic workers,
it is perhaps fitting to advert to the prevailing international standards.
D. 4. 2 International norms and standards
43. In the international spectrum, over the course of many decades, the ILO
has provided various guidelines and conventions for the betterment of
labour laws across the world. It is noteworthy that it has also extensively
sought to protect the rights of domestic workers, which it recognises as a
uniquely disadvantaged and marginalised class. It proactively advocates
for the inclusion of domestic workers in pre-existing labour treaties.
For instance, during discussions on the Protection of Workers’ Claims
(Employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992 (No. 173), the definition of
‘insolvency’ was revised to refer to as ‘employer’s assets’ instead of
the narrower term ‘enterprise’s assets,’ ensuring domestic workers
were covered. Moreover, Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), applies
to all ‘workers and employers’ without any exception.
44. Reference may also be made to the principles of non-discrimination
and equal opportunity in the Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), and the Equal Remuneration
Convention, 1951 (No. 100), which also cover domestic workers. In
fact, the ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly emphasised that
laws or policies promoting equality in jobs must include domestic
workers and that excluding them would violate these Conventions.10
45. However, the most significant international development in the
realm of the rights of domestic workers was in 2011, with the
adoption of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189).
This Convention offers specific protection to domestic workers
10 ILO Guide, “Effective Protection for Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws”, 2012;
ILO Manual, “Achieving decent work for domestic works”, 2012.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1749
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
while laying down the basic rights that such workers are entitled
to, and the measures that States must take to ensure decent work
conditions. These protections include regulating work settings and
providing domestic workers with social security benefits that are at
par with other workers. This Convention is supplemented by the
ILO Recommendation No. 201, which further addresses the need
for facilities like proper accommodation, food, and the medical
health of domestic workers.
46. Apart from the illustrative treaties reproduced hereinabove, the plight
of domestic workers is also addressed in several other Conventions.
For instance, the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990,
in its General Comment No. 1, provides for and acknowledges
the particularly vulnerable position of migrant domestic workers.
Similarly, General Comment No. 26 to the landmark Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979
addresses female migrant workers and extends to those undertaking
domestic work as well.
47. Thus, contemporary international standards not only acknowledge
the vulnerability of domestic workers but also strive to provide them
extensive protection and parity with other labourers.
D. 4. 3 Domestic laws and guidelines
48. Coming to the legal standing of domestic workers within India,
there seems to be a degree of lacunae in legislative frameworks,
safeguarding and protecting their rights.
49. At this juncture, we must fairly note that there have already been
several attempts to bring domestic workers under legal protection.
However, for a plethora of reasons that are beyond the scope of the
present discussion, these Bills have never materialized into tangible
laws or policies. In this regard, we may briefly note the following:
i. The Domestic Workers (Conditions of Employment) Bill of
1959 was among the earliest legislative attempts to regulate the
working conditions of domestic workers. It aimed to establish
minimum standards for wages, work hours, and employment
terms for domestic workers. However, the Bill received little
support and was ultimately not enacted into law.
1750 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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ii. The House Workers (Conditions of Service) Bill of 1989
sought to address similar issues, focusing on formalising
employment practices and providing essential safeguards for
domestic workers. Despite being introduced, this Bill neither
formed the subject of significant Parliamentary discussions nor
advanced towards enactment.
iii. The Housemaids and Domestic Workers (Conditions of
Service and Welfare) Bill, 2004 was introduced in the Rajya
Sabha as a private member’s Bill. This Bill proposed mandatory
registration of domestic workers and required the government
to ensure sufficient employment opportunities, medical benefits,
and other welfare measures. It also included penalties for
employers hiring unregistered workers. However, the Bill was
not passed by Parliament.
iv. The Domestic Workers (Registration, Social Security and
Welfare) Bill, 2008, introduced by the National Commission for
Women, aimed to establish a registration process for domestic
workers and to provide them with social security benefits. The
Bill did not progress beyond its drafting stage and was not
enacted into law.
v. The Domestic Workers (Decent Working Conditions) Bill of
2015 sought to include domestic workers under existing labour
laws, such as the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. The Bill
proposed ensuring fair wages and regulated working conditions
for domestic workers. However, it remained pending and was
not enacted into law.
vi. The Domestic Workers Welfare Bill 2016 proposed including
migrant and minor domestic workers within its ambit. The Bill
prescribed working conditions, terms of employment, and
the collection of a cess from employers to maintain a social
security fund. It also mandated the registration of workers by
employers and placement agencies. This Bill was, however,
not enacted.
vii. The Domestic Workers (Regulation of Work and Social
Security) Bill, 2017 sought to regulate the work of domestic
workers, prescribe duties for employers and placement agencies,
establish Boards for their registration, address issues related
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1751
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
to the marginalisation caused by migration, and provide for
the inclusion of domestic workers in significant labour laws.
However, the Bill was never enacted.
50. It, thus, seems to us that no effective legislative or executive action
in furtherance of enacting a statute, which could prove to be a boon
to millions of vulnerable domestic workers across the country, has
been undertaken as of now. Over and above the absence of any
legislation protecting their interests, domestic labourers also find
themselves excluded from existing labour laws as well. These,
inter alia, include statutes such as the Payment of Wages Act 1936,
Equal Remuneration Act 1976, Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, etc.
51. Be that as it may, we must also acknowledge that recent years
have witnessed certain positive developments aimed at improving
the legal and social status of domestic workers in India. These
developments, while still in their initial stages of implementation,
signal recognition of the need to address the systemic neglect
faced by this workforce. In this regard, reference may be made to
the Code on Wages, 2019, which introduces provisions to address
the issue of minimum wages for domestic workers. Moreover,
statutes such as the Social Security Code of 2020 replace earlier
legislation, including the Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act
of 2008, bringing domestic workers within the ambit of ‘unorganised
workers’. This inclusion makes them eligible for various benefits such
as social security, health insurance, provident fund, and maternity
benefits. Further, the introduction of the e-Shram portal in 2021
has facilitated the creation of a centralised database to identify
and register migrant/domestic/unorganised workers, enabling their
access to welfare schemes.
52. It is equally noteworthy that despite the absence of comprehensive
protections for domestic workers through a Central Law, several
States have taken initiatives to safeguard their rights and welfare.
Tamil Nadu established the Tamil Nadu Domestic Workers Welfare
Board in 2007 under the Tamil Nadu Manual Workers (Regulation
of Employment and Conditions of Work) Act, 1982. The Board
administers various social security benefits, including education
assistance, marriage assistance, delivery assistance, accidental death
1752 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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compensation, and pensions. These benefits are provided through
monetary compensation at fixed rates. Maharashtra has enacted the
Maharashtra Domestic Workers Welfare Board Act, 2008, creating
District Domestic Labour Welfare Boards with tripartite representation
from employers, employees, and the government. This Act allows
domestic workers to voluntarily register to access social security
benefits, including maternity and child care, education assistance,
and medical expense reimbursement. Similarly, Kerala introduced
the Kerala Domestic Workers (Regulation and Welfare) Bill, 2021
to protect, regulate, and improve the welfare of domestic workers.
The Bill aims to ensure minimum wages, fair treatment, and lawful
payment for workers, many of whom are employed through third-
party agencies.
53. Amidst this backdrop, which motions the lack of specific protections
covering domestic workers in India, it becomes this Court’s solemn
duty and responsibility to intervene, exercise the doctrine of parens
patriae and forge the path leading to their proper welfare. In a
catena of decisions,11 this Court has repeatedly stepped in and
laid down interim guidelines to protect vulnerable groups who were
utterly unprotected due to legal gaps. That being said, we do not
presently deem it appropriate to lay down an interim legal code
which would govern the working conditions of domestic workers. We
say so, being cognizant of the factum that ordinarily, the judiciary
should not stray too far out of bounds, and expressly interfere
in the legislative domain. The democratic setup of this country
may be likened to a tripartite machine, fueled by the doctrine of
separation of powers, without which it’s functioning shall surely
come to a grinding halt.
54. It is in this vein, that we once again repose our faith in the Legislature,
and the elected representatives of the Indian people, to take the
imperative steps towards ensuring an equitable and dignified life for
domestic workers. In light of the same, we seek to dispose of these
appeals with certain pointed directions to the Government of India.
11 Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141; M.C. Mehta (2) v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 471;
Nilabati Bahera v. State of Orissa, (1993) Cri. LJ 2899; Vishwa Jagriti Mission v. Central Govt., (2001) 6
SCC 577; Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454; Vineet Narain v. Union
of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1753
Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.
E. Conclusion and Directions
55. In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions arrived at
hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to invoke this Court’s
extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India
and issue the following directions:
i. Ajay Malik’s appeal (SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022) is thus allowed
and the Impugned Judgement dated 01.09.2022 passed by High
Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 96/2018 is accordingly
set aside. Additionally, the FIR No. 60/2017 (Case Crime No.
94/2017), Chargesheet and all other proceedings therefore
arising qua him are hereby quashed.
ii. There is no merit in the appeal preferred by the State against
Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No. 15131/2024), and it is thus
dismissed. Therefore, the High Court’s order dated 12.01.2021
in Criminal Revision No. 173/2019 is upheld.
iii. The conclusions drawn in favour of Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar
shall have no bearing on the criminal proceedings pending
against the other accused, including those who are alleged to
have exploited the Complainant on the pretext of securing her
employment. Those proceedings shall be decided as per their
own merits.
iv. As regard to the larger issue of the protection of rights of domestic
workers, we direct the Ministry of Labour and Employment in
tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment,
the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry
of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising
subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending
a legal framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of
the rights of domestic workers.
v. The composition of the Expert Committee is left to the wisdom
of the Government of India and its concerned Ministries. It will
be appreciated if the Committee submits a Report within a
period of 6 months, whereupon the Government of India may
consider the necessity of introducing a legal framework which
may effectively address the cause and concern of domestic
workers.
1754 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
56. The present appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Consequently,
pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
57. Ordered accordingly.
Result of the case: SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022 is allowed and
SLP (Crl.) No. 15131/2024 is dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Harshit Anand, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)
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