Holding

The convictions under Section 149 IPC cannot stand where the evidence is inconsistent, uncorroborated, and the alleged FIR is not a genuine first information report, and thus the accused are acquitted.

Summary

The case arose from a violent clash in Katihar district where a mob of 400‑500 armed persons assaulted several villagers, resulting in the deaths of two men and injuries to five others. The trial court convicted 21 accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC; the High Court affirmed the convictions of 12 and acquitted 7. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, finding material contradictions, inconsistencies with medical evidence, and unreliable identifications, especially the statement of PW‑20 which could not be treated as an FIR. The Court reiterated the requirements of Section 149, emphasizing the need for proof of a common object and constructive liability, and warned against convicting passive onlookers without cogent evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions of the ten appellants, granting them the benefit of doubt and discharging their bail bonds.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt under Sections 302 and 149 IPC.
Whether the oral testimonies of injured eyewitnesses are reliable despite contradictions and medical inconsistencies.
Whether the statement of PW‑20 can be treated as a First Information Report under Section 154 CrPC.
The scope and application of Section 149 IPC, including the distinction between active participants and passive onlookers.
The requirement of identifying overt acts and common object for constructive liability.

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 161
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 141, s. 142, s. 143, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 323, s. 324

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 124 of 1989 holding the appellants herein guilty of the offence of murder punishable u/s.302 r/w. Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 and 149 – Prosecution case that PW-20 visited his agricultural field alongwith his brother – The accused nos. 2, 16, 17, and 21 respectively alongwith 400- 500

Subjects

Section 149 IPCUnlawful assemblyInnocent bystanderConstructive liabilityEvidence evaluationInjured eyewitnessFIRCommon objectRule of prudenceMedical evidenceOcular evidence

Judgment

[2025] 11 S.C.R. 60 : 2025 INSC 1192

Zainul
v.
The State of Bihar
(Criminal Appeal No. 1187 of 2014)
07 October 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants
herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 124 of 1989 holding
the appellants herein guilty of the offence of murder punishable
u/s.302 r/w. s.149 of the Penal Code, 1860. Whether the High Court
committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 and 149 – Prosecution case that
PW-20 visited his agricultural field alongwith his brother – The
accused nos. 2, 16, 17, and 21 respectively alongwith 400- 500
persons were hiding nearby the agricultural field of the PW-20
with weapons – They attacked PW-20 and his brother – PW-20’s
brother was shot dead – Upon hearing the alarm, the PWs 3,
4, 5, 6, and 10 respectively alongwith one SM accompanied
by other villagers reached at the place of occurrence – They
were also assaulted by the accused and SM was shot dead –
Statement of PW-20 was reduced in form of an FIR – 24
accused persons were put to trial – At the conclusion of the
trial, 21 persons stood convicted – Out of the 21 convicts,
19 preferred appeals before the High Court – The High Court
upheld the conviction of 12 and acquitted 7 – Therefore, 12
convicts whose conviction was affirmed came before this
Court in appeal – However, the appeals stood abated in so far
as two appellants were concerned – Accordingly, the instant
two appeals concern 10 convicts:
Held: The case in hand revolves around the evidence of five
injured eyewitnesses, and two eyewitnesses to the occurrence –
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence, this Court finds that the
oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses is marred by material
* Author
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 61

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

inconsistencies and embellishments striking at to the root of the
matter – The oral evidence of PW-20, an injured eyewitness, on
whose police statement the FIR was registered, would indicate
that he had no dispute with the accused persons regarding the
settlement of land – The deposition of the PW-20 stands at variance
with his fardbeyan – In his oral testimony, the PW-20 admitted that
he fell unconscious after the assault and, therefore, was unable
to name the assailants who had attacked the PWs 3, 6, and 10
respectively – In stark contrast, his fardbeyan categorically records
that the PWs 3, 5, 6, and 10 respectively had informed him that
forty others, armed with various weapons, had participated in the
assault – This contradiction strikes at the root of his credibility – To
add to this, the PW-3 deposed that he had never disclosed the
names of forty assailants to the PW-20, thereby further undermining
the credibility of the witness – The PW-3, an injured eyewitness, in
his oral evidence has attributed overt acts to the accused nos. 12
and 10 respectively – He stated that the accused no. 10 assaulted
him with a gandasa on his leg – However, the medical evidence
on record indicates not only the absence of any injury on the leg
of the witness but also that an injury caused by a gandasa would
ordinarily result in an incised wound – Further, there is conflict
between the ocular version and the Medical evidence – The PW-5,
an injured eye-witness, has in his oral evidence attributed overt acts
to the accused nos. 8 and 6 respectively – However, the medical
evidence does not support the version of assault as narrated by
the witness – The oral testimony of the PW-4 is that he does not
say anything about the presence of any of the appellants – On the
contrary, he states that there were a large number of persons at the
spot, and he was unable to distinguish between the assailants and
the spectators – The accused nos. 7, 13, and 14 respectively have
been implicated only by the PW-6 – Their presence or participation
finds no support from the testimony of any other witness – There
is no credible evidence even against the accused no. 17 except
an omnibus identification by the PW-20 – This Court holds that
the accused nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 respectively
are entitled to the benefit of doubt – Also, the statement of the
PW-20 could not have been treated as the FIR, since the first
information about the occurrence had already reached the police
prior to its recording of statements at the hospital – It cannot be
said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt – A case attains that standard when all its links are firmly
established and recognizable to the eyes of a reasonable person –
62 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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In the present matter, the prosecution version does not appear to
stem from a truthful narration of facts – The oral testimonies of
the witnesses neither corroborate each other nor align with the
medical records – The various contradictions in the form of material
omissions go to the root of the matter, and in such circumstances,
it cannot be held that the prosecution has discharged its burden
of proof – Thus, the impugned judgment and order to the extent
of holding the appellants herein guilty of the offences they were
charged with, is set aside. [Paras 65-68, 72, 73, 82, 83, 86, 91]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – Essentials:
Held: i) There must be an assembly of five or more persons; ii)
An offence must be committed by any member of that unlawful
assembly; iii) The offence committed must be in order to attain
the common object of that assembly, or iv) The members of the
assembly must have the knowledge that the particular offence is
likely to be committed in order to attain the common object. [Para 45]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – First limb and Second limb of the
provision:
Held: s.149 of the IPC stipulates that if an offence is committed
by any member of an unlawful assembly (of 5 or more persons)
in prosecution of the common object (as defined in s.141 of the
IPC) of that assembly, or if the members of the assembly knew
that the said offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the
said common object, every person who, at the time of committing
that offence, was a member of that assembly, will be guilty of that
offence – The first limb of the provision envisages the commission of
an offence by a member of an unlawful assembly in order to attain
the common object of that assembly – Whereas, the second limb
of the provision encapsulates knowledge on the part of a member
of the unlawful assembly qua the likelihood of such offence being
committed in order to attain the common object. [Paras 46, 47]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – Expression “in prosecution of the
common object”:
Held: The expression “in prosecution of the common object” means
that the offence committed must be directly connected with the
common object of the assembly, or that the act, upon appraisal
of the evidence, must appear to have been done with a view to
accomplish that common object. [Para 49]
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 63

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – Unlawful assembly – Constructive
liability of any member:
Held: s.149 of the IPC makes all the members of an unlawful
assembly constructively liable when an offence is committed by
any member of such assembly with a view to accomplish the
common object of that assembly or the members of the assembly
knew that such an offence was likely to be committed – However,
such liability can be fastened only upon proof that the act was
done in pursuance of a common object – Once the existence of
a common object amongst the members of an unlawful assembly
is established, it is not imperative to prove that each member
committed an overt act – The liability under this provision is
attracted once it is certain that an individual had knowledge that
the offence committed was a probable consequence in furtherance
of the common object, thereby rendering him a “member” of the
unlawful assembly. [Paras 50, 51]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – When the assembly consisted of
some persons who were merely passive onlookers:
Held: While ascertaining this fact, it is of utmost importance to
consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who
were merely passive onlookers who had joined the assembly as
a matter of idle curiosity, without the knowledge of the common
object of the assembly, since such persons cannot be said to be
members of the unlawful assembly – Because, the nucleus of
s.149 is “common object”. [Para 52]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – Innocent Bystander and Member
of an Unlawful Assembly:
Held: Mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a
person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established
that such an accused also shared its common object – A mere
bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within
the ambit of s.149 of the IPC – The prosecution has to establish,
through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the accused
persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly – The
test to determine whether a person is a passive onlooker or an
innocent bystander is the same as that applied to ascertain the
existence of a common object – The existence of a common object
is to be inferred from the circumstances of each case, such as:
a) the time and place at which the assembly was formed; b) the
64 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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conduct and behaviour of its members at or near the scene of the
offence; c) the collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from
that of individual members; d) the motive underlying the crime; e)
the manner in which the occurrence unfolded; f) the nature of the
weapons carried and used; g) the nature, extent, and number of
the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations. [Para 54]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.149 – Cogent and credible material –
Careful consideration by the Court:
Held: Where there are general allegations against a large number
of persons, the court must remain very careful before convicting
all of them on vague or general evidence – Therefore, the courts
ought to look for some cogent and credible material that lends
assurance – It is safe to convict only those whose presence is
not only consistently established from the stage of FIR, but also
to whom overt acts are attributed which are in furtherance of the
common object of the unlawful assembly. [Para 61]

Evidence – Evaluation of the testimony of injured eyewitness:
Held: The testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a
special status in law because the injuries on the person lends
credence to the fact that the witness was present at the scene of
the occurrence – The courts lend credence to the testimony of an
injured eyewitness, assuming that the witness would not want to
let his actual assailant go unpunished – Thus, unless there are
cogent grounds for disbelieving the evidence of an eyewitness
due to major contradictions and discrepancies, ordinarily, such
evidence should be relied upon. [Para 63]

Case Law Cited
Mizaji & Ors. v. State of U.P. [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 940 : 1958 SCC
OnLine SC 95; Charan Singh v. State of U.P. [2004] 2 SCR 925 :
(2004) 4 SCC 205; Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab [1962] Supp.
3 SCR 848 : AIR 1963 SC 174; Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[1964] 8 SCR 133 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30; Muthu Naicker v.
State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385; Sherey v. State of U.P. (1991)
Supp. 2 SCC 437; Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B. [2009] 7 SCR
518 : (2009) 7 SCC 415; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer
Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390; Balu Sudam Khalde & Anr. v.
State of Maharashtra [2023] 6 SCR 851 : (2023) 13 SCC 365;
Abdul Syeed v. State of M.P. [2010] 13 SCR 311 : (2010) 10 SCC
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 65

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

259; Balaka Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1975] Supp. 1 SCR
129 : (1975) 4 SCC 511; Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai [2003] Supp.
4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395; State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu
& Ors. (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 590; Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar
[1995] 2 SCR 826 : (1995) 4 SCC 392 – relied on.
Shyam Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 8 SCR 255 : (2012)
8 SCC 651; Kanhaiya Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [2013] 6
SCR 361 : (2013) 5 SCC 655; Subal Ghorai & Ors. v. State of West
Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607; Musa Khan v. State of Maharashtra
(1977) 1 SCC 733; Ranvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
[2023] 1 SCR 841 : (2023) 14 SCC 41; Joy Devaraj v. State of
Kerala (2024) 8 SCC 102; Bikau Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar
[2003] Supp. 6 SCR 201 : (2003) 12 SCC 616; Vasant @ Girish
Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka [2025] 3 SCR 158 :
2025 SCC OnLine SC 337 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Section 149 of IPC; Interpretation of Section 149 of the IPC; Unlawful
assembly; Innocent bystander; Member of unlawful assembly; Rule
of prudence in convicting members of unlawful assembly; Ocular
evidence; Medical evidence; Common object; Evaluation of injured
eyewitness; Cogent material; Credible material.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1187 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2013 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in CRLA No. 202 of 1990
With
Criminal Appeal No. 1188 of 2014

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ashwani Kumar Singh, Rauf Rahim, Sr. Advs., Ashish Anshuman,
Chandan Malav, Ms. Prerna Singh, Ambar Qamaruddin, Tejasvi
Kumar, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin.
66 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Advs. for the Respondent:
Divyansh Mishra, Yoshit Jain, Manish Kumar, Ms. Himani
Choudhary, Samir Ali Khan, Pranjal Sharma, Anil Kumar Verma.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*

I. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION ................................................. 2
a. Oral Evidence on Record ................................................... 11
b. Judgment of the Trial Court ............................................... 20
II. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ............................................................ 28
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT ......................... 31
IV. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-
STATE .......................................................................................... 36
V. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 39
A. Interpretation of Section 149 of the Indian Penal
Code ................................................................................... 40
a. Innocent Bystander v/s Member of an Unlawful
Assembly ................................................................... 47
i. Rule of Prudence in Convicting Members of an
Unlawful Assembly ........................................... 48
b. Principles of Law relating to Appreciation of Evidence
of the Witnesses ........................................................ 58
i. Conflict between the Ocular Version and the
Medical Evidence ............................................. 62
c. Whether the Prosecution could be said to have proved
its case Beyond Reasonable Doubt? ........................ 67
B. Whether the Statement of the PW-20 could have been
treated as an FIR? ............................................................ 69
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 74

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 67

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

1. Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are the same,
the appellants are co-convicts and the challenge is also to the self-
same judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were
taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this
common judgment and order.
2. These appeals arise from the common judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 17.07.2013 in
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 202 of 1990 (hereinafter, “the impugned
judgment”), by which the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred
by the appellants herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order
of conviction passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 124 of
1989 holding the appellants herein guilty of the offence of murder
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the IPC”).

I. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
3. It appears from the materials on record that the investigating officer
recorded the statement of one Jagdish Mahato (PW-20), an injured
eyewitness, dated 20.11.1988, while he was admitted in the hospital,
which later came to be reduced in the form of a first information report
(Ext. 7). The statement of the PW-20 recorded by the investigating
officer dated 20.11.1988 reads thus:
“ST No. 124/89
5055
16.2.90
Statement of Jagadish Mahato, S/o- Jamun Mahato,
R/o-Raharkhal, PS- Ajam Nagar, District- Katihar, recorded
by the S.I. AK Jha, OIC of Ajam Nagar PS, Date: 20.11.88,
Time: 13.30 in the State Dispensary, Ajam Nagar.
My name is Jagadish Mahato, S/o- Jamun Mahato,
R/o-Baharkhal, PS- Ajam Nagar, District- Katihar. Today,
on 20.11.88 at about 13.30 hrs, I give my statement to the
Inspector of the Ajam Nagar PS in an injured condition
in the Government hospital, Ajam Nagar, that today at
about 8.00 AM, I was watching my field which used to be
grazed by buffaloes along with my brother Meghu Mahato.
Seeing the buffalo not there, we both the brothers went to
68 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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the field of Aslam which I have taken on ‘Batai and doing
the sweet potato cultivation and came to our paddy field
and sat down there. Yesterday, on 19.11.88, I had got the
paddy cut by the labourers from the land given to me by
the Government of Bihar. I had cultivated the said land.
Due to this Sh. Jainul Sarkar, Muslim Sarpanch, Barik,
Aftab, all R/o- Mahila along with 400-500 people were
hiding there. All of them armed with gun, country made
pistol, bhalla, farsa, gadasa, sword, suli and kachia etc.
Some of them were having stones. Some of them were
cutting the paddy from the land given by the Government
of Bihar. Seeing me and my brother, all of them ran
towards us from all directions and surrounded us. At first
they threw stones. Among them, I found 1. Masiad, S/o-
Mahi, 2. Ajam, S/o-Shekh Nausad, 3. Khwaja, S/o- Shekh
Nausad, 4. Shekh Aladi, S/o- Shekh Shekh Sadiq, 5.
Shekh Karim, S/o- Sekh Sadiq, 6. Kaimuddin, S/o- Shekh
Habib, 7. Sahebuddin, S/o- Habib, 8. Hoda, S/o- Habib, all
R/o- Mahila, 9. Manoria, S/o- Unknown, 10. Asarul, S/o-
Jhagru, 11. Rajjak, S/o- Salim, 12. Sikandar, S/o- Salim,
13. Aku, 14. Sallu, all are S/o- Gaffur, 15. Israel Munsi,
S/o- Shekn Kalu, 16. Shekh Muslim, 17. Shekh Barik,
18. Shekh Jainul, 19. Shekh Mustaffa, 20. Sheikh Aftab,
all are S/o- Kalimuddin, 21. Abbu Naser, S/o- Basir, 22.
Haklu, S/o- Bazaru, 23. Gulam, S/o- Haklu, 24. Jaina,
S/o- Shekh Mallu, 25. Shekh Mahsuddin, S/o- Massu,
26. Niajuddin, S/o- Shekh Masu, 27. Ismail, S/o- Shekh
Chutharu, 28. Masiyad, S/o- Shekh Mohidi, 29. Shekh
Udhva, S/o- Shekh Mohidi all are R/o-Mahila, PS-Ajam
Nagar, out of whom Manoriya was holding three-not pistol,
Abu Nasar was holding gun, Gulam holding ‘suli’ and
others were holding lathi, bhala, farsa, gadasa, sword,
suli and stones. At first those people having surrounded
threw stones on us. Then I and my brother raised alarm
and tried to flee. During this time I was hit by a stone.
When we fell down upon this Gulam hit me in the ribs with
‘suli’. Then they assaulted us with lathi, and farsa. Then
my brother Meghu fled when 30. Ibrahim, S/o-Unknown,
R/o- Kantakosh, PS- Manihari who was with those persons
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 69

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

opened fire from a pistol on my brother Meghu. Then he
fell down. By that time, hearing our alarm, people of the
village, Dudhnath Mahato S/o- Bhuneswar Mahato, Faiju
Mahato S/o- Jagdev Mahato, Sripati Mahato S/o- Bhujangi
Mahato, Dasu Mahato S/o- Ram Govind Mahato, Sarjug
Mahato S/o- Munni Lal Mahato, all R/o-Baharkhal arrived
there running. Behind them a large number of men and
women also came there running. Those people assaulted
them also. Among them Sarjug Mahato also suffered gun-
shot injuries and he had succumbed to death. My brother
Meghu had sustained gun-shot injury and he died there.
The other injured persons Doodhnath, Faizu, Sripati and
Dasu had told me that 31. Allauddin, S/o- Alam, 32. Abbas,
33. Safat, both S/o- Nseer, 34. Basir, 35. Phooli, S/o Balal,
36. Hakkimul, S/o- Suleman, 37. Mahtab, S/o- Hakimuddin,
38. Khalil, S/o- Jamal, 39. Sattar, S/o- Taslim, 40. Mister,
S/o- Garibul, 41. Matru, 42. Motiya, 43. OC Mohammed,
S/o- Alimuddin, 44. Nizam, 45. Ishaq, both S/o- Badaruddin,
46. Sakur Ahmmed, 47. Habib, both S/o- Mehdi, 48. Dhelu,
49. Dablu, both S/o- Siraj, 50. Nizam, S/o- Modi Khalil, 51.
Kalimuddin, S/o- Sarfailly, 52. Mouzia, S/o- Kalimuddin,
53. Mahamuddij, S/o-Safar Ali, 54. Allouddin, S/o- Sadi
Mahajan, 55. Saha, 56. Jamal, both are S/o- Basarat,
57. Mustaffa, 58. Fajak, 59. Imamdi, 60. Faijuddin, all
S/o- Banka Naseer, 61. Pachharu, S/o-Hanif, 62. Najim,
63. Jabir, S/o- Naushad, 64. Arif, 65. Majibbul, 66. Jamir,
S/o- Maqbool, 67. Ayub, S/o- Makbool, 68. Farooq, S/o-
Jhagru, 69. Asarul, S/o- Jhagru, 70. Aslam, S/o- Alum, 71.
Mokhtiyar, S/o- not known, all are R/o-Mahila, PS-Ajam
nagar, District- Katihar and Mulla Master’s aide who is
having pox marks on his face, were also armed with bhalla,
farsa, gadasa, sword, suli, kachia, stones, gun, pistol. They
had surrounded them and injured them. Kaimuddin had
fired from pistol on Sarjug Mahato and he died instantly.
After Sarjug Mahato and Meghu Mahato had succumbed
to their injuries, those people had dragged their dead
bodies to take those away. But seeing other men and
women near the embankment, they left them there and
took Sripati Mahato with them. They had left him near the
70 [2025] 11 S.C.R.

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Mahila embankment. This incident had been seen by all
the men and women of the village. They will narrate the
incident. They will identify the accused persons. The injured
persons will tell who had injured them. After those people
left the spot, the co-villagers took us and the deceased
Sarjug Mahato and Meghu Mahato to the Government
hospital on a cot, where we are under treatment.
This is my statement. I claim that the aforementioned
accused persons with the intention to kill us were hiding
in the field being armed with bhalla, farsa, gadasa, sword,
suli, kachia, stones, gun and country made pistol and
killed Sarjug Mahato and Meghu Mahato and injured us.
This statement of mine was read over to me which I found
correct and put my thumb impression on this.
Witness:
1. Ram Suraj Mahato
2. Uttam Mahato
3. Suresh Mahato
RTI
Jagadish Mahato
This statement of the informant was read over to him which
he found correct and put his thumb impression on this.
ST/124
Sd.//Arvind
Ajam Nagar PS
20.11.88”
4. The aforesaid statement later came to be reduced in the form of
a first information report as prescribed under Section 154 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the CrPC”) and was
numbered as FIR No. 148 of 1988 registered with the Ajam Nagar
Police Station, Kathiar. In the FIR, in all 72 persons came to be
arrayed as accused. The FIR reads thus:
“Brief facts of the case and offence with sections and
details of the property stolen:
Assault by lathi, bhalla, farsa, gadasa, sword, suli, kachia,
stones, gun, pistol with the intention to murder by forming
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 71

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

unlawful assembly and injuring others, Offence committed
U/s. 147/148/149/342/302/324/323 IPC and section 27 of
the Arms Act.”
5. As per the FIR, on the fateful day of the incident, the first informant,
Jagdish Mahato (PW-20) decided to visit his agricultural field on
20.11.1988 alongwith his brother (deceased). A day prior, i.e., on
19.11.1988, he had harvested paddy crop from the field that was
assigned to him by the Government. It is the case of the prosecution
that the accused nos. 2, 16, 17, and 21 respectively alongwith 400-
500 persons were hiding nearby the agricultural field of the PW-20
with weapons. These persons did not want the PW-20 to harvest
the paddy. According to the case of the prosecution, some of those
persons even started causing damage to the paddy crop. All these
persons upon seeing the PW-20 and his brother cornered them and
started pelting stones.
6. The PW-20 named 30 persons as accused in his statement recorded
by the investigating officer at the hospital. According to him, the
accused no. 9 named in the FIR had a pistol in his hand, the accused
no. 21 named in the FIR was holding a gun, the accused no. 23
named in the FIR had a suli in his hand and others were having
weapons like lathi, bhala, farsa, gandasa, sword, suli, stones etc. It is
alleged that the accused persons laid an assault on the PW-20 and
his brother was shot dead in the incident. Upon hearing the alarm,
the PWs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 respectively alongwith one Sarjug Mahato
(deceased) accompanied by other villagers reached at the place of
occurrence. The accused persons are said to have assaulted the
aforesaid witnesses as well. Sarjug Mahato is alleged to have been
shot dead by the accused no. 1.
7. On the strength of the FIR referred to above, the investigation started.
On conclusion of the investigation, the chargesheet came to be
filed against 24 accused persons for the offences punishable under
Sections 148, 149, 307 and 302 of the IPC respectively.
8. The criminal case came to be committed by the Magistrate to the
court of Sessions under the provisions of Section 209 of the CrPC.
Upon committal, the same came to be registered as the Sessions
Case No. 124 of 1989 in the court of Sessions Judge, District
Katihar.
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9. The Trial Court proceeded to frame charge against the accused
persons for the offences enumerated above. The accused persons
denied the charge and claimed to be tried.
10. The prosecution examined the following 24 witnesses.

Sr. Prosecution Witness Particulars
No.
1. Suraj Mahto Resident of Baharkhal.
2. Ram Surat Mahto Witness to inquest report prepared by the
PW-24.
3. Dasu Mahto Injured eyewitness; cousin of PW-20.
4. Chhedi Mahto Injured eyewitness.
5. Faizu Mahto Injured eyewitness.
6. Sripati Mahto Injured eyewitness.
7. Munilal Mahto Father of the deceased Sarjug, resident
of Baharkhal.
8. Chinta Devi Wife of the deceased Sarjug, resident of
Baharkhal.
9. Ram Nath Mahto Witness to seizure lists, resident of
Baharkhal.
10. Dudh Nath Mahto Injured eyewitness.
11. Maharania Devi Wife of the deceased Meghu, resident of
Baharkhal.
12. Tilaki Devi Wife of the PW-5, resident of Baharkhal.
13. Samudri Devi Wife of the PW-6, resident of Baharkhal.
14. Tusia Devi Wife of the PW-20, resident of Baharkhal.
15. Bhubneshwar Mahto Father of the PW-10, Resident of
Baharkhal.
16. Suresh Mahto Brother of the PW-6, resident of
Baharkhal.
17. Uttam Mahto Witness to inquest report prepared by the
PW-24.
18. Radhe Mahto Witness to seizure lists; cousin of
deceased Sarjug.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 73

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

19. Arjun Mahto Witness to seizure lists.
20. Jagdish Mahto Injured eyewitness; brother of deceased
Meghu; resident of Baharkhal.
21. Dr. B.P. Gupta At Kishanganj Hospital, conducted
post-mortem on dead body of deceased
Sarjug and Meghu.
22. Dr. Narayan Mishra Medical Officer at the Azam Nagar
Hospital; examined injuries on 5 injured
persons.
23. Arvind Kumar Investigating Officer
24. Surendra Prasad Assistant Sub-Inspector at the Azam
Singh Nagar Police Station; prepared the
inquest reports.

11. It also relied upon few pieces of documentary evidence.

Exhibit Particulars
Ext. 2 to 2/4 Parcha granted by the State of Bihar
Ext. 3 and 3/1 Rent receipts of the P.O. Land
Ext. 4 Fardbeyan
Ext. 5 and 5/1 Post-mortem reports of the deceased
Ext. 6 to 6/4 Injury reports
Ext. 7 Formal FIR
Ext. 8 to 8/4 Injury Reports prepared by the police
Ext. 9 and 9/1 Inquest reports
Ext. 10 and 10/1 Seizure lists

12. Upon closure of the recording of the oral evidence, the Trial Court
recorded the further statements of the accused persons under Section
313 of the CrPC. The accused persons stated that they all were
innocent and had been falsely implicated in the crime.
13. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence on record, held 21 accused persons guilty of the alleged
offence whereas the remaining 3 accused persons were acquitted of
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all the charges. All the convicted accused persons were sentenced
to undergo life imprisonment for the offence of murder.
14. The appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court went in appeal before the High Court. The
High Court after reappreciation of the oral as well as the documentary
evidence on record dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants
herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the Trial Court.
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here
before this Court with the present appeals.

a. Oral Evidence on Record
16. Jagadish Mahto (PW-20), the brother of the deceased Meghu
Mahto, on whose statement the FIR was registered, and one of
the eyewitnesses to the incident deposed that, at about 8 AM, the
PW-20 and the deceased had gone to have a look at their paddy
field. Thereafter, they went to the sweet potato field where they saw
the accused nos. 17, 2, 21, and 16 respectively loitering around
the settlement land. The witness has further deposed that at some
distance, he saw 400-500 people, all armed with weapons like gun,
pistol, suli, pick-axe, spear, sickle, etc.
17. The witness further stated that out of the 400-500 people, 10-11 persons
started cutting the paddy from his field, and when the deceased and
the witness tried to stop them, they started pelting stones on them. The
PW-20 went on to identify the accused nos. 9, 4, Aladi (not arrayed
as an accused in the FIR), accused nos. 20, 5, 22, 8, 6, 1, 18, 11, 10,
12, Abbas (accused no. 32 in the FIR), Safak (accused no. 33 in the
FIR), Nayazuddin (not arrayed as an accused in the FIR), Jaharuddin
(not arrayed as an accused in the FIR), Ismail (accused no. 27 in
the FIR), accused nos. 2, 17, 21, and Gulam (accused no. 23 in the
FIR) respectively. He deposed that after being hit by a stone, he fell
down. Thereafter, Gulam hit him on his ribs with a suli, the accused
no. 10 assaulted him by a pick-axe on his head, the accused no. 12
assaulted him with a lathi, the accused no. 2 assaulted him with a
gandasa and the accused no. 11 with a bana. According to the PW-
20, his brother was also assaulted. During this time, the PWs 3, 5,
6, 10, and the deceased Sarjug Mahto respectively, reached at the
place of occurrence but they, too, were assaulted by them.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 75

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

18. The PW-20 further deposed that his brother was done to death by
a gun-shot and was also assaulted with a suli. After the assault, all
accused fled away. Thereafter, the villagers took them to the Azam
Nagar Hospital. The Police Inspector recorded his statement, and
obtained his signature. He stated that prior to the incident, he had
no quarrel of any nature with the residents of the village Mahila with
respect to the settlement land. He further deposed that the accused
persons were not concerned in any manner with the settlement land.
One Hakimul of the village Mahila had set the house of Fekan Mahto
on fire which had led to a murder on account of the said dispute.
19. The PW-20 admitted that the accused persons were never in
possession of the settlement land. He denied stating before the
police that the accused persons were hiding being agitated because
of the harvesting of the paddy which had taken place a day prior
to the incident. He deposed that he was unable to identify the
persons harvesting the paddy crop and identified them as labourers.
According to him, he fell unconscious after the assault and was
unable to witness as to who had assaulted the deceased Sarjug and
the PWs 3, 6, and 10 respectively. He stated that he was unable to
remember whose names he had disclosed. He categorically stated
that the injured persons had disclosed before the police as to who
all had assaulted them. In his cross-examination, the witness partly
resiled from his previous statement and stated that he was unable
to remember whether the statement that he had given to the police
in the hospital was read over to him or not.
20. The medical examination of the PW-20 revealed the following injuries
on him:
i. Incised wound on the right-side scalp 1” X 1/4” X bone deep;
ii. Lacerated wound on the scalp 2½” X 1/2” X bone deep;
iii. Punctured wound on the right side of the back ¼” diameter X
½” deep;
iv. One bruise in the right thigh 2½ X ½”;
v. Bruise on the left wrist joint 1½” X 1½”;
vi. Bruise over right wrist joint 1” X 1½”;
vii. Bruise on the left side chest 3” X ½”.
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21. Dasu Mahto (PW-3), the cousin-brother of the PW-20 and one of the
eyewitnesses to the incident deposed that the PW-20 and his brother
(deceased Meghu Mahto) had gone to the paddy field. When he
heard shouts, he ran towards the field. He was followed by deceased
Sarjug and the PWs 5, 6, and 10 respectively. He deposed that the
accused no. 12 assaulted him on his head with a lathi, the accused
no. 10 assaulted him on his leg with a gandasa, the accused nos.
2 and 17 respectively were holding a gun, the accused no. 2 was
holding a spear, the accused no. 11 was holding a suli. The PWs 5,
6, 10, and 20 respectively, were injured. The accused persons killed
Sarjug and Meghu respectively.
22. The witness further deposed that the fight ensued because of the
cutting of the paddy crop. He stated that he was at his house when
he heard the sound of the firing of two gun-shots. He fell unconscious
after being assaulted and regained consciousness only after some
time. He further deposed that the police had arrived between 11:00
AM and 12:00 noon and he had given his brief statement. He deposed
that he had not stated the names of 40 accused persons out of the
72 accused persons to PW-20, and he does not remember whether
the accused no. 2 was armed with a spear and the accused no. 11
was armed with a suli.
23. The medical examination of the PW-3 revealed the following injuries
on him:
i. One lacerated wound on the forehead 1½” X ½” X bone deep;
ii. One bruise over left scapular region 2½” X ½”;
iii. Bruise over left thigh outer aspect 3” X ½”;
iv. One bruise over left knee joint outer aspect 2” X ½”.
24. Faiju Mahto (PW-5), one of the eyewitnesses to the incident deposed
that after he heard some noise from the southern side of the settlement
land, he ran in that direction. The PW-3 was running ahead of him.
The PWs 6, 20, and deceased Sarjug and Meghu respectively were
also there. Upon reaching the place of occurrence the residents of the
village Mahila surrounded them and accused no. 5 (acquitted accused)
assaulted him on his right hand with a farsa and Sayab (absconder)
assaulted him on his head with a pick-axe. Further, the accused nos.
6, 8, and 22 respectively, assaulted him with lathis. Thereafter, he
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 77

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

was taken to the hospital, where he came to know that the assailants
had killed Sarjug and Meghu, and the PWs 3, 6, and 20 had suffered
serious injuries. The PW-5 had heard two rounds of firing.
25. In his cross-examination, the PW-5 deposed that he regained
consciousness in the boat while on his way to the hospital. All five
injured persons were taken to the police station. They reached the
police station at about 9:00 AM where the police recorded their
statements. Thereafter, he was admitted to the hospital. In the night,
the Sub-Inspector had recorded his statement.
26. The medical examination of the PW-5 revealed the following injuries
on him:
i. One incised wound on the right forearm measuring 2½” X ½”
X muscle deep;
ii. Incised wound on the middle of scalp 1½” X ¼” bone deep.
27. Sripati Mahto (PW-6), one of the eyewitnesses to the incident
deposed that the incident had occurred at about 8:30 AM. He heard
a commotion coming from the direction where the settlement land
was situated. He ran behind the PW-3, and the PWs 5 and 10
respectively ran alongwith him. The witness deposed that even before
he could reach the settlement land, the residents of the village Mahila
assaulted them. The accused no. 19 hit him with a pick-axe, the
accused no. 14 assaulted him with a sword, and the accused nos.
18, 7, 3, 13, Matru (absconder) and Jamshed (absconder) assaulted
him with a lathi. The witness denied having stated before the police
that he had heard the commotion coming from the direction where
the settlement land was situated. He had reached the hospital at 5
PM but his statement was not recorded on that day.
28. The medical examination of the PW-6 revealed the following injuries
on him:
i. One incised wound 1½” X ¼” X bone deep over root of right
ring finger;
ii. Incised wound 1” X ¼” over right side of injury No. 1;
iii. Incised wound ¾” X 1/6” X muscle deep over right middle finger;
iv. One lacerated wound ¾” X ¼” over right side of scalp;
v. One abrasion 1” diameter over right cheek;
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vi. One incised wound with out of radius bone 1½” X ½” over left
forearm.
29. Doodhnath Mahto (PW-10), one of the eyewitnesses to the incident,
deposed that the incident occurred between 8:00 AM and 9:00
AM. On hearing some noise, he ran towards the settlement land.
Jalla (not arrayed as an accused in the FIR) hit him on his head
with a lathi. Thereafter, someone assaulted him on his neck with a
pick-axe. He was unable to see the assailant as he was assaulted
from behind. At this juncture, the witness was declared hostile. He
denied stating before the police that upon reaching the settlement
land, the residents of the village Mahila surrounded him and he
was assaulted. Thereafter, he named Masiyan (not arrayed as an
accused in the FIR) as the assailant who assaulted him on his
neck from behind.
30. Further, he denied stating before the police that the accused no. 10
had assaulted him on his head with a lathi, the accused nos. 18 and
22 had assaulted him with a lathi, the accused no. 4 had assaulted
him with a pick-axe on his wrist, the accused no. 1 was armed with
a pistol, the accused nos. 11 and 20 were armed with a spear, and
the accused no. 8 was armed with a lathi.
31. The medical examination of the PW-10 revealed the following injuries
on him:
i. One incised wound on the back of neck 4” X 1” X 1½” (deep)
with bending of neck;
ii. One incised wound on the back 1” X ¼” X ¼” deep;
iii. One incised wound on the scalp back side 1” X ¼”;
iv. One incised wound on the right wrist joint 1 ¼” X ¼” X muscle
deep.
32. Chhedi Mahto (PW-4), resident of the village Mahila and one of
the eyewitnesses to the incident, deposed that the incident had
occurred at about 8:00 AM. At the time of the incident, he was in
his sweet potato field. He identified the accused nos. 1 and 18
respectively. He first stated that the accused no. 1 was holding a
gun. Then, he stated that he was armed with a spear. He deposed
that all were fighting with eachother. He further deposed that the
accused no. 1 shot dead deceased Sarjug, and the PWs 3, 5, 6, 10,
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 79

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

20 respectively, were injured. The accused no. 19 had a gandasa in
his hand, Jamir (absconder) held a suli. In his cross-examination,
the witness stated that he had no idea of the cause behind the fight.
He further deposed that there were many people and it could not be
said as to who were the assailants and who were the spectators.
The police arrived at about 12:00 to 1:00 PM, and his statement
was recorded on the spot.
33. Chinta Devi (PW-8), the wife of deceased Sarjug Mahto and one of
the eyewitnesses to the incident, deposed that she and her husband
were sowing crops in the morning of the day of the incident. At that
time, the deceased-Meghu raised an alarm. The PW-8 alongwith her
husband ran in that direction. She deposed that her husband was
surrounded by the residents of the village Mahila. She identified the
accused no. 18 passing on a gun to the accused no. 1, who in turn
fired a shot towards her husband. Thereafter, the accused no. 14
assaulted him with a suli, the accused no. 11 with a pick-axe, the
accused no. 17 with a suli. In her cross-examination, the witness
deposed that there was a crowd of around 400-500 people. While
some were armed, some were unarmed. She further deposed that
the Station-House-Officer of the police station arrived after 2 hours
of the incident and interrogated her.
34. Arvind Kumar Jha (PW-23), the Officer-In-Charge of the Azam Nagar
Police Station, deposed that on the day of the incident at about
1:25 PM, he received an O.D. Slip from the Govt. Hospital. On the
basis of the same, he recorded the statement of PW-20, and the
same was reduced in the form of an FIR. He deposed that he had
collected the injury reports of the PWs 3, 5, 6, and 10 respectively,
from the hospital and then immediately left for the place of occur-
rence. He reached the place of occurrence, i.e., the settlement
land at 3:20 PM. He found blood at various places on the ground
and a blood stained lathi. He inspected the documents pertaining
to the settlement land, which he found to be in the joint names of
the deceased Meghu Mahto, Lalu Mahto, Dharmu Mahto, and the
PW-20 respectively. On 21.11.1988, he recorded the statements of
the PWs 3, 5, 6, 10, and 15 respectively.
35. The police officer further deposed that the PW-4 had stated that
the accused no. 17 inflicted injuries with a suli on the body of the
deceased-Meghu, Ibrahim was armed with a pick-axe, Kirouri (not
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arrayed as an accused in the FIR) was armed with a sword, Tara
(not arrayed as an accused in the FIR) was armed with a gupti,
Manoriya (accused no. 9 in the FIR) had come with a pistol, and
Kaimuddin snatched the gun from accused no. 18 and fired a shot
at the deceased-Sarjug. Further, the PW-8 neither stated that the
accused nos. 14 and 17 respectively had assaulted her husband
with a suli nor that accused no. 11 assaulted him with a pick-axe.
She had named Sarful, Hamzu, Mozamil, Tulku, Shakil, Faltu, Nasir,
Azimuddin, Ishahak, and Chhotiya as the asssailants.

b. Judgment of the Trial Court
36. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on
record, the Trial Court vide its judgment and order dated 24.05.1990
passed in Sessions Case No. 124/1989 held 21 accused persons
guilty of the alleged crime and acquitted the remaining 3 accused
persons. The findings recorded by the Trial Court in its judgment
can be better understood in seven parts:-
a. First, on the factum of assault, it was observed that the PW- 21,
i.e., the doctor who performed postmortem on the dead bodies
had found several injuries, including a firearm injury, on both
the dead bodies. The description of injuries given by the PW-
22, who examined the injured witnesses, lend credence to the
version of assault narrated by the five-injured persons, i.e., the
PWs 3, 5, 6, 10, and 20 respectively. The injuries were found
to be on vital parts of the body like neck, chest, and head,
caused by sharp and hard blunt weapons. They were reflective
of the intention of the assailants at the time of causing such
injuries. They had knowledge that the injuries were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, the
oral testimony of the other eyewitnesses and IO read with the
inquest report and seizure list, entirely supported the case of
the prosecution. The Trial Court further observed that the blood
marks at different places, the trails of dragging marks and the
presence of a blood-stained lathi also substantiated the case
made out by the prosecution. It noted that the two deaths and
the injuries to five persons were not in dispute. It held that from
the oral evidence of the PWs 21, 22, 23, and 24 respectively,
the factum of assault as narrated by the PW-20 stood fully
corroborated.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 81

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

b. In continuation of the above, the Trial Court declined to accept
the version of the defence that the deceased and the witnesses
wanted to forcibly harvest the paddy from the settlement land
and as they started harvesting the paddy, the accused nos. 3
and 24 respectively objected, due to which the deceased and the
witnesses had assaulted both the accused persons. The court
declined to believe such defence on the ground that paddy was
not found at the spot at which the accused persons claimed to
have harvested it. The relevant observations read as under:-
“39. From the evidence of P.Ws. referred to in different
para above, it is apparent that the medical officer who
held postmortem on the dead bodies found numerous
injuries on both the dead bodies. There was injury
of fire arm on both the dead bodies. In this way the
doctor fully supports the picture of assault given by the
eye witnesses of the alleged occurrence. The Medical
Officer of Azamnagar Hospital who has examined the
five injured persons had also found various injuries on
the persons of Jagdish Mahto, Dudhnath Mahto, Faiju
Mahto, Sripati Mahto and Dasu Mahto. Their injuries
disclose that on the vital parts of the body like neck,
chest, head etc. the sharp cutting weapons and hard
blunt substance caused injuries and the injuries were
of the quality which would have caused fatal results.
These injuries are sufficient to show the intention
of the assailants that at the time of causing these
injuries they had very clear knowledge that these
injuries could have led to the worst result of death
of these injured persons. These injuries found by the
doctor fully corroborates the story of assault given
by the five injured persons Jagdish Mahto (P.W. 20),
Dasu Mahto (P.W. 3), Faizu Mahto (P.W. 5), Sripati
Mahto (P.W. 6), and Dudh Nath Mahto (P.W. 10).
The evidence of other eye witnesses on the point of
assault is also corroborated by the medical evidence
of the two doctors P.Ws. 21 and 22. The I.O. P.W.
23 and the A.S.I. P.W. 24 have also supported the
prosecution story the fair injury reports (Ext. 8 series)
inquest reports and seizure lists fully support the story.
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The P.O. of this case described by the I.O. (P.W. 23)
speaks clearly that the parcha land is the P.O. field
and the occurrence covered a big area of about 50
yards. The blood marks at different places and the
dragging mark and the trampling mark and presence
of “dhelas” and blood stained lathi fully corroborates
the picture of assault given by the prosecution that a
large number of persons took part in this assault and
the assault was indiscriminate. One thing is very clear
from the evidence of the I.O. that there was no paddy
bundle nor there was any harvested paddy in any
field near the P.O. According to the prosecution story
few members of the mob started forcibly harvesting
the paddy from the parcha land which was objected
to by the complainant Jagdish Mahto and his brother
Meghu Mahto on which they were surrounded by the
mob and they were assaulted. Against this according
to the defence story the complainant party had gone
in a group to forcibly harvest the paddy from the P.O.
land and they were harvesting the paddy against
which Habib and Allauddin protested on which the
complainant party assaulted Habib and Allauddin
causing injuries then villagers came in the help of
Habib and Allauddin and there was “marpeet”. It is
worth consideration that the defency story contained
in the complaint petition filed by Habib speaks about
the theft of paddy from 6-7 bighas on the date of
occurrence. The two murders and injuries to five
persons is not seriously disputed by the defence
side. If actually there was harvesting of paddy by
the complainant party and there was protest by the
accused side to protect their paddy and exercised their
right of defence of property as the defence side has
argued then there was no time for the complainant
and others to remove even a single bundle of paddy.
Therefore, in the natural circumstances one will expect
that the harvested paddy of the entire 6-7 bighas of
land should have been found there. But there was
no such harvested paddy either in bundle shape or
in spread shape. This falsifies the story presented
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 83

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

by the defence side. The I.O. and the two doctors
examined in this case are independent responsible
public servants. They have no reason to depose
falsely against the accused persons. In their cross-
examination also there is nothing it discredit there.
Therefore I find nothing to doubt the correctness of
their evidence. Accordingly I rely on the evidence of
the public servants examined as P.Ws. 21, 22, 23
and 24. From their evidence the picture of assault
given by the complainant in the fard bayan and in the
evidence as well as in the evidence of other injured
persons and eye witnesses finds full corroboration.”
c. Secondly, the Trial Court rejected the defence of right to private
defence, observing that the accused persons could not have
cultivated paddy on the settlement land as it had previously
been in the possession of the State of Bihar, and later with the
PW-20 alongwith his brothers. It further ruled out the possibility
of paddy been grown by the accused persons as none of the
witnesses or the deceased had harvested the paddy from the
settlement land. The relevant observations read as under:-
“40.[…]Therefore the claim presented by the accused
persons in this case clearly speaks that they want to
force the settles of the State of Bihar to flee away
from the settled land only due to the strength of the
accused side. This tendency cannot create any right
of private defence rather it clearly suggests. that the
whole occurrence is the result of the principle of might
is right. The accused persons had no justification
for going to the parcha and but they went upon the
strength of their violence to take possession of the
land which the complainant and his brothers and
cousins had got settlement. In this way I find that there
is no scope to argue for right of private defence.[…]”
d. Thirdly, the Trial Court noted that the contradictions in the
testimonies of the witnesses would not be of any help to the
accused persons as the witnesses were not found to have
suppressed the relevant facts. The relevant observations read
as under:-
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“42. The learned defence lawyer has tried to show
some contradictions in the evidence on the point
of occurrence with the help of witnesses who have
gone hostile. I do not think that such contradictions
can be used in favour of the defence when the case
diary and the evidence on the record speaks that
they are not suppressing the relevant facts. I do not
find any merit in the contradictions pointed out by
the defence side. The P.Ws. are all illiterate simple
and rustic villagers. If something is extracted by the
lawyer from them due to complicated questions it
can’t be used to contract other P.Ws.[…]”
e. Fourthly, the oral evidence of the PWs 3, 4, 7, 8, and 20
respectively, was found to be inspiring confidence, more
particularly, the fact that the accused no. 1 had fired shots killing
deceased Sarjug Mahto, the accused Ibrahim had fired shots
killing deceased Meghu Mahto, and that the other members of
the mob had assaulted them. It noted that the common object
of the members of the unlawful assembly was apparent from
the fact that they had arrived there with weapons without any
provocation.
f. Fifthly, the charge under Section 302 r/w Section 149 of the
IPC stood duly proved as the accused persons wanted that the
PW-20 and his brothers give up their claim over the settlement
land to enable the accused persons to forcibly occupy it. It held
that the common object of all the members of the unlawful
assembly was to cause the death of any person coming in the
way of their illegal design to forcibly dispossess the PW-20
and his brothers from the settlement land. Further, the charge
under Section 307 of the IPC against all the accused persons
also stood duly proved qua the assault on the PWs 3, 5, 6, 10,
and 20 respectively. The relevant observations read as under:-
“44. Question No. II: From the evidence of the P.Ws.
it is well proved that Kaimuddin fired killing Sarjug
Mahto and Ibrahim fired killing Meghu Mahto. There
are numerous other injuries on dead bodies besides
the injuries of fire arms which speak that several
other members of the mob also assaulted both the
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

deceased. From the evidence of P.W. 4 Chhedi
Mahto, P.W. 8 Chinta Devi, P.W. 7 Munilal Mahto,
P.W. 3 Dasu Mahto and the complainant P.W. 20 it is
proved that Kaimuddin fired on Sarjug Mahto killing
him on the spot. It is further proved that Ibrahim fired
on Meghu Mahto and other members of the mob
also assaulted him. This Ibrahim has absconded in
this case. The preplanning of all the members of the
mob is apparent from the fact that they had collected
there variously armed and without any provocation
they started assaulting the complainant and his
brother Meghu Mahto and the persons who came
to their rescue were also indiscriminately assaulted
mercilessly. This clearly speaks that all had one
and the same object that the complainant and his
brothers who had got parchas in respect of the land
should abandon their claims and allow the accused
persons to forcibly occup7y those settled lands and
if there was any protest the persons should be killed.
Therefore the common object of all the members of
the mob was one and the same to cause the death
of the persons coming in the way of their illegal
design to forcibly dispossess the complainant party
from the settled land. Therefore all the members
of the mob are equally responsible for causing the
death of Meghu Mahto and Sarjug Mahto. Therefore
the charge u/s 302/149 IPC is well proved against
the accused persons who have taken part in this
assault. There is no evidence to connect accused
Aslam, Kalimuddin and Allauddin. Therefore they are
not found responsible for this incident. The charge
framed u/s 302 IPC against Kaimuddin is well proved.
The charge u/s 307 IPC framed against the accused
persons for murderous attack on Dudhnath Mahto,
Jagdish Mahto, Dasu Mahto, Sripati Mahto and
Faiju Mahto is also well proved from the evidence
discussed above.[…]”
g. Sixthly, the Trial Court found that the accused no. 10 was
identified as an assailant by the PWs 3, 7, and 20 respectively.
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Further, the accused no. 12 was identified by the PWs 3, 7, 8, 20
respectively; the accused no. 11 by the PWs 3, 8, 20 respectively;
the accused no. 18 by the PWs 4, 6, 8, 20 respectively; the
accused no. 19 by the PWs 4, 6, 16 respectively; the accused
no. 5 by the PWs 8 and 20 respectively; the accused no. 8
by the PWs 5 and 20 respectively; the accused no. 22 by the
PWs 5 and 20 respectively; the accused no. 2 by 3 and 20
respectively; the accused no. 14 by the PWs 7 and 8 respectively;
the accused nos. 3, 7, 13, 16 by the PW-6; the accused nos.
4, 9, 16, 20, and 21 respectively by the PW-20. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“45. In the evidence of P.Ws. I have found that
accused Allu @Allauddin has been identified as an
assailants in the members of mob by P.W. 3 Dasu
Mahto, and the complainant P.W. 20 Jagdish Mahto.
Further his name has come in the evidence of P.W. 7
Munilal Mahto as dying declaration of Sarjug Mahto.
Accused Sallu has been identified by P.W. 3 Dasu
Mahto, P.W. 8 Chinta Devi, P.W. 20 Jagdish Mahto
and his name also comes in the evidence of P.W. 7.
Accused Hoda has been identified by P.W. 3, P.W.
8 and P.W. 20. Accused Samuddin stands identified
P.W. 4 Chhedi Mahto, P.W. 6 Sripati Mahto, P.W. 8
Chinta Devi and P.W. 20 Jagdish Mahto. Accused
Garibul has been identified by P.W. 4, P.W. 6 and
P.W. 16 Suresh Mahto. Accused Asarul has been
identified by P.W. 8 Chinta Devi and P.W. 20 Jagdish.
Accused Razak has been identified by P.W. 5 Faiju
Mahto and P.W. 20 Jagdish Mahto. Accused Sikander
has been identified by P.W. 5 Faiju Mahto and P.W.
20 Jagdish Mahto. Accused Muslim Sarpanch has
been identified by P.W. 3 Dasu Mahto and P.W. 20
Jagdish Mahto. Accused Udwa has been identified
by P.W. 6 Sripati Mahto. Accused Majia @ Mojib has
also been identified by P.W. 6. Accused Mister has
been identified by P.W. 8 Chinta Devi and he has
also been named by P.W. 7 in the dying declaration.
Accused Barik has been identified by the complainant
Jagdish Mahto. Accused Aftab, Masiat, Azam and
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

Khaza have also been identified by the complainant
Jagdish Mahto P.W. 20. Accused Habib has been
identified by P.W. 6 Sripati Mahto. In this way all
these 21 accused persons have been specifically
alleged by the P.W. b with definite identification that
they took part in this assault.”
h. Lastly, as the prosecution had failed to prove the charges
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused nos. 15, 23, and
24 respectively, the Trial Court acquitted them. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“44. […]Accordingly I find that the prosecution has
proved the charges beyond reasonable shadow
of doubts against all the accused persons except
accused Aslam, Kalimuddin and Allauddin.”

II. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
37. The 18 convicts being dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court
by way of Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 202 of 1990. The High Court
vide its impugned final judgment and order dated 17.07.2013 partly
allowed the appeal by acquitting 7 accused persons. As a sequitur,
the High Court affirmed the conviction of 11 accused persons. The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court is in three-parts.
i. First, the High Court by relying on the Exhibit I series (petitions
filed by the respective PWs for settlement of land), held that the
defence had admitted the validity of Exhibit 2 series (purcha
granted by the State Government in favour of the PW-20
and others), more particularly, it acknowledged the khata and
khasra number. Thus, the Exhibit 2 series could be said to be
conclusive on account of it not being challenged. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“52. This case suffers from some sort of peculiarity
and that is with regard to its origin. The origin happens
to be connected with the right to possess actual
physical possession of the land under dispute. The
position would have been very much clear, had the
defence allowed the prosecution to sail on its boat
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without pouncing upon the same but as is evident,
the defence was not satisfied with the suggestion
whatever they have during course of cross-examining
the P.Ws. They jumped into fray and advanced their
plea that the land was possessed by them and to
support the same, they have exhibited trace-map,
C.S. Khatian, R.S. Khatian. Not only this by having
Ext-I to 1/4 the defence had also brought on record
the petitions filed by the respective prosecution
witnesses for settlement of the land and by such action
the defence had admitted its propriety, genuineness
and on account thereof the defence had accepted
validity of Ext-2 series, the Purcha granted by State
Government in favour of the prosecution party. It is
no where the case of the defence that they have
had ever challenged Ext-2 series, Parcha before
the competent authority. That means to say, there
happens to be acceptance of the aforesaid Ext-2 in
its conclusiveness.
53. When particular act is performed in pursuance
of mandate of specific law then its genuineness,
its propriety, its effectiveness, its execution will be
accepted unless and until contrary is proved. The
defence had nowhere challenged or tried to rebut the
genuineness of purcha as well as even having purcha
issued in favour of prosecution party, they never came
over the land side by side when there happens to be
specific claim on behalf of defence, then in that event
it should have been proved at least to such extent
to cast doubt with regard to the prosecution version
relating to possession over the land brought under
Ext-2 series, Ext-2 relates to Meghu Mahto which
discloses settlement of 1.25 Acres of land of Khesra
no. 29/3 of Khata No. 94 of village, Giddhaur, 2/1
relates to Jagdish Mahto to the extent of area 1.50
Acre of Khesra no. 29/1 of Khata No. 94 of village,
Giddhaur, 2/2 relates to Dharmu Mahto covering an
area of 1 Acre of Khesra no. 108 (MI) of Khata No.
94 of village Giddhaur, 2/3 relates to Dasu Mahto of
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

area of 1 Acre of Khesra no. 29/5 of Khata No. 94
of village, Giddhaur, 2/4 relates to Lalu Mahto to the
extent of area 1 acre under Khesra no. 29/4 of Khata
No. 94 (MI) of village, Giddhaur.
xxx
55. None of the exhibits, that means to say, Ext-F
series, Ext-g relates to Khata No. 94, the Khata having
under Purcha and not Khata No. 14 so claimed under
Ext-C. The defence by exhibiting respective petitions
filed by the prosecution party under Ext-I series, in
real sense had shown their status acknowledging
Khata No, Khesra No. incorporated therein and by
such measure they have virtually sacked their own
status to advance their claim or having their claim
with regard to land covered under Khata No.94, the
Khata having been allotted in favour of prosecution
party.”
ii. Secondly, the High Court noted that the presence of injured
witnesses, i.e., the PWs 3, 5, 6, 10, and 20 respectively, cannot
be doubted. It observed that the oral testimonies of the said
witnesses were found to be reliable and trustworthy. Further, by
relying on the decision of this Court in Shyam Babu v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 651, it was held
that the oral evidence of the witnesses cannot be discarded
solely because they are related to each other. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“60. Coming to the remaining witnesses, as stated
above, 1.C PWs, 3,-4-, 5, 6 and 20 are injured
witnesses whose presence cannot be doubted. After
going through their testimony, it is found reliable
and trustworthy because of the fact that from their
testimony it is apparent that they have hot tried to inter-
mingle their evidence with any sort of development or
going beyond their status what they have perceived
as eyewitnesses as well have been victimized. at the
hands of appellants during course of occurrence. It
has also been found from their evidence that they
are inter-related.[...]”
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iii. Thirdly, on the applicability of Section 149 of the IPC, the High
Court by relying on the decision of this Court in Kanhaiya Lal
& Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 655,
and Subal Ghorai & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, reported
in (2013) 4 SCC 607, held that all the accused persons were
members of the unlawful assembly and the common object of
the unlawful assembly was to commit the crime as alleged.
After a meticulous examination of the oral evidence on record,
the High Court found that the prosecution was able to prove its
case against some of the accused persons beyond reasonable
doubt. Having said so, it acquitted the accused nos. 4, 5, 16,
18, 20, 21, and 22 respectively, as their possibility of being
passive onlookers could not have been ruled out. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“75. Thus after meticulously examining the evidence
of PWs, including that of injured witnesses, it is found
and held that prosecution has succeeded in proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. However, appellants
Azam, Asarul, Aftab Alam, Shahabuddin, Md. Khaza,
Barik, Md. Sikandar find their involvement as a
member of an unlawful assembly but without having
any sort of allegation at the end of prosecution and and
as as revealed by the prosecution on its own showing
presence of large numbers of persons, then in that
circumstances presence of person as spectators at
the place of occurrence cannot be ruled out.
76. Consequent there upon, they should at least are
found entitled for benefit of doubt and accordingly are
acquitted. They are on bail. Hence, they are directed
to be discharged from the liability of bail bond.”
38. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here
before us with the present appeals.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
39. Mr. Rauf Rahim, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the sole
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1187/2014, submitted that the FIR
was lodged at 2:35 PM on the basis of the statement of the PW-20.
However, the statements of other witnesses indicate that the statement
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

of the PW-20 was not the first information to the police. He submitted
that it is inconceivable that the complainant was able to see and
identify 72 assailants in a sudden assault. He further submitted that
the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence so far as
the accused no. 17 is concerned.
i. Mr. Rahim further submitted that the PW-20 has named accused
nos. 2, 10, 11, and 12 respectively as his assailants. The PW-20
had deposed that the accused no. 17 was loitering with accused
nos. 16 and 21 respectively near the settlement land. The High
Court has acquitted both the accused nos. 16 and 21 on the
possibility of them being passive onlookers. Moreover, it has also
come clearly on record that the land of many residents of the
village Mahila is situated towards north of the settlement land.
Hence, their presence cannot be said to be unusual. Notably,
the accused no. 17 is not related to either the accused nos. 1
or 2 respectively, who have been claiming their right over the
settlement land.
ii. Mr. Rahim pointed out that the PWs 5 and 6 respectively, failed
to identify the accused no. 17 as being present or having been
as assailant. Further, the PW-3 has improved upon his version
which has come on record in the statement of the PW-23, i.e.,
the Investigating Officer. The I.O. deposed that the PW-3 had
not stated in his police statement that the accused no. 17 was
armed with a spear.
iii. He argued that the PW-3 cannot be said to be a credible
witness as the other witnesses, i.e., the PWs 5, 6, and 10
respectively have neither identified the accused no. 17 to be
present nor have stated that he was one of the assailants even
when all of them have stated to have arrived at the place of
occurrence together. The statement of the I.O. also revealed
that the PW-8 had not stated before him that the accused no.
17 had assaulted her husband.
iv. As regards the applicability of Section 149 of the IPC, Mr. Rahim
relied on the decision of this Court in Musa Khan v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 733, to submit that
courts should not presume that any and every person who is
present near a mob at any time or to have joined or left it at any
stage, is guilty of every act committed by it from the beginning
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till the end. He further relied on the decision of this Court in
Ranvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in
(2023) 14 SCC 41, to fortify his submission that, in such cases,
courts should evaluate the evidence more closely as there is
always a tendency to implicate the innocent with the guilty. He
argued that the oral testimony of the witness could be termed
as consistent only when the evidence is found to be credible,
and satisfies the conscience of the court.
v. In the last, Mr. Rahim submitted that the High Court committed
a serious error by not properly marshalling the evidence. It has
merely referred to the evidence, and not appreciated the same.
He submitted that Section 149 of the IPC demands a greater
degree of appreciation of the evidence. He urged that the
impugned judgment be set aside and the appellant be acquitted.
40. Mr. Ashwani Kumar Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
nine appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 1188/2014, would argue that
the FIR is ante-timed and an afterthought. The incident allegedly took
place on 20.11.1988 at about 8 AM. The I.O. recorded the statement
of the informant at about 1:30 PM, and the FIR was registered on
the same day at 2:35 PM. However, the same was transmitted to
the concerned Magistrate after 2 days, as is apparent from the
Column 8 of the said FIR. Therefore, on account of substantial
delay in forwarding the FIR and non-explanation thereof, the FIR
becomes doubtful and would come under the suspicion of being an
exaggerated version.
i. He submitted that the PW-5 stated in his deposition that he
reached the police station at about 9 AM alongwith all the five
injured persons, i.e., the PWs 3, 6, 7, 10, and 20 respectively.
The Sub-Inspector of Police prepared the papers of the injured
persons after which they were taken to the hospital. Further,
PW-3, in his cross-examination admitted that the Sub-Inspector
reached the hospital at about 11 AM, wherein his statement was
recorded. Whereas, the PW-4 deposed that the Sub-Inspector
arrived at the place of occurrence at about 12 PM, where his
statement was recorded by him.
ii. In light of the conflicting versions given by the aforesaid
witnesses, the possibility that the statement of PW-20, on the
strength of which the FIR was registered, might have been
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

recorded after due deliberations and consultations cannot be
ignored. In such circumstances, the statement given by PW-
20 could not have been treated as the FIR. Consequently, the
investigation could be termed as tainted, and it would be unjust
to rely upon such a tainted investigation.
iii. With a view to fortify the aforesaid submission, Mr. Singh
highlighted one another contradiction in the deposition of the
PW-22, i.e., the Medical Officer of the Azam Nagar Hospital
and the PW-23, i.e., the I.O. The I.O. had deposed that he had
gone to the hospital on the basis a O.D. Slip received from
the hospital. Whereas, the PW-22 stated that he examined
the injuries on the injured persons upon police requisition. He
further submitted that there are contradictions in the form of
material omissions in the testimony of the witnesses before
the Trial Court.
iv. In the last, he submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate
the evidence in its true prespective. The PW-5 had deposed that
the accused no. 5 had hit him with a farsa on his right-hand,
and the accused nos. 6, 8, and 22 respectively had assaulted
him with a lathi. Strikingly, the High Court acquitted the accused
nos. 5 and 22 respectively but affirmed the conviction of the
accused nos. 6 and 8 respectively. He highlighted that the case
against the accused nos. 6 and 8 respectively stood at par
with that of the accused persons acquitted by the High Court.

IV. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE
41. Mr. Divyansh Mishra, the learned counsel would argue that the
evidence on record clearly indicates the specific role played by the
appellants in the assault. They all were heavily armed and laid an
indiscriminate attack on the prosecution party in pursuance of their
common object. He submitted that the appellant-accused no. 17 was
identified by the PWs 3 and 8 respectively as one of the assailants.
The accused no. 6 was identified as one of the assailants by the
PW-5, and was identified by the PW-20 as one of the members of
the unlawful assembly.
i. Further, the PW-5 had deposed that the accused no. 8 assaulted
him with a lathi. He was also identified as one of the members
of the unlawful assembly by the PW-20. The PWs 3 and 20
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respectively deposed that the accused no. 10 assaulted the
PW-3 on his left leg with a gandasa and the PW-20 on his head
with a pick-axe. The PWs 3 and 20 respectively deposed that
the accused no. 12 was one of the assailants who assaulted
them with a lathi. The PW-8 also witnessed the accused no.
12 assaulting her deceased husband Sarjug Mahto. The
PW-6 deposed that the accused nos. 7 and 13 respectively
had assaulted him. Mr. Mishra also submitted that the injuries
sustained by the witnesses are consistent with the description
of assault given by them in their testimonies.
ii. Mr. Mishra relied on this Court’s decision in Joy Devaraj v. State
of Kerala, reported in (2024) 8 SCC 102, to submit that the
discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses must be viewed
in the context of the chaotic incident, where multiple accused
persons are alleged to have assaulted the witnesses with various
weapons. In such circumstances, minor inconsistencies qua the
weapons are natural and do not undermine the credibility of the
witnesses. The discrepancies are not fatal to the case of the
prosecution when the ocular version stands fully corroborated
with medical evidence.
iii. He further submitted that the motive behind the incident was the
previous enmity between the witnesses belonging to the Mahto
community and the residents of Mahila village. He placed reliance
on the decision of this Court in the case of Bikau Pandey & Ors.
v. State of Bihar, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 616, to submit that
the existence of the common object under Section 149 of the
IPC is to be inferred from the conduct, language, and acts of the
members of the unlawful assembly. The nature of the weapons
carried by the members holds considerable significance. The
common object of the assembly could be ascertained from the
formation of the assembly, the arms carried, and the conduct of
the members before, during, and after the occurrence.
iv. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Mishra
submitted that the injured witnesses, i.e., the PWs 3, 5, 6, and
20 respectively, have attributed specific overt acts to each of
the appellants. The unlawful assembly was armed with deadly
weapons like firearms, pick-axes, suli, gandasa, lathi, etc.,
which reflects on the common object.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 95

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

v. Elaborating on the liability of the accused persons under Section
149 of the IPC, Mr. Singh submitted that the liability under Section
149 of the IPC is not dependent on the individual intention of
each member of the assembly. He relied on the decision of this
Court in the case of Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v.
State of Karnataka, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 337, to
submit that a person may be held guilty for an offence committed
by another member of the assembly, even if it was contrary to
their personal intention, so long as the act was in prosecution
of the common object and the individual continued to be a part
of the assembly at the material time. The provision focuses on
collective action directed at a shared objective.
vi. He further relied upon the decision of this Court in Mizaji &
Ors. v. State of U.P., reported in 1958 SCC OnLine SC 95, to
submit that where a body of persons go armed to take forcible
possession of land, it is reasonably inferred that they knew
murder was likely to be committed in the course of achieving
the object.
vii. In the present case the appellants were armed with lethal
weapons. Further, their presence at the place of occurrence as
part of the mob is proved by the oral testimony of the witnesses.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the appellants knew that death
was likely to be caused by the assembly in an attempt to take
forcible possession of the land.

V. ANALYSIS
42. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned judgment and order.
43. We take notice of the fact that 24 accused persons were put to trial,
excluding 5 persons who were declared as absconding accused. At
the conclusion of the trial, 21 persons stood convicted. Whereas, 3
persons came to be acquitted. Out of the 21 convicts, 19 preferred
appeals before the High Court. The High Court upheld the conviction
of 12 and acquitted 7. Therefore, 12 convicts whose conviction was
affirmed came before this Court in appeal. However, the appeals
stood abated in so far as two appellants were concerned vide orders
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of this Court (Md. Muslim in Criminal Appeal No. 1187/2014 and
Kaimuddin in Criminal Appeal 1329/2014). Accordingly, the present
two appeals concern 10 convicts. The chart as below would make
the picture further clear:-

Before the TC Status
A-1 Kaimuddin Since Deceased
A-2 Md. Muslim Since Deceased
A-3 Habib
A-4 Azam Acquitted by HC
A-5 Asarul Acquitted by HC
A-6 Sattar Appellant no. 1 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-7 Udua Appellant no. 2 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-8 Razaque Appellant no. 3 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-9 Md. Mashiyat Appellant no. 4 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-10 Allauddin @Allu Appellant no. 5 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-11 Hoda Appellant no. 6 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-12 Salahuddin @ Appellant no. 7 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
Sallu
A-13 Md. Mojib @ Appellant no. 8 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
Mujiya
A-14 Md. Mister Appellant no. 9 in Crl. Appeal No. 1188/2014
A-15 Aslam Acquitted by TC
A-16 Aftab Alam Acquitted by HC
A-17 Zainul Appellant no. 1 in Crl. Appeal No. 1187/2014
A-18 Sahabuddin @ Acquitted by HC
Samuddin
A-19 Garibul
A-20 Md. Khaza Acquitted by HC
A-21 Barik Acquitted by HC
A-22 Md. Sikander Acquitted by HC
A-23 Kalimuddin Acquitted by TC
A-24 Allauddin Acquitted by TC

44. There is no gainsaying that appreciation of evidence primarily falls
within the domain of the trial court, and the first appellate court.
However, if the courts below could be said to have faltered by
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

overlooking material aspects resulting in the miscarriage of justice,
this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 is duty-bound
to intervene and look into the matter closely.

A. Interpretation of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
45. Albeit the essentials of Section 149 of the IPC are oft-repeated
and firmly established, they are reiterated herein for the sake of
convenience:
i. There must be an assembly of five or more persons;
ii. An offence must be committed by any member of that unlawful
assembly;
iii. The offence committed must be in order to attain the common
object of that assembly, or
iv. The members of the assembly must have the knowledge that
the particular offence is likely to be committed in order to attain
the common object.
46. Section 149 of the IPC stipulates that if an offence is committed
by any member of an unlawful assembly (of 5 or more persons) in
prosecution of the common object (as defined in Section 141 of the
IPC) of that assembly, or if the members of the assembly knew that
the said offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the said
common object, every person who, at the time of committing that
offence, was a member of that assembly, will be guilty of that offence.
47. The first limb of the provision envisages the commission of an
offence by a member of an unlawful assembly in order to attain the
common object of that assembly. Whereas, the second limb of the
provision encapsulates knowledge on the part of a member of the
unlawful assembly qua the likelihood of such offence being committed
in order to attain the common object.
48. The distinction between the two limbs of Section 149 of the IPC
was elucidated in the decision of Mizaji v. State of U.P., reported in
1958 SCC OnLine SC 95. The relevant observations are reproduced
hereinbelow:-
“6. This section has been the subject-matter of interpretation
in the various High Courts of India, but every case has to
be decided on its own facts. The first part of the section
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means that the offence committed in prosecution of the
common object must be one which is committed with a
view to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary
that there should be a preconcert in the sense of a
meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly as to
the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the
members and is shared by all of them. In order that the
case may fall under the first part the offence committed
must be connected immediately with the common object
of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were
members. Even if the offence committed is not in direct
prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it
may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held that the
offence was such as the members knew was likely to
be committed. The expression ‘know’ does not mean a
mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. For
instance, it is a matter of common knowledge that when
in a village a body of heavily armed men set out to take
a woman by force, someone is likely to be killed and all
the members of the unlawful assembly must be aware of
that likelihood and would be guilty under the second part
of Section 149. Similarly, if a body of persons go armed
to take forcible possession of the land, it would be equally
right to say that they have the knowledge that murder is
likely to committed if the circumstances as to the weapons
carried and other conduct of the members of the unlawful
assembly clearly point to such knowledge on the part of
them all. There is a great deal to be said for the opinion
of Couch, C.J., in Sabid Ali case [(1873) 20 WR 5 Cr]
that when an offence is committed in prosecution of the
common object, it would generally be an offence which
the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to
be committed in prosecution of the common object. That,
however, does not make the converse proposition true;
there may be cases which would come within the second
part, but not within the first. The distinction between the
two parts of Section 149, Indian Penal Code cannot be
ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue
to be determined whether the offence committed falls
within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

it was an offence such as the members of the assembly
knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object and falls within the second part.”
(Emphasis supplied)

49. The expression “in prosecution of the common object” means that the
offence committed must be directly connected with the common object
of the assembly, or that the act, upon appraisal of the evidence, must
appear to have been done with a view to accomplish that common
object. In Charan Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2004) 4 SCC
205, this Court held that the test for determining the “common object”
of an unlawful assembly must be assessed in light of the conduct
of its members, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It can be
deduced from the nature of the assembly, the weapons carried by
its members, and their conduct before, during, or after the incident.
The relevant observations read as thus:-
“13. […]Section 149 IPC has its foundation on constructive
liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The
emphasis is on the common object and not on common
intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot
render a person liable unless there was a common object
and he was actuated by that common object and that object
is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common
object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused
persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149.
The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and whether the said
persons entertained one or more of the common objects,
as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as
a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is
proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member
of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he
should have understood that the assembly was unlawful
and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within
the purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the
purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it
must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be
common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that
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is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A
common object may be formed by express agreement after
mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary.
It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members
of the assembly and the other members may just join
and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the
same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any
stage. The expression “in prosecution of common object”
as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed
as equivalent to “in order to attain the common object”.
It must be immediately connected with the common
object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must
be community of object and the object may exist only up
to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an
unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a
certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects
and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what
is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common
object may vary not only according to the information at
his command, but also according to the extent to which
he shares the community of object, and as a consequence
of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on
different members of the same assembly.
14. “Common object” is different from a “common intention”
as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting
of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the
same object in view and their number is five or more and
that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The
“common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained from
the acts and language of the members composing it, and
from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.
It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by
the members of the assembly. What the common object of
the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident
is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping
in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the
members, and the behaviour of the members at or near
the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law
that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful
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common object, the same must be translated into action
or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an
assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled,
may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary
that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to
render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence
at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not
material. An assembly which, at its commencement or
even for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently
become unlawful. In other words, it can develop during
the course of incident at the spot eo instanti.”
(Emphasis supplied)

50. To put it briefly, Section 149 of the IPC makes all the members of an
unlawful assembly constructively liable when an offence is committed
by any member of such assembly with a view to accomplish the
common object of that assembly or the members of the assembly
knew that such an offence was likely to be committed. However,
such liability can be fastened only upon proof that the act was done
in pursuance of a common object. The essentials of Section 149
were succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench in the decision
of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 174.
It reads thus:-
“8. The true legal position in regard to the essential
ingredients of an offence specified by Section 149 are not in
doubt. Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or constructive
criminal liability for all members of an unlawful assembly
where an offence is committed by any member of such an
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
that assembly or such as the members of that assembly
knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object. It would thus be noticed that one of the essential
ingredients of Section 149 is that the offence must have
been committed by any member of an unlawful assembly,
and Section 141 makes it clear that it is only where
five or more persons constituted an assembly that an
unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course, the other
requirements of the said section as to the common object
of the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. In
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other words, it is an essential condition of an unlawful
assembly that its membership must be five or more.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)

51. Undoubtedly, once the existence of a common object amongst the
members of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not imperative
to prove that each member committed an overt act. The liability under
this provision is attracted once it is certain that an individual had
knowledge that the offence committed was a probable consequence in
furtherance of the common object, thereby rendering him a “member”
of the unlawful assembly.
52. While ascertaining this fact, it is of utmost importance to consider
whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely
passive onlookers who had joined the assembly as a matter of
idle curiosity, without the knowledge of the common object of the
assembly, since such persons cannot be said to be members of the
unlawful assembly. We say so because, the nucleus of Section 149
is “common object”.

a. Innocent Bystander v/s Member of an Unlawful Assembly
53. Once the two broad essentials of Section 149 are fulfilled, i.e.,
(1) an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly
in prosecution of the common object, or (2) if the members of the
assembly knew that the said offence is likely to be committed in
prosecution of the said common object, every person who at the at
the time of commission of the offence was a member of the assembly
is to be held guilty of that offence.
54. At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto
render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is
established that such an accused also shared its common object. A
mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall
within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC. The prosecution has to
establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the
accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly.
The test to determine whether a person is a passive onlooker or
an innocent bystander is the same as that applied to ascertain the
existence of a common object. The existence of a common object
is to be inferred from the circumstances of each case, such as:
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a. the time and place at which the assembly was formed;
b. the conduct and behaviour of its members at or near the scene
of the offence;
c. the collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of
individual members;
d. the motive underlying the crime;
e. the manner in which the occurrence unfolded;
f. the nature of the weapons carried and used;
g. the nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and
other relevant considerations.

i. Rule of Prudence in Convicting Members of an Unlawful
Assembly
55. This Court, as a matter of caution, has enunciated parameters to
safeguard innocent spectators or passive onlookers from being
convicted merely on account of their presence. This cautionary rule,
however, does not dilute the doctrine of constructive liability, under
which proof of an overt act by each individual is not indispensable.
Where the presence of a large number of persons is established
and many are implicated, prudence mandates strict adherence to
this rule of caution.
56. In Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 30, 40 persons were charged with having committed
several offences, the principal ones of which were under Section
302 r/w Section 149 of the IPC. The accused persons were alleged
to be armed with guns, spears, swords, gandasas, and a lathi.
While dealing with the oral evidences, the High Court observed
that most of the witnesses belonged to the prosecution faction.
Further, the evidence of all the witnesses gave an account of the
incident in similar terms. The High Court held that unless at least
four witnesses give a consistent account against the accused
persons, the allegations against them cannot be said to have
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. A Four-judge Bench of this
Court approved the test applied by the High Court and held that
a conviction in cases involving a large number of offenders and
victims can be sustained only when supported by the consistent
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account of two or three, or more, reliable witnesses. The relevant
observations are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“16. Mr Sawhney also urged that the test applied by the
High Court in convicting the appellants is mechanical. He
argues that under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy
evidence given by a single witness would be enough to
convict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half
a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be
enough to sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but
where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining
to the commission of an offence involving a large number
of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to
adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only
if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who
give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the
test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to
see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable.
Therefore, we do not think any grievance can be made by
the appellants against the adoption of this test. If at all the
prosecution may be entitled to say that the seven accused
persons were acquitted because their cases did not satisfy
the mechanical test of four witnesses, and if the said test had
not been applied, they might as well have been convicted.
It is, no doubt, the quality of the evidence that matters and
not the number of witnesses who give such evidence. But
sometimes it is useful to adopt a test like the one which the
High Court has adopted in dealing with the present case.”
(Emphasis supplied)

57. In Muthu Naicker v. State of T.N., reported in (1978) 4 SCC 385,
two factions in a village were involved in a dispute over the laying of
pipelines. In the facts of the case, 28 persons were put to trial and
34 witnesses were examined, 6 of whom were injured eyewitnesses.
The Court noted that whenever a fight amongst factions happens
in rural society, numerous people appear on the scene as curious
spectators. In such a case, mere presence in the assembly shall not
be treated as evidence of the fact that the person was a member
of the unlawful assembly. It further observed that the presence of
those accused would be accepted as satisfactorily proved if there
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was reliable evidence of at least three witnesses against them. The
relevant extracts have been reproduced hereinbelow:-
“6. Where there is a melee and a large number of assailants
and number of witnesses claim to have witnessed the
occurrence from different places and at different stages
of the occurrence and where the evidence as in this case
is undoubtedly partisan evidence, the distinct possibility of
innocent being falsely included with guilty cannot be easily
ruled out. In a faction-ridden society where an occurrence
takes place involving rival factions it is but inevitable that
the evidence would be of a partisan nature. In such a
situation to reject the entire evidence on the sole ground
that it is partisan is to shut one’s eyes to the realities of
the rural life in our country. Large number of accused
would go unpunished if such an easy course is charted.
Simultaneously, it is to be borne in mind that in a situation
as it unfolds in the case before us, the easy tendency
to involve as many persons of the opposite faction as
possible by merely naming them as having been seen in
the melee is a tendency which is more often discernible
and is to be eschewed and, therefore, the evidence has
to be examined with utmost care and caution. It is in such
a situation that this Court in Masalti v. State of U.P. [AIR
1965 SC 202 : (1964) 8 SCR 133 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226]
adopted the course of adopting a workable test for being
assured about the role attributed to every accused. To some
extent it is inevitable that we should adopt that course.
7. Before we proceed to look into the evidence it is also
necessary to make it clear that whenever in uneventful
rural society something unusual occurs, more so where
the local community is faction ridden and a fight occurs
amongst factions, a good number of people appear on the
scene not with a view to participating in the occurrence but
as curious spectators. In such an event mere presence in
the unlawful assembly should not be treated as leading
to the conclusion that the person concerned was present
in the unlawful assembly as a member of the unlawful
assembly. Vicarious liability would attach to every member
of the unlawful assembly if that member of the unlawful
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assembly either participates in the commission of the
offence by overt act or knows that the offence which is
committed was likely to be committed by any member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
the unlawful assembly and becomes or continues to remain
a member of the unlawful assembly. If one becomes a
member of the unlawful assembly and his association in the
unlawful assembly is clearly established, his participation
in commission of the offence by overt act is not required
to be proved if it could be shown that he knew that such
offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object of the unlawful assembly. But while finding
out whether a person was a curious spectator or a member
of an unlawful assembly it is necessary to keep in mind
the life in a village ordinarily uneventful except for small
squabbles where the village community is faction ridden
and when a serious crime is committed people rush just to
quench their thirst to know what is happening. In this case
we will have occasion to point out that there are accused
who are convicted with the aid of Section 149 of the IPC
but in respect of whom we have no doubt in our minds
that they were mere spectators and could hardly be said
to be members of the unlawful assembly.
xxx
39. Now, turning to the case of the rest of the accused, we
would ordinarily accept the presence of those accused as
satisfactorily proved in respect of whom at least there is
reliable evidence of three witnesses and while analysing the
evidence we would be rather slow to accept the evidence
of PW 19 standing by itself who, as we would presently
point out, has been materially contradicted by her statement
under Section 161, CrPC Approaching the matter from this
angle, we would briefly set out the evidence. The presence
of Accused 6 is consistently spoken to by PWs 1, 19, 20
and 24 and that evidence establishes the fact that Accused
6 was a member of unlawful assembly and charge under
Section 148 IPC is brought home to him.
xxx
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54. Turning now to the Charges under Heads 4, 8, 10, 12,
14, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 30, it must be pointed out that
under these charges all the accused were convicted with
the aid of Section 149 IPC in respect of specific offences
committed by each individual accused in the case of one
or the other prosecution witness. Without elaborating we
must at once say that in a case of this nature where a large
crowd collected all of whom are not shown to be sharing the
common object of the unlawful assembly, a stray assault
by any one accused on any particular witness could not be
said to be an assault in prosecution of the common object
of the unlawful assembly so that the remaining accused
could be imputed the knowledge that such an offence
was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common
object of the unlawful assembly. To illustrate, when it is
alleged that a certain accused pelted a stone and caused
an injury to some one who came within the trajectory of
the stone, could it be said that all other members of the
unlawful assembly knew that such an offence would be
committed? We are, therefore, not inclined to sustain the
conviction of the accused for charges under Heads 4, 8,
10, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 30 and accordingly
the conviction of the accused under the aforementioned
charges and the sentence imposed for the same are set
aside and they are acquitted of these charges.”
(Emphasis supplied)

58. Where allegations are levelled against a large number of persons,
the courts must carefully scrutinize the evidence, more particularly,
if the evidence available on record is hazy. In Sherey v. State of
U.P., reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 437, six eyewitnesses had
deposed about the incident, and the complainant had attributed overt
acts to nine accused persons. One of the eyewitnesses, therein in
his deposition, named further five accused persons who attacked
the deceased. Regarding the others, he had mentioned that the
accused persons were armed with lathis; no overt act was attributed
to anyone. In such circumstances, this Court cautioned saying that
the evidence of witnesses should be subjected to a close scrutiny
vis-à-vis their former statements. This Court thought it fit to convict
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only those who were consistently named from the stage of the earliest
report. The relevant extract has been reproduced thus:-
“4. We have carefully gone through the evidence. We have
no doubt that all the eye-witnesses were present. Nothing
significant has been elicited in their cross-examination.
However, the eye-witnesses simply named these appellants
and identified them. So, the question is whether it is safe
to convict all the appellants. In a case of this nature, the
evidence of the witnesses has to be subjected to a close
scrutiny in the light of their former statements. The earliest
report namely the FIR has to be examined carefully. No
doubt in their present deposition they have described the
arms carried by the respective accused but we have to
see the version given in the earliest report. In that report
PW 1 after mentioning about the earlier proceedings has
given a fairly detailed account of the present occurrence.
He has mentioned the names of the witnesses and also the
names of the three deceased persons. Then he proceeded
to give a long list of names of the accused and it is generally
stated that all of them were exhorting and surrounded the
PWs and the other Hindus and attacked them. But to some
extent specific overt acts are attributed to appellants 1, 4,
5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 22 and 25. It is mentioned therein that these
nine accused were armed with deadly weapons and were
seen assaulting the deceased Ram Narain and others.
Now in the present deposition he improved his version and
stated that in addition to these nine accused, five more
persons also attacked the deceased and others. In view of
this variation we think that it is safe to convict only such of
the appellants who are consistently mentioned as having
participated in the attack from the stage of earliest report.
With regards the rest PW 1 mentioned in an omnibus way
that they were armed with lathis. He did not attribute any
overt act to any one of them. Further, the medical evidence
rules out any lathis having been used. The doctor found
only incised injuries on the dead bodies and on the injured
PWs. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the prosecution case
that the other appellants were members of the unlawful
assembly with the object of committing the offences
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with which they are charged. We feel it is highly unsafe
to apply Section 149 IPC and make everyone of them
constructively liable. But so far as the above nine accused
are concerned the prosecution version is consistent namely
that they were armed with lethal weapons like swords and
axes and attacked the deceased and others. This strong
circumstance against them establishes their presence as
well as their membership of the unlawful assembly.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)

59. In Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B., reported in (2009) 7 SCC 415,
this Court observed that in cases of convoluted facts, the rule of
prudence should be applied. The Court held that something more
than their being cited as an accused in a witness box would be
necessary. There must be some material before the Court to form an
opinion that the accused had shared a common object. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“41. In a case of this nature, the rule of prudence should
be applied. Something more than their being cited as an
accused in a witness box would be necessary. The court
must have before it some materials to form an opinion that
they had shared a common object. It has not been denied
or disputed that whereas five brothers were implicated as
one brother had deposed against PW 9 and sons had also
been implicated because a father had deposed against
them. Whereas PW 1 in his deposition denied that the
accused deposed in the case in which a son was found to
be guilty of murder of Dol Gobinda Acharya (ex-Pradhan),
PW 9 admitted that he committed the said murder in broad
daylight. The defence that there were other reasons for
their false implication cannot also be ruled out.
xxx
43. We are not unmindful that Akbar and Kanku have been
named by both the witnesses but even against them no
overt act has been attributed. We, therefore, are of the
opinion that doubts legitimately arise as regards their
presence and/or sharing of common object. While saying
so, we are not oblivious of the fact that the incident had
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taken place at the dead of night. Enmity between two
groups in the village is admitted. But, we cannot also lose
sight of the fact that a person should not suffer rigorous
imprisonment for life although he might have just been a
bystander without anything more.”
(Emphasis supplied)

60. In Subal Ghorai (supra), about 200/250 persons armed with weapons
had launched an attack, in which three persons succumbed to their
injuries. The trial court convicted 36 persons. The Court held that
the constructive liability enshrined in Section 149 of the IPC can be
extended to the acts done only in pursuance of the common object.
The commission of an overt act by such a person would prove that
he shared the common object. It ought to be proved that the accused
was not only a member of the unlawful assembly but shared the
common object of the assembly at all stages that he was a part of the
assembly. At the same time, the Court left a note of caution stating
that the courts must guard against the possibility of convicting mere
passive onlookers. The relevant observations read thus:-
“52. The above judgments outline the scope of Section 149
IPC. We need to sum up the principles so as to examine the
present case in their light. Section 141 IPC defines unlawful
assembly to be an assembly of five or more persons. They
must have common object to commit an offence. Section
142 IPC postulates that whoever being aware of facts which
render any assembly an unlawful one intentionally joins
the same would be a member thereof. Section 143 IPC
provides for punishment for being a member of unlawful
assembly. Section 149 IPC provides for constructive liability
of every person of an unlawful assembly if an offence is
committed by any member thereof in prosecution of the
common object of that assembly or such of the members
of that assembly who knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of that object. The most important ingredient
of unlawful assembly is common object. Common object
of the persons composing that assembly is to do any
act or acts stated in clauses “First”, “Second”, “Third”,
“Fourth” and “Fifth” of that section. Common object can
be formed on the spur of the moment. Course of conduct
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adopted by the members of common assembly is a
relevant factor. At what point of time common object of
unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. Once the case of
the person falls within the ingredients of Section 149 IPC,
the question that he did nothing with his own hands would
be immaterial. If an offence is committed by a member of
the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object,
any member of the unlawful assembly who was present
at the time of commission of offence and who shared
the common object of that assembly would be liable for
the commission of that offence even if no overt act was
committed by him. If a large crowd of persons armed with
weapons assaults intended victims, all may not take part in
the actual assault. If weapons carried by some members
were not used, that would not absolve them of liability for
the offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC if they shared
common object of the unlawful assembly.
53. But this concept of constructive liability must not be
so stretched as to lead to false implication of innocent
bystanders. Quite often, people gather at the scene of
offence out of curiosity. They do not share common object
of the unlawful assembly. If a general allegation is made
against large number of people, the court has to be cautious.
It must guard against the possibility of convicting mere
passive onlookers who did not share the common object of
the unlawful assembly. Unless reasonable direct or indirect
circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution case that
they shared common object of the unlawful assembly, they
cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It must
be proved in each case that the person concerned was not
only a member of the unlawful assembly at some stage, but
at all the crucial stages and shared the common object of
the assembly at all stages. The court must have before it
some materials to form an opinion that the accused shared
common object. What the common object of the unlawful
assembly is at a particular stage has to be determined
keeping in view the course of conduct of the members of
the unlawful assembly before and at the time of attack, their
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behaviour at or near the scene of offence, the motive for
the crime, the arms carried by them and such other relevant
considerations. The criminal court has to conduct this difficult
and meticulous exercise of assessing evidence to avoid
roping innocent people in the crime. These principles laid
down by this Court do not dilute the concept of constructive
liability. They embody a rule of caution.”
(Emphasis supplied)

61. The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that where
there are general allegations against a large number of persons, the
court must remain very careful before convicting all of them on vague
or general evidence. Therefore, the courts ought to look for some
cogent and credible material that lends assurance. It is safe to convict
only those whose presence is not only consistently established from
the stage of FIR, but also to whom overt acts are attributed which
are in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

b. Principles of Law relating to Appreciation of Evidence of
the Witnesses
62. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, reported
in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390, wherein one of us, J.B. Pardiwala, J.,
was a part of the Bench, had underscored two principal considerations
for assessing the value of the evidence of eyewitnesses. It read thus:-
“57. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence
of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are
whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible
to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or
in such situations as would make it possible for them to
witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether
there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in
their evidence. In respect of both these considerations,
the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses
themselves or established by other evidence tending to
improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of
their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which
a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases
where the plea of the accused is a mere bald assertion
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of tutoring, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused
raises a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which
is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of
such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will
also have to be taken into account while assessing the
value of the prosecution evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

63. At this stage, we would also like to discuss the established principles
of law on the evaluation of the testimony of injured eyewitnesses. The
testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a special status in law
because the injuries on the person lends credence to the fact that the
witness was present at the scene of the occurrence. The courts lend
credence to the testimony of an injured eyewitness, assuming that
the witness would not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished.
Thus, unless there are cogent grounds for disbelieving the evidence
of an eyewitness due to major contradictions and discrepancies,
ordinarily, such evidence should be relied upon.
64. In Balu Sudam Khalde & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, reported
in (2023) 13 SCC 365, one of us, J.B. Pardiwala, J., had the benefit
of expounding the law on this subject as follows:-
“26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be
appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated
by the courts are required to be kept in mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time
and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless
there are material contradictions in his deposition.
26.2. Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence,
it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow
the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.
26.3. The evidence of injured witness has greater
evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist,
their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
26.4. The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted
on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or
minor contradictions.
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26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,
then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment
should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not
the whole evidence.
26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version
must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which
normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of
time should be discarded.”
65. Keeping in view the above principles of law and the rule of caution,
we shall now look into and discuss the evidence on record. The case
in hand revolves around the evidence of five injured eyewitnesses,
and two eyewitnesses to the occurrence. Upon a careful scrutiny
of the evidence, we find that the oral testimony of the prosecution
witnesses is marred by material inconsistencies and embellishments
striking at to the root of the matter.
66. The oral evidence of PW-20, an injured eyewitness, on whose police
statement the FIR was registered, would indicate that he had no
dispute with the accused persons regarding the settlement of land.
Further, he denied stating before the police that the accused persons
were hiding because they were opposed to the harvesting of paddy.
He was unable to identify the persons harvesting the paddy, and
rather described them as labourers. In the fardbeyan, he stated that
a day prior to the incident, he had harvested paddy from the field
that was allotted to him by the Government and, for this reason, the
accused nos. 2, 16, 17, and 21 respectively, alongwith 400 to 500
other persons, were hiding with weapons in order to stop him from
further harvesting the paddy. More importantly, he admitted that he
was unable to disclose the names of the assailants as stated by
the PWs 3, 6, and 10 respectively, as he fell unconscious after the
assault. However, in the fardbeyan, while naming forty-one assailants,
the PW-20 stated that the PWs 3, 5, 6, and 10 respectively had told
him about the assailants.
67. The deposition of the PW-20 stands at variance with his fardbeyan. In
his oral testimony, the PW-20 admitted that he fell unconscious after
the assault and, therefore, was unable to name the assailants who
had attacked the PWs 3, 6, and 10 respectively. In stark contrast,
his fardbeyan categorically records that the PWs 3, 5, 6, and 10
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 115

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

respectively had informed him that forty others, armed with various
weapons, had participated in the assault. This contradiction strikes
at the root of his credibility. To add to this, the PW-3 deposed that
he had never disclosed the names of forty assailants to the PW-20,
thereby further undermining the credibility of the witness.
68. The PW-3, an injured eyewitness, in his oral evidence has attributed
overt acts to the accused nos. 12 and 10 respectively. He stated that
the accused no. 10 assaulted him with a gandasa on his leg. However,
the medical evidence on record indicates not only the absence of any
injury on the leg of the witness but also that an injury caused by a
gandasa would ordinarily result in an incised wound. It further emerges
from his deposition that he reached the scene of occurrence later,
upon hearing the sound of two gunshots. He also admitted that he
had not disclosed the names of forty accused persons to the PW-20.

i. Conflict between the Ocular Version and the Medical
Evidence
69. The law on conflict between the medical evidence and ocular
evidence has been succinctly explained in Abdul Syeed v. State
of M.P., reported in (2010) 10 SCC 259, succinctly explained thus:-
“Medical evidence versus ocular evidence
32. In Ram Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4
SCC 497 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 571 : AIR 1975 SC 1727] this
Court held that where the evidence of the witnesses for
the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical
evidence or the evidence of the ballistics expert, it amounts
to a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and
unless reasonably explained it is sufficient to discredit
the entire case.
xxx
38. In State of U.P. v. Hari Chand [(2009) 13 SCC
542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112] this Court reiterated the
aforementioned position of law and stated that : (SCC p.
545, para 13)
“13. … In any event unless the oral evidence is
totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it
has primacy.”
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39. Thus, the position of law in cases where there is
a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular
evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though
the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary
value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence
makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a
relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence.
However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it
completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence
being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved.”
(Emphasis supplied)

70. The PW-5, an injured eye-witness, has in his oral evidence attributed
overt acts to the accused nos. 8 and 6 respectively. However,
the medical evidence does not support the version of assault as
narrated by the witness. While both, i.e., the accused nos. 8 and 6
respectively, are alleged to have assaulted the witness with lathis,
the medical evidence discloses only incised wounds on his body.
His oral testimony further indicates that he had reached the scene
of the occurrence much after the deceased had already been shot.
71. The oral testimony of the PW-6, another injured eyewitness, would
reveal that he was assaulted even before he could reach the scene
of the occurrence. It appears from the materials on record that his
statement was recorded on 30.11.1988, i.e., 10 days after the incident.
Whereas, according to the investigating officer, he had recorded the
statement of the said witness on 21.11.1988. The PW-6 has attributed
overt acts to the accused nos. 14, 7, and 13 respectively; however, no
other witness has said anything about the complicity of the accused
nos. 14, 7, and 13 respectively. From the oral testimony of PW-10,
it emerges that he was assaulted by one Jalla and Masiyan, who
were neither named as accused in the FIR nor charge-sheeted. He
further denied having stated before the police that the accused no.
10 had assaulted him.
72. Further, what is significant from the oral testimony of the PW-4 is that
he does not say anything about the presence of any of the appellants.
On the contrary, he states that there were a large number of persons
at the spot, and he was unable to distinguish between the assailants
and the spectators. However, the PW-23, i.e., the investigating officer,
has deposed that the PW-4 had disclosed before him many names.
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Zainul v. The State of Bihar

Further, the PW-8 had not stated that the accused nos. 14, 11, and
17 respectively had assaulted her husband. In fact, she had also
disclosed different names.
73. In the present case, prudence demands that we should believe the
presence or participation of only those accused as satisfactorily
established with the aid of at least two reliable witnesses. The oral
testimonies of the PWs 3 and 5 respectively, also suffer from material
contradictions.
74. Likewise, the accused nos. 7, 13, and 14 respectively have been
implicated only by the PW-6. Their presence or participation finds
no support from the testimony of any other witness, nor stands
corroborated by any intrinsic evidence on record. So far as accused
no. 9 is concerned the only evidence against him is the identification
by the PW-20, which, in the absence of any supporting evidence,
cannot be regarded as sufficient to bring home his guilt. The presence
of the accused no. 10 is also doubtful.
75. According to the PW-3 he was assaulted by accused no. 10 with
a gandasa. However, the evidence reveals something else. The
fardbeyan recorded at the instance of the PW-20 does not name the
accused no. 10 as one of the assailants. Further, there is nothing
cogent or credible to indicate the presence or participation of the
accused nos. 11 and 12 respectively. Lastly, there is no credible
evidence even against the accused no. 17 except an omnibus
identification by the PW-20.
76. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we hold that the accused nos. 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 respectively are entitled to the benefit
of doubt. Their conviction cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
77. A common man may legitimately argue that if all the eyewitnesses are
to be disbelieved then who is to explain the various injuries suffered
by them. In other words, a common man may say that it is not even
the case of the accused persons that no injuries were suffered by the
eyewitnesses or that they were self-inflicted. In such circumstances,
why should the eyewitnesses be outrightly disbelieved?
78. It needs to be emphasized that injuries on the eyewitnesses, at
the best, may ensure their presence at the scene of occurrence
but that is not enough. Before a criminal court even accepts the
testimony of an injured eyewitness, it has to be satisfied that he is a
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truthful witness and had no reason to falsely implicate the accused
persons. We have extensively explained or rather discussed the
various infirmities in the oral evidence of all the eyewitness. These
eyewitnesses in their police statements recorded under Section 161
of the Cr.P.C. have gone to the extent of implicating even those
persons who were ultimately not arrayed as an accused in the
chargesheet including those who ultimately came to be acquitted
by the trial court.
79. In cases like the one in hand, the courts must make an attempt to
separate grain from the chaff, the truth from falsehood, yet this could
only be possible when the truth is separate from the falsehood.
80. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the decision of this Court
in Balaka Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, reported in (1975) 4
SCC 511. In paragraph 8, this Court observed thus:-
“8. The suggestion of the appellants is that they were
falsely implicated because the prosecution could not
succeed in convicting Balaka Singh for the murder of
Gurnam Singh in the previous murder case. It was to
wreak fresh vengeance on the accused that they had
been falsely implicated in the present case. It is true that
there are as many as eight witnesses who are alleged
to have seen the occurrence and they have given a
parrot-like version of the entire case regarding the assault
on the deceased by the various accused persons. All
these witnesses have with one voice and with complete
unanimity implicated even the four accused persons,
acquitted by the High Court, equally with the appellants
making absolutely no distinction between one and the
other. A perusal of the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses would show that the prosecution case against
the appellants and the four accused is so inextricably
mixed up that it is not possible to sever one from the other.
It is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel
v. State of M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1954 SC 15 :
1954 Cri LJ 230] and other cases which have followed
that case, the Court must make an attempt to separate
grain from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet
this could only be possible when the truth is separable
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 119

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated
from the chaff because the grain and the chaff are so
inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation
the Court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new
case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details
presented by the prosecution completely from the context
and the background against which they are made, then
this principle will not apply.[...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

c. Whether the Prosecution could be said to have proved its
case Beyond Reasonable Doubt?
81. In Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 395,
this Court explained the meaning of “reasonable doubt”. It means
doubts that are free from abstract speculation, not a result of an
emotional response, which are actual and substantial doubts on the
guilt of the accused person, and not vague apprehensions. It cannot
be an imaginary, trivial or a possible doubt, but a doubt based upon
reason and common sense. The relevant observations have been
reproduced hereinbelow:-
“23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability
amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to (sic) of probability amounts to “proof” is
an exercise, the interdependence of evidence and the
confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, as
learned author says : [see The Mathematics of Proof II :
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet
and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the
separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two
events are dependent when they tend to occur
together, and the evidence of such events may
also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case,
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different pieces of evidence directed to establishing
that the defendant did the prohibited act with the
specified state of mind are generally dependent. A
juror may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged
confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the
fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it
is generally guilty rather than innocent people who
make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent
people who run away, the two doubts are not to be
multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may
confirm the other.”
24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable
doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response.
Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions.
A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.
25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such
units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There
is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on
a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of
trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of
criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by
Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State
of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 928 : AIR 1988 SC 2154] .”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 121

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

82. It cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. A case attains that standard when all its links
are firmly established and recognizable to the eyes of a reasonable
person. In the present matter, the prosecution version does not
appear to stem from a truthful narration of facts.
83. The oral testimonies of the witnesses neither corroborate each other
nor align with the medical records. The various contradictions in the
form of material omissions go to the root of the matter, and in such
circumstances, it cannot be held that the prosecution has discharged
its burden of proof.

B. Whether the Statement of the PW-20 could have been
treated as an FIR?
84. The FIR, based on the statement of the PW-20 recorded by the
investigating officer, arrayed as many as 72 persons as accused,
several of whom find no mention in the statements of the prosecution
witnesses. Out of these 72 accused persons, chargesheet was filed
only against 24 persons who were eventually put to trial. What is
indeed disconcerting is that the individuals against whom direct and
specific allegations were levelled have either not been named in the
FIR or have been inexplicably dropped from the chargesheet. The
materials on record do not indicate what action, if any, was taken
by the police against them.
85. We consider it necessary to address yet another pertinent issue.
It appears from the oral evidence of the injured eyewitnesses and
other eyewitnesses that the fardbeyan of PW-20 could not have
been treated as the first information report. A bare perusal of the oral
evidence of the PWs 3, 4, 5, 8, and 22 respectively, would indicate
that the information about the commission of the offence had reached
the police much prior to the recording of the statement of the PW-20
and lodging of the FIR. We have arrived at this conclusion on the
basis of the reading of the following evidence:
a. First, the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW-23) reveals
that he received an O.D. Slip from the Government Hospital,
Azam Nagar, and thereafter, he proceeded towards the hospital
to record the fardbeyan of the PW-20. Whereas, the PW-22
(Medical Officer of the Government Hospital, Azam Nagar) stated
that he had examined the injured persons on police requisition.
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b. Secondly, the oral evidence of the PW-23, i.e., the I.O. indicates
that he recorded the statement of the PW-20 around 1:25 PM.
i. However, the PW-3 testified that when he regained
consciousness at the scene of occurrence, he saw that
the police had arrived. It was around 11:00 AM to 12:00
noon, and his statement was recorded.
ii. The PW-5, on the other hand, stated that he regained
consciousness in the boat while being taken to the
hospital, and that all the injured persons first went to the
police station around 9 AM, where their statements were
recorded, and thereafter, proceeded to the hospital.
iii. The PW-4, another eyewitness to the incident, stated that
after the injured persons were taken to the hospital, the police
arrived at the scene of occurrence at around 12:00 noon to
1:00 PM and recorded his statement. The testimony of the
PW-4 in this regard finds corroboration from the testimony of
the PW-8. She stated that the police arrived approximately
two hours after the incident and interrogated her.
c. Thirdly, the PW-20 in his oral evidence admitted that after the
assault he fell unconscious, and hence, he was not able to
identify the assailants of the deceased and the PWs 3, 6, and
10 respectively. Whereas, in his fardbeyan/statement to the
police, it is recorded that the PWs 3, 5, 6, and 10 respectively
had informed him that forty other persons, armed with various
weapons, had assaulted them.
86. From the foregoing, it appears that the statement of the PW-20 could
not have been treated as the FIR, since the first information about
the occurrence had already reached the police prior to its recording
of statements at the hospital. Resultantly, the statement of PW-20
becomes a police statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.
87. In State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu & Ors., reported in 1994 Supp
(1) SCC 590, this Court observed that once it is found that the
investigating officer deliberately failed to record the first information
report on receipt of the information of a cognizable offence, and had
prepared the FIR after deliberations, consultations and discussions,
the FIR would fail to inspire confidence. The relevant observations
have been reproduced below:-
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 123

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

“5.[…]Once we find that the investigating officer has
deliberately failed to record the first information report
on receipt of the information of a cognizable offence
of the nature, as in this case, and had prepared the
first information report after reaching the spot after
due deliberations, consultations and discussion, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the investigation
is tainted and it would, therefore, be unsafe to rely upon
such a tainted investigation, as one would not know
where the police officer would have stopped to fabricate
evidence and create false clues. Though we agree that
mere relationship of the witnesses PW 3 and PW 4, the
children of the deceased or of PW 1 and PW 2 who are
also related to the deceased, by itself is not enough to
discard their testimony and that the relationship or the
partisan nature of the evidence only puts the Court on its
guard to scrutinise the evidence more carefully, we find
that in this case when the bona fides of the investigation
has been successfully assailed, it would not be safe to
rely upon the testimony of these witnesses either in the
absence of strong corroborative evidence of a clinching
nature, which is found wanting in this case.”
(Emphasis supplied)

88. In Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 392,
the police officer had already started to investigate about a riot in
the night, however, he did not record the statements of any of the
persons he talked to. The FIR of the incident only came to be reported
in the next morning on the basis of the information given by one of
the witnesses. This Court held that the courts below erred in treating
the statement as an FIR as the same was a statement under Section
161 of the CrPC. The following are the relevant excerpts:-
“38. Having gone through the evidence of PW 96 we
are constrained to say that the courts below were not
justified in treating Ext. 10/1 as an FIR. Undisputedly
PW 96 had reached Village Laxmipur Bind Toli in the
night of 11-11-1985 to investigate into the two cases
registered over the incident that took place in the morning.
He deposed that after reaching the village at 10.30
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p.m. he got information about the second incident also
and in connection therewith he had talked to several
persons. He, however, stated that he did not record
the statements of the persons to whom he talked to. In
cross-examination it was elicited from him that on the
very night he learnt that houses of some people had
been looted and set on fire, some people had been
murdered and that some villagers were untraceable.
While being further cross-examined he volunteered that
he had started the investigation of the case registered
over the second incident in the same night. In the face
of such admissions of PW 96 and the various steps
of investigation he took in connection with the second
incident there cannot be any escape from the conclusion
that the report lodged by PC PW 1 on the following
morning could only be treated as a statement recorded
in accordance with Section 161(3) of the Code and not
as an FIR. The next question, therefore is whether the
evidence of PC PW 1 is inadmissible as contended by
Mr Jethmalani.”
(Emphasis supplied)

89. There is no gainsaying that an FIR must faithfully reflect the
information furnished by the informant at the very time it is presented.
The true test for an information to qualify as an FIR lies in whether
it is capable of supplying grounds for the police officer to suspect
the commission of a cognizable offence. Once this requirement is
met, the officer is bound to reduce it into writing.
90. In the present case, in the natural course of events, the PWs 3,
4, 5, and 8 respectively, would have disclosed the commission of
the alleged offence to the police. The very first statement relating
to the two homicidal deaths ought to have been treated as an FIR.
However, the daily diary or the roznamcha entry of the police station
about the visit of the witnesses to the police station or the visit of the
investigating officer to the scene of occurrence or even visit of the
investigating officer to the hospital was not brought on record which
further creates a doubt as regards the genuineness of the FIR. In
such circumstances, the statement of the PW-20 reduced as an FIR
fails to inspire confidence.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 125

Zainul v. The State of Bihar

VI. CONCLUSION
91. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The
impugned judgment and order to the extent of holding the appellants
herein guilty of the offences they were charged with, is set aside.
The appellants are accordingly acquitted. Their bail bonds stand
discharged.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan