YUVRAJ LAXMILAL KANTHER & ANR.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                  [2025] 3 S.C.R. 502 : 2025 INSC 338

                     Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr.
                                   v.
                         State of Maharashtra
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024)
                                 07 March 2025
                [Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as to whether the High Court was correct in dismissing
       the revision application filed by the appellants assailing the order of
       the trial court dismissing their discharge applications u/s.227 CrPC.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – Discharge – Penal
       Code, 1860 – ss.34, 304 Part II, 304A – Culpable homicide
       not amounting to murder – Appellant no.1 was doing interior
       decoration of the shop on contract basis and the appellant no.2
       was the Store Manager of the company which had taken the
       said shop on lease – Two employees of appellant no.1 while
       working on the sign board of the shop at a height of 12 feet
       from the ground level, struck by electricity, got electrocuted,
       and fell from iron ladder resulting in multiple injuries, leading
       to their death – Registration of FIR – Chargesheet against
       the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A/182/201
       rw s.34 IPC since the appellants did not provide any safety
       equipments to the deceased employees – Appellants sought
       their discharge u/s. 227 which was dismissed – Revision
       applications thereagainst dismissed by the High Court –
       Correctness:
       Held: Basic ingredient of s.304 Part II is presence of knowledge
       and absence of intention – Doer must have the knowledge that
       the act performed by him would likely cause death etc. but there
       should not be any intention to cause death – No prima facie case
       can be said to have been made out against the appellants for
       committing an offence u/s.304 Part II – No intention on the part
       of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily


* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                           503

         Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


     injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased
     employees – Also, the appellants had no knowledge that by asking
     the two deceased employees to work on the sign board that such
     act was likely to cause death – Thus, the basic ingredients for
     commission of offence u/s.304 Part II are absent – Furthermore, at
     the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required
     to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by
     the prosecution – It is only to be seen that there are sufficient
     grounds to proceed against the accused – On facts, the incident
     was purely accidental, and no prima facie case can be said to
     be made out against the appellants for committing an offence
     u/ss.304A and 304 Part II – In any case, the trial court only
     considered culpability of the appellants qua s.304 Part II as the
     Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions
     confining the allegations against the appellant to s. 304 Part II
     and not s.304A – Both the trial court and High Court erred in
     rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants – Order
     of the trial court and impugned order set aside and quashed,
     and the discharge applications are allowed. [Paras 12.3, 12.4,
     14-16, 17.3, 18]

                             Case Law Cited
     Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. [1996] Supp. 6 SCR 285 :
     (1996) 6 SCC 129 – distinguished.

                                List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal
     Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords
     Discharge; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Knowledge;
     Intention; Fall from iron ladder; Electrocution; Safety equipments;
     Murder; Prima facie case of culpable homicide; Unnatural death.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     2356 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 02.11.2017 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay in CRRA No. 269 of 2017
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                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellants:
       Gaurav Agarwal, Sr. Adv., S S Ray, Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pawan
       Shukla, Ms. Kanika Kalyan, Ms. Akanksha Tyagi, Ms. Rakhi Ray.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha
       Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S.
       Phanse, Adarsh Dubey.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

       This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and
       order dated 02.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
       Bombay (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) in Criminal Revision
       Application No. 269 of 2017.
2.     By the aforesaid judgment and order dated 02.11.2017, the revision
       application filed by the appellants assailing the order dated 01.04.2017
       passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions
       Case No. 749 of 2014 came to be dismissed.
       2.1. Be it stated that by the aforesaid order dated 01.04.2017, learned
            Additional Sessions Judge, Pune dismissed the discharge
            applications filed by the appellants being Exhibit Nos. 6 and
            10 in Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
3.     Appellants are Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and Nimesh Pravinchandra
       Shah.
4.     Appellant No. 1 was doing interior decoration of the concerned shop
       in Pune on contract basis. Appellant No. 2 was the Store Operation
       Manager of M/s. lntergold Gems Private Limited which had taken
       the concerned shop on lease.
       4.1. On 27.09.2013, at about 09:00 PM, the work of decoration of the
            front side of the shop was being undertaken by two employees
            of appellant No.1, Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma. It is
            alleged that both the employees viz. Salauddin Shaikh and
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                       505

         Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


           Arun Sharma were provided with an iron ladder and they were
           working on the sign board which was approximately at a height
           of 12 feet from the ground level. While they were working on
           the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of
           which they got electrocuted and fell down. Due to the fall, they
           suffered head injuries as well as injuries on their arms. They
           were taken to Pune Hospital and Research Centre where they
           were declared dead on arrival.
     4.2. Accidental reports bearing Nos. 67/23 and 68/23 under
          Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
          were registered.
     4.3. After more than two months, on 04.12.2013, FIR was lodged at
          Vishrambag Police Station, Pune by the Police Sub-Inspector
          Shri S.G. Patil against the appellants which was registered as
          FIR No. 316/2013. It was stated that the appellants did not
          provide any safety equipments like belt, helmet, rubber shoes etc
          to the two deceased employees. According to the investigating
          officer, the two accused persons had not taken proper care and
          caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two
          employees though the work assigned to them was quite risky.
          Informant opined that both the appellants were responsible
          for the unnatural death of the two employees since they had
          knowledge that there was risk to the lives of the employees.
          Therefore, the first informant summed up by saying that both
          the accused persons were responsible for the unnatural death
          of the two deceased persons. Accordingly, it was alleged that
          appellants had committed offences under Sections 304 and
          304A IPC.
     4.4. On 04.12.2013 itself both the appellants were arrested in
          connection with the aforesaid FIR. They were subsequently
          released on the same day. After completion of investigation,
          police submitted chargesheet in which the two appellants
          were arrayed as accused. Appellants were chargesheeted for
          committing an offence under Sections 304A/182/201 read with
          Section 34 IPC.
     4.5. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune, before whom
          the chargesheet was filed, was of the view that there were
          material to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. Since it became a
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            sessions triable case, the same was committed to the Court
            of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune where it was registered as
            Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.
5.     Appellants filed Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 applications in the Court of
       Additional Sessions Judge, Pune seeking their discharge under
       Section 227 of CrPC.
       5.1. Contention of the appellants in the discharge applications
            was that there were no materials to show that the appellants
            had committed the alleged offence. Ingredients of the alleged
            offence charged were not even prima facie established against
            the appellants. Charge levelled by the prosecution against the
            appellants was groundless. FIR was totally silent about any
            overt act of the appellants. Appellants were not present at the
            place of occurrence when the incident took place. There was
            no negligence on the part of the appellants; not to speak of
            having any knowledge or intention to cause the death of the
            two employees or such bodily injury as would likely cause their
            death.
       5.2. Even if all the statements of the witnesses were considered and
            accepted as correct, the trial would not end in conviction of the
            appellants. Going ahead with the trial would be a futile exercise.
            There were no materials to show that appellants had committed
            the offence as charged. In the circumstances, appellants sought
            for discharge as contemplated under Section 227 of the CrPC.
6.     Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune vide his order dated
       01.04.2017 dismissed both the discharge applications. He held that
       the two appellants were certainly not oblivious of the fact that they
       had not provided safety gear to the employees which was certainly
       dangerous to them as they got exposed to electrocution risk. Learned
       Additional Sessions Judge was also of the view that there was much
       force in the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution that
       there was sufficient material justifying framing of charge against
       the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II
       read with Section 34 IPC. In that view of the matter, the discharge
       applications were dismissed.
7.     Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, appellants preferred Criminal
       Revision Application No. 269 of 2017 before the High Court. After
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                        507

         Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


     going through the materials on record and after hearing the parties,
     High Court was of the view that there was strong suspicion against
     both the appellants for committing the offence for which they were
     charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to proceed
     against the appellants. No case for interference was made out.
     Hence, the revision petition was dismissed vide the judgment and
     order dated 02.11.2017.
8.   Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 of the
     High Court, appellants preferred the related SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of
     2017. By order dated 09.01.2018, this Court had issued notice and
     granted stay of further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of
     2014 pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.
     8.1. The matter was heard on 30.04.2024 when leave was granted.
          Hence, the appeal.
9.   Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the Trial
     Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the discharge
     applications filed by the appellants. Though the prosecution had
     submitted chargesheet alleging commission of offence under Sections
     304A/182/201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, learned Magistrate
     while committing the case to the Court of Sessions concluded that
     there was material to invoke Section 304 Part II IPC. Trial Court took
     the view that there is sufficient material justifying framing of charge
     against the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304
     Part II read with Section 34 IPC. Interestingly, High Court proceeded
     on the basis that appellants were accused of committing offences
     under Sections 304 and 304A IPC while dismissing the revision
     application of the appellants.
     9.1. Learned counsel submits that no offence is made out against the
          appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC or even under Section
          304A IPC. The two deceased employees of appellant No. 1
          were working on the sign board as part of cleaning the front
          side of the shop. It was an accident that they got electrocuted
          and fell down because of which they suffered multiple injuries
          leading to their death.
     9.2. The only reason for filing of chargesheet against the appellants
          is that according to the prosecution, appellants had not provided
          safety equipments to the two deceased employees such as
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            rubber shoes, safety belt etc. He submits that non-furnishing
            of such equipments would not make it a criminal offence.
       9.3. Adverting to the order of the High Court, learned counsel
            submits that the High Court proceeded on the basis that it
            was expected from a prudent person to have provided the
            deceased employees wooden scaffolding instead of an iron
            ladder. Therefore, by applying the test of a prudent person, High
            Court found shortcomings on the conduct of the appellants.
            Therefore, it observed that a strong suspicion could be inferred
            against the appellants that they had knowledge that by asking
            the two deceased employees to work in the manner in which
            they did would cause their death.
       9.4. Learned counsel submits that such observations by the High
            Court are way off the mark and cannot justify initiation of criminal
            proceedings against the appellants. Neither any negligent or
            rash act was committed by the appellants nor any specific
            overt act can be attributed to the appellants. It was a case of
            sudden accident.
       9.5. Learned counsel also submits that appellants have paid
            compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased employees
            to the extent of Rs. 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma) and Rs.
            5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). Appellant No. 1 has also
            provided employment to the brother of the deceased Salauddin
            Shaikh. That apart, educational expenses of the children of Arun
            Sharma have been taken care of by appellant No. 1.
       9.6. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the appellants
            submits that there is no material to justify launch of criminal
            trial against the appellants. Therefore, the appellants should
            be discharged.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that appellants
    knew fully well about the risk that the two deceased employees had
    to undertake to do the work assigned to them. Yet the appellants
    did not provide any safety equipments to them. The two deceased
    employees sustained electric shock and fell down because of which
    they suffered multiple injuries causing their death. There is, thus, a
    strong prima facie case made out against the appellants.
       10.1. Learned counsel submits that there is sufficient material to
             justify framing of charge against the appellants for the offence
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          509

          Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


              punishable under Section 302 Part II IPC read with Section
              34 thereof. In any case, police had filed the charge-sheet
              alleging commission of offence under Section 304A IPC by
              the appellants. There are sufficient materials to substantiate
              such a charge. In this connection, learned counsel has placed
              reliance on the decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra Vs.
              State of M.P.1
     10.2. Finally, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there
           is no merit in the appeal and, therefore, the same should be
           dismissed.
11. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received
    the due consideration of the court.
     11.1. At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the relevant legal
           provisions.
12. We have noted above that the appellants have been charged for
    committing offence under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 34
    IPC. Since Section 34 IPC covers common intention, the substantive
    charge against the appellants is under Section 304 Part II IPC which
    reads as under:
     Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder –
     Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall
     be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
     may extend to ten years or with fine or with both, if the act is done
     with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but without any
     intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely
     to cause death.
     12.1. The ingredients constituting an offence under Section 304
           Part II IPC are as follows:
                   (i) he must commit culpable homicide not amounting
                   to murder;
                   (ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it
                   is likely to cause death;



1   (1996) 6 SCC 129
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                 (iii) but such act is done without any intention to cause
                 death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
                 cause death.
       12.2. Therefore, the first important expression is ‘culpable homicide
             not amounting to murder’. Culpable homicide is defined in
             Section 299 IPC. It says that whoever causes death by doing
             an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention
             of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with
             the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death,
             commits the offence of culpable homicide.
       12.3. All culpable homicides are murders except in the cases
             excepted under Section 300 IPC. Thus, except the cases
             specifically exempted under Section 300 IPC, all other acts
             within the meaning of Section 299 IPC would amount to
             committing the offence of culpable homicide. However, what is
             important to note is that for committing the offence of culpable
             homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer with the
             intention that such act would cause death or cause such bodily
             injury as is likely to cause death or he having the knowledge
             that by such an act, death may be caused. What, therefore, is
             significant is that the doer of the act must have the intention
             of causing death or the intention of causing such bodily injury
             as is likely to cause death or has the knowledge that by doing
             such an act he is likely to cause death. Therefore, to commit
             the offence of culpable homicide, intention or knowledge is
             of crucial importance.
       12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find that the
             said section would be attracted if anyone commits culpable
             homicide not amounting to murder if the act is done with the
             knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any
             intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is
             likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement of Section 304
             Part II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge that the
             act performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily
             injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to
             cause death. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part
             II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention.
             The doer must have the knowledge that the act performed
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                      511

         Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


            by him would likely cause death etc but there should not be
            any intention to cause death.
13. This being the legal framework, let us now deal with the charge
    against the appellants taking the same as correct. According to the
    prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court and the High Court,
    the two accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by
    providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though
    they were asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as
    part of decorating the front side of the shop which was approximately
    at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. The accused persons
    had provided only an iron ladder to the two employees but while
    working they were struck by electricity as a result of which they
    suffered electrocution and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries
    which led to their death. Therefore, both the accused persons
    were declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two
    deceased employees.
14. Even if we take the allegation against the appellants as correct, we
    are afraid no prima facie case can be said to have been made out
    against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304
    Part II IPC. From the record of the case, it is evident that there was
    no intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death
    or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the
    two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that the appellants
    had knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work
    on the sign board as part of the work of decoration of the frontage
    of the shop, they had the knowledge that such an act was likely to
    cause the death of the two deceased employees. As such, no prima
    facie case of culpable homicide can be said to have been made out
    against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent requirement
    of having knowledge that the act was likely to cause the death but
    not having any intention to cause death would become irrelevant
    though we may hasten to add that nothing is discernible from the
    record of the case that the appellants had the knowledge that by
    asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely
    cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
    their death.
15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of offence under
    Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the present case.
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16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC
    contemplates is that if upon consideration of the record of the
    case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the
    submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the
    judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding
    against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his
    reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge,
    the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the
    materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen
    at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against
    the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to
    enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may
    be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be acquitted.
    At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to
    whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a
    criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is
    at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the
    trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the
    prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but
    when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials
    to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is
    discharged, he is no longer an accused.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a
    decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra (supra). However, on
    going through the aforesaid judgment, we are of the view that facts
    in Keshub Mahindra and facts in the present case are poles apart.
    Keshub Mahindra arose out of the in-famous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A
    highly dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal
    factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result of
    such leakage, 3828 human beings lost their lives; 18922 suffered
    permanent injuries; 7172 suffered temporary disablement; 1313
    suffered temporary disablement caused by permanent injuries; and
    permanent partial disablement was suffered by 2680 persons. While
    40 human beings suffered from permanent total disablement, a total
    of 2544 animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against
    the company and officials belonging to the company. Charges were
    framed under Sections 304 Part II/324/326/429 IPC read with Section
    35 IPC. Some of the accused persons challenged such framing of
    charge before the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. However, the High
    Court dismissed the criminal revision application whereafter the
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          513

         Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


     matter came up before this Court. In Keshub Mahindra (supra), this
     Court upon perusal of the material on record held that charges under
     Section 304 Part II, 324, 326 and 429 of IPC were not attracted at
     all. Framing of such charges against the concerned accused persons
     fell short of even prima-facie case. It was observed that mere act of
     running a plant as per permission granted by the authorities would
     not be a criminal act. This Court held that:
           20. …….Consequently in our view taking the entire
           material as aforesaid on its face value and assuming it to
           represent the correct factual position in connection with
           the operation of the plant at Bhopal on that fateful night
           it could not be said that the said material even prima
           facie called for framing of a charge against the accused
           concerned under Section 304 Part II IPC on the specious
           plea that the said act of the accused amounted to culpable
           homicide only because the operation of the plant on that
           night ultimately resulted in deaths of a number of human
           beings and cattle.
     17.1. However, considering the gravity of the incident, this Court
           exercised power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India
           and examined the question as to whether the material led
           by the prosecution could prima facie support a charge under
           Section 304A IPC against the concerned accused persons.
           This Court thereafter opined as under:
                22. ……..It cannot be gainsaid that the voluminous
                evidence led by the prosecution in this connection at
                least prima facie shows that the accused concerned
                who operated the plant on that fateful night at Bhopal
                could be alleged to be at least guilty of rash and
                negligent act in the way this highly volatile substance
                MIC was handled by them and which ultimately
                escaped in vaporous form and extinguished the lives
                of thousands of human beings and animals apart from
                causing serious bodily injuries to thousands of others.
                    *        *        *        *        *        *
                However for framing charge under Section 304-A
                on the aforesaid material it cannot be said that the
                said material even prima facie did not point out the
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                  culpability of the accused concerned in running a
                  defective plant having a number of operational defects
                  and in being prima facie guilty of illegal omissions to
                  take safety measures in running such a limping plant
                  on that fateful night which resulted into this colossal
                  tragedy. The aforesaid conclusion of ours, therefore,
                  would make out a prima facie case against accused
                  5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 who were in actual charge of running
                  of the Bhopal Plant and would require them to face
                  the trial for charge under Section 304-A of the IPC.
       17.2. The aforesaid conclusion of this Court and the consequential
             directions issued was in exercise of power under Article 142 of
             the Constitution of India considering the gravity and magnitude
             of the incident.
       17.3. In so far facts of the present case is concerned, the two
             deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking the
             work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part of the
             said work, they were working on the sign board which was
             approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. For
             this purpose, they were provided with an iron ladder. While
             working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a
             result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in
             multiple injuries leading to their death. It was purely accidental.
             On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be
             made out against the appellants for committing an offence
             under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II
             IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only considered culpability of
             the appellants qua Section 304 Part II IPC as the committing
             Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions
             confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304
             Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.
       17.4. Therefore, Keshub Mahindra (supra) can be of no assistance
             to the respondent.
18. That being the position and having regard to the discussions made
    above, we are of the view that both the Trial Court and the High Court
    fell in error in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants.
    For the reasons stated above, the order of the Trial Court dated
    01.04.2017 and that of the High Court dated 02.11.2017 are hereby set
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                     515

            Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra


     aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge applications being
     Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014 are hereby
     allowed. Appellants are discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of
     2014. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 is allowed.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain