Holding

The appellants, as pattadar title‑holders with uninterrupted possession, are entitled to a declaration of ownership and compensation, as the State failed to prove any valid title or lawful resumption.

Summary

The appellants claimed ownership of a 3.34‑acre parcel of land in Kurnool district, asserting that it was a patta land acquired by a registered sale deed in 1970 and that they had been in uninterrupted possession for over twenty years. The State argued that the land was an assigned government land, subject to a non‑alienation clause, and that it had lawfully resumed the land in 1989 for a public purpose without compensation. The Supreme Court examined the statutory presumption under the Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights Act, 1971, the burden of proof under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and the procedural requirements of Section 80 CPC, finding that the State failed to prove any subsisting title or proper resumption procedure. The Court held that the appellants, as pattadar title‑holders, enjoyed a presumption of ownership and that the State’s failure to rebut this presumption entitled them to compensation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the State was directed to pay Rs. 70 lakhs as compensation to the appellants.

Issues considered

Whether the land in dispute is a patta land or an assigned government land subject to the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
Whether the State complied with the procedural requirements of resumption under the Assigned Lands Act and Section 80 of the CPC.
Whether the burden of proof lies on the State to establish a subsisting title under Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
Whether the appellants have satisfied the thirty‑year possession requirement for a declaratory suit against the Government.
Whether compensation is payable for the resumption of the land.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977s. 2(1), s. 2(3), s. 2(6), s. 3, s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(3), s. 3(5), s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7
Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971s. 2(4), s. 2(4‑a), s. 2(6), s. 2(7), s. 2(9), s. 6, s. 6‑A, s. 6‑B
Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886
Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023s. 113
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 79, s. 80, s. Order 21 Rule 94, s. Order XXVII
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 112

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellants were held to be the lawful owners of the ‘Patta Land’. Headnotes† Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 – Assigned government land - Resumption of land – Father of the appellant acquired the subject land by way of a registered sale deed in 1970 and after his death, appellants have been in possession and enjoyment of the subject

Subjects

Ryotwari pattaIllegal dispossessionPatta landPattadar passbookResumption proceedingsArable wastelandsBoard Standing Order No. 15Mandal revenue officerTehsildarD‑Form pattaKhatadarLand patta holderPublic interestRight to propertyCentral Law CommissionAdministration’s lack of responsivenessAssigned government landResumption of landCompensationPublic purposePresumptionPossession as a proof of ownershipStatutory presumptionNotice in government suitsStatutory noticePublic AuthoritiesDeclaratory title suit against the governmentSuits for declaration of title against governmentSuits against private partiesBurden of proofPatta and PattadarLand Allottee

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1011 : 2025 INSC 383

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr.
v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4311 of 2025)
24 March 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the judgment
of the trial court whereby the appellants were held to be the lawful
owners of the ‘Patta Land’.

Headnotes†
Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar
Pass Books) Act, 1971 – Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands
(Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 – Assigned government
land - Resumption of land – Father of the appellant acquired
the subject land by way of a registered sale deed in 1970
and after his death, appellants have been in possession and
enjoyment of the subject land – Appellant’s case that in 1995 the
respondents-Government ‘illegally’ dispossessed them from
the subject land without any intimation/prior notice and without
payment of compensation, for construction of an Education
Institute – Upon explanation sought, the respondents informed
that the subject land was an assigned government land, the
Government retained the rights to resume the land at any time
for ‘public purpose’, and due process of law was followed to
resume the land in 1989 whereas appellant’s case that subject
land was ‘Patta Land’ and could not have been assigned to
anybody – Suit by appellant seeking declaration of title to the
subject land, and direction to the respondents to deliver the
possession to them – Trial court decreed the suit in favour
of the appellants declaring them to be the lawful owners of
the subject land and directed the respondents to deliver the
possession of the land to the appellants – However, the High
Court set aside the said order – Correctness:
Held: Appellants have Pattadars’ title to the suit land – Under
the 1971 Act, once the recording of right is done, followed by the
* Author
1012 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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issuance of a pattadar pass book, the presumption in favour of
the holder of the pass book is that he is having right in the said
land – Appellants have sale deed in their favour which was never
questioned by the State – Perusal of the transcripts of the oral
evidence shows that the entire approach of the courts below was
wrong – High Court overlooked the fact that the appellants were
in possession of the land since 1970 and failed to consider the
legal effect of the said period – State miserably failed to establish
that the subject land was an assigned land – Onus was on the
State to prove that the Government had a subsisting title to the
subject land – Appellants established their possession over the suit
land from 1970 by cogent and convincing evidence, and were in
peaceful enjoyment of the suit land – Respondent not been able to
prove its title to the suit land, they failed to advance any credible
evidence on record to rebut the presumption – Furthermore, the
State Authorities failed to acknowledge the notice issued by the
appellants and inform them as regards their stance – It would be
extremely difficult to give effect to a decree passed in favour of
the appellant – Construction stood completed almost thirty years
back, and to ask the State Authorities to demolish that part of
the construction made over the suit land, would be too much –
Having regard to the nature of the land, the total area and the
time spent in pursuing the litigation for past thirty years, the State
to pay Rs.70 lakhs towards compensation to the appellants.
[Paras 45, 58, 72, 85, 114, 127]

Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – s.113 (corresponding
to s.110 of the repealed Evidence Act, 1872) – Possession as
a proof of ownership:
Held: s.113 embodies the principle that possession is prima facie
proof of ownership – Once the plaintiff proves that he has been
in possession of the suit property, the burden of proving that the
plaintiff is not the owner is on the defendant who affirms that the
plaintiff is not the owner – Section does not make a distinction
between the Government and a private citizen – s.113 is equally
applicable where a Government claims to be the owner or
challenges the ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of
the property – s.113 raises a statutory presumption in favour of
a person who is in possession that he is the owner and places
burden upon the other persons who say that the plaintiff is not the
owner – Presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1013

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party
has no title. [Paras 72, 84, 85]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.80 – Notice in government
suits – Object of notice – Significance:
Held: Primary objective behind s.80 is to provide the Government
or a public officer with an opportunity to assess the legal merits
of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be just and
reasonable – Unlike private parties, Government is expected to
objectively assess the claim, seek legal advice as necessary,
and make decisions in public interest within the stipulated two-
month time frame – Statutory notice holds significance beyond
mere formality – In practice, such notices have often become
empty formalities – Public Authorities must take statutory notice
issued to them in all seriousness – Courts may be obliged to
draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not
acknowledging the notice – In the absence of that, a stand taken
during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought.
[Paras 97, 101, 102, 105, 113]

Suit – Declaratory title suit against the government –
Adjudication of – Suits for declaration of title against
government and suits against private parties – Difference:
Held: In suits for declaration of title against the government, there
is a presumption in favour of the Government, as all lands which
are unoccupied or not vested in any individual/local authority,
are presumed to belong exclusively to the Government – There
is additional burden of proof on the party seeking declaration of
title against Government – Plaintiff has to establish its possession
over the land in question for a period of thirty years as opposed
to twelve years in the case of adverse possession against a
private party – Before granting a decree declaring title against
the government, trial court must ensure that plaintiff has furnished
adequate evidence for establishing ownership/adverse possession
for over thirty years and name of the plaintiff has been recorded as
the owner, holder, or occupant in the relevant revenue/municipal
records for over thirty years – Trial court must scrutinize the nature
of the possession to ensure public property is not inadvertently
converted into private ownership by unscrupulous elements – In a
suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able
to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on
the defendant, it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and
1014 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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in the absence thereof, the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff
shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof
of the plaintiff’s title. [Paras 88, 92]

Land laws – “Patta”and “Pattadar” – Meaning of – Difference
between Land Patta Holder and Land Allottee:
Held: “Pattadar” is a landowner who holds a land deed (Patta)
directly from the government and is registered in the land revenue
accounts as the holder or occupant of the land, liable to pay land
revenue – “Patta” is a type of land deed issued by the government,
indicating ownership or the right to hold land – Land Patta Holder
is a person who has been granted a Patta (a legal document) that
confers rights over a specific piece of land, indicating ownership
or entitlement to use the land – Land Allottee is a person to whom
land has been allotted by the Government or relevant authority,
often under specific conditions and for designated purposes –
Land Patta Holder possesses rights that are often permanent,
heritable, and transferrable, as established under the land revenue
regulations – Land Allottee may not have the same level of rights,
allotment can be conditional and may not confer full ownership
rights – Patta Holder is recognized as having a legal claim to the
land, which can be defended in court – Land Patta Holders generally
have the right to transfer their interests in the land, subject to any
conditions specified in the patta, the allottees may face restrictions
on transferring their rights, particularly within a specified period or
without government permission. [Paras 38-42]

Case Law Cited
Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund
[2007] 13 SCR 77 : (2007) 13 SCC 565; Nair Service Society
Ltd. v. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander [1968] 3 SCR 163 : AIR 1968
SC 1165; Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector
[2003] 2 SCR 180 : (2003) 3 SCC 472; State of Andhra Pradesh
and Ors. v. Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser Company [2013] 4 SCR
394 : (2013) 9 SCC 319; R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt. of
Karnataka, Revenue Department [2010] 4 SCR 904 : (2010) 5 SCC
203; R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami &
V.P. Temple and Another [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 450 : (2003) 8 SCC
752; Addagada Raghavamma v. A. Addagada Chenchamma [1964]
2 SCR 933 : AIR 1964 SC 136; Bihari Chowdhary and Another v.
State of Bihar and Others [1984] 3 SCR 309 : (1984) 2 SCC 627;
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1015

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd. [1978] 1 SCR
746 : (1978) 1 SCC 68; Raghunath Das v. Union of India and
Another [1969] 1 SCR 450 : 1968 SCC OnLine SC 199; Land
Acquisition Officer-cum-R.D.O. v. Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine
AP 217; State of A.P. and Anr. v. P. Peda Chinnayya & Ors., 1996
SCC OnLine AP; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bondapalli Sanyasi,
2001 SCC OnLine AP 1037; Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [1955] 1
SCR 408 : (1954) 1 SCC 787; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan
v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1982] 1 SCR 1137 : (1982) 1 SCC 39;
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1994] Supp. 1 SCR
807 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.
and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. [2011] 12 SCR 191 : (2011) 9
SCC 354 – referred to.
Dharma Reddy v. Sub-Collector, Bodhan & Ors. (1987) 1 APLJ 171;
Chittoor District Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd., Milk Products
Factory v. C. Rajamma (1996) 2 ALT 526; K.M. Kamallula Basha
v. District Collector, Chittoor District, Chittoor (2009) 3 ALD 385;
Narayan Anandram Marwadi v. Gowbai, widow of Dhondiba, ILR
37 Bom. 415; M. Krishna Aiyar v. The Secretary of State for
India, I.L.R. 33 Mad. 173; Jagannath Shivnarayan v. Municipal
Commissioner, City Municipality, Indore, AIR 1951 MB 80; Suraji
Fulaji v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 Bom 193; Hanmantrao v.
Secretary of State, (1901) 25 Bom 287; The Secretary of State
for India in Council v. Chimanlal Jamnadas and others, AIR 1942
Bom 161 – referred to.
Pandurang Balaji v. Krishnaji Govind (1903) 28 Bom. 125 –
approved.
Bater v. Bater (1950) 2 All ER 458 – referred to.

List of Acts
Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act,
1977; Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass
Books) Act, 1971; Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908; Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886.

List of Keywords
Ryotwari patta; Illegal dispossession; Patta land; Pattadar
passbook; Resumption proceedings; Arable wastelands; Board
Standing Order No. 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue
Standing Orders; Mandal revenue officer; Tehsildar; D-Form patta;
1016 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Khatadar; Land patta holder; Public interest; Right to property;
Central Law Commission; Administration’s lack of responsiveness;
Assigned government land; Resumption of land; Compensation;
Public purpose; Presumption; Possession as a proof of ownership;
Statutory presumption; Notice in government suits; Statutory notice;
Public Authorities; Declaratory title suit against the government;
Suits for declaration of title against government; Suits against
private parties; Burden of proof; “Patta”and “Pattadar”; Land Allottee.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4311 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2014 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for The State of Telangana and the
State of Andhra Pradesh in AS No. 1931 of 2002

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Raavi Yogesh Venkata, Ms. Twinkle Rathi, Kotte Venkata Pawan
Kumar, Ms. Thithiksha Padmam.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Prerna Singh, Guntur Pramod Kumar, Dhruv Yadav, V. Sridhar
Reddy, Abhijit Sengupta, Rohit Jaiswal.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts: -

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL AVERMENTS ............................................................. 2
B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ............................................................. 18
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS .............. 23
D. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS ............. 27

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1017

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

E. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 34
i. The Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and
Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 ........................................... 36
ii. The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfers) Act, 1977 .............................................................. 39
iii. Oral Evidence on record ....................................................... 45
iv. Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ........ 57
v. How is the Court expected to consider title suits against the
Government .................................................................... 62
vi. Section 80 of CPC ................................................................ 67
vii. Object of Notice in Government Suits .................................. 71
viii. Essentials of Section 80 CPC ............................................... 72
ix. Payment of compensation in cases of resumption of land ... 77
F. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 93

1. Leave granted
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and
the State of Andhra Pradesh dated 10.07.2014 in AS No. 1931 of
2002 by which the High Court allowed the first appeal filed by the
Respondents (original defendants) and thereby set aside the judgment
and decree dated 05.08.1999 passed by the Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Kurnool in Original Suit No. 115 of 1996 instituted by the
appellants herein (original plaintiffs).

A. FACTUAL AVERMENTS
3. The subject matter of the present litigation is a parcel of land,
admeasuring approximately 3.34 acres, bearing Survey No. 451/1
situated in Dinnedevarapadu Mandal, Kurnool District, Andhra
Pradesh (hereinafter, the “Subject Land”). It is the case of the
appellants that in 1995, the Respondents, without any intimation
or prior notice, unlawfully dispossessed the appellants from the
Subject Land - a purported act that compelled them to institute O.S.
1018 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

No. 115 of 1996 in the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge,
Kurnool, wherein the appellants sought a declaration of their title to
the Subject Land.
4. According to the appellants, the ownership of the land can be traced
back to 1943. The subject land was then originally owned by one
Harijana Govindu. It is the case of the appellants that the subject
land was not a government assigned land but rather a private
property over which the respondents had no right, title or interest
at any point of time.
5. The Subject Land was mortgaged by Harijana Govindu with Perugu
Swamy Reddy by virtue of a mortgage deed dated 06.06.1943 as
security for a sum of Rs. 100/-. The said mortgage deed was not
redeemed during the lifetime of Harijana Govindu and Perugu Swamy
Reddy As Harijana Govindu defaulted on the payment of the loan,
the Legal Representatives of Perugu Swamy Reddy instituted a suit
for the recovery of the said sum, bearing suit number O.S. No. 178
of 1967, before the Court of the Principal District Munsif, Kurnool.
The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the legal representatives
for sale of the mortgaged property.
6. In furtherance of the aforesaid decree, execution proceedings were
instituted by the legal representatives of Perugu Swamy Reddy
in E.P. No. 69 of 1961 before the Court of the Principal District
Munsif, Kurnool. In the said proceedings, the Subject Land was
duly auctioned in a Court Auction dated 22.04.1970, whereupon one
Kuruva Ramanna purchased it for Rs. 600/- and took possession of
the land by way of a process issued by the Court on 09.10.1970.
The delivery of possession of the subject land was recorded by the
District Munsif Court, Kurnool on 06.11.1970. Later on, 10.12.1970,
a sale certificate was issued by the Trial Court under Order 21 Rule
94 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the “CPC”). The
relevant portion of the Certificate issued under Order 21 Rule 94 of
C.P.C is reproduced herein below:
“In the execution of the above decree on 22.4.1970 auction
was conducted in respect of the Schedule immovable
property belonging to the respondents, knocked down
in favour of the Auction Purchaser P. Ramannna for Rs.
600/ only and the said sale was confirmed. on 1.7.1970
certificate is issued accordingly.”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1019

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

7. The auction purchaser viz. Kuruva Ramanna further transferred
the property to one Yerikala Rosanna, the deceased father of the
appellant no. 1 by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 10.12.1970
bearing Document No. 3154 of 1970, for a total sale consideration
of Rs. 600/-. Accordingly, the father of the appellant no.1 was in
possession and enjoyment of the Subject Land till his death in
1986. The Ryotwari patta was also issued in favor of the father
of appellant no. 1 in respect of the subject land and other survey
numbers, considering his uninterrupted possession and enjoyment
thereof. The relevant portion of the sale deed is reproduced herein
below:
“Document No. 3154 of 1970
Sale Deed for Rs. 600/-, dated 10.12.1970 1970 December
10 equivalent Shalivahana Shaka 192 Margasira 19 Kuruva
P. Ramanna, S/o Kuruva P. Ramanna, Agriculturist, R/o
Dinnadevarapadu Village, Deinnedevarapadu P.O. Kurnool
Taluq, Kurnool District, executed the sale deed in favour of
Yerukala Roshanna, S/o Yerukala N aganna, agriculturist,
R/o Dinnadevarapadu Village, Dinnadevarapadu Post,
Kunool Taluq, Kurnool District, which recites that and my
personal and family agricultural expenses today received
a sum of Rs. 600/-only in consideration of whereof I sold
the schedule property in your favour and delivered the
possession of it to you today itself. From today onwards
you, your legal heirs are entitled to enjoy with absolute
and Saleable rights over the schedule land and that from
today neither myself nor my legal heirs have any right or
title over the schedule land. I have executed the sale deed
with my free will and consent.”
8. On the death of his father, the appellant no. 1 is said to have been
in possession and enjoyment of the Subject Land. According to the
appellants, the principal cause of action to institute the suit first arose
in the year 1995, as they came to be ‘illegally’ dispossessed from the
Subject Land without any intimation or prior notice by the respondents.
It is the case of the appellants that as the respondents wanted to
construct a District Institute of Education and Training Centre (DIET)
building on the aforesaid land, they were forcibly dispossessed without
payment of any compensation of any description.
1020 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

9. According to the appellants, upon seeking explanation from the
respondents as regards their subject land, they were informed that
the subject land was an assigned government land, endowed with
non-alienable rights to it and that the Government retained the rights
to resume the assigned land at any time for a ‘public purpose’.
10. The appellants refuted the claim of the respondents before the Trial
Court, contending that the Subject Land was a ‘Patta Land’ and,
by its very nature, it could not have been assigned to anybody. In
support of this position, it was averred that a Pattadar Passbook
was issued to the appellants under the Andhra Pradesh (Record of
Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971 (for short, the
“Act of 1971”).
11. Aggrieved by the foregoing, the appellants submitted a representation
dated 23.01.1996 addressed to the District Collector, Kurnool, stating
that the subject land was purchased from one Kuruva Ramanna under
a registered sale deed in the year 1970 for a valid consideration and
they had been in exclusive possession of the same. The appellants
requested the District Collector to cancel the aforementioned
resumption. As the District Collector failed to respond to the said
representation, the plaintiffs issued a notice dated 04.01.1996 under
Section 80 CPC to the District Collector, intimating that a suit would
be instituted against the State if the Subject Land was not reconveyed
back to the appellants.
12. The appellants ultimately instituted an original Suit being O.S. No.
115 of 1996 before the Trial Court, praying for a declaration of their
title to the Subject Land and for an order directing the respondents
to deliver the possession to them.
13. The respondents in their written statement took the stance that the
Subject Land was an arable waste land owned by the Government.
The respondents had no knowledge of the events occurring from
the time when Harijana Govindu mortgaged the land till when the
land was conveyed by Kuruva Ramanna to the deceased father of
the appellant no.1 and the respondents denied that the appellants
were in possession of the subject land after the death of father of
appellant no.1.
14. According to the respondents, the subject land by virtue of being an
assigned government land was subject to certain conditions; one of
those being that the Government at any time may resume the land
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1021

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

wholly or in part, if it was of the opinion that the land is required
for any public purpose. In light of the same, it was contended that
Harijana Govindu did not possess any alienable rights at any point in
time and therefore, could not have further alienated the Subject Land.
15. According to the respondents, the Subject Land was resumed
by the Mandal Revenue, Kurnool in the resumption proceedings
No. R.C.C 184/89 dated 03.02.1989 and in addition to the same, the
Mandal Officer also resumed various other parcels of land, as the
said lands were situated at a hill slope with red gravel. Thus, they
were unfit for any sort of cultivation.
16. According to the respondents upon requisition from the District
Educational Officer, Kurnool for the construction of a DIET Building,
the Mandal Revenue Officer, together with the Mandal Surveyor and
Revenue Inspector, inspected the lands and found them suitable
for such construction. Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Records were
prepared and scrutinized by the Deputy Inspector of Survey, Kurnool
whereby the said lands were classified as arable waste lands.
17. Pursuant to the resumption proceedings, a notice was published in
the village as part of the procedure to invite objections, if any, against
the transfer of the subject land in favor of the Education Department.
As no objections were received within the time period stipulated, the
Gramapanchayat of Dinnedevarapadu gave its consent for transfer
of the said lands in favour of the Education Department. Thereafter,
on 01.05.1989, the possession of the land was handed over to the
District Educational Officer, Kurnool for the purpose of constructing
the DIET Building.
18. According to the respondents, in the year 1995, the Education
Department commenced the construction of the DIET Buildings on
a portion of the resumed land. According to the respondents, the
resumption of the land was effected bona fide for a public purpose
and in strict compliance with the Rules framed under the Board
Standing Order No. 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue
Standing Orders and other provisions. The action of the government
in resuming the lands cannot be termed as a high-handed action
and the appellants have no right, title, or interest in the land.
19. According to the respondents, the suit was otherwise also barred
by limitation. The possession of the Subject Land was transferred to
the District Collector in 1989, whereas the suit came to be instituted
1022 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in 1996, i.e., beyond the prescribed period of limitation as per the
Limitation Act, 1963.
20. We must try to understand the exact case of the appellants as
pleaded in the plaint. The relevant pleadings in the plaint read thus:
“3. The plaintiffs are the owners of plaint schedule land.
Then plaint schedule land originally belonged to one
Harijana Govindu, resident of Dinne Devarapadu. The said
Govindu mortgaged the plaint schedule land for Rs. 100 in
favour of one Perugu Swamy Reddy of Dinne Devarapadu
under a mortgage deed dated 6.6.1943 the mortgage was
not redeemed during the life time of Govindu and Perugu
Swamy Reddy. Therefore Perugu Swamy Reddy’s sons
filed a suit O.S. 178/67 in District Munsif’s court, Kurnool.
For recovery of mortgage money against the sons of
Govindu and accordingly a decree was passed for sale
of the mortgaged property i.e. the plaint schedule land. In
pursuance of the said decree E.P. was filed for sale of the
plaintiff schedule land and recover the decretal amount. In
the court auction held on 22.4.70, one Kuruva Ramanna
of Dinne Devarapadu purchased the plaint schedule land
for Rs. 600 and took delivery of the land through process
of court on 9.10.70 and the delivery was recorded by
court on 6.11.70.
4. The court auction purchaser, Kuruva Ramanna, in turn
sold the plaint; schedule land for Rs. 600 to 1st plaintiffs
father, Yerikala Rosanna, under a registered sale deed
dated 10.12.70. The 1st plaintiffs father was in possession
and enjoyment of plaint schedule land till his death in the
year 1986. A ryotwari patta pass book was issued to 1st
plaintiffs father for the plaint schedule land and others S.
nos. in his possession and enjoyment. On the death of his
father, the 1st plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of
plaint schedule land without obstruction from any quarter.
5. The defendant has no manner of right, title or possession
to the plaint schedule land. From the beginning the plaint
schedule land is in the hands of private individuals and
at no time it was in possession of Government. Last year
the defendant took possession of a portion plaint schedule
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1023

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

land for the purpose of constructing a building for District
Institute of Educational Training Centre (DIET) without
issuing any notice to the plaintiff and without paying any
compensation to the plaintiff. The area so occupied by
Government will be about 34 cents and the plaintiff is
cultivating the balance extent in the plaint schedule land.
6. The Government has taken possession of plaint schedule
land from the plaintiffs on the false and mischievous plea
that the plaint schedule land is an assigned land and that
the Government is at liberty to resume their assigned land
at any time for public purpose. This stand of Government
is utterly false. The plaint schedule land is a patta land
from the days of yore and it is not an assigned land to
anybody. The 1st plaintiff gave a representation to the
Dist. Collector, Kunrool on 23.1.96 stating all the true
facts about plaint schedule land and requested the District
Collector, Kurnool, to reconvey the plaint schedule land
to the petitioner. But the District Collector Kurnool did not
redress the grievance of plaintiff. Therefore the 1st plaintiff
ultimately gave a notice to the Dist. Collector, Kurnool,
under Section 80 C.P.C. on 4.1.96 informing the District
Collector that a suit will be filed against the State for its
high handed action if the District Collector does not cancel
the so called resumption of plaint schedule land or pay the
compensation to the plaintiff at the rate of one lakh rupees
per acre. The District Collector, Kurnool received the said
notice on 8.1. 96 but did not comply with the demand of
the plaintiff. Hence the plaintiff files this suit for declaration
of plaintiff’s title to the plaint schedule and for recovery of
possession of plaint schedule land from the defendant.
7. The cause of action arose in September, 95 when the
defendant took over the plaint schedule land high handed
by for construction of District Institute of Educational
Training Centre. (DIET) and subsequent dates when the
plaintiff demanded reconveyance of plaint schedule land
to the plaintiff and the defendant refused to comply with
the demand of plaintiff.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1024 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

21. In para 11, the appellants prayed as under:
“11. The plaintiffs therefore pray that the Hon’ble Court may
be pleased to declare plaintiffs title to the plaint schedule
land, direct the defendants to deliver back the possession
of the plaint schedule land to the plaintiff, award costs and
grant any other relief which the Hon’ble Court deems fit
and proper under the circumstance of the case.”
22. To the aforesaid, the respondents herein filed their written statement
stating as under:
“3. The allegations in para 3 of the plaint that the
plaintiffs are the owner of the suit schedule land, and
it originally belonged to Harijana Govindu, and the said
Govindu mortgage and land to Perugu Swamy Reddy of
Dinnedevarapadu Village, under a mortgage deed dated
6.6.1943, and that Perugu Swamy Reddy filed O.S. No.
178/67 in D.M.C. Kurnool for recovery of the mortgage
debt and that one Kuruva Ramana purchased the. said
land in Court Auction for realization of the decree in O.S.
No. 178/1967 on 22.4.1970 and delivery was effected in
favour of Kuruva Ramana on 6.11.1970 are all not known
to this defendant and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of all
the said allegations. Likewise the further allegations that
Kuruva Ramana sold the plaint schedule land to Yerikala
Rosanna under a registered sale deed dtd. 10.12.1970
and that plaintiffs father was in possession and enjoyment
of the said land till his death in the year 1986 are also
not within the knowledge of this defendant. The further
allegations that on the death of his father, the plaintiff
is in possession and enjoyment of the suit land without
obstructions from any quarter are all false and incorrect
statements made for the purpose of the suit.
4. The contention of the plaintiff in para 5 of the plaint that
the defendant has no manner of right title or possession to
the plaint schedule land and that from the beginning the
suit land is in the hands of private persons and at no time
it was in possession of Government are all not true and
correct. The further allegations that the suit schedule land
is a patta land and it is not an assigned land to anybody
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1025

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

is also an utterly false statement created for the purpose
of the suit.
5. This defendant humbly submits that the land in S.No.
451/1 extent Ac. 3.34 cents situated in Dinnedevarapadu
Village was originally arable waste land belonging to the
Government. The said land was assigned to Harijana
Govindanna subject to certain conditions and one among
them is that the Government may resume the land wholly
or in part if in the opinion of the Government the land is
required for any public purpose. The said Govindanna
has no alienable rights in the land assigned to him. The
suit schedule land was resumed to Government by the
Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool in his proceedings No.
R.C.B. 184/89 dated 3.2.1989.
6. The following lands are situated within the
Dinnedevarapadu village limits near B. Tandrapadu village
and are classified as Arable Waste lands.

S. No. 449/1 Extent Ac. 1.48
449/2 0.95
449/3 3.03
449/4 3.00
451/1 3.34
451/3 1.41
451/4 0.70
Total 13.91 cents

The entire lands were on hill slope with red gravel. These
lands are unfit for cultivation.
7. It is further submitted that on the requisition of District
Educational Officer, Kurnool for transfer of the above
lands including the plaint schedule land for the purpose
of construction of District Institution of Education and
Training Centre Buildings, the Mandal Revenue Officer,
Kurnool along with Mandal Surveyor and Revenue
1026 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Inspector, inspected the above lands and found that the
said lands are suitable for the construction of DIET Centre.
Thereupon the Sub-Divisional Records for the above lands
have been got prepared and it has been got scrutinized
by the Deputy Inspector of Survey, Kurnool. According
to the Village accounts the said lands are classified as
Arable Waste lands. A notice has been got published in
the village inviting objections if any against the transfer
of the land in favour of Education Department. The time
allowed for objections was expired by 31.10.1990, and
no objections have been received from the public. The
said lands are in Dinnedevarapadu Gran1a Panchayat
limits. The Grama Panchayat also has given its consent
for transfer of the above land in favour of the Education
Department. It is further submitted that these lands are
vacant lands and are free from any encroachments, and
the said land is quiet suitable for construction of DIET
buildings. Thereupon the land was given possession to
the District Educational Officer, Kurnool on 1.5.1989 by
the Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool in strict conformity
with the rules and regulations prescribed under Law.
Subsequently the said land was transferred in favour
of District Educational Officer, Kurnool for construction
of DIET buildings. During the year 1995 the Education
Department started construction of DIET Centre buildings
in a portion of the plaint schedule land. The action of the
Government in resuming the assigned and required bona
fide for a public purpose cannot be termed as a high handed
action. The entire process was made in accordance with
the Rules framed under the Board standing orders and
other relevant provisions of law. The allegations contra
are denied as false.
8. This defendant submits that the plaintiff has no right,
title, interest and possession of the plaint schedule land.
Therefore the question of declaration of his title or delivery
of possession to the plaintiff does not arise. The plaintiff
has misconceived his remedy if any.
9. In any event the suit is barred by limitation. Issue of
notice will not save limitation. The land was required to
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1027

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

the Government in the year 1989. Therefore, the suit filed
in the year 1996 is clearly barred by time.”
(Emphasis supplied)

i. Trial Court’s Judgment
23. The Trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment
of the suit land without obstruction from any quarter from
the date of his father?
2. Whether the defendants have no manner of right or
title for the possession of the plaint schedule property?
3. Whether the suit land is assigned land and Govindanna
has no alienable rights for said assigned lands?
4. Whether the suit was resumed to Govt. by M.R.O.,
Kurnool with the proceedings No. R.C.B. 184/89, dt. 3-2-
1989?
5. Whether the suit land was given in possession of District
Educational Officer on 1-5-89 by M.R.O., Kurnool?
6. Whether the plaintiff has no right or interest or possession
of the plaint schedule right?
7. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
8. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary
parties?
9. To what relief?
10. The issues 1, 2, 3 and 6 are recasted as follows:
“Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of suit schedule
property and if so, ‘they are entitled for declaration and
recovery of possession as prayed for in respect of the suit
schedule property”?
24. The findings recorded by the Trial Court in its Judgment and Decree
dated 05.08.1999 can be understood in two parts: -
a. First, the Trial Court held that the resumption proceedings
conducted by the Mandal Officer was tainted with serious
1028 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

procedural irregularities. The respondents had failed to adduce
any credible evidence to establish that the Mandal Revenue
Officer had conducted any enquiry before resuming the Subject
Land & handing it over to the District Educational Officer, Kurnool.
It was held that mere bald assertions in the oral evidence of DW1,
Mandal Revenue Officer, would not be sufficient to establish
that the resumption of the Subject Land was in accordance with
law. Moreover, when the appellants challenged the resumption
proceedings, the authorities had failed to produce any relevant
records to establish that they had followed proper procedure
for the purpose of resumption of the land. Therefore, the Trial
Court had drawn an adverse inference against the evidence
of the DW1, Mandal Revenue Officer.
b. Secondly, the issuance of the pattadar passbook duly signed
by the then Tahsildar in favour of the appellants combined with
the land revenue receipts was held to serve as clear indicators
of the actual possession and enjoyment of the Subject Land by
the appellants. Furthermore, the Trial Court observed that the
oral testimony of PW1 was duly corroborated by documentary
evidence. This was considered to have sufficiently established
the appellants’ title and possession to the Subject Land, thereby
entitling them to recover possession of the same.
25. The Trial Court accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the appellants
declaring them to be the lawful owners of the subject land and directed
the respondents to deliver the possession of the subject land back
to the appellants and observed as under:
“21. As seen from ex. All proceedings from District Revenue
Officer, Kurnool dt. 31-5-1996 indicating that the first
plaintiff issued Ex.A8 Section 80 C.P.C. notice dt. 4-1-1996
and the District Revenue officer requested the Mandal
Revenue Officer to send resumption records without any
delay. Further as seen Ex.A12 dt. 6-5-1996 proceedings
from District Revenue Officer, Kurnool indicating that
D.R.O. Kurnool address Ex. A12 to M.R.O., Kurnool to
send resumption records pertaining to the suit schedule
property. As regard Ex. A7, Ex.A8 and Exs.A10 to A12
indicates that the first plaintiff sent petitions to the higher
revenue authorities and also issued notices to them to
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1029

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

enquire into the matter. Absolutely, there is no material on
record that what action was taken by the District Revenue
Authorities on the petitions and notices issued by the first
plaintiff. Even today, this Court did not see the light of the
day with regard to the alleged resumption proceedings
of suit schedule property in R.C.B. 184/89 dt. 28-2-1989.
Absolutely, there is no evidence when Mandal Revenue
Officer conducted enquiry and resumed the suit land and
handed over possession of suit land to District Educational
officer, Kurnool. The mere statement of DW1, Mandal
Revenue Officer is not sufficient to prove that he has
followed proper procedure and resumed the suit land. When
the plaintiffs challenging the resumption proceedings itself
as no enquiry was conducted and no notice was served on
them, it is for the Government to produce such resumption
proceedings in R.C.B. 184/89, dt. 3-2-89 to prove that
they have followed proper procedure in resumption of the
suit land. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case, absolutely there is no material before this court
to know whether the Mandal Revenue Officer adopted
proper procedure or conducted any enquiry at the time
of resumption of suit land. The evidence of DW1 is not
sufficient to establish that the resumption of suit land is
legal and proper without produce any relevant records.
Nothing prevented the revenue authorities to produce
the resumption proceedings of the suit land before this
court. Therefore, inference can be drawn that the Mandal
Revenue Officer, Kurnool has not adopted procedure in
resumption of suit land. In the absence of resumption
proceedings of the suit land, the court cannot accept the
evidence of DW1 Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool with
regard to resuming of the suit land. Therefore, I have no
hesitation to come to conclusion that Mandal Revenue
Officer, Kurnool has not adopted proper procedure while
resuming the suit land and possession given to Education
Officer cannot be said legal.
22. The learned Asst. Government Pleader pointed that the
Mandal Revenue Officer resumed the suit schedule land
for public purpose as the suit land is an assigned land.
1030 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

It is true that there are some conditions in D. Form patta
that the Government may take the assigned lands if it is
required for the public purpose. But, in this case, the facts
are different. The plaintiffs belong to Yerikala Community
(Schedule Tribe). It is also the case of plaintiff that except
the suit land, they have no other land of their own. They
purchased the suit schedule land under a registered
sale deed in the year 1970 DW1 admitted in his cross-
examination that they have issued Ex.A3 patta pass book
in respect of suit schedule land and also Ex.A4 to Ex.A6
land revenue receipts for having paid the land revenue
by the plaintiffs to the suit schedule property. If really, the
plaintiffs family is not in possession and enjoyment of
the suit land, there is no need to issue Ex.A3 patta pass
book to the plaintiffs and also receive land revenue from
the plaintiffs. Learned Asst. Govt. pleader argued that
buildings were raised in the suit property. Even structures
raised in the suit property, it has no significance to the
circumstances of present case.
23. DW1 Mandal Revenue officer on one hand he admits
having issued Ex.A3 patta pass book and Ex.A4 to A6
land revenue receipts and on the other hand, denies
the plaintiff peaceful possession in respect of the suit
schedule property. It is not the case of defendant that
they have not issued Ex.A3 to A6 patta pass book
and land revenue receipts. Having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case there is no proof when
Government resuming the suit land and is handed over
possession to Educational Officer, Kurnool. Therefore I
have to answer issues 4 and 5 against defendant and
in favour of plaintiffs.
Further, there is no material on record to show that the
Mandal Revenue officer has adopted proper procedure
while resuming the suit land. Therefore, the resumption
of suit land can be said as improper and illegal.
24. RECASTED ISSUE FRAMED ON 30-7-1999:
On this issue, the burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove that
they are the owners of suit schedule property and they
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1031

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

are entitled for declaration and also relief of recovery of
possession.
25. Coming to the evidence of Second Plaintiff as PW1
that the suit schedule land originally belongs to one Madiga
Govindu of her village. The said Govindu mortgaged the suit
schedule land to Perugu Swamy Reddy. As the Govindu
did not pay the mortgage amount, the Swamy Reddy filed
a suit against the Govindu, the said suit was decreed. One
Kuruva Ramanna purchased the suit schedule property in
court auction and took possession of the same through
court. Ex.A1 is registration extract of sale certificate in
E.P. 51/59 in O.S. 178/67 for having purchased the suit
schedule property by Kuruva Ramanna in court auction.
26. Further, according to PW1, Rosanna the father of
first plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property under
the original of Ex.A2 dt. 10-12-1970. Considering the
possession and enjoyment, the Government also issued
patta pass book in favour of her father-in-law. Ex. A3 is
such pass book. They have been paying the land revenue
to the suit schedule land. Ex.A4 to Ex.A6 are such receipts.
Further, according to PW1, the suit schedule property is
an agricultural land and they are raising crops in the suit
schedule property. The Government took the possession
of suit schedule property for constructing the school
without their consent. First plaintiff her husband also sent
Ex.A7 petition to District Collector, Kurnool. The District
Collector, Kurnool did not act on Ex.A7. Thereafter notice
under Section 80 C.P.C. issued. Ex.A8 is such notice at
4-1-1996. Ex.A9 is served acknowledgments relating to
Ex.A8 Sec. 80 C.P.C. notice. The District Collector, Kurnool
issued reply notices which are Ex.A10 to Ex.A12.
27. Further, according to plaintiffs that they belong to
Yerikala community which is a schedule tribe caste.
The Mandal Revenue Officer has issued Ex.A13 caste
certificate to that effect. They were in possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The suit land is
not assigned land. Hence, to declare their rights in respect
of the suit schedule land and also deliver the same.
1032 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. In the cross-examination, PW1 denied the suggestion
that they have no way connected or related to the suit
schedule property. PW1 further denied the suggestion
that they never raised any crop in the suit schedule
property. PW1 further denied the suggestion that they are
neither the owners nor possessors of the suit schedule
property. As seen from Ex.A1 registration extract of sale
certificate would go to show that the legal representatives
of Perugu Swamy Reddy filed suit in O.S. 178/67 against
the legal representatives of Govindu and others to pass a
preliminary decree, in respect of suit schedule property. In
the auction, one Kuruva Ramanna purchased the schedule
property for Rs. 600/- being the highest auction purchaser.
So, as seen from Ex.A1, sale certificate issued by the
competent Civil Court, that Kuruva Ramanna purchased
the suit schedule property in court auction being the
highest bidder.
29. Further as seen Ex.A2 registration extract sale deed
dt. 10-12-1970, it discloses that Rosanna, the father of
first plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property for Rs.
600/- from Ramanna. It is also evident that considering
the possession and enjoyment of Yerikala Rosanna, the
father of first plaintiff, the Government issued Ex.A3 patta
pass book in respect of the suit schedule property. As
seen from Ex. A4 to Ex.A6, the plaintiffs family have paid
necessary land revenue to the suit schedule property. It is
also evident that the first plaintiff sent petitions to the District
Revenue authorities for taking possession of his property
by Mandal Revenue officer, Kurnool which is evident under
Ex.A7, Ex.A8, Ex.A10 to Ex.A12. It is clear that the District
Revenue authorities did not act on the notices given by the
plaintiff to enquire the dispute with regard to suit schedule
property. The District Revenue authorities did not take
any action, there after the first plaintiff has issued Ex.A8
Section 80 C.P.C. statutory notice and filed present suit
for the reliefs as stated above.
30. It is the case of plaintiffs that they belong to Yerikala
community (schedule tribe) they do not possess any
other land except the suit schedule property. The Mandal
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1033

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

Revenue Officer, Kurnool did not issue any notices nor
enquired at the time of resumption of land.
31. It is the case of defendant that the plaintiffs are
strangers to the suit schedule property. The Govindu
original assignee has no right to alienate the suit schedule
property to anybody. The plaintiffs were never in possession
and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. If really, the
plaintiffs are not in possession and enjoyment of the suit
schedule property, the question of issuing Ex.A3 patta pass
book duly signed by then Tahsildar and village Karnam to
Rosanna, the father of first plaintiff does not arise. If the
plaintiffs family were not in possession of the suit property,
the question of taking any land revenue with them under
Ex.A4 to Ex.A6 does not arise. If we correlate, the evidence
of PW1, coupled with Ex.A1 to Ex.A6, it would clinchingly
and conclusively establish that the plaintiffs are the owners
and possessors of the suit schedule property.
32. Having considered the possession and enjoyment
of the suit schedule property of the plaintiffs family, the
Government has issued Ex.A3 patta pass book and also
received land revenue under Ex.A4 to Ex.A6. One thing is
certain that the Mandal Revenue Officer has not adopted
proper procedure while resuming the suit schedule land.
The Mandal Revenue officer should have allotted some
other land to the plaintiffs in view of suit property or to
pay some compensation to them for resuming the land as
the plaintiffs belong to Yerikala caste which is a schedule
tribe community.
33. In the instant case, the plaintiff have not only marked
Ex.A1 to Ex. A6, but also examined second plaintiff
as PW1 to prove their title and possession in respect
of the suit schedule property. Therefore, I have no
hesitation to hold that the plaintiffs are the owners of the
plaint schedule property, certainly they are entitled for
recovery of possession of suit schedule property. The
issue is, answered in favour of plaintiffs and against the
defendants.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1034 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
26. Aggrieved by the judgment & decree passed by the Trial Court, the
respondents preferred an Appeal before the High Court of Judicature
at Andhra Pradesh being in AS No. 1931 of 2002.
27. Before the High Court, the respondents submitted that the suit land,
having been assigned to Harijana Govindanna, by its very nature was
a government assigned land, and thereby any attempt to alienate
it was consequently invalid. It was argued that due process of law
was followed to resume the land. The record clearly indicated that
the Mandal Revenue Officer at Kurnool, acting under proceedings
No. Rc.B.No.184/89 dated 03.02.1989, resumed possession and
subsequently on 01.05.1989, transferred the land to the District
Educational Officer in strict compliance with the statutory requirements.
28. It was further submitted that the fact as stated above established that
the appellant and their predecessors had no right, title or authority
to convey any interest in the Subject Land. While contending so,
the respondents placed strong reliance on the following decisions:
(i) Dharma Reddy v. Sub-Collector, Bodhan & Ors. reported in
(1987) 1 APLJ 171.
(ii) Chittoor District Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd., Milk
Products Factory v. C. Rajamma. reported in (1996) 2 ALT 526.
29. The appellants herein, while opposing the appeal, before the High
Court placed strong reliance on the decision in K.M. Kamallula
Basha v. District Collector, Chittoor District, Chittoor reported
in (2009) 3 ALD 385.
30. The High Court framed the following point for its determination:
“1. Whether the Plaintiff got no right and title over
the property and the Defendant/Appellant got right of
resumption of land in claiming as assigned land for the
public purpose and if so, the Trial Court’s decree and
judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs impugned in the appeal
by the Defendant/Appellant is unsustainable, so also on
the ground of maintainability?”
31. The High Court allowed the appeal and thereby set aside the judgment
& decree of the Trial Court on the ground that the appellants had failed
to establish their title over the Subject Land and further that they had
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1035

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

failed to produce any valid documents to counter the respondent’s
case that the subject land was a government-assigned land.
32. The High Court relying on the decision in K.M. Kamallula
Basha(supra) took the view that if a D-Form patta contains a condition
permitting the Government to resume an assigned land for a public
purpose, such as the establishment of a milk-processing plant by a
cooperative society, such condition remains binding irrespective of
the duration of possession by the assignee or those claiming through
them. The Court noted that in cases of assigned lands, the proprietary
rights remain with the Government, and as such, no assignee can
claim a title beyond what is expressly stipulated in the conditions of
assignment. It was further observed that an assignee cannot lawfully
transfer an assigned land, and consequently, no transferee can claim
a better title than the assignee.
33. Accordingly, the High Court held that the assignee, being in
permissive possession by virtue of the assignment, and any alienee
deriving title from such possession, whether through voluntary or
involuntary alienation, cannot obtain a title superior to that which
the original assignee and his legal representatives had. Even when
the land is alienated through a court auction or by mortgage to a
private individual who subsequently resells the property, the title
acquired remains limited to the rights originally conferred by the
assignment.
34. Few relevant observations made by the High Court in its impugned
judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:
“25. It is also deposed by D.W. 1 that the said Govindu,
original assignee had no right to transfer or alienate to
anybody. It was revealed in the cross examination of D.W.1
that according to Board Standing Orders No. 15, pattas
were issued with conditions in favour of the assignees.
It is deposed that conditions are administrative in nature.
In fact, Board Standing Orders got statutory force as a
subordinate legislation and when the original assignment
by patta issued is subject to conditions and the B.S.O. No.
15 is not in dispute by plaintiffs including from D.W. 1 cross
examination in favour of the original assignee, Govindu
they have no right to dispute the enforceability of B.S.O.
No.15, more particularly, even in the suit.
1036 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

26. It is also brought in the cross examination that it is
the Government land and after assigning the Government
land, it is being called as patta land of the assignee. He
deposed that he does not know whether individual notices
were issued to the occupants before resumption and any
personal enquiry was conducted. He deposed that no
enquiry conducted under Section 3 of the A.P. Assigned
Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (in brief ‘the
Act’). In fact, for resumption of land for public purpose,
Section 3 of the Act has no direct application, as Section
3 reads, prohibition of any transfer is null and void and
unless the transfer is to a landless poor, the land is to be
resumed. Here, D.W. l deposed that there is a violation
of the assignment conditions brought by D-Form patta by
transfer also under Section 3 of the Act. He denied the
suggestion that suit land assigned Govindu was on market
value and thus the suit land is a patta land of Govindu. It
is important to note here that it is a clear admission from
the plaintiffs by said suggestion not even inadvertent
one being unambiguous to bind the plaintiffs that the
suit land is the Government assigned land, assigned to
the original person Govindu i.e., assignee. It is for the
plaintiffs to establish therefrom that it was assigned for
consideration or without right of resumption or Govindu
got any absolute rights, which they did not prove. He also
denied the suggestion that they did not follow the correct
procedure and manipulated the records and occupying the
land from the possession of the plaintiffs. From the said
suggestion also, they are indirectly saying that there is
some procedure followed and as such it is for the plaintiffs
to show how the procedure followed is not correct. There
is no worth evidence in this regard, more particularly, from
the evidence of P.W. 1/2nd plaintiff who is the only witness
examined on behalf of the plaintiffs. In the reexamination,
even D.W.1 deposed that other assignees never raised
any objection for resumption of the lands to construct the
buildings of the Education Department. He did not disclose
that fact, but for asked in the cross examination including
the names of the other assignees. It is also crystal clear
that suit land is part of the Government assigned land by
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1037

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

D-Form patta in favour of the Harijana Govindu, way back
in 1943, with right of resumption by the Government at any
time and the assignee is like a licencee and not absolute
owner and thus any length of possession does not confer
any right, much less to set up any adverse possession.
27. From this background, coming to the legal position,
in K.M. Kamallula Basha (supra) it was held that, under
Section 3, there is a prohibition for transfer of the assigned
land that was assigned prior to 1954, would not operate
for assignments made two decades earlier thereto and
the purchaser of assigned land acquires ownership rights
by prescription, if he enjoys possession of said land for
30 years. For the said conclusion in the writ petition
referred but for relied upon Mandal Revenue Officer report
suggesting for no objection certificate for registration in
favour of the transferee of the assigned land that was
since objected by the District Collector impugned in the
writ petition in the Sub-Registrar insisted for no objection
of the Government land for transfer from the Government.
This decision no way dealt with the earlier precedents on
the scope of the law including the provisions of the A. P.
Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
28. The Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Dharma Reddy
(supra), held that the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfers) Act (9 of 1977), Section 3(1) is retrospective
in nature, which applies even to transfer of assigned land
taking place prior to the Act came into force for resumption
of the land to the original assignee by disbursing the transfer
alienee unless the alienee is a landless poor. Therefore,
the expression in K.M. Kamalluia Basha (supra) that runs
contrary to the Full Bench expression in Dharma Reddy
(supra), cannot be outweighed. Apart from it, in the Full
Bench expression it was observed that while answering
a reference upholding the Division Bench expression of
Dharma Reddy (supra) of retrospective operation by over
ruling of earlier Division Bench expression of (1979) 1 ALT
79 of only prospective in operation while answering the said
reference also by referring to the Apex Court’s expression in
Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, under the Karnataka
1038 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

S.C. & S.T. Prohibition of transfer of certain lands Act 2
of 1979, the provisions of which are identical to the Act
7 of 1977 are similar analogy to rely on the probabilities
that where the transferee acquires only a defeasible title
liable to be defeated in accordance with law, avoidance
of such defeasible title which still remains to be defeated
in accordance with law at the date of commencement of
the Act and recovery of possession of such granted land
on the basis of provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5
of the Act cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and
such a provision cannot be termed as unconscionable,
unjust and arbitrary. It was also observed that an assignee
or transferee shall not get any indefeasible title over the
assigned Land for prohibiting the resumption.
29. In Chittoor District Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd.,
(supra) also it was held that in the D-Form patta when there
was condition No.17 for resumption of assigned land by
the Government for public purpose without compensation
where it is for establishing milk processing plan by a
society, the same is permissible and assignee shall not
have any right to property more than what is stipulated
in the assignment conditions and that too in the case of
assignment land the proprietary land remains with the
Government and thereby Government can resume the
land for public purpose at any time irrespective of duration
of possession of land by assignee or those who inherited
from the assignee or claiming through it was so held by
setting aside the Single Judges order reported in Smt. C.
Rajamma vs The District Collector, wherein the Division
Bench observed at paras 8 and 9 to the conclusion that
it is the well settled law that when on the one side there
is ‘public interest’ and on the other side interest of an
individual, the Court will protect the ‘public interest and
not the interest of an individual’. Resumption of land, we
have already noticed, is intended for a public purpose
and thus the public interest is in favour of resumption of
land. No assignee can get a right to transfer and in that
no transferee can get a right. The document of assignment
has incorporated a condition and that condition always
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1039

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

remained alive irrespective of the duration of possession
of land by the assignee or those who inherited from
the assignee. The principle of derivative title is not at
all attracted in the case of an assignment because the
proprietary right remains with the person who assigns and
does not vest in the assignee.
30. Having regard to the above, the assignee is for
all purposes in permissive possession by virtue of the
assignment, so also any alienee from the assignee, either
from voluntary alienation or involuntary alienation, for
its makes no difference and thereby this assigned land
prohibited from alienation, alienated through court - auction
pursuant to the alienation by mortgage to a private individual
and who in turn brought the property to sale, the auction
purchaser can get no better title than what the original
assignee and his legal representatives got, so also the in
turn alienee from the auction purchaser as well as the in
turn alienee legal representatives or those claiming through.
As such, the Plaintiffs cannot claim any right or title
over the property and they cannot even set up adverse
possession against the Government from any length
of possession even more than 30 years and they have
no iota of right to oppose the resumption much less
to seek for restoration of the land by the Government
to them and the land having been taken possession
and constructed buildings thereby the trial court went
wrong. Accordingly, the Point No.1 is answered.”
(Emphasis supplied)

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
35. We heard Mr. Raavi Yogesh Venkata, the learned counsel appearing
for the appellants (original plaintiffs). Mr. Venkata urged that over and
above the oral submissions made by him, the written submissions
filed on behalf of the appellants may also be taken into consideration.
The written submissions read thus:
“1. Petitioner has already filed its written synopsis of
submission on 26.12.2021 along with a compilation of
1040 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

relevant statutes and judgments. This Special Leave
Petition was heard and reserved on 21.01.2025. In
compliance of the order dated 21.01.2025, these written
submissions are being filed in addition to the written
synopsis of submission already filed.
2. In these submissions Reference to the judgments and
statutes is from the ‘Compilation for Final Hearing on
behalf of Petitioners’ already filed on behalf of Petitioners.
3. PETITIONER’S CASE: Petitioner is the Plaintiff in
the subject suit from which the instant SLP arises. The
suit was filed for declaration and recovery of possession
of subject land. In the suit, the Petitioner traced back
their title to 1943, when the land was owned by one Mr.
Govindu. Title pleaded and proved by the Petitioner is
as follows:
a) Mr. Govindu had mortgaged the subject property (in
1943)
b) After failure to pay the mortgage money, the subject
property was foreclosed and sold in a Court auction after
default (in July 1970)
c) Petitioner’s predecessor purchased the subject property
from the Court auction purchaser vide a registered sale
deed (in December 1970)
d) Thereafter, the Petitioner’s family had been in continuous
enjoyment and possession of the subject property.
e) Petitioner’s predecessor was also issued a pattadar
passbook under the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and
Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (“ROR Act”) and paid land
revenue on the subject land.
4. In 1995 for the first time, State (Respondent No.1)
illegally disposed the Petitioner, after which after following
due process under Section 80 of CPC, the subject suit was
filed for Declaration of title and recovery of possession.
5. RESPONDENT’S CASE: It was Respondent’s case
that the subject land is a government land assigned to
Mr. Govindu. Respondent claimed that the assignment
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1041

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

was made subject to the condition of non-alienation and
the government can also resume the land. It was claimed
that the subject land was resumed after following due
process. Respondent did not file any documents in the
Trial. As such no documents, whatsoever, were marked
on behalf of the Respondent.
6. THE JUDGMENTS: The Trial Court decreed the suit in
Petitioner’s favour. The same was erroneously reversed by
the Hon’ble High Court in a first appeal vide the Impugned
Judgment.
7. The following are Petitioner’s submissions:
I. RESPONDENT’S DEFENCE BASED ON THE PLEA
OF ASSIGNMENT IS MISCONCEIVED AND LEGALLY
ERRONEOUS.
8. Firstly, except for a bald plea, Respondent had not filed
a single document to demonstrate that the subject land
was an assigned land.
9. Even if the Respondent’s stand on assignment is
considered on demurrer, it is settled position of law in the
State of Andhra Pradesh that the non-alienation clause
was only introduced vide G.O.Ms. No. 1142 in 1954 and
the assignments made prior thereto were freely alienable.
10. In the State of Andhra Pradesh, there are 3 distinct
periods on the issue of assignments and non-alienation.

PRIOR TO 1954: There was no condition of non-alienation.
FROM 1954-177: Executive instructions in G.O.Ms. No.
1142 governed the assignments, which introduced the
condition of non-alienation.
POST 1977: The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands
(Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (“Assignment Act”)
was enacted. Section 2(1) of the Act defines “assigned
lands” and “assigned” as lands assigned to the “subject
to the condition of non alienation”.
11. State authorities routinely try to illegally interfere in land
ownerships of private parties, with long standing titles and
1042 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

possession – as in the present case – contending that the
subject land was assigned.
12. In a catena of judgments, the Hon’ble High Court dealt
with this issue categorially holding that the State cannot
interfere in assignments made prior to 1954.
• KM Kamallula Basha v. District Collector reported in
2009 SCCOnline AP 88.
• G Satyanarana v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh
reported in 2014 SCCOnline AP 334.
• PV Rajendra Kumar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh
reported in 2010 SCCOnline AP 919.

13. It was also held in Satyanarana’s case that the burden of
proof lies on the State to demonstrate that the assignments
contained a condition of non-alienation.
14. The Hon’ble High Court failed to consider the ratio
in Kamallula Basha’s case on the premise that the
Assignments Act was held to be retrospectively applicable
by a Full Bench judgment in Dharma Reddy v. Sub Collector
reported in 1986 SCC Online AP 141.
15. The Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the
ratio on retrospectivity in Dharma Reddy’s case is based
on the express wording of the Section 3.
16. If Section 3 is read with Section 2(1) of the Act, it is
clear that the ratio in Dharma Reddy’s case was meant to
deal with situations between 1954 and 1977. In fact, if the
eventual decision of the Single Judge of Dharma Reddy
after reference is observed, this legal aspect becomes
very clear.
17. But for this misreading of the Dharma Reddy’s case,
the Kamallula Basha’s case and other judgments governing
the filed are squarely applicable to the instant case, thus
supporting the Petitioner’s case ex facie.
18. For the first time in the Reply to the SLP, the Respondent
took a new factual plea that the subject assignment was
made in 1955. This is misconceived for the following reasons:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1043

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

• Such stand was never taken before the Trial Court
or the High Court. Therefore, new factual pleas cannot
be introduced in the Supreme Court.
• The High Court itself held that the assignment in
the present case was “way back in 1943”.
• The mortgage by the original owner Mr. Govindu
was a registered mortgage in the year 1943
• The factum of mortgage in the year 1943 was
also specifically pleaded in the Petitioner’s plaint.
In response thereto, in its Written Statement, the
Respondent did not take any plea that the assignment
was after 1954, much less a specific plea that the
assignment was in the year 1955.
PETITIONER’S TITLE IS LEGALLY SUPPORTED BY
SECTION 6 OF THE ROR ACT
20. It has been the petitioner’s plea that the subject land
is a patta land and not an assigned land. The petitioner
also filed the pattadar passbook issued under the ROR Act.
21. Section 6 of the ROR Act categorially stipulates that
the entries in record of rights maintained under the Act
“shall be presumed to be true” until the contrary is proved.
The presumption provided under Section 6 is not a factual
presumption (‘may presume’) but a legal presumption
(‘shall presume’) to be read with Section 4 of the Evidence
Act, 1872.
22. Respondent had not filed a single document to disprove
the legal presumption to the reliefs claimed in the suit.”

D. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
36. We heard Ms. Prerna Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents. Her written submissions read thus:
“(i) The land measuring Sy. No. 451/1 measuring Ac 3.34
in Dinnedevarapadu Village (hereinafter referred to as the
“Subject Land”) was derived from Sy. No. 396 classified
as Government Land (dotted land) in the land record/
Resettlement Register. The said land was assigned to
1044 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

one Harijan Govindu in NRC 519/1364 dt 12.1.1955 of
the Affidavit dt 30.12.2021 filed by the State of Andhra
Pradesh). Such an assignment of land is subject to certain
conditions, pertinently that such a right is heritable but
non-alienable, and the assignee cannot transfer the land.
(ii) On the requisition of the District Educational Officer,
Kurnool for transfer of the subject land for the construction of
the District Institute of Education & Training (DIET) building.
A notice was issued in the village giving due chances for any
objections, and the Gram Panchayat, Dinnedevarapadu
also gave its consent. The Government took possession of
the land vide proceedings No.Rc.C.184/89 of the Mandal
Revenue Officer dated 03.02.1989 and the possession was
given to the Education Department on 01.05.1989. The
DIET building was constructed, and has been functioning
since 1995.
(iii) However, after the construction of the building, a Suit
being OS No.115/96 was filed before the Ld. Principal
Subordinate Judge, Kurnool, wherein the present Petitioner
was Plaintiff No.2, praying for declaration of title and
recovery of possession of the Subject Land. The Plaintiffs
claimed their title to the land based on a sale deed dated
10.12.1970, by way of which the Plaintiffs’ predecessor
purchased the property from one Kuruva Ramanna, who
had bought the subject property in a Court auction vide a
Sale Certificate dated 01.07.1970.
The said Court auction allegedly took place since the
assignee Harijan Govindu had mortgaged the subject
property, and thereafter his LRs had defaulted in the
mortgage. Apart from a bare averment that Harijan Govindu
mortgaged the subject property vide mortgage deed dated
6.6.1943 (thereby implying that the assignment to Harijan
Govindu was prior to 1943), there was no material produced
to show the date of the assignment. No documents
whatsoever prior to 1970 were produced establishing the
date of assignment in any way.
(iv) Petitioner No.1 was the sole Plaintiff Witness and
examined as PW1. She specifically deposed that she
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1045

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

was not aware of the assignment of the land to Harijan
Govindu and the conditions in the Patta.
(v) The Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) was examined
as DW2 and specifically stated that the land had been
assigned to Harijan Govindu subject to the condition of
non-alienation.
(vi) By way of the decree dated 05.08.1999, the Ld. Trial
Court decreed the Suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. A perusal
of the said decree/order reveals that there has been no
examination of the title/possession of the Petitioners/
Plaintiff. Further, for establishing the Petitioners/Plaintiffs’
case that they had been dispossessed illegally, instead of
relying on the Plaintiff to establish their case, the Ld. Trial
Court placed the burden on the Defendant/Government
to refute it (Pg 101-102). The consideration of the Ld.
Trial Court nowhere relies on/finds that the assignment to
Harijan Govindu was in/before 1943, but only on the sale
deed of 1970 (Pg 102-106). The Ld. Trial Court directed
recovery of possession to the Plaintiffs/Petitioner.
(vii) Aggrieved by the order of the Ld. Trial Court, the State
filed an Appeal being Appeal Suit No.1931 of 2002 before
the Hon’ble High Court, in which the impugned order came
to be passed, whereby the Hon’ble High Court set aside
the order of the Ld. Trial Court. The Hon’ble High Court
inter alia observed that the Petitioners/Plaintiffs did not
file any document showing the title of Harijan Govindu
(Pg11, Pg15). The Hon’ble High Court primarily based the
impugned order on the fact that rather than placing the
burden on the Plaintiffs to prove their case, the Ld. Trial
Court erroneously placed the burden on the Defendant/
State and drew an adverse inference (Pg 12-13). The
Hon’ble High Court also duly noted that the Petitioners
herein accepted that buildings had been constructed and
the Government was running an educational institution
in the subject land since 1995 (Pg 14). The Hon’ble High
Court also noted that no evidence of cultivation was
adduced by the Plaintiffs. There is only 1 stray sentence
that the assignment was in 1943, but the same is not borne
1046 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

out from any material/evidence on record whatsoever,
especially in light of Petitioner No.1’s admission that she
did not know the conditions of the assignment, and it is
not the basis of the impugned order. The Hon’ble High
Court also correctly relied on the Full Bench Judgment
of the Hon’ble High Court, whereby the operation of the
A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977
were held to be retrospective. Accordingly, the Hon’ble
High Court allowed the Appeal.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/
STATE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE JUDGMENT
DOES NOT SUFFER FROM ANY INFIRMITY:
(viii) The Petitioners Have Not Proved Title to the Subject
Land:
● The Petitioners claim their title as a subsequent
purchaser of the assignee Harijan Govindu. It is
admittedly the Petitioners’ own case that after 1954,
any assignment to landless poor contained the
condition of non-alienation (Pg C). However, apart
from relying on a bare, unsupported observation of
the Hon’ble High Court and a bare statement that
Harijan Govindu mortgaged the property in 1943,
there is no material adduced to demonstrate that
the assignment was before 1954. To the contrary,
the land record produced by the Respondent State
before this Hon’ble Court showing assignment being
of the year 1955 (Pg 9 of the Affidavit dt 30.12.2021
filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh) as well as the
deposition of DW1, Mandal Revenue Officer before
the Ld.
Trial Court clearly demonstrates that there the
assignment was one, which contained the condition
of non-alienation.
● In this regard, reliance may be placed on Sections
91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, which cover
evidence of documents including grants. Section 91
clearly states that no evidence of such document
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1047

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

is acceptable “..except the document itself, or
secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which
secondary evidence is admissible..” In the present
case, the Plaintiffs/Petitioners have not produced the
document/any admissible evidence in terms of the
Indian Evidence Act to prove assignment to Harijan
Govindu being prior to 1954.
● To the contrary, the Respondent State has produced
the Extract of the Land Register showing the
assignment to be of 1955 as well as the oral evidence
of DW2 before the Ld. Trial Court, wherein he asserts
that the assignment had a condition of non-alienation,
which is not controverted by the Petitioner/Plaintiff
in any manner.
● The Petitioner has relied on the full Bench judgment
of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Dharma
Reddy v. Sub- Collector, Bodhan & Ors. AIR 1987 AP
160 (pg109- of the Compilation for Final Hearing on
Behalf of the Petitioner). The said judgment, in para
2, frames the issue being that whether the operation
of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers)
Act, 1977 is retrospective. The said question was
answered holding the operation of the Act to be
retrospective, and any transfer of an assigned land
even prior to coming into force of the Act to be illegal.
It was held as follows:
“10. After having considered all aspects of the
matter in depth, due regard having been had to
the submissions made by the counsel for the writ
petitioners agreeing with the views of the Second
Division Bench in the judgment in W.P. Nos. 3972/78
and batch dt. 9-10-1980 V. C. Kondayya’s case,
(supra) we answer the question formulated for our
decision in the affirmative holding that S. 3(1) of the
Act not only prohibits transfer of the assigned lands
on or after the commencement of the Act, but also
declares retrospectively that all transfers of such
assigned land which took place prior to the coming into
1048 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

force of the Act shall also be null and void, non est in
the eye of law, and no right or title in such assigned
land shall vest in any person acquiring the land by
such transfer. Having thus answered the question
of law, which arose out of the order of reference to
the Full Bench we direct these writ petitions to be
posted before a learned single Judge to deal with
the other points, if any arising out of the pleadings,
and to finally dispose them of…”
(Emphasis supplied)

● On the issue of possession/cultivation, it is pertinent
to point out that admittedly, as per the statement of
the Petitioner as well as the finding of the Hon’ble
High Court, the buildings had been erected and were
operational by 1995. Thus, the possession must
have been taken by the Government much earlier
in order to construct the said building. However, the
Petitioner/Plaintiff instituted the suit only in 1996. If the
land had been in continuous possession/cultivation,
it is submitted that the Petitioners/Plaintiffs would
have known of the taking over by the Government/
resumption, yet the Suit was filed years later,
thereby demonstrating that the Petitioners were not
in continuous possession/cultivation.
● Thus, viewed from any angle, the Plaintiffs/Petitioners
did not have valid title to the land, as the land was
land assigned to a landless poor, and could not be
transferred in any manner. Such a sale is illegal and
void ab initio. The assignee, Harijan Govindu could
not have legally mortgaged the land, and therefore
the Petitioners’ vendor did not have any right/title
to the land. Consequently, the sale deed based on
which the Petitioners claim ownership is unlawful/
void, and cannot create any right in favour of the
Petitioners.
(ix) The Decree Was Passed by the Trial Court on
Absolutely Erroneous Grounds:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1049

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

(a) The Plaintiff did not Prove the Cause of Action:
● As discussed above, the Ld. Trial Court did not
base its decree on the case set up by the Petitioner/
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs therein made vague assertions
of valid title and the land being taken “without consent”
and failed to adduce any documents/material to
prove their title or the right of the assignee Harijan
Govindu to transfer the land. On the contrary, the
Mandal Revenue Officer gave clear and cogent oral
evidence that the assignment to Harijan Govindu was
conditional, and nonalienable. Yet, without examining
any document to prove their title, the Ld. Trial Court
instead placed the burden on the State/Defendant,
and drew an adverse inference.
● In light of the Petitioner/Plaintiff’s specific admission
before the Ld. Trial Court that she did not know the
conditions of the Patta, it is humbly submitted that
she cannot now be permitted to claim knowledge of
the date/conditions of the assignment, unsupported
by any document/evidence.
● It is submitted that it is the most fundamental
principle of civil law that the Plaintiff must prove its
case/cause of action independently, which as rightly
found by the Hon’ble High Court, the Petitioner
herein failed to do.

xxx xxx xxx
In the case of R. Hanumaiah v. State of Karnataka;
(2010) 5 SCC 203, this Hon’ble Court has laid down
extensive guidelines on how Trial Courts ought to
consider title suits against the Government. Court
held as follows:
“19. Suits for declaration of title against the
government, though similar to suits for declaration of
title against private individuals differ significantly in
some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the
presumption available in favour of the government.
1050 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

All lands which are not the property of any person
or which are not vested in a local authority, belong
to the government. All unoccupied lands are the
property of the government, unless any person can
establish his right or title to any such land. This
presumption available to the government, is not
available to any person or individual. The second
difference is in regard to the period for which title
and/or possession have to be established by a
person suing for declaration of title. Establishing
title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years
may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory
suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/
possession for a period exceeding thirty years will
have to be established to succeed in a declaratory
suit for title against government. This follows from
Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes
a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard
to suits by government as against the period of 12
years for suits by private individuals. The reason is
obvious. Government properties are spread over
the entire state and it is not always possible for the
government to protect or safeguard its properties from
encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who
are expected to protect its properties and maintain
proper records, either due to negligence or collusion,
create entries in records to help private parties, to
lay claim of ownership or possession against the
government. Any loss of government property is
ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a
duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is
not converted into private property by unscrupulous
elements.
20. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration
of title and injunction against government, in a
casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special
features relating to government properties. Instances
of such suits against government being routinely
decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1051

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs
or stray revenue entries are common. Whether
the government contests the suit or not, before a
suit for declaration of title against a government is
decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title
by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace
title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the
date of the suit (except where title is claimed with
reference to a grant or transfer by the government or
a statutory development authority), or by establishing
adverse possession for a period of more than thirty
years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the
presumptions available in favour of the government,
grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the
government by relying upon one of the principles
underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are
not denied or traversed are deemed to have been
accepted or admitted.
21. A court should necessarily seek an answer to
the following question, before it grants a decree
declaring title against the government : whether the
plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for
a period of more than thirty years; or whether the
plaintiff has established his adverse possession
to the knowledge of the government for a period
of more than thirty years, so as to convert his
possession into title. Incidental to that question,
the court should also find out whether the plaintiff
is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant
of the property in the revenue records or municipal
records, for more than thirty years, and what is
the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if
he is in possession - authorized or unauthorized;
permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and
clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed
or implied (following a title).”
(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx
1052 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(c) In a Suit for Possession, the Burden of Proof of
Ownership Lies on the Plaintiff as per Sec 110 of the
Indian Evidence Act:
● The Suit was filed in 1996, by which time the
Government was admittedly in possession of the
Subject Land. The Petitioners/Plaintiffs inter alia
prayed for recovery of possession. In this regard,
Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act states that,
“When the question is whether any person is owner
of anything of which he is shown to be in possession,
the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on
the person who affirms that he is not the owner.”
● The same has also been reiterated on a number of
occasions by this Hon’ble Court, illustratively in the
case of Chuharmal v. CIT; 1988 SCR (3) 788, wherein
it was held by this Hon’ble Court that:
“6…Section 110 of the Evidence Act is material in
this respect and the High Court relied on the same
which stipulates that when the question is whether
any person is owner of anything of which he is shown
to be in possession, the onus of proving that he is
not the owner, is on the person who affirms that he
is not the owner. In other words, it follows from well
settled principle of law that normally, unless contrary
is established, title always follows possession..”

xxx xxx xxx
(x) The Petitioner’s Suit was Barred by Limitation:
● It is the clear and unequivocal stand of the Respondent/
State that the land was resumed vide proceedings
dated 03.02.1989. however, the Suit was filed only
in the year 1996, without any proper cause of action,
vague and artfully drafted averments to conceal the
delay, and thus the Suit was not maintainable.”

E. ANALYSIS
37. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1053

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the impugned judgment and order.
38. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must try to understand as to who is a Pattadar: A “Pattadar” is
essentially a landowner who holds a land deed (Patta) directly from
the government and is registered in the land revenue accounts as
the holder or occupant of the land, liable to pay land revenue.
39. To put it more elaborately, a “Patta” is a type of land deed issued
by the government, indicating ownership or the right to hold land.
Consequentially, the person who holds this land deed (Patta) is called
a Pattadar. The Pattadars are responsible for paying land revenue to
the government and their names are registered in the land revenue
accounts of the government as a Pattadar, or as an occupant, or
a khatadar. A Pattadar Passbook is a document that contains all
the information about the landowner, including their landownership
details. Revenue officials, such as Tehsildars, are responsible for
maintaining land records and verifying, modifying, and registering
Pattas. The Patwari is the land record official at the village level,
who maintains records of rights and other records concerning land.
40. Upon a comparison between a Land Patta Holder and a Land Allottee,
it can be seen that a Land Patta Holder is a person who has been
granted a Patta (a legal document) that confers rights over a specific
piece of land, typically indicating ownership or entitlement to use the
land. On the other hand, a Land Allottee is a person to whom land
has been allotted by the Government or relevant authority, often
under specific conditions and for designated purposes.
41. There exist several key differences between a Land Patta Holder and
a Land Allottee. With respect to the nature of rights, it can be seen
that a Land Patta Holder possesses rights that are often permanent,
heritable, and transferrable, as established under various land revenue
regulations. For instance, the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation,
1886, states that a Patta Holder has a permanent, heritable and
transferable right of use and occupancy in their land. However, a
Land Allottee, may not have the same level of rights. Allotment can
be conditional and may not confer full ownership rights. For example,
the conditions of allotment may restrict transferability or impose
specific usage requirement.
1054 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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42. As far as their legal standing is concerned, the Patta Holder is
recognized as having a legal claim to the land, which can be defended
in court. The Patta serves as evidence of ownership or entitlement. A
Land Allottee, on the other hand, may have limited rights, especially
if the allotment was made under specific government schemes or
conditions that restrict ownership rights. For instance, the Andhra
Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (the
“Act of 1977”), imposes restrictions on the transfer of assigned lands.
While Land Patta Holders generally have the right to transfer their
interests in the land, subject to any conditions specified in the patta, the
allottees may face restrictions on transferring their rights, particularly
within a specified period or without government permission.
43. At this juncture, we must also look into a few relevant legal provisions,
particularly the Act of 1971 and the Act of 1977 respectively, as they
existed during the date on which, according to the respondents herein,
the alleged resumption proceedings took place i.e., on 03.02.1989.

i. The Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar
Pass Books) Act, 1971
44. A bare perusal of the Act of 1971 indicates that the purpose of
a Pattadar Passbook is to ensure that there remains a record of
rights in respect of a particular stretch of land. Therefore, a person
holding a Pattadar Passbook is mandated under the said Act to
have necessary entries of alienation, transfer of land, etc. The Act
of 1971 is reproduced below:
“1. Short title, extent and commencement: - (1) This
Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights
in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971.
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
(3) It shall come into force in such area or areas and on
such date or dates as the Government may, by notification,
from time to time specify in this behalf.”
Section 2(4) defines the term “land” as under:
“(4) “Land” means land which is used or is capable of being
used for purposes of agriculture, including horticulture but
does not include land used exclusively for non-agricultural
purposes”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1055

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

Section 2(4-a) defines who is “Mandal Revenue Officer” as
under:
“[(4-a) “Mandal Revenue Officer” means the Officer-in
charge of a Revenue Mandal and includes any Officer of
the Revenue Department authorised by the Commissioner
to perform the functions of the Mandal Revenue Officer
under this Act”
Section 2(6) defines the term “Occupant” as under:
“(6) “Occupant” means a person in actual possession of
land, other than a tenant or a usufructuary mortgagee.”
Section 2(7) defines who is “Pattadar” as under:
“(7) “Pattadar” includes every person who holds land
directly under the Government under a patta whose
name is registered in the land revenue accounts of the
Government as pattadar or an occupant or khatadar and
who is liable to pay land revenue.”
Section 2(9) defines “Records of Rights” as under:
“(9) “Record of Rights” means records prepared and
maintained under the provisions, or for the purposes of
this Act”
Sections 6, 6-A and 6-B read thus:
“6. Presumption of correctness of entries in record
of rights – Every entry in the record of rights shall be
presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or until it
is otherwise amended in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
6-A. Passbook holder to have entries of alienation etc.
recorded in Passbook:- (1) Every Owner, Pattadar,
mortagee, occupant, or tenant of any land shall apply for
the issue of a Passbook to the Mandal Revenue Officer
on payment of such fee, as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no application is made under this sub-
section, the Mandal Revenue Officer may suo-moto issue
a passbook after following the procedure prescribed under
sub-section (2) and collect the fee prescribed therefor.
1056 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(2) On making such application, the Mandal Revenue
Officer shall cause an enquiry to be made in such manner
as may be prescribed and shall issue a passbook in
accordance with the Record of Rights with such particulars
and in such form as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such passbook shall be issued by the
Mandal Revenue Officer unless the Record of Rights have
been brought up to date.
(3) The entries in the passbook may be corrected either
suo-moto or on application made to the Mandal Revenue
Officer in the manner prescribed.
(4) The Government may prescribe by rules the manner
in which the pass book may be issued to all owners,
pattadars, mortgagees or tenants and to such other person
in accordance with the Records of Rights.
(5) The passbook issued under sub-section (1) and duly
certified by the Mandal Revenue Officer and any other
authority as may be prescribed shall be the record of the
title in respect of an owner and the rights and interests in
land in respect of others. Every entry in the passbook shall
be presumed to be correct and true unless the contrary
is proved.
6-B. Passbook holder to have entries of alienation
etc. recorded in passbook:- Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Registration Act, 1908, every passbook
holder presenting a document of title-deed before a
registering officer appointed under the said Act, on or after
coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights
in Land (Amendment) Act, 1980, relating to alienation or
transfer recorded in the passbook by such registering
officer or by the recording authority in respect of all other
cases of transfers of land effected otherwise than under
a registered document. ”
45. Thus, mere recording of right under the Act of 1971, by itself, may
not be a conclusive proof of title and ownership, but it definitely
records rights of the person. Once the recording is done, followed
by the issuance of a pattadar pass book, the presumption in favour
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1057

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

of the holder of the pass book is that he is having right in the land
in question. In the case on hand, the appellants have a sale deed
in their favour which never came to be questioned by the State at
any point of time.

ii. The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfers) Act, 1977
46. The Act of 1977 restricts the transfer of assigned lands, indicating that
an allotment does not equate to full ownership rights. The Act of 1977
is another piece of legislation, which is protective in its nature, with a
view to prevent transfers and alienations of assigned lands. The said
Act further provides for restoration of such lands to the assignees.
Section 3 of the Act of 1977 declares that notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force, no land
assigned to a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation or as
a house site shall be transferred and shall be deemed never to have
been transferred; and accordingly no right or title in such assigned
land shall vest in any person acquiring the land by such transfer.
However, such transfer of assigned land, if any, in favour of another
landless poor person in good faith, for a valuable consideration, is
saved. The Competent Authority is assigned with the duty to take
possession of the assigned land after evicting the purchaser in
possession and restore the assigned land to the original assignee
or his legal heir, or where it is not reasonably practicable to do so,
to resume the same to government for assignment to landless poor
persons in accordance with the Rules.
47. Section 2(1) defines the expression “assigned lands”. The same
reads thus:
“Section 2. Definitions :- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,
(1) “assigned lands” means lands assigned by the
Government to the landless poor persons under the rules
for the time being in force, subject to the condition of
non alienation and includes lands allotted or transfered
to landless poor persons under the relevant law for the
time being in force relating to land ceilings; and the word
“assigned” shall be construed accordingly.”
1058 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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48. Section 2(3) defines who is a “landless poor person” and the same
reads thus:
“(3) “landless poor person” means a person who owns an
extent of land not more than 1.011715 hectares (two and
half acres) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (five acres)
of dry land or such other extent of land as has been or
may be specified by the Government in this behalf from
time to time, and who has no other means of livelihood.”
49. Section 2(6) defines the term “transfer” as under:
“(6) “transfer” means any sale, gift, exchange, mortgage
with or without possession, lease or any other transaction
with assigned lands, not being a testamentary disposition
and includes a charge on such property or a contract
relating to assigned lands in respect of such sale, gift,
exchange, mortgage, lease or other transaction.”
50. A plain reading of the above provisions would show that three types
of land are treated as assigned lands for the purpose of the Act
of 1977 : (i) the land assigned by the Government to a landless
poor person under the rules for the time being in force; (ii) the land
allotted/transferred to the landless poor person under relevant law
relating to land ceilings; (iii) the land which is allotted or transferred
subject to the condition of non-alienation. Any person who owns an
extent of less than 1.011715 hectares (2.50 acres) of wet land or
2.023430 hectares (5.00 acres) of dry land is a landless poor person.
Assigned land is heritable and it can be transferred by testamentary
disposition. However, any sale, gift, exchange, lease, or any other
transaction in relation to assigned land is treated as transfer and
Section 3(1) declares that such land shall not be transferred and
shall be deemed never to have been transferred. Any such transfer
of assigned land shall not confer any right on the purchaser of such
assigned land and the land shall not vest in any person acquiring
the land by any such transaction.
51. Section 3 of the Act of 1977 reads thus:
“Section 3. Prohibition of transfer of assigned lands:-
(1) Where, before or after the commencement of this
Act, any land has been assigned by the Government to
a landless poor person for purposes of cultivation or as a
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1059

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

house site, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
in any other law for the time being in force or in the deed
of transfer or other document relating to such land, it shall
not be transferred and shall be deemed never to have
been transferred; and accordingly no right or title in such
assigned land shall vest in any person acquiring the land
by such transfer.
(2) No landless poor person shall transfer any assigned
land, and no person shall acquire any assigned land, either
by purchase, gift, 1ease, mortgage, exchange or otherwise.
(3) Any transfer or acquisition made in contravention of
the provisions of subsection (1) or sub-section (2) shall
be deemed to be null and void.
(4) The provisions of this section shall apply to any
transaction of the nature referred to in sub-section (2) in
execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any
award or order of any other authority.
(5) Nothing in this section shall apply to an assigned
land which was purchased by a landless poor person in
good faith and for valuable consideration from the original
assignee or his transferee prior to the commencement of
this Act and which is in the possession of such person for
purposes of cultivation or as a house site on the date of
such commencement.”
52. Section 3(2) of the Act of 1977 declares that no landless poor person
shall transfer any assigned land and no person shall acquire any
assigned land. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 declares that any transfer
or acquisition made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) shall be deemed to be null and void. Sub-section
(5) carves out an exception and a plain reading of sub-section (5)
would show that nothing in sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 3 shall
apply to the assigned land which was purchased by a landless poor
person in good faith and for valuable consideration from the original
assignee or his transferee, prior to the commencement of the Act
provided that such person is in possession of the land “as a person
cultivating the land or uses it as a house-site” on the date of such
commencement.
1060 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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53. Section 4 of the Act of 1977 reads thus:
“Section 4. Consequence of breach of provisions of
Section 3:- (1) If, in any case, the District Collector or any
other officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar, authorised
by him in this behalf, is satisfied that the provisions of
sub-section (1) of Section 3, have been contravened in
respect of any assigned land, he may, by order -
(a) take possession of the assigned land, after evicting
the person in possession in such manner as may be
prescribed; and
(b) restore the assigned land to the original assignee or
his legal heir, or where it is not reasonably practicable
to restore the land to such assignee or legal heir,
resume the assigned land to Government for
assignment to landless poor persons in accordance
with the rules for the time being in force:
Provided that the assigned land shall not be so restored
to the original assignee or his legal heir more than once,
and in case the original assignee or his legal heir transfers
the assigned land again after such restoration, it shall be
resumed to the Government for assignment to any other
landless poor person.
(2) Any order passed under sub-section (1) shall be final
and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no
injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any
proceeding taken or about to be taken by any officer
or authority or Government in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section, where any assigned
land is in possession of a person, other than the original
assignee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, that there is a contravention of the
provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3.”
54. Section 4 deals with consequences of breach of provisions of Section
3 and mandates that the District Collector or any other officer not
below the rank of a Tahsildar can take possession of the assigned
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1061

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

land after evicting the person in possession when provisions of sub-
section (1) of Section 3 are contravened. Clause (b) of sub-section
(1) of Section 4 requires the land to be restored to the original
assignee or his legal heirs, or where it is not reasonably practicable,
the same can be resumed for assignment to landless poor persons in
accordance with the rules which are in force. Such restoration of land
to the original assignee after resumption from the purchaser shall not
be more than once. Even after restoration, if the land is transferred
again, it shall be resumed to the Government for assignment to any
other landless poor person. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 throws the
burden on the person who is in possession of the assigned land to
show that he has not contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) of
the Act of 1977.
55. Few other provisions of the Act of 1977 namely, Sections 5, 6 and
7 respectively are also relevant for appreciating the question raised
in this appeal and read as under:
“Section 5. Prohibition of registration of assigned
lands:--Notwithstanding anything in the Registration
Act, 1908 on or after the commencement of this Act, no
registering officer shall accept for registration any document
relating to the transfer of, or the creation of any interest
in, any assigned land included in a list of assigned lands
in the district which shall be prepared by the District
Collector and furnished to the registering officer except
after, obtaining prior permission of the District Collector
concerned for such registration.
Section 6. Exemption:--Nothing in this Act shall apply
to the assigned lands held on mortgage by the State or
Central Government, any local authority, a Co-operative
Society, a scheduled bank or such other financial institution
owned, controlled or managed by a State Government
or the Central Government, as may be notified by the
Government in this behalf.
Section 7. Penalty: - (1) Whoever acquires any assigned
land in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (2)
of section 3 shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to six months or with fine which may extend
to two thousand rupees or both.
1062 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(2) Whoever opposes or impedes the District Collector
or any person authorised, in taking possession of any
assigned land under this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both.
(3) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable
under this section, except with the previous sanction of
the District Collector.”
56. Section 5 contains a non-obstante clause. It lays down that
notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908, after coming
into force of the Act of 1977, no registering officer shall accept
registration of any document relating to transfer of any assigned
land. Nonetheless, as per the second part of Section 5, if the
transfer of assigned land is effected after obtaining prior permission
of the District Collector concerned for registration, it is open for any
registering officer to accept any document for registration relating
to transfer of an assigned land. Section 6 enables the assignee to
mortgage the assigned land to a Co-operative Society, scheduled
bank and any financial institution owned, controlled or managed
by the State Government or the Central Government as may be
notified by the State Government. It is also necessary to notice that
Section 7 prescribes imprisonment upto six months and fine up to
Rs. 2,000/- in case when there is contravention of the provisions of
Section 3(2) of the Act of 1977.
57. It may be noted that the word “Tahsildar” occurring in sub-section (1)
of Section 4 was later substituted with the words “Mandal Revenue
Officer” vide Act No. 32 of 1989 which amended the Act of 1977.
The amendment was published in the Official Gazette on 05.12.1989.
However, it has been brought to our attention that there neither exists
any difference in rank nor in functions between these two officers
and that the terms “Tehsildar” and “Mandal Revenue Officer” are
used interchangeably. Therefore, the existence of the expression
“Tahsildar” during the time of the alleged resumption proceedings
No. R.C.C. 184/89 dated 03.02.1989 and its subsequent substitution
with the words “Mandal Revenue Officer” at a later point in time,
does not bear any significant importance as far as the issue at hand
is concerned.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1063

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

iii. Oral Evidence on record
58. We must now look into the oral evidence on record. A perusal of the
transcripts thereof, shows that the entire approach of the courts below
in the present litigation was wrong. The Trial Court all throughout
proceeded to consider whether the resumption of the subject land
was in accordance with law, whereas, the High Court all throughout
proceeded on the footing that since the subject land was an assigned
land and there was a breach of conditions on which the land was
assigned, the government was well within its power to resume the
land for the purpose of construction of building for the Education
Department. The High Court seems to have totally ignored or rather
overlooked the fact that the appellants herein were indisputably in
possession of the land from the year 1970 till the subject land was
resumed and the appellants came to be dispossessed. The High
Court failed to consider the legal effect of this period of twenty years.
59. It is in the aforesaid context that we must first look into the oral
evidence of P.W.1- Y.Sunkalamma, the appellant no.1 (second plaintiff)
and thereafter, we shall look into the oral evidence of D.W.1 – B.L.
Chinnakesava Rao, Mandal Revenue Officer, who led evidence on
behalf of the State.
60. The oral evidence of PW1 reads thus:
“CHIEF – EXAMINATION: First plaintiff is my husband,
3rd plaintiff is my son. I am 2nd plaintiff in this suit. First
plaintiff died after filing of the suit. Hence, myself and 3rd
plaintiff are brought on record as L.Rs. of deceased first
plaintiff. The suit land called ‘Thippalanaduma Chenu’ is
in our possession even prior to my marriage i.e., 10 to 15
years prior to my marriage. My marriage took place more
than twenty years back. The plaint schedule land originally
belonged to one Madiga Govindu and he is resident
of Dinnedevarapadu. The said Govindu subsequently
alienated the suit schedule property to one Perugu Swamy
Reddy. Again witness says the said Govindu mortgaged
the suit schedule property to Swamy Reddy even ten years
prior to my marriage. The said Govindu did not pay the
amount under mortgage to Swamy Reddy and hence he
filed a suit against said Govindu. Hence, the suit is decree.
1064 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

At request for continuation of chief-examination
posted to 20.1.1999.
10.06.99: P.W. recalled and sworn in for continuation of
chief examination: Accordingly preliminary decree was
passed the properties were brought to sale. In the said
sale one K. Ramanna purchased the said property in the
court auction and took delivery of the same through court.
Ex.A1 registration extract of sale certificate in E .P. 51/69
in O.S. 178/67. In turn Kurva Ramanna sold the schedule
property to Yerikala Rosanna my father in law. Ex.A2 is
the registration extract of sale deed dt. 10.12.70 for having
conveyed sale by K. Ramanna in favour of Y. Rosanna
my father in law. Yerikala Rosanna my father in law was
in possession and enjoyment of said property during his
life time. Considering the possession and enjoyment the
Government has issued patta pass book in favour of my
father in law in respect of suit schedule property and
other properties. Ex.A3 is the such pass book issued by
revenue authorities. My father in law has paid revenue
during his life time. Ex.A4 to A6 are such land revenue
receipts. Rosanna my lather in law died about 15 years
back and after his death my husband has succeeded
the suit schedule property being the legal representative
of my father in law. My husband was in possession and
enjoyment of suit schedule property during his life time.
My husband died about two years back. My father in law
and after him husband were in exclusive possession of
the suit schedule property one have raised any objection
to our peaceful possession including the defendants for
suit schedule property. The suit schedule property is
an agricultural land and we are raising crops in the suit
schedule property. The Govt. took the possession of the
suit schedule land for the purpose of constructing a school
without our consent. The Govt. have no right what so ever
to take possession of our land without our consent. 1st
plaintiff my husband also gave application to the District
Collector, Kurnool for taking possession of suit land without
our consent by the defendants. Ex.A7, is copy of such
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1065

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

petition sent my husband to the Dist. Collector, Kurnool.
The Dist. Collector did not act on Ex.A 7. I issued Sec. 80
CPC notice prior to filing of the suit. Ex.A8 is such notice
dt. 4.1.96. Ex.A9 is served acknowledgment relating to
Ex.A8 .notice. The Dist. Collector Kurnool also issued
replied to our notice dt. 28.4.96, 31.5.96 and 6.5.96 Exs.
A10 to A12 are copies of notices.
We belong to Yerikala Community which is a Schedule
Tribes Caste. The M.R.O., Kurnool has issued caste
certificate to us. Ex.A13 is the caste certificate issued
by M.R.O., Kurnool. Ex.A14 is the nativity certificate
issued by M.R.O., Kurnool. The allegation that we never
in possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property is
false. The suit land is not a assigned land. The defendants
have no right what so ever to interfere our peaceful
possession and enjoyment of our property. We pray the
court declare our title and also deliver possession of the
suit schedule property. Hence I pray the court to pass
decree as prayed for.
Cross-examination: Deferred.
8.7.99: P.W. 1 recalled and sworn in for cross-examination
by AGP:-
I do not know how Govindu the original owner acquired the
suit schedule property. I do not know whether the Govt.
has assigned the suit property to the said Govindu. I do
not know the conditions mentioned in the D. Form patta
assigned to Govindu in respect of suit schedule property.
I do not know whether the Govt. Properties are situated
surrounding the suit land in question. The suit schedule
property and other properties situated near the suit property
are not same level. It is not true to say that the suit land
is not fit for cultivation. The Govt. has taken over the suit
property to construct school building. It· is not true to say
that the concerned MRO and revenue inspector enquired
prior to taken over the suit property and they thought that
the suit property is suitable to construct District Institution
of Education Training Centre. I do not know whether the
suit property is not fit for cultivation even as per village
1066 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

accounts. It is not true to say that the Govt. also made
proclamations in the village prior to taken over of the
suit land. It is not true to say that nobody has raised any
objections including we the plaintiffs at any point of time
for taking over the suit property by Government for the
above said purpose.
The suit property is situated within the limits of
Dinnedevarapadu village. It is not true to say that since
the suit land is a Govt. land it is free from encumbrances
and the Govt. had every right to take back the suit land for
the public purpose. It is not true to say that we the plaintiffs
have no right in the suit schedule property whatsoever. I
do not know whether the concerned M.R.O. handed over
the suit property to District Educational Officer, Kurnool on
1.5.1989. I do not know whether the MRO has transferred
the suit property to Dist. Educational Officer, Kurnool in the
year 1989. It is true that the buildings were constructed in
the year 1995 in the suit property. It is not true to say that
the Govt. has constructed the buildings in the suit property
for the purpose of interest of general public. It is not true
to say that the Govt. constructed the buildings in the suit
property as per board standing orders within their limits.
It is not true to say that we the plaintiffs neither owners
nor possessors of suit property. It is not true to say that
we filed the present suit only to harass the Govt. with a
view to extract money. It not true to say that our claim is
barred by limitation. It is not true to say that the suit is
also barred by limitation.”
(Emphasis supplied)

61. Thus, P.W.1 in her examination-in-chief gave more than a fair idea
as to how her father-in-law, Y. Rosanna acquired the subject land by
way of a registered sale deed. She has deposed that the Government
had issued Pattadar Passbook in favour of her father-in-law. Ex. A3
is the passbook that she produced before the Trial Court. Ex. A4
to Ex. A6 are the land revenue receipts produced in evidence. She
has deposed that about fifteen years back her father-in-law passed
away and her husband succeeded the subject land. Two years before
the date of deposition, her husband also passed away. However,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1067

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

she along with her children remained in peaceful possession of the
subject land. She has deposed about the issue of statutory notice
to the State under Section 80 of the CPC. She has categorically
deposed that the Subject Land is not an assigned land. In her cross
examination, she deposed that she had no idea if the government
had assigned the Subject Land to Harijana Govindu and that she
was also unaware of the conditions mentioned in the alleged “D”
Form Patta assigned to Harijana Govindu.
62. We shall now look into the evidence of D.W.1 B.L. Chinnakesava
Rao, the Mandal Revenue Officer. In his examination in chief, he
has deposed as under:
“CHIEF - EXAMINATION: I have been working as M.R.O.,
Kurnool from 25.3.1998. I am acquainted with the facts
of the case. We were not aware that one Govindanna
mortgaged the suit schedule property to one Perugu
Swamy Reddy of Dinnedevarapadu village. We were not
aware the suit in O.S. 178/ 1967 which was filed by L.
Rs of Swamy Reddy against L.Rs of Govindanna. The
plaintiffs were never in possession and enjoyment of
suit schedule properties. The Government assigned the
suit schedule survey number to Harijana Govindanna.
Similarly the Govt. have assigned lands to others in S.
No. 451/23, 451/4 and 451/3, 549/1, 449/2, 449/3 and
449/4. The properties covered in the above said survey
numbers are Government lands. The land was assigned
to Harijana Govindu subject to certain conditions one
among them the Government may resume land for any
public purpose. The assignees have no right whatsoever
to alienate D. Form patta lands. The suit land is a waste
land, comprising rocky and pits. The suit land is sloppy
land. The suit land is not fit for cultivation Govindu had
no right whatsoever to mortgage assigned land to P.
Swamy Reddy. The Government had resumed Ac. 31.19
cents from assignees for the purpose of construction of
Dist. Institution of Education Training Centre. In the year
1989 the Govt. resumed the lands under RCB 184/89, dt.
3.2.1989. The M.R.O. and Mandal Surveyor inspected the
suit land prior to resume of the suit land. The M.R.O. and
surveyor have also prepared a report for resuming land for
1068 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

public purpose. Sub-Division records were also prepared
and scrutinized by Dy. Inspector of survey for resuming
of the land. There was a general notice and proclamation
in the village inviting any objections for transfer of
lands in favour of Educational Department. None have
given any objections nor submitted anything in writing
objecting for resuming the lands. The Grampanchayat,
Dinnedevarapadu also gave consent for transfer of above
land in favour of Education Department. The Education
Department took possession of the suit land on 1.5.1989.
The Education Department started construction in the
year 1995 and entire buildings were constructed and
the buildings are in operation. Govindanna the assignee
have no right whatsoever over the suit schedule property
or to alienate to anybody. We followed board standing
orders and entire process was done in accordance with
rules. The suit is barred by limitation. Since the Education
Department running buildings in the suit property the
question of declaring the plaintiff’s title in respect of
suit property does not arise. The plaintiff’s are no way
connected or related to original assignee Govindu. The
plaintiffs are strangers and they have no way connected
or related to suit property. Hence I pray the court to
dismiss the suit.”
(Emphasis supplied)

63. In his cross examination, he deposed as under:
“Cross-examination: We has record to show that in which
year the Government assigned the suit land to Govindanna.
I do not have patta readily on which the land was assigned
to Govindanna. As per Board standing orders 15 we issue
pattas on some conditions to assignees. The conditions
embodied the BSO 15 only administrative conditions.
Ex.A3 patta pass book was issued by our department in
favour of first plaintiffs father. Ex.A4 to Ex.A6 land revenue
receipts were issued by our department. The suit land is a
Government land. After assigning the Government land to
any body such land being called patta land. I do not know
whether any notices were given to occupiers of suit land
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1069

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

prior to resumption. We did not conduct any enquiry u/s 3
of A.P. assigned land prohibition Act as the assignee has
violated the conditions embodied in D.Form patta.
It is not true to say that the suit land assigned to Govindanna
on market value and that the suit land is patta land of
Govindanna. I do not know whether the said Govindanna
mortgaged the suit property to one P. Swamy Reddy in the
year 1944. I do not know whether as the Govindanna did
not redeem the mortgage, a suit was filed by P. Swamy
Reddy and brought the suit property for sale and suit
property was put into court auction in the year 1970. I was
not aware whether one K. Ramanna purchased the suit
property in the court auction. I was not aware whether the
father of first plaintiff purchased the suit property from K.
Ramanna in the year 1970. It is not true to say that the
plaintiff’s family were in possession and enjoyment of suit
schedule property from 1970 onwards. I was not aware
whether any reply was given by our department to the sec.
80 C.P.C. issued by the first plaintiff which is. Ex. A8. it is
not true to say that we have not followed correct procedure
and manipulated records and occupied the lands forcibly
from the possession of the plaintiff. It is not true to say
that the plaintiffs are owners of the suit schedule land. It
is not true to say that the Government had highhandedly
occupied the suit land from the possession of the plaintiffs.
It is not true to say that the suit land is a cultivable land
and the plaintiff were raising crops in the suit land. The
suit land is situated near to G. Pulla Reddy Engineering
College, Kurnool. Recently house plots raised around the
suit land. It is not true to say that the we the Government
highhandedly occupied the suit property which belongs
to plaintiffs.
Re-examination with permission: The other assignees
never raised any objections for resuming their lands to
construct buildings by Education Department. Further
cross-examination: I do not know the names of other
assignees.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1070 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

64. Thus, the first admission on the part of the Mandal Revenue
Officer in his examination-in-chief is that the State had no idea or
knowledge that Harijana Govindu had mortgaged the subject land
in favour of one Perugu Swami Reddy of Village Dinnedevarapadu.
He pleaded absolute ignorance of the Original Suit No. 178 of 1967
instituted by the legal heirs of Swamy Reddy against the legal heirs
of Govindanna for enforcement of mortgage. He has thereafter
said that the appellants herein (plaintiffs) were never in possession
of the Subject Land. He has deposed that the Government had
assigned the suit land in favour of Harijana Govindu. However, his
cross examination is important. In his cross examination, he has
stated that the State has the record to show the year in which the
Government assigned the land to Harijana Govindu. However, the
fact remains that no such record was produced. He has admitted
that he does not have the “D” Form Patta said to have been issued
in favour of Harijana Govindu and had no idea of the terms and
conditions on which the land was assigned to Harijana Govindu.
He admitted that Ex. A3 Patta Passbook was issued by the revenue
department in favour of the first plaintiffs’ father, i.e., the father-in-law
of PW1 - Y. Sunkulamma. He admits that Ex. A4 to Ex. A6 are the
land revenue receipts issued by the revenue department in favour of
the appellants. He admitted that if a government land is assigned to
any person, the same assumes the character of being a Patta Land.
He has said that he had no idea whether any notice was issued to
the occupiers of the suit land prior to its resumption. He has admitted
that no inquiry under Section 3 of the Act of 1977 was undertaken
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the assignee had violated
the conditions laid in the “D” Form Patta. He deposed that he had
no knowledge whether any reply was given by the department to
the Section 80 CPC notice or not. He denied that the family of the
plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the said schedule
property from 1970 onwards.
65. Having regard to the oral as well as documentary evidence on record,
the picture that emerges is as under:
a. The Subject Land belonged to Harijana Govindu. Whether it
was an assigned land or was of his ownership, is not clear. If
it is the case of the State that the same was an assigned land,
the State has miserably failed to establish the same. They could
have produced the record while asserting that in fact it was an
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1071

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

assigned land and there was a “D” Form Patta issued in favour
of Harijana Govindu.
b. Harijana Govindu had borrowed money from one Perugu Swamy
Reddy. Harijana was not in a position to repay the money he
had borrowed and in such circumstances, Perugu Swamy Reddy
enforced the mortgage by filing civil Original Suit no. 178 of
1967. The same came to be decreed. The Subject Land was
ultimately put to auction by the court. In the court auction, one
Kuruva Ramanna purchased the same and Kuruva Ramanna
in turn sold the subject land in favour of PW1’s father-in-law by
way of a registered sale deed dated 10.12.1970. To this extent,
the State has no say in the matter.
c. Indisputably, since the date of the registration of sale deed by
Kuruva Ramanna in favour of Y. Rosanna i.e., the father-in-law of
PW1, the plaintiffs remained in possession of the Subject Land
till the time they were dispossessed by the State Authorities.
Even this cannot be disputed in any manner by the State.
d. It appears that the State conceived the idea of putting up
construction on few parcels of land owned by it other than the
Subject Land. However, as the Subject Land is in between
the parcels of land owned by the Government, they exerted
pressure on the appellants herein to give up their land saying
that the Subject Land was assigned to Harijana Govindu and
he could not have mortgaged the land. Harijana Govindu,
according to the State, could be said to have violated the terms
and conditions of assignment.
e. Why did the State maintain silence all throughout or why the
State has no answer to the issue of “D” Form Patta Passbook
in favour of the appellants?
f. What is the explanation of the State in so far as the Ex. A4 to
Ex. A6, i.e., the land revenue receipts are concerned? Why is
the State silent on all this?
g. What is the basis for the State to say that the appellants at no
point of time were in possession of the suit land?
h. The crux of the matter is that the State could not have taken over
the land in a highhanded and arbitrary manner? In other words,
could the State have resumed the land saying that the appellants
1072 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

were in illegal possession of the same without following due
process of law? It goes without saying that be it an assigned
land or of individual ownership, if the State is in need of the
land for any public purpose, it can always acquire the same in
accordance with law, more particularly in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act by paying appropriate
compensation in terms of money. However, what the State did
in the present case was nothing but an exhibit of raw power
by taking over the possession forcibly. The matter of concern
is that the State knew very well that the appellants were in
lawful possession of the land for more than 20 years. Well, if
the State was in need of the land occupied by the appellants, it
could have informed the appellants that the land is required for
public purpose and that the State intends to acquire the same
and that they would be paid adequate compensation in terms
of money in accordance with law. However, the intention of
the State was to take over the possession without paying any
compensation. In the process, what the State did was that it
conveniently shut its eyes towards four things, viz. (i) the civil
suit filed by the original mortgagee, (ii) the decree passed by the
competent Civil Court, (iii) sale of the land by court auction and
the sale certificate issued by the court, and (iv) the appellants
purchasing the land in question by a sale deed from the person
who had participated in the court auction and purchased the
land in question.
i. It appears that way back in 1995, the construction was
completed, and, in such circumstances, the appellants were
left with no choice but to institute the suit.
66. We have been able to lay our hands on a very lucid and erudite
decision rendered by the Bombay High Court more than a century
ago i.e., in 1912, in Narayan Anandram Marwadi v. Gowbai, widow
of Dhondiba reported in ILR 37 Bom. 415. We could not resist the
temptation to refer to and rely upon this decision of the Bombay High
Court. In the said case, the property of an agriculturist mortgagor
was sold in an execution of money decree by the civil court and the
auction purchaser’s rights subsequently came to be vested in the
mortgagee. As Section 22 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists’ Relief Act,
1879 prohibited execution of sale of agriculturists’ properties, the
mortgagor treated the sale as void and sued to redeem the mortgage.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1073

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

The mortgagee, in turn, relied on the court-sale to contend that the
mortgagor had no right to redeem. The Subordinate Judge, the
District Judge on appeal and the High Court in second appeal held
that the court-sale was void ─ but on Letters Patent Appeal, Scott,
C.J., speaking for himself and Chandavarkar, J., held:
“Now the provisions of section 22 of the Dekkhan
Agriculturists’ Relief Act are provisions conferring upon
members of a certain class great privileges in litigation.
The section confers upon a person who is shown to be
a member of the privileged class the right to resist the
attachment or sale of any of his immovable property and
to contend that if an attachment or sale took place in
violation of the provisions of the section, such attachment
or sale shall be held to be void.
How then is the Court to know when it is authorized to
attach and sell property and when it is not? The ordinary
rule is that set out in the Civil Procedure Code, section
60, which reproduces section 266 of the Code of 1882.
It provides that property liable to attachment and sale in
execution of a decree is lands, houses, etc., belonging to
the judgment-debtor. An agriculturist in order to resist the
application of that general rule must, we think, show that
he belongs to the privileged class so as to render section
22 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists’ Relief Act applicable to his
case. That conclusion seems to follow from the provisions
of Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act. In the
absence of proof we, therefore, hold that there is no reason
to treat the immovable property sold by the Vinchur Court
as the property of an agriculturist.”
(Emphasis supplied)

67. Consequently, the suit was dismissed adopting the following dictum
of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Pandurang Balaji v. Krishnaji Govind
reported in (1903) 28 Bom. 125:
“It is a general rule that in Courts of law only those facts
can be taken to exist which are proved; so that it is manifest
that in the absence of proof the exemption from liability
to attachment or sale did not exist for the purpose of the
1074 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

execution proceedings. Therefore the executing Court had
complete jurisdiction to make the order it did.”
(Emphasis supplied)

68. The dictum as laid down in the decision referred to above of the
Bombay High Court accords with our own view of the matter.
69. Having regard to the aforesaid, is there anything to indicate that
the Subject Land is of the ownership of the Government? If there
is a Pattadar Pass Book issued in favour of the appellants and if
they have been able to establish that land revenue was also being
paid over a period of years, then the appellants could be said to be
owners of the suit land as Pattadars. Unfortunately, even the “D”
Form Patta admitted by the State to have been issued in favour of
the Harijana Govindu is not on record. Had it been on record, we
could have looked into its terms and conditions. It appears from the
evidence on record that the Pattadar Passbook was issued in favour
of the appellants keeping in mind their long-standing possession
and occupancy on the Subject Land by virtue of the sale deed
dated 10.12.1970. Why the State remained silent right from the time
Harijana Govindu mortgaged the land? Why no action was taken from
1943 onwards till the time the State decided to put up construction
of a building for the Education Department? It is difficult to believe
that the State Authorities had no idea of the developments that had
taken place over a period of almost forty-five years.
70. The oral and documentary evidence should now be tested on the
anvil of Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (for
short, the “BSA”) which corresponds to Section 110 of the repealed
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, the Evidence Act”).

iv. Section 113 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
71. Section 113 of the BSA reads as follows:
“When the question is whether any person is owner of
anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the
burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person
who affirms that he is not the owner.”
72. The Section embodies the well-recognised principle that possession
is prima facie proof of ownership. A person in possession is entitled
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1075

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

to remain in possession until another person can disclose a
better title under Section 113 of the BSA. Therefore, once the
plaintiff proves that he has been in possession of the suit property,
the burden of proving that the plaintiff is not the owner is on the
defendant who affirms that the plaintiff is not the owner. The
Section does not make a distinction between the Government
and a private citizen. Section 113 is, therefore, equally applicable
where a Government claims to be the owner or challenges the
ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of the property. It is
not disputed that before the possession of the Subject Land was
taken over, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property for
more than twenty years. The onus, therefore, under section 113
of the BSA was on the State to prove that the Government had a
subsisting title to the Subject Land.
73. In M. Krishna Aiyar v. The Secretary of State for India reported
in (1910) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 173, a Bench of the Madras High Court
held that:
“Where in a suit for declaration of title against the
Government the plaintiff proves possession for a period
of more than 12 years, the Government must prove that it
has a subsisting title. When the Government fails to prove
such title or possession within sixty years, the plaintiff
is entitled to a declaration of title and not merely to a
declaration that he is lawfully in possession of such land.”
(Emphasis supplied)

74. It must be remembered that what Section 113 of the BSA does is
to raise a statutory presumption in favour of a person who is in
possession that he is the owner and places a burden upon the other
persons who say that the plaintiff is not the owner.
75. Section 113 of the BSA provides that when the question is whether
any person is the owner of anything of which he is shown to be in
possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the
person who affirms that he is not the owner. The application of this
Section to lands claimed by the Government or the Municipality has
been considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jagannath
Shivnarayan v. Municipal Commissioner, City Municipality, Indore
reported in AIR 1951 MB 80.
1076 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

76. Sanghi, J., discussed the case law on the subject and held that to
apply the provisions of Section 110 of the Evidence Act (now section
113 of the BSA), to a plaintiff’s possession, the possession must be
founded on a ‘prima facie’ right. According to the learned Judge, mere
acts of the user would not lead to a presumption of title in case the
possession was ‘prima facie’ not proved to be lawful.
77. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court in Suraji Fulaji v. Secretary of State reported in AIR 1937
Bom 193. It was a suit against the Government for declaration that
the plaintiff was the owner of certain plots in a village. The plaintiff
adduced oral evidence to show that he had been using a large
area of land for the purposes of tethering cattle and storing grass
and that he had been in possession thereon for a number of years.
It was also proved by him that he had erected badges to the west
and south of the plot.
78. In the aforesaid case, it was held that although the Government had
not succeeded in rebutting the plaintiff’s evidence as to its act of
user, yet it could not be said that the plaintiff had been able to prove
such possession as would raise a presumption of title in his favour.
Broomfield, J., approved the view taken by Ranade, J. in Hanmantrao
v. Secretary of State reported in (1901) 25 Bom 287 and held that
to come within the scope of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, the
possession of the plaintiff must be based on a ‘prima facie’ right.
This case was followed by another Division Bench of the same High
Court in The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chimanlal
Jamnadas and others reported in AIR 1942 Bom 161.
79. Chimanlal Jamnadas (supra) was also a suit against the Government
for declaration that certain property consisting of land was of the
absolute ownership of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had proved some
kind of possession, and the question arose whether it was sufficient
to give rise to a presumption under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.
Divatia, J., discussed the case law on the subject and observed as
follows:
“[…] It is necessary, in my opinion, therefore for the
plaintiffs to prove that their possession was of such a
character as would lead to the presumption of title, and
not such a sort of possession as would be regarded as
wrongful in its origin. In my opinion it could not be the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1077

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

law that a man might usurp somebody else’s land and
without the plea of adverse possession say that ‘I am in
long possession of this land. I have erected buildings on
it, and although, I have no title in my favour and even
though I have got possession of the land by usurpation
or encroachment, I am entitled to remain in possession
under Section 110 and that nobody can oust me’. The
presumption under Section 110 would apply only if the
conditions are satisfied, viz., that the possession of the
plaintiff is not ‘prima facie’ wrongful, and, secondly, the
title of the defendant is not proved.”
(Emphasis supplied)

80. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund
reported in (2007) 13 SCC 565 this Court held as under:
“12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely
raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption
of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and
backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the
Evidence Act.”
81. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander reported
in AIR 1968 SC 1165, dealing with the provisions of Section 110 of
the Evidence Act, this Court held as under:
“17. […] possession may prima facie raise a presumption
of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly
arise when the facts are known. When the facts disclose
no title in either party, possession alone decides.”
(Emphasis supplied)

82. In Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector reported
in (2003) 3 SCC 472, this Court held that:
“20. … presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted
when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the
contesting party has no title.”
(Emphasis supplied)
1078 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

83. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act (now Section
113 of the BSA) is based on public policy with the object of preventing
persons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own
hands, however good their title over the land in question may be.
It is for this purpose that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of the India Penal Code, 1860,
were enacted. All the aforesaid provisions have the same objective.
The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act
and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little
proof of ownership on either side. The maxim “possession follows
title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot
reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of wastelands,
or where nothing is known about possession one way or another.
Presumption of title as a result of possession can arise only where
facts disclose that no title vests in any party and the possession of
the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful. It certainly does not mean
that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in
possession of it. It, in fact, means, that if at any time a man with title
was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption
that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him. A
person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit
property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case
of trespass/encroachment, etc. Where the apparent title is with the
plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace
this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself,
he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that
favour his version. Even a revenue record is not a document of title.
It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption
of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward,
can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act. [See:
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser
Company reported in (2013) 9 SCC 319]
84. Section 113 of the BSA as discussed aforesaid, embodies the
principle that possession of a property furnishes prima facie principle
of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party
who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is
attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the
contesting party has no title.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1079

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

85. The appellants could be said to have established their possession
over the suit land in question right from the year 1970. There
is cogent and convincing evidence in this regard. They were in
peaceful enjoyment of the suit land in question. In our opinion, the
respondent State has not been able to prove its title to the suit
land. Just because the suit land is surrounded by few other parcels
of land owned by the Government, that by itself will not make the
suit land of the ownership of the Government. If the Government
claims title over the land, it has to establish it by producing relevant
records in the form of revenue records etc. In our opinion, the State
has failed to advance any credible evidence on record to rebut the
presumption. Consequently, the appellants have Pattadars’ title to
the suit land in question.
86. There was no need for the High Court to look into and follow the
dictum as laid in its Full Bench decision in the case of Dharma
Reddy (supra). The Full Bench decision in Dharma Reddy (supra)
has only discussed the retrospective effect of the Act, 1977.

v. How is the Court expected to consider title suits against
the Government
87. In the case of R. Hanumaiah v. Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka,
Revenue Department reported in (2010) 5 SCC 203, this Court has
explained as to how the Trial Courts are expected to consider title
suits against the Government. This Court held as follows:
“19. Suits for declaration of title against the Government,
though similar to suits for declaration of title against
private individuals differ significantly in some aspects.
The first difference is in regard to the presumption
available in favour of the Government. All lands which
are not the property of any person or which are not
vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All
unoccupied lands are the property of the Government,
unless any person can establish his right or title to any
such land. This presumption available to the Government,
is not available to any person or individual. The second
difference is in regard to the period for which title
and/or possession has to be established by a person
suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession
1080 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to
establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual.
On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding
thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a
declaratory suit for title against the Government. This
follows from Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which
prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in
regard to suits by the Government as against the period
of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is
obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire
State and it is not always possible for the Government to
protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments.
Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect
its properties and maintain proper records, either due to
negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help
private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession
against the Government. Any loss of government property
is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty
to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted
into private property by unscrupulous elements.
20. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title
and injunction against the Government, in a casual manner,
ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to
government properties. Instances of such suits against
the Government being routinely decreed, either ex parte
or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral
assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common.
Whether the Government contests the suit or not, before a
suit for declaration of title against a Government is decreed,
the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing
the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum
period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except
where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer
by the Government or a statutory development authority),
or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more
than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the
presumptions available in favour of the Government, grant
declaratory or injunctive decrees against the Government
by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1081

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed
are deemed to have been accepted or admitted.
21. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the
following question, before it grants a decree declaring
title against the Government: whether the plaintiff has
produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more
than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his
adverse possession to the knowledge of the Government
for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert
his possession into title. Incidental to that question, the
court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded
to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in
the revenue records or municipal records, for more than
thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed
by the plaintiff, if he is in possession—authorised or
unauthorised; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive
and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed
or implied (following a title).”
(Emphasis supplied)

88. We are of the view that the following principles, as elucidated in
R. Hanumaiah (supra), must govern the adjudication of declaratory
title suits against the Government:
i. Suits for declaration of title against the government differ from
suits against private parties on two counts:
a. First, there is a presumption in favour of the Government
in such suits, as all lands which are unoccupied or not
vested in any individual or local authority, are presumed
to belong exclusively to the Government.
b. Secondly, there is an additional burden of proof on the
party seeking declaration of title against the Government.
The plaintiff has to establish its possession over the land
in question for a period of thirty years as opposed to
twelve years in the case of adverse possession against
a private party.
ii. A decree declaring title against the Government must not be
passed casually. Before granting any such decree, the trial
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court must ensure that the plaintiff has furnished adequate
documentary evidence, either through title deeds tracing
ownership for over thirty years or by establishing adverse
possession for a period of thirty years.
iii. The trial court must verify whether the name of the plaintiff has
been recorded as the owner, holder, or occupant in the relevant
revenue or municipal records for more than thirty years.
iv. Finally, the trial court must carefully scrutinize the nature of the
possession as may be asserted, determining whether the same
is authorized or unauthorized, permissive or casual, furtive
or clandestine, as well as open, continuous, and hostile, or
implied by title, to ensure that public property is not inadvertently
converted into private ownership by unscrupulous elements.
89. As held by this Court in R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu
Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and Another reported in (2003) 8
SCC 752, whether a civil or a criminal case, the anvil for testing of
“proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”, as defined in Section 3 of
the Evidence Act, is one and the same. A fact is said to be “proved”
when, considering the matters before it, the court either believes it
to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man
ought to, under the circumstances of a particular case, act upon the
supposition that it exists. It is the evaluation of the result drawn by
the applicability of the rule, which makes the difference. The relevant
portion of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“The probative effects of evidence in civil and criminal
cases are not, however, always the same and it has
been laid down that a fact may be regarded as proved for
purposes of a civil suit, though the evidence may not be
considered sufficient for a conviction in a criminal case.
Best says: ‘There is a strong and marked difference as
to the effect of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings.
In the former a mere preponderance of probability, due
regard being had to the burden of proof, is a sufficient
basis of decision: but in the latter, especially when the
offence charged amounts to treason or felony, a much
higher degree of assurance is required.’ (Best, § 95) While
civil cases may be proved by a mere preponderance of
evidence, in criminal cases the prosecution must prove
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1083

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

the charge beyond reasonable doubt.” (See Sarkar on
Evidence, 15th Edn., pp. 58-59.)”
(Emphasis supplied)

90. In the words of Denning, L.J. (Bater v. Bater reported in (1950) 2
All ER 458):
“[…]It is of course true that by our law a higher standard of
proof is required in criminal cases than in civil cases. But
this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute
standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be
degrees of proof within that standard.
As Best, C.J., and many other great judges have said, “in
proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to
be clear”. So also in civil cases, the case may be proved by
a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees
of probability within that standard. The degree depends on
the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge
of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher degree of
probability than that which it would require when asking
if negligence is established. It does not adopt so high a
degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering
a charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require a
degree of probability which is commensurate with the
occasion. Likewise, a divorce court should require a degree
of probability which is proportionate to the subject-matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

91. Agreeing with this statement of law, Hodson, L.J. said:
“Just as in civil cases the balance of probability may be
more readily tilted in one case than in another, so in
criminal cases proof beyond reasonable doubt may more
readily be attained in some cases than in others.” (Hornal
v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [(1956) 3 All ER 970 : (1957) 1
QB 247 : (1956) 3 WLR 1034 (CA)] , All ER at p. 977 D).
92. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title, it is for the plaintiff
to prove his title and satisfy the court that he, in law, is entitled to
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dispossess the defendant from his possession over the suit property
and for the possession to be restored to him. However, as held in
Addagada Raghavamma v. A. Addagada Chenchamma reported
in AIR 1964 SC 136, there is an essential distinction between burden
of proof and onus of proof. Burden of proof lies upon a person who
has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts.
Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation
of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title
once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability
so as to shift the onus on the defendant, it is for the defendant to
discharge his onus and in the absence thereof, the burden of proof
lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to
amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.

vi. Section 80 of CPC
93. Before we close this matter, we must say something as regards
Section 80 of the CPC. It is not in dispute that in the case on hand,
before the institution of the suit by the appellants herein, they had
issued statutory Notice under Section 80 of the CPC. However, there
is nothing on record to indicate that any reply to the same was given
by the State Authorities.
94. Sections 79, 80 and Order XXVII respectively of the CPC deal
with the procedure where the suits are brought by or against the
Government or Public officers acting in an official capacity. Section
79 is a procedural provision and contains provisions in relation to
the suits by or against the Government. It states that in a suit by or
against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or
defendant, as the case may be, shall be—
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, the
Union of India, and
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the State.
95. Section 80 of the CPC deals with the provisions relating to notice which
is a condition precedent before filing a suit against the government
or against a public servant. It states that –
“(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), no suits
shall be instituted against the Government or against a
public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1085

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

by such public officer in his official capacity, until the
expiration of two months after notice in writing has been
delivered to, or left at the office of—
(a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government,
except where it relates to a railways, a Secretary to
that Government;
(b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government
where it relates to railway, the General Manager of
that railway;
(c) in the case of a suit against any other State
Government, a Secretary to that Government or the
Collector of the district and, in the case of a public
officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating
the cause of action, the name, description and place
of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he
claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that
such notice has been so delivered or left.
(2) A suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against
the Government or any public officer in respect of any
act purporting to be done by such public officer in his
official capacity, may be instituted, with the leave of
the Court, without serving any notice as required by
sub-section (1); but the Court shall not grant relief in the
suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to
the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the
relief prayed for in the suit.
Provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing
the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief needs to be
granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it
after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1).
(3) No suit instituted against the Government or against
a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be
done by such public officer in his official capacity shall be
dismissed merely by reason of any error or defect in the
notice referred to in sub-section (1), if in such notice—
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(a) the name, description and the residence of
the plaintiff had been so given as to enable the
appropriate authority or the public officer to identify
the person serving the notice and such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate
authority specified in sub-section (1), and
(b) the cause of action and the relief claimed by the
plaintiff had been substantially indicated.”
96. Order XXVII, CPC enumerates the following:
i. This Order deals with the Suits by or against the government
or public officers in their official capacity.
ii. Rule 1 of Order XXVII states that in any suit by or against the
Government, the plaint or written statement shall be signed by
such person as the Government may, by general or special
order, appoint in this behalf, and shall be verified by any person
whom the Government may so appoint and who is acquainted
with the facts of the case.
iii. Rule 2 of Order XXVII states that the persons being ex-officio or
otherwise authorized act for the Government in respect of any
judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be recognized agents
by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code
may be made or done on behalf of the Government.
iv. Rule 3 of Order XXVII states that in suits by or against the
Government, instead of inserting in the plaint the name and
description and place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant,
it shall be sufficient to insert the appropriate name as provided
in section 79 of CPC.
v. Rule 4 of Order XXVII provides that the Government Pleader
shall be the agent of the Government for the purpose of receiving
processes against the Government by the Court.
vi. Rule 5 of Order XXVII provides that the Court shall, in fixing the
day for the Government to answer the plaint, allow a reasonable
time for the necessary communication with the Government
through the proper channel.
a. Rule 5A of Order XXVII provides that the Government
will be joined as a party in a suit against a public officer
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1087

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

in respect of any act alleged to have been done by him
in his official capacity.
b. Rule 5B of Order XXVII deals with the duty of the Court in
suits against the Government or a public officer to assist
in arriving at a settlement.
vii. Rule 6 of Order XXVII provides that the Court can direct the
attendance of a person who is able to answer any material
question relating to the suit against the Government.
viii. Rule 7 of Order XXVII deals with the extension of time to enable
public officers to make reference to the Government.
ix. Rule 8 of Order XXVII provides that where the government
undertakes a defense of suit against a public officer, the
government pleader will apply to the Court for the same and the
Court upon such application shall cause a note of his authority
to be entered in the register of civil court. If no application is
made by a government pleader, then the case shall proceed
as in a suit between private parties:
a. Rule 8A of Order XXVII provides that no such security
as is mentioned in rules 5 and 6 of Order XLI shall be
required from the Government.
b. Rule 8B of Order XXVII contains the definitions of
Government and Government pleader.

vii. Object of Notice in Government Suits
97. The primary objective behind Section 80 of the CPC is to provide
the Government or a public officer with an opportunity to assess
the legal merits of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be
just and reasonable.
98. Unlike private parties, the Government is expected to objectively
and impartially evaluate the matter, seek appropriate legal advice,
and make decisions in public interest within the two-month period
mandated by the section. This serves to save both time and taxpayer’s
money by preventing needless litigation.
99. The legislative intent is to ensure that public funds are not squandered
on unnecessary legal battles. The provision of the notice is intended
to prompt the Government or public officer to engage in negotiations
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for a fair settlement or, at the very least, to explain to the potential
plaintiff why their claim is being contested.
100. In the case of Bihari Chowdhary and another v. State of Bihar
and others reported in (1984) 2 SCC 627, this Court emphasised
the purpose of the provision, stating that it is a measure of public
policy aimed at allowing the Government or the relevant officer
to scrutinise the proposed claim and, if deemed just, take prompt
action to settle it, thereby avoiding protracted litigation and saving
public resources.
101. The Government’s obligation differs from that of private parties, as
it is expected to objectively assess the claim, seek legal advice as
necessary, and make decisions in public interest within the stipulated
two-month timeframe
102. The overarching goal of this mandatory provision is to promote justice
and the public good by minimising unnecessary legal disputes.

viii. Essentials of Section 80 CPC
103. A notice issued under Section 80 must include:
i. The name, description, and place of residence of the person
providing the notice.
ii. A statement outlining the cause of action.
iii. The relief sought by the plaintiff.
104. When determining whether the essential requirements of the Section
have been met, the court should consider the following questions:
(i) Has the notice provided adequate information to allow the
authorities to identify the person issuing the notice?
(ii) Have the cause of action and the relief sought by the plaintiff
been sufficiently detailed?
(iii) Has the written notice been delivered to or left at the office of
the appropriate authority as specified in the section?
(iv) Has the suit been initiated after the expiration of two months
following the delivery or submission of the notice, and does
the plaint include a statement confirming that such notice has
been provided as required?
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1089

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

105. A statutory notice holds significance beyond mere formality. Its
purpose is to provide the Government or a public officer with an
opportunity to reconsider the matter in light of established legal
principles and make a decision in accordance with the law. However,
in practice, such notices have often become empty formalities.
106. The administration frequently remains unresponsive and fails to
even inform the aggrieved party why their claim has been rejected.
107. In the case of State of Punjab v. Geeta Iron & Brass Works
Ltd. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 68, Krishna Iyer J. emphasised the
need for accountability of Governments regarding wasteful litigation
expenses borne by the community due to governmental inaction. It
was highlighted therein that the statutory notice under Section 80 of
the CPC is meant to prompt the State to negotiate a fair settlement
or, at the very least, to explain to the affected party why their claim
is being resisted.
108. However, Section 80 has become more of a ritual due to the
administration’s lack of responsiveness, despite recommendations
from the Central Law Commission for its removal from the Code.
109. Krishna Iyer J. further noted that opportunities for dispute resolution
through arbitration are often missed due to governmental inaction.
He advocated for a litigative policy that prioritises conciliation over
confrontation, suggesting that it should be a directive for the State to
empower its legal officers to resolve disputes rather than prolonging
them in court.
110. In Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd. (supra) referred to above, this
Court observed thus:
“3. While dismissing the Special Leave petition for the
reasons mentioned above, we would like to emphasise
that the deserved defeat of the State in the Courts below
demonstrates the gross indifference of the administration
towards litigative diligence. In the present case a notice
under Section 80 CPC was sent. No response. A suit
was filed and summons taken out to the Chief Secretary.
Shockingly enough, the summons was refused. An ex parte
proceeding was taken when the lethargic Government
woke up.
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Supreme Court Reports

4. We like to emphasise that Governments must be
made accountable by Parliamentary social audit for
wasteful litigative expenditure inflicted on the community
by inaction. A statutory notice of the proposed action
under Section 80 CPC is intended to alert the State to
negotiate a just settlement or at least have the courtesy
to tell the potential outsider why the claim is being
resisted. Now Section 80 has become a ritual because
the administration is often unresponsive and hardly lives
up to the Parliament’s expectation in continuing Section
80 in the Code despite the Central Law Commission’s
recommendations for its deletion. An opportunity for
settling the dispute through arbitration was thrown away
by sheer inaction. A litigative policy for the State involves
settlement of governmental disputes with citizens in
a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood.
Indeed, it should be a directive on the part of the State to
empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes
rather than continue them in Court. We are constrained to
make these observations because much of the litigation
in which Governments are involved adds to the case load
accumulation in Courts for which there is public criticism.
We hope that a more responsive spirit will be brought to
bear upon governmental litigation so as to avoid waste
of public money and promote expeditious work in Courts
of cases which deserve to be attended to.”
(Emphasis supplied)

111. In Bihari Chowdhary (supra), this Court observed thus:
“3. … The effect of the section is clearly to impose a bar
against the institution of a suit against the Government or
a public officer in respect of any act purported to be done
by him in his official capacity until the expiration of two
months after notice in writing has been delivered to or left
at the office of the Secretary to Government or Collector
of the concerned district and in the case of a public officer
delivered to him or left at his office, stating the particulars
enumerated in the last part of sub-section (1) of the section.
When we examine the scheme of the section it becomes
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1091

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

obvious that the section has been enacted as a measure
of public policy with the object of ensuring that before a
suit is instituted against the Government or a public officer,
the Government or the officer concerned is afforded an
opportunity to scrutinise the claim in respect of which
the suit is proposed to be filed and if it be found to be
a just claim, to take immediate action and thereby avoid
unnecessary litigation and save public time and money
by settling the claim without driving the person, who has
issued the notice, to institute the suit involving considerable
expenditure and delay. The Government, unlike private
parties, is expected to consider the matter covered by the
notice in a most objective manner, after obtaining such
legal advice as they may think fit, and take a decision in
public interest within the period of two months allowed by
the section as to whether the claim is just and reasonable
and the contemplated suit should, therefore, be avoided by
speedy negotiations and settlement or whether the claim
should be resisted by fighting out the suit if and when it is
instituted. There is clearly a public purpose underlying the
mandatory provision contained in the section insisting on
the issuance of a notice setting out the particulars of the
proposed suit and giving two months’ time to Government
or a public officer before a suit can be instituted against
them. The object of the section is the advancement of
justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of
unnecessary litigation.
4. When the language used in the statute is clear and
unambiguous, it is the plain duty of the Court to give effect
to it and considerations of hardship will not be a legitimate
ground for not faithfully implementing the mandate of the
Legislature.
5. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had
occasion to consider the scope and effect of Section
80 CPC in an almost similar situation in Bhagchand
Dagadusa v. Secretary of State [AIR 1927 PC 176 : 54
IA 338, 357] . In that case though a notice had been
issued by the plaintiffs under Section 80 CPC on June
26, 1922, the suit was instituted before the expiry of
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Supreme Court Reports

the period of two months from the said date. It was
contended before the Privy Council, relying on some
early decisions of High Court of Bombay, that because
one of the reliefs claimed in the suit was the grant of
a perpetual injunction and the claim for the said relief
would have become infructuous if the plaintiffs were to
wait for the statutory period of two months prescribed
in Section 80 CPC before they filed the suit, the rigour
of the section should be relaxed by implication of a
suitable exception or a qualification in respect of a suit
for emergent relief, such as one for injunction. That
contention did not find favour with the Privy Council
and it was held that Section 80 is express, explicit and
mandatory and it admits no implications or exceptions.
The Judicial Committee observed:
“To argue, as the appellants did, that the plaintiffs had
a right urgently calling for a remedy, while Section
80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for Section 80
imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon
the Court....”
This decision was subsequently followed by the Judicial
Committee in Vellayan v. Madras Province [AIR 1947 PC
197 : (1946-47) 74 IA 223] . The dictum laid down by the
Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary
of State for India [AIR 1927 PC 176 : 54 IA 338, 357] ,
was cited with approval and followed by a Bench of five
Judges of this Court in Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v.
Union of India [AIR 1966 SC 1068 : (1966) 1 SCR 986 :
1966 Mah LJ 371] .
6. It must now be regarded as settled law that a suit
against the Government or a public officer, to which the
requirement of a prior notice under Section 80 CPC is
attracted, cannot be validly instituted until the expiration
of the period of two months next after the notice in writing
has been delivered to the authorities concerned in the
manner prescribed for in the section and if filed before
the expiry of the said period, the suit has to be dismissed
as not maintainable.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1093

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

7. On behalf of the appellants, strong reliance was placed
on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Kerala in Nani Amma Nannini Amma v. State of
Kerala [AIR 1963 Ker 114 : 1962 Ker LJ 1267] . Therein
the learned Judge has expressed the view that Section
80 is not a provision of public policy and there is nothing
in the section expressly affecting the jurisdiction of the
Court to try a suit instituted before the expiry of the period
prescribed therein. The reasons stated by the learned
Judge in justification of his taking the said view despite
the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Bhagchand case [AIR 1927 PC 176 : 54
IA 338, 357] do not appeal to us as correct or sound. In
the light of the conclusion expressed by us in the foregoing
paragraphs about the true scope and effect of Section 80
CPC, the aforecited decision of the learned Single Judge
of the Kerala High Court cannot be accepted as laying
down good law.”
(Emphasis supplied)

112. In Raghunath Das v. Union of India and another reported in 1968
SCC OnLine SC 199, this Court observed that the object of notice
contemplated by Section 80 of the CPC was to give to the concerned
Government and public officers, an opportunity to reconsider the
legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised,
without litigation.
113. The purpose of law is the advancement of justice. The least that
was required in the present case was for the State Authorities to
acknowledge the notice issued by the appellants herein and inform
them as regards their stance. We make it abundantly clear that the
Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all
seriousness. The Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and
force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation. They are expected to
let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any
case before he embarks upon the litigation. In certain cases, courts
may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public
Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of
its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course
1094 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of trial may be considered as an afterthought. This is exactly what
has happened in the present case.
114. In view of the foregoing discussion, we should have allowed this
appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the appellants herein. We
could have directed the State Authorities to put the appellants back
in possession. However, it is too late in the day to pass such a
decree as it is going to be extremely difficult to give effect to such a
decree. The construction stood completed almost thirty years back.
It would be too much for this Court to ask the State Authorities to
demolish that part of the construction made over the suit land. In
such circumstances, we have reached the conclusion that the State
must be asked to compensate the appellants in terms of money.

ix. Payment of compensation in cases of resumption of land.
115. In Land Acquisition Officer-cum-R.D.O. v. Mekala Pandu, reported
in 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217, a Full Bench comprising of 7 Judges
had to be constituted in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for the
purpose of answering the reference – “whether the claimants are
entitled to payment of compensation under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act, 1894”) when the assigned
lands are resumed by the Government for a public purpose?”
116. For the sake of clarity, we find it necessary to give a background of
how the aforesaid question came to be referred to the High Court in
Mekala Pandu (supra). The High Court had the occasion to address
the issue of compensation in lieu of assigned lands resumed by the
Government initially in State of A.P. and Anr. v. P. Peda Chinnayya
& Ors., reported in 1996 SCC OnLine AP 60, wherein it held thus:
“Where the Government resorts to the provisions of the
Act for acquisition of the patta lands without resorting to
the terms of the grant for resumption, it is liable to pay
compensation under the Act, but such compensation will
be only the market value of the interest of the owner or
the assignee of the land, subject to the clog. In such
cases of acquisition, the claimant would also be entitled
to consequential reliefs, such as those of solatium and
interest etc., under the Act. In a case where the patta
lands are resumed by the Government, the assignees
cannot claim compensation under the Act, but can claim
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1095

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

compensation equal to the market value of their interest
in the land, subject to the clog. In such cases, no solatium
may be payable but interest may be claimed on the amount
of compensation from the date of dispossession and till
the date of payment of compensation. In a case where the
assignees are dispossessed from their patta lands without
resuming the lands in terms of the grant and/or initiation
of proceedings under the Act, the Government may be
directed to initiate proceedings under the Act and to pay
compensation under the Act as indicated.”
117. The very same issue as above once again was referred to and
came up for consideration before another Full Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bondapalli
Sanyasi, reported in 2001 SCC OnLine AP 1037. The reference in
the matter reads thus:
“Furthermore, we are prima facie of the opinion that that
part of the law laid down by the judgment of the Full Bench
that the plaintiffs would be entitled to the market value
together with interest may not be correct, particularly,
in view of the fact that the right of assignees of the
Government land is subordinate to the State. The lands
assigned under such patta are resumable. In that view of
the matter, they may not be treated to be owners of the
lands so as to claim entire compensation calculated at
the market value for acquisition thereof under the Land
Acquisition Act.”
118. That is how the matter once again came up for consideration before
a larger five Judge Bench in Bondapalli Sanyasi (supra). While
answering the reference, the High Court observed and held that:
“34. (…) the Full Bench committed error insofar as it held
that where patta lands are resumed by the Government,
the assignee would be entitled to compensation which
would be equal to the market value of their interest in the
land subject to the clog. Quantum of damages has to be
ascertained having regard to the fact situation of each
case. The right of the State to resume land is conditional
only to the extent referred to in D-Form patta. Once such
conditions are fulfilled, which have been done in the
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instant case, no grant of compensation would be payable
towards resumption of land. Compensation may, however,
be payable if lands have not been resumed by following
due process of law. The act of the State in such cases
would be tortuous in nature.”
119. However, the correctness of the view taken in Bondapalli Sanyasi
(supra) came to be challenged before a Division Bench, which
once again referred the matter to another Bench consisting of five
Judges. When the matter was taken up, objections were raised by
the Government Pleader inter alia contending that the Division Bench
is bound by the decision of the five Judge Bench in Bondapalli
Sanyasi (supra) and, therefore, it was not correct to make a Reference
to a Bench of five Judges.
120. As a consequence, the Bench of five Judges, having regard to the
fact that the subject matter that arose for its consideration was of
very great public importance, placed the matter before the Chief
Justice for constitution of a larger Bench of seven Judges to resolve
the issue in public interest. That is how the matter came to be heard
by seven Judges in Mekala Pandu (supra).
121. The question that fell for the consideration in Mekala Pandu (supra)
was whether the terms of grant or patta enabling the State to resume
the assigned land for a public purpose without paying compensation
equivalent to the market value of the land to the assignees, are
valid in law. In other words, whether such restrictive conditions or
covenants suffer from any constitutional infirmity? Answering the
question, the Full Bench (seven Judges) held as under:
“81. The State while directing no compensation be paid
equivalent to the market value of the assigned lands never
took into consideration and had any regard to the length of
time the land held by the grantee or assignee, the social
objectives for which the assignment had been made by
the State in discharge of its constitutional obligation of
providing public assistance to the weaker sections of the
society, the improvements or developments upon the land
made by the assignees on any legitimate expectation of
continuance of the assignment, heritable nature of the
right under the grant, etc.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1097

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

82. The question is whether the ‘no compensation clause’
imposed in the grant of assignment, in effect, requires the
assignee to relinquish some constitutional right? Whether
the conditions imposed at the time of assignment are
“unconstitutional conditions”?
83. The assignees are constitutional claimants. The
constitutional claim cannot be subjected to governmental
restrictions or sanctions except pursuant to the
constitutionally valid rule or law. There is no legislation
enacted by the State compelling it to assign the lands to
the weaker sections of the society. The State obviously
assigned and granted pattas as a measure of providing
public assistance to the weaker sections of the society. The
proposition is that as a general rule the State may grant
privilege upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose; but
the power of the State in that regard is not unlimited, and
one of the limitations that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.
That whenever State is required to make laws, regulations
or policies, it must do so consistently with the directive
principles with a view to securing social and economic
freedom so essential for establishment of an egalitarian
society. The Directive Principles of State Policy reflect
the hopes and aspirations of people of this great country.
The fact that they are not enforceable by any Court in no
manner reduces their importance. They are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and the
State is under obligation to apply them in making laws
and framing its policies particularly concerning the weaker
sections of the society.
84. Dr. Ambedkar characterised the Directive Principles
of State Policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution of
India as “Instruments of Instructions”. He said “whoever
captures power will not be free to do what he likes with it.
In exercise of it, he will have to respect these “Instruments
of instructions”, which are called Directive Principles. He
cannot ignore them.”
85. The Directive Principles fix the socio-economic goals,
which the State must strive to attain. By incorporating
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unconstitutional clause of ‘no compensation’ the State
kept the democles sword suspended over the head of the
assignee forever. The State cannot act as a private giver.
86. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of
Gujarat, 1974 (1) SCC 717, Mathew, J., expounded the
doctrine of ‘unconstitutional condition’:
“The doctrine of “unconstitutional condition” means any
stipulation imposed upon the grant of a governmental
privilege which in effect requires the recipient of the
privilege to relinquish some constitutional right. This
doctrine takes for granted that ‘the petitioner has no
right to be a policeman’ but it emphasizes the right he is
conceded to possess by reason of an explicit provision
of the Constitution, namely, his right “to talk politics”.
The major requirement of the doctrine is that the person
complaining of the condition must demonstrate that it is
unreasonable in the special sense that it takes away or
abridges the exercise of a right protected by an explicit
provision of the Constitution.”
87. After referring to the decision in Frost and Frost Trucking
Co. v. Railroad Comm., of the Supreme Court of United
States (271 US 583), the learned Judge observed:
“ ……..though the State may have privileges within its
control which it may withhold, it cannot use a grant of
those privileges to secure a valid consent to acts which,
if imposed upon the grantee in invitum would be beyond
its constitutional power.”
88. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995
Supp.(1) SCC 596, the Supreme Court observed:
“Those without land suffer not only from an economic
disadvantage, but also a concomitant social
disadvantage. In the very nature of things, it is not
possible to provide land to all landless persons but
that cannot furnish an alibi for not undertaking at
all a programme for the redistribution of agricultural
land. Agrarian reforms therefore require, inter alia,
the reduction of the larger holdings and distribution
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1099

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

of the excess land according to social and economic
considerations. We embarked upon a constitutional
era holding forth the promise that we will secure to all
citizens justice, social economic and political, equality
of status and of opportunity; and, last but not the
least, dignity of the individual …….. Indeed, if there
is one place in an agriculture dominated society like
ours where citizens can hope to have equal justice,
it is on the strip of land which they till and love, the
land which assures to them dignity of their person by
providing to them a near decent means of livelihood.”
It is further held:
“Property, therefore, accords status. Due to its lack
man suffers from economic disadvantages and
disabilities to gain social and economic inequality
leading to his servitude. Providing facilities and
opportunities to hold property furthers the basic
structure of egalitarian social order guaranteeing
economic and social equality. In other words, it
removes disabilities and inequalities, accords status,
social and economic and dignity of person …….
Property in a comprehensive term is an essential
guarantee to lead full life with human dignity, for, in
order that a man may be able to develop himself in a
human fashion with full blossom, he needs a certain
freedom and a certain security. The economic and
social justice, equality of status and dignity of person
are assured to him only through property.”
(Emphasis is supplied)

89. The purpose of assignment of land either under
the Board Standing Orders or under the land reforms
legislations to the weaker sections of the society by the
State is obviously in pursuance of its policy to empower
the weaker sections of the society. Having assigned the
land, the State cannot deprive him of the welfare benefit
or public assistance. Deprivation of assignee’s right to
enjoy the property assigned to him may affect his dignity
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and security. It may adversely affect the equality of status
and dignity.
90. It is said that the institution called property guards
the troubled boundary between individual man and the
State. Even if the assignment granted is considered to be
government largess it should not be able to impose any
condition on largess that would be invalid if imposed on
something other than a “gratuity”. The most clearly defined
problem posed by government largess is the way it can be
used to apply pressure against the exercise of constitutional
rights. A first principle should be that government must
have no power to “buy up” rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The forms of largess, which are closely linked
to status, must be deemed to be held as of right. These
interests should be “vested”. If revocation is necessary,
not by reason of the fault of the individual holder, but by
reason of overriding demands of public policy, perhaps
payment of just compensation would be appropriate. The
individual should not bear the entire loss for a remedy
primarily intended to benefit the community. The benefits
granted are based upon a recognition that misfortune and
deprivation are often caused by forces far beyond the
control of the individual, such as technological change,
variations in demand for goods, depressions, or wars. The
aim of these benefits is to preserve the self-sufficiency of
the individual, to rehabilitate him where necessary, and
to allow him to be a valuable member of a family and a
community; in theory they represent part of the individual’s
rightful share in the commonwealth. Only by making such
benefits into rights can the welfare State achieve its goal
of providing a secured minimum basis for individual well-
being and dignity in a society where each man cannot be
wholly the master of his own destiny.
91. There is an interesting article in Harvard Law Review —
Volume 73 — Page 1595:
“Conditioning the extension of a governmental benefit or
“privilege” upon the surrender of constitutional rights has
long appealed to Congress and the State Legislatures
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1101

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

as a means of regulating private conduct. This appeal
is principally attributable to the superficially compelling
logic of the arguments upon which the validity of such
conditions is supposed to rest. It is contended that if the
government may withhold the benefit in the first instance,
without giving a reason, it may withhold or revoke the
benefit even though its reason for doing so may be the
individual’s refusal to surrender his constitutional rights.
This argument is often phrased in syllogistic terms; if the
Legislature may withhold a particular benefit, it may grant
it in a limited form since the greater power of withholding
absolutely must necessarily include the lesser power of
granting with restrictions. As a corollary to this argument,
the contention is made that the recipient of the benefit is
not deprived of a right since he may retain it simply by
rejecting the proffered benefit.
Were this logic accepted in all cases, dangerous
consequences would follow. The rapid rise in the number of
government regulatory and welfare programs, coupled with
the multiplication of government contracts resulting from
expanded budgets, has greatly increased the total benefits
extended, thus affording the government countless new
opportunities to bargain for the surrender of constitutional
rights. The potential erosion of fundamental liberties
through the use of this bargaining technique has prompted
the development of the doctrine of “unconstitutional
conditions”.
Since the government is under no obligation to grant a
benefit, failure to grant may appear to be a positive power
to withhold. The arbitrary character of this apparent power
seems to justify the withholding or revocation of benefits
where the individual fails to comply with conditions requiring
the surrender of constitutional rights. But withholding is
really a non-exercise of power, and the absence of a
requirement that there be constitutional justification for
inaction offers no logical support for the positive assertion
of an authority to extend benefits and impose conditions
which limit the rights of the recipient. In the latter case,
the State is asserting its spending power which is limited
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by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The cases limiting State spending power draw a dichotomy
between spending for public and for private uses; however,
they seem to imply a broader limitation, namely that the
fourteenth amendment limits spending to purposes related
to the general welfare. Despite the wide discretion this term
suggests, it is at least arguable that State spending power
cannot be exercised to “ buy up” rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Since federal spending power is explicitly
restricted to general welfare purposes, this limitation is
even more likely to apply to the national government. Its
application to either governmental entity would require the
invalidation of conditions unrelated to the achievement of
the benefit’s objective since in such cases the spending
power is being exercised to encourage, through subsidies
the non-assertion of constitutional rights, as well as to
finance a “welfare” program. Although the individual
deprived of the benefit does not have standing to assert
this misuse of the spending power in his capacity as
taxpayer, he should have it as a beneficiary, since in that
capacity he has suffered as immediate and measurable
injury; it is evident that, but for the assertion of the right,
he would have received the benefit.”
92. ‘No compensation’ clause which virtually enables the
State to withdraw the privilege granted without payment
of just compensation is an “unconstitutional condition”
imposed by the State adversely affects the life, liberty,
equality and dignity guaranteed by the Constitution. The
assignment of lands to the exploited and vulnerable
sections of the society is neither a formality nor a gratis.
The privilege granted is with a view to ensure and protect
the rights of the exploited sections of the people to live
with human dignity free from exploitation. The privilege
or largesse once granted acquires the status of vested
interest. The policy to assign the government land by the
State was obviously designed to protect the socio-economic
status of a vulnerable citizenry; its deprivation would be
universally perceived as a misfortune.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1103

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

122. The Full Bench thereafter proceeded to examine the matter keeping
in mind the right to life. It proceeded to observe as under:
“93. Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act,
1993 (Act 10 of 1994) defines “human rights” that the
rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in
the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts
in India.
94. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right
to life. The right to life includes the right to livelihood.
95. Time and again the Courts in India held that Article
21 is one of the great silences of the Constitution. The
right to livelihood cannot be subjected to individual
fancies of the persons in authority. The sweep of the
right to life conferred by Art. 21 is wide and far reaching.
An important facet of that right is the right to livelihood
because, no person can live without the means of living,
that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood
is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life,
the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life
would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the
point of abrogation.
96. Chandrachud, C.J., in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation, 1985 (3) SCC 545, observed:
“If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to
the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the
right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude
the right to livelihood from the content of the right
to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be
compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood
or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is
deprived of his right to livelihood except according
to just and fair procedure established by law, can
challenge the deprivation as offending the right to
life conferred by Article 21.”
(Emphasis is supplied).
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97. The right to live with human dignity, free from
exploitation is enshrined in Art. 21 and derives its life
breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and
particularly Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41
and 42 and at least, therefore, it must include the right to
live with human dignity, the right to take any action which
will deprive a person of enjoyment of basic right to live
with dignity as an integral part of the constitutional right
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
98. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101, the Supreme Court while
reiterating the principle observed that the right to life
includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore
cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority …..
Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights ………
Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the
limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications.
That will be a mockery of them.
99. The function of human rights is to protect the individual
from the leviathan of the State. A welfare State provides
a wide range of benefits to the citizens as of right, but at
the same time it enhances the power of administration,
since the benefits provided are inevitably administered by
government departments or their agents. A welfare State
will continue to grow leading to a more just distribution of
the resources resulting in greater governmental regulation.
These developments may add further dimension to the
relationship between the individuals and the State. There
will be more and more assertions claiming entitlements
to basic social benefits from the State in addition to civil
and political rights.
100. The deprivation of the assignee’s right to payment
of just compensation equivalent to the market value of
the assigned land may amount to deprivation of right to
livelihood. The denial of constitutional claim to receive just
compensation after depriving the assignee of his land is
impermissible except pursuant to a constitutionally valid
rule or law.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1105

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

101. The contention is that if the Government may withhold
the benefit in the first instance itself without giving a
reason, it may withhold or revoke the benefit even though
its reason for doing so may be the individual’s refusal to
surrender his constitutional rights. This argument is often
phrased in syllogistic terms: if the State may withhold a
particular benefit, it may grant it in a limited form since the
greater power of withholding absolutely must necessarily
include the lesser power of granting with restrictions. The
contention often advanced is that the recipient of the benefit
is not deprived of a right since he may retain all his rights
simply by rejecting the proffered benefit. This contention
is fraught with dangerous consequences. The number of
‘social choices’ programmes resulting from expanded social
welfare activities, has greatly increased the total benefits
extended, thus affording the government countless new
opportunities to bargain for the surrender of constitutional
rights. The potential erosion of fundamental liberties
through the use of this bargaining technique has prompted
the development of the doctrine of “unconstitutional
conditions”. Reasonable conditions may be imposed in
order to see that the interest in ensuring that the benefit
or facility extended to the individual is maintained for the
purposes intended, in order to protect the effectiveness
of the benefit itself.
102. The recipients of public assistance are not estopped
from setting up their fundamental rights as a defence as
against “no compensation clause”. It is very well settled
and needs no restatement at our hands that there can be
no estoppel against the Constitution.
103. In Olga Tellis (18 supra), the Supreme Court observed:.
“The Constitution is not only the paramount law of the land
but it is the source and sustenance of all laws. Its provisions
are conceived in public interest and are intended to serve
a public purpose. The doctrine of estoppel is based on
the principle that consistency in word and action imparts
certainty and honesty to human affairs. If a person makes
a representation to another, on the faith of which the latter
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Supreme Court Reports

acts to his prejudice, the former cannot resile from the
representation made by him. He must make it good. This
principle can have no application to representations made
regarding the assertion or enforcement of fundamental
rights. For example, the concession made by a person
that he does not possess and would not exercise his
right to free speech and expression or the right to move
freely throughout the territory of India cannot deprive him
of those constitutional rights, any more than a concession
that a person has no right of personal liberty can justify
his detention contrary to the terms of Article 22 of the
Constitution. Fundamental rights are undoubtedly conferred
by the Constitution upon individuals which have to be
asserted and enforced by them, if those rights are violated.
But, the high purpose which the Constitution seeks to
achieve by conferment of fundamental rights is not only
to benefit individuals but to secure the larger interests of
the community. The Preamble of the Constitution says
that India is a democratic Republic. It is in order to fulfil
the promise of the Preamble that fundamental rights are
conferred by the Constitution, some on citizens like those
guaranteed by Articles 15, 16, 19, 21 and 29 and, some on
citizens and non-citizens alike, like those guaranteed by
Articles, 14, 21, 22 and 25 of the Constitution. No individual
can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the
Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding,
whether under a mistake of law or otherwise, that he does
not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental
right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any
subsequent proceeding. Such a concession, if enforced
would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Were the
argument of estoppel valid, and all-powerful State could
easily tempt an individual to forego his precious personal
freedom on promise of transitory, immediate benefits.”
104. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the recipients
had accepted the assignment subject to ‘no compensation
clause’ and that they will not object to the resumption of
the assigned lands for a public purpose, they are entitled
to assert that any such action on the part of the authorities
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1107

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

will be in violation of their guaranteed fundamental rights.
How far the argument regarding the existence and scope
of the right claimed by the recipients is well-founded is
another matter. But, the argument has to be examined
despite the concession.
105. In the matter of distribution of material resources of
the community to the vulnerable sections of the society
by the State in furtherance of its constitutional obligations
no argument can be heard from the State contending that
the recipient of the benefit may either accept with the
restrictions or not to accept the benefit at all. The whole
idea of distributive justice is to empower the weaker
sections of the society and to provide them their share of
cake in the material resources of the community of which
they were deprived from times immemorial for no fault of
theirs. Having resolved to extend the benefits as a welfare
measure, no unconstitutional condition can be imposed
depriving the recipients of the benefits of their legitimate
right to get compensation in case of taking over of the
benefit even for a valid public purpose. The recipients
cannot be at the mercy of the State forever.
106. Justice K.K. Mathew, in his Democracy, Equality and
Freedom has observed that property is a legal institution
the essence of which is the creation and protection of
certain private rights in wealth of any kind. The learned
Judge stated:
“In a society with a mixed economy, who can be
sure that freedom in relation to property might not be
regarded as an aspect of individual freedom? People
without property have a tendency to become slaves.
They become the property of others as they have no
property themselves. They will come to say: ‘Make
us slaves, but feed us.’ Liberty, independence, self-
respect, have their roots in property. To denigrate
the institution of property is to shut one’s eyes to
the stark reality evidenced by the innate instinct
and the steady object of pursuit of the vast majority
of people. Protection of property interest may quite
1108 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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fairly be deemed in appropriate circumstances an
aspect of freedom. There is no surer way to give
men the courage to be free than to insure them a
competence upon which they can rely. This is why
the Constitution-makers wanted that the ownership
of the material resources of the community should
be so distributed as to subserve the common good.
People become a society based upon relationship
and status.”
107. In Murlidhar Dayandeo Keskar v. Vishwanath Pandu
Barde, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 549, the Supreme Court
observed:
“Economic empowerment to the poor, Dalits and
Tribes, is an integral constitutional scheme of socio-
economic democracy and a way of life of political
democracy. Economic empowerment is, therefore, a
basic human right and a fundamental right as part of
right to live, equality and of status and dignity to the
poor, weaker sections, Dalits and Tribes. The State
has evolved, by its legislative and executive action, the
policy to allot lands to the Dalits and Tribes and other
weaker sections for their economic empowerment.
The Government evolved two-pronged economic
policies to render economic justice to the poor. The
Planning Commission evolved policies like DRDL
for economic empowerment of the weaker sections
of the society; the Dalits and Tribes in particular.
There should be short-term policy for immediate
sustenance and long-term policy for stable and
permanent economic empowerment. All the State
Governments also evolved assignment of its lands
or the lands acquired under the ceiling laws to them.
Appropriate legislative enactments are brought on
statute books to prevent alienation of the assigned
lands or the property had under the planned schemes,
and imposed prohibition thereunder of alienation,
declaring any conveyance in contravention thereof as
void or illegal and inoperative not to bind the State or
the assignee. In case the assignee was disqualified
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1109

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

or not available, on resumption of such land, the
authorities are enjoined to resume the property and
assign to an heir or others eligible among the Dalits
and Tribes or weaker sections in terms of the policy.
The prohibition is to effectuate the constitutional
policy of economic empowerment under Articles 14,
21, 38, 39 and 46 read with the Preamble to the
Constitution. Even in respect of private sales of the
lands belonging to tribes, statutes prohibit alienation
without prior sanction of the Competent Authority.”
108. Be it noted, the land by way of assignment is let for
purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto,
for personal occupation and cultivation by the agricultural
labourers and others belonging to weaker sections of
the society. It may be lawful for the State to acquire any
portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit but not
without providing for compensation at a rate which shall
not be less than the market value thereof. The acquisition
of such land even for a public purpose without payment
of compensation shall be in the teeth of Article 31 -A of
the Constitution of India.
109. The masses have suffered socio-economic injustice
too long and been separated by the poverty curtain too
strong that if peaceful transformation of the nation into an
egalitarian society were not achieved, chaos, upsurge may
destroy the peaceful progress and orderly development
of the society.
110. In the result, we hold that ‘no compensation’
clause, restricting the right of the assignees to claim full
compensation in respect of the land resumed equivalent
to the market value of the land, is unconstitutional. The
‘no compensation clause’ infringes the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Articles 14 and 31-A of the Constitution. We
are conscious that Article 21 essentially deals with personal
liberty. But in cases where deprivation of property would
lead to deprivation of life or liberty or livelihood, Article
21 springs into action and any such deprivation without
just payment of compensation amounts to infringement
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Supreme Court Reports

of the right guaranteed thereunder. The doctrine of
‘unconstitutional conditions’ applies in all its force.
111. In the circumstances, we hold that the assignees of the
government lands are entitled to payment of compensation
equivalent to the full market value of the land and other
benefits on par with full owners of the land even in cases
where the assigned lands are taken possession of by
the State in accordance with the terms of grant or patta,
though such resumption is for a public purpose. We further
hold that even in cases where the State does not invoke
the covenant of the grant or patta to resume the land for
such public purpose and resorts to acquisition of the land
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
assignees shall be entitled to compensation as owners of
the land and for all other consequential benefits under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No condition
incorporated in patta/deed of assignment shall operate as
a clog putting any restriction on the right of the assignee
to claim full compensation as owner of the land.”
(Emphasis supplied)

123. The State has admitted that Pattadar Passbook was issued to the
appellants years back. They have also not disputed that the appellants
were paying revenue to the government and the revenue receipts
have also been exhibited in the form of documentary evidence. Even
if we were to ignore the sale deed executed in 1970 for the time
being and treat the appellants as mere occupants with the right to
possession, cultivation and enjoyment, we still must remain cognizant
of the rights specifically vested in the appellants by way of issuance
of Pattadar Passbook. Thus, what was vested in the appellant with
the issuance of a Pattadar Passbook was a “property” within the
meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution.
124. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. This Article has been inserted by the
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. Prior to this amendment,
the right to property was guaranteed by Article 31. While Clause (1)
of that Article has been shifted from Part III to Article 300-A, Clause
(2) of that Article, which dealt with compulsory acquisition of property,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1111

Yerikala Sunkalamma & Anr. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Revenue & Ors.

has been repealed. Sub-Clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 19, which
guaranteed the right to acquire and hold property, has also been
omitted by the same 44th Amendment Act, 1978. The result of these
changes, in short, is that the right to hold property has ceased to be
a fundamental right under the Constitution and it has been left to the
Legislature to deprive a person by the authority of law.
125. Article 300-A provides that the property of a person can be deprived
by authority of law. The phrase “save by authority of law” came
before the Court for interpretation. This Court in the case of Wazir
Chand v. State of H.P., reported in (1954) 1 SCC 787 held that
under the Constitution, the Executive cannot deprive a person of his
property of any kind without specific legal authority which can be
established in Court of law, however laudable the motive behind such
deprivation may be. In the same decision, this Court also held that in
case of dispossession of property except under the authority of law,
the owner may obtain restoration of possession by a proceeding for
mandamus against the governmental authorities. Further, this Court
in Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh
reported in (1982) 1 SCC 39 held that the phrase “by authority of
law” means by or under a law made by the competent Legislature.
The same position is reiterated by this Court in the case of Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in 1995 Supp. (1)
SCC 596 wherein it has been observed that “Article 300-A only
limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation
without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not
acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words,
if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
126. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and
Anr. reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, this Court recognized the right
to property as a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different
political thinkers that some amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view
that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of
property.” Property must be secured, else liberty cannot
subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the
1112 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

view that property itself is the seed bed which must be
conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is
the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
(Emphasis supplied)

F. CONCLUSION
127. Having regard to the nature of the land, the area of the suit land
which is approximately three acres and the time spent pursuing this
litigation for the past thirty years, we believe that the State should pay
an amount of Rs. 70 lakhs towards compensation to the appellants.
128. We dispose of this appeal with the direction to the respondents to pay
an amount of Rs. 70 lakhs to the appellants by way of compensation
within a period of three months from the date of this judgment.
129. The Registry is directed to circulate one copy each of this judgment
to all the High Courts across the country and one copy each to all
the Chief Secretaries of the respective State Governments with more
emphasis on the chapter of Section 80 CPC as discussed by this
Court in the judgment.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain