Supreme Court of India
YASHPAL JAINversusSUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 948
- Decided
- 20 October 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S RAVINDRA BHAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order allowing Yashpal Jain to be substituted as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is valid and must be affirmed, setting aside the High Court's quashing order.
Summary
The suit was filed in 1982 by Urmila Devi to declare a sale deed void and claim possession of land. After her death in 2007, multiple applications were filed to substitute a legal representative, with Manoj Kumar Jain initially approved, later withdrawn, and Yashpal Jain seeking substitution. The trial court allowed Yashpal Jain's substitution, which was affirmed by a civil revision, but the High Court quashed that order. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in rejecting Yashpal Jain's status as legal representative and considered the broader issue of judicial delay in a 41‑year‑old suit. It held that the trial court's order was correct, set aside the High Court's order, and affirmed the substitution, while issuing extensive directions to curb case pendency. The appeal was allowed, and the Supreme Court emphasized strict compliance with CPC provisions and case‑flow management to ensure speedy justice.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court's order quashing the trial court's order allowing Yashpal Jain to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff should be set aside.
- Whether further directions are required to conclude the long‑pending suit in a time‑bound manner.
Legislation cited
- Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999
- Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002
- Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Rules, 1976
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VIII Rule 1, s. Order V Rule 2, s. Order X, s. Order XI, s. Order XII, s. Order XVII Rule 1, s. Order XX, s. Section 2(11)
- Code of Criminal Procedure
- Uttar Pradesh Act No.1 of 1951s. Section 137-A
Subjects
legal representativesubstitutioncivil suitjudicial delayadjournmentCode of Civil Procedurecase flow managementspeedy justiceadoptionwillabatementcondonation of delay
Judgment
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 948 : 2023 INSC 948
CASE DETAILS
YASHPAL JAIN
v.
SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 4296 of 2023)
OCTOBER 20, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the impugned order passed quashing
the order dated 13.12.2012 rendered in Civil Revision by the High Court
whereby the order dated 09.05.2012 passed by trial court allowing the
impleadment application filed by the appellant had been rejected, to be
sustained or set aside; whether any further directions require to be issued
for concluding the proceedings in a time bound manner on account of the
suit pending for trial for past 41 years?
Suit – Suit was instituted by the original plaintiff in 1982 to declare
the sale deed executed by first defendant in favour of defendants No.4 to
32 in respect of the suit properties, to be null and void and for a decree
of possession of the suit properties – Proceedings protracted from 1982
till her demise in 2007 whereafter, several orders were passed by the
courts below, both in original jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction
– Impugned order resulted in rejection of the application filed by the
appellant to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – On facts, respondents herein themselves
having filed an application in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005 for bringing the
present appellant as the plaintiff’s legal representative in the aforesaid writ
petition and prosecuted the same, reflects that they were in the acquaintance
of the fact of the present appellant being the legal representative of deceased
plaintiff but yet are attempting to contend that ‘MKJ’ is to be brought
on record as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff – Further, the
948
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 949
defendants cannot be heard to contend that appellant herein had filed two
affidavits (Annexure P-5 and Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted
‘MKJ’ as the legal representative of deceased plaintiff and as such he cannot
turn around to assert himself to be the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff, as the affidavits filed by the appellant does not even remotely
suggest or indicate that he had admitted ‘MKJ’ being the legal representative
of the deceased plaintiff – On the other hand, said affidavits clearly indicate
that he had only affirmed and reiterated the fact that he is a signatory to the
Will and nothing more or nothing less – Furthermore, ‘MKJ’ himself had
filed an application, accompanied by affidavit before the Revisional Court in
Civil Revision No.2 of 2010, stating that he would not press the application
filed by him for substitution – This was sufficient for the High Court to have
accepted the plea of the appellant or in other words, it should have sustained
the order of trial court and ordered for appellant being brought on record as
legal representative of deceased plaintiff – Impugned order set aside – Order
dated 09.05.2012 passed by the Trial Court as affirmed in Civil Revision
No.4 of 2012 vide order dated 13.12.2012, affirmed – Further directions
issued – Judicial Delay . [Paras 12, 14-16]
Directions by Supreme Court – Judicial Delay – Certain litigations
initiated more than 50 years back still pending – Data from National
Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), three oldest civil and criminal cases noted
– Factors behind Judicial Delays, enumerated – Steps taken to curb
Judicial delay, historical outlook – Reasons for delay in civil trial –
Discussed – Case Flow Management System Rules – Chief Justices
of High Courts where said Rules are yet to be framed, requested to
take immediate steps to formulate such rules – State-wise pendency
of cases before the respective High Courts and overall Civil Courts
as on 16.10.2023; stage-wise pendency also stated – Requests made to
the Chief Justices of the High Courts – Directions issued to the trial
courts to ensure that speedy justice is delivered – Further directions for
implementation of the said directions to be issued from time to time, if
necessary – Secretary General to circulate the copy of this judgment
to the Registrar General of all the High Courts for being placed before
the respective Chief Justices for consideration and suitable steps being
taken. [Paras 18, 19, 21-26, 27-31, 33, 34]
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
All India Judges Association v. Union of India [2002] 2 SCR 712 :
(2002) 4 SCC 247; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Another AIR (1977)
4 SCC 467; Kailash v. Nanku [2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4 SCC 480; Serum
Advocates Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs Union of India, [2005] 1 Suppl.
SCR 929 : AIR 2005 SC 3353; Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chhabra (2022)
SCC OnLine SC 613; Salem Bar Association v. Union of India [2002] 3
Suppl. SCR 353 : AIR 2003 SC 189 – referred to.
Shoraj Singh v. Charan Singh (2018) SCC OnLine All 6613; M.
Mahalingam v. Shashikala ILR Karnataka 4055 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4296 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2019 of the High Court of
Uttarakhand at Nainital in WPMS No. 144 of 2013.
Appearances:
Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Sr. Adv., Anurag Kashyap, Mrs. Mona K.
Rajvanshi, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Sushil Kumar Dubey, Advs. for the
Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
PREFACE
1. Even after 41 years, the parties to this lis are still groping in the dark
and litigating as to who should be brought on record as legal representative
of the sole plaintiff Mrs. Urmila Devi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Urmila
Devi’ for the sake of brevity). This is a classic case and a mirror to the fact
that litigant public may become disillusioned with judicial processes due
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 951
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
to inordinate delay in the legal proceedings, not reaching its logical end,
and moving at a snail’s pace due to dilatory tactics adopted by one or the
other party. The said suit, OS No.2 of 1982, was instituted for the relief to
declare the sale deed, executed by Shri Mangal Singh (hereinafter referred
to as ‘first defendant’ for the sake of convenience) in favour of defendants
No.4 to 32 in respect of the suit properties described in the plaints schedule
as item No.1 to 8, to be null and void by claiming to be the owner of the said
properties; and for a decree of possession of the suit properties with costs.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
2. When the aforesaid suit was still at infancy stage the sole-plaintiff
expired on 18.05.2007. One Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an application
to substitute him as her legal heir, by placing reliance on the Will dated
19.05.1999 and claiming to be a legatee under the said registered Will. He
also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that Mr. Yashpal Jain (hereinafter
referred to as ‘appellant’ for the sake of convenience) was a witness to
the said registered Will. The defendants objected to the said application
contending inter alia that the appellant herein was the adopted son of late
Urmila Devi by relying upon the adoption deed dated 06.01.1973 duly
registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar. In the said proceedings, the
present appellant also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that he was a
witness to the Will dated 19.05.1999 executed by Urmila Devi in favour of
Manoj Kumar Jain. The application filed by Manoj Kumar Jain came to be
allowed by order dated 24.02.2010.
2.1 Being aggrieved by the said Order the legal heirs of the first
defendant namely, legal heirs of Mangal Singh, filed a Civil Revision No.2
of 2010 before the District Judge which came to be allowed by setting aside
the Order of the Trial Court on the ground that applicant had stated during
the course of the revisional proceedings that he would not press the said
application and as such directed the Trial Court to consider the application
filed by Yashpal Jain-appellant herein and permitted him to file an application
seeking condonation of delay along with the application to bring on record
the legal representatives of the sole plaintiff, since he had failed to do so
earlier. Accordingly, revision application came to be allowed by order
dated 02.12.2011 and Mr. Yashpal Jain filed an application before the Trial
Court for condoning the delay in filing such application and also prayed
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
for abatement of suit to be set aside. The learned Trial Judge vide Order
dated 09.05.2012 allowed the application by setting aside the abatement
and permitted Yashpal Jain to be substituted as legal representative of late
Urmila Devi.
3. At this juncture, we would like to point out that a careful perusal of
the application and the orders passed by the courts below would indicate that
the parties and the courts below seem to have proceeded on the footing that
they were to adjudicate the rights of a legal heir which if seen in the light
of expression used in the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to
as ‘CPC’) is impermissible, as it is not referable to ‘legal heir’ but ‘legal
representative’ as defined under Section 2 (11) which reads:
“Legal representative” means a person who in law represents the
estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles
with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a
representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on
the death of the party so suing or sued.
On the death of a party to the suit it is the legal representative who is/
are entitled to prosecute the proceedings and, in law, represent the estate of
the deceased. The legal representative who is brought on record not only
includes a legatee under a Will but also an intermeddler of the property
who would be entitled to sue and to be sued and/or continue to prosecute
the proceedings. This vital aspect seems to have been lost sight of by the
courts below conveniently.
4. Be that as it may, the aforesaid Urmila Devi who claimed to be
Bhumidar and owner in possession of land situated in village Sonargaon,
Patti Katulsyun, District Garhwal, Uttarakhand has contended in her suit
that the suit schedule properties were looked after by Mangal Singh- the first
defendant and as he had fraudulently obtained a Bhumidar Sanad of the land
comprising No.77, 3/16 Nalis, she had filed an application under Section
137-A of UP Act No.1 of 1951 before the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector,
Pauri Garhwal, challenging the said Bhumidari Sanad obtained by the first
defendant, which was held in her favour by the Tehsildar, and confirmed
by the appellate authority. Not being satisfied with the said order, the first
defendant had filed a second appeal before the Revenue Board which came
to be allowed in favour of Mangal Singh, against which a review petition
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 953
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
was filed thereon by Urmila Devi which came to be allowed on 30.08.1982.
The said order was challenged before the High Court of Uttarakhand in
Writ Petition (M/S) No.342 of 2005 (old No.14655 of 1983) by Mangal
Singh. In the said proceedings a substitution application came to be filed
by the legal representative of Mangal Singh stating thereunder that Yashpal
Jain (appellant herein) is the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi
and prayed for his name to be substituted. The said application came to be
allowed vide order dated 24.02.2012 and appellant herein was substituted
as the legal representative of Urmila Devi in writ proceedings. There is no
further challenge to said order or in other words, it has attained finality.
5. As already noticed hereinabove, appellant herein filed an application
for substitution as legal representative of the original plaintiff-Urmila
Devi along with an application for condoning the delay in filing said
application and to set aside the abatement. The said application came to be
allowed vide Order dated 09.05.2012. Being aggrieved by the said order,
the Legal Representatives of Mangal Singh filed Civil Revision No.4 of
2012 before the District Judge who affirmed the Order of the Trial Court
and dismissed the Revision Petition by Order dated 13.12.2012. The legal
representatives of Mangal Singh filed WP No.144 of 2013 before the High
Court challenging the Orders dated 09.05.2012 and 13.12.2012 passed by
the Trial Court and the Revisional Court, respectively. The High Court
allowed the writ petition by quashing the impugned orders and rejecting
the application of the appellant herein, thereby restoring the original order
dated 17.05.2008 wherein Manoj Jain had been ordered for being substituted
as legal representative of late Urmila Devi on the strength of the registered
Will dated 19.05.1999 propounded by him with a direction to conclude the
proceedings within a period of 9 months. Being aggrieved by the same, the
present appeal has been filed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
6. We have heard the arguments of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned
Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant and Mr. Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents.
7. It is the contention of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the appellant, that the High Court committed
a serious error in upsetting the findings of the Trial Court and the
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
Revisional Court whereunder the discretionary power was exercised
by condoning the delay while setting aside the abatement and allowing
the application of the appellant herein to be brought on record as legal
representative of deceased Urmila Devi; the High Court erred in not
considering the fact that courts below had recorded a clear finding
that appellant herein was the sole surviving legal representative of
the deceased plaintiff and as such it ought not to have interfered
with the well-reasoned order passed by the Trial Court as affirmed
by the Revisional Court; She would also contend that defendants in
this suit who were the writ petitioners in WP(M/S) 342 of 2005 (old
number 14655 of 1983) had substituted the appellant herein as legal
representative of Urmila Devi in dispute related to the suit schedule
property (involved in OS No.2 of 1982) and as such defendants cannot
be permitted to take stand contrary to same. Hence, it is contended that
impugned order is liable to be set aside.
8. Per contra, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents, supports the impugned order and
contends that in the Writ Petition No.144 of 2013, appellant herein who
was a party therein had not filed a counter-affidavit and as such High
Court had recorded that non-traversing of petition averments would
amount to admission and had also taken note of the fact that appellant
herein had filed an affidavit before the Trial Court on 25.10.2008
whereunder he has accepted the Will dated 19.05.1999 executed by
deceased Urmila Devi and thereby supported the stand of Manoj
Kumar Jain being the legal heir of Urmila Devi. He would also draw
the attention of this Court to yet another affidavit dated 21.08.2009
filed by the appellant himself in OS No.2 of 1982 whereunder he has
again supported the Will dated 19.05.1999 or in other words, supported
the substitution of Shri Manoj Kumar Jain as legal representative
of deceased Urmila Devi. Hence, he contends there is no illegality
committed by the High Court. It is further contended that appellant
was having knowledge of OS No.2 of 1982 and as such he cannot plead
ignorance for the delay. Lastly, challenging the adoption on the ground
that same cannot be the basis for the appellant herein to be brought on
record, he has sought for rejection of this appeal.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 955
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
9. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and after
bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions
raised at the Bar, we are of the considered view that following points would
arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2019 passed in Writ
Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 quashing the orders dated 13.12.2012
rendered in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 by the High Court whereby the
order dated 09.05.2012 passed by trial court allowing the impleadment
application filed by the appellant herein had been rejected, is to be
sustained or set aside?
(ii) Whether any further direction or directions requires to be issued
for concluding the proceedings in a time bound manner on account of
Suit No.2 of 1985 pending for trial for past 41 years?
(iii) What order?
RE: POINT No.(i)
10. It is not in dispute that Smt. Urmila Devi had instituted a suit O.S.
No.2 of 1982 against Mangal Singh and others in respect of suit schedule
properties as described in the plaint schedule for declaring the sale deeds
executed by Mangal Singh in favour of defendant Nos.4 to 32, as mentioned
in Plaint Schedule 1 to 18, as null and void; and during the pendency of
the said suit the plaintiff- Smt. Urmila Devi expired on 18.05.2007. On
her demise Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an application on 17.05.2008
for substitution as her legal heir and claiming right legatee under the
Will dated 19.05.1999. This application was followed by an affidavit of
the appellant (Yashpal Jain) dated 25.10.2008 stating thereunder that his
mother Urmila Devi had executed a Will dated 19.05.1999 in favour of
Manoj Kumar Jain and also stating thereunder that Will was duly registered.
The legal heirs of the defendant objected the said substitution contending,
inter alia, that the present appellant is the adopted son of Urmila Devi
and said adoption deed was duly registered on 06.01.1973 in the office of
the Sub-Registrar. It was also contended that Shri Rajendra Prasad Jain
was the holder of power of attorney of Urmila Devi and on his (Rajendra
Prasad) death on 18.02.2001, she had executed another power of attorney
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
on 21.04.2001 appointing Virender Kumar Jain and on the basis of the same
the name of his wife came to be mutated in respect of the lands indicated
thereunder. Hence, it was contended that Will propounded by Manoj Kumar
Jain was fabricated and forged. Hence, it was prayed that claim of Manoj
Kumar Jain for being substituted as legal representative of Urmila Devi is
liable to be rejected. Yet another affidavit was also filed by the appellant on
21.08.2009 reiterating the contents of the earlier affidavit dated 25.10.2008.
In other words, it was contended that Manoj Kumar Jain was not the legal
representative of Urmila Devi.
11. The learned trial judge allowed the application by order dated
24.02.2010 for substitution by condoning the delay with costs and directed
substitution of Manoj Kumar to be the legal representative of deceased
plaintiff Urmila Devi.
12. The aforestated order dated 24.02.2010 came to be challenged
by legal representatives of Mangal Singh in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010
which resulted in same being allowed vide order dated 02.12.2011 and the
order of the trial court dated 24.02.2010 was set aside by taking note of
the fact that Manoj Kumar Jain had stated in his application 27/C along
with affidavit that he would not press the substitution application. The
appellant was granted liberty to file an application for impleadment as
a party before the lower court. In this background appellant herein filed
an application for substitution as legal representative of Urmila Devi and
this application came to be filed on 05.12.2011 along with application for
condonation of delay and to set aside abatement, which was opposed by
the legal representatives of the first defendants by filing objections and
contending that application filed by Yashpal Jain is not maintainable. After
hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties learned trial judge
by a detailed order dated 09.05.2012 condoned the delay and allowed the
application of the appellant to be brought on record as legal representative
of the deceased-plaintiff Urmila Devi. This order came to be affirmed by
order dated 13.12.2012 in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 filed by the legal
representatives of Mangal Singh.
13. It is pertinent to mention at this juncture that during the life time
of Urmila Devi an application came to be filed under Section 137-A of
U.P. Act No.1 of 1951 before Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri Garhwal
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 957
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
contending that the Bhumidari Sanad had been obtained by Mangal Singh,
with reference to land comprising Nos.77, 3/16 Nalis, by adopting forgery,
which came to be accepted. The appeal filed by Mangal Singh before the
Assistant Collector against the order of Tehsildar did not yield any result,
which gave rise to filing of a Second Appeal before the Revenue Board
culminating in said appeal being allowed in favour of Mangal Singh. The
Review Petition filed against the order of the Second Appellate Authority
came to be allowed and this was challenged by Mangal Singh in WP (M/S)
No.342 of 2005 (Old No.14655 of 1983). During the pendency of the said
writ petition, as noticed earlier, Urmila Devi expired and an application for
substitution came to be filed by the very same legal representatives of Mangal
Singh (who are Respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein) vide Annexure P-10, specially
pleading thereunder to delete the name of Respondent No.4 (therein) Smt.
Urmila Devi and substitute Yashpal Jain (appellant herein) in her place. This
application came to be allowed by order dated 24.02.2012 as reflected in
Annexure RA/2 annexed to the rejoinder affidavit of the appellant. In this
view of the matter, it cannot be gain said by the respondents herein that the
appellant is not to be substituted as legal representative of deceased Urmila
Devi. It is for this cogent reason, the learned trial judge vide order dated
09.05.2012 allowed the substitution and permitted the appellant herein to be
substituted as legal representative of deceased plaintiff-Urmila Devi. Rightly
so, this order of the trial court came to be affirmed by the Revisional Court
vide order dated 13.12.2012. It would be apt and appropriate to note at this
juncture and at the cost of repetition that Manoj Kumar Jain, who had initially
filed an application for substitution which came to be allowed by the trial
court by order dated 24.02.2010, which order was carried in Civil Revision
No.2 of 2010 and in the said proceedings an application came to be filed by
said Manoj Kumar Jain stating thereunder that he does not intend to press
the application filed by him for being substituted as legal representative of
Urmila Devi. This fact also persuaded the Revisional Court to remand the
matter back to the trial court vide order dated 02.12.2011.
14. In this factual scenario, the defendants cannot be heard to
contend that appellant herein had filed two affidavits (Annexure P-5 and
Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted Manoj Kumar Jain as the legal
representative of deceased Urmila Devi and as such he cannot turn around to
assert himself to be the legal representative of Urmila Devi, for the simple
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
reason that affidavits filed by the appellant Yashpal Jain does not even
remotely suggest or indicate that he have admitted Manoj Kumar Jain
being the legal representative of Urmila Devi. On the other hand, said
affidavits which has been perused by us, would clearly indicate that he
has only affirmed and reiterated the fact that he is a signatory to the said
Will and nothing more or nothing less.
15. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents herein, have also contended that on account of non-traversing
of the writ petition averments the contents thereof are to be presumed
true and correct, though seems to be an attractive proposition at first
brush, it cannot be accepted for the simple reason that consent does not
confer jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the records would clearly indicate
that Manoj Kumar Jain himself had filed an application, accompanied
by affidavit before the Revisional Court in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010,
stating thereunder that he would not press the application filed by him for
substitution and this was sufficient for the High Court to have accepted
the plea of the appellant or in other words, it should have sustained the
order of trial court and ordered for appellant being brought on record
as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi.
16. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that
respondents herein themselves having filed an application in WP (M/S)
No.342 of 2005 for bringing the present appellant (Yashpal Jain) as her
legal representative in the writ petition (M/S) 342/2005 and prosecuted
the same, would reflect that they were in the acquaintance of the fact that
present appellant being the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi
but yet are attempting to contend that Manoj Kumar Jain is to be brought
on record as legal representative of Urmila Devi. In this background
the impugned order which has resulted in rejection of the application
filed by the appellant to be brought on record as legal representative of
Urmila Devi if sustained would result in the estate of deceased plaintiff
not being represented, as a consequence of which suit would abate or
would be put to a silent death by the defendants without claim made in
the suit being adjudicated on merits. Hence, point No.(i) is answered
in favour of the appellant and against respondents and therefore, the
impugned order is set aside.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 959
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
17. As far as the question of right of the appellant over the suit schedule
properties, we are of the view, by virtue of adoption propounded, it is an
issue which would be at large before the learned trial court and the veracity
of the Will dated 19.05.1999 alleged to have been executed by Urmila Devi
in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain, is to be decided in appropriate proceedings
and as such we desist from expressing any opinion in that regard and
contentions of both parties are kept open.
RE: POINT No.(ii)
18. Case papers on hand would disclose that dispute between the
parties relates back to 02.02.1982 the date of institution of the suit
No.2/1982 by the original plaintiff Smt. Urmila Devi. As to the stage of the
suit namely, as to whether trial has commenced or otherwise, the material
available before this court are silent but the fact remains that proceedings
have got protracted from 1982 till demise of Urmila Devi on 18.05.2007
and thereafter it has moved at a snail’s pace or in other words, the litigation
seems to have not been taken to its logical end for reasons best known.
The death of the original plaintiff opened up a flood of litigation and as a
result of it, several orders came to be passed by the courts below, both in
original jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction, which also reached the
High Cout and ultimately before this Court by the present proceedings. The
cause for delay has been myriad. It is for this reason we have expressed
our anguish at the beginning of this judgment as to likelihood of litigant
public getting disillusioned of justice delivery system due to delays. It
would be apt to note that certain litigations initiated more than 50 years
back are still pending. As per the data extracted from National Judicial
Data Grid (NJGD), we have noted hereinbelow the three oldest civil and
criminal cases:
TOP 3 PENDING CIVIL CASES
1. West Bengal
(a) Civil Judge Senior Division, Malda – Partition Suit No.30 of
1952 – registered on 04.04.1952
(b) Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Medinipur – Other Suit No.39 of 2017
-registered on 15.09.1953.
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
2. Uttar Pradesh
Civil Judge, Junior Division, Varanasi – Original Suit No.319 of
1953 – registered on 02.07.1953
TOP 3 PENDING CTRIMINAL CASES
(1) Maharashtra
(a) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.2319 of
1959 – registered on 11.04.1959
(b) CJJD & JMFC Mehkar – R.C.C. No.61 of 1960 – registered
on 06.10.1959
(c) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.778 of 1961
– registered on 30.08.1961
The Underlying factors behind Judicial Delays
19. The causes of delay are numerous loopholes in the law itself,
redundant and voluminous paper work, absence of the witnesses,
adjournments sought and granted for no justifiable reason as also delay in
service of summons, lack of implementation of the provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and Code of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’), as the case may be. These are
only illustrative and not exhaustive. It is not that there has been any lack of
effort to speed up the Justice Delivery System. However, the attempts made
hitherto have yielded limited results. Time and again various provisions of
C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. have been amended to cater the ever-increasing demands
for speedy disposal of cases and the results are not inspiring. There is an
urgent need to take pro-active steps to not only clear the huge backlog of
cases at all levels but there should be introspection by all the stakeholders to
gear up to meet the aspirations of the litigant public who would only seek for
speedy justice and to curtail the methods adopted to delay the proceedings
which may suit certain section or class of the litigant public. When millions
of consumers of justice file their cases by knocking at the doors of the courts
of first instance, they expect speedy justice. Thus, an onerous responsibility
vests on all stakeholders to ensure that the people’s faith in this system is not
eroded on account of delayed justice. It is imperative to note that about 6 per
cent of the population in India is affected by litigation, in such a scenario the
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 961
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
courts would play an important role in the life of a nation governed by Rule
of Law. Peace and Tranquility in the society and harmonious relationship
between the citizens are achieved on account of effective administration
of justice and its delivery system, even the economic growth of a country
is dependent on the robust Justice Delivery System which we have in our
country.
20. When the efficiency has become the hallmark of modern civilization
and in all spheres of life there is an urgent need to hasten the pace of delivery
of justice by reducing the time period occupied by the trial of suits and
criminal proceedings as also the offshoots of such litigation which results
in revisions, appeals etc. arising out of them.
A historical outlook of steps taken to curb the Judicial delay
21. The issue of delay has been bothering all the stakeholders for
ages. Way back in the year 1924, a committee was constituted known as
the Civil Justice Committee to enquire into the issues relating to changes
and improvements necessary to bring in “more speedy, economical and
satisfactory dispatch of the business transacted in the courts” under the
chairmanship of Justice Rankin. Delay in disposal of cases beyond a period
of two and a half years was a crucial concern and it was emphasized by the
said Committee that “where the arrears are unmanageable, improvement
in the methods can only palliate. It cannot cure”.1 The Central Government
under the chairmanship of Justice S.R. Das set up a committee known as High
Court Arrears Committee in the year 1949. In 1979, the Law Commission
of India in its 77th Report on ‘delay and arrear in trial courts’ observed that
the delay in civil or criminal matters have decreased the confidence among
the general public about the judicial system. It was emphasized that civil
cases should be treated as lapsed if the matter was not disposed of within
one year from the date of registration, whereas a criminal matter should
be disposed within six months and in case of sessions trial it should not
go beyond one year. It was also suggested to timely fill up the vacancies,
appoint additional and ad-hoc judges and increase overall judicial strength.
Some of the key recommendations of the Committee were:
1 Civil Justice Committee, 1924
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
“(i) Improvement of judicial system to meet modern requirement
of society.
(ii) Time for scrutiny of the cases should not take more than one week.
(iii) Summons and notices should be attached with the plaint at the
stage of filing, without stating the filing date.
(iv) Procedural reforms in civil and criminal case proceedings.”
22. The 79th reports of the Law Commission of India pertains to
“Delay and Arrears in High Courts and Appellate Court” which when
read along with the 77th report as aforementioned, has provided a step-
by-step manual for managerial judging, prescribing upper time limits for
trial procedure to ensure speedy disposal of cases to be followed by Trial
Courts, High Courts, and other appellate courts. Its recommendations
range from ways in which judges should expedite the service of summons
to the drafting of the decree and includes the suggestions that they should
become more active in conciliation efforts. Other notable recommendations
include:
“(i) Appointment of administrative justices who supervise the work
of process servers;
(ii) Fixing of dates should be done by presiding officer and not
readers, cases should deliberately not be fixed when the prospects
of them being taken up for low and a standard of number of cases
pending before courts should be decided and whenever there are
indications that the number of cases will go beyond the standard,
additional courts should be set up.”
23. The 120th Law Commission Report on ‘Manpower planning
in judiciary: a blueprint’ recommended that the most effective way to
overcome the heavy pendency of cases clogging on the judicial system is by
reducing judicial delay. It further states that the judiciary is overburdened
by large number of cases filed each year, which clog an already stressed
system. The report states that in 2002, when the ratio of the judges
to population was 13 judges to 10,00,000 people, the Supreme Court
recommended, in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India (2002)
4 SCC 247, to increase the ratio to at least 50 judges per 10,00,000 people.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 963
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
24. The Malimath Committee, constituted on Reforms of Criminal
Justice System, suggested multiple recommendations in its report, for
Criminal Justice System, however some of them can be applied even in
the civil litigation:
1. Time limit for filing written statements, amendments of pleadings,
service of summons etc., must be prescribed.
2. So far as possible, parties must endeavor to decide or to settle
the cases outside the court and to carry out the same objective,
Section 89 in CPC, was introduced.
3. To record the evidences by issuing the Commission instead of
by presence before the court of law. For the purpose of the same
under Section 75 of the CPC, commission can be issued for
collecting evidence.
4. Time frame need to be provided for oral argument before the
court of law.
5. Restriction on Right of appeal.
25. Similarly, the Delhi High Court undertook a pilot project titled
‘‘Zero Pendency Court Project Report’2 whereunder 22 specific pilot and
reference courts were referred to collect data to examine meticulously the life
cycles of the legal cases. At its core, the project sought to understand how
the cases progressed through the legal system in the absence of any backlog.
The Data collected from the pilot project led to suggestions of some major
recommendations which included, primarily, the assessment of Judicial
strength, which as per the report, is regarded as a vital attribute to the cause
of delay. The report in this regard suggested to arrive at an optimal judge
strength to handle cases pending in different court and went on to provide the
Ideal number of judges for different court. The report also highlighted that
in criminal cases, prosecution evidence hearings accounts for the Highest
percentage of court hearings however when it comes to allocation of time,
the courts tend to dedicate more minutes to final arguments and the issuance
2 The Inspiration for the project was a remark by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaih (former
CJI) in a conversation with Justice Ravindra Bhat, one of the members of the State
Court Management System Committee (SCMS) of the Delhi HC.
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
of final orders. In civil cases, miscellaneous hearings are common, but final
order proceedings receive more time nevertheless, judges allocate a greater
amount of time to the final order or judgment hearings.
26. Melvin M Belli, a member of the California Bar, in his article titled
“The Law’s Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil Litigation”,
which was prepared as a project for the Belli society, has noted “Trial delays
or the period of the American Legal System”. The backlog of the system
has become so typical that a plaintiff has to wait 5 years for trial of a simple
personal injury claimed. In case, if there is an appeal, a final disposition of
the case may occur 10 years after plaintiff has been injured and the following
factors were outlined as the major contributors to the delay:
(i) The inefficient management of the court system by the judiciary.
(ii) A Tremendous increase in litigation.
(iii) The philosophy of procrastination of many judges and lawyers, and
(iv) The priority of criminal or civil cases on the court calendar.
To tackle the aforesaid problems, the following remedial measures
were suggested as possible solutions:
1) Appointment of surrogate judges (auditors, referees, judges pro
tempore) to handle certain cases. The idea of using surrogate judges is
to avoid unnecessary adjudication under formal trials. This is followed
in Massachusetts, where court appointed auditors or referees, who
were practicing attorneys, used to adjudge motor vehicle tort cases.
They report their findings of facts and conclusions to the court and
the parties may accept the auditor’s report as final or request a trial. If
the case goes to trial, the auditor’s findings are prima facie evidence
and may be read to the jury.
2) The imposition of interest accruing retroactively from the time of
incident, rather than from time of judgment, to remove defendant’s
incentives to delay.
3) The elevation of civil cases to parity with criminal cases so that
civil cases will not be usurped.
4) A requirement that judges set definite trial dates and honor them, so
that litigation cannot be delayed by one of the attorneys.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 965
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
DELAY ON ACCOUNT OF PROCEDURAL LAWS
27. At the outset, it is necessary to point out the reasons for delay in
civil trial namely:
(i) Absence of strict compliance with the provisions of CPC;
(ii) Misuse of processes of the court;
(iii) Lengthy/prolix evidence and arguments. Non-utilization of
provisions of the CPC namely Order X (examination of parties
at the first hearing);
(v) Non-Awarding of realistic cost for frivolous and vexatious
litigation;
(vi) Lack of adequate training and appropriate orientation course to
judicial officers and lawyers;
(vii) Lack of prioritization of cases;
(viii) Lack of accountability and transparency.
28. Apart from the above reasons, the other vital reasons include the
over-tolerant nature of the courts below while extending their olive branch
to grant adjournment at the drop of the hat and thereby bringing the entire
judicial process to a grinding halt. It is crucial to understand that the wheels
of justice must not merely turn, they must turn without friction, without
bringing it to a grinding halt due to unwarranted delay. It is for such reasons
that the system itself is being ridiculed not only by the litigant public but
also by the general public, thereby showing signs of constant fear of delay
in the minds of public which might occur during the resolution of dispute,
dissuading them from knocking at the doors of justice. All the stakeholders
of the system have to be alive to this alarming situation and should thwart
any attempt to pollute the stream of judicial process and same requires to be
dealt with iron hands and curbed by nipping them at the bud, as otherwise
the confidence of the public in the system would slowly be eroded. Be it the
litigant public or Member of the Bar or anyone connected in the process of
dispensation of justice, should not be allowed to dilute the judicial processes
by delaying the said process by in any manner whatsoever. As held by this
Court in T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Another AIR (1977) 4 SCC
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
467 the answer to an irresponsible suit or litigation would be a vigilant
judge. This analogy requires to be stretched in the instant case and to all the
pending matters by necessarily holding that every stakeholder in the process
of dispensation of justice is required to act swiftly, diligently, without giving
scope for any delay in dispensation of justice. Thus, an onerous responsibility
rests on the shoulders of the presiding officer of every court, who should be
cautious and vigilant against such indolent acts and persons who attempt to
thwart quick dispensation of justice. A response is expected from all parties
involved, with a special emphasis on the presiding officer. The presiding
officer must exercise due diligence to ensure that proceedings are conducted
efficiently and without unnecessary delays. While it’s important to maintain
a friendly and cooperative atmosphere with the members of the Bar, this
should not be misused as a pretext for frequent adjournment requests. A
word of caution to the learned members of the Bar, at this juncture, would
also be necessary because of they being considered as another wheel of the
chariot of dispensation of justice. They should be circumspect in seeking
adjournments, that too in old matters or matters which have been pending for
decades and desist from making request or prayer for grant of adjournments
for any reason whatsoever and should not take the goodness of the presiding
officer as his/her weakness.
29. In-fact, the utilization of the provision of CPC to the hilt would
reduce the delays. It is on account of non-application of many provisions of
the CPC by the presiding officers of the courts is one of the reason or cause
for delay in the proceedings or disputes not reaching to its logical conclusion.
30. The very fact of the pendency of the present suit No. 2 of 1982,
in the instant case, for the past 41 years is reflective of the fact, as to how
some of the civil courts are functioning and also depicting how stakeholders
are contributing to such delays either directly or indirectly. The procedure
that is being adopted by the courts below or specifically the trial courts is
contrary to the express provisions of the CPC. It can also be noticed that
there are party induced delays. It is laid down under Orders VIII Rule (1)
that a defendant shall at or before the first hearing or within 30 days, or 90
days as the court may permit, present a written statement of his defence.
In most cases, there would be no difficulty in presenting such a written
statement on the date fixed, and no adjournment should be given for the
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 967
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
said purpose except for a good cause shown, and in proper cases, costs
should be awarded to the opposite side, namely realistic costs. However,
this is seldom found. Delay in filing the written statement and seeking
adjournments is also another tactic used by the parties to litigation to
delay the proceedings No doubt in catena of judgments including Kailash
vs. Nanku 2005 (4) SCC 480, Serum Advocates Bar Association, Tamil
Nadu vs Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353. Bharat Kalra vs. Raj Kishan
Chhabra (2022) SCC OnLine SC 613 and Shoraj Singh vs Charan Singh
(2018) SCC OnLine All 6613 the time limit prescribed under the CPC
has been held to be directory and not mandatory which by itself does
not mean that adjournments if sought should be granted for mere asking.
Only when such prayer being honest and prayer sought with a bona-fide
intention, which we will have to be demonstrated in express terms, at least
by way of an affidavit, such prayers should be entertained as otherwise
the purpose of the legislative mandate would get defeated and the purpose
of the amendment brought to CPC by Act 22 of 2002 would also become
otiose. In other words, it is high time that the presiding officers of all the
trial courts across the country strictly enforce the time schedule prescribed
under sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Order VIII in its letter and spirit rather
than extending the olive branch on account of said provision being held
directory to its illogical end even where circumstances of a particular case
does not warrant time being enlarged. Although Order XVII of the CPC
indicate under the heading “adjournments”, making it explicitly clear the
procedure which requires to be adopted by the civil courts in the matter
of trial, as evident from plain reading of the said provision would reveal,
seems to have been completely lost sight of by all the stakeholders, which
can be held as one of the root cause for delay in disposal of civil cases. It
would be apt and appropriate to extract Order XVII of the CPC and it reads:
ORDER XVII
“1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing” (1) The court may,
if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the
parties or to any of them, and may from time to time adjourn the
hearing of the suit for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three
time to a party during hearing of the suit.
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
(2) Costs of adjournment. -In every such case the Court shall fix a
day for the further hearing of the suit, and
[shall make such orders as to costs occasioned by the adjournment
or such higher costs as the court deems fit:
Provided that, -
(a) when the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be continued
from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been
examined, unless the Court finds that, for the exceptional reasons
to be recorded by it, the adjournment of the hearing beyond the
following day is necessary.
(b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except
where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party,
(c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court,
shall not be a ground for adjournment,
(d) where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct the case
for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court, is
put forward as a ground for adjournment, the Court shall not grant
the adjournment unless it is satisfied that the party applying for
adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time,
(e) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is
not present or the party or his pleader, though present in Court, is
not ready to examine or cross-examine the witness, the Court may,
if it thinks fit, record the statement of the witness and pass such
orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or
cross-examination of the witness, as the case may be, by the party
or his pleader not present or not ready as aforesaid.”
The High Court of Karnataka in the matter of M. Mahalingam vs.
Shashikala reported in ILR Karnataka 4055 had an occasion to deal with
this rule and it was observed as under:
“17. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII was
introduced by the code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules, 1976.
The object and reason behind the introduction of this proviso was
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 969
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
that, when hearing of evidence has once begun such hearing shall be
continued from day to day. The said provision is being made more
strict so that once such stage is reached, an adjournment should be
granted only for unavoidable reasons. A few other restrictions were
also being imposed on the grant of adjournments. The intention in
enacting the said proviso is that, when the hearing of the suit has
commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day, until all the
witnesses in attendance have been examined. In other words, it
provided that a suit being tried like a sessions case in a Criminal Court.
Therefore, the Rule is, once trial begins, evidence should be recorded
on day-to-day basis. Even in exceptional cases, if an adjournment
becomes necessary, it has to be adjourned to the following day only.
Clauses-(b) (c) and (d) were introduced restricting the power of the
Court to grant adjournments on the grounds set out therein. These
clauses make it clear that, the fact that a pleader of a party is engaged
in another Court, is not a ground for adjournment. Even the illness
of the pleader and inability of a pleader to conduct a case is not a
ground for adjournment, unless the Court is satisfied that the party
applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader
in time. It also provides for the Court to record the statement of
witnesses who are present in Court, when the party who summoned
him and the party who has to cross-examine, the said witnesses and
their counsel being not present Therefore, it is clear that the Court
can be liberal in granting adjournments before the commencement of
the Trial. But once the trial commences, there is an obligation cast on
the Court to conduct the said trial day-to-day until all the witnesses
in attendance have been examined. Unfortunately, this procedure
which is in the statute book since 1976, is followed more in breach.
Adjournments are sought for and granted by the Courts as a matter of
course. The intention of the Parliament in enacting the said provision
was not appreciated. In spite of introduction of the proviso, there
was no marked change in the trial of suits. Adjournments continued
to dominate and obstruct speedy trial. Therefore, the parliament
amended the law once again and now an attempt is made to control
the power of the courts in granting adjournments.
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
18. This time sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII was amended
substantially by the code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999.
The object and reason behind the amendment Act was that, every effort
should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings
so that justice may not be delayed. The committee on Subordinate
Legislation (11th Lok Sabha) recommended that it should be made
obligatory to record reasons for adjournment of cases as well as award
of actual or higher cost and not merely notional cost against the parties
seeking adjournment in favour of the opposite party. Further limit up
to three adjournments has also been fixed in a case.
19. The amended Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 provides that at any stage
of the suit, if sufficient cause is shown, the Court may adjourn the
hearing of the suit for the reasons to be recorded in writing. Therefore,
an adjournment cannot be granted for a mere asking. There should be
sufficient cause for such an adjournment. Before granting adjournment,
the Court has to record in writing the reasons, which constituted
sufficient cause for it to adjourn the case. The proviso to sub-rule (1)
of Rule 1 puts an embargo on the Court’s power to grant adjournments,
in as much as, it restricts the said power to grant adjournments to
three times to a party during the hearing of the suit. Therefore, the
Court cannot exercise its power of granting adjournments arbitrarily,
whimsically and it should know its limitations. The amendment to
sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to
make an order as to costs occasioned by the adjournments. This rule
is intended to see that the imposition of costs may act as a deterrent to
the party seeking adjournment when there being no sufficient cause.
By such costs, the cost of litigation would increase and it may dissuade
the party from seeking adjournment on flimsy grounds.
20. In spite of the legislative mandate reflected in the aforesaid
provision, the Courts and the Lawyers continue to ignore the said
statutory provisions and the requirement of holding a continuous
trial day to day. The Courts, in practice, have buried the rule fathoms
deep and have been granting adjournments on the flimsiest grounds.
In every case these provisions are honoured more in breach than in
compliance with the spirit of providing justice expeditiously. It is rare
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 971
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
indeed when a court holds a trial continuously in terms of this rule.
If only the provisions of the Code are followed in letter and spirit,
the grievance of delay in disposal of cases would have been reduced
considerably. The rule of law requires respect for the law by all the
citizens of this country. The Judges and Lawyers who are the officers of
the Court are No. exception. First, they should respect the rule of law,
i.e., these statutory provisions. Without any exception they cannot plead
any difficulty in implementing these provisions in letter and spirit.
They are duty bound to act according to these statutory provisions.
Without doing what we are legally expected to do, we are barking up
at the wrong tree and by this process we are deceiving ourselves. Any
number of amendments to the Code or any efforts to reform the law
would have no effect, unless the Courts give effect to the statutory
provisions contained in the Code. If the Courts do not implement
the law, one cannot find fault with the Advocates or the litigants. If
these rules are implemented in letter and spirit, it may lead to some
inconvenience and hardship as, for more than a century, the Judges,
the lawyers and litigants are used to a particular atmosphere in Court.
It is this atmosphere in Courts, which has no legal support and is the
cause for delay in disposal of cases. Therefore, it is high time in the
interest of speedy disposal of cases, these rules are implemented; once
implemented, in course of time, lawyers and litigants would fall in line.
In order to implement these statutory provisions as amended, what is
required is a change of mind set among the Judges and they must have
the courage to depart from the practice which is in vogue. They must
remind themselves that till now these provisions are not followed and
the procedure which is adopted in Courts was totally different from
what is provided under the statute and thus has no legal basis. That is
the real cause for delay in disposal of cases. Therefore, the need of the
hour is a change of mental attitude, firstly, on the part of the judges
and secondly, on the part of lawyers and litigants. A beginning has to
be made. It has to be done by Judges and Judges alone. In spite of the
criticism and the amendment to the law made by the Parliament, if
the Judges are not sensitive and do not give effect to these provisions
which are made with an avowed object of speedy disposal of cases, the
Judges would be failing in their duty. Therefore, one may not blame
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
the Code for delay in disposal of cases. The delay is on account of not
following the provisions of the Code and in not knowing the philosophy
behind these statutory provisions. Even now it is not too late for the
Judges and Lawyers to give effect to the statutory provisions and render
speedy justice to the litigants. Time has come that this malady should
be treated with even handed at all levels.
21. In fact this view finds support from the observations made by the
Law Commission in the Reports on the Code of Civil Procedure:
“In the 14th Report of the Law Commission of India on “Reform of
Judicial Administration”, the Commission notes with concern the
failure of the Courts to appreciate that Order 17 Rule 1 contemplates the
continued hearing of a case, once it has started, from day to day until it
is finished. It noted with concern that the judiciary seemed to think that
the interrupted hearings should be a rule and day to day hearings the
exception. Both the lawyers and the subordinate judiciary still persist
in floating these provisions by refusing to have a continuous trial.
27th Law Commission Report reads as under:
“There is a popular belief that the technicalities of legal procedure can
be exploited and a case continued almost indefinitely if so desired.
In a weak case, apart from numerous applications for adjournment,
frivolous interlocutory applications are made, e.g. applications for
amendment of the pleadings or for amendment of issues, examination
of witnesses on commission summoning unnecessary witnesses etc.,
These tactics do not succeed before an experienced and astute Judge.
They succeed only before Judges who have no adequate experience.
And such tactics succeed not because of the observance, but because
of the non-observance, of the rules of procedure. Delay under this item
is, therefore, not due to any defects in procedure. Rules of procedure
are intended to subserve and not to delay or defeat justice.”
22. Therefore, while considering the prayer for grant of adjournment,
it is necessary to keep in mind the legislative intent. After the trial
commences, the legislative mandate is, it shall be continued from day
to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined. Even
to grant an adjournment beyond the following day exceptional reasons
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 973
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
should exist and it should be recorded in writing before adjourning the
hearing beyond the following day. A reading of the proviso makes it
clear that the limitation of three adjournments contained in proviso to
sub-rule (1) apply where adjournment is to be granted on account of
circumstances which are beyond the control of that party. Even in cases
which may not strictly fall within the category of circumstances beyond
the control of a party, the Court by resorting to the provisions of higher
cost which can also include punitive cost grant adjournment beyond
three times, having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal
thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case and compensate the
party who is inconvenienced by such adjournment. The said cost cannot
be notional. It should be realistic. As far as possible actual cost incurred
by the other party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to
be avoidable but is being granted on account of either negligence or
casual approach of a party or is being sought to delay the progress of
the ease. Therefore, an attempt is made by the Parliament to enable the
Court to have complete control over the litigant and prevent parties from
controlling the course of the litigation. The whole object is to deter the
parties from seeking adjournment for the sake of mere adjournment. If
a party wants to have the luxury of an adjournment, he should be made
to pay for such luxury and the opposite party who is inconvenienced is
to be compensated. In other words, the cost of litigation should be made
high in so far as a party who is not interested in speedy trial. A person
who wants to obstruct the course of justice, delay the disposal of cases,
abuse the process of court and wants to harass his opponent by virtue of
his money power, for him the litigation should become costly which is
not so now. Therefore, this provision of imposition of cost to prevent the
litigant from seeking adjournment, thus, delay the disposal of cases, is to
be given full effect. It is a weapon in the armory of the Judge to control
the course of litigation and expedite trial. In spite of this provision if
the Judges do not understand the significance and importance of these
amendments and allow the parties to control the course of litigation, it
only shows either lack of will on their part to implement these statutory
provisions or their inability to give effect to these statutory provisions.
23. When the litigants complain of delay in disposal of cases, they
cannot seek adjournments as a matter of right, as it is against their
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
interest. An adjournment at the instance of one party, puts the other
party to inconvenience, which in turn gives rise to such complaints.
But an adjournment may become necessary for various reasons.
Therefore, in such circumstances it would be in the interest of justice
to grant adjournment, but at the same time the party inconvenienced
has to be duly compensated. It is in this background the provision of
Rule 1 of order XVII of CPC as amended has to be understood and
given effect to. A party to a litigation cannot have any grievance for
day-to-day trial and on the contrary he should welcome it. It is only
those litigants who want to abuse the judicial process and wants to use
this legal machinery as a weapon of oppression against his opponents
can have any grievance. It is there, these amended provisions come
in handy to the courts to prevent such abuse of the judicial process.
The Case Flow Management System Rules:
An Overlooked Lifesaver
31. On the recommendation of this Court in ‘Salem Bar Association
vs. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 189=2003 (1) SCC 49 a committee
was appointed to study the application on implementation of Case Flow
Management system in India, and in response, ‘Case Flow Management
Rules for High Courts and Subordinate Courts’ were meticulously crafted.
These guidelines mirrored the suggestions outlined in the ‘National Mission
for Delivery of Justice and Legal Reform,’ which served as a comprehensive
blueprint for judicial reforms through its strategic initiatives from 2009
to 2012. Furthermore, the introduction of the Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
Committee on Case Management System aimed to align with these efforts.
On the basis of above recommendation most of the states have adopted the
concept of Case Flow Management and have framed their own Rules for
ensuring timely delivery of justice since 2005. However, some of the States
are yet to frame the rules. We request the Hon’ble Chief Justices of those
High Courts where said Rules are yet to be framed to take immediate steps
to formulate such rules.
32. Be that as it may, mere framing of the rules would not suffice
the problem on hand, until and unless the spirit underlying in the making
of the such rules is effectively implemented. The mode, method and
manner in which it requires to be implemented is in the hands of the
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 975
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
respective High Courts. In this regard, although many High Courts have
constituted committees (with different nomenclature) to monitor the
same, the effective implementation seems to have gone into oblivion.
Thus, it would be imperative on the part of the High Courts to ensure
the object with which such committees were constituted would not
remain on paper but are implemented in its letter and spirit by constant
monitoring, at least by securing the reports from trial courts through
the District Judges once in two months and keeping a watch and vigil
particularly, over the old cases. Such Committees should focus their
attention through monitoring efforts so as to keep a check on matters
being adjourned for no justifiable reason. When such exercise is carried
out with utmost dedication, it would necessarily yield positive results.
Therefore, both the existing committees and any yet-to-be-constituted
Committees by the respective High Courts should make all endeavours
to achieve the object of making such rules. The Hon’ble Chief Justices
of the High Courts are requested to activate these Committees and
ensure the implementation of the rules. It is in this background, with
utmost concern the observations were made in the Chief Justice’s
Conference, 2016 towards strengthening Case Flow Management Rules
for the purposes of not only reducing arrears but also for ensuring
speedy trial.
Numbers speak more than words: A closer look to the Statistics
of the National Judicial Data Grid
33. One of the gravest Administrative and structural delay in
litigation in whole, appears to be because of judicial delay. According
to National Judicial Data Grid, the figures available for the contribution
of judicial delay in pendency of cases is alarming. The State-wise
pendency of cases before the respective High Courts and overall Civil
Courts as on 16.10.2023 are as under:
S.No Name of the High Courts Civil Courts
State & High
Courts
Civil Criminal Civil Criminal
1 Andhra Pradesh 2,12,317 37,615 4,15,774 4,40,468
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
2 Arunachal 47,941 13,817 2,911 14,378
Pradesh
(Gauhati High
Court)
3 Assam (Gauhati 98,763 3,38,828
High Court)
4 Bihar (Patna 1,08,550 87,779 5,07,039 3,022,705
High Court)
5 Chattisgarh 59,640 32,342 23,419 76,331
(Chhatisgarh
High Court)
6 Goa (Bombay 6,01,362 1,14,309 26,040 30,521
High Court)
7 Gujarat 1,10,403 56,267 4,02,283 12,70,278
(Gujarat High
Court)
8 Haryana 2,76,432 1,65,363 4,55,539 11,13,672
(Punjab &
Haryana High
Court)
9 Himachal 81,875 13,618 1,63,805 3,70,345
Pradesh
(Himachal
Pradesh High
Court)
10 Jharkhand 37,565 46,895 85,359 4,21,577
(Jharkhand
High Court)
11 Karnataka 2,535,097 45,802 9,33,869 10,69,156
(Karnataka
High Court)
12 Kerala (Kerala 1,99,169 55,659 5,56,950 13,70,576
High Court)
13 Madhya 2,74,085 1,75,924 3,68,346 16,37,442
Pradesh
(Madhya
Pradesh High
Court)
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 977
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
14 Maharashtra 15,96,833 34,09,391
(Bombay High
Court)
15 Manipur 4,567 493 5,049 2,670
(Manipur High
Court)
16 Meghalaya 883 189 3,517 10,880
(Meghalaya
High Court)
17 Mizoram 2,980 3,120
(Gauhati High
Court)
18 Nagaland 1421 2747
(Gauhati High
Court)
19 Odisha (Orissa 1,08,154 38,078 3,50,358 15,05,895
High Court)
20 Punjab (Punjab 3,93,004 5,24,061
and Haryana
High Court)
21 Rajasthan 4,86,248 1,78,745 5,50,742 18,19,230
(Rajasthan High
Court)
22 Sikkim (Sikkim 119 39 522 1,126
High Court)
23 Tamil Nadu 4,89,316 58,164 7,48,895 6,56,014
(Madras High
Court)
24 Telangana 2,20,677 30,974 3,38,275 5,33,262
(Telangana
High Court)
25 Tripura (Tripura 1,075 138 11,719 32,952
High Court)
26 Uttarakhand 28,117 21,898 37,760 2,80,476
(Uttarakhand
High Court)
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
27 Uttar Pradesh 5,62,794 4,94,366 16,38,238 96,34,553
(Allahabad
High Court)
28 West Bengal 1,69,651 27,275 609910 20,09,011
(Calcutta High
Court)
29 National 78,890 32,770 2,40,118 11,44,038
Capital
Territory of
Delhi (Delhi
High Court)
30 Jammu & 36443 8195 78,981 1,95,903
Kashmir and
Ladakh (High
Court of J&K)
31 Andaman & 4,757 4,923
Nicobar Islands
(Calcutta High
Court)
32 Chandigarh 23419 76331
(High Court
of Punjab &
Haryana)
33 Lakshadweep 140 365
(Kerala High
Court)
34 Dadra and 1412 1572
Nagar Haveli
and Daman and
Diu (Bombay
High Court)
35 Puducherry 13,196 19,015
(Madras High
Court)
TOTAL 67,31,370 17,36,714 1,06,91,343 3,30,43,812
34. Further, according to National Judicial Data Grid, if we consider
the stage-wise pendency, it is revealed that majority of the pendency in cases
is at the Evidence/ Argument/ Judgement stage (43,22,478), within which
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 979
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
the maximum pendency is caused at the stage of hearing and evidence. High
pendency is also caused during the Appearance/Service stage (27,03,493),
within which the maximum pendency is appearance and service/summons
related. The reasons behind the maximum pendency as stated by the NJDC
has been ruled to be matters which are stayed (9,69,262) unattended
(8,31,076) and awaiting records (8,219,929).
35. It is important to acknowledge that while striving for the oft-
cited goal of expeditious justice, courts, litigants, staff, and lawyers may
encounter some level of inconvenience. However, this inconvenience
should take a backseat in light of the Fundamental Duties enshrined in
the Constitution, specifically Article 51A(j) which obligates every citizen
to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective
activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour
and achievement. Article 51A is to be understood to be in a positive form
with a view to strive towards excellence. The people should not conduct
themselves so as to enable anyone to point fingers at them or blame them.
“Excellence” means honest performance. It is the vision of the founder of
constitution makers that citizens of this great country India that is Bharat,
should discharge duties in an exemplary manner rather than perform
half-heartedly. The duties envisaged under Article 51A are obligatory on
citizens. No doubt the fundamental duties cannot be enforced by Writs
and it is in this background it has to be understood that the duties which
are required to be performed by the citizens in general and particularly by
the stakeholders of judicial dispensation system should ensure that they
do discharge the obligations prescribed under the law in an exemplified
manner and not blame worthy.
36. In the hallowed halls of justice, where the rights and liberties of
every citizen are protected, we find ourselves at a critical juncture. Our
Judiciary, the cornerstone of our democratic system, stands as the beacon
of hope for those who seek remedy. Yet, it is a solemn truth that we must
confront with unwavering resolve—the spectre of delay and pendency has
cast a long shadow upon the very dispensation of justice. In this sacred
realm, where the scales of justice are meant to balance with precision, the
backlog of cases and the interminable delays have reached a disconcerting
crescendo. The relentless march of time, while it may heal wounds for some,
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
it deepens the chasm of despair for litigants who await the enforcement of
their rights. Hence, It is here, in the chambers of jurisprudence, that we must
heed the clarion call of reform with unwavering urgency.
37. It is undisputedly accepted that the significance of a swift and
efficient judiciary cannot be overstated. It is a cornerstone of democracy,
a bulwark against tyranny, and the guarantor of individual liberties. The
voices of the oppressed, the rights of the marginalized, the claims of the
aggrieved—all are rendered hollow when justice is deferred. Every pending
case represents a soul in limbo, waiting for closure and vindication. Every
delay is an affront to the very ideals that underpin our legal system. Sadly,
the concept of justice delayed is justice denied is not a mere truism, but an
irrefutable truth.
Thus, we stand at a crossroads, not of our choosing but of our duty
where the urgency of legal reforms in our judiciary cannot be overstated, for
the pendulum of justice must swing unimpeded. The edifice of our democracy
depends on a judiciary that dispenses justice not as an afterthought but as a
paramount mission. We must adapt, we must reform, and we must ensure
that justice is not a mirage but a tangible reality for all.
38. Therefore, in this pursuit, we call upon all stakeholders—the legal
fraternity, the legislature, the executive, and the citizens themselves—to join
hands in a concerted effort to untangle the web of delay and pendency. We
must streamline procedures, bolster infrastructure, invest in technology, and
empower our judiciary to meet the demands of our time.
39. The time for procrastination is long past, for justice cannot be
a casualty of bureaucratic inefficiency. We must act now, for the hour is
late, and the call for justice is unwavering. Let us, as guardians of the
law, restore the faith of our citizens in the promise of a just and equitable
society. Let us embark on a journey of legal reform with urgency, for
the legacy we leave will shape the destiny of a nation. In the halls of
justice, let not the echoes of delay and pendency drown out the clarion
call of reform. The time is now, and justice waits for no one. Hence,
the following requests to Hon’ble the Chief Justices of the High Courts
are made and directions are issued to the trial courts to ensure ‘speedy
justice’ is delivered.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 981
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
RE: POINT NO.3
For the reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following
ORDER
1. Civil Appeal is allowed and the order dated 28.11.2019 passed in
Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 by High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
is set aside and the order dated 09.05.2012 passed by the Trial Court as
affirmed in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 dated 13.12.2012 stands affirmed.
2. The following directions are issued:
i. All courts at district and taluka levels shall ensure proper
execution of the summons and in a time bound manner as
prescribed under Order V Rule (2) of CPC and same shall be
monitored by Principal District Judges and after collating the
statistics they shall forward the same to be placed before the
committee constituted by the High Court for its consideration
and monitoring.
ii. All courts at District and Taluka level shall ensure that written
statement is filed within the prescribed limit namely as prescribed
under Order VIII Rule 1 and preferably within 30 days and
to assign reasons in writing as to why the time limit is being
extended beyond 30 days as indicated under proviso to sub-Rule
(1) of Order VIII of CPC.
iii. All courts at Districts and Talukas shall ensure after the
pleadings are complete, the parties should be called upon to
appear on the day fixed as indicated in Order X and record the
admissions and denials and the court shall direct the parties to
the suit to opt for either mode of the settlement outside the court
as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 89 and at the option of
the parties shall fix the date of appearance before such forum or
authority and in the event of the parties opting to any one of the
modes of settlement directions be issued to appear on the date,
time and venue fixed and the parties shall so appear before such
authority/forum without any further notice at such designated
place and time and it shall also be made clear in the reference
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R.
order that trial is fixed beyond the period of two months making
it clear that in the event of ADR not being fruitful, the trial would
commence on the next day so fixed and would proceed on day-
to-day basis.
iv. In the event of the party’s failure to opt for ADR namely
resolution of dispute as prescribed under Section 89(1) the court
should frame the issues for its determination within one week
preferably, in the open court.
v. Fixing of the date of trial shall be in consultation with the
learned advocates appearing for the parties to enable them to
adjust their calendar. Once the date of trial is fixed, the trial
should proceed accordingly to the extent possible, on day-to-
day basis.
vi. Learned trial judges of District and Taluka Courts shall as
far as possible maintain the diary for ensuring that only such
number of cases as can be handled on any given day for trial and
complete the recording of evidence so as to avoid overcrowding
of the cases and as a sequence of it would result in adjournment
being sought and thereby preventing any inconvenience being
caused to the stakeholders.
vii. The counsels representing the parties may be enlightened of
the provisions of Order XI and Order XII so as to narrow down the
scope of dispute and it would be also the onerous responsibility
of the Bar Associations and Bar Councils to have periodical
refresher courses and preferably by virtual mode.
viii. The trial courts shall scrupulously, meticulously and without
fail comply with the provisions of Rule 1 of Order XVII and once
the trial has commenced it shall be proceeded from day to day
as contemplated under the proviso to Rule (2).
ix. The courts shall give meaningful effect to the provisions for
payment of cost for ensuring that no adjournment is sought for
procrastination of the litigation and the opposite party is suitably
compensated in the event of such adjournment is being granted.
YASHPAL JAIN v. SUSHILA DEVI & OTHERS 983
[ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
x. At conclusion of trial the oral arguments shall be heard
immediately and continuously and judgment be pronounced
within the period stipulated under Order XX of CPC.
xi. The statistics relating to the cases pending in each court
beyond 5 years shall be forwarded by every presiding officer
to the Principal District Judge once in a month who (Principal
District Judge/District Judge) shall collate the same and forward
it to the review committee constituted by the respective High
Courts for enabling it to take further steps.
xii. The Committee so constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of
the respective States shall meet at least once in two months and
direct such corrective measures to be taken by concerned court
as deemed fit and shall also monitor the old cases (preferably
which are pending for more than 05 years) constantly.
It is also made clear that further directions for implementation of the
above directions would be issued from time to time, if necessary, and as
may be directed by this Court.
3. The Secretary General is directed to circulate the copy of this
judgment to the Registrar General of all the High Courts for being placed
before the respective Chief Justices for a consideration and suitable steps
being taken as opined herein above.
4. We make no order as to costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed with directions.
Divya Pandey
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