Holding

Section 13(2) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, 1971 grants the SRA a power coupled with a duty to ensure timely completion of slum rehabilitation projects, and the termination order was valid.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the termination of a development agreement between Yash Developers (appellant) and Harihar Krupa Co‑Operative Housing Society (respondent) under Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, which had been upheld by the Bombay High Court. The Court considered whether the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (AGRC) had lawfully exercised its power to cancel the agreement due to inordinate delay in project implementation spanning over 16 years. It held that Section 13(2) confers a power coupled with a duty on the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) and its CEO to ensure timely completion, and that the developer could not rely on litigation, environmental clearances, or non‑cooperation of some slum dwellers as justifications. The Court found the appellant’s explanations untenable, affirmed the accountability of the SRA and CEO, and dismissed the appeal. Additionally, the Court directed the Bombay High Court to initiate a performance audit of the Act to address systemic deficiencies.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed under Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act, 1971.
Whether the power conferred on the SRA under Section 13(2) is coupled with a statutory duty to ensure timely completion of slum rehabilitation projects.
Whether the delays attributed to litigation with a competing builder, environmental clearances, and non‑cooperation of slum dwellers justify termination of the development agreement.
Accountability of the CEO and SRA for dereliction of duty under the Act.
Maintainability of the appeal before the AGRC and the locus of respondent No.6.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 226
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971s. 13, s. 13(2), s. 2(b+a), s. 3A(2), s. 3B

Subjects

Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas ActJudicial review under Article 226Development agreementDeveloper accountabilityPerformance audit of statuteOrder of terminationComprehensive statutory auditRehabilitation of slum dwellersDelay in implementationEnvironmental clearanceRight to life under Article 21Slum Rehabilitation Scheme

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1443 : 2024 INSC 559

Yash Developers
v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society
Limited & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 8127 of 2024)
30 July 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Development agreement in favour of the appellant was terminated
by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (AGRC) exercising
its power under Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. Order
of termination upheld by the High Court. Issue as regards scope
of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution against
an order passed under Section 13; accountability of officers
exercising power coupled with duty under Section 13; Performance
audit of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971.

Headnotes†
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 – s.13 – Constitution of India – Article
226 – Rehabilitation of slum dwellers – Appellant was appointed
as a developer by respondent no. 1 – However, development
was prolonged for over two decades – Development agreement
terminated by the statutory authority – Apex Grievance
Redressal Committee (AGRC) – Validity of the said power
exercised by the AGRC – Order of termination upheld by
the High Court – Plea of the appellant that the delay in
implementation of the project was in various phases between
2003 to 2011, 2011 to 2014 and 2014 to 2019 due to various
reasons inter alia long-drawn litigation with a competing
builder, delay in obtaining the environmental clearances or the
delay due to non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers, in which
the appellant had no role and was not at all responsible for:
Held: Under s.13(2), Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) has the
power to redevelop the project if it is satisfied that the development
is not proceeding within the time specified – This power of SRA
* Author
1444 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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is coupled with a duty to ensure that the project is completed
within time – The provision is a statutory incorporation of time
integrity in the performance of the duty – SRA is accountable
for the performance of this duty – The primary responsibility to
implement s.13 and allied provisions and to monitor compliances
of schemes and agreements vests with the CEO – If the actions
of CEO are based on the directions of the SRA, then the SRA
must equally bear the responsibility – A writ of mandamus would
lie against the concerned authorities if they do not perform the
statutory duty of ensuring that the project is completed within
the time prescribed – Delay of 8 years in resolving disputes
with a competing builder cannot be a justification under any
circumstance – Appellant being a developer fully understands
the process of obtaining environmental clearances while other
sanctions and permissions are pending, and it was for him to
make all the necessary arrangements – Non-cooperation of some
of the members cannot be a ground for delaying the project from
2014 to 2019 – AGRC and High Court correctly held that the delay
caused due to the sanction of the draft development plan for the
construction of the road cannot be a justification for delaying the
project from 2015 to 2019 – Justifications given by the appellant
for delaying the project, rejected – No merit in the present appeal,
costs imposed – Though the justifications for delay are rejected, but
there was dereliction of the statutory duty of the SRA in ensuring
that the project is completed within time – There was negligence
on the part of CEO and the SRA and they are accountable for
their actions. [Paras 13, 14.1, 24, 26, 27]
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to life – Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme – Rehabilitation of slum dwellers:
Held: Execution of the project under the Slum Rehabilitation
Scheme cannot be viewed as a real estate development project –
There is a public purpose involved inextricably connected to the
right to life of some of our brother and sister citizens living in
pathetic conditions. [Para 27]
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971 – Performance audit of – Litigation
under the Act, worrisome – Directions for comprehensive
statutory audit issued – Problem with the statutory scheme
w.r.t issues such as identification and declaration of land as a
slum; identification of slum dwellers; selection of a developer;
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1445

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

apportionment of the slum land between redevelopment area
and sale area; obligation to provide transit accommodation for
the slum dwellers pending redevelopment; issues of lack of
independence and objectivity in the functioning of statutory
authorities; effectiveness of statutory remedies; judicial review
proceedings under Art. 226 cannot be a long-term solution:
Held: The problems arising out of the statutory scheme and
policy framework should have come under review by the State
of Maharashtra – Assessment of the working of the statute to
realise if its purpose and objective achieved or not is the implied
duty of the executive government – Reviewing and assessing the
implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law – It
is in recognition of this obligation of the executive government
that the constitutional courts have directed governments to carry
performance audit of statutes – Role of judiciary elaborated – Chief
Justice of the Bombay High Court requested to constitute a bench
to initiate suo motu proceedings for reviewing the working of the
statute to identify the cause of the problems indicated. [Para 35, 42]
Judicial review – Directions for review and assessment of the
implementation of a Statute – Justification:
Held: Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such
directions as they are in a unique position of perceiving the
working of a statute while exercising judicial review, during
which they could identify the fault-lines in the implementation of
a statute. [Para 37]

Case Law Cited
Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CEO, Slum Rehabilitation Authority
& Ors. [2018] 1 SCR 1 : (2018) 2 SCC 230; Vijay Rajmohan v.
CBI [2022] 19 SCR 563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329; State of Haryana v.
Mukesh Kumar [2011] 14 SCR 211 : (2011) 10 SCC 404; Pravin
Electricals (P) Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra & Engineering (P) Ltd. [2021] 1
SCR 1162 : (2021) 5 SCC 671; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand
[2010] 9 SCR 1168 : (2010) 7 SCC 667; Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v.
Aptech Ltd. [2024] 3 SCR 73 : (2024) 5 SCC 313; Public Interest
Foundation v. Union of India [2018] 10 SCR 141 : (2019) 3 SCC
224 – referred to.
Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra (2019) SCC OnLine
Bom 897; Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-op Housing Society Ltd. & Anr.
1446 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2008 (1) Bom.C.R.1; New Janta
SRA CHS Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2019) SCC Online Bom
3896 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Justice in Adapting to Change, in R.W.M. Dias, JURISPRUDENCE,
305-327 (5th edn., 2013).
List of Acts
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Section 13 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance
and Redevelopment) Act, 1971; Judicial review under Article 226 of
the Constitution; Development agreement; Developer; Performance
audit of statute; Order of termination; Comprehensive statutory
audit; Rehabilitation of slum dwellers; Delay in implementation of
the project; Development agreement terminated; Redevelopment
of the project; Rehabilitation building; Environmental clearance;
Development plan; Builders; Slum Rehabilitation Scheme; Right
to life.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
8127 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WPL No.18022 of 2021
With
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 217 of 2024 In SLP (C) No. 20844 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv., C.U. Singh, Vikas Mehta, Adit Nair, Prakash
Shah, Ranbir Singh, Abhik Chimni, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Kartik, Advs.
for the Appellant.
Sanjay Kharde, Shekhar Naphade, C.A. Sunderam, Dama
Seshadri Naidu, Dhruv Mehta, Huzeifa Ahmadi, Vinay Navare,
Sr. Advs., Satyajeet Kharde, Sunil Kumar Verma, Anirudha Joshi,
Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Ms. Pradnya S. Adgaonkar, Aaditya
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1447

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse,
Adarsh Dubey, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Ankit Ambasta, Amit
Srivastava, Amlaan Kumar, Saket Sikri, Aman Vachher, Dhiraj,
Ashutosh Dubey, Ms. Anshu Vachher, Ms. Abhiti Vachher, Akshat
Vachher, Ms. Smriti Puri, Amit Kumar, P. N. Puri, Anil Nag, Zulfikar
Ali, Mrs. Jaya, Ms. Monica Saini, Amit Agnihotri, Ms. Priyanka Midha,
Ms. Priya Misra, M. Yogesh Kanna, Ms. Anshula Vijay Kumar Grover,
Ms. Rucha Deshpande, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy, Nilesh Kumar,
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Table of Contents*

I. Introduction :...................................................................... 2
II. Scope of Judicial Review against an order under Section
13 of the Act:........................................................................ 4
III. Accountability of officers exercising power coupled
with duty under Section 13:................................................. 11
IV. Submissions and Analysis:.............................................. 13
(i) The first phase of delay is between 2003 and 2011..... 14
(ii) The second phase relates to the delay in obtaining
necessary permissions, approvals and environmental
clearances from 2011 to 2014......................................... 17
(iii) The third phase of delay relates to the alleged
non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers leading to
the stalling of the project from 2014 to 2019................. 18
(iv) The next period of inaction is from 2015 to 2017.
This is sought to be justified on the ground that the
Municipal Corporation sanctioned a road that may
pass through the property and published the draft
development plan (DP) on 25.02.2015........................... 20
(v) Re: Appellant did not have the financial resources..... 21

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1448 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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(vi) Re: Submission on maintainability of proceedings
before AGRC................................................................... 25
(vii) Re: Locus or conflict of respondent no.6.............. 27
V. Findings:......................................................................... 28
VI. Conclusion:...................................................................... 32
VII. Re : Performance audit of statute:.................................. 32

1. Leave granted.
I. Introduction:
2. The present controversy is a manifestation of common battles between
competing real estate developers under the pretext of rehabilitating
slum dwellers under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement,
Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971.1 In the year 2003, the
appellant was appointed as a developer by respondent no. 1, a co-
operative Housing Society of slum dwellers having their hutments on
the subject land in Borivali, Mumbai which was declared as a ‘slum
area’ under the Act. As the development was unduly prolonged for over
two decades, the development agreement in favour of the appellant
was terminated by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee2 by its
order dated 04.08.2021. The order of termination was challenged
by the appellant before the Bombay High Court.3
3. The Bombay High Court formulated the following issues:
“(i) A developer being removed on the non-fulfillment of
the basic requirement to commence construction of a slum
rehabilitation building for a long period of 18 years, whether
is not fatal to the object and intention of a statutory intent
behind a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
(ii) Another question would be as to whether the right to
shelter which is part of the slum dwellers’ right to livelihood
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, can be

1 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Act”.
2 For short, the ‘AGRC’.
3 Writ Petition (L) No. 18022 of 2021.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1449

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

continued to be nullified by such actions of unconscionable
delay on the part of the developer, in not commencing
construction of the slum project even by an inch more
particularly when the nature of such work awarded to a
developer for him is purely a commercial venture, for profit.”
4. Apart from the above two issues, the High Court highlighted the
limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution
against the decision of the statutory authority-AGRC. The High Court,
however, proceeded to examine the facts in full detail and dismissed
the writ petition on facts, as well as on law.4 Thus, the present appeal.
5. Even before us, the appellant argued the case only on facts, to the
extent that we were under an illusion that we were hearing suit for
specific performance involving an issue of ready and willingness.
Having heard the learned counsels for the parties at length on
facts, we will certainly deal with their submissions, but before that
we must reiterate the limited scope of inquiry under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
II. Scope of Judicial Review against an order under Section
13 of the Act:
6. In this case, as in any other public law proceedings, we are concerned
with the legality and validity of the power exercised by the AGRC
in terminating the development agreement with the appellant by its
order dated 04.08.2021. This order is in exercise of power under
Section 13 of the Act which is as under:
“13. Power of Competent Authority to redevelop
clearance area:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
of Section 12 the Competent Authority may, at any
time, after the land has been cleared of buildings in
accordance with a clearance order, but before the work
of redevelopment of that land has been commenced
by the owner, by order, determine to redevelop the
land at its own cost, if that Authority is satisfied that
it is necessary in the public interest to do so.

4 By judgment dated 14.10.2022, reported as 2022 SCC Online Bom 3712, hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Judgment.
1450 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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(2) Where land has been cleared of the buildings in
accordance with a clearance order, the Competent
Authority, if it is satisfied that the land has been,
or is being, redeveloped by the owner thereof in
contravention of plans duly approved, or any restrictions
or conditions imposed under sub-section (10) of Section
12, or has not been redeveloped within the time, if
any, specified under such conditions, may, by order,
determine to redevelop the land at its own cost.
Provided that, before passing such order, the owner
shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause why the order should not be passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Section 13(2) of the Act specifically empowers the competent
authority to re-determine the agreement if it is satisfied that the
re-development has not been done within the time specified. The
provision is certainly a statutory incorporation of time integrity in
the performance of the duty. We recognise this as a statutory duty
of the competent authority to ensure that the project is completed
within the prescribed time. We have no hesitation even in holding
that a writ of mandamus would lie against the concerned authorities
if they do not perform the statutory duty of ensuring that the project
is completed within the time prescribed.
8. In Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. CEO, Slum Rehabilitation Authority
& Ors.,5 this Court held that Section 13(2) of the Act empowers the
statutory authorities to take action and hand over the project to some
other agency if the development is being delayed. The relevant
portions of the judgment are as under:-
“49. Otherwise, there would be an anomalous situation
where the Society would have terminated its contract
with Susme but the letter of intent issued by the SRA
would continue to hold the field and it would be entitled
to develop the land. The Society approached the SRA,
in fact, asking it to take action against Susme. Since the
SRA is the authority which issued the letter of intent, it will
definitely have the power to cancel the letter of intent...

5 [2018] 1 SCR 1 : (2018) 2 SCC 230
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1451

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

…
52. A bare reading of these provisions shows that in
terms of clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (3) of Section
3-A of the Slum Act, the SRA not only has the power,
but it is duty-bound to get the slum rehabilitation scheme
implemented and to do all such other acts and things as
will be necessary for achieving the object of rehabilitation
of slums. In this case, the SRA was faced with a situation
where the slum-dwellers were suffering for more than 25
years and, therefore the action taken by SRA to remove
Susme for the unjustified delay was totally justified.”
9. Case after case, the Bombay High Court has been ruling that, a) the
developer is duty-bound to complete the project within the stipulated
time and that b) the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) has not
merely the power but a broader duty to ensure that the developer
completes the project within time. We will refer to those judgments,
not so much to certify that the issue is no more res-integra, but to
emphasise that the rulings have not had the desired impact, much
less compliance. The reason is that, neither the developer nor the
authority is asked to face the consequences of their derelictions.
That Section 13(2) is a power coupled with duty is clear from the
judgments of this Court and many other judgments of the High
Courts, however experience tells us that this recognition of a statutory
duty in itself is not sufficient. Until and unless duty is identified with
accountability, judicial review is ineffective.
10. In Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra,6 the Bombay High
Court observed:
“53. The record reveals that what M/s Saral could do in
eight years of its appointment, was to get the Annexure II,
namely the list of the 73 eligible occupants certified from
the MHADA. It was, thus, expected from the petitioner
that the revalidation of Annexure II, which was possibly
not a complex formality be undertaken at the earliest.
However this certainly did not happen and citing various
reasons, which cannot be believed to be not attributable

6 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 897.
1452 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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to the petitioner, ultimately, the petitioner could not get the
Annexure II certified only on 23 December 2013, which is
after about eight years of the petitioner’s appointment. This
fact itself raises a serious doubt as to the real intentions
of the petitioner to undertake the scheme. The petitioner
could not have simply blamed the authorities for the
delay, as there is complete lack of concrete and/or any
real steps which were to be taken by the petitioner to
effectively seek different approvals, once the society had
put the petitioner in the driver’s seat, in complete control
of the project as rightly commented, in the impugned
orders. Thus, the case of the petitioner, that from time to
time steps were taken to implement the slum scheme as
entrusted to it be the society cannot be accepted. These
are the contentions of the petitioner, merely pointing out
some movement of the files with the authorities. This
was certainly not sufficient and what was required and
expected by the petitioner was to take real effective steps
to progress the slum redevelopment. The petitioner was
expected to expeditiously obtain an Annexure II, as certified
by the MHADA, thereafter obtain a LOI and then obtain a
Commencement Certificate to start with the constructions
and before that make a provision for temporary alternate
accommodation for the slum dwellers to reside till
completion of the scheme. There is not an iota of material
to show that any such steps much less expeditiously were
taken by the petitioner which will show the real bonafides
of the petitioner to undertake the scheme.
54. In fact the petitioner kept the slum dwellers/society
in dark on any of the steps alleged to be taken by the
petitioner. There was no transparency in the petitioner’s
approach with the slum-dwellers whose anxious, impatient
and painful wait of so many years for the slum scheme to
start was continuously staring at the petitioner’s right from
the word go. This was not what was expected of a diligent
developer. The slum schemes are expected to be taken and
pursued by the developers for genuine and bonafide object
and purpose to redevelop the slums as reflected in the
rules which is for the mutual benefit namely the benefit of
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1453

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

the slum dwellers of being provided a permanent alternate
accommodation and so far as the developer, to exploit
the free sale component, which is nothing but a business
consideration for the developer. If this be the long and short
of a slum scheme what can be the intention of a developer
to sit tight on a slum scheme and not take expeditious
measures to undertake and complete the scheme. The
reasons can be innumerable, if the reasons are attributable
to the authorities, the developer has certainly remedies in
law to be immediately resorted. No forum competent to
entertain such complaints would refuse to look into such
grievances when the very right to livelihood of the slum
dwellers who are living in inhuman conditions, being a
concomitant of Article 21 of the Constitution, is involved
and which becomes a matter of urgent concern and of
utmost priority. A developer cannot shut his eyes to all
these factors and attributes, once appointed by the society.
For the developer, there has be relentless action on day
to day basis as any delay in not implementing the slum
scheme is not only detrimental to the slum dwellers, but
to the society at large. Delay in effective implementation
of the slum scheme would defeat the very goal, the ideals
and the purpose of the slum redevelopment scheme.
55. A perusal of the record indicates that the society is
correct in contending that during the period from 2006 to
2016 i.e. for about 10 years the petitioner did not take
any concrete steps towards implementation of the slum
rehabilitation scheme and the petitioner had clearly failed
to obtain a LOI for such a long period. The society, thus,
was constrained to file the application dated 15 March
2016, under Section 13(2) of the Slums Act, praying for
change of the petitioner as the developer. It is correct
that Annexure-II was originally issued by MHADA on 16
April 1998. The petitioner was appointed as developer
in the month of June 2006 and it clearly took about
seven to eight years for the petitioner to obtain revised
Annexure-II which was obtained on 23 December 2013.
Before the Chief Executive Officer and even before the
appellate authority the petitioner has failed to show any
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justifiable reason as to why it took these many years for
the petitioner to simply obtain a revised Annexure-II when
as per norms issued by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
Annexure-II is required to be finalised within a period of
four months when the hutment dwellers are below 500 in
number. Further the record clearly indicates that even after
obtaining the revised Annexure II, on 23 December 2013,
the petitioner did not initiate immediate steps to obtain LOI
for the next three years. There is, thus, much substance
in the contention of the society that only after the society
initiated proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slums
Act, the petitioner initiated steps to obtain a LOI.
...
57. There cannot be a myopic approach to these issues
of a delay in implementation of a slum rehabilitation
scheme. Things as they stand are required to be seen in
their entirety. The only mantra for the slum schemes to be
implemented is it’s time bound completion and a machinery
to be evolved by the authorities, to have effective measures
in that direction to monitor the schemes as a part of their
statutory obligation to avoid delays. Non-commencement
of the slum scheme for long years and substantial delay
in completion of the slum schemes should be a thing of
the past. In the present case, looked from any angle there
is no plausible explanation forthcoming for the delay of
so many years at the hands of the petitioner to take bare
minimum steps to commence construction.
58. The authorities should weed away and reprimand
persons who are not genuine developers and who are
merely agents and dealers in slum schemes. These
persons after get themselves appointed as developers,
to ultimately deal/sell the slum schemes, as if it is a
commodity. Any loopholes in the rules to this effect,
therefore, are required to be sealed.
...
64. Thus, it is quite clear that inordinate delay is a sufficient
ground for removal of a developer. There is neither any
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1455

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

perversity nor any illegality in the findings as recorded by
both authorities below, in observing that the petitioner had
grossly delayed the implementation of the slum scheme in
question. The findings as recorded in the impugned order
passed by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee are
also sufficiently borne out by the files produced before
this Court…”
(emphasis supplied)
11. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Tulsiwadi Navnirman Co-
op Housing Society Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,7 held
that the SRA has been conferred with certain powers and each one
of them is coupled with a duty. If the slum dwellers are eligible to be
rehabilitated at the site and within a reasonable period, they cannot
be left at the mercy of developers and builders. The slum dwellers
cannot be expected to occupy a transit accommodation endlessly,
without proper maintenance, and hygiene. An independent and
impartial implementation, supervision and monitoring of the projects
is the purpose for which the authority has been set up under the Act.
12. In New Janta SRA CHS Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,8 the High Court
considered the dispute between two rival societies claiming rights
over a slum scheme. The Court observed as under:-
“187. It thus cannot be accepted more particularly
considering the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Slums Act
that a slum society at its sole discretion and/or without any
control and regulations by SRA can change the developer.
If such a course of action is made permissible, considering
the hard realities and the hundreds of developers being
available to take over such schemes, it would create a
chaos and it is likely that a situation is created, that the slum
rehabilitation scheme never takes off and it is entangled
into fights between two factions within the society and/or
two rival developers. This is certainly not the object of the
legislation. It would be too farfetched to read such draconian
rights available to the Managing Committee or to general

7 2008(1) Bom.C.R.1.
8 2019 SCC Online Bom 3896.
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body of a society without any regulation, supervision and
control of the SRA to change the developer. The SRA
has all the powers not only to regulate and control such
situations but to take a decision as to what is in the best
interest of the slum dwellers and intended to achieve the
object of the legislation.
188. Secondly it is not in dispute that the application of the
petitioner for change of respondent no.5-developer was
under Section 13(2) of the Slums Act. Having noted this
provision in the foregoing paragraphs, Section 13(2) of the
Slums Act would come into play only when the developer
fails to adhere to the provisions of the development
permissions granted by the SRA and a change of developer
can be sought only when there is an inordinate delay or
the construction carried on, is contrary to the sanctioned
plans and/or the permissions. Considering this clear position
falling under Section 13(2), in the context of this factual
controversy as raised by the petitioner in regard to the
consent of 70% of the slum dwellers being not available
to respondent no.5, 1 am of the clear opinion that the view
taken by both the authorities, in not accepting the petitioner’s
contention, is required to be held to be correct and valid. “
III. Accountability of officers exercising power coupled with
duty under Section 13:
13. Two facets of Section 13 (2) of the Act are that; a) the SRA
has the power to redevelop the project if it is satisfied that the
development is not proceeding within the time specified, and
b) that power of SRA is coupled with a duty to ensure that the project
is completed within time. We hold that the SRA is accountable for the
performance of this duty. Accountability need not be superimposed by
the text of a statute, it exists wherever power is granted to accomplish
statutory purpose. In Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI,9 this Court held:-
“34. Accountability in itself is an essential principle of
administrative law. Judicial review of administrative action
will be effective and meaningful by ensuring accountability
of the officer or authority in charge.

9 [2022] 19 SCR 563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1457

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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

35. The principle of accountability is considered as a
cornerstone of the human rights framework. It is a crucial
feature that must govern the relationship between “duty
bearers” in authority and “right holders” affected by their
actions. Accountability of institutions is also one of the
development goals adopted by the United Nations in 201510
and is also recognised as one of the six principles of the
Citizens Charter Movement.11
36. Accountability has three essential constituent
dimensions: (i) responsibility, (ii) answerability, and (iii)
enforceability. Responsibility requires the identification
of duties and performance obligations of individuals in
authority and with authorities. Answerability requires
reasoned decision-making so that those affected by their
decisions, including the public, are aware of the same.
Enforceability requires appropriate corrective and remedial
action against lack of responsibility and accountability to be
taken.12 Accountability has a corrective function, making it
possible to address individual or collective grievances. It
enables action against officials or institutions for dereliction
of duty. It also has a preventive function that helps to
identify the procedure or policy which has become non-
functional and to improve upon it.”
14. For effective implementation of the principle of accountability of power
under the Act, we identify the duties and performance obligations of
the CEO. It is evident from the statutory scheme that the responsibility
vests in the CEO, defined under Section 2 (b+a) read with Section
3A(2) of the Act. The CEO reports to the SRA, the duty of which
is defined under Section 3B of the Act. One of the most important
duties of the SRA is to ensure that the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme
is implemented.

10 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1 dated 25-9-2015.
11 Citizens Charter adopted by the Government in the “Conference of Chief Ministers of various States and
Union Territories” held in May 1997 in New Delhi, available from https://goicharters.nic.in/public/website/
home.
12 See Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Who will be Accountable? Human
Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, available from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/WhoWillBeAccountable.pdf
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14.1. The primary responsibility to implement Section 13 of the Act
and allied provisions and to monitor compliances of schemes
and agreements vests with the CEO. If the actions of CEO are
based on the directions of the SRA, then the SRA must equally
bear the responsibility. The CEO and/or the SRA must explain
the delay in implementation, failing which, the consequences
as determined by the court will follow.
PART-II
IV. Submissions and Analysis:
15. Returning to facts of the case, Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel,
appearing on behalf of the appellant, articulated the allegation of delay
into six parts and in his inimitable style proceeded to explain how in
each part, the appellant had no role and not at all responsible. We
will deal with each phase of delay in the same manner as Mr. Sibal
has presented the case before us.
16. (i) The first phase of delay is between 2003 and 2011. The relevant
facts are as follows.
16.1. The appellant was appointed by respondent no.1 to develop
the Project under a development agreement dated 20.08.2003,
following which the appellant made a proposal for development
on 11.12.2003. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai,
however, assigned the re-development to a rival society,
namely Omkareshwar Co-Operative Housing Society13 and a
developer, namely Siddhivinayak Developers14 on 06.05.2004.
Pursuant to this, on 07.09.2004, the SRA accepted the
proposal given by Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak for the
development of the Property. After a long-drawn litigation
between the appellant and respondent no. 1 on one side,
and Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak on the other, the CEO,
SRA finally settled the dispute by its order dated 07.06.2011
and held that the appellant had the required 70% consent of
individual slum dwellers to implement the project and also
that the proposal of Omkareshwar was not valid as it was

13 Hereinafter, referred to as “Omkareshwar”.
14 Hereinafter, referred to as “Siddhivinayak”.
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

made after the proposal of respondent no.1. Dealing with
the period, Mr. Sibal has submitted that multiple proceedings
between the appellant and respondent no. 1 on one side and
Omkareshwar and Siddhivinayak on the other consumed lot of
time. While the High Court initially disposed of a writ petition
recording a settlement that appellant and respondent no.1 are
entitled to develop the Property, Omkareshwar challenged it
leading to several rounds of litigation before the High-Powered
Committee15 and the High Court. The issue was laid to rest
only on 07.06.2011 by an order of the CEO, SRA holding that
the appellant enjoyed the consent of 70% of eligible slum
dwellers and hence was qualified to be the developer. Mr.
Sibal has submitted that the consequence of this litigation is
that the LOI could be issued in favour of the appellant only
on 29.06.2011, i.e. after this dispute was settled. The eight
years’ delay in obtaining the LOI was inevitable and was not
due to any fault of the appellant.
16.2. Per contra, Mr. C A Sundaram, learned senior counsel,
appearing for the respondent no.6-Veena Developers, has
submitted that the appellant did not have the financial capacity
or the technical expertise to complete the project within the
prescribed time of 3 years. It is due to this reason that the
appellant was unable to commence construction even when
all the requisite permissions and approvals had been obtained.
Further, Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel,
appearing for respondent nos.8-48, who are some of the slum
dwellers, has submitted that the delay in the construction is
entirely attributable to the appellant. He submitted that the
appellant did not take any action to obtain the LOI anytime
between 2003-2011.
16.3. While adjudicating on the delay in implementation of the
project during 2003-2011, the AGRC relied on clause 11
of the development agreement dated 20.08.2003 requiring
the appellant to complete the development of the project
within three years from the issuance of the Commencement
Certificate dated 14.07.2014.

15 Hereinafter, referred to as the “HPC”.
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16.4. On the issue of delay from 2003 to 2011, the High Court
examined the facts independently and upheld the findings of
the AGRC. The High Court held that a delay cannot be viewed
as reasonable. Further, the High Court held that the litigation
with Omkareshwar did not prevent the appellant from starting
the project, especially when the appellant had the consent of
more than 70% of the slum dwellers at all material times. The
High Court also observed that the appellant was not diligent
in procuring the LOI.
17. (ii) The second phase relates to the delay in obtaining necessary
permissions, approvals and environmental clearances from 2011 to
2014. The SRA issued Annexure-III, certifying the financial capability
of a developer on 21.06.2011 and this was followed by issuance
of LOI dated 29.06.2011. The appellant applied for Environmental
Clearance16 on 15.12.2011 and obtained it only on 28.04.2014. The
Commencement Certificate for the construction of the rehabilitation
building and the high-rise clearance by the Municipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai were issued to the appellant on 14.07.2014 and
09.10.2014, respectively.
17.1. In the above referred background, Mr. Sibal submitted that the
EC had to be obtained before the Commencement Certificate
could be issued for the construction of the rehabilitation
building. For on-site construction of more than 20,000 square
meters, EC is required and for this, he relied on condition no.
51 of the LOI dated 29.06.2011 and condition no. 38 of the
intimation of approval dated 21.04.2012. While the appellant
made an application for EC in the year 2011, it was granted
only on 28.04.2014. He has submitted that the delay between
2011-2014 was again unavoidable as certain mandatory
permissions were required. Per contra, Mr. Ahmadi submitted
that an EC was not required to commence construction of
the rehabilitation building as the on-site construction did not
exceed 20,000 square meters.
17.2. Upon perusing the record, the AGRC found that the delay was
indeed attributable to the appellant. The High Court also noticed
that the appellant did not commence the construction after

16 Hereinafter, referred to as “EC”.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1461

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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

getting the necessary approvals but waited for the EC. The
High Court also noted that some parts of the project like the
rehabilitation building did not require an EC for commencing
construction.
18. (iii) The third phase of delay relates to the alleged non-cooperation
of certain slum dwellers leading to the stalling of the project from
2014 to 2019. Mr. Sibal submitted that as some of the slum dwellers
were not cooperative, applications under Sections 33 and 38 of the
Act for eviction were made to the Assistant Municipal Commissioner,
MCGM. Initially, the Deputy Collector passed orders on 05.11.2020
observing that the eviction proceedings can be taken forward only
after directions from the High Court and in the meanwhile directed the
appellant to deposit 11 months rent concerning 30 non-cooperating
slum dwellers. These applications under Sections 33 and 38 of the Act
came to be decided only in 2021, and that is how, it is submitted, the
project got delayed for reasons beyond the control of the appellant.
18.1. Mr. Ahmadi submitted that the pendency of the eviction
applications does not justify the extraordinary delay of 5
years on the part of the appellant. Mr. Sundaram submitted
that the mere filing of applications under Sections 33 and 38
of the Act is not sufficient to justify the delay. It is submitted
that the appellant has failed to take active steps in getting the
applications disposed of. This inaction suited the appellant as
it did not have the capacity or the capability to complete the
project.
18.2. Affirming the findings of the AGRC, the High Court observed that
the appellant went into deep slumber after filing applications for
eviction of non-cooperating slum dwellers between 2014-2015.
18.3. The fact that the appellant had to initiate proceedings against
certain non-cooperating members and that the proceedings
were pending for a long time, whether justified or not, should not
have a bearing on the obligations of the appellant to complete
and handover the project as per the development agreement.
Under no circumstance, litigation of this nature would justify
inaction from 2014 to 2019.
19. (iv) The next period of inaction is from 2015 to 2017. This is sought to
be justified on the ground that the Municipal Corporation sanctioned
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a road that may pass through the property and published the draft
development plan (DP) on 25.02.2015.
19.1. The objections filed by the appellant on 03.04.2015 eventually
came to be disposed of only on 12.11.2018 when the said road
was deleted from the development plan. This period, Mr. Sibal
submits, must be excluded as no development, much less any
construction, is permissible once the draft plan is published.
19.2. Mr. Sundaram submitted that if the appellant had commenced
the construction after the commencement certificate dated
14.07.2014, the draft development plan published in 2015
could never have affected the re-development at all. He
further submitted that as LOI and IOA were issued in 2011 and
2012, the so-called draft DP published in 2015 cannot be a
justification. Mr. Ahmadi has submitted that except for 2 months
between 25.02.2015 and 23.04.2015, there was no proposed
development plan road in any of the plans. He would submit
that the proposed DP road affected only the proposed sale
building, not the entire project. In any event, he would submit
that the sale building could not have commenced till substantial
progress in rehabilitation building was made.
19.3. The observations of AGRC also go to show that draft DP could
justify 2 years’ delay and no more. The High Court observed
that the notification dated 25.02.2015 under no circumstances
precluded the appellant from starting construction of other
parts of the Property.
20. (v) Re: Appellant did not have the financial resources. Dealing with
the findings of the AGRC and the High Court that the appellant did
not have the financial resources as evidenced by the agreements
that they have executed in favour of third parties, Mr. Sibal
submitted that this issue was never raised in the show-cause notice
dated 04.12.2020, which initiated the proceedings leading to the
termination of the development agreement of the appellant. The
factual background is that from 2017 onwards, the appellant executed
certain financial agreements with third parties. On 17.02.2017, an
agreement with M/s Rajesh Habitat Private Limited was executed as
per which the saleable rights under the project were transferred in
favour of Rajesh Habitat in lieu of finance of Rs. 30 crores. Further,
Rajesh Habitat mortgaged their rights in favour of M/s Vistra ITCL
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1463

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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

by a deed dated 22.03.2017, which later came to be cancelled on
08.02.2019 and a deed of reconveyance between the appellant and
Vistra was entered into. Later, one M/s Sanghvi Associates provided
financial assistance of Rs. 50 crores to the appellant by way of a
mortgage deed. In pursuance of these financing arrangements,
Sanghvi Associates gave no objection to the appellant entering into
an agreement with respondent no.6-Veena Developers. Following
this, a joint development agreement dated 18.10.2019 was entered
into between the appellant and respondent no. 6.
20.1. Mr. Sibal contended that the appellant has the requisite financial
capacity of technical expertise to complete the project. He
would submit that these agreements do not establish that the
appellant does not have the financial capacity or the technical
expertise to undertake and complete the project. That the
appellant had the capacity is evidenced by the deposit of rents
due to the slum dwellers and in fact, the SRA has certified the
appellant’s financial capacity on 21.12.2019.
20.2. Mr. Sundaram submitted that all the documents were before
the SRA and that the parties have made submissions on all
aspects of the matter. He has taken us through the various
findings of the High Court on the finances and the clauses in
the agreements entered into with the third parties. The following
findings of the High Court were referred to:
“57. In any case, the petitioner struggled to avail
finance and was facing severe financial crisis, this
itself was material for the Chief Executive Officer of
the SRA to come to a conclusion that it may not be
possible for the petitioner to execute the scheme. The
Chief Executive Officer however did not call upon the
petitioner to satisfy that it had the appropriate finances
to undertake the “entire scheme”. The Chief Executive
Officer merely asking the petitioner to deposit the
arrears of rent, can in no manner, whatsoever, be
accepted as a certificate to the petitioner possessing
a financial capacity to complete the project.
58. It is crystal clear from the petitioner’s own
showing that the petitioner was required to take the
crutches/financial assistance initially from Rajesh
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Habitat Pvt. Ltd., who in turn looked at Vistra ITCL
India Ltd. and thereafter having failed with both these
entities, with one M/s Sanghvi Associates, which is
not for a small amount but for a substantial amount
of Rs. 50 crores. Things however would not stop at
this and subsequently it appears that now respondent
no.6-Veena Developers was roped in, to provide
working capital for the entire project described to be
the business partners/joint developers of the petitioner
as in para 1 of the petition.”
20.3. Mr. Sundaram also brought to our notice certain clauses in
agreements with third parties and submitted that this amounts
to complete subversion of the scheme. High Court has reflected
on these clauses. The following findings of the High Court are
important:
“73. Certainly, the period of two years as contractually
agreed, under the development agreement cannot be
stretched to such a long period of almost 17 to 18 years
as in the present case, despite these circumstances, an
attempt on the part of the petitioner to justify that such delay
was not attributable to the petitioner, at least in the facts
of the case, is wholly untenable. The AGRC examined the
case of the petitioner and of the society and the situation
persisting at the ground level. The AGRC however not
agreeing with the findings of the Chief Executive Officer-
SRA, has reached a conclusion that the petitioner could
not take the project forward for reasons which were borne
out by the record.
74. In these circumstances to upset the decision of the
AGRC would amount to rewarding the petitioner of its
defaults and the breaches committed by it, not only of the
very terms and conditions of the Development Agreement,
but also, the clear statutory mandate in undertaking Slums
Rehabilitation Schemes. In fact, the petitioner has betrayed
the trust of the society/slum dwellers. Even otherwise, a
closer scrutiny of the petitioner’s actions clearly hint of the
petitioner’s interest not in the rehabilitation of the slum
dwellers but in its own private interest, solely in relation
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

to the sale component. There cannot be a space for a
pure commercial greed in taking up such projects which
involves the basic rights of the slum dwellers.”
21. (vi) Re: Submission on maintainability of proceedings before
AGRC. Finally, Mr. Sibal submitted that the complaints filed by
the 12 members of the managing committee of respondent no.1 on
18.11.2019 were withdrawn by 8 members on 31.12.2019 and by
another member on 14.01.2020. Consequently, the show-cause notice
dated 04.12.2020, based on these complaints, was rightly withdrawn
on 16.03.2021. Secondly, although the managing committee of
respondent no. 1 had initially terminated the development agreement
on 02.02.2020, this termination was revoked on 28.02.2021. The
revocation of termination was because the agreement was terminated
by Mr. Rai, who did not have the requisite authorisation. Mr. Sibal has
relied on the above to submit that respondent no.1 did not object to
the withdrawal of the termination of the development agreement of
the appellant, and in fact, wanted the appellant to continue as the
developer. He would further submit that Mr. Rai was acting without
the authorisation of the other members, and hence, he also could
not have filed an appeal before the AGRC on behalf of respondent
no.1 against the order of the respondent no. 3 – CEO, SRA dated
16.03.2021 that dropped the proceedings against the appellant.
Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel, appearing for some of the
slum dwellers, supported the submissions put forth by Mr. Sibal
regarding the lack of authorisation of Mr. Rai to act on behalf of
respondent no. 1.
21.1. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the appeal before the AGRC
against the order dated 16.03.2021 was maintainable even if
some of the complaints filed on 18.11.2019 were withdrawn.
He submits that Mr. Rai, who filed the appeal, had the requisite
locus because he, along with some others, had also filed
complaints that were not withdrawn. It is submitted that Mr.
Rai was still a slum dweller and a member of respondent
no.1 and hence, was an ‘aggrieved person’ against the
order dated 16.03.2021. There were also, as many as 132
complaints against the appellant by other slum dwellers who
filed complaints in January and February, 2021 before the SRA
under Section 13(2) of the Act alleging non-payment of rent.
Lastly, he submits that in any case, the SRA has the power to
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suo moto proceed against the appellant under Section 13(2) of
the Act and therefore the withdrawal of complaints is not fatal
to proceeding against the appellant and does not preclude the
AGRC from deciding the appeal. Mr. Ahmadi made a submission
along the same lines and to the same effect.
21.2. Answering the question regarding the maintainability of the
proceedings after the complaints dated 18.11.2019 were
withdrawn, the High Court held that even if many complaints
before the SRA were withdrawn, the complaint filed by Mr.
Rai survived to be adjudicated. Further, the High Court
rejected the contention of the appellant that Mr. Rai was not
authorised by respondent no. 1 to take any action against the
appellant. In order to reach this conclusion, the High Court
observed that if the contention of the appellant was true,
then respondent no. 1 would have supported the appellant
before the High Court; however, this was not the case. The
High Court also held that in any case, the SRA and the
AGRC have the requisite power under Section 13(2) of the
Act to suo moto examine the delay caused by the appellant
in implementing the project.
22. (vii) Re: Locus or conflict of respondent no.6: Mr. Sibal concluded
his submissions by arguing that respondent no.6 does not have the
locus to take a stand contrary to that of the appellant as it has been
involved with the venture from the time of the joint development
agreement dated 18.10.2019. For this reason, he would submit that
the findings of AGRC and the High Court must apply to respondent
no. 6 as well.
22.1. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel, appearing for the
administrator of respondent no.1 has argued that Section 13(2)
of the Act empowers and places an obligation upon the SRA
to take action against the developer when the project is not
being implemented. Therefore, he submits that even if some
of the complaints have been withdrawn, the termination of the
development agreement is valid.
V. Findings:
23. Having considered the findings of the AGRC and the High Court in
detail, we have found them to be correct on law and fact. Further,
having independently considered the detailed submissions of the
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

appellant and the respondents, on delay as well as on lack of
financial and technical capabilities and maintainability of the appeal,
we proceed to analyse and discuss them as follows.
24. Admittedly, the delay in executing the project, by the time of the
termination order is more than 16 years. This period is sought to
be explained by fragmenting it into bits and pieces falling between
2003 to 2011, 2011 to 2014 and 2014 to 2019.
25. What amuses us is that we are called upon to hold that the order of
termination for delaying the project for 16 years must be held to be
bad by examining each episode of delay as independent and stand
alone. Judicial Review Courts enquiring into these allegations would
only examine whether it would be arbitrary and/or unreasonable to
exclude the delay caused because of the incidents that occurred from
2003 to 2019. In other words, the inquiry must be to see whether it
would be unjust if we do not account for the long-drawn litigation with
a competing builder between 2003 to 2011, the delay in obtaining the
environmental clearances from 2011 to 2014, or the delay caused
due to non-cooperation of certain slum dwellers.
26. Having examined the matter, we are of the opinion that the delay of
8 years in resolving disputes with a competing builder cannot be a
justification under any circumstance. The appellant is a developer and
fully understands the process of obtaining environmental clearances
while other sanctions and permissions are pending, and it is for him
to make all the necessary arrangements. To say the least, the non-
cooperation of some of the members cannot be a ground for delaying
the project from 2014 to 2019. The findings of the AGRC and the High
Court are very clear, they have correctly held that the delay caused
due to the sanction of the draft DP for the construction of the road
cannot be a justification for delaying the project from 2015 to 2019.
27. In any event, execution of the project under the Slum Rehabilitation
Scheme cannot be viewed as a real estate development project.
There is a public purpose involved, and that is inextricably connected
to the right to life of some of our brother and sister citizens who are
living in pathetic conditions. While we reject the justifications given
by the appellant for delaying the project, we are fully conscious of
the dereliction of the statutory duty of the SRA in ensuring that the
project is completed within time. We have already expressed our
opinion that the CEO and the SRA are accountable for their actions.
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While we reject the justification for delay, we record our dissatisfaction
about the indifference, amounting to negligence on the part of CEO
and the SRA.
28. So far as the submissions relating to the financial resources are
concerned, we have seen the number of agreements that the
appellants have entered into. We need not examine this aspect
independently as the findings are concurrent and thorough. The
following findings of the High Court are sufficient for disposing of
this issue:
“59. The petitioner time and again having approached
third parties for financial requirements in the manner
as discussed above, in fact was quite fatal and counter
productive to the implementation of the slum scheme, for
the reason that if any of the financers were to withdraw
from their financial support and the commitments as made
to the petitioner, the same would leave the petitioner with
no remedy but to wander further hunting for fresh finance.
Such financial instability of a developer certainly would
have a devastating effect on the implementation of the
slum scheme which could also result in the total collapse
of the slum scheme being implemented and in fact a death
knell for the slum scheme. It is for such reason, the real
wherewithal and financial stability of a developer plays an
extremely pivotal role, as finance is the very lifeline for
successful implementation and completion of the slum
scheme. The present case is a classic case of how the
petitioner is running helter-skelter to secure finance, that
too without taking the society into confidence much less
the authorities. This on the basis of a solitary clause in
the Development Agreement which is being discussed
hereafter.”
29. We will now deal with the submission on the maintainability of the
appeal before the AGRC and that respondent no. 6 who was the
collaborator of the appellant must face the same consequence as
that of the appellant. This submission proceeds on the assumption
that the statutory power under Section 13(2) of the Act is to be
exercised only upon an application made to the authority. This is a
complete misconception. We have already dealt with the scope and
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Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

ambit of Section 13 of the Act, and in particular the duty followed
by accountability of the SRA under the said provision. Irrespective
of whether anybody applied or not, the authority is bound to ensure
that the project is completed within the time stipulated. In any event,
as the dispute before us is confined to the legality and propriety of
the termination order, we are not concerned about the relationship
of the appellant with respondent no. 6.
VI. Conclusion:
30. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal, and we
dismiss the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 20844 of 2022
with costs quantified at Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) payable
to Supreme Court Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee.
In view of our decision, no further orders are necessary in the
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 217 of 2024.
31. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
VII. Re : Performance audit of statute:
32. Though we have disposed of this Civil Appeal by dismissing it, we
must record that this case has provoked us to reflect on the working
of this Act.
33. The Act came into being in 1971 and since then, for over five decades,
the High Court has been exercising judicial review jurisdiction,
disposing of Writ Petitions raising claims or challenges to the exercise
of powers or dereliction of duties by Authorities under the Act. Data
fetched from National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) reveals that a total
of 1612 cases involving disputes arising under the Act are pending
before the Bombay High Court. Of these, 135 cases are more than
10 years old. In the last 20 years, 4488 cases have been filed and
disposed of under the said Act. Latest data from the Bombay High
Court reveal that about 923 cases on the Appellate side and 738 on
the Original Side are pending adjudication. The Act is a beneficial
legislation, intended to materialize the Constitutional assurance of
dignity of the individual by providing basic housing, so integral to
human life. However, the propensity and the proclivity of the statute
to generate litigation are worrisome. There seems to be a problem
with the statutory framework for realizing the purpose and object
of the statute. In M/s. Galaxy Enterprises v. State of Maharashtra
(supra) the Bombay High Court has remarked that:
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“3. …Nonetheless, considering the volumes of disputes
still reaching the Courts, it can certainly be said that
time is ripe, if not too late, to ponder, whether things are
realistically working in the right direction, to eradicate slums
and rehabilitate the slum dwellers, with the desired efficacy
and expedition. This not only at the hands of the authorities
but also at the hands of the other stake holders. The vital
issue which has often led to controversy and disputes, is
on the rules permitting, the selection and appointment of
developers to undertake a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme,
being conferred on the slum dwellers, who are hardly
expected to know the nitty-gritty of the slum redevelopment
schemes. It is seen that the so called leaders of the slum
dwellers who are themselves in need to be rehabilitated,
are often lured by developers and their agents, and once
a developer is appointed, what normally prevails is a
constant fear of incertitude and scepticism amongst the
slum dwellers, leading to disputes on variety of issues
affecting their final rehabilitation. Such issues not only
frustrate the very object of a speedy slum redevelopment
but completely derail the slum schemes. It can be seen
that scores of slum schemes have remained incomplete for
years together and are languishing on such issues, either
in litigation before Courts and/or before the authorities.
These schemes need not face such ordeal, including
of an unending litigation. To change the developer is no
answer as even this process involves dispute resolution
and ultimately lengthy litigation from one forum to another.”
33.1. Further, referring to the statutory scheme, as per which
development is possible only when the slum dwellers feel the
need and seek development, the High Court pointed out yet
another problem about the statutory framework in the following
terms;
“…It cannot be countenanced that the slums be
redeveloped only when the slum dwellers feel the need
of a redevelopment and the Government Authorities cannot
initiate redevelopment and cannot initiate a suo motu action
in that behalf. It is hence, for the Government and the
Slum Authority to give its anxious consideration to these
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1471

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

issues and in its wisdom to device a substantial, nay a
full proof mechanism, by undertaking a study and identify
these grey areas, so that the helping hand as extended by
the legislature in providing this beneficial law as far back
in 1971 that is almost 50 years back is held strongly and
firmly by all concerned. It is never too late.”
34. The exasperation of the High Court about working of the Act is
understandable. The present appeal is a classic example of why the
High Court’s concern is genuine. It has been noticed that the statutory
scheme is problematic with respect to: i) Identification and declaration
of land as a slum. This problem involves an examination of the role of
authorities in giving such recognition, insidious intervention of builders
in the said process cast doubts on the independence and integrity in
the decision-making process; ii) Identification of slum dwellers: This
involves a complicated process of proof of such a status, the attendant
problem of groupism, giving rise to competing claims inevitably leading
to litigation; iii) Selection of a developer: The Act leaves this decision
to the cooperative society of slum dwellers and the majority decision
is manipulated by competing and rival developers; iv) Apportionment
of the slum land between redevelopment area and sale area: This
is yet another area where court has witnessed developers seeking
to increase the proportion of the sale area, leading to contestation;
v) Obligation to provide transit accommodation for the slum dwellers
pending redevelopment: Invariably, we see instances where the
developer does not provide transit accommodation within time or
provides an inadequate alternative in the form of a quantified amount
towards rent, On the other hand, there are instances where some
slum dwellers refuse to vacate the premises on the ground that the
transit accommodation is either inconvenient or the amount offered
is insufficient; vi) There are also issues of lack of independence and
objectivity in the functioning of statutory authorities: This is a matter
of serious concern. Courts have witnesses that the authorities have
no independence and, their tenure is also short. Additionally, the
functioning of these statutory authorities gives an indication that there
could be a regulatory capture; vii) Another concern which exists is
about the effectiveness of statutory remedies: Statutory remedies
are ineffective and at the same time, lacking in accountability and
vii) Judicial review proceedings under Art. 226 cannot be a long-
term solution: We have given details of the number of writ petitions
pending before the High Court in Para 33.
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35. The above-referred problems arising out of the statutory scheme and
policy framework should have come under review by the State of
Maharashtra. Assessment of the working of the statute to realise if
its purpose and objective achieved or not is the implied duty of the
executive government. Reviewing and assessing the implementation
of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. It is in recognition of
this obligation of the executive government that the constitutional
courts have directed governments to carry performance audit of
statutes.
36. Four aspects for achieving justice are well founded and articulated as,
i) distribution of advantages and disadvantages of society, ii) curbing
the abuse of power and liberty, iii) deciding disputes and, iv) adapting
to change.17 Adapting to change is important for achieving justice,
as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an abuse
of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to change is in its own
way an abuse of power. In fact, the issue is not one of change or not
to change, but of the direction and the speed of change and such
a change may come in various ways, and most effectively through
legislation. Legal reform through legislative correction improves the
legal system and it would require assessment of the working of
the law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well. The Executive
branch has a constitutional duty to ensure that the purpose and
object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it. It has the
additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute and must
have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact that
the statute is having. As stated above, reviewing and assessing
the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law.
The purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out
in practice as it was intended. If not, to understand the reason and
address it quickly. It is in this perspective that this court has, in a
number of cases, directed the Executive to carry a performance/
assessment audit of a statute or has suggested amendments to
the provisions of a particular enactment so as to remove perceived
infirmities in its working.18

17 See: Justice in Adapting to Change, in R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 305-327 (5th edn., 2013).
18 State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 404; Pravin Electricals (P) Ltd. v. Galaxy Infra &
Engineering (P) Ltd. (2021) 5 SCC 671; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667; Arif Azim
Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. (2024) 5 SCC 313; Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 224.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1473

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

37. Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such directions as
they are in a unique position of perceiving the working of a statute
while exercising judicial review, during which they could identify
the fault-lines in the implementation of a statute. This extraordinary
capacity to assess the working of a statute is available to the
judicial institution because of its unique position where, i) disputes,
based on the statutory provisions unfold before it, ii) claims of rights
or allegations of dereliction of duties are raised with varied, and
sometimes, contradictory interpretations of the same text of the
statute, iii) submissions of lawyers opens up a debate and as officers
of the Court experienced lawyers would lay bare the fault-lines in
the statutory scheme, iv) many a times court silently witnesses the
play of statutory power relegating the deserving to the backseat,
and the undeserving taking away all the benefits.
38. Laws that are made by Parliament or the legislative assemblies
create rights, entitlements, duties or liabilities. Application of such
empowerments or disabilities gives rise to competing claims or
conflicting interests. For resolution of these disputes, constitutional
courts provide public law remedies19 where claims and contestations
are decided by High Courts on a case by case basis. Judicial review
is generally episodic, and is intended to resolve the lis on a case-
to-case basis. Though cases are decided on their own merit and
the lis disposed of, what is left behind is the institutional memory
of the Court about the working of the statute and its interpretation
preserved as precedents. Over a period of time, a critical mass of
adjudicatory determinations on the working of the statute is built.
This critical mass, coupled with the experiences gained by the
Judges and the Court on the working of the statute, is of immense
value for auditing the working of the legislation. It enables the
court to assess whether the purpose and object of the Act is being
achieved or not.

19 Judicial control of administrative action in our country, the effective and the most prolific, has evolved
from its classical scrutiny of ultra vires exercise of power, to a whole set of procedural and substantive
principles, such as: legality, procedural propriety, reasonableness, legitimate expectation, proportionality,
transparency, legal certainty, accountability, level playing field, consultation or participation etc. These
principles are now well entrenched in our judicial review processes and are part of our administrative law.
In fact, bulk of judicial review proceedings initiate before the High Courts examine if the power exercised
is with its bounds.
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39. The traditional perception of the constitutional role of writ courts
was confined to judicial review of executive and legislative action.
In that role, the courts were to decide the vires of the legislative
and executive actions based on constitutional parameters. Not only
have the tools of judicial review been reinvented (the rise of the
proportionality and arbitrariness doctrines) but also the breadth of the
judicial power has substantially expanded to areas that were hitherto
forbidden (review of policy decisions, constitutional amendments and
continuing mandamus being prime examples). However, even this
expansive reading of judicial review does not capture the essence
of the judicial branch in its entirety.
40. There is yet another role which the judiciary can and ought to
perform- that of facilitator of access to justice and effective functioning
of constitutional bodies. In this role, the judiciary does not review
executive and legislative actions, but only nudges and provides
impetus to systemic reforms. The statute in question is one which
was intended to benefit the marginalised and the impoverished. It
is not easy for the intended beneficiaries of this legislation to carry
their voice to legislative branch for effective reform. The exercise
that this Court intends to direct presently is aimed at facilitating their
access to legislative and executive reform, which this court believes
is an essential component of constitutional justice. That all justice
is to be achieved only through courtroom debates is too myopic an
understanding of constitutional justice. The facilitative role is not
just inspired from the institutional role that the judiciary perceives
for itself, but is also a directive of many of the fundamental rights
in Part III and the cherished preambular vision of justice- social,
economic and political.
41. A peculiar feature of how our legislative system works is that an
overwhelming majority of legislations are introduced and carried
through by the Government, with very few private member bills being
introduced and debated. In such circumstances, the judicial role does
encompass, in this court’s understanding, the power, nay the duty
to direct the executive branch to review the working of statutes and
audit the statutory impact. It is not possible to exhaustively enlist
the circumstances and standards that will trigger such a judicial
direction. One can only state that this direction must be predicated
on a finding that the statute has through demonstrable judicial data
or other cogent material failed to ameliorate the conditions of the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1475

Yash Developers v.
Harihar Krupa Co-Operative Housing Society Limited & Ors.

beneficiaries. The courts will also do well, to arrive the very least, at
a prima facie finding that much statutory schemes and procedures
are gridlocked in bureaucratic or judicial quagmires that impede or
delay statutory objectives. This facilitative role the judiciary compels
audit of the legislation, promote debate and discussion but does not
and cannot compel legislative reforms.
42. In light of the foregoing, considering that the Act is a state-legislation,
implementation of which lies with the State of Maharashtra, and
till date no comprehensive statutory audit has been undertaken,
we request the Ld. Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to
constitute a bench to initiate suo motu proceedings for reviewing
the working of the statute to identify the cause of the problems
indicated in Paragraph 34. The concerned bench will hear the
government, the statutory authorities, the necessary stakeholders
including intended beneficiaries and perhaps take the assistance of
some senior members of the bar specialising in this area as amici
curae. We leave it to the High Court to devise such methods as it
deems fit and appropriate. Having examined the matter, the bench
may consider directing the government to constitute a committee for
performance audit of the Act. The court’s jurisdiction extends only to
that extent, and no further. The law-making, including amendments,
is the exclusive domain of the legislature.

Result of the case: Civil Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey