Holding

The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to summon the private respondents was justified and the High Court’s order setting aside the summons was erroneous.

Summary

The appellant, Yadwinder Singh, complained that his brother was murdered in a politically motivated incident and that the private respondents were present at the scene, as testified by eye‑witnesses. The trial court issued summons against the private respondents under Section 319 of the CrPC, but the High Court set aside those summons, relying on a Special Investigation Team report that found no evidence against them. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 319, holding that the power to summon additional persons may be exercised when the court, on the basis of evidence before it (including examination‑in‑chief), forms a prima facie view of their involvement, requiring a degree of satisfaction stronger than mere probability but not necessarily proof of guilt. The Court found that the trial court’s discretion was neither capricious nor arbitrary, and that the High Court’s interference was unwarranted. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the trial court was directed to issue fresh summons against the private respondents.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's order issuing summons under Section 319 CrPC.
Scope and ambit of the power conferred by Section 319 CrPC to summon additional persons.
Whether evidence recorded only in examination‑in‑chief suffices for invoking Section 319, or cross‑examination is required.
Degree of satisfaction required by the court to exercise the power under Section 319.
Whether the power under Section 319 extends to persons not named in the FIR or who have been discharged.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 319

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the Trial Court issuing summons u/s.319, CrPC against the private respondents. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed against other of offence – Murder of the appellant-informant’s brother, political rivalry alleged – FIR filed – SIT set up, no evidence found against the private respondents – Trial Court issued summons to the private respondents – High Court set aside the summons

Subjects

Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973MurderIssuance of summonsOther persons appearing to be guilty of offenceSpecial Investigation Team (SIT)Political rivalrySitting SarpanchAdditional accusedPersons present on the site of occurrenceDoctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1407 : 2025 INSC 420

Yadwinder Singh
v.
Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1713-1720 of 2025)
26 March 2025
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and
Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of
the Trial Court issuing summons u/s.319, CrPC against the private
respondents.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed
against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence –
Murder of the appellant-informant’s brother, political rivalry
alleged – FIR filed – SIT set up, no evidence found against
the private respondents – Trial Court issued summons to the
private respondents – High Court set aside the summons
issued – Interference with:
Held: Though, the SIT found no evidence against the private
respondents however, this by itself puts no fetters on the powers
conferred u/s.319 – Moreover, eye-witnesses named the private
respondents as persons present on the site of occurrence –
Absolving the private respondents based on the SIT’s findings alone
is not in the interests of justice – A case is made out to summon
the private respondents – On facts, discretion exercised by the Trial
Court neither capricious, nor arbitrary or mechanical – Impugned
order set aside – Trial Court to issue fresh summons. [Paras 16-18]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed
against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence –
Exercise of – Scope and ambit, discussed. [Paras 11-15]

Case Law Cited
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3 SCC
92; Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2021]
* Author
1408 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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6 SCR 219 : (2021) 12 SCC 608; Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State
of Punjab [2022] 10 SCR 156 : (2023) 1 SCC 289; Ramkrishna
Forgings Limited v. Ravindra Loonkar [2023] 16 SCR 672 : (2024)
2 SCC 122 – relied on.
Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan [2017] 3 SCR 374 : (2017)
7 SCC 706; Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 506; Shishupal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC
682; Yashodhan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2023] 10 SCR
1196 : (2023) 9 SCC 108 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Murder; Issuance
of summons; Other persons appearing to be guilty of offence;
Special Investigation Team (SIT); Political rivalry; Sitting Sarpanch;
Additional accused; Persons present on the site of occurrence;
Doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitor.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
1713-1720 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2024 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM Nos. 44097, 20532
and 25310 of 2022 and CRR Nos. 1204, 1474, 1513, 1558 and
1695 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha Dahiya, Jatin Hooda, Ms. Anjana Sharma,
Abhay Singh, Satish Kumar.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Adv., Saurabh Singh Chauhan,
Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Diggaj Pathak, Ms. Shweta Sharma,
Naveen Gaur, Ms. Vaibhavi Pathak, B. Abishek, Pradyut Kashyap,
Ms. Shreya Nair, Shivam Harsana, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor,
Shrey Kapoor.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1409

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah & Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Leave granted. By way of extraordinary indulgence to the respondents,
we have taken up the matter(s) de novo. The instant Judgment be,
therefore, read and contextualised in conjunction with our Order
dated 19.03.2025.
2. Heard learned counsel and learned senior counsel for the parties.
3. The present appeals are directed against the Impugned Order
dated 18.07.2024 [2024 SCC OnLine P&H 11673] passed by a
learned Single Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh by which summons issued under Section 3191 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Code’) by the learned Trial Court against the private respondents in
connection with First Information Report No.50 of 2020 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘FIR’) registered at Police Station Passiana, District
Patiala, Punjab were set aside.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr Jitesh Malik, submits that the
appellant is the complainant/informant and his brother had died. It
was submitted that in the FIR itself, all the respondents/accused were
identified ‘in the light of the car’2 and it was a brutal murder where

1 ‘319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.—(1) Where, in the
course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being
the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused,
the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances
of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by
such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then—
(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses
re-heard;
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an
accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or
trial was commenced.’
2 We take it that this means that the identity of the accused was discernible to the appellant-complainant
despite it being 8.30pm in the night.
1410 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the deceased was pulled out from the car and then done to death.
Learned counsel submitted that the issuance of summons was on
the basis of the tentative view formed by the Trial Court, being that
of likely involvement of the private respondents in the crime and
ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court at such a
preliminary stage, especially when the Trial Court had found sufficient
material to summon the private respondents/accused. Prayer was
made to allow the appeals.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
5. Per contra, the private respondents led by Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
learned senior counsel, submit that the instant is not a fit case where
this Court should interfere. It was contended that power to summon
a person as accused under Section 319 of the Code, though exists
on the statute-book but is to be sparingly used and under very fitting
circumstances. It was submitted that the Courts have consistently
held that the test would be higher than at the stage of framing of
charge and just short of holding a person guilty of the charge. It was
submitted that in the present case, as per the allegation in the FIR
itself, 24 persons had come on three different vehicles, which, to
begin with, was highly improbable and impractical. Further, it was
submitted that the complainant’s initial version is that he along with
the deceased were travelling in the car, whereas in his deposition
before the Court, it is stated that three persons were travelling in the
car i.e., PW1 (who is the informant himself) alongwith the deceased
and their other brother i.e., PW2. It was urged that this was not a
minor and natural variation but a clear building-up of a case against
others and to get additional eye-witnesses created, since there was
no other independent corroboration of the incident in question.
6. Learned senior counsel submitted that in the present case, after
the lodging of the FIR, a Special Investigation Team (hereinafter
referred to as ‘SIT’) was set up to verify the facts because of the
sensitive nature of the incident. It was advanced that the SIT found
that the respondents could not have been at the place of occurrence
for cogent reasons both on the basis of witnesses supporting their
presence at some other place(s) and also on the basis of CCTV3

3 Abbreviation for Closed Circuit Television.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1411

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

footage, which is electronic evidence. Learned senior counsel
submitted that the fall-out was due to political rivalry as the deceased
was a sitting Sarpanch. In support of his contentions, he relied upon
Brijendra Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706 to contend
that the power to summon under Section 319 of the Code has been
circumscribed by the conditions laid down by this Court from time-
to-time. Going by the same, in the present case where only two
prosecution witnesses, that too close relatives of the deceased, have
been examined, without being subjected to any cross-examination,
the repetition of the version in the FIR with the addition that the
other eye-witness viz. PW-2 has been introduced as being present
in the car in which the deceased and PW1/informant were travelling
was not sufficient to fulfil the requirement for invoking power under
Section 319 of the Code. In the present case, learned senior counsel
contended that from Paragraph 15 of Brijendra Singh (supra), the
following law emerges, which was a case where witnesses had been
examined and after that summons under Section 319 of the Code
were issued, and the Court held:
‘15. This record was before the trial court. Notwithstanding
the same, the trial court went by the deposition of
complainant and some other persons in their examination-
in-chief, with no other material to support their so-called
verbal/ocular version. Thus, the ‘evidence’ recorded during
trial was nothing more than the statements which was
already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the
time of investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court
would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis
of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-
chief. However, in a case like the present where plethora
of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation
which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least
duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie
opinion and to see as to whether ‘much stronger evidence
than mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has
come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature.
Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised
of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the
appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is
more troubling is that even when this material on record
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was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in
the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court
too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing
the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and
expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been
done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny.’
7. The private respondents also cited Jamin v State of Uttar Pradesh,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 506. The private respondents, collectively,
sought dismissal of these appeals.

APPELLANT’S REJOINDER:
8. By way of rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellant submits that
though there has been consistency in the stand of the appellant
with regard to presence of all the private persons concerned i.e.,
that they came in three cars and that their presence has also been
supported by two eye-witnesses, including the appellant, the SIT
for obvious reasons, as the case has a political nature, shielded
the private respondents. It was submitted that during trial, when in
deposition, persons claiming to be eye-witnesses take the name of
the private respondents as being present on the spot, it is always in
the interest of justice that at the earliest point of time possible, they
are called upon, so that the trial does not linger or has to revert back
to an early stage, to enable the persons so summoned to go through
the paraphernalia of cross-examining all the witnesses, which has
to be in their presence. It was submitted that in the recent judgment
in Jamin (supra), the foundational facts were different inasmuch as
the persons who were summoned under Section 319 of the Code
were still under investigation by the police. Thus, in that view, the
Court held there was no occasion for the Court to jump the gun and
issue summons under Section 319 of the Code.

STATE IN ABSENTIA:
9. Regrettably, despite service of notice, none appeared for the State
of Punjab. In this case, before the High Court, the stand of the
State was that the private respondents ‘have rightly been declared
innocent.’ The State should not forget that in criminal matters, it acts
as investigator and prosecutor and must be available to assist the
Courts when called upon so to do. Let a copy of this Judgment be
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1413

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

despatched to the Legal Remembrancer and Principal Secretary,
Department of Legal and Legislative Affairs, Government of Punjab
by the Registry, for information and appropriate remedial steps.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
10. Having thoughtfully considered the submissions of learned counsel
for the parties and upon going through the materials available on
record, we find that the order impugned requires interference. Let us
first survey the legal position pertaining to Section 319 of the Code.
11. In Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, a 5-Judge
Bench explained:
‘12. Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex
damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned
when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used
as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit
underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC.
13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing the
real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason
does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the
court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face
trial. The question remains under what circumstances
and at what stage should the court exercise its power as
contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?
xxx
16. It is at this stage that the comparison of the words used
under Section 319 CrPC has to be understood distinctively
from the words used under Section 2(g) defining an inquiry
other than the trial by a Magistrate or a court. Here the
legislature has used two words, namely, the Magistrate
or court, whereas under Section 319 CrPC, as indicated
above, only the word “court” has been recited. This has
been done by the legislature to emphasise that the power
under Section 319 CrPC is exercisable only by the court
and not by any officer not acting as a court. Thus, the
Magistrate not functioning or exercising powers as a court
can make an inquiry in a particular proceeding other than
a trial but the material so collected would not be by a court
1414 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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during the course of an inquiry or a trial. The conclusion
therefore, in short, is that in order to invoke the power
under Section 319 CrPC, it is only a Court of Session or
a Court of Magistrate performing the duties as a court
under CrPC that can utilise the material before it for the
purpose of the said section.
17. Section 319 CrPC allows the court to proceed against
any person who is not an accused in a case before it.
Thus, the person against whom summons are issued in
exercise of such powers, has to necessarily not be an
accused already facing trial. He can either be a person
named in Column 2 of the charge-sheet filed under
Section 173 CrPC or a person whose name has been
disclosed in any material before the court that is to be
considered for the purpose of trying the offence, but not
investigated. He has to be a person whose complicity
may be indicated and connected with the commission
of the offence.
18. The legislature cannot be presumed to have imagined
all the circumstances and, therefore, it is the duty of the
court to give full effect to the words used by the legislature
so as to encompass any situation which the court may
have to tackle while proceeding to try an offence and not
allow a person who deserves to be tried to go scot-free by
being not arraigned in the trial in spite of the possibility of
his complicity which can be gathered from the documents
presented by the prosecution.
19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty
is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it
will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers
with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is
not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away
by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting
agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an
accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved
even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though
he may be connected with the commission of the offence.
xxx
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1415

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

55. Accordingly, we hold that the court can exercise the
power under Section 319 CrPC only after the trial proceeds
and commences with the recording of the evidence and also
in exceptional circumstances as explained hereinabove.
xxx
78. It is, therefore, clear that the word “evidence” in Section
319 CrPC means only such evidence as is made before
the court, in relation to statements, and as produced before
the court, in relation to documents. It is only such evidence
that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or the
court to decide whether the power under Section 319
CrPC is to be exercised and not on the basis of material
collected during the investigation.
79. The inquiry by the court is neither attributable to the
investigation nor the prosecution, but by the court itself
for collecting information to draw back a curtain that hides
something material. It is the duty of the court to do so
and therefore the power to perform this duty is provided
under CrPC.
xxx
83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilised,
rather it is that material after cognizance is taken by a
court, that is available to it while making an inquiry into
or trying an offence, that the court can utilise or take
into consideration for supporting reasons to summon
any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the
court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated
to be an accomplice in the commission of the offence.
The inference that can be drawn is that material which
is not exactly evidence recorded before the court, but
is a material collected by the court, can be utilised to
corroborate evidence already recorded for the purpose of
summoning any other person, other than the accused. This
would harmonise such material with the word “evidence”
as material that would be supportive in nature to facilitate
the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity in
the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped
the notice of the court.
1416 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in
its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed
earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section
319 CrPC. The court, therefore, should be understood
to have the power to proceed against any person after
summoning him on the basis of any such material as
brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court
becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously
on such material after evidence has been led during trial.
xxx
89. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
diverse views expressed in the aforementioned cases.
Once examination-in-chief is conducted, the statement
becomes part of the record. It is evidence as per law
and in the true sense, for at best, it may be rebuttable.
An evidence being rebutted or controverted becomes a
matter of consideration, relevance and belief, which is the
stage of judgment by the court. Yet it is evidence and it
is material on the basis whereof the court can come to a
prima facie opinion as to complicity of some other person
who may be connected with the offence.
90. As held in Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq,
(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889: AIR 2007 SC
1899] and Harbhajan Singh [(2009) 13 SCC 608: (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1135], all that is required for the exercise of the
power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to
the court that some other person also who is not facing
the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The
prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to
the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to
in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no
straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to
conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and,
if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of
evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise
the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed
against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the
section also uses the words “such person could be tried”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1417

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not
to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and
cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on
the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact,
it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person
sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having
any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4)
of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a
fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the
right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine
defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the
same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-
chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a
person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence
appearing against such person is such that it prima facie
necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact,
examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination,
undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
91. Further, in our opinion, there does not seem to be
any logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the
witness is over. It is to be kept in mind that at the time of
exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, the person
sought to be arraigned as an accused, is in no way
participating in the trial. Even if the cross-examination
is to be taken into consideration, the person sought to
be arraigned as an accused cannot cross-examine the
witness(es) prior to passing of an order under Section 319
CrPC, as such a procedure is not contemplated by CrPC.
Secondly, invariably the State would not oppose or object
to naming of more persons as an accused as it would only
help the prosecution in completing the chain of evidence,
unless the witness(es) is obliterating the role of persons
already facing trial. More so, Section 299 CrPC enables
the court to record evidence in absence of the accused
in the circumstances mentioned therein.
92. Thus, in view of the above, we hold that power
under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage
of completion of examination-in-chief and the court does
not need to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross-
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examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can
be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court, in
respect of complicity of some other person(s), not facing
the trial in the offence.
xxx
105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary
and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly
and only in those cases where the circumstances of the
case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the
Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that
some other person may also be guilty of committing that
offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs
against a person from the evidence led before the court
that such power should be exercised and not in a casual
and cavalier manner.
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is
to be established from the evidence led before the court,
not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination,
it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability
of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one
which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the
time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an
extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to
conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court
should refrain from exercising power under Section 319
CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if
“it appears from the evidence that any person not being
the accused has committed any offence” is clear from the
words “for which such person could be tried together with
the accused”. The words used are not “for which such
person could be convicted”. There is, therefore, no scope
for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any
opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
xxx
116. Thus, it is evident that power under Section 319
CrPC can be exercised against a person not subjected to
investigation, or a person placed in Column 2 of the charge-
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1419

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

sheet and against whom cognizance had not been taken, or
a person who has been discharged. However, concerning
a person who has been discharged, no proceedings can
be commenced against him directly under Section 319
CrPC without taking recourse to provisions of Section
300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC.
xxx
117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence”
in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and
not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section
319(1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-
examination or the court can exercise the power under the
said provision even on the basis of the statement made in
the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Answer
117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC
a person against whom material is disclosed is only
summoned to face the trial and in such an event under
Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against such person
is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance,
the court need not wait for the evidence against the
accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-
examination.
Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction
required to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to
arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section
319(1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied
that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be
convicted?
Answer
117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) CrPC the accused
subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been
an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the
offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for
summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would be
the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the
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degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused
and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that
the trial may have already commenced against the original
accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials
are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh
summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial
therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the
accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
Question (v)—Does the power under Section 319 CrPC
extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the
FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?
Answer
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though
named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a
person who has been discharged can be summoned under
Section 319 CrPC provided from the evidence it appears
that such person can be tried along with the accused
already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused
who has been discharged is concerned the requirement
of Sections 300 and 398 CrPC has to be complied with
before he can be summoned afresh.’
(emphasis supplied)

12. In Brijendra Singh (supra), the Court reiterated, inter alia:
’13. … However, since it is a discretionary power given
to the court under Section 319 CrPC and is also an
extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly
and only in those cases where the circumstances of the
case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction is more than
the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of
the charges against others in respect of whom charge-
sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence
occurs against a person from the evidence led before the
court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be
exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie
opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence
than mere probability of his complicity.’
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1421

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

13. In Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 12
SCC 608, a 2-Judge Bench noted:
‘10. We say this for the following reason: The test as laid
down by the Constitution Bench of this Court for invoking
power under Section 319CrPC inter alia includes the
principle that only when strong and cogent evidence
occurs against a person from the evidence the power
under Section 319CrPC should be exercised. The power
cannot be exercised in a casual and cavalier manner.
The test to be applied, as laid down by this Court, is one
which is more than prima facie case which is applied at
the time of framing of charges.
11. It will all depend upon the evidence which is tendered
in a given case as to whether there is a strong ground
within the meaning of para 105.’
(emphasis supplied)

14. In Sukhpal Singh Khaira v State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289,
another 5-Judge Bench elucidated:
‘15. At the outset, having noted the provision, it is amply
clear that the power bestowed on the court is to the effect
that in the course of an inquiry into, or trial of an offence,
based on the evidence tendered before the court, if it
appears to the court that such evidence points to any
person other than the accused who are being tried before
the court to have committed any offence and such accused
has been excluded in the charge-sheet or in the process
of trial till such time could still be summoned and tried
together with the accused for the offence which appears
to have been committed by such persons summoned as
additional accused.
xxx
23. A close perusal of Section 319CrPC indicates that
the power bestowed on the court to summon any person
who is not an accused in the case is, when in the course
of the trial it appears from the evidence that such person
has a role in committing the offence. Therefore, it would
1422 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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be open for the court to summon such a person so that
he could be tried together with the accused and such
power is exclusively of the court. Obviously, when such
power is to summon the additional accused and try such
a person with the already charged accused against whom
the trial is proceeding, it will have to be exercised before
the conclusion of trial. The connotation “conclusion of trial”
in the present case cannot be reckoned as the stage till
the evidence is recorded, but, is to be understood as the
stage before pronouncement of the judgment as already
held in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2014) 3 SCC 92: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] since on judgment
being pronounced the trial comes to a conclusion since
until such time the accused is being tried by the court.
xxx
33. In that view of the matter, if the court finds from the
evidence recorded in the process of trial that any other
person is involved, such power to summon the accused
under Section 319CrPC can be exercised by passing an
order to that effect before the sentence is imposed and
the judgment is complete in all respects bringing the trial
to a conclusion. While arriving at such conclusion what is
also to be kept in view is the requirement of sub-section
(4) to Section 319CrPC. From the said provision it is clear
that if the learned Sessions Judge exercises the power
to summon the additional accused, the proceedings in
respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and
the witnesses will have to be re-examined in the presence
of the additional accused. In a case where the learned
Sessions Judge exercises the power under Section
319CrPC after recording the evidence of the witnesses or
after pronouncing the judgment of conviction but before
sentence being imposed, the very same evidence which
is available on record cannot be used against the newly
added accused in view of Section 273CrPC. As against
the accused who has been summoned subsequently a
fresh trial is to be held. However while considering the
application under Section 319CrPC, if the decision by
the learned Sessions Judge is to summon the additional
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1423

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

accused before passing the judgment of conviction or
passing an order on sentence, the conclusion of the trial
by pronouncing the judgment is required to be withheld
and the application under Section 319CrPC is required
to be disposed of and only then the conclusion of the
judgment, either to convict the other accused who were
before the Court and to sentence them can be proceeded
with. This is so since the power under Section 319CrPC
can be exercised only before the conclusion of the trial by
passing the judgment of conviction and sentence.
34. Though Section 319CrPC provides that such person
summoned as per sub-section (1) thereto could be jointly
tried together with the other accused, keeping in view
the power available to the court under Section 223CrPC
to hold a joint trial, it would also be open to the learned
Sessions Judge at the point of considering the application
under Section 319CrPC and deciding to summon the
additional accused, to also take a decision as to whether
a joint trial is to be held after summoning such accused
by deferring the judgment being passed against the tried
accused. If a conclusion is reached that the fresh trial to
be conducted against the newly added accused could
be separately tried, in such event it would be open for
the learned Sessions Judge to order so and proceed
to pass the judgment and conclude the trial insofar as
the accused against whom it had originally proceeded
and thereafter proceed in the case of the newly added
accused. However, what is important is that the decision
to summon an additional accused either suo motu by the
court or on an application under Section 319CrPC shall in
all eventuality be considered and disposed of before the
judgment of conviction and sentence is pronounced, as
otherwise, the trial would get concluded and the court will
get divested of the power under Section 319CrPC. Since
a power is available to the court to decide as to whether
a joint trial is required to be held or not, this Court was
justified in holding the phrase, “could be tried together
with the accused” as contained in Section 319(1)CrPC,
to be directory as held in Shashikant Singh [Shashikant
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Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh, (2002) 5 SCC 738: 2002 SCC
(Cri) 1203] which in our opinion is the correct view.
xxx
38. For all the reasons stated above, we answer the
questions referred as hereunder.
39.(I) Whether the trial court has the power under Section
319CrPC for summoning additional accused when the
trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the
judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before
pronouncing the summoning order?
The power under Section 319CrPC is to be invoked
and exercised before the pronouncement of the order of
sentence where there is a judgment of conviction of the
accused. In the case of acquittal, the power should be
exercised before the order of acquittal is pronounced.
Hence, the summoning order has to precede the conclusion
of trial by imposition of sentence in the case of conviction.
If the order is passed on the same day, it will have to be
examined on the facts and circumstances of each case
and if such summoning order is passed either after the
order of acquittal or imposing sentence in the case of
conviction, the same will not be sustainable.
40.(II) Whether the trial court has the power under Section
319CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial
in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose
presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending,
having been bifurcated from the main trial?
The trial court has the power to summon additional
accused when the trial is proceeded in respect of the
absconding accused after securing his presence, subject
to the evidence recorded in the split-up (bifurcated) trial
pointing to the involvement of the accused sought to
be summoned. But the evidence recorded in the main
concluded trial cannot be the basis of the summoning
order if such power has not been exercised in the main
trial till its conclusion.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1425

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

41.(III) What are the guidelines that the competent
court must follow while exercising power under Section
319CrPC?
41.1. If the competent court finds evidence or if application
under Section 319CrPC is filed regarding involvement
of any other person in committing the offence based on
evidence recorded at any stage in the trial before passing
of the order on acquittal or sentence, it shall pause the
trial at that stage.
41.2. The court shall thereupon first decide the need or
otherwise to summon the additional accused and pass
orders thereon.
41.3. If the decision of the court is to exercise the power
under Section 319CrPC and summon the accused, such
summoning order shall be passed before proceeding
further with the trial in the main case.
41.4. If the summoning order of additional accused is
passed, depending on the stage at which it is passed, the
court shall also apply its mind to the fact as to whether
such summoned accused is to be tried along with the
other accused or separately.
41.5. If the decision is for joint trial, the fresh trial shall
be commenced only after securing the presence of the
summoned accused.
41.6. If the decision is that the summoned accused can be
tried separately, on such order being made, there will be
no impediment for the court to continue and conclude the
trial against the accused who were being proceeded with.
41.7. If the proceeding paused as in para 41.1 above, is
in a case where the accused who were tried are to be
acquitted, and the decision is that the summoned accused
can be tried afresh separately, there will be no impediment
to pass the judgment of acquittal in the main case.
41.8. If the power is not invoked or exercised in the main
trial till its conclusion and if there is a split-up (bifurcated)
case, the power under Section 319CrPC can be invoked or
1426 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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exercised only if there is evidence to that effect, pointing to
the involvement of the additional accused to be summoned
in the split-up (bifurcated) trial.
41.9. If, after arguments are heard and the case is reserved
for judgment the occasion arises for the Court to invoke and
exercise the power under Section 319CrPC, the appropriate
course for the court is to set it down for re-hearing.
41.10. On setting it down for re-hearing, the above laid
down procedure to decide about summoning; holding of
joint trial or otherwise shall be decided and proceeded
with accordingly.
41.11. Even in such a case, at that stage, if the decision
is to summon additional accused and hold a joint trial the
trial shall be conducted afresh and de novo proceedings
be held.
41.12. If, in that circumstance, the decision is to hold
a separate trial in case of the summoned accused as
indicated earlier:
(a) The main case may be decided by pronouncing the
conviction and sentence and then proceed afresh against
summoned accused.
(b) In the case of acquittal the order shall be passed to that
effect in the main case and then proceed afresh against
summoned accused.’
(emphasis supplied)

15. We are cognizant of the observations in Shishupal Singh v State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 682 and Yashodhan Singh v State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 9 SCC 108. A Coordinate Bench, recently in
Jamin (supra), has stated, inter alia:
‘115. We summarise our findings on the issues framed for
consideration as follows:
a. The High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
was justified in setting aside the order passed by the
Trial Court rejecting the second application preferred by
respondent no. 2 under Section 319 of the CrPC as the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1427

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

same was found to have been passed contrary to the
settled position of law, suffering from a patent illegality,
thus, leading to serious miscarriage of justice.
b. Once a superior court deems fit to interfere with an order
passed by a subordinate court, then any rectifications to
such order passed in exercise of revisional powers under
Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC must be
treated on the same footing as rectifications made by an
appellate court and as a result would relate back to the
time the original order was passed.
c. By virtue of relating back of the order passed by the
High Court in a revision petition, the summoning order
passed by the Trial Court in compliance with the order of
the High Court would also relate back to the initial order
rejecting the second application under Section 319, and
therefore could be said to have been passed before the
conclusion of the trial.
d. Unlike cases where an application under Section
319 is being decided in the first instance by the Trial
Court, the conclusion of trial will have no bearing on the
adjudication of an application under Section 319 in terms
of the directions of the High Court passed in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction.
e. The legal effect of the order passed by the High Court
relating back to the original order of the Trial Court is that
the Trial Court would not be rendered functus officio for the
purpose of considering the application under Section 319
after the conclusion of the trial. We say so because the
Trial Court, in considering the application under Section
319 after the conclusion of the trial, merely gave effect to
a revisional order directing it to consider the application
afresh which it had originally rejected.
f. The summoning order dated 21.02.2024 was passed by
the Trial Court in pursuance of the directions issued by
the High Court vide the revisional order dated 14.09.2021.
Therefore, the same should be construed as an extension
of the revisional order passed by the High Court. The
combined effect of the revisional order passed by the
1428 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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High Court and the summoning order passed by the Trial
Court dated 21.02.2024 would be that the order of the
Trial Court dated 19.07.2010 rejecting the second Section
319 application stood replaced and substituted by the
summoning order dated 21.02.2024. Thus, although the
summoning order in the present case came to be passed
on 21.02.2024, that is, after the conclusion of the trial, yet,
it would be deemed to have been passed on 19.07.2010
by virtue of the law expounded by this Court in Maru Ram
(supra) and Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat (supra).
g. Section 319 does not contemplate that a summoned
person must be given an opportunity of being heard before
being added as an accused to face the trial. A right of
hearing would accrue only to a person who is already
discharged in the very same proceeding prior to the
commencement of the trial. This is different from holding
that a person who has been summoned as per Section
319 CrPC has a right of being heard in accordance with
the principles of natural justice before being added as an
accused to be tried along with the other accused. However,
after the rejection of an application under Section 319, a
right enures in favour of the proposed accused. Thereafter,
if in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is
to pass an order which is prejudicial to the benefit which
had already enured in favour of the proposed accused,
then the High Court is obligated in law to provide an
opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused. This
is also the mandate as contained in sub-section (2) of
Section 401 of the CrPC.’
(emphasis supplied)

16. The law contemplates and provides for a different outcome under
Section 319 of the Code, dependent on the peculiar factual
premises of a case. Juxtaposition of the law with the instant
factual backdrop reveals as under: It is true that the SIT found no
evidence against the private respondents, however such factum
by itself puts no fetters on the powers bestowed under Section
319 of the Code. Moreover, eye-witnesses in the Trial Court have
named the private respondents as persons present on the site of
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1429

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.

occurrence. The hardship, were we to adjudge it at this juncture,
could be more if the private respondents are not summoned than
opposed to if they are.
17. Be it noted, the private respondents will have all defences open to
them before the Trial Court to put forth their version of innocence,
including by way of resort to cross-examination. Trial being an exercise
to unravel the truth, given the depositions before the Trial Court, to
absolve the private respondents based on the SIT’s findings alone,
to our mind, may not be in the best interests of justice. Indubitably,
while an innocent person should not be punished, no guilty person
should go scot-free. The Trial Court could have better worded its
order through clearer reasoning. Reproduction of a passage from
Ramkrishna Forgings Limited v Ravindra Loonkar, (2024) 2 SCC
122 is apt:
‘39. In the recent past, from Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan [Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood
Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 852]
to Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan [Manoj
Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan, (2022) 3 SCC 501:
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 1], the clear position in law is that
a court or even a quasi-judicial authority has a duty to
record reasons for its decision. Needless to add, “Reason
is the heartbeat of every conclusion. Without the same,
it becomes lifeless.” [Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar,
(2003) 11 SCC 519: 2004 SCC (Cri) 212]…’
18. On an overall conspectus, the discretion exercised by the Trial Court
cannot be said to be capricious/arbitrary/mechanical in juxtaposition
with the facts, subject to the comment supra. But then, this Court
cannot be oblivious to the work pressure on the learned Judges
manning the District and Trial Courts. When we are satisfied that
a case is made out to summon the private respondents, in the
totality of the relevant considerations, the order impugned cannot
withstand judicial scrutiny and will have to be interdicted. Accordingly,
the Impugned Order dated 18.07.2024 passed by the High Court
is set aside and the Criminal Appeals are allowed. The Trial Court
shall issue fresh summons against the private respondents. If they
do not appear, the Trial Court shall make all efforts to secure their
appearance and proceed as per law.
1430 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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19. Observations hereinabove are restricted to the purpose of deciding
the challenge to the Impugned Order and shall have no bearing on
the merits of the underlying case. All factual and legal contentions
are left open to be pressed into service before the Court concerned,
at the appropriate stage.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey