Supreme Court of India
XXXversusTHE UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 943
- Decided
- 7 August 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The in‑house Procedure is a constitutionally valid, non‑removal, fact‑finding mechanism, and its provisions including paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) do not violate the Constitution; therefore the writ petition is dismissed.
Summary
A High Court judge (the petitioner) was implicated after a fire in his bungalow revealed burnt currency notes, prompting the Supreme Court's in‑house Procedure. A three‑member committee found serious misconduct and the Chief Justice of India (CJI) forwarded the report to the President and Prime Minister, after which the judge filed a writ petition challenging the constitutionality of paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the Procedure and seeking to quash any removal action. The Court examined whether the Procedure has legal sanction, whether it is an extra‑constitutional removal mechanism, and whether it conflicts with Articles 124, 217 and 218 of the Constitution. It held that the Procedure is a valid, fact‑finding mechanism rooted in Article 141, does not itself effect removal, and its provisions do not violate any constitutional provision. The CJI acted within the Procedure, and the requirement to inform the President and Prime Minister is lawful. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the writ petition should be entertained given the conduct of the petitioner‑High Court Judge.
- Whether the in‑house Procedure has legal sanction.
- Whether an inquiry and report under the Procedure constitute a parallel and extra‑constitutional mechanism for removal of a judge.
- Whether paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure contravenes clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218, or abrogates any fundamental right of a High Court judge.
- Whether the CJI or the Committee acted in accordance with the Procedure or deviated from it.
- Whether paragraph 7(ii) obliging the CJI to forward the Committee’s report to the President and Prime Minister is unconstitutional.
Legislation cited
- Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
- Judges (Protection) Act, 1985s. 2, s. 3(1), s. 3(2)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to the conduct of the petitioner-High Court Judge; does the In-house Procedure have legal sanction; is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the Procedure (which could be unfavourable a parallel and extra- constitutional mechanism; does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure foul clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Arts.217 and 218 of the Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court; did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI act in terms of
Subjects
Proceedings for removal of a JudgeImpeachmentIn‑house ProcedureJudges (Protection) ActJudges (Inquiry) ActFundamental RightsJudicial independenceSeparation of powersPreliminary inquiryConfidentialityParliamentary removal processChief Justice of India
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1941 : 2025 INSC 943
XXX
v.
The Union of India & Others
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699 of 2025)
07 August 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the writ petition be entertained at all
having regard to the conduct of the petitioner-High Court Judge;
does the In-house Procedure have legal sanction; is an inquiry
and the consequent report in terms of the Procedure (which could
be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-
constitutional mechanism; does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure
foul clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Arts.217 and 218 of the
Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of
a High Court; did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI
act in terms of the Procedure or in deviation thereof; and is the
requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the CJI
to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the
Prime Minister unconstitutional.
Headnotes†
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Constitutional validity – Restatement of Values
of Judicial Life dated 31st October, 1997 – Incident of fire at a
store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to the petitioner-
High Court Judge – Burnt currency notes discovered, and his
conduct fell for scrutiny – “In-house Procedure” devised by
the Supreme Court set in motion – Responses sought from the
petitioner – Thereafter, three-member Committee constituted
by the Chief Justice of India – Committee recorded that
misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation
of proceedings for removal of the petitioner from his office –
In terms of the Procedure, the CJI forwarded the report of the
Committee to the President and Prime Minister – Petitioner
then filed writ petition being aggrieved by the Procedure to
the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the
* Author
1942 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal; and
that the Procedure permits the CJI to intimate the President
and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants initiation
of proceedings for removal and sought declaration that his
removal was unconstitutional and ultra vires Art.124 and 218
and be quashed:
Held: Conduct of the petitioner does not inspire much confidence
to entertain the writ petition – Petitioner did not object to the
photographs/video footage being uploaded, he participated in the
inquiry without demur – Procedure could be seen as having a legal
sanction – It is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a parallel
and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge – In-
house inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself
does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally
ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal
mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
mechanism – Argument that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional
scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is
unsustainable – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure
in any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional
provision – Right from the constitution of the Committee till
intimations were given to the President and the Prime Minister by
the CJI-its neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either
the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in
deviation of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video
footage were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – As
regards the requirement of para 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging
the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
and the Prime Minister, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the
Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution
or the concept of separation of powers – Constitution of India –
Art.14, 32, 121, 124, 211, 217, 218, 141 – Judges (Inquiry) Act,
1968. [Paras 100-125]
Constitution of India – Art.32 – Maintainability/Entertainability
of the writ petition considering conduct of petitioner-High
Court Judge as distinguished from waiver of rights:
Held: Challenge to the constitutionality of paragraph 5(b) and 7(ii)
of the Procedure has been raised in this writ petition only after
the CJI had written to the President and the Prime Minister, while
enclosing therewith copy of the Report of the Committee together
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1943
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
with the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025, as required
by the Procedure – According to the petitioner, uploading of the
photographs/video footage, caused him immense harm, not only did
it lower his reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without
even a preliminary inquiry – However, the conduct of the petitioner
to acquiesce to such uploading, participate in the inquiry without
demur, and to question such uploading only after the Committee
submitted its report to the CJI recording that there was sufficient
substance in the allegations, baffles this Court – Submission
that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry is
untenable – Though uploading of incriminating evidence available
against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step
which the Procedure requires and while such uploading may not be
considered to be proper, it is indeed fait accompli – No benefit can
be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence
at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have
been recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner
to abide by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life – If indeed
any fault were found in the Procedure and questions were to be
raised, the Petitioner ought not to have waited for completion of
the fact-finding inquiry set in motion by the CJI – Conduct of the
Petitioner, does not inspire much confidence to entertain the writ
petition. [Paras 100, 105-107]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Does the In-house Procedure have legal
sanction – Whether an inquiry and the consequent report
in terms of the Procedure (which could be unfavourable to
the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional
mechanism:
Held: Procedure could be seen as having a legal sanction –
Procedure has its roots in the law declared by this Court u/Art.141
of the Constitution – ‘Law for the time being in force’ in sub-
section (2) of s.3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down
by this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with
‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough
to encompass measures that the Procedure contemplates – It
is not the law that once the Committee constituted by the CJI
records in its report that the conduct of the Judge under probe
warrants initiation of proceedings for his removal and the CJI,
in turn, upon accepting such report furnishes the same together
1944 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
with his recommendation, if any, to the President and the Prime
Minister, that would invariably in all cases result in initiation of
proceedings u/Art.124(4) and (5) of the Constitution (for Supreme
Court Judges) and Arts.217 and 218 read with Art.124 (for High
Court Judges) and the inquiry under the Inquiry Act – Report or
no report, recommendation or no recommendation, whatever
is the case, the Parliament’s power to initiate proceedings for
removal of a Judge for alleged misbehaviour or incapacity remains
unfettered – Even though there could be a case where good
grounds for initiation of proceedings do exist, the Parliament
may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to initiate proceedings
for removal – Contrarily, even if it is reported by the Committee
under the Procedure that there exists any of the two situations
[para 5(a) or 5(c)] and the CJI, accepting such report, does not
make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to
initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers
necessary so to do – Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong
indication of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or
suffering from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for
removal, no proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie
for activating the Parliament to have such Judge removed from
office – Power, competence, authority and jurisdiction of the
Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of the nation
is left untrammelled by the Procedure; hence, it is fallacious to
argue that the Procedure is a parallel and extra-constitutional
mechanism for removal of a Judge – Yet again, the in-house
inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself does
not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally
ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal
mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
mechanism. [Paras 110-117]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” –
Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure, if foul
clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Art.217 and 218 of the
Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge
of a High Court:
Held: Submission that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional
scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is
unsustainable – Procedure that has been laid down in the Procedure
is fair and just which does not compromise judicial independence
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1945
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
either, a basic feature of our Constitution – Judge by his conduct
of being fair and just is supposed to earn for himself as well as
the judiciary the trust and respect of the members of the bar as
well as the litigants and all other stakeholders – If a complaint
of misconduct committed by a Judge is received and if at an
inquiry conducted under the Procedure the allegations against
such a Judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot
claim any immunity-either by citing abrogation of his Fundamental
Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a
Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment-that his conduct
is not open to be commented upon by the Committee or even by
the CJI – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in
any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional
provision. [Paras 119, 120]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
Whether CJI/Committee acted in terms of the Procedure or
in deviation thereof:
Held: Right from the constitution of the Committee till intimations
were given to the President and the Prime Minister by the CJI, it
has neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either the CJI
constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in deviation
of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video footage
were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – Placing
incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in
the public domain is not a measure provided in the Procedure,
either expressly or by implication – Inquiry under the Procedure
is for the information and satisfaction of the CJI and the report
of inquiry is confidential and, thus, such report cannot be made
public – Entire process under the Procedure is confidential having
ascertainment of truth as one of its objectives – Demands of being
fair and transparent, in such cases, have to yield to the confidential
nature of the process – Thus, uploading of the photographs/
video footage on the website of this Court cannot be viewed
as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure”, thus,
approved – However, nothing really turns on the uploading of the
photographs/video footage since the Petitioner, did not have any
grievance in relation thereto which is obvious from his failure to
question such uploading at an appropriate time thereby allowing
a situation to grow where the Court is faced with a fait accompli.
[Para 121]
1946 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
Requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the
CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
and the Prime Minister – Constitutionality:
Held: CJI, as the leader of the judiciary, apart from his various other
duties owes a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice
delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted – It is unreasonable
to even think that despite an incident of the present nature, the
CJI would wait for the Parliament to take action – It is up to the
Parliament whether or not to activate Art.124 – Left to him, the
CJI upon being informed of a Judge’s remissness does have the
authority-moral, ethical and legal-to take such necessary action
as is warranted to keep institutional integrity intact – Keeping in
view such concerns and the legal position of the President being
the ultimate appointing authority of Judges and the Prime Minister
being the head of the Council of Ministers, upon whose aid and
advice the President acts under the Constitution, coupled with
receipt of complaints from the office of the President, the provision in
para 7(ii) of the Procedure requiring the CJI to write to the President
and the Prime Minister along with the report of the Committee
to be quite in order, legal and valid – Office of the CJI not to be
regarded as a post office that the report should only be routed
through the CJI without his observations – This Court is unaware
like the Petitioner of what the CJI remarked while forwarding the
Report of the Committee and the Petitioner’s response dated 6th
May, 2025 to the President and the Prime Minister – However, if
the CJI has reiterated the finding of the Committee as contained in
the Report and recommended initiation of proceedings for removal
of the Petitioner from office, such a recommendation cannot be
impeached on any valid and legal ground – Notwithstanding that
the recommendation of the CJI carries much weight, one has to
realize that the intimation given by the CJI, under the Procedure,
is for the eyes of the President and the Prime Minister alone and
not anyone else – Thus, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the
Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or
the concept of separation of powers. [Paras 123-125]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure”
devised by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated
15th December, 1999 through administrative resolution to deal
with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting
Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court –
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1947
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
Genesis and contents of the in-house Procedure – Discussed.
[Paras 41-47]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) vis-à-vis In-house
Procedure – Applicability:
Held: Protection Act does not offend the constitutional scheme,
and, being in addition to the extant provisions, does not affect
the Supreme Court’s authority to take such action, as deemed fit,
against a Judge of a High Court who is alleged to have indulged
in misconduct in terms of the Procedure – To address the growing
concern of incidents of misconduct, the Procedure has been craftily
designed to discipline Judges internally for such misconduct that is
sufficient to tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution
to which he belongs – CJI’s discretion as to whether, where and
when to act, mindful of the substance in the complaints received,
would obviously be a regulated discretion; but, once the ball is
set rolling by the CJI, it must end with his recommendation/advice
to the President and the Prime Minister depending on what the
Committee records as its findings – With the advancement in
science and technology and all other spheres of work, it is quite
possible to bring to the CJI’s notice how a particular Judge might
have conducted himself inappropriately calling for strict action –
Withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure
that the Procedure expressly permits – There are other measures
too, which could be explored if Judges are found to deviate from
the Code of Conduct – Given that the only formal mechanism
for addressing judicial misbehaviour under the Constitution is
impeachment by Parliament, it must be remembered that not all
misbehaviour of Judges necessarily rise to the level of “proved
misbehaviour” attracting Arts. 217 and 218 r/w. clauses (4) and (5)
of Art. 124 – Constitution’s silence on cases that do not rise to
the level of proven misbehaviour creates a significant structural
vulnerability, which has since been addressed by the Procedure –
Procedure acts as a check on Judges’ unbridled freedom of action
and thereby seeks to prevent outcomes that could be harmful or
unjust – Under the present set-up, impeaching the Procedure
or any part thereof may itself be viewed as unreasonable and
unjustified. [Paras 71-85]
Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure –
Nature of inquiry:
1948 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: Inquiry that is part of the In-house Procedure is designed
to be a fact-finding inquiry as distinguished from guilt-finding
inquiry, thus, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular
disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee – Once
the CJI constitutes the Committee, it is required to hold an inquiry
into the allegations contained in the complaint in the manner that
the Procedure ordains – Committee does have some leeway
to devise its own Procedure consistent with the principles of
natural justice – Though the Committee is not required to extend
opportunity of cross-examination of the persons who come before
it for giving their versions or opportunity to the Judge under probe
to be represented by a lawyer, the Judge must be called upon to
appear and given opportunity to have his say recorded – After
concluding the inquiry, Committee may conclude and report to
the CJI as regards the substance in the allegations contained in
the complaint – Given its very nature, the Committee by preparing
its report and recording its findings, effectively assists the CJI in
arriving at a conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given
case based thereon – Instant case falls within the second situation
where Committee has recorded an opinion that there is sufficient
substance in the allegations contained in the letter of the CJI and
the misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation of
proceedings for removal of the petitioner-High Court Judge – Thus,
the nature of inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final as well as
not violative of any principle of natural justice. [Paras 88-91, 94]
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Provisions relatable to removal of
a Judge of a High Court from office – Process of impeachment
of a Judge – Discussed. [Paras 28-40]
Judiciary – Chief Justice of India – Role of the CJI – Explanation:
Held: While the CJI is no doubt primus inter pares, first among
equals and also does not exercise powers of superintendence over
the High Courts and the Judges of the High Court, nonetheless,
the CJI bears a significant moral responsibility as the foremost
judicial officer to ensure that the judiciary of the country functions
in a transparent, efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner –
Although the CJI is the head of the institution, he too is not above
the law which is supreme; hence, utmost care to be taken to
ensure that any action of the CJI is not in deviation of the In-house
Procedure which permits the in-house inquiry to be undertaken.
[Paras 61, 69]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1949
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
Case Law Cited
C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee [1995] Supp. 3
SCR 319 : (1995) 5 SCC 457; Supreme Court Advocates-on-
Record Assn. v. Union of India [2015] 13 SCR 1 : (2016) 5 SCC 1;
Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 190 :
AIR 1964 SC 1854 – followed.
Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India [1991]
Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1991) 4 SCC 699 – distinguished and held
inapplicable.
Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 108 :
(2003) 5 SCC 494 – relied on.
Sahara India v. SEBI [2012] 12 SCR 256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603;
Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General,
High Court of Madhya Pradesh [2014] 13 SCR 300 : (2015) 4
SCC 91; P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee [2011]
10 SCR 1064 : (2011) 8 SCC 380; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India
[1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 655; D.C. Saxena (Dr) v. Hon’ble
The Chief Justice of India [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5
SCC 216; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand [1997] Supp. 6
SCR 1 : (1998) 1 SCC 1; Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v.
State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC
299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat [2013] 5 SCR 200 :
(2013) 4 SCC 301 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; Judges (Protection)
Act, 1985.
List of Keywords
Proceedings for removal of a Judge; Impeachment; Fire at a store-
room; Burnt currency notes; Restatement of Values of Judicial
Life dated 31st October, 1997; “In-house Procedure”; Procedure
obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the
President and the Prime Minister; Fact-finding exercise; Legal
sanction; Fundamental Rights of the Judge of a High Court; No
waiver of Fundamental Right; Judicial independence; Basic feature
of Constitution; Misconduct committed by Judge; Photographs/
video footage uploaded on the website of Supreme Court; Fait
accompli; Guilt-finding inquiry; Principles of natural justice; Internal
1950 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
mechanism; CJIs recommendation for initiation of proceedings of
removal; Constitutional scheme; Separation of powers; Judicial
misbehaviour; Primus inter pares; Committee constituted by CJI;
Provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from
office; Process of impeachment of a Judge; Role of the Chief
Justice of India.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699
of 2025
Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Siddharth Luthra,
Sidddharth Aggarwal, Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advs., Ms. Stuti Gujral,
Ms. Manisha Singh, Vaibhav Niti, George Pothan Poothicote,
Ms. Jyoti Singh, Anurag Jain, Keshav Sehgal, Vishwajeet Singh,
Prakarsh Kumar, Tasnimul Hassan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
Preface
1. A deeply anguished Judge of the Allahabad High Court1 has petitioned
this Court for enforcement of his Fundamental Rights under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India by invoking his Fundamental
Right to constitutional remedy guaranteed by Article 32 thereof.
2. Lest any observation made by us denies the petitioner a level playing
field in any future proceedings that he might face, we would tread
the path cautiously and refer to, very briefly, only the bare facts
leading to presentation of this writ petition as well as deal with only
such of the several contentions, as urged, to the extent the same
are absolutely necessary for our decision.
1 Petitioner
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1951
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
Facts
3. Petitioner finds himself in an unsavoury situation. While the Petitioner
was a Judge of the Delhi High Court, there was an incident of fire at
a store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to him. On the date
of the incident, the Petitioner was away from home. In the process of
dousing the fire, certain burnt currency notes were discovered in the
store-room. Such discovery gave rise to suspicion that the Petitioner
may not have followed the universally accepted values of judicial life
including those included in the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life
dated 31st October, 1997; consequently, his conduct fell for scrutiny.
Without wasting time, the “In-house Procedure” devised by the
Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated 15th December, 19992
was set in motion. The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court3 vide letter
dated 21st March, 2025 sought a response from the Petitioner. In his
response dated 22nd March, 2025, the Petitioner’s defence, inter alia,
was that no cash was ever placed in the store-room by him or his
family members and he strongly denounced the suggestion that the
cash belonged to him or his family members. Petitioner also stated
that the same must have been planted in the store-room to frame
him. However, the Petitioner neither denied the incident of fire nor
discovery of the burnt currency notes. Upon receipt of the response,
the same was considered. Inter alia, on 22nd March, 2025, a three-
member Committee4 was constituted by the Chief Justice of India5.
A press release of even date named the members of the Committee,
and also disclosed that the CJ, DHC was asked not to assign judicial
work to the Petitioner. At or about the same time, presumably on
the orders of the CJI, certain documents/photographs/video footage
linked to the fire incident and discovery of currency notes had been
placed in the public domain. On 24th March, 2025, the Collegium of
the Supreme Court recommended the Petitioner’s repatriation to his
parent High Court. Immediately thereafter, the Committee set out to
accomplish the task assigned to it. The fire ravaged store-room was
inspected. Versions of several witnesses having some knowledge of
2 Procedure
3 CJ, DHC
4 Committee
5 CJI
1952 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and/or relation with the incident of fire/discovery of burnt currency
notes were recorded by the Committee. Petitioner was furnished the
versions of the witnesses. Thereafter, he was afforded an opportunity
to state his case. An inquiry report6 dated 3rd May, 2025 of the
Committee followed. On the basis of appreciation of the materials
collected in course of the inquiry, the Committee recorded in the
Report of having found sufficient substance in the allegations raised
in the letter dated 22nd March, 2025 of the CJI. It was recorded by
the Committee that misconduct found proved is serious enough to
call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from his
office. Vide letter dated 4th May, 2025, the CJI gave the Petitioner
the option to resign or to seek voluntary retirement within 6th May,
2025, failing which the competent authorities would be intimated to
initiate action for removal. Petitioner responded on 6th May, 2025
seeking reconsideration of the letter dated 4th May, 2025 and more
time to submit a written representation upon thorough review of
the Report. At the same time, the Petitioner further expressed his
inability to either resign or seek voluntary retirement in the event
his prayers for grant of additional time and reconsideration were not
allowed. According to the Petitioner, acceptance of such advice could
imply acquiescence to a process and outcome that he considered
fundamentally unjust. Petitioner also urged that strict confidentiality
be maintained by all stakeholders. The prayers, apparently, were
not granted and a further press release of 8th May, 2025 came to
be issued recording that in terms of the Procedure, the CJI had
written to the nation’s Hon’ble President and Hon’ble Prime Minister
and forwarded the Report of the Committee and the response of the
Petitioner dated 6th May, 2025. What exactly were the contents of
the CJI’s letter is, however, unknown to the Petitioner as well as us.
4. In the prevailing circumstances, the Petitioner presented this writ
petition on 17th July, 2025, claiming the following relief from the Court:
a. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring Paragraphs
5(b) and 7 of In-House Procedure dated 15.12.1999 to the
extent that it enables the In-House Committee to inquire and
comment on the existence of ‘serious misconduct warranting
6 Report
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1953
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
removal’ and the Hon’ble CJI to intimate the same to the
Hon’ble President and the Hon’ble Prime Minister for initiating
proceedings for removal and other consequential action as
being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
b. Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction declaring the
intimation by the Hon’ble CJI to the Hon’ble President and the
Hon’ble Prime Minister (as referred to in the Press Release
dated 08.05.2025) for initiation of action for removal as being
unconstitutional and ultra vires art 124 and 218 and quash the
same.
c. Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction to quash and set
aside the Final Report dated 03.05.2025 submitted by the
Committee, and all consequential actions taken pursuant to
the same.
d. Pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit
in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Arguments for the Petitioner
5. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by other
senior counsel, advanced arguments at length in support of the writ
petition. A brief note of submissions was also placed by Mr. Sibal
before the Court, which duly captures the points of challenge and
the contentions in support of the relief claimed.
6. Mr. Sibal commenced his arguments by submitting that “it is a matter
of moment”.
7. According to Mr. Sibal, the Petitioner is aggrieved by the Procedure
to the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the
misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal. He is
also aggrieved because the Procedure permits the CJI to intimate
the President and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants
initiation of proceedings for removal.
8. In course of his arguments, Mr. Sibal outlined what the Petitioner was
not challenging. While fairly admitting that the Procedure itself is a
valid in-house mechanism contemplated for the purpose of discipline
by self-regulation by the higher judiciary, Mr. Sibal laid challenge to
paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) thereof on the ground that these are ultra
vires the Constitution violating Articles 124 and 218 thereof. It was
1954 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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also fairly admitted that even though the Committee’s remit was to
conduct a fact-finding exercise, the subsequent recommendation
by the Committee regarding the necessity to initiate proceedings for
removal of a Judge is unconstitutional.
9. Moving ahead, Mr. Sibal accepted that he did not see any wrong in
the CJI in advising the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court
not to allocate judicial work to the Judge under probe or the CJI’s
authority to forward the report of the Committee to the President and
the Prime Minister along with intimation of the advice to the Chief
Justice of the concerned High Court not to allocate judicial work to
the concerned Judge.
10. While, however, confining the constitutional challenge to the validity of
paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) of the Procedure, Mr. Sibal contended that
Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution are the only provisions under
which a Judge of a High Court may be removed. In exercise of the
powers under Article 124(5), the Parliament has enacted the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 19687. He argued that the constitutional provisions read
with the Inquiry Act constitute a complete and comprehensive code
which occupies the field of the process for removal.
11. Continuing further, Mr. Sibal stressed that the tenure of a High Court
Judge is protected by the Constitution, and such a Judge is subject
to the Constitution and the Constitution alone. Even Parliament
is not permitted to discuss the conduct of any Judge either of the
Supreme Court or of the High Courts except when a Motion for
presenting an address is admitted. Hence, any procedure/process
for removal, other than that provided for under Article 124, would
be unconstitutional. As per the constitutional scheme, removal of
a Judge from office is subject to the Judge being found guilty of
proved misbehaviour or incapacity in an inquiry conducted under
the Inquiry Act; however, the Procedure to the extent it could trigger
proceedings for removal, without being bound by the constitutional
rigours, is liable to be held ultra vires.
12. Mr. Sibal further argued that the removal process, set in motion
by the Procedure with the Committee being empowered to make
recommendation, lacks constitutional sanction or contemplation. As
against the safeguards provided in the Inquiry Act, such as framing
7 Inquiry Act, hereafter
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1955
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
of charges, presentation of evidence in support of the charge(s),
statement of defence, cross-examination of witnesses, strict proof,
etc. – all of which are compliant with the overarching mandate of
Article 14 – the Procedure contemplates such procedure as may
be appropriate in the facts of a case. The Procedure does not
obligate the Committee to follow the codified or defined rules of
evidence and permits the Committee to adopt such procedure as
necessary, potentially leading to holding a Judge guilty, not just of
serious misconduct but also calling for his removal. Such process,
based only on a preliminary or prima facie view, where the Judge
is denied the procedural safeguards which are otherwise available
in consonance with due process, is wholly arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The report of the Committee, Mr. Sibal further contended, could only
be used by the CJI to take corrective measures within his domain.
It cannot possibly interfere with the process envisaged under Article
124. Separation of powers that is in-built in the Constitution demands
that the judicial institution remains clear of the constitutional process
undertaken for removal.
14. Finally, Mr. Sibal sought to again impress upon us that the Procedure
to the extent it permits the CJI to trigger the initiation of removal
process by the Parliament through his recommendation is bound
to have its own impact. Though termed as a recommendation or
advice, such recommendation/advice from a high constitutional
functionary such as the CJI would clearly be far more than being
merely persuasive and is bound to influence the decision making and
evaluation process. It would act as a virtual death knell for a Judge,
particularly based on a prima facie evaluation of the allegations.
Such process would also circumvent the constitutionally prescribed
mechanisms.
15. In any case, Mr. Sibal argued, uploading of the photographs/video
footage on the website of the Supreme Court together with the
Report of the Committee has the effect of convicting the Petitioner
even before the procedure under Article 124 has been initiated. Such
being the state of affairs, the powers of the CJI cannot extend to
making such a recommendation. Hence, paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii)
of the Procedure need to be set aside not only being violative of
the constitutional scheme for removal of Judges but also because
1956 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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they deprive the Petitioner of equal protection of the laws, thereby
infringing his valuable right under Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. Having completed his address on the constitutional challenge, Mr.
Sibal placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Indira Jaising v.
Supreme Court of India 8 and Sahara India v. SEBI 9, to contend
that the allegations against the Petitioner and the correspondence
exchanged by and between him and the CJI as well as the evidence
(photographs/video footage), ought not to have been put in the
public domain. By so doing, not only has the good reputation of the
Petitioner as a Judge (which he built by years of dedicated work) been
tarnished, the public perception based on viewing of such evidence
led to an exercise which has held the Petitioner guilty even before
an inquiry according to fair procedure could commence and he being
afforded the opportunity to raise an effective defence. Highly critical
of uploading of the photographs/video footage on the website of this
Court, Mr. Sibal contended that the Petitioner’s precious right under
Article 21 stood abrogated right from the inception.
17. Relying heavily on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sub-
Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India10, Mr.
Sibal argued that the powers of the CJI in case of removal of a High
Court Judge stand restricted. It was pointed out that as the CJI has
no disciplinary control over Judges of the High Courts, the procedure
for removal is not akin to removal of a delinquent employee. The
CJI, it was contended, cannot have an authoritative say or partake
in the process, which is otherwise the preserve of the Parliament.
18. Referring to the decision in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice
A.M. Bhattacharjee11, Mr. Sibal urged that the observations made
therein were only intended to fill the ‘yawning gap between proved
misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office’. The
Procedure, however, reaches far and beyond filling the gap and, in
fact, attempts to kick-start the process under Article 124(5), which
is the sole prerogative of the Parliament.
8 (2003) 5 SCC 494
9 (2012) 10 SCC 603
10 (1991) 4 SCC 699
11 (1995) 5 SCC 457
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1957
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
19. While concluding, Mr. Sibal prayed that paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the
Procedure be declared ultra vires. He also prayed for a declaration
that none including the Parliament be influenced either by the Report
of the Committee or the recommendation/advice of the CJI.
20. We heard Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel assisting Mr. Sibal,
submit at the very end that the Petitioner ought to have been given
an opportunity of personal hearing by the CJI before making his
recommendation/tendering his advice to the President and the
Prime Minister. To support such submission, he referred to a similar
opportunity that was extended by the then CJI to a Judge of the
Calcutta High Court who also went through the same Procedure.
Non-grant of such opportunity, according to him, breached principles
of equality before law.
Proceedings before the Court
21. Although the challenge read with the prayers in the writ petition
relate to the constitutionality of the Procedure and the legality of
the inquiry conducted by the Committee together with its Report,
as part of the Procedure, Mr. Sibal rightly did not argue the second
point12 and restricted his arguments on the point of constitutionality.
22. It is placed on record that the Petitioner not having objected to
uploading of the photographs/video footage at the first available
opportunity and having participated in the inquiry conducted by the
Committee without raising any demur, we posed a query: why should
we entertain the writ petition at such a belated stage, notwithstanding
the challenge laid on the constitutional aspect, particularly when the
inquiry had culminated in submission of the Report by the Committee
to the CJI who, in turn, had written to the President and the Prime
Minister while forwarding the Report together with the Petitioner’s
response?
23. In answer thereto, Mr. Sibal submitted that since a constitutional
challenge was being raised by the Petitioner and law being settled
that there could be no waiver of a Fundamental Right, the Court
may not decline interference and decide the writ petition based on
the points argued by him.
12 we need not spell out the reasons therefor in the judgment
1958 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
24. During the course of hearing, we had also put it across to Mr.
Sibal whether the Judges (Protection) Act, 198513 would have any
application in the instant case. Faced with the Protection Act, Mr. Sibal
sought to counter it by submitting two points. First, that no law as is
referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 - either the Constitution
or any statutory enactment - confers such power on the Supreme
Court; hence the Protection Act has no application. Secondly, since
sub-section (2) of Section 3 includes Central Government/State
Government, it would then mean that these authorities could also
initiate proceedings for removal of a High Court Judge which would
be wholly unconstitutional and could not have been the intention of
the Parliament.
25. Upon hearing Mr. Sibal and Mr. Rohatgi, we did not consider it
necessary to issue notice to the respondents and reserved judgment.
Questions
26. Based on Mr. Sibal’s arguments as well as the facts on record, the
following substantial questions of law arise for an answer:
I. Should the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to
the conduct of the Petitioner?
II. Does the Procedure have legal sanction?
III. Is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the
Procedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under
probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism?
IV. Does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure foul clauses (4) and (5)
of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218# of the Constitution
or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court?
V. Did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI act in terms
of the Procedure or in deviation thereof?
VI. Is the requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging
the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President
and the Prime Minister unconstitutional?
13 Protection Act
# Ed. Note: “foul clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218” instead of “foul Article 124
and Article 125 read with Articles 217 and 218” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1959
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
Analysis and Findings with Reasons
27. Appreciating the merits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner and expressing our opinion ought to be preceded by an
examination of the provisions in the Constitution relating to removal of
a Judge of a High Court from office, the law in terms whereof inquiry
has to be held, the genesis of the Procedure, what this Procedure
is all about, the role of the CJI, the nature of inquiry the Procedure
contemplates, what impact does such inquiry have on a Judge of a
High Court whose conduct is under probe, and other related issues
including the aspect of applicability of the Protection Act. This would
also necessarily require us to take note of the precedents in the field
which find place in the compilation of judgments handed over by Mr.
Sibal. In our view, such an exercise would significantly facilitate and
aid answering the above questions effectively and thereby enable
us to complete the task at hand appropriately.
Constitutional Provisions and The Inquiry Act
28. That a Judge of a High Court cannot be removed from office except
on the ground of proved misbehaviour or proved incapacity admits
of no doubt. The provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a
High Court from office are traceable to Articles 217 and 218 read
with Article 124. Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read as follows:
124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court
…
(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from
his office except by an order of the President passed after an
address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority
of the total membership of that House and by a majority of
not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present
and voting has been presented to the President in the same
session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour
or incapacity.
(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the
presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof
of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4).
…
1960 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
29. Articles 217 (to the extent relevant) and 218 provide:
217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge
of a High Court
(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the
President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation
with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and,
in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief
Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold
office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided
in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age
of sixty-two years:
Provided that—
(a) ***
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President
in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the
removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;
(c) ***
(2) ***
(3) ***
218. Application of certain provision relating to Supreme
Court to High Courts
The provisions of clauses (4) and (5) of article 124 shall apply in
relation to a High Court as they apply in relation to the Supreme
Court with the substitution of references to the High Court for
references to the Supreme Court.
30. The law that is referred to in clause (5) of Article 124 is the Inquiry Act.
31. The Constitution itself does not prescribe the procedure for the
presentation of an address and for investigation and proof of the
misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge but leaves it for the Parliament
to regulate the same by law. In exercise of such powers, as discussed
above, the Parliament enacted the Inquiry Act. The Inquiry Act, inter
alia, provides for constitution of a committee which is to conduct an
investigation/inquiry into the allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1961
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
levelled against the Judge. The procedure enumerated in the Inquiry
Act is in consonance with the principles of natural justice in that,
formal charges are framed, the Judge is provided with the supporting
material for each charge, opportunity is extended to cross-examine
witnesses as well as to present his defence. The committee has
the same powers as that of a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, for summoning and enforcing the attendance
of a person, examining a person on oath, requiring discovery and
production of documents, receiving evidence on oath, issuing a
commission for examination of witnesses or documents, and for all
such other matters as may be prescribed. It is imperative to note that
if the Judge is not found guilty of any charge(s) by the committee,
then the pending Motion in the House or Houses of Parliament will
not be proceeded with. Thus, it marks the end of the proceedings.
32. The process for impeachment of a Judge, however, is very rigid
at all levels – starting with a Motion in the House, followed by an
investigation/inquiry conducted by a committee comprising of persons
of high calibre, adherence to fair procedure, then the necessity of
approval by a majority of the Houses and finally the approval by
the President whereafter a Judge can be removed from office by
impeachment.
33. These provisions apart, there are two other similarly worded articles
in the Constitution which, though not directly related to removal of
a Judge of a High Court, impose restrictions on discussions in the
Parliament/State Legislatures with respect to the conduct of a Judge
of a High Court. They are Articles 121 and 211.
34. Mr. Sibal is right in his contention that apart from proviso (b) of clause
(1) of Article 217 and Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of
Article 124, there is no other provision in the Constitution relating to
removal of a Judge of a High Court from his office. He is also right in
contending that Article 121 even bars the Parliament to discuss the
conduct of a Judge of a High Court except in the stated situation.
Similar is the restriction imposed by Article 211.
35. A reading of the Constituent Assembly debates does not reveal any
discussion or debate on any proposed measure, other than removal
by the Parliament in the manner constitutionally ordained, if the
conduct of a Judge of a High Court amounts to misbehaviour but
1962 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
does not amount to such misbehaviour as would warrant the severest
measure of removal§ from office. The framers of the Constitution, in
their wisdom, possibly might have thought that having regard to the
status of a Judge, being a high constitutional functionary in whom
the people would repose trust and faith for rendering justice, only
such individuals possessing the highest standards of integrity and
moral character, apart from legal acumen, would be considered for
appointment to the judicial office; yet, should there be an exceptional
situation calling for removal of a Judge from office and to ensure
that the Constitution is not incomplete without an in-built mechanism
for a disciplinary measure, provisions for removal (by impeachment)
were incorporated. Indeed, it took Parliament long 18 (eighteen)
years after the advent of the Constitution to enact the law wherefor
it was empowered by clause (5) of Article 124. It is also noteworthy
that the first process of removal of a Judge by impeachment did
not see the light of the day till the early nineties of the last century,
i.e., almost 4 (four) decades after the people proclaimed India as a
sovereign democratic republic14. It does suggest that the framers of
the Constitution were not amiss in thinking that an exceptional case
for disciplining a Judge might seldom arise.
36. Nonetheless, times have changed and changed drastically. With the
process of appointment becoming executive-centric, fissures in the
system became apparent; aberrations of Judges started attracting
notice. However, possibly because of the cumbersome process that
a process for removal by impeachment involves, many a Judge could
have escaped unscathed without such aberration being brought in
the public domain.
37. There have, however, been certain reported instances since the
eighties of the last century of Judges having indulged in (perceived)
misbehaviour leading to some of them being disciplined internally
by the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts.
38. Till date, there have been only 4 (four) instances of Motions for
removal of a Supreme Court/High Court Judges being admitted
by the Parliament and not a single instance of the Motion being
14 on 26th November, 1949
§ Ed. Note: “warrant the severest measure of removal” instead of “warrant the extreme measure of removal”
in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1963
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
carried through (although one cannot ignore that a couple of Judges
strategically resigned prior to culmination of the proceedings).
39. Be that as it may, the Constitution was and is silent with regard to
any disciplinary measure, short of removal by impeachment, should
there be an aberration or bad conduct by a Judge of a High Court
as distinguished from misbehaviour in the discharge of his judicial
duties or administrative/non-judicial/official duties.
40. It is worthy of note that six years before the turn of the last century,
the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court was compelled to demit
office on the ground of alleged misbehaviour as a sequel to exertion
of pressure by the local Bar Council/Bar Associations. A writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution presented by a practising advocate
changed the legal landscape of the country. The decision on such
writ petition, which laid down a precedent and which we propose
to consider a little later, has rightly been commented in one of the
subsequent decisions of this Court as having sowed the seeds for
the Procedure.
The Procedure - its genesis and contents
41. The Procedure (commonly known as the “In-house Procedure”),
which has been developed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court
through an administrative resolution, serves as an internal mechanism
to deal with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting
Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
42. Reading of paragraph 32 of the decision in Additional District and
Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya
Pradesh15 provides useful guidance as to how the Procedure came
to be devised. It reads:
“32. In furtherance of the directions issued in C.
Ravichandran Iyer case, this Court constituted a committee
comprising of three Judges of this Court, namely, Justices
S.C. Agrawal, A.S. Anand (as he then was) and S.P.
Bharucha (as he then was), and the then two seniormost
Chief Justices of the High Courts i.e. Justices P.S. Misra
and D.P. Mohapatra (of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
15 (2015) 4 SCC 91
1964 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and the Allahabad High Court, respectively), to lay down
the ‘In-House Procedure’, for taking suitable remedial
action against Judges, who by their acts of omission or
commission, do not follow the accepted values of judicial
life, including the ideals expressed by the Supreme Court in
the ‘Restatement of Values of Judicial Life’. The Committee
submitted its report on 31-10-1997. The same was adopted
with amendments, in a Full Court Meeting of the Supreme
Court of India, on 15-12-1999. In the aforestated report,
three sets of procedure for taking such suitable remedial
action against Judges were laid down. The first, related to
the Judges of the High Courts, the second, to the Chief
Justices of the High Courts, and the third, to the Judges
of the Supreme Court. …”.
43. At the outset, the Procedure itself records complaints made against
Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court often being
received either by the Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI.
Such complaints, also made to the President of India, are generally
forwarded to the CJI for being looked into. Considering the lack of
any constitutional mechanism or otherwise based whereon measures
could lawfully be taken when the CJI is seized of such complaints,
the Full Court of the Supreme Court by its resolution dated 15th
December, 1999 adopted the Procedure.
44. The process under the Procedure begins when a written complaint
containing verifiable and specific allegations is received by the CJI
or the Chief Justice of a High Court. What actions are required to be
taken thereunder if the complaint is found to be of a serious nature
have been provided in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Procedure.
45. Should the matter merit a deeper probe, the CJI would constitute a
Committee consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts (other
than the High Court to which the Judge belongs) and one High Court
Judge (paragraph 3), and the Committee so constituted has the
liberty to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of
natural justice (paragraph 4). The inquiry, being in the nature of a
fact-finding exercise, entitles the Judge under probe to appear and
have his say recorded. Since it is not a formal judicial inquiry and
given its fact-finding and non-punitive character, examination/cross-
examination of witnesses and representation by lawyers are excluded.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1965
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
46. Upon receipt of the report of inquiry from the Committee, the CJI is
empowered to take one of three possible courses of action, depending
on the nature and gravity of the findings qua the allegations. Firstly, if
the Committee concludes that the allegations are unfounded or lacking
in substance, the CJI may choose to close the matter [paragraph
5(a) read with paragraph 6]. Secondly, if the inquiry reveals serious
misconduct, the CJI may advise the Judge to resign his office or
seek voluntary retirement [paragraph 7(i)]. If the concerned Judge
elects not to do so, the CJI shall intimate the President and the
Prime Minister that the allegations are serious enough to warrant
initiation of proceedings for removal and hence, judicial work has
been withdrawn [paragraph 5(b) read with para 7(ii)]. Thirdly, where
the misconduct is established but it is not so serious as to warrant
removal, the CJI may call the Judge concerned and advise him
accordingly; the report of the Committee to be placed on record may
also be directed [paragraph 5(c) read with paragraph 8].
47. Despite the decision in Additional District and Sessions Judge
‘X’ (supra) at paragraph 47 thereof having delineated the various
steps in the Procedure through which the proceedings must pass,
we have given a brief overview for our own understanding.
Precedents
48. Having noted the genesis and the contents of the Procedure, we
proceed to consider the precedents that have been cited which
directly dealt with proceedings/initiation of proceedings for removal
of a Judge of a High Court.
49. The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sub-
Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) is, incidentally, the
sheet anchor of Mr. Sibal’s arguments.
50. At the same time, other decisions of this Court having a material
bearing for deciding the question of constitutionality of the Procedure
would also necessarily fall for consideration which we propose to
consider in seriatim.
51. Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) had to consider
issues of some importance bearing on the construction of Articles
121 and 124 of the Constitution as well the provisions of the Inquiry
Act. The occasion for the controversy raised in the proceedings, the
1966 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
issues arising for decision and the broad contentions raised by the
parties are noted in paragraphs 3, 4 and 15, respectively, of the
majority judgment authored by Hon’ble B. C. Ray, J. (as His Lordship
then was). For the sake of completeness but, at the same time, to
maintain brevity, we discern that the main issues arising for decision
were (i) what is the legal position and status of a Motion for the
removal of a Judge under a law made pursuant to Article 124(5) of
the Constitution? (ii) whether the Doctrine of Lapse would apply to
such a Motion upon the dissolution of the Lok Sabha? (iii) whether
the matters arising out of or relating to a Motion for removal of a
Judge in either House of the Parliament are at all justiciable before
courts of law? and (iv) whether the Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction as its decision and its writ might become infructuous
(in view of the fact that in the ultimate analysis, the final arbiter
whether at all any Address is to be presented rests exclusively with
the Houses of Parliament and which are wholly outside the purview
of the courts)?
52. One of the contentions was Contention F, reading as follows:
“Contention F:— The process of removal by means of a
Motion for address to the President is a political remedy.
But the fundamental right to move the Supreme Court for
enforcement of fundamental rights take within its sweep the
right to access to a court comprising of Judges of sterling
and unsullied reputation and integrity which is enforceable.
This judicial remedy is independent of the constitutional
remedy and that the court has jurisdiction to decide as to
its own proper constitution. In exercise of this jurisdiction
it should examine the grounds of the alleged misbehaviour
and restrain the Judge from judicial functioning.”
53. While rejecting the said contention, this Court, inter alia, held thus:
“111. The relief of a direction to restrain the Judge from
discharging judicial functions cannot be granted. It is the
entire Constitutional Scheme including the provisions
relating to the process of removal of a Judge which are to
be taken into account for the purpose of considering this
aspect. It is difficult to accept that there can be any right
in anyone running parallel with the Constitutional Scheme
for this purpose contained in clauses (4) and (5) of Article
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1967
XXX v. The Union of India & Others
124 read with Article 121. No authority can do what the
Constitution by necessary implication forbids. Incidentally,
this also throws light on the question of interim relief in
such a matter having the result of restraining the Judge
from functioning judicially on initiation of the process under
the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The Constitutional Scheme
appears to be that unless the alleged misbehaviour or
incapacity is ‘proved’ in accordance with the provisions
of the law enacted under Article 124(5) and a Motion for
presenting an address for removal of the Judge on the
ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity is made,
because of the restriction contained in Article 121, there
cannot be a discussion about the Judge’s conduct even in
the Parliament which has the substantive power of removal
under Article 124(4). If the Constitutional Scheme therefore
is that the Judge’s conduct cannot be discussed even in
the Parliament which is given the substantive power of
removal, till the alleged misconduct or incapacity is ‘proved’
in accordance with the law enacted for this purpose, then it
is difficult to accept that any such discussion of the conduct
of the Judge or any evaluation or inferences as to its merit
is permissible according to law elsewhere except during
investigation before the Inquiry Committee constituted
under the statute for this purpose. The indication, therefore,
is that interim direction of this kind during the stage of
inquiry into the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is not
contemplated it being alien to our Constitutional Scheme.”
(emphasis laid by Mr. Sibal)
54. Having read what Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
(supra) ruled while not accepting Contention F, we proceed to take
note of the next relevant decision, i.e., C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra).
55. Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking
for the Bench in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), after referring to
previous decisions, reaffirmed the importance of the CJI as the head
of the institution, when a matter questioning the integrity of a Judge
arises, in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the decision. In very clear words,
His Lordship suggested an in-house procedure to be followed by the
Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI, when they are seized
1968 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of a complaint related to a Judge’s conduct. The CJI, upon receipt
of information from the Chief Justice of a High Court could take such
action as “deemed necessary or warranted”. Although, the concerned
Judge in this case had demitted office before the judgment was
delivered, this Court held that its statements were to be treated as
a precedent. Relevant passages from the decision read as follows:
“35. It is true that this Court has neither administrative
control over the High Court nor power on the judicial side
to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or
Judge of a High Court. When the Bar of the High Court
concerned reasonably and honestly doubts the conduct
of the Chief Justice of that Court, necessarily the only
authority under the Constitution that could be tapped is
the Chief Justice of India, who in common parlance is
known as the head of the judiciary of the country. It is of
importance to emphasise here that impeachment is meant
to be a drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious
cases. But there must exist some other means to ensure
that Judges do not abuse the trust the society has in them.
It seems to us that self-regulation by the judiciary is the
only method which can be tried and adopted. …
***
40. Bearing all the above in mind, we are of the considered
view that where the complaint relates to the Judge of the
High Court, the Chief Justice of that High Court, after
verification, and if necessary, after confidential enquiry
from his independent source, should satisfy himself about
the truth of the imputation made by the Bar Association
through its office-bearers against the Judge and consult
the Chief Justice of India, where deemed necessary, by
placing all the information with him. When the Chief Justice
of India is seized of the matter, to avoid embarrassment to
him and to allow fairness in the procedure to be adopted
in furtherance thereof, the Bar should suspend all further
actions to enable the Chief Justice of India to appropriately
deal with the matter. This is necessary because any action
he may take must not only be just but must also appear
to be just to all concerned, i.e., it must not even appear
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
to have been taken under pressure from any quarter. The
Chief Justice of India, on receipt of the information from the
Chief Justice of the High Court, after being satisfied about
the correctness and truth touching the conduct of the Judge,
may tender such advice either directly or may initiate such
action, as is deemed necessary or warranted under given
facts and circumstances. If circumstances permit, it may be
salutary to take the Judge into confidence before initiating
action. On the decision being taken by the Chief Justice
of India, the matter should rest at that. This procedure
would not only facilitate nipping in the bud the conduct of
a Judge leading to loss of public confidence in the courts
and sustain public faith in the efficacy of the rule of law
and respect for the judiciary, but would also avoid needless
embarrassment of contempt proceedings against the office-
bearers of the Bar Association and group libel against all
concerned. The independence of judiciary and the stream
of public justice would remain pure and unsullied. The Bar
Association could remain a useful arm of the judiciary and
in the case of sagging reputation of the particular Judge,
the Bar Association could take up the matter with the Chief
Justice of the High Court and await his response for the
action taken thereunder for a reasonable period.
41. In case the allegations are against Chief Justice of a
High Court, the Bar should bring them directly to the notice
of the Chief Justice of India. On receipt of such complaint,
the Chief Justice of India would in the same way act as
stated above qua complaint against a Judge of the High
Court, and the Bar would await for a reasonable period
the response of the Chief Justice of India.
42. It would thus be seen that yawning gap between proved
misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high
office on the part of a non-cooperating Judge/Chief Justice
of a High Court could be disciplined by self-regulation
through in-house procedure. This in-house procedure
would fill in the constitutional gap and would yield salutary
effect. Unfortunately, recourse to this procedure was not
taken in the case at hand, may be, because of absence
of legal sanction to such a procedure.
1970 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
43. Since the 1st respondent has already demitted the
office, we have stated as above so that it would form a
precedent for future.”
(emphasis ours)
56. After the Procedure was devised in 1999 by the Full Court, acting on
the precedent set by C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), Indira Jaising
(supra) happened to be the first reported decision that had the
occasion to consider whether a report of the Committee, constituted
by the CJI in terms of the Procedure, ought or should be placed
in the public domain. Answering the question in the negative, what
the Court said [speaking through Hon’ble S. Rajendra Babu, J. (as
the Chief Justice of India then was)] provides valuable guidance.
Relevant passages read as under:
“2. In the Chief Justices’ Conference held in December
1999, sixteen clauses formed part of the Code of Conduct
in addition to the declaration of assets by the Judges
and in-house procedure was suggested in the event of
any complaint against any Judge. However, sanction for
these guidelines is absent. In our constitutional scheme it
is not possible to vest the Chief Justice of India with any
control over the puisne Judges with regard to conduct,
either personal or judicial. In case of breach of any rule of
the Code of Conduct, the Chief Justice can choose not to
post cases before a particular Judge against whom there
are acceptable allegations. It is possible to criticise that
decision on the ground that no enquiry was held and the
Judge concerned had no opportunity to offer his explanation
particularly when the Chief Justice is not vested with any
power to decide about the conduct of a Judge. There is
no adequate method or machinery to enforce the Code of
Conduct. Article 124 provides for appointment of Judges
of this Court and also their removal. Similarly, Article 217
deals with the appointment and removal of the Judges
of the High Court. In the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968
provisions are made for investigation into misbehaviour or
incapacity of a Judge. It may be noted that since Judges of
the superior courts occupy very high positions, disciplinary
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
proceedings which exist in the case of all other employees
cannot be thought of.
3. The Committee referred to by the petitioner is stated
to have been constituted as a part of in-house procedure.
A Judge cannot be removed from his office except by
impeachment by a majority of the House and a majority
of not less than 2/3rds present and voting as provided
by Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India. The
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been enacted providing
for the manner of conducting inquiry into the allegation
of judicial conduct upon a M otion of impeachment
sponsored by at least hundred Lok Sabha Members or
fifty Rajya Sabha Members. The Presiding Officer of the
House concerned has the power to constitute a committee
consisting of three persons as enumerated therein. No
other disciplinary inquiry is envisaged or contemplated
either under the Constitution or under the Act. On account
of this lacuna in-house procedure has been adopted for
inquiry to be made by the peers of Judges for report to the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India in case of a complaint
against the Chief Justices or Judges of the High Court in
order to find out the truth of the imputation made in the
complaint and that in-house inquiry is for the purpose of
his own information and satisfaction. A report made on
such inquiry if given publicity will only lead to more harm
than good to the institution as Judges would prefer to face
inquiry leading to impeachment. In such a case the only
course open to the parties concerned if they have material
is to invoke the provisions of Article 124 or Article 217 of
the Constitution, as the case may be. It is not appropriate
for the petitioner to approach this Court for the relief or
direction for release of the report, for what the Chief Justice
of India has done is only to get information from peer
Judges of those who are accused and the report made to
the Chief Justice of India is wholly confidential. The said
report is only for the purpose of satisfaction of the Chief
Justice of India that such a report has been made. It is
purely preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final. If the
Chief Justice of India is satisfied that no further action is
1972 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
called for in the matter, the proceeding is closed. If any
further action is to be taken as indicated in the in-house
procedure itself, the Chief Justice of India may take such
further steps as he deems fit. Therefore, in the hierarchy
of the courts, the Supreme Court does not have any
disciplinary control over the High Court Judges, much less
the Chief Justice of India has any disciplinary control over
any of the Judges. That position in law is very clear. Thus,
the only source or authority by which the Chief Justice of
India can exercise this power of inquiry is moral or ethical
and not in exercise of powers under any law. Exercise of
such power of the Chief Justice of India based on moral
authority cannot be made the subject-matter of a writ
petition to disclose a report made to him.”
(emphasis ours)
57. This decision was followed by P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry
Committee16. In this case, no part of the Procedure or any step
taken in furtherance thereof was under challenge. The challenge in
the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was to an order
of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha constituting a three-member
committee under Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act. The principle, nemo
debet esse judex in propria sua causa, was sought to be invoked
and a pointed challenge to the inclusion of a senior advocate in the
committee in the category of ‘jurist’ was laid on the ground of bias.
The petitioning judge had not approached the Court soon after the
committee was constituted; on the contrary, he did so ten months
later when he was notified of the charges. Based on such conduct,
this Court held:
“80. The issue deserves to be considered from another
angle. Admittedly, the petitioner raised the plea of bias
only after receiving the notice dated 16-3-2011 which was
accompanied by the statement of charges and the lists of
documents and witnesses. The petitioner’s knowledgeful
silence in this regard for a period of almost ten months
militates against the bona fides of his objection to the
16 (2011) 8 SCC 380
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
appointment of Respondent 3 as member of the Committee.
A person of the petitioner’s standing can be presumed to
be aware of his right to raise an objection. If the petitioner
had the slightest apprehension that Respondent 3 had
prejudged his guilt or he was otherwise biased, then, he
would have on the first available opportunity objected
to his appointment as a member of the Committee. The
petitioner could have done so immediately after the
publication of the Notification dated 15-1-2010. He could
have represented to the Chairman that investigation by
a Committee of which Respondent 3 was a member will
not be fair and impartial because the former had already
presumed him to be guilty.
81. … However, the fact of the matter is that the petitioner
never thought that Respondent 3 was prejudiced or ill-
disposed against him and this is the reason why he did not
raise any objection till April 2011 against the inclusion of
Respondent 3 in the Committee. This leads to an irresistible
inference that the petitioner had waived his right to object
to the appointment of Respondent 3 as member of the
Committee. The right available to the petitioner to object
to the appointment of Respondent 3 in the Committee
was personal to him and it was always open to him to
waive the same.”
58. Next in line is the decision in Additional District and Sessions
Judge ‘X’ (supra). Hon’ble J. S. Khehar, J. (as the Chief Justice of
India then was), speaking for the Court, went deep into the Procedure
and observed that:
“35. It is, therefore, apparent that the seeds of the “In-
House Procedure” came to be sown in the judgment
rendered by this Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer case. It
is also apparent, that actions have been initiated under
the ‘In-House Procedure’, which has the approval of the
Full Court of the Supreme Court of India. And, based
on the aforestated ‘In-House Procedure’, impeachment
proceedings were actually initiated by Parliament under
Article 124 of the Constitution of India. There can therefore
be no doubt whatsoever, that in the above situation, the
1974 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
‘In-House Procedure’ is firmly in place, and its adoption
for dealing with matters expressed by this Court in C.
Ravichandran Iyer case is now a reality.
36. Despite the above conclusion, it is imperative to take
into consideration the observations recorded by this Court
in Indira Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of
India , as under : (SCC pp. 496-97, paras 2-3)
“…………”
A perusal of the observations made by this Court in the
extract reproduced above, reveals that the existence of
the ‘In-House Procedure’ is now an established means
for inquiring into allegations levelled against a Judge of a
superior court, through his peers. It is a confidential inquiry
for institutional credibility under the charge of the Chief
Justice of India. And therefore, its affairs are to be kept
out of public domain. The proceedings under the above
procedure being sensitive, are required to be inaccessible
to third parties. And therefore, the prayer seeking the
disclosure of the report submitted on the culmination of
the ‘In-House Procedure’ was declined. The object sought
to be addressed through the ‘In-House Procedure’, is to
address concerns of institutional integrity. That would, in
turn, sustain the confidence of the litigating public, in the
efficacy of the judicial process.
37. It is impermissible to publicly discuss the conduct of a
sitting Judge, or to deliberate upon the performance of his
duties, and even on/of court behaviour, in public domain.
Whilst the ‘In-House Procedure’ lays down means to
determine the efficacy of the allegations levelled, it is now
apparent, that the procedure is not toothless, in the sense,
that it can lead to impeachment of the Judge concerned
under Article 124 of the Constitution of India. … But, that
should not be understood to mean, that an individual
concerned, who is called upon to subject himself/herself
to the contemplated procedure, should be precluded or
prevented from seeking judicial redress. It is now well
understood, that an individual who subjects himself/herself
to the jurisdiction of an authority, cannot turn around to find
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
fault with it at a later juncture. If there is a fault, the same
should be corrected, before one accepts to submit to the
jurisdiction of the authority concerned. The submission of the
petitioner in the present case, to the ‘two-Judge Committee’,
would certainly have had the above effect. We are therefore
satisfied to hold, that those who are liable to be affected by
the outcome of the ‘In-House Procedure’, have the right to
seek judicial redressal, on account of a perceived irregularity.
The irregularity may be on account of the violation of the
contemplated procedure, or even because of contemplated
bias or prejudice. It may be on account of impropriety.
The challenge can extend to all subjects on which judicial
review can be sought. The objections raised on behalf of
Respondent 3, in respect of the sustainability of the instant
petition at the hands of Addl. D & SJ X, are therefore wholly
untenable. The challenge to the maintainability of the instant
writ petition, is accordingly declined.
***
55. In view of the consideration and the findings recorded
hereinabove, we may record our general conclusions as
under:
55.1. The ‘In-House Procedure’ framed by this Court,
consequent upon the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran
Iyer case can be adopted to examine allegations levelled
against the Judges of the High Courts, Chief Justices of
the High Courts and Judges of the Supreme Court of India.
55.2. The investigative process under the ‘In-House
Procedure’ takes into consideration the rights of the
complainant, and that of the Judge concerned, by adopting
a fair procedure, to determine the veracity of allegations
levelled against a sitting Judge. At the same time, it
safeguards the integrity of the judicial institution.
55.3. Even though the said procedure should ordinarily
be followed in letter and spirit, the Chief Justice of India
would have the authority to mould the same, in the
facts and circumstances of a given case, to ensure that
the investigative process affords safeguards, against
favouritism, prejudice or bias.
1976 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
55.4. In view of the importance of the ‘In-House Procedure’,
it is essential to bring it into public domain. The Registry
of the Supreme Court of India, is accordingly directed to
place the same on the official website of the Supreme
Court of India.”
59. It is in the conspectus of the above noted precedents that the
contentions urged by the Petitioner would fall for consideration.
Other Topics
60. Dwelling on a few more topics having relevance and materiality would
not be inapt. Hence, we venture to do that now while making our
own observations to assist us in accomplishing our task.
Role of the CJI
61. While the CJI is no doubt primus inter pares – first among equals –
and also does not exercise powers of superintendence over the High
Courts and the Judges of the High Court, nonetheless, the CJI bears
a significant moral responsibility as the foremost judicial officer to
ensure that the judiciary of the country functions in a transparent,
efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner.
62. Petitioner has challenged the CJI’s recommendation for initiation of
proceedings for removal (if at all such recommendation has been
made, for we do not know what exactly was intimated to the President
and the Prime Minister) on the ground that the CJI, under the
constitutional scheme, has no authority to make such recommendation
and moreover, such opinion would prejudice the Members of the
Parliament and violate the spirit of separation of powers.
63. The Procedure contemplates withdrawal of judicial work of the
Judge under probe. While forwarding the report of inquiry to the
President/the Prime Minister, the CJI does so for indicating why
judicial work is not assigned to the Judge, not as to why he should
be impeached/removed. Withdrawing judicial work from a Judge
is indeed an extreme measure and, therefore, has to be based on
sound reasons; hence, the report of inquiry forms the plinth for the
President and the Prime Minister to be intimated of such an action.
This is an important distinction, not noticed by the Petitioner.
64. Assuming arguendo that the CJI endorsed the findings in the
Report submitted by the Committee and did recommend initiation of
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
proceedings against the Petitioner for removal from office, we have
no hesitation to say that the CJI is not a mere post office between
the Committee and the President/the Prime Minister that the Report
is to be forwarded without any remarks/recommendation. The CJI is
clearly an important person, if not the most, in the larger scheme of
maintaining institutional interest and credibility to ascertain whether
a Judge has indulged in misconduct. As per the Procedure, after
receiving a complaint against a Judge or a report from the Chief
Justice of the High Court of which he is a Judge, the CJI has to apply
his mind to the nature of complaint/report together with supporting
materials, if any. If the CJI believes that the matter requires a deeper
probe, he is required to constitute a Committee for an in-house inquiry.
The report of inquiry may, or may not, find the allegations against
the Judge to be serious, so as to call for any measure. However, if
it does, the CJI is under an obligation to forward the report to the
President and the Prime Minister. We see no justification to hold that
in so forwarding, the CJI may not give his own views.
65. Moreover, the President of India is not a stranger to the judicial
process. In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India17, the Court noted that:
“51. The President is not an outsider so far as judiciary
is concerned. The President appoints the Judges of the
High Courts and the Supreme Court in exercise of his
executive powers. Clause (1) of Article 217 provides that
every Judge of the High Court shall be appointed by the
President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India,
the Governor of the State, and in the case of appointment
of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice
of the High Court. Similarly the President appoints the
Judges of the Supreme Court. Clause (2) of Article 124
provides that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be
appointed by the President in consultation with such of
the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts
as the President may deem necessary for the purpose
and in case of appointment of a Judge other than the
Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be
consulted. The President exercises this power with the aid
17 (1991) 3 SCC 655
1978 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and advise of his Council of Ministers under Article 74 of the
Constitution. (Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab [(1974)
2 SCC 831 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 550 : (1975) 1 SCR 814]
and S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87 :
AIR 1982 SC 149] ). Parliament has no part to play in the
matter of appointment of Judges except that the executive
is responsible to the Parliament.”
66. We wish to go a bit further in observing that the President is not
only not an outsider to the judiciary but also not an outsider to the
Procedure itself. In the prefatory paragraphs of the Procedure, as
devised by the Full Court, it has been acknowledged that complaints
are received by the CJI from the office of the President. Having
received such complaints from the President, it is quite but natural that
the CJI would not only acknowledge receipt of such complaints but
also apply his mind and respond to the same, wherever necessary.
67. Pausing here for a moment, what else is the CJI expected to do,
if he is of the view that the matter requires a deeper probe? We
hasten to add that where the Committee itself (constituted by the
CJI) finds substance in the allegations and the misconduct found is
serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal, the
CJI does have the authority, in a fit and proper case, to endorse
such finding while forwarding the report of inquiry.
68. Next, the argument that the Members of either or both houses of the
Parliament could be influenced by the CJI’s opinion is not acceptable
since the opinion is not forwarded either to the Speaker of the Lok
Sabha or to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. For arguments sake,
even if it is assumed that Members of Parliament have had access
to the recommendation/advice of the CJI, if any, nothing much turns
on it. The Inquiry Act includes a specific mechanism which has to
be statutorily followed before any address for impeachment is made
in the House(s). The report of the Committee being preliminary
in nature, ad hoc and not final, as held in Indira Jaising (supra),
cannot affect the Petitioner in future proceedings unless such report
is relied upon at a future stage of the proceedings/at the inquiry; if
relied upon, the Petitioner would be free to exercise his rights as
are available in law.
69. At the same time, it needs no emphasis that although the CJI is the
head of the institution, he too is not above the law which is supreme;
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
hence, utmost care has to be taken to ensure that any action of the
CJI is not in deviation of the Procedure which permits the in-house
inquiry to be undertaken.
The Judges (Protection) Act
70. The relevant provisions of the Protection Act are reproduced
hereunder:
“2. Definition.—In this Act, ‘Judge’ means not only every
person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also
every person— (a) who is empowered by law to give in
any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment
which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a
judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority,
would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons
which body of persons is empowered by law to give such
a judgment as is referred to in clause (a).
3. Additional protection to Judges.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force and subject to the provisions
of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any
civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or
was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done
or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial
duty or function.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any
manner the power of the Central Government or the State
Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High
Court or any other authority under any law for the time
being in force to take such action (whether by way of
civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise)
against any person who is or was a Judge.”
(emphasis ours)
71. The Protection Act, we guess, may not have been brought to the
notice of this Court in any of the previous decisions considered
here by us. Viewed in that light, this decision could be the first of
1980 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
judicial pronouncements by this Court touching Section 3(2) of the
Protection Act vis-à-vis the Procedure; hence, we propose to deal
with it in some detail while assigning reasons for our firm opinion on
applicability of the Protection Act in the instant case.
72. First, the definition of a Judge in the Protection Act is an expansive
one intended to take into its fold anyone empowered by law to give
a definitive judgment in a legal proceeding. Therefore, the protection
envisaged thereunder applies not only to the Judges appointed under
the Constitution (i.e., the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and
the Judges recognised by the Constitution (the district Judiciary) but
also to judges of various tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies having
powers of adjudication across the country.
73. Secondly, Section 3(1) of the Protection Act provides that no Court
would entertain any civil or criminal proceeding against a judge acting
in his official or judicial duty or function. In the case of D.C. Saxena
(Dr) v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India18, it was observed that:
“57. ….The protection of Articles 124(4), 121, 211, the
Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 and the Judges
(Protection) Act, 1985 is to ensure independence to the
judiciary. Threat to judicial process is a challenge to the
authority of the court or the majesty of justice. It would be
ex facie contumacious conduct.”
74. While referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Protection Act, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand19
noticed its object and purport as follows:
“35. Even under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 immunity
has been given to judicial officers in relation to judicial
work done by them as well as for the judicial orders
made by them. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
for introducing the Bill in relation to the 1985 Act which
reads thus is instructive:
‘Judiciary is one of the main pillars of parliamentary
democracy as envisaged by the Constitution. It is essential
18 (1996) 5 SCC 216
19 (1998) 1 SCC 1
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XXX v. The Union of India & Others
to provide for all immunities necessary to enable Judges
to act fearlessly and impartially in the discharge of their
judicial duties. It will be difficult for the Judges to function if
their actions in court are made subject to legal proceedings,
either civil or criminal.’ …”
75. A similar sentiment was noticed in the Constitution Bench decision in
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India20
wherein it was observed:
“724. Similarly, Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act,
1985 provides, inter alia, that no court shall entertain or
continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person
who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed,
done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial
duty or function. This is in addition to the protection given
by Section 77 of the Penal Code, 1860…”
76. Indeed, Section 3(1) is subject to Section 3(2) and does not expressly
prohibit a departmental proceeding or otherwise but bars entertainment
and continuance of civil or criminal proceedings against a Judge as
defined in Section 2 for any act, thing or word committed, done or
spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.
77. Section 3(2) starts with a non-obstante clause with reference to
Section 3(1) and inter alia specifically ordains that the authorities
mentioned therein are not denuded of the power to initiate civil,
criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise against any Judge
as long as the law in force allows them to do so. We place sufficient
emphasis on the word “otherwise” as present in Section 3(2). The
Procedure having provisions for an in-house inquiry, with which
we are concerned, is admittedly not akin to any inquiry connected
with a departmental proceeding since it lacks the bearings of a true,
valid and legal departmental proceeding. It is a proceeding akin to a
preliminary fact-finding inquiry intended to serve a specific purpose.
However, the Procedure contemplating a fact-finding inquiry can
and does very well fit in the mould of the word “otherwise”. It is a
20 (2016) 5 SCC 1
1982 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
cardinal principle that no word in a statute is superfluous. We need
not burden our judgment with referring to precedents on this point.
78. We have noted the response of Mr. Sibal earlier that no law exists
conferring power on the Supreme Court to initiate proceedings against
a Judge of a High Court.
79. Attractive though at first blush, and accepting that a Judge cannot
be removed from office except in the manner ordained by the
Constitution, this submission of Mr. Sibal fails to take note of the
legal position flowing from Article 141 of the Constitution. As noted
in the decisions starting with C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), the
“In-house Procedure” proposes to fill the gap in the constitutional
mechanism and the ground realties present. Paragraph 43 of the
decision quoted above provides the guiding light for this purpose.
Parliament has saved the Supreme Court’s authority to initiate such
proceedings and take such action as it thinks fit, provided there is
a law for the time being in force in that regard by enacting sub-
section (2) of Section 3; and, the law declared by the Court in C.
Ravichandran Iyer (supra) is what bridges the breach.
80. Moreover, the 1999 Full Court resolution has been framed on the
basis of this decision; therefore, there is full legal sanction to the
Procedure when read in the light of guidance provided by Article
141 of the Constitution.
81. It was also submitted that if we propose to interpret the Protection
Act as conferring power to proceed against a Judge of a High
Court, then the Central Government/State Government would also
be able to initiate proceedings for such removal. While respectfully
disagreeing with Mr. Sibal, we have no hesitation to hold that
inclusion of the Central Government or the State Government or
such other authority in sub-section (2) of Section 3 is for the simple
reason that ‘Judge’, as defined in the Protection Act, is not limited
to the Judges of the Supreme Court and/or the High Court but also
includes judges conducting judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings
in the Tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies, thereby ensuring that the
protection granted under the Protection Act encompasses all such
individuals having authority to exercise judicial power under the law.
82. In our considered opinion, the Protection Act does not offend the
constitutional scheme present; and, being in addition to the extant
provisions, does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take
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such action, as deemed fit, against a Judge of a High Court who is
alleged to have indulged in misconduct in terms of the Procedure.
83. In interpreting the Protection Act, we are once again reminded of
the “yawning gap” in the procedure as noticed in C. Ravichandran
Iyer (supra), on ‘who’ sets the ball rolling. If we were to accept the
contention of Mr. Sibal, the Supreme Court and the CJI would be
powerless to initiate any action even on the face of allegations of
gross misconduct against a sitting Judge of a High Court which
cannot be the legislative intention. To address the growing concern
of incidents of misconduct, the Procedure has been craftily designed
to discipline Judges internally for such misconduct that is sufficient to
tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution to which he
belongs. The recognition that self-imposed ethical norms are integral
to the judiciary’s credibility, forms the cornerstone of the non-statutory
but wholly legal internal procedure for maintaining discipline and, by
extension, integrity of the institution. On this construction, we hold that
the CJI’s discretion as to whether, where and when to act, mindful
of the substance in the complaints received, would obviously be a
regulated discretion; but, once the ball is set rolling by the CJI, it must
end with his recommendation/advice to the President and the Prime
Minister depending on what the Committee records as its findings.
84. It does not require any emphasis that judicial officers in every rank,
and more specifically, the Judges in the higher echelons of the
Judiciary owe huge obligation to the people of this country. No Judge,
either of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, being above the law,
acting in the discharge of his judicial or administrative/non-judicial
or official duties in a manner attracting a possible complaint of not
abiding by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (widely regarded
now as the Code of Conduct for Judges of the Supreme Court and
the High Courts) has to be shunned. Frivolous complaints being
lodged by disgruntled litigants, lawyers and others, though cannot
be avoided, the path of probity also can never be abandoned by a
Judge. Any thought of there being absence of disciplinary measure
other than removal by impeachment (which has never fructified over
the years despite occasions calling for it) and therefore escaping
unscathed despite committing a misbehaviour or indulging in bad
conduct/misconduct, is what is normal, should be eschewed. With the
advancement in science and technology and all other spheres of work,
it is quite possible to bring to the CJI’s notice how a particular Judge
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might have conducted himself inappropriately calling for strict action.
Withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure that
the Procedure expressly permits. There are other measures too,
which could be explored if Judges are found to deviate from the Code
of Conduct. The Judges should, therefore, act cautiously and exercise
their discretion wisely, to evade creation of a situation where initiating
action becomes imperative. The judiciary in India is characterised
by judicial independence; however, judicial independence signifies
flexibility of judicial thought and the freedom to adjudicate without
external and internal pressure, and not unfettered liberty to act as
one might wish. Just as judicial independence is fundamental, so too
is judicial accountability; compromising one compromises the other.
85. Given that the only formal mechanism for addressing judicial
misbehaviour under the Constitution is impeachment by Parliament, it
must be remembered that not all misbehaviour of Judges necessarily
rise to the level of “proved misbehaviour” attracting Articles 217 and
218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124. The Constitution’s
silence on cases that do not rise to the level of proven misbehaviour
creates a significant structural vulnerability, which has since been
addressed by the Procedure. The Procedure acts as a check on
Judges’ unbridled freedom of action and thereby seeks to prevent
outcomes that could be harmful or unjust. Under the present set-up,
impeaching the Procedure or any part thereof may itself be viewed
as unreasonable and unjustified. Expressing our imprimatur of the
Procedure, we close our discussion on the Protection Act without
spilling further ink on this issue.
The nature of Inquiry under the Procedure
86. We wish to now dwell on the nature of inquiry that the Procedure
contemplates.
87. The inquiry that is part of the Procedure is designed to be a fact-
finding inquiry as distinguished from a guilt-finding inquiry; and it
is, therefore, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular
disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee.
88. To repeat, Indira Jaisingh (supra) terms the report of the in-house
inquiry as preliminary in nature, ad-hoc and not final.
89. Once the CJI constitutes the Committee, it is required to hold an
inquiry into the allegations contained in the complaint in the manner
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that the Procedure ordains. The Committee does have some leeway
to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural
justice. Though the Committee is not required to extend opportunity of
cross-examination of the persons who come before it for giving their
versions or opportunity to the Judge under probe to be represented
by a lawyer, the Judge must be called upon to appear and given
opportunity to have his say recorded. After concluding the inquiry, the
Committee may conclude and report to the CJI that (a) there is no
substance in the allegations contained in the complaint, or (b) there
is sufficient substance in the allegations contained in the complaint
and the misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation
of proceedings for removal of the Judge, or (c) there is substance
in the allegations contained in the complaint but the mis-conduct
disclosed is not of such a serious nature as to call for initiation of
proceedings for removal of the Judge.
90. Given its very nature, the Committee by preparing its report and
recording its findings, effectively assists the CJI in arriving at a
conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given case based
thereon.
91. Admittedly, this is a case falling within the second situation where the
Committee has recorded an opinion that there is sufficient substance
in the allegations contained in the letter of the CJI and the misconduct
disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation of proceedings for
removal of the Petitioner.
92. Insofar as the purpose that a preliminary enquiry seeks to serve, there
are multiple decisions of this Court on the point. A Constitution Bench
in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India21 observed that a
preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie
case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very
necessary that the two should not be confused. In Narayan Dattatraya
Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra22, it has been held that
a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the inquiry conducted
after the issue of charge-sheet; once regular inquiry is held under
the rules, the preliminary inquiry loses its importance and whether
the preliminary inquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by
observing principles of natural justice remains of no consequence.
21 AIR 1964 SC 1854
22 (1997) 1 SCC 299
1986 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat23 is one other decision where
this Court categorically observed that the material collected in a
preliminary inquiry has no relevance once a regular inquiry has started
and no material obtained during such preliminary enquiry can be used
against the delinquent employee, if such employee had no occasion
to cross-examine the concerned witnesses. All these decisions are
authorities on the point that generally, in the sphere of disciplinary
proceedings against delinquent officers/employees, the concept of
a preliminary inquiry contrasted with an inquiry, which is part of a
disciplinary/ departmental enquiry, is different. The raison d’être of
a preliminary enquiry is to determine whether a full-fledged inquiry
is at all needed based on the materials collected in course thereof.
93. That the “In-house Procedure” is not toothless and may very well
trigger initiation of proceedings in the Parliament for removal is
acknowledged in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’
(supra); however, no action for removal can be taken merely on the
basis of the Committee’s report since the Inquiry Act contemplates
a full-fledged inquiry against the concerned Judge. To that extent,
the report of the Committee may not carry much weight. Even
though the report might record that there is sufficient substance in
the allegations, the Inquiry Act does not debar the Judge charged
with misbehaviour to raise an effective defence by presenting such
evidence as are admissible and relevant once the evidence of the
witnesses supporting the charge are recorded. Needless to say,
if any reliance is placed by the Committee under the Inquiry Act
upon the report of the Committee prepared under the Procedure,
the Judge charged has a right to be informed whereupon it shall be
open to him to raise such points as to non-reliability/non-acceptability
thereof as are available in law. All rights of a Judge charged with
misbehaviour have, necessarily to be traced to the Inquiry Act as
well as rules of fair play so as to facilitate a fair, reasonable and
adequate opportunity of hearing. Nonetheless, the lack of opportunity
of a fair hearing in the Procedure cannot prejudice the concerned
Judge given the nature of the inquiry.
94. In line with the previous decisions, we have no hesitation to hold that
the nature of inquiry in the instant case is preliminary, ad-hoc and
not final as well as not violative of any principle of natural justice.
23 (2013) 4 SCC 301
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Why is the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
(supra) not applicable?
95. Reliance placed by Mr. Sibal on the decision in Sub-Committee
on Judicial Accountability (supra) is, in our considered view,
misplaced. That decision is distinguishable both on facts and on law
for the following reasons:
First, the issue which arose in such case was materially different
from the one in the present case. The questions which were required
to be answered by this Court in the said decision have been noted
earlier in paragraph 51 (supra). Anything and everything said in a
decision, while answering the questions which might arise, do not
form a precedent. It is settled law that a decision is an authority for
what it decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and
not every observation found therein, nor what logically follows from
every observation made in the decision.
Secondly, the Constitution is not a static document. Constitutional
Courts are obligated to interpret the Constitution in the light of evolving
standards and institutional needs. The decision in C. Ravichandran
Iyer (supra) marked a turning point by recognising the necessity of
an “In-house Procedure” to address complaints against Judges. The
decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra),
rendered years earlier, could not have envisioned the framework
developed in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) simply because of the
nature of problem that the latter had to solve.
Thirdly, C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), while being one amongst
few authoritative pronouncements by this Court acknowledging
the primacy of the CJI in preserving the institutional integrity of the
judiciary, categorically held that the CJI may take preliminary steps
when credible allegations arise, without encroaching upon the domain
of the Parliament under Article 124(4). The role assigned to the CJI
in this context is entirely distinct and was never under contemplation
in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra).
Fourthly, in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), though the concerned
judge had tendered his resignation and demitted office before the
judgment was pronounced, the Court nonetheless proceeded to lay
down the legal foundation for an in-house mechanism and setting
it as a precedent for all future cases. The Court’s stance makes it
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evident that Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) is
not applicable to the issue of “In-house Procedure”.
Fifthly, the Protection Act did not exercise the consideration of the
Court in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra).
Sixthly and finally, the evolution of the law post C. Ravichandran Iyer
(supra) has seen consistent affirmation of the in-house mechanism of
discipline by self-regulation by this Court. The Procedure has since
received judicial endorsement in at least three subsequent decisions.
96. The scope of the present matter, to a discerning eye, goes
beyond the principles laid down in Sub-Committee on Judicial
Accountability (supra), which did not have the occasion to address
the permissibility or validity of an in-house mechanism. In any event,
we do not see any observation in Sub-Committee on Judicial
Accountability (supra) made by the Court precluding the judiciary
from instituting internal, non-punitive mechanisms for the purpose
of fact-finding and disciplinary introspection by self-regulation. The
constitutional silence on internal mechanisms, in our opinion, cannot
be seen as a prohibition but rather it provided a space for responsible
judicial innovation which has stood the test of time.
97. For all the foregoing reasons, the ruling in Sub-Committee on
Judicial Accountability (supra) cannot be read as a limitation upon
the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the CJI, particularly
in matters concerning internal judicial discipline and the preservation
of institutional integrity.
98. Mr. Sibal’s contention relying on Sub-Committee on Judicial
Accountability (supra) is, thus, rejected.
Answers
99. Resting on the observations/findings given above, our endeavour to
answer the questions is rendered easy.
Answer to Question (i)
100. The question of entertainability of the writ petition assumes
importance, keeping the conduct of the Petitioner in perspective as
distinguished from a waiver of his rights. It has been noted that not
only did the Petitioner not object to the photographs/video footage
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being uploaded, he participated in the inquiry without demur. In his
representation dated 6th May, 2025 addressed to the CJI too, there
was no whisper of the Procedure fouling any constitutional provision.
Challenge to the constitutionality of paragraph 5(b) and paragraph 7
(ii) of the Procedure has been raised in this writ petition only after
the CJI had written to the President and the Prime Minister, while
enclosing therewith copy of the Report of the Committee together
with the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025, as required by
the Procedure.
101. We had repeatedly asked Mr. Sibal as to why the Petitioner waited
to invoke the writ jurisdiction. Why did the Petitioner not object to the
photographs/video footage being uploaded? Should the Petitioner
not have approached the Court earlier without submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Committee? Once the Petitioner submitted to
the jurisdiction, is it not to be presumed that he did so expecting a
favourable outcome and the writ petition came to be filed only when
the outcome was not palatable to him? Having regard to the caution
sounded in paragraph 37 of Additional District and Sessions Judge
‘X’ (supra), was it not incumbent for the Petitioner to point out any
perceived fault or flaw in the Procedure before submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Committee? In view of P.D. Dinakaran (1) (supra),
does the Petitioner pass the test of acting bona fide?
102. P.D. Dinakaran (1) (supra) emphasised that the petitioning judge
should not have waited for 10 months to approach the Court when
he had objection regarding inclusion of a member in the committee
as a jurist. Mr. Sibal’s argument that there cannot be a waiver of a
Fundamental Right is unexceptionable. However, what was said in
paragraph 81 of the decision is important. The Petitioner can well be
held disentitled to relief based on his tardy conduct but not, perhaps,
on the ground of waiver.
103. Mr. Sibal was, however, heard to submit that if the Petitioner had
approached it earlier, the Court could well have declined interference
on the ground that the writ jurisdiction may be invoked if at all the
report of inquiry were adverse to his interest.
104. We do not consider this answer worthy of acceptance. There are
umpteen decisions of this Court ruling that when the vires of a
provision is under challenge in a writ petition, it forms one of the four
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exceptions to the self-imposed restraint, propounded by decisions of
this Court, of not entertaining a writ petition because an alternative
remedy is available to the petitioner. Then again, there are good
number of decisions of this Court to the effect that challenge in a writ
petition to a show-cause notice for stalling inquiries or investigative
processes is not to be entertained unless the Court is satisfied that
the notice is non-est for total lack of jurisdiction of the notice issuing
authority to inquire into/investigate facts. This Court, in criminal
matters, even entertains challenges to criminal proceedings after
police reports (charge-sheets) have been filed and interfered in fit
and proper cases. There does hardly exist any strait-jacket formula
that the Courts would be loath to interfere or refuse to entertain a
writ petition since the proceedings are yet to draw to a conclusion.
Every case coming before the Court for adjudication would necessarily
depend on its own facts and the nature of challenge, i.e., whether
challenge to the vires of a provision has been raised on prima facie
strong grounds or whether a total lack of jurisdiction is shown to exist
in the notice issuing authority even to inquire into or investigate facts;
and, there can be no rule of universal application that the Courts
must invariably decline interference for no better reason than that
the proceedings, out of which the challenge stems, are pending. It
was, therefore, not open to the Petitioner to believe that the Court
would have refused to entertain the writ petition had he approached
earlier, which made him wait.
105. Uploading of the photographs/video footage, according to the
Petitioner, caused him immense harm. Not only did it lower his
reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without even a
preliminary inquiry. It could be so. However, what baffles us is the
conduct of the Petitioner to acquiesce to such uploading, participate
in the inquiry without demur, and to question such uploading only
after the Committee submitted its report to the CJI recording that
there was sufficient substance in the allegations. The argument of Mr.
Sibal that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry
is untenable. Though uploading of incriminating evidence available
against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step
which the Procedure requires and while such uploading may not be
considered to be proper, it is indeed a fait accompli. No benefit can
be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence
at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have been
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recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner to abide
by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life.
106. Even otherwise, inquiry had been initiated against the Petitioner
in terms of the Procedure which itself has been affirmed by this
Court multiple times before. If indeed any fault were found in the
Procedure and questions were to be raised, the Petitioner ought
not to have waited for completion of the fact-finding inquiry set in
motion by the CJI.
107. The conduct of the Petitioner, therefore, does not inspire much
confidence for us to entertain the writ petition.
108. We could have closed the writ petition based on our observation as
above. However, we do not wish to tread the easy route but would
rest our conclusions based on the answers to the other questions too.
Answer to Questions (ii) and (iii)
109. These questions being related, are taken up for consideration together.
110. Mr. Sibal has referred to the decision in Indira Jaising (supra) to
urge that the only source or authority of the CJI to exercise the
power of ordering an inquiry is moral and ethical. According to him,
the Procedure has no legal sanction.
111. We are of the firm opinion that the argument is unacceptable for
twin reasons, based on two key tenets.
112. The first reasoning rests on the rulings of this Court in the decisions
noted above affirming the Procedure, with which we are ad idem.
Significantly, C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) in express terms made it
abundantly clear that the yawning gap between proved misbehaviour
and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office of a Judge of a
High Court could be disciplined by self-regulation through “In-house
Procedure” which, in turn, while filling up the constitutional gap,
would yield salutary effect. Even though the respondent Judge had
demitted office as the Chief Justice, but noting the absence of legal
sanction to such procedure, the Court ruling is a revelation that its
statements should form a precedent for the future. Once the dicta
in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) constitutes a precedent, it is law
declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is judicial legislation
that emerged because of the vacuum in the field of disciplining a
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Judge who shows signs of delinquency. Additional District and
Sessions Judge ‘X’ (supra) traced the history of the Procedure and
stamped its approval. Merely because in Indira Jaising (supra) the
source of authority was held to be moral and ethical would not assist
the Petitioner. We unhesitatingly hold that might have originated as
moral and ethical authority gradually transformed into legal authority
of the CJI in view of C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra).
113. There is one other compelling reason for us to hold that the Procedure
could be seen as having a legal sanction. Sub-section (2) of Section
3 of the Protection Act has been noticed by us, above. Although
sub-section (1) of Section 3 extends protection to Judges and
restrains courts from entertaining and continuing proceedings – civil
or criminal – in respect of any act, thing or word committed, done or
spoken by a Judge when, or in the course of, acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function, the
same is subject to sub-section (2). In terms thereof, a person who
is or was a Judge is not immune from proceedings being initiated by
the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme
Court or any High Court or any other authority, as the case may
be, under any law for the time being in force. The action that could
lawfully be taken against anyone, who is or was a Judge, might be
civil, criminal, departmental proceedings or otherwise; but, such an
action, has to be at the instance of the named authority only if it is
conferred with such authority by law.
114. That the Procedure has its roots in the law declared by this Court
under Article 141 of the Constitution admits of no doubt. Accordingly,
we hold that ‘law for the time being in force’ in sub-section (2) of
Section 3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down by
this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with
‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough to
encompass measures that the Procedure contemplates.
115. The contention that the Procedure lacks legal sanction must,
accordingly, fail.
116. Having held so, we are inclined to the view that it is not the law
that once the Committee constituted by the CJI records in its report
that the conduct of the Judge under probe warrants initiation of
proceedings for his removal and the CJI, in turn, upon accepting
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such report furnishes the same together with his recommendation,
if any, to the President and the Prime Minister, that would invariably
in all cases result in initiation of proceedings under Article 124(4)
and (5) of the Constitution (for Supreme Court Judges) and Articles
217 and 218 read with Article 124 (for High Court Judges) and the
inquiry under the Inquiry Act. Report or no report, recommendation
or no recommendation, whatever is the case, the Parliament’s
power to initiate proceedings for removal of a Judge for alleged
misbehaviour or incapacity remains unfettered. Even though there
could be a case where good grounds for initiation of proceedings
do exist, the Parliament may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to
initiate proceedings for removal. Contrarily, even if it is reported by
the Committee under the Procedure that there exists any of the two
situations [para 5(a) or 5(c)] and the CJI, accepting such report, does
not make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to
initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers
necessary so to do. Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong indication
of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or suffering
from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for removal, no
proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie for activating the
Parliament to have such Judge removed from office. The power,
competence, authority and jurisdiction of the Parliament to decide
what is in the best interests of the nation is left untrammelled by the
Procedure; hence, it is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a
parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge.
117. Yet again, the in-house inquiry or its report forming part of the
Procedure in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the
constitutionally ordained procedure. Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a
removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional
mechanism. We reiterate that “a stitch in time saves nine”.
118. Questions (II) and (III), thus, stand answered.
Answer to Question (IV)
119. More than once, we have observed above how the Procedure found
its way into the system. The Procedure having been discussed and
affirmed in multiple precedents since C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra)
and we having expressed our agreement therewith, the argument
that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional scheme for removal
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of Judges by taking recourse to Article 124 is unsustainable. Our
observations, while dealing with the relevant topics, do provide ample
reasons why the Procedure or the inquiry contemplated thereunder
has not been considered to be in violation of any provision of the
Constitution, much less Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The
procedure that has been laid down in the Procedure is fair and just
which does not compromise judicial independence either, a basic
feature of our Constitution. A judge by his conduct of being fair and
just is supposed to earn for himself as well as the judiciary the trust
and respect of the members of the bar as well as the litigants and
all other stakeholders. If a complaint of misconduct committed by a
Judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the Procedure
the allegations against such a Judge are found to have sufficient
substance, he cannot claim any immunity - either by citing abrogation
of his Fundamental Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for
removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment - that
his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the Committee
or even by the CJI.
120. We see no reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in any
manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional provision.
Answer to Question (V)
121. We have noticed each and every stage through which the proceedings
against the Petitioner have passed. Right from the constitution of
the Committee till intimations were given to the President and the
Prime Minister by the CJI - we have neither been shown nor is it
a fact proved that either the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI
acted in any manner in deviation of the Procedure, except when
the photographs/video footage were uploaded on the website of the
Supreme Court. We wish to observe here that placing incriminating
evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain
is not a measure provided in the Procedure, either expressly or
by implication. Indira Jaising (supra) holds in clear terms that the
inquiry under the Procedure is for the information and satisfaction
of the CJI and the report of inquiry is confidential and, therefore,
such report cannot be made public. That being the clear position,
we are inclined to hold the entire process under the Procedure too
as confidential having ascertainment of truth as one of its objectives.
The demands of being fair and transparent, in such cases, have to
yield to the confidential nature of the process. Thus, uploading of
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the photographs/video footage on the website of this Court cannot
be viewed as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure”
and, thus, approved. But, then again, nothing really turns on the
uploading of the photographs/video footage since the Petitioner,
as observed above, did not have any grievance in relation thereto
which is obvious from his failure to question such uploading at an
appropriate time thereby allowing a situation to grow where the Court
is faced with a fait accompli. Even in this writ petition, no relief is
claimed in respect of such uploading.
122. Now that nothing is pending at the end of the Supreme Court and/
or the CJI, the Petitioner may exercise his rights in accordance with
law as and when an appropriate occasion arises.
Answer to Question (VI)
123. The CJI, as the leader of the judiciary, apart from his various other
duties owes a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice
delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted. It is unreasonable to
even think that despite an incident of the present nature, the CJI
would wait for the Parliament to take action. As observed before,
it is up to the Parliament whether or not to activate Article 124.
Left to him, the CJI upon being informed of a Judge’s remissness
does have the authority – moral, ethical and legal – to take such
necessary action as is warranted to keep institutional integrity intact.
Any adverse impact on the credibility of the institution could prove
dear. It is keeping in view such concerns and the legal position of
the President being the ultimate appointing authority of Judges and
the Prime Minister being the head of the Council of Ministers, upon
whose aid and advice the President acts under our Constitution,
coupled with receipt of complaints from the office of the President
that we find the provision in paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure
requiring the CJI to write to the President and the Prime Minister
along with the report of the Committee to be quite in order, legal
and valid. We repat, the office of the CJI is not to be regarded as
a post office that the report should only be routed through the CJI
without his observations.
124. We say again, we are unaware like the Petitioner of what the CJI
remarked while forwarding the Report of the Committee and the
Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025 to the President and the
Prime Minister. However, if indeed, the CJI has reiterated the finding
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of the Committee as contained in the Report and recommended
initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from office,
such a recommendation cannot be impeached on any valid and
legal ground. Notwithstanding that the recommendation of the CJI
carries much weight, one has to realize that the intimation given by
the CJI, under the Procedure, is for the eyes of the President and
the Prime Minister alone and not anyone else.
125. Therefore, we see no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure
as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or the concept
of separation of powers.
126. Before we conclude, one other contention is left to be dealt with
which was advanced by Mr. Rohatgi. It could be true that the then
CJI granted an opportunity of hearing to the Judge of the Calcutta
High Court under probe. However, it must be realised that it was a
step going beyond the Procedure. Here, the CJI has scrupulously
followed the Procedure which does not envisage a hearing to be
given to the Judge under probe after he has expressed his inability
to resign or voluntarily retire. Even though a hearing ‘could have
been given’, it cannot be equated with ‘should have been given’ in
the absence of any such express obligation in the Procedure. The
contention, thus, fails to impress us.
Conclusion
127. For the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for. The writ
petition stands dismissed.
Result of the case: Writ Petition dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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