Holding

A judgment or order obtained by fraud is a nullity; consequently, the High Court order and the Supreme Court's decision in Reddy Veerana are vitiated by fraud and the doctrine of merger does not apply.

Summary

The dispute concerned ownership of a 2‑18‑10 bigha parcel of land in NOIDA, jointly purchased in 1997 by Reddy, Sudhakar and Vishnu. Reddy later sought to establish sole ownership by filing separate suits and a writ petition, suppressing the earlier joint‑ownership litigation, and obtained a High Court order declaring him the sole owner. Vishnu challenged this order through a civil appeal, a writ petition under Article 32, and a review application, alleging that Reddy procured the orders by fraud and that the doctrine of merger should not bar his proceedings. The Supreme Court examined whether fraud vitiates the impugned order and the earlier decision in Reddy Veerana, and whether the doctrine of merger, forum‑shopping, and maintainability objections apply. It held that fraud unravels everything, rendering the High Court order and the Supreme Court’s decision in Reddy Veerana nullities, and that the merger doctrine does not apply in cases of fraud. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order, recalled the Reddy Veerana judgment, allowed the civil appeal and related applications, and dismissed the writ petition.

Issues considered

Whether the impugned High Court order, having merged with the Supreme Court's order in Reddy Veerana, renders the present civil appeal and writ petition non‑maintainable
Whether the writ petition is maintainable as it does not allege a violation of any Fundamental Right
Whether the appellant can simultaneously pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order and a petition for review of the Supreme Court's decision in which the impugned order has merged
Whether the appellant has engaged in forum shopping
Whether the orders obtained by Reddy were procured by fraud and therefore should be set aside

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 114, s. Order 14 Rule 2, s. Order 1 Rule 10, s. Order 1 Rule 9, s. Order LV Rule 6, s. Order XLVII Rule 1
Constitution of Indias. Article 131, s. Article 14, s. Article 141, s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 21, s. Article 226, s. Article 300-A, s. Article 32
Contract Act, 1872s. Section 208
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. Section 18, s. Section 24, s. Section 30, s. Section 4, s. Section 6
Land Revenue Act, 1996s. Section 34
Power of Attorney Act, 1882s. Section 3
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. Section 24
Supreme Court Rules, 2013s. Order LV Rule 6, s. Order VIII Rule 6

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the impugned order having merged with this Court’s order in Reddy Veerana’s case, as claimed by R, renders the present appeal which lays a collateral challenge to an order of this Court itself not maintainable; whether the present maintainable, as it seeks to challenge a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never be said to violate Fundamental Rights; whether the appellant can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order as well as a petition for review of the decision of this Court in which the impugned order

Subjects

Fraudulent conductFraudSubverting the judicial process through fraudConcealment of material factsSuppression of material factsDoctrine of mergerForum shoppingJoint ownershipExclusive ownershipQuantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject landViolation of fundamental rightsActus curiae neminem gravabitPublic policyPublic interestOwnership of a landsuggestio falsi nor suppressio veriWrit jurisdictionDeception upon the courtsFraud played by one on courts to reap benefitsNew Okhla Industrial Development AuthorityPetition for reviewApplication for recallFraud unravels everything

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1371 : 2025 INSC 884

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7777 of 2023)
23 July 2025
[Surya Kant, Dipankar Dutta* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the impugned order having merged with this
Court’s order in Reddy Veerana’s case, as claimed by R, renders
the present appeal which lays a collateral challenge to an order of
this Court itself not maintainable; whether the present writ petition
is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge a judicial order which,
by its very nature, can never be said to violate Fundamental
Rights; whether the appellant can pursue a civil appeal against the
impugned order as well as a petition for review of the decision of
this Court in which the impugned order has merged, as claimed,
simultaneously; whether the appellant has engaged in forum
shopping; and whether the R obtained the impugned order, as
well as this Court’s order in Reddy Veerana’s case, by practising
fraud and deception upon the courts and, thus, liable to be set
aside/recalled.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Arts.32, 226 – Dispute in respect
of ownership of land – Fraud played by one on courts to
reap benefits – Land acquired by the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority in 2005 and now forms a part of Sector
18, NOIDA – Land jointly purchased in 1997 by R, one S and
the appellant – Relying on joint ownership, the trio initiated
various legal proceedings seeking multiple relief from time to
time, before and after the acquisition of the land by NOIDA –
Appellant’s case that R made several attempts to assert his
exclusive ownership in proceedings where the appellant and
S were not joined as parties; that in one such proceeding,
R succeeded and the High Court, by the impugned order,
declared him the sole owner – Appellant alleging the conduct

* Author
1372 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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of R as fraudulent, filed instant appeal, petition for review and
application for recall:
Held: Fraud unravels everything – R tailored a situation to suit
his convenience by not impleading the appellant as a party with
the sole intention of obtaining an order in respect of not only the
quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject
land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto all, behind
the appellant’s back, is all fraud – R’s failure before the High Court
to disclose the earlier series of litigation where he consistently
asserted joint ownership with the appellant and S being a fact
having a bearing on the merits of the case, sufficient to vitiate the
impugned order – Suppression of material facts before the High
Court by R is writ large; highlights the fraudulent intent behind
R’s claim however, his fraudulent conduct not confined to that
forum alone – Rapid pleadings, exclusion of a necessary party,
and abandonment of the suit clearly reflects a collusive effort by
R to manufacture support for his claim of sole ownership – All
this confirms that his deceptive practices date back over two
decades – Judicial orders procured by R by subverting the judicial
process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot
be permitted to stand – Fact of the appellant being a co-owner of
the property could not have been discovered by either the High
Court or this Court unless the same were placed before such
courts – Impugned order and the decision of this Court in Reddy
Veerana’s case procured by R are tainted by fraud and, thus,
lack legal sanctity and validity – As regards the maintainability
of petition, writ petition did not disclose violation of any of the
fundamental rights including, inter alia, the right to have access
to an effective legal remedy, since all the available options for
relief are being sought to be explored by him and, hence, is not
maintainable – Writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order –
There being no challenge to any judicial order, this ground of
challenge rejected – Furthermore, this Court is not exercising
any “intra-court appeal” jurisdiction – Fraud is an exception
to the doctrine of merger and considering that the impugned
order of the High Court and the decision of this Court in Reddy
Veerana have been found to be vitiated by fraud, the plea of R
as regards the non-maintainability of the present proceedings
based on the merger doctrine of no significance – When the Court
has been the victim of fraud, it’s hands cannot be tied down by
procedural laws in a manner to defeat the interests and rights of
other parties – An appeal against a decree or order, passed or
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1373

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

made by an inferior court, before a superior court and a review
of the same decree/order before the court which passed/made it
cannot simultaneously be pursued by the same party – However,
on facts there is an absence of a two-pronged assail in two
different proceedings by the appellant to the same decree or
order: whereas the civil appeal is directed against the impugned
order, a petition has subsequently been filed by the appellant for
review of the decision in Reddy Veerana’s case (which had the
occasion to modify the impugned order) – Thus, neither s.114
nor Or.XLVII r.1, CPC would create a legal bar for entertaining
the two proceedings-appeal and review that have been initiated
by the appellant – Due to fraud having been played by R, the
doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order
is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court
in Reddy Veerana’s case – Impugned order set aside, since fraud
has vitiated the entire proceedings – As a logical corollary of the
impugned order, the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana’s
case, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be
a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of the inherent
powers – Application for recall of the order whereby this Court
directed the appellant to approach the court u/s.30 of the 1894
Act for appropriate relief allowed. [Paras 49, 51, 54, 60, 63, 64,
80-82, 84, 89, 122-124, 133, 134, 138-140, 144]

Doctrines – Doctrine of Merger – Application of – Explanation:
Held: When an appeal is limited to a specific part of the judgment
and order of the first-instance court, the merger occurs only to that
extent, leaving the rest intact and available for future consideration –
Extent of merger is determined by the subject matter of the appeal –
Merger can only operate on issues which were the subject-matter
of the appellate court’s judgment and order and cannot have any
application to issues which are not being taken on appeal by
either party or which had not been touched upon by the appellate
court – Application of the doctrine of merger, in every case, should
be accompanied by an awareness of its limitations and should not
be wielded to close avenues for addressing genuine concerns –
Prioritizing justice and fairness should supersede an absolute
insistence on finality – While the latter is commendable, the former
is superior – These doctrines, even though are grounded in sound
and justifiable public policy arguments, yet, do not limit the powers
of the courts in cases where larger public interest is at stake – They
have been adapted to accommodate exceptions and qualifications,
1374 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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leaving room for acknowledging special circumstances, particularly
in matters of public significance – Doctrine of merger may not have
any application in all cases of cognate civil appeals being carried
from the same order (obviously at the instance of a party different
from the appellant who approached this Court first in point of time).
[Paras 110, 111, 113, 122, 123]

Case Law Cited
Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 414 :
(2006) 5 SCC 638 – relied on.
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [1974] 2 SCR 34 : (1974) 4 SCC 3;
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC
248; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 :
(1985) 3 SCC 398; D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab : (1971) 2
SCC 269; Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India [2010] 3 SCR 1059 :
(2010) 4 SCC 1; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra
[1966] 3 SCR 744 : AIR 1967 SC 1; Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [2017] 4 SCR 527 : (2017) 4 SCC 1; S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu v. Jagannath [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422 : (1994) 1 SCC 1;
Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Bhoopendra Singh (2022) 14 SCC
277; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (LAPSE-5 J.)
[2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129; Reddy Veerana v. State of U.P.
[2022] 3 SCR 663 : (2022) 14 SCC 252; Sathyanath v. Sarojamani
[2022] 4 SCR 46 : (2022) 7 SCC 644; Poonam v. State of U.P.
[2015] 14 SCR 565 : (2016) 2 SCC 779; Ajay Ishwar Ghute and
Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors. [2024] 5 SCR 155 : 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 681; Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar
(Land Acquisition) Neyvely [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 567 : (1995) 1
SCC 221; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar
[2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 166; United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh [2000] 2 SCR 264 : (2000) 3 SCC 581;
Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros. [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 446 :
(1992) 1 SCC 534; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [2007]
3 SCR 603 : (2007) 4 SCC 221; Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra
University [1976] 2 SCR 722 : (1976) 1 SCC 311; Amina Marwa
Sabreen v. State of Kerala (2018) 14 SCC 193; Amrit Lal Berry v.
CCE [1975] 2 SCR 960 : (1975) 4 SCC 714; Harbhajan Singh v.
State of Haryana [2022] 12 SCR 1113 : (2023) 11 SCC 693; Anita
Kushwaha v. Pushap Sadan [2016] 9 SCR 560 : (2016) 8 SCC
509; Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India [2023] 14 SCR 477 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1334; Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1375

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Union of India [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382: (1986) 1 SCC 133;
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
Ltd. [1979] 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC 489; Basudeo Tiwary v.
Sido Kanho University [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 633 : (1998) 8 SCC
194; Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909; Inderjit
Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab [2011] 10 SCR 557 : (2011) 12
SCC 588; Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai [1954] 1
SCR 339 : (1953) 2 SCC 489; State of Madras v. Madurai Mills
Co. Ltd [1967] 1 SCR 732 : 1967 AIR 681; Collector of Customs,
Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. and Others [1963]
2 SCR 563; Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1
SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri
Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal
[2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; Commissioner of Sales Taxv.
Vijai International Udyog (1984) 4 SCC 543; MRF Ltd. v. Manohar
Parrikar [2010] 5 SCR 1081 : (2010) 11 SCC 374; Commissioner
of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Ltd. [2010] 7 SCR 808 :
(2010) 11 SCC 153; S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N. [2002]
Supp. 2 SCR 498 : (2002) 8 SCC 361; Jatan Kumar Golcha v.
Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. [1971] 3 SCR 247 : (1970) 3 SCC 573;
State of Punjab v. Amar Singh [1974] 3 SCR 152 : (1974) 2 SCC
70; State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari [1976] 2 SCR 82 : (1976)
1 SCC 719; M.V. “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez [1989] Supp. 1
SCR 187 : (1989) 4 SCC 671 – referred to.
Bhoopendra Singh & Ors. v. Awas Vikas Parishad, 2005 (2)
Uttaranchal Decision 295; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Tejaji
Farasram Kharawalla, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 28 – referred to.
Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 Q.B. 702; King v. Hoare,
(1844) 13 Meeson and Welsby 494; Kendall v. Hamilton, (1879)
4 App. Cas. 504; Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK
Ltd., [2013] UKSC 46 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition) – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Land
Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013;
Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
1376 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords
Fraudulent conduct; Fraud; Subverting the judicial process through
fraud; Concealment of material facts; Suppression of material
facts; Doctrine of merger; Forum shopping; Joint ownership;
Exclusive ownership; Quantum of compensation payable for
acquisition of the subject land; Violation of fundamental rights;
Actus curiae neminem gravabit; Public policy; Public interest;
Ownership of a land; suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri; Writ
jurisdiction; Deception upon the courts; Fraud played by one
on courts to reap benefits; New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority; Petition for review; Application for recall; Fraud unravels
everything.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7777 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 2272 of 2019
With
W.P. (C) No. 673 of 2023, MA No. 1737 of 2023 in MA 255 of
2023 in C.A. No. 3636 of 2022, CONMT. PET. (C) No. 23-24 of
2024 in W.P. (C) No. 673 of 2023, Diary No. 6013 of 2024 and
SMC (C) No. 3 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
By Courts Motion (for Appellant)
Advs. for the Appellant:
Dushyant Dave, Niranjan Reddy, Nikhil Goel, Shyam Divan,
Devadatt Kamath, Sr. Advs., Aniruddha Deshmukh, Vipin Nair,
Sughosh Subramanyam, Udayaditya Banerjee, Ms. Sanskruti
Samal, Mohd Aman Alam, M.B. Ramya, Aditya Narendranath,
Ms. Madhavi Yadav.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A.A.G,
Shyam Divan, Devakatt Kamath, Pinaki Mishra, Shoaib Alam, Sr.
Advs., Vipin Nair, Sughosh Subramanyam, Udayaditya Banerjee,
Ms. Sanskruti Samal, Mohd Aman Alam, Ms. M.B. Ramya, Aditya
Narendranath, Ms. Madhavi Yadav, Yashvardhan Singh, Shashank
Shekhar Singh, Abhinav Singh, Sameer Jain, Suvigya Awasthy,
Vivek Joshi, Deepesh Raj, Soayib Qureshi, Ashutosh Ghade, Ms.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1377

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Ruby Singh Ahuja, Pravin Bahadur, Amit, Ms. Kanika Gomber,
Ms. Akanksha Thapa, Ms. Uzma Sheikh, Tribhuvan Narain Singh,
M/s. Karanjawala & Co., Abhinav Agrawal.
Advs. for Intervenor:
Ms. Shalini Kaul, Chaman Choudhary.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

Index*
Introduction ................................................................................ 3
Facts ........................................................................................... 6
Impugned Order .......................................................................... 20
Before This Court In Civil Appeal No 3636-37 Of 2022 .......... 22
Contentions ................................................................................ 24
Arguments by Vishnu ............................................................ 24
Arguments by Reddy ............................................................. 25
Arguments by NOIDA ............................................................ 28
Reply by Vishnu regarding objections to maintainability .... 29
Issues .......................................................................................... 29
Analysis ....................................................................................... 30
I. Has Reddy Played Fraud On The Courts? ......................... 33
II. Maintainability ....................................................................... 47
A. Maintainability of the Writ Petition .............................. 47
B. Maintainability of Civil Appeal/Jurisdiction of the Supreme 56
Court ...............................................................
Intra-Court Appeal ........................................................ 56
Merger ........................................................................... 59
Procedure, If An Impediment To Exercise Jurisdiction . 76
C. Vishnu pursuing the civil appeal as well as the review 78
petition and application for modification/recall,
simultaneously ................................................................
D. Forum Shopping .............................................................. 81
Conclusion .................................................................................. 82

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1378 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Introduction
1. In Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, a three-Judge Bench
of this Court emphatically asserted “… stated simply, nothing …
nothing … and nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as
fraud unravels everything.”
2. At the end of the last century, this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu v. Jagannath2 noticed the growing trend of abuse of the
process of law by dishonest litigants playing fraud on courts. Fraud
was held to be an act of deliberate deception with the design of
securing something by taking unfair advantage of another: a deception
in order to gain by another’s loss. The opening paragraph of such
decision reads as follows:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal”
observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about
three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law
that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on
the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such
a judgment/decree — by the first court or by the highest
court — has to be treated as a nullity by every court,
whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any
court even in collateral proceedings.
This Court then warned that:
5. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to
the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of
fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law
are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One
who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We
are constrained to say that more often than not, process of
the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders,
bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from
all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to
retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation
to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood,

1 (2017) 4 SCC 1
2 (1994) 1 SCC 1
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1379

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily
thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
3. “Fraud unravels everything” was famously said by Lord Denning
in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley3, emphasising that fraud can
invalidate judgments, contracts and all transactions. The principle
highlights the importance of honesty and transparency in legal
proceedings and transactions. However, it is a cardinal principle of
law that fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Order VI Rule 4, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084 may be referred to ordaining that
particulars, inter alia, of fraud have to be stated in the pleadings.
4. From the multiple decisions of this Court on ‘fraud’, what follows is
that fraud and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature never
intends to guard fraud, the question of limitation to exercise power
does not arise, if fraud is proved, and even finality of litigation
cannot be pressed into service to absurd limits when a fraud is
unravelled.
5. The issue of fraud unravelling everything is pertinent here due to the
nature of dispute we are tasked to adjudicate; hence, its reference
at the beginning of our judgment.
6. The primary parties involved in these proceedings are the appellant-
writ petitioner-applicant, Vishnu Vardhan5, and the respondent no.7,
Reddy Veeranna6. Vishnu has alleged that fraud has been played by
Reddy on courts to reap benefits behind Vishnu’s back. The tangled
facts involved in these proceedings, the complex web of activities of
the primary parties and their associates and the relief claimed in the
civil appeal as well as the writ petition by Vishnu would have to be
examined in great depth to ascertain whether fraud, as alleged by
him, is established; and, if so, how it has affected the flow of judicial
proceedings and the manner in which the same has to be dealt with.
In the process, other petitions/applications that are on record would
also require due consideration.

3 (1956) 1 Q.B. 702
4 CPC
5 Vishnu
6 Reddy
1380 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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7. In the civil appeal, by special leave, Vishnu has assailed the judgment
and order7 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad8 dated 28th
October, 2021, whereby the High Court allowed a writ petition9 filed
by Reddy.
8. Concurrently with the civil appeal, Vishnu has presented a writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution. He has prayed for diverse relief
therein, which we propose to notice a little later.
9. The present lis concerns rival claims in respect of ownership of a land10
situated in Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, which was acquired
by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority11 in 2005 and now
forms a part of Sector 18, NOIDA. The land was jointly purchased
in 1997 by Reddy, one T. Sudhakar12 and Vishnu13. Relying on their
joint ownership, the trio initiated various legal proceedings seeking
multiple relief from time to time, before and after the acquisition
of the land by NOIDA. Vishnu alleges that Reddy made several
attempts to assert his exclusive ownership in proceedings where
Vishnu and Sudhakar were not joined as parties. He further alleges
that in one such proceeding, Reddy succeeded and the High Court,
by the impugned order, declared him the sole owner. Aggrieved by
the conduct of Reddy (which, according to Vishnu, is fraudulent)
and the impugned order, Vishnu has sought relief from this Court
by presenting the civil appeal.
10. While the relief claimed in the civil appeal is for setting aside of the
impugned order, what is prayed in the writ petition is (i) a declaration
that Reddy is not the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) an order
setting aside NOIDA’s decision (reflected in its letter dated 17th
January, 2023) to sanction full compensation for acquisition of the
land to Reddy, (iii) a declaration that the trio, as co-owners of the
land, be jointly awarded compensation for acquisition thereof and (iv)
ordering an inquiry to unearth the fraud and to initiate appropriate
legal proceedings against the persons responsible.

7 impugned order
8 High Court
9 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2272/2019
10 referred to as land, subject land or property, interchangeably, hereafter
11 NOIDA
12 Sudhakar
13 the trio, wherever referred to collectively
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1381

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

11. Inter alia, there is a petition for review (defective) and an application
for recall, both at the instance of Vishnu. While the former seeks
review of the judgment and order dated 5th May, 2022 of this Court
in C.A. No. 3636/2022, the latter seeks recall of an order dated 30th
January, 2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil Appeal 3636/2022.

Facts
12. Since it is essential to delve deep into the facts for a proper
determination of the claims raised by Vishnu against Reddy and the
officials of NOIDA, for the sake of clarity and convenience, the full
factual details are set out in the table below.

17th April, 1976 Vide Notification No. 4157 dated 17th April, 1976
issued under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, NOIDA
was constituted by declaring large tracts of land
comprising of several villages in Gautam Budh
Nagar District, including lands in the village of
Chhalera Banger.

1985-1986 Between 1985 and 1986, NOIDA acquired a
certain portion of land from one Banwari and
Bansha Singh and compensation was received
by them.

24th April, 1997 The trio jointly purchased a land measuring 5-13-
10 Bighas at Khasra No. 422 and 427M of Village
Challera Banger, Gautam Budh Nagar, for a sum
of Rs. 1 crore from Bansa and Banwari Singh.
Only 2-18-10 Bighas of land14 which was un-
acquired by NOIDA is the subject of the present
proceeding. The names of the trio were entered
in the revenue records and the record of rights.

1998 The trio instituted a suit15 seeking a permanent
injunction against NOIDA from disturbing their
First Suit
possession and title in the subject land.

14 subject land
15 Civil Suit No. 416/1998
1382 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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16th February, 2000 The trial court by its decree restrained NOIDA from
interfering with the possession of the unacquired
land admeasuring 2-18-10 bighas.
26th June, 2000 Vide an agreement to sell, Sudhakar purportedly
relinquished his share in the subject land to Reddy
for Rs. 10 lakh.
2001 Aggrieved, NOIDA carried an appeal16 from the
trial court’s decree dated 16th February, 2000
before the First Appellate Court.
30th March, 2001 The First Appellate Court dismissed the civil
appeal filed by NOIDA and this decision not being
challenged, attained finality.
30th May, 2001 Sudhakar instituted a civil suit17 against Reddy,
seeking a declaration of his 1/3rd share in the
Second Suit
subject land.
31st May, 2001 Reddy filed his written statement in the said suit.
On the same day, a compromise agreement was
signed by and between Sudhakar and Reddy,
conceding that Reddy was the absolute owner
of the land.
12th September, 2002 The trial court, declaring that the compromise
agreement was not bona fide, refused to act
upon it.
5th December, 2002 The civil suit instituted by Sudhakar was dismissed
for default by the trial court.
2003-2004 NOIDA introduced a scheme for development of
a commercial hub at Sector 18, NOIDA.
11th November, 2003 Sudhakar requested the Deputy CEO to convert
the subject land for use from agricultural to
commercial, which was denied on 13th January,
2004.
27th March, 2004 An office order set the rates for commercial land
at Rs. 1,10,000 per sq. metre and for residential
land at Rs. 4000 per sq. metre.

16 Civil Appeal No. 61/2000
17 Civil Suit No. 283/2001
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1383

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

2003 – 2005 NOIDA allegedly made several attempts
to dispossess the trio from the subject
land.

12th April, 2004 NOIDA issued an acceptance letter to DLF
Universal for allotment of the commercial hub.

2005 The trio filed Execution Petition No. 2/2005 for
execution of the decree of the trial court dated
16 th February, 2000, restraining NOIDA from
dispossessing them from the land.

3rd February, 2005 Vishnu purportedly executed an Agreement for
Sale for his share of the land with Reddy for a
Agreement for Sale
sum of Rs. 25 lakh.

3rd February, 2005 Vishnu executed a General Power of Attorney
(PoA) in favour of one Venkataramana.
PoA

25th February, 2005 NOIDA and DLF Universal entered into a lease
deed for Plot No. M-3, Sector 18, NOIDA for
a total premium of Rs. 173 crore for an area
admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. metre.

2nd August, 2005 Execution Petition No. 2/2005 was rejected.

4th August, 2005 The trio, through their power of attorney holders,
except for Reddy who was himself present,
agreed to sell land measuring 5-13-10 Bighas in
favour of M/s Prabhat Home Pvt. Ltd. for 50%
of the undivided share of the entire land, for a
consideration of Rs. 13.15 crore.

2nd September, 2005 A Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition
Act, 189418 in respect of the subject land was
Land Acquisition
issued.

3rd October, 2005 The trio had filed another execution application
bearing Execution Application No. 6/2005. This
application was rejected on 3rd October, 2005.

18 1894 Act
1384 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

November/December WP(C) 66797/2005 was filed before the High
2005 Court by the trio, challenging the orders dated
2nd August, 2005 and 3rd October, 2005 whereby
Execution Petition No. 2/2005 and Execution
Application No. 6/2005, respectively, were
rejected.

22nd November, 2005 A notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act in
respect of the subject land was issued.

21st December, 2005 The General Power of Attorney dated 3rd February,
2005 was purportedly cancelled by Vishnu.
PoA - Cancellation

December 2005 Vishnu filed WP(C) No. 75152/2005, challenging
the land acquisition proceedings initiated by
NOIDA authorities.

28th April, 2006 WP(C) 66797/2005 filed by the trio was allowed,
and the matter was remanded to the executing
court to decide whether the land in question stood
acquired by NOIDA.

31st May, 2006 Reddy filed a civil suit19 against Vishnu, praying
for a declaration that he was the sole owner of
Third Suit
the land.

7th June, 2006 Vishnu executed a registered agreement for sale,
agreeing to sell his 1/3rd share of the subject land
to one Ranbir Singh Narag for Rs. 3 crore.

4th October, 2006 Vishnu, through his Power of Attorney holder
(Venkataramana), filed a written statement in
Civil Suit No. 370/2006, admitting Reddy’s claims.

4th October, 2006 A Joint Compromise Application was filed by
Reddy and the PoA holder of Vishnu.
Note: Vishnu argues that Venkataramana had
no authority to file the written statement or a
compromise application, as the PoA had already
been cancelled on 21st December, 2005.

19 Civil Suit No. 370/2006
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1385

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

17th November, 2006 Civil Suit No. 370/2006, i.e., the third suit, was
decreed as per the compromise.

18th December, 2006 Execution Petitions, which had been remanded,
were rejected by the executing court on 1st August,
2008 because the lands were already acquired by
NOIDA. Challenging the rejections, the trio filed
WP(C) 70088/2006 on 18th December, 2006. At
paragraph 3 (three) of this WP, the trio pleaded
that they are the co-owners of the property.

10th December, 2009 While WP(C) No. 75152/2005, filed by Reddy,
challenging the land acquisition proceedings was
pending, Sudhakar and Vishnu filed impleadment
application claiming themselves to be the co-
owners of the property. The said application was
allowed.

10th December, 2009 WP(C) No. 75152/2005 for compensation was
allowed by the High Court in light of the decision
of the Uttaranchal High Court in Bhoopendra
Singh & Ors. v. Awas Vikas Parishad20.
Note: This Court has upheld the decision of the
Uttaranchal High Court in Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad v. Bhoopendra Singh21.

2010 NOIDA challenged the order of the High Court
dated 10 th December, 2009 in SLP (C) No.
20196-97/2010.

1st September, 2010 Reddy had Vishnu’s name deleted from the
land records qua the subject land using the
compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006.
In this regard, Khatauni Entry of Fasli Year 1407-
1412 dated 26th September, 2010 shows Reddy
as the sole owner.

20 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295
21 (2022) 14 SCC 277
1386 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

10th January, 2011 Notice was issued by this Court in the SLP
filed by NOIDA, and operation of the impugned
judgment dated 10th December, 2009 in WP(C)
No. 75152/2005 was stayed. On leave being
granted, this SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal
No. 731/2013.

30th January, 2011 An award for compensation of the subject land
was made. This award has not been placed on
record.

4th January, 2013 Vishnu was served by paper publication but did
not enter appearance before this Court.

4th November, 2015 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 filed by NOIDA was
dismissed by this Court.

2015-17 Reddy made representations to NOIDA and the
District Magistrate seeking compensation in terms
of the judgment dated 4th November, 2015 passed
by this Court.

8th January, 2018 The District Magistrate rejected Reddy’s
representation.

22nd October, 2018 Reddy initiated action for contempt by filing
Contempt Petition No. 1841-42/2018 in Civil
Appeal No. 731/2013 and alleged wilful and
deliberate non-compliance with the order dated
4th November, 2015. The petition was withdrawn
with liberty to avail appropriate remedies before
the High Court.

17th January, 2019 Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court,
Reddy filed WP(C) 2272/2019 before the High
Court praying for:
quashing of the order dated 8th January, 2018.
quashing of the award dated 31st January, 2011.
a declaration that the land acquisition
proceedings have lapsed and to direct NOIDA to
either initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings
or pass a fresh award or hand over possession
to Reddy.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1387

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

7th August, 2020 Vishnu instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 before
the trial court claiming that the compromise decree
Fourth Suit
dated 17th November, 2006, was null and void.
11th October, 2021 Served with summons, Reddy filed his written
statement in Civil Suit No. 471/2020. However,
it has not been placed on record.
28th October, 2021 The High Court allowed WP(C) 2272/2019 filed
by Reddy and accepted the plea that he was the
Impugned order
sole owner of the property. The compensation
in C.A. No. 7777/2023 was enhanced from Rs.181.87 per sq. yard (or
Rs.152.04 per sq. metre) to Rs.1,10,000 per sq.
metre, with a deduction for development charges
at 50%, i.e., Rs. 55,000 per sq. metre, along with
a 30% solatium and interest @ 15%.
30th October, 2021 Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Reddy
challenged the same in SLP (C) No. 19035/2021
which, on leave being granted, was numbered as
Civil Appeal No. 3636/2022.
8th March, 2022 NOIDA filed a counter in Civil Appeal No.
3636/2022.
24th March, 2022 Aggrieved by enhancement of compensation by
the order dated 28th October, 2021 of the High
Court, NOIDA too challenged the same in SLP
(C) No. 5500/2022. Upon leave being granted,
the SLP was numbered as Civil Appeal No.
3637/2022.
5th May, 2022 This Court vide a common judgment and order,
dismissed the civil appeal filed by NOIDA (C.A.
Challenge to the
No. 3637/2022) and partly allowed the civil appeal
impugned order was
filed by Reddy (C.A. No. 3636/2022), setting aside
dismissed by this
deduction of the development charges ordered
Court
by the High Court.
10th August, 2022 Review Petition (C) Nos. 874-875/2022 filed by
NOIDA were dismissed by this Court.
15th September, 2022 Due to the financial implications arising out of the
order dated 5th May, 2022, the then CEO, NOIDA
issued a letter to the Deputy Secretary, Govt. of
Uttar Pradesh seeking guidance from for filing a
curative petition.
1388 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

19th September, 2022 Vishnu filed IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No.
3636/2022 seeking modification of the order dated
5th May, 2022.
30th September, 2022 Pursuant to letter dated 15th September, 2022, the
matter was examined by the Law Department and
letter dated 30th September, 2022 was issued to
NOIDA requesting that instead of filing a curative
petition, an attempt be made to negotiate the
compensation amount with Reddy.
7th October, 2022 A meeting/negotiation took place between
NOIDA and Reddy, where they agreed to have
the compensation payable reduced from Rs.359
crore to Rs.295 crore, which was paid to Reddy
on 28th December, 2022.
30th January, 2023 IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No. 3636/2022 was
disposed of by a Bench of two-Judges [of which
one of us (Surya Kant, J.) was a member], granting
Vishnu liberty to agitate his claim regarding co-
ownership before the Reference Court.
3rd July, 2023 Vishnu approached this Court with the civil
appeal and the writ petition, which are under
consideration.
3rd July, 2023 Vishnu filed MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in
Civil Appeal 3636/2022 seeking recall of order
dated 30th January, 2023.
13th August, 2023 Vishnu filed a defective Review Petition Diary no.
33040/2023 praying for review of the judgment
MA Diary No.
dated 5th May, 2022. As the defects were not
6013/2024
cured within time, registration thereof was
(tagged with the declined 22 by the Registrar (J-A) vide order
present set of dated 4th January, 2024. Vishnu filed an appeal23
matters) against the Registrar’s order, registered as MA
Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition Diary
No. 33040/ 2023. On 24th October, 2024, the
Chamber Judge ordered that the said appeal be
tagged with Civil Appeal 7777/2023 and the other
connected matters.

22 under Order VIII Rule 6(3) and 6(4) of Supreme Court Rules, 2013
23 under Order VIII Rule 6 (5) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1389

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
14 August, 2023
th
Notice on the special leave petition, writ petition,
miscellaneous application as well as on the
application seeking condonation of delay was
issued by a bench of this Court (cor. Surya Kant
and Dipankar Datta, JJ.). Reddy was directed to
Notice and stay by keep the compensation amount received by him
this Court in an FDR and to file affidavits with details of such
FDR along with an undertaking not to encash the
FDR without prior permission of this Court.
21st November, 2023 After noting his pleading that the compensation
amount had been invested in immovable
properties, Reddy was directed to furnish details of
the immovable properties/lands and investments
in the business within three weeks. The two-Judge
Reference to a larger Bench (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ.)
bench condoned the delay in filing the SLP, granted leave
to appeal, issued Rule Nisi in the writ petition and
considering the issues likely to be raised in the
civil appeal directed that these matters be placed
before a larger Bench after obtaining necessary
orders from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

10th January, 2024 Vishnu filed Contempt Petition No. 23-24/2024 in
WP (C) 673/2023 for violation of the orders dated
14th August, 2023 and 21st November, 2023.

8th May, 2024 This Court disposed of the IAs filed by Reddy
seeking recall/modification of orders dated 21st
November, 2024 and 14 th August, 2023 by
directing him to file details of the investments
made by him (out of the compensation amount)
in a sealed cover, duly signed by him, along with
an affidavit/undertaking inter alia stating : (i) that
he shall not create any third-party rights in respect
of the said properties; (ii) that the compensation
amount has been invested only in the assets to
be disclosed by him in the sealed cover; (iii) that
the said assets have been disclosed in his Income
Tax Returns; and (iv) that there are no third-party
interests or encumbrances on the said assets, and
if any exist, the same shall be disclosed.
1390 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

August 2024 Suo Moto Contempt Petition (C) No. 3 of 2024
was registered against NOIDA for not having filed
SMC (C) No. 3/2024
the counter affidavit within the time prescribed as
(tagged with the per order dated 8th May, 2024.
present set of
matters)
September 2024 The civil appeal, the writ petition and the
connected matters were heard on several dates.
3rd October, 2024 This Bench, during the final hearing, opened the
sealed cover and, upon perusal of its contents,
noted that instead of making full disclosures,
Reddy had submitted a vague and misleading
certificate from Pradeep Reddy & Co., Chartered
Accountants, omitting essential details regarding
the parties involved, the nature and manner of the
investments, the terms securing such investments,
and the particulars of the properties and loans.
Accordingly, the affidavit submitted by Reddy was
rejected and he was granted one final opportunity
to deposit a sum of Rs. 300 crore with the Registry.
Reddy was further restrained from entering into
any agreement to sell and/or creating any third-
party rights in respect of immovable assets owned
by him, his family and the companies created by
him or his family members. He was also directed
to furnish details of all the movable/ immovable
assets owned by him, his family and the said
companies.
4th November, 2024 Pursuant to the order dated 3rd October, 2024,
Reddy filed IAs praying for deposit of title deeds
of immovable properties instead of cash deposit.
22nd January, 2025 This Bench allowed Reddy to furnish securities
through his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine.
Upon conclusion of hearing, judgment was
reserved.

Impugned Order
13. The impugned order, as noted above, was passed on 28th October,
2021 partly allowing Reddy’s writ petition.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1391

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

14. Reddy, in paragraph 7 of his writ petition, asserted that as on the
relevant dates, he owned the subject land privately in light of the
decree in Civil Suit No. 416 of 1998 and that the respondents therein
had no ‘right, title and interest’ over the subject land.
15. A reply affidavit was filed by the State of U.P. and its officers; but as
is usual with official respondents, they did not go beyond averring
that contents of paragraph 7 of the writ petition are not admitted and
that the entire land acquisition proceedings, for planned development
of NOIDA, were in observance of the 1894 Act.
16. Before the High Court, the parties (namely Reddy as writ petitioner,
the State of Uttar Pradesh and seven others as respondents)
advanced several arguments and placed various documents on
record. Preliminary objections on the maintainability of the writ
petition including, inter alia, suppression of facts as well as the locus
of Reddy to claim compensation for the subject land without there
being a decree in his favour were raised by the respondents therein.
17. Regarding the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the
writ petition:
a. the High Court rejected the same on the ground that Reddy had
become the sole owner of the subject land. This observation
was premised on the order of the trial court dated 17th June,
2010 under Section 34 of the “Land Revenue Act, 1996” and
Reddy’s name was, accordingly, entered in the Khatauni.
b. On the same premise, the allegation that Reddy had suppressed
the order dated 12th September, 2002 whereby the trial court
denied to act on the compromise decree was overruled by the
High Court in view of the finding of the trial court dated 17th
June, 2010.
c. The objection of the respondents in the writ petition to the
maintainability of the writ petition asserting that a remedy is
available under Section 18 of the 1894 Act was overruled by
the High Court holding that the writ petition was filed in view
of the liberty given by this Court to approach the High Court
vide order dated 22nd October, 2018.
18. Regarding the quantum of compensation:
a. The High Court repelled the submission of Reddy that
compensation was not determined as per the direction of the
1392 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

High Court and, therefore, the award is to be treated as a nullity
so as to apply Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 201324 in view of the decision of this Court in
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (LAPSE-5 J.)25.
b. Qua the challenge to the award and the prayer for determination
of compensation in accordance with law, the High Court held
that the award dated 31st January 2011 had been made subject
to the final outcome of the appeal filed by NOIDA. Since that
appeal was dismissed by this Court on 4th November 2015, the
State ought to have passed a fresh award in compliance with
the High Court’s judgment dated 10th December 2009.
c. The High Court then proceeded to determine the compensation
by referring to the circle rate of Sector 18, NOIDA, i.e., Rs.
1,10,000/- per sq. metre. The High Court also determined that
development charges can be to the extent of maximum 50%
(fifty percent) and, therefore, held that the State should have
taken Rs. 55,000/- per sq. metre as the market value of the
land. It was, therefore, ordered accordingly.

Before This Court In Civil Appeal No 3636-37 Of 2022
19. When the impugned order was challenged before this Court in
separate appeals, vide Reddy Veerana v. State of U.P.26, the civil
appeal filed by NOIDA was dismissed and the civil appeal filed by
Reddy was allowed in part. Learned senior counsel representing
Reddy before us asserted that this decision has therefore upheld the
impugned order. However, on a closer perusal of the case records,
it is clear that the adjudication stands on a much narrower footing.
This Court in paragraph 39 of its decision in Reddy Veerana (supra)
noted that it is merely deciding on the quantum of compensation and
not the title of Reddy on the scheduled piece of land. For ease of
reference, paragraph 39 is quoted below:
39. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on
the scheduled piece of land has not been contested by the

24 2013 Act
25 (2020) 8 SCC 129
26 (2022) 14 SCC 252
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1393

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

respondents and the adjudication is confined only to the
quantum of compensation, we deem it appropriate not to
interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect
to the ownership…
20. In view of the decision rendered in Bhoopendra Singh (supra), this
Court held that NOIDA must determine the compensation by taking
into consideration the circle rate which has been determined as per
the market value, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/- per square metre. Further,
dealing with the issue of deduction of the development charges,
this Court held that the High Court failed to consider the contextual
circumstances in its decision. Therefore, applying the ratio of
previous decisions, this Court concluded that NOIDA’s actions, i.e.,
the passing of the award after a delay of five years from the date of
taking possession, was a violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution,
leading to a constitutional tort. Thus, taking note of the aforesaid and
in the peculiar facts of the case, it was directed that in addition to
the statutorily paid interest, the additional amount of penal interest
must be paid in place of shifting the date for determination of the
amount of compensation or to determine the compensation as per
the 2013 Act, as demanded by Reddy.

Contentions

Arguments by Vishnu
21. The principal submission advanced by learned senior counsel for
Vishnu is that the impugned order, along with all other orders obtained
by Reddy through misrepresentation and suppression of material
facts, ought to be treated as void ab initio, relying on the settled
legal proposition that “fraud unravels everything”.
a. Our attention was drawn to various documents on record
indicating that Reddy has taken inconsistent and mutually
contradictory positions regarding the extent of his ownership
over the property. While he jointly prosecuted various litigation
from 2001 till 2019 along with Vishnu and Sudhakar, he asserted
sole ownership in other proceedings.
b. The written statement filed by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu’s
power of attorney holder, admitting Reddy’s sole ownership
of the property, was without authority, as such power granted
1394 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in Venkataramana’s favour had been cancelled long before
institution of Civil Suit No. 370/2006. It has also been shown
that Venkataramana is a partner of Reddy in the partnership
firm that offered securities before this Court.
c. Using this fraudulent decree dated 17th November 2006, Reddy
managed to have his name mutated in the revenue records.
d. Even after the decree, Reddy filed several pleadings claiming
to be the joint owner of the land.
e. The existence of the said decree was consistently suppressed
by Reddy before the courts.
22. As regards the quantum of compensation for the acquisition, it was
submitted on behalf of Vishnu that relegating the matter back to
the Collector or the Reference Court for computation after a lapse
of two decades would be unjust. It has been urged that the subject
land should be treated as commercial in nature, and compensation
should be awarded accordingly.
23. On this basis, Vishnu has sought that the impugned order, insofar
as it records findings with respect to the ownership of the subject
land, be set aside.

Arguments by Reddy
24. At the outset, maintainability of this civil appeal and the connected
writ petition has been challenged by Reddy on various grounds
including the fact that:
a. Vishnu has sought apportionment of the subject land prior to
getting the registered Power of Attorney dated 3rd February
2005, full settlement agreement dated 3rd February 2005 and
decree of the Trial Court dated 17th November, 2006, nullified.
Even though Vishnu instituted CS No. 471/2020 praying that
the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 be declared
null and void, he has not sought any monetary compensation in
the aforesaid suit and has, therefore, bypassed the Trial Court
in approaching the Supreme Court only to save the payment
of the court fee which smacks of mala fide;
b. Vishnu has engaged in ‘forum shopping’ as he has been
pursuing various types of proceedings before this Court as well
as instituted a civil suit before the Trial Court;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1395

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

c. This Court does not have the original jurisdiction to adjudicate
complicated questions of fact under Article 131 of the Constitution;
d. Relying on the decision in Nidhi Kaim (supra), it is submitted
that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide an
“intra-court appeal”;
e. The order dated 21st November, 2023 of this Court referring
the matter to a three-Judge Bench is against the established
principle of stare decisis as the reference order included not
just questions of law but complicated questions of fact;
f. The writ petition filed by Vishnu is not maintainable as against
the order of this Court dated 5th May, 2022 - much less when
there is no violation of any Fundamental Right alleged in the said
writ petition - since judicial orders of the Supreme Court cannot
be challenged in the writ jurisdiction before this Court itself;
g. The order of the High Court has now merged with the final order
of this Court and, therefore, the civil appeal filed by Vishnu is
not maintainable, and that the doctrine of merger would apply;
h. This Court does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a review
of a judgment through a miscellaneous application, much less
in a second miscellaneous application, by placing reliance on
Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 201327;
i. The listing of the review and chamber appeal is in clear violation
of Order XLVII, Rule 3 of the SC Rules, 2013; and
j. Vishnu is a chronic litigant coming with unclean hands as he
has engaged in supressing material documents before this
Court and has played fraud upon this Court.
25. On merits, it has been argued before us that:
a. Reddy has perfected his title through the decree of the Trial Court
dated 17th November, 2006 in CS No. 370 of 2006. Moreover,
Vishnu sold off his entire property to a third party, Ranbir Singh,
vide a registered agreement to sell dated 7th June, 2006 while
supressing the earlier sale made to Reddy;

27 SC Rules, 2013
1396 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

b. The principle that fraud vitiates every proceeding is subservient
to the principle of interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium. It was
specifically contended that Reddy has not played any fraud by
not making Vishnu a party to the previous litigation;
c. On the contrary, fraud has been played upon Reddy as Vishnu
has not disclosed material documents;
d. Vide decree dated 17th November, 2006, the interest in the
subject land passed from Vishnu to Reddy which to this day
stands as a valid instrument;
e. The three deeds, namely, the full settlement sale agreement,
Affidavit/declaration and the Registered Power of Attorney must
be read together as part of the same transaction;
f. A registered document can only be cancelled/modified by
another registered document; in the instant case, the registered
irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 3rd February, 2005 could
not have been cancelled without registering the document of
cancellation;
g. Moreover, no notice of cancellation was provided to
Venkataramana and, therefore, it is not a valid cancellation as
per Section 208 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section
3 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882;
h. Furthermore, a registered Power of Attorney cannot be revoked
unilaterally;
i. Vishnu is estopped from re-agitating the issue on title as he
has relinquished his entire share of the property; and
j. Lastly, NOIDA has no right to re-agitate the dispute on merits
collaterally.

Arguments by NOIDA
26. NOIDA has argued before us that:
a. The doctrine of merger is not applicable when the order of the
Court is vitiated by fraud and that fraud is an exception to the
rule of stare decisis;
b. This Court exercises plenary powers to prevent the abuse of
process and to meet the ends of justice under Article 129 of
the Constitution;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1397

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

c. The landowners must be relegated to the reference court under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act for determining compensation;
and
d. The High Court and this Court committed a grave legal
and factual error by ignoring vital evidence in the form of
exemplar sale deeds of the subject land for determining the
true and actual market value for assessment of quantum of
compensation.
27. In consequence thereof, NOIDA has prayed for recalling the orders
of the High Court dated 28 th October, 2021 and of this Court
dated 5th May, 2022 in exercise of the powers under Article 142
of the Constitution and to revisit the enhanced compensation of
Rs.1,10,000/- per sq. metre or to direct the landowners to approach
the appropriate court under the 1894 Act.

Reply by Vishnu regarding objections to maintainability
28. In response to the objections raised regarding the maintainability of
the present set of petitions, Vishnu submitted that:
a. Through the present proceedings, he is not seeking to appeal
the judgment dated 5th May 2022 and is, therefore, not invoking
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court but rather its inherent
jurisdiction to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice;
b. The provisions of the SC Rules—particularly Order LV Rule
6—preserve the inherent powers of this Court to prevent the
abuse of the court’s process;
c. Fraud constitutes an exception to the doctrine of merger;
d. The doctrine of merger is also inapplicable in the present case,
as Vishnu was not a party before the High Court; and
e. The writ petition is maintainable not only on the basis of
infringement of the right under Article 300-A of the Constitution
of India, 195028, but also because Vishnu’s rights of access to
justice and to a fair, equal, and transparent judicial process
are at stake.

28 Constitution
1398 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Issues
29. On maintainability,
a. whether the impugned order having merged with this Court’s
order dated 5th May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), as claimed
by Reddy, renders the present appeal – which, so to say, lays
a collateral challenge to an order of this Court itself – not
maintainable?
b. whether the present writ petition is not maintainable, as it seeks
to challenge a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never
be said to violate Fundamental Rights?
c. whether Vishnu can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned
order as well as a petition for review of the decision of this
Court in which the impugned order has merged, as claimed,
simultaneously?
d. Whether Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping?
30. Whether Reddy obtained the impugned order, as well as this Court’s
order dated 5th May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), by practising
fraud and deception upon the courts and, therefore, the same deserve
to be set aside/recalled?
31. Should the answer to the above issues be in favour of Vishnu and
against Reddy, what would be the appropriate order to be passed
in these proceedings having regard to the peculiar facts and
circumstances?

Analysis
32. We begin with recording the realisation that undoubtedly, there seems
to be much more than what have met our eyes. However, like all
courts, we are bound to decide cases based on the evidence on
record, judicially noticeable facts, and the applicable law. Despite
Reddy and Vishnu – and to certain extent Sudhakar – having used
the judicial process obviously to secure their personal interests, we
cannot be a bystander. If things have happened with a telling effect
on public interest, resulting in public funds from the public exchequer
being drained, the same has to be dealt with within the bounds of
our jurisdiction. In our pursuit for the truth and to uphold the rule of
law, we must adhere to established principles unless a valid reason
warrants deviation.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1399

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

33. Vishnu, as can be gathered from the narrative of events, has not left
any stone unturned to have the benefits accruing in favour of Reddy
undone. The sheer number of proceedings instituted by Vishnu bear
testimony to his struggle to set at naught all such orders that operate
to his detriment. Apart from the civil appeal against the impugned
order and a writ petition under Article 32 seeking enforcement of
what, Vishnu calls infringement of his Fundamental Rights, he has
inter alia pursued the alternate channel of filing a petition (which is
defective) for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), an
application for modification/recall of the order of this Court relegating
him to the remedy under the 1894 Act and a petition for contempt
of this Court’s order. The multiplicity of proceedings in this particular
case raises a reasonable apprehension that the legal process,
including this Court’s, is being potentially abused by Vishnu. While,
in no uncertain terms has Reddy asserted that Vishnu has indulged
in abuse, we need to carefully assess whether it is Vishnu or Reddy,
or both, who is/are the real abuser(s).
34. While judicial consuetude ordinarily mandates that we begin with
a threshold examination of the issue of maintainability, the sui
generis features of the present case impel us to first address the
core allegation levelled by Vishnu of fraud having been committed
by Reddy. We find that the question of maintainability, in the present
case, is a mixed question of fact and law which, ideally, ought to be
determined after adjudicating the question of alleged fraud played
by Reddy on the courts. We draw support for this approach from the
decision of this Court in Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta29
where, dealing with Order XIV, CPC, it was observed as under:
13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that
where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same
suit, and the court is of the opinion that the case or any
part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only,
it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the
jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by
any law for the time being in force. The provisions of this
Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major
S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon [(1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR

29 (2006) 5 SCC 638
1400 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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1964 SC 497] and it was held as under: (SCR p. 421)
“Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure
where issues both of law and of fact arise in the
same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case
or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues
of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that
purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement
of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have
been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law
apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only
where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may
be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the
Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a
suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary
issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be
tried by the court; not to do so, especially when the
decision on issues even of law depend upon the
decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided
trial of the suit.”
Though there has been a slight amendment in the language
of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but
the principle enunciated in the above quoted decision
still holds good and there can be no departure from the
principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the
court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a
preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law
depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a
preliminary issue.
(emphasis ours)

35. Recently in Sathyanath v. Sarojamani30, this Court after analysing
judgments rendered by various High Courts and also Ramesh (supra)
made the following observations:
21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the
procedural law, but the fact remains that such procedural law

30 (2022) 7 SCC 644
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1401

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

had been enacted to ensure expeditious disposal of the lis
and in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary
issue, the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was
the language prior to the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If
the issue is a mixed issue of law and fact, or issue of law
depends upon the decision of fact, such issue cannot be
tried as a preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary
issues can be those where no evidence is required and on
the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the
jurisdiction of the court or the bar to the suit is made out, the
court may decide such issues with the sole objective for the
expeditious decision. Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or
there is a statutory bar, such issue is required to be decided
in the first instance so that the process of civil court is not
abused by the litigants, who may approach the civil court
to delay the proceedings on false pretext.

* * *
23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to
above are in consonance with the principles laid down by
this Court in Ramesh B. Desai [Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin
Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638] that not all issues of law
can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of
law can be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the
ambit of clause (a) relating to the “jurisdiction of the Court”
and (b) which deal with the “bar to the suit created by any
law for the time being in force”. The reason to substitute
Rule 2 is to avoid piecemeal trial, protracted litigation and
possibility of remand of the case, where the appellate court
differs with the decision of the trial court on the preliminary
issues upon which the trial court had decided.
(emphasis ours)

36. We shall therefore decide the issue of maintainability after examining
the allegation of fraud.

I. Has Reddy Played Fraud On The Courts?
37. Upon due consideration of the entire factual matrix, some notable
facts stand out which, we believe, are appropriate to highlight.
1402 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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38. At the inception, the trio – Vishnu, Reddy and Sudhakar – stood as
a united front. They consistently projected themselves as co-owners
of the property in question in multiple judicial proceedings:
a. in 1998, claiming to be the owners of the property, the trio jointly
instituted a suit31 seeking a permanent injunction against NOIDA.
b. upon securing a decree, they together filed an execution
application32.
c. they jointly pursued a writ petition33 challenging rejection of their
execution application.
d. even when Vishnu singly assailed the land acquisition
proceedings in a writ petition34, Reddy and Sudhakar filed
an impleadment application reaffirming the narrative of joint
ownership.
e. NOIDA, in its appeal35 before this Court, arrayed the trio as
respondents and not once did Reddy assert exclusive ownership
during these proceedings.
39. Contrary to the consistent earlier stance, Reddy, in a complete
volte-face, asserted his sole ownership of the property in not one
but multiple judicial proceedings:
a. in 2001, Sudhakar sued36 Reddy, seeking his 1/3rd share in
the land. Curiously, the written statement was filed the very
next day, and even more curiously, a compromise agreement
was filed a day later. The Trial Court, sceptical of this sudden
turn of events, rejected the compromise finding its bona fides
questionable. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed for default as
Sudhakar did not pursue it further.
b. in 2006, Reddy sued37 Vishnu, claiming to be the sole owner. This
suit took a particularly curious turn when one Venkataramana,

31 Civil Suit No. 416/1998
32 Execution Application No. 6/2005
33 WP (Civil) 66797/2005
34 WP (Civil) 75152/2005
35 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013
36 Civil Suit No. 283/2001
37 Civil Suit No. 370/2006
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1403

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

claiming to be Vishnu’s Attorney, filed a written statement
admitting the claim. However, records reveal that the Power of
Attorney had already been cancelled on 21st December, 2005,
a full six months prior to the suit being instituted. Worse still,
pursuant to the documents having been filed in the Court by
Reddy, it has surfaced that Venkataramana is also a partner
of Reddy in the firm Manyata-Pristine.
c. Finally, in January 2019, Reddy once again laid exclusive claim
to the subject land asserting himself as the sole owner in a
writ petition38 before the High Court, challenging the District
Magistrate’s decision to deny him compensation. Vide the
impugned order, his claim was allowed by the High Court.
40. In a judicial landscape that values consistency and candour, this
case strikes a discordant note. This trajectory of the contradictory
claims made by Reddy can hardly be ignored by this Court.
41. The impugned order was passed on a writ petition presented by
Reddy, wherein he challenged the District Magistrate’s refusal to
grant compensation for the acquired land and simultaneously sought
a declaration of his exclusive ownership. The High Court accepted
his claim albeit based on material which was scant, information that
was incomplete and knowledge appearing to be fragmentary.
42. Considering Reddy’s consistent stance in earlier proceedings that
the property was jointly owned with Vishnu and Sudhakar, his
failure to implead them in the writ petition is appalling, if not more.
This, in our view, was a calculated attempt by Reddy to wrongfully
appropriate the entire property keeping the other two – Vishnu and
Sudhakar – in the dark.
43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ proceedings ex
proprio vigore, the principles flowing therefrom, as far as practicable,
can be made applicable. Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted,
ordained that a suit shall not be defeated by reason of misjoinder
or non-joinder of parties; however, after its amendment in 1976
introducing the proviso, the implication is that non-joinder of a party
could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief claimed by
the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is not impleaded, and

38 WP (Civil) 2272/2019
1404 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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defeat the suit. Although Order I Rule 10 does empower a court to
implead at any stage of the proceedings a party who should have been
joined as a defendant, either upon or without the application of either
party, a decree passed by the court in the absence of a necessary
or proper party to the suit and affecting his interest could be avoided
by such party; however, if the decree is such that it acknowledges
and declares the right of the decree-holder to the subject matter
of the suit and entitles him to its benefits, such a decree has to be
carried either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest
the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to.
44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no longer res integra
that any order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party
who has not been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on
the ground of breach of natural justice.
45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v. State of U.P.39.
Although the decision was rendered in connection with a selection
process for allotment of a fair price shop, this Court after analysing
various previous decisions emphasised:
21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state
the basic principle behind the doctrine of natural justice, that
is, no order should be passed behind the back of a person
who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle
behind the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil
Procedure enjoins it and the said principle is also applicable
to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate challenging the
selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned
is bound to make the selected candidates parties.
46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay Ishwar
Ghute and Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors.40 wherein a Bench of
two-Judges [of which one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) was a member] in
an appeal against an order made under Article 226 of the Constitution,
held thus:
21. In the facts of the case, the senior district-level officials
of the State had stated on oath that the construction of the

39 (2016) 2 SCC 779
40 2024 SCC OnLine SC 681
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1405

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

compound wall, in respect of which relief was sought in the
Writ Petition, would affect the rights of several third parties.
However, the Court completely ignored the same. Even in
clause 6(iii) of the “Minutes of Order”, there was enough
indication that the compound wall, if not appropriately
constructed, would affect the rights of owners of the other
lands. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to have
called upon the 1st and 2nd respondents to implead the
persons who were likely to be affected. The 1st and 2nd
respondents could not have pleaded ignorance about the
names of the concerned parties as they have referred to
the owners of the other lands in the “Minutes of Order”.
However, the Division Bench of the High Court has failed
to make even an elementary enquiry whether third parties
will be affected by the construction of the compound wall
under police protection. Hence, the order dated 16th March
2022 passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the “Minutes
of Order” is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The
Writ Petition will have to be remanded to the High Court
to decide the same in accordance with the law.
47. More generally, there are umpteen number of decisions of this
Court wherein the rights of a third party have been protected in civil
litigation. This principle was specifically noted in respect of claims
arising out of land acquisition in the case of Neyvely Lignite Corpn.
Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely41 as follows:
12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local
authority or the company right to adduce evidence before
the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was
specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the
Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company
may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining the amount of compensation. However, it has
no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention
is that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the
purpose of determining the compensation does not carry
with it the right to participate in the proceedings or right

41 (1995) 1 SCC 221
1406 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We
cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction
with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act within a narrow
compass. The right given under sub-section (2) of Section
50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation
to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing
from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with
the principles of natural justice. The consistent thread
that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting
from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980)
3 SCR 235] is that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority
or company, a cooperative society registered under the
relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person
interested to determine just and proper compensation for
the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows
from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the
Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it
is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal
or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made
a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court and file
the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of
the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and
decree under Section 54 or is entitled to file writ petition
under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness.
When the award made under Section 11 of the Collector
is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary
is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart from the
settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge
is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action.
These are very valuable and salutary rights. Moreover in
the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence
of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher
compensation, no complete and effectual determination
of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired
land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party
if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1
Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested
is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article
14 of the Constitution.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1407

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that
though the stakes involved are heavy, the Government
plead or the instructing officer do not generally adduce,
much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims
for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will
be formal, halting and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably
the governmental agencies involved in the process take
their own time and many a time in collusion, file the
appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain
insensitive even if the States (sic Stakes)involved run into
several crores of public money. The courts insist upon
proper explanation of every day’s delay. In this attitudinal
situation it would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill
the unbridgeable gaps of the delay in filing the appeals
and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the
threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in
the compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued
to the local authority etc. it/they would participate in the
award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce
necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the
Collector and the court before determining compensation.
For instance that without considering the evidence in the
proper perspective, the court determined the compensation.
14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the
beneficiary and if the State does not file the appeal or if
filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it not the beneficiary
who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation,
who would be the affected person? Is it not interested to
see that the appellate court would reassess the evidence
and fix the proper and just compensation as per law? For
instance the reference court determined market value at
Rs 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is
only Rs 10,000. Who is to bear the burden? Suppose State
appeal was dismissed due to refusal to condone the delay,
is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can
be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary
for whose benefit the land is acquired is served with the
notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry by
the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in
an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be interested to
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defend the award under Section 11 or Section 26 or would
file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc. against
the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party
affected by the determination of higher compensation, the
beneficiary must have a right to challenge the correctness
of the award made by the reference court under Section
18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this
perspective we are of the considered view that the appellant-
Company is an interested person within the meaning of
Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party, if not a
necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The
High Court had committed manifest error of law in holding
that the appellant is not a person interested. The orders
of the High Court are accordingly set aside.
48. However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any opprobrious
remarks against the High Court as it was incumbent upon Reddy
to implead Vishnu and Sudhakar as respondents in his writ petition
and the High Court could not have been expected to know the long-
standing disputes or the fact that Reddy had procured change in the
revenue records on the basis of the compromise decree whereupon
further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape of a
suit were pending unless the same was brought to its notice.
49. In any event, having regard to the events preceding presentation of
the writ petition by Reddy, out of which the present proceedings have
arisen, we have no hesitation to hold that Reddy tailored a situation
to suit his convenience by not impleading Vishnu as a party with the
sole intention of obtaining an order in respect of not only the quantum
of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land but also a
declaration as to his entitlement thereto – all, behind Vishnu’s back. An
attempt by Reddy to steal a march over Vishnu is clearly discernible
which, without reference to anything more, does border on fraud.
50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a
single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one
may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business
Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly
been stated as follows:

42 (2004) 7 SCC 166
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1409

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts
to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material
one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would
have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be
a matter which was material for the consideration of the
court, whatever view the court may have taken …
(emphasis ours)

51. In the present case, Reddy’s failure before the High Court to disclose
the earlier series of litigation - where he consistently asserted joint
ownership with Vishnu and Sudhakar - being a fact having a bearing
on the merits of the case, is alone sufficient to vitiate the impugned
order.
52. However, the concealment runs deeper. It stems from the suit43 that
Vishnu had instituted on 7th August, 2020, referred to hereafter.
53. During the pendency of the writ petition (in which the impugned
order was passed), Vishnu instituted the suit praying to declare the
compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 as null and void
on the ground that the written statement (admitting Reddy’s sole
ownership over the property) filed by Venkataramana on his behalf
was without any authority as the Power of Attorney in his favour
already stood cancelled. Reddy filed his written statement in that
suit on 11th October 2021 – which is 17 (seventeen) days before
the High Court disposed of the writ petition. Despite being a party
to the suit, Reddy chose not to inform the writ court of pendency of
the suit. Notably, the decree dated 16th February, 2000 in the suit44
instituted by the trio and the change in the land records based on the
compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 in the suit45 instituted
by Reddy were relied on by Reddy to have a ruling in his favour. As
per the records available from the website of the High Court, it is
noted that judgment was reserved on 6th October, 2021. Therefore,

43 Civil Suit No. 471/2020
44 Civil Suit No. 416/1998
45 Civil Suit No. 370/2006
1410 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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between 7th August, 2020 (date of institution of the fourth suit) and
28th October, 2021 (date of the impugned order), ample opportunity
was available for Reddy to disclose the factum of a suit having been
instituted by Vishnu. This deliberate suppression, of a material fact,
further highlights the fraudulent intent behind Reddy’s claim.
54. As discerned above, suppression of material facts before the High
Court by Reddy is writ large; however, his fraudulent conduct is not
confined to that forum alone.
55. It has not been shown to us by Reddy that during the course of
the proceedings before this Court leading to the decision in Reddy
Veeranna (supra), this Court was informed of institution of the suit
by Vishnu. In fact, this Bench discovered the pendency of such suit
solely through examination of the related documents and proceedings.
56. Another instance – though ultimately unsuccessful – that underscores
Reddy’s fraudulent conduct is the suit46 instituted on 30th May, 2001,
i.e., the first suit. In this suit, which was filed just two days before
the summer vacation of the court, Sudhakar sought a declaration
of his 1/3rd ownership in the land. Curiously, despite acknowledging
in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the property was jointly owned by
three individuals, Vishnu, the third co-owner, was not made a party
to the suit. What followed reveals the dubious conduct of Reddy. The
very next day, Reddy filed his written statement, outright denying
Sudhakar’s claims and asserting exclusive ownership. He contended
that he alone paid the full sale consideration, and that Sudhakar’s
name was included in the sale deed merely due to his status as a
practicing advocate, whose help was needed in official dealings.
57. Interestingly, on the very same day, Reddy and Sudhakar filed a
compromise agreement in which Sudhakar unconditionally admitted
Reddy’s sole ownership. However, the trial court, rightly suspicious of
the extraordinary speed at which the pleadings and the compromise
agreement were filed, questioned the bona fides of the agreement
and refused to act upon it. Subsequently, neither party pursued the
matter, and the suit was dismissed for default on 5th December 2002.
58. It is almost unprecedented for a written statement and a compromise
to be filed the day after a suit is instituted. Even more astonishing

46 Civil Suit No. 283/2001
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1411

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

is Sudhakar’s complete and unopposed surrender of his claim
without any explanation, and notably, without impleading the third
co-owner, Vishnu. The moment the trial court declined to endorse
the compromise, both of them lost interest in the case and the suit
was ultimately dismissed for default. This sequence: rapid pleadings,
exclusion of a necessary party, and abandonment of the suit clearly
reflects a collusive effort by Reddy to manufacture support for his
claim of sole ownership (emphasis ours). While Reddy’s conduct
before the High Court reveals fraud, this episode confirms that his
deceptive practices date back over two decades.
59. Another instance of somewhat shady dealings stem from the fact of
filing of a written statement before the trial court by Venkataramana,
acting as Vishnu’s Attorney, whereas it is Vishnu’s claim that the Power
of Attorney was cancelled by the time the written statement was filed.
Having regard to the ultimate order proposed to be passed, we do
not wish to make any factual determination as to whether the Power
of Attorney stood cancelled or not as on the relevant date or even if
cancelled, whether the due procedure was followed; however, suffice
it to note that Venkataramana, in course of the proceedings before
this Court, has been discovered to be a partner with Reddy in their
firm Manyata – Pristine and it is this firm which offered securities
before this Court as recorded in the order dated 21st January, 2025.
60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his
favour by playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its
presence. Thus, we find Vishnu’s core argument to be creditworthy
and compelling for us to hold that judicial orders procured by Reddy
by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of
material facts cannot be permitted to stand.
61. In decisions abound, the Courts have consistently nullified orders
obtained through fraudulent means. Key excerpts from some of
these decisions read thus:
a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh47, this
Court reiterated that fraud unravels everything:
3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et
jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which

47 (2000) 3 SCC 581
1412 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord
Denning observed in a language without equivocation
that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister
can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by
fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates
Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER
341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] ).
b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros.48, it was held:
20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence.
It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.
Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton’s sorcerer,
Comus, who exulted in his ability to, ‘wing me into
the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares’. It
has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary fraud
in equity has been defined as an act or omission to
act or concealment by which one person obtains an
advantage against conscience over another or which
equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to
another. In Black’s Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined
as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose
of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with
some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender
a legal right; a false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed, which deceives
and is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury……..
c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.49, this Court held:
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any
judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be
said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three
centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

48 (1992) 1 SCC 534
49 (2007) 4 SCC 221
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1413

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment,
decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye
of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by
the first court or by the final court—has to be treated
as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can
be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal,
revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. ***
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith’s Leading Cases,
13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud,
de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would
be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it
might be impeachable from without. In other words,
though it is not permissible to show that the court was
“mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”.
There is an essential distinction between mistake
and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction
is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot
be brought on the ground that it has been decided
wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision
was one which should not have been rendered, but
it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon
or tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell
together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud
and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus
nemini patrocinari debent).
d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. (supra),
which has since been quoted with approval by this Court in a
catena of decisions including Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted
intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the following words:
No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage
which he has obtained by fraud. […] Fraud unravels
everything. The court is careful not to find fraud
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unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once
it is proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and all
transactions whatsoever….
62. We are also mindful of the legal principle that if a fact could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, its non-
disclosure does not constitute suppressio veri or suggestio falsi.
Profitable reference may be made to the decision in Shri Krishnan
v. Kurukshetra University50 where this Court observed that “where
a person on whom fraud is committed is in a position to discover
the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved”. It would neither be
a case of suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri.
63. However, the circumstances of the present case clearly indicate
that the fact of Vishnu being a co-owner of the property could not
have been discovered by either the High Court or this Court unless
the same were placed before such courts. Reddy having conducted
himself throughout in a fraudulent manner and with intent to deceive
not only Vishnu but also the High Court could not be expected to
lay bare all previous transactions and proceedings. As is usual
with statutory authorities, not much was also expected of NOIDA.
Corruption of a large scale in payment of compensation has not gone
unnoticed by this Court for which a suo motu contempt action has
been initiated. Since proceedings are pending, we wish to leave it
at that. However, what is important for the present purpose is the
overarching element of fraud in which Reddy indulged with impunity.
64. In light of the above discussion, we feel no hesitation to hold that
given the deception involved, the impugned order and the decision of
this Court dated 5th May, 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra) procured by
Reddy are tainted by fraud and, thus, lack legal sanctity and validity.

II. Maintainability
65. We now propose to deal with the arguments raised by learned senior
counsel for Reddy relatable to maintainability of this writ petition and
civil appeal as well as the other applications filed by Vishnu. We
propose to deal with them in detail considering the labyrinthine and
peculiar facts presented before us.

50 (1976) 1 SCC 311
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1415

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A. Maintainability of the Writ Petition
66. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has vociferously contended that the
writ petition under Article 32 presented by Vishnu is not maintainable
on the twin grounds that (i) the writ petition makes no mention of
violation of any Fundamental Right and (ii) no writ petition can lie
against a judicial order.
67. Writ jurisdiction in India, as is well known, emanates from two articles
of the Constitution – Articles 32 and 226. The latter pertains to writ
jurisdiction exercisable by the various High Courts in the country
while the former confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue
writs/orders/directions for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights,
guaranteed by the Constitution. Since the High Courts are empowered
under the Constitution to enforce legal rights, apart from Fundamental
Rights, the power conferred under Article 226 is considered to be
more expansive compared to the power under Article 32.
68. It is axiomatic that merely because a litigant barely pleads in his writ
petition before this Court that any of his Fundamental Rights has
been breached would not entitle him to maintain a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution. What is additionally necessary for him
to plead is the nature of breach of Fundamental Right, actual or
apprehended, and the (likely) consequence thereof.
69. The importance of pleadings in a writ petition under Article 32 was
highlighted by this Court in Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of
Kerala51 as follows:
14. Reverting to the preliminary objections raised by the
respondent State, as already mentioned above, there is
no reference to the G.O. in the entire writ petition. This
document is not even part of the writ petition. Therefore,
there are no foundational facts and/or pleadings in the writ
petition challenging this G.O. as unconstitutional. More
importantly, there is no prayer in the writ petition seeking
quashing of this G.O. Even when the learned counsel
for the State had pointed out fundamental infirmity in the
writ petition, no attempt was made by the petitioners to
amend the writ petition so as to incorporate challenge to

51 (2018) 14 SCC 193
1416 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the said G.O. as well. In the absence of any pleadings
and the prayer seeking quashing of the said G.O., it is not
permissible for the petitioners to seek a relief by making
oral submissions in this behalf.
(emphasis ours)

70. For a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to be
entertained, the petitioner has to run a case establishing prima
facie violation or imminent threat of violation of any Fundamental
Right. In this context, some relevant judicial pronouncements are
discussed below.
a. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab52, this Court held:
44. We have already found that none of the provisions
of the Act offend any fundamental rights of the
petitioners. But it is contended on behalf of the
petitioners that in a petition under Article 32 once it
is alleged and a prima facie case is made out that
the fundamental rights of a citizen are threatened or
violated this Court is not only bound to entertain it for
determining to what extent the allegation is valid but
is also bound to go into the question, if raised, that
the law under which it is alleged that his fundamental
right is infringed is invalid on the ground of want
of legislative competence. There are two facets
to this submission. Firstly, whether ultimately any
fundamental right in fact is threatened or violated,
so long as a prima facie case of such a threat or
violation is made out a petition under Article 32
must be entertained. Secondly, once it is entertained
irrespective of whether it is found ultimately that in fact
no fundamental rights of the petitioners are invaded
the vires of the legislation or the competence of the
legislature to enact the impugned legislation must be
gone into and determined. While the first proposition
is valid, the second is not.

52 (1971) 2 SCC 269
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1417

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46. It is apparent therefore that the validity or the
invalidity of the impugned law, on the ground of
legislative competence should purport to infringe the
fundamental rights of the petitioner as a necessary
condition of its being adjudicated. But if in fact the
law does not, even on the assumption that it is valid,
infringe any fundamental rights, this Court will not
decide that question in a petition under Article 32.
The reason for it is obvious, namely, that no petition
under Article 32, will be entertained if fundamental
rights are not affected and if the impugned law does
not affect the fundamental rights it would be contrary
to this principle to determine whether that law, in fact,
has legislative competence or not.
(emphasis ours)

b. In Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE53, a coordinate Bench of this Court
had the occasion to rule that:
11. […] But, we may point out here that a mere failure
to apply a rule which ought to have been applied
may not, by itself, justify an invocation of the powers
of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. In
order to succeed in a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution the petitioner has to disclose how his
fundamental right has been infringed by a particular
rule or decision or its application. The impact of the
Rule or decision upon the facts of each petitioner
case has to be clearly brought out.
12. In the cases before us, the fundamental rights
alleged to be violated could only be the general
ones embraced by Article 16(1) of the Constitution
which reads:
“There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or appointment to
any office under the State.”

53 (1975) 4 SCC 714
1418 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Where a petitioner alleges that he has been denied
equality of opportunity for service, during the course
of his employment as a government servant, it is
incumbent upon him to disclose not only the Rule
said to be infringed but also how this opportunity
was unjustifiably denied on each particular occasion.
The equality of opportunity in a matter relating to
employment implies equal treatment to persons
similarly situated or in the same category as the
petitioner. It postulates equality of conditions under
which a number of persons belonging to the same
category compete for the same opportunities and a
just and impartial application of uniform and legally
valid standards in deciding upon competing claims.
It does not exclude justifiable discrimination.
(emphasis ours)

c. In Ramdas Athawale (5) v. Union of India54, it was observed
by this Court that:
46. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the
Constitution guarantees the right to a constitutional
remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the
right conferred by Part III of the Constitution and
unless a question of enforcement of a fundamental
right arises, Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled
that no petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless
it is shown that the petitioner has some fundamental
right. In Northern Corpn. v. Union of India [Northern
Corpn. v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 239] this
Court has made a pertinent observation that when a
person complains and claims that there is a violation
of law, it does not automatically involve breach of
fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone
Article 32 is attracted.
(emphasis ours)

54 (2010) 4 SCC 1
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1419

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d. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana55, this Court referring to
the decisions in D.A.V. College (supra) and Ramdas Athawale
(supra) observed as follows:
11. But the above decisions do not wholly support
the stand of the respondents. This Court in D.A.V.
College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2
SCC 269] has held that there are two aspects. The
first is whether ultimately any fundamental right in
fact is threatened or violated. So long as a prima
facie case of such a threat or violation is made
out, a petition under Article 32 must be entertained.
Second, once it is entertained, irrespective of whether
it is found ultimately that in fact no fundamental
rights of the petitioners are invaded, the vires of the
legislation or the competence of the legislature to
enact the impugned legislation must be gone into
and determined. [The Constitution Bench in D.A.V.
College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2
SCC 269], further held that while the first proposition
is valid, the second is not. Thus, the entertainment
of the writ petition does not mean that this Court has
to examine the impugned legislation or legislative
competence if the same is not found to be infringing
fundamental rights.
71. Furthermore, the right to seek an effective legal remedy for an
infringed right is part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution. One may make a profitable reference to the decisions
in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sadan56 and Kishan Chand Jain v.
Union of India57 for the same.
72. Since the 1970s, interpretation of the Constitution, particularly
Fundamental Rights, has undergone a significant transformation.
Through dynamic and evolving interpretations, various aspects of
equality, life and freedom have been recognised and expanded to
reflect the changing needs of society.

55 (2023) 11 SCC 693
56 (2016) 8 SCC 509
57 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1334
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73. We are, at this stage, reminded of what this Court held in Express
Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India58 while negating a challenge
to the interpretation placed on Article 14 in E.P. Royappa v. State of
T.N.59, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India60 and Ramana Dayaram
Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India Ltd.61 that all
governmental actions, which are not supportable by law, would
be per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Excerpts from
paragraph 70 read as follows:
70. […] it is urged that the content of Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution would not include the right which is
guaranteed by other clauses of Article 19. According to
the learned counsel, it must therefore logically follow that
what facilitated the exercise of a fundamental right did not
for that reason become a part of the fundamental right
itself. He read out different passages from the judgments
of Bhagwati. J. in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India Ltd. and endeavoured
to show, to use his own language, that “in spite of some
literal flourish in the language here and there, they did not
and could not depart from the ambit of Article 14 which
deals with the principle of equality embodied in the Article”.
He was particularly critical of the dictum of Bhagwati, J.
in International Airport Authority case5 that “arbitrariness
was the antithesis of Article 14” and commented that this
would mean that all governmental actions which are not
supportable by law were per se violative of Article 14. I am
afraid, it is rather late in the day to question the correctness
of the landmark decision in Maneka Gandhi case and the
innovative construction placed by Bhagwati, J. on Article
14 in the three cases of Royappa, Maneka Gandhi and
International Airport Authority which have evolved new
dimensions in judicial process.

58 (1986) 1 SCC 133
59 (1974) 4 SCC 3
60 (1978) 1 SCC 248
61 (1979) 3 SCC 489
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1421

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

74. As we read the above passage acknowledging the declaration of
law that arbitrariness in State action is an antithesis of Article 14,
we are also reminded of decisions of high authority of this Court
that a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a
violation of Article 14 [see Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel62] and
that natural justice is an antithesis of arbitrariness [see Basudeo
Tiwary v. Sido Kanho University63].
75. Article 14’s guarantee against arbitrariness is fundamental to all
State actions. Since equality and natural justice are antithesis of
arbitrariness, nowadays it has become customary to style a petition
as one filed under Article 32 and vaguely allege either arbitrariness
or violation of the traditional principles of natural justice [the rules
that none should be condemned unheard and no one should be
a judge of his own cause] as well as a third principle developed in
India, which also includes the right to be afforded a fair hearing and
a reasoned order should the outcome of the proceedings be adverse
to the person proceeded against. Question is, should the Supreme
Court entertain writ petitions under Article 32 without clear and specific
pleadings as to how the right of equality or any other Fundamental
Right has been infringed and what is the impact thereof on the suitor
without clear, specific, and definite pleadings? The answer must be an
emphatic ‘NO’. If the principles deducible from the authorities referred
to above are of any guidance and help, a loosely drafted writ petition
under Article 32 ought not to be entertained in the absence of the
requisite pleadings. Even where violation of a statutory right is sought
to be camouflaged as violation of a Fundamental Right, or where a
statutory right is found to have been predominantly violated with only
an incidental infringement of a Fundamental Right, this Court may,
in the judicious exercise of its discretion, refuse to entertain the writ
petition while safeguarding the liberty of the suitor to pursue his writ
remedy before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
76. Having said that, we now proceed to decide the contentions raised
by Reddy.
77. The first contention is that the writ petition does not disclose violation
of any Fundamental Right. In this regard, reference may be made
to the first paragraph of the writ petition which reads:

62 (1985) 3 SCC 398
63 (1998) 8 SCC 194
1422 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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This Writ Petition under Article 32 seeks to enforce
Petitioner’s fundamental Rights under Article 14, 19(1)
(g) & Article 21 together with 300-A of the Constitution of
India. This Writ Petition is necessitated on account of an
extraordinary and brazen fraud upon this Hon’ble Court…
This appears to be a general statement regarding the particular
Fundamental Rights which, according to Vishnu, stand breached. It
is of no help to him. Furthermore, a perusal of paragraph 6(h) of the
writ petition reveals averments to the effect that the rights of Vishnu
under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 have been severely impaired insofar
as it relates to access to appropriate legal remedies, as the remedy
available under Section 30 of the 1894 Act is only illusory in nature,
considering that the question of title has already been declared in
favour of Reddy.
78. A plain reading of the writ petition together with the prayer clauses,
noted in paragraph 6 (supra), makes it evident that none of Vishnu’s
Fundamental Rights were invaded to enable him maintain a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. To recapitulate, Vishnu
prayed in his writ petition that (i) Reddy be declared as not the
sole owner of the subject land, (ii) NOIDA’s decision (reflected in
its letter dated 17th January, 2023) to sanction full compensation
for acquisition of the land to Reddy be set aside, (iii) the trio be
declared as co-owners of the land and jointly awarded compensation
for acquisition thereof and (iv) an inquiry be ordered to unearth
the fraud and to initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the
persons responsible. The case set up in the writ petition by Vishnu
does not, in our opinion, constitute breach of any of his Fundamental
Rights; although, it cannot be gainsaid that his property rights are
definitely in jeopardy leading to violation of Article 300A of the
Constitution for which a petition under Article 226 could have been
entertained regard being had to the law laid down by a five-Judge
Constitution Bench of this Court in Shivdev Singh v. State of
Punjab64. However, Vishnu sought to project that the writ petition
had to be filed due to concerns that even if a sound case on merits
were presented, other courts would feel hesitant to entertain the
grievance given this Court’s decision in Reddy Veerana (supra). It

64 AIR 1963 SC 1909
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1423

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was as if apart from the remedy of a writ petition before this Court,
no other remedy was available to Vishnu.
79. That is, however, not the case before us. Vishnu has sought to avail
the appellate remedy against the impugned order as well as a review
of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) which, if undisturbed by
us, would incidentally seal his fate. In any event, if Vishnu were to
succeed in the civil appeal and the petition for review considered
bearing in mind the decision on this civil appeal, the resulting relief
would likely address his grievance arising from the fraud, of which
he has claimed to be a victim.
80. In our view, there is no prima facie infringement of Vishnu’s
Fundamental Rights including, inter alia, the right to have access
to an effective legal remedy, since all the available options for relief
are being sought to be explored by him. Accordingly, we uphold
the first argument advanced by Reddy that the writ petition did not
disclose violation of any of the Fundamental Rights and, hence, is
not maintainable.
81. Having regard to the aforesaid finding, we are not required to deal
with the second ground; however, for completeness of decision,
we are ad idem with the contention that a writ petition cannot lie
against a judicial order. In this context, reference may be made to
the nine-Judge Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Naresh
Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra65 where it was pertinently
observed as follows:
18. On these facts, the question which arises for our
decision is whether a judicial order passed by the High
Court prohibiting the publication in newspapers of evidence
given by a witness pending the hearing of the suit, is
amenable to be corrected by a writ of certiorari issued by
this Court under Article 32(2). This question has two broad
facets; does the impugned order violate the fundamental
rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a), (d) and
(g); and if it does, is it amenable to the writ jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 32(2)? Thus, in the present
proceedings, we will limit our discussion and decision to

65 AIR 1967 SC 1
1424 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the points which have a material bearing on the broad
problem posed by the petitions before us.

* * *
37. The next question which calls for our decision is :
does the impugned order contravene the fundamental
rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)? In dealing
with this question, it is essential to bear in mind the object
with which the impugned order has been passed. As we
have already indicated, the impugned order has been
passed, because the learned Judge was satisfied that the
interests of justice required that Mr Goda should not be
exposed to the risk of excessive publicity of the evidence
that he would give in court. This order was passed by
the learned Judge after hearing arguments from both
the parties to the suit. Thus, there is no doubt that the
learned Judge was satisfied that in order to be able to do
justice between the parties before him, it was essential
to grant Mr Goda’s request for prohibiting the publication
of his testimony in the newspapers from day to day. The
question is : can it be said that an order which has been
passed directly and solely for the purpose of assisting
the discovery of truth and for doing justice between the
parties, infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioners
under Article 19(1)?
38. The argument that the impugned order affects the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1),
is based on a complete misconception about the true
nature and character of judicial process and of judicial
decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before
him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact
on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the
relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact
recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the
conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity,
can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by
the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the
appellate court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume
that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1425

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jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him
for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the
citizens under Article 19(1). What the judicial decision
purports to do is to decide the controversy between the
parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this
basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in
mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced
by court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for
its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights
of citizens under Article 19(1).
(emphasis ours)

82. Interestingly, a perusal of the prayer clauses of the writ petition
presented by Vishnu does not show that a challenge has been
laid to any judicial order. He has prayed for a writ in the nature of
certiorari, to quash and set aside the decision of NOIDA dated 17th
January, 2023 and a writ of declaration to declare Reddy to not have
an exclusive right to claim compensation. There being evidently no
challenge to any judicial order, this ground of challenge is liable to
be rejected.

B. Maintainability of Civil Appeal/Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
83. A variety of objections regarding the jurisdiction of this Court in
determining the questions arising for decision have been raised.

Intra-Court Appeal
84. Firstly, we wish to clarify that we do not possess and are not
exercising any “intra-court appeal” jurisdiction, as contended by
learned senior counsel representing Reddy. The Constitution does
not confer any such jurisdiction on us and we are conscious of the
legal position. However, having so clarified, it is important to note
that the principle of “fraud unravels everything” is not confined only
to examining judgments rendered by the courts below but could
include the unravelling of judgments of this Court as well, if at all
the justice of the case before us so demands. In the former moiety
of this judgment, we have discussed that Reddy has with impunity
indulged in playing fraud on the courts and, therefore, his challenge
to the jurisdiction of this Court must fail.
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85. In Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab66, this Court held that:
17. It is a settled legal proposition that where a person
gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing
fraud upon the competent authority, such order cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law as fraud unravels everything.
“Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty
evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law.” It is
trite that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus
et jus nunquam cohabitant). Fraud is an act of deliberate
deception with a design to secure something, which is
otherwise not due. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
“Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair
tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine.” An act of fraud on
court is always viewed seriously. [Vide Meghmala v. G.
Narasimha Reddy [(2010) 8 SCC 383, para 34.]
18. However, the question does arise as to whether it is
permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order
as null and void without getting it set aside from the
competent court. The issue is no more res integra and
stands settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. For
setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to
approach the appropriate forum. [Vide State of Kerala v.
M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [(1996) 1
SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber
Industries (P) Ltd. [(1997) 3 SCC 443].
86. Moreover, as noted hereinabove, the decision in A.V. Papayya Sastry
(supra) delineated that every Court, either superior or inferior – first
or final – has jurisdiction in cases where a judgment of the court
has been obtained by fraud to treat it as nullity.
87. Acceptance of the contention of Reddy would lead to a situation
akin to a juridical cul-de-sac, where no option is available to Vishnu
to assert his legal rights. Adopting a hands-off approach weighed
down by the fact of existence of a judicial order of this Court of
competent jurisdiction and thereby keeping it untouched (despite

66 (2011) 12 SCC 588
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proof of such judicial order having been procured by fraud), would
be a travesty of justice. Much of what has been said by this Court on
the aspect of fraud vitiating even the most solemn of proceedings,
in that case, would seem to be dead letter. On the contrary, ends
of justice demand that such order(s), as might have been procured
based on established fraud, must not be retained on the record of
Courts of Record.
88. Another challenge to the maintainability of the civil appeal is on
the ground that the reference of the case, by this Court using its
“intra-court appeal” jurisdiction to the present bench of three judges
violate the established principle of stare decisis as it refers not only
a question of law but also questions of fact. While the High Court
and any subsequent Bench of this Court would no doubt continue
to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the dicta in A.V. Papayya
Sastry (supra), in reality, for the purposes of judicial propriety and
abundant caution, this Court in a coordinate configuration deemed it
inappropriate to examine whether the decision of this Court in Reddy
Veerana (supra), in which it is contended that the impugned order has
merged into, ought to be examined in greater depth for ascertaining
whether it was obtained by fraud. Therefore, the only plausible option
open to the Bench of coordinate strength was to refer the matter
to a larger bench to decide whether fraud has been played on this
Court and this is precisely what has been done in the present case
by the order dated 21st November, 2023. The said order was open-
ended in the sense that who should constitute the larger bench was
not specified. It was left open for the master of the roster to decide
on constitution of the larger bench; and it could have included the
available member(s) of the two-Judge Bench, which decided Reddy
Veerana (supra). However, this Bench having been constituted by
the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Reddy having participated in the
proceedings before us without raising any demur regarding coram,
we see the contention as one raised in desperation. Even otherwise,
to put it straight, we do not wish to spill much ink regarding this
misconceived contention since by way of this judgment, we have kept
our focus limited to the point of “fraud” and have exercised caution
and circumspection in not making any determination regarding the
merits pertaining to the dispute at hand. We, therefore, see no merit
in the contention urged on behalf of Reddy that placement of the
civil appeal and the writ petition before us is in violation of any law.
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89. Lastly, ex abundanti cautela, as pointed out above, this Court in
Reddy Veerana (supra) made no determination on the title of Reddy
and only made the decision with respect to the compensation on
the basis of the circle rate. Therefore, this larger bench is not strictly
sitting in “appeal” on any point of law/fact but is concerned only with
whether this Court’s judgment was procured through fraud.

Merger
90. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has also assiduously argued that
the present civil appeal is not maintainable, as it effectively challenges
an order of the Supreme Court, into which the impugned order has
merged. It is contended that no appeal lies before the Supreme
Court against its own order.
91. Since arguments in extenso were advanced on the aspect of non-
applicability/applicability of the doctrine of merger, we need to notice
what it means, how this Court has applied it or declined to apply it
to the cases before it, and finally how relevant it is to the present
exercise.
92. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition), ‘merger’ means “the act
or an instance of combining or uniting; Civil Procedure. the effect of
a judgment for the plaintiff, which absorbs any claim that was the
subject of the lawsuit into the judgment, so that the plaintiff’s rights
are confined to enforcing the judgment”.
93. A brief overview of English law on the doctrine of merger by judgment
reveals that when an action prevails, the cause of action, along with
all attendant rights emanating from it, merge into the judgment and
thereby stand extinguished.
94. To trace the origin of the doctrine of merger in English law, we must
journey back to the nineteenth century. Almost two centuries ago,
the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in the case of King v. Hoare67,
articulated the following principles:
If there be a breach of contract, or wrong done, or any
other cause of action by one against another, and judgment
be recovered in a court of record, the judgment is a bar to

67 (1844) 13 Meeson and Welsby 494
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the original cause of action, because it is thereby reduced
to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained, so far
as it can be at that stage; and it would be useless and
vexatious to subject the defendant to another suit for the
purpose of obtaining the same result. Hence the legal
maxim, ‘transit in rem judicatam’—the cause of action is
changed into matter of record, which is of a higher nature,
and the inferior remedy is merged in the higher.
95. Similarly, in Kendall v. Hamilton68, the House of Lords, endorsing
the decision in Hoare (supra), stated thus:
The doctrine of merger is quite intelligible. Where a security
of one kind or nature has been superseded by another of
a higher kind or nature, it is reasonable to insist that the
party seeking redress should rest only upon the latter. So
when what was once a mere right of action has become
a judgment of a court of record, the judgment is a bar to
the original cause of action.
96. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd 69, the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, summarised the doctrine of
merger as follows:
17. […] [Merger] treats a cause of action as extinguished
once judgment has been given upon it, and the claimant’s
sole right as being a right upon the judgment. Although
this produces the same effect as the second principle,
it is in reality a substantive rule about the legal effect of
an English judgment, which is regarded as ‘of a higher
nature’ and therefore as superseding the underlying cause
of action: see King v Hoare […].
97. Perhaps one of the earliest Indian decisions exploring the doctrine
of merger is that of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of
Income-Tax v. Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla70 wherein a Division
Bench held thus:

68 (1879) 4 App. Cas. 504
69 [2013] UKSC 46
70 (1953) SCC OnLine Bom 28
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It is a well-established principle of law that when an appeal
is provided from a decision of a Tribunal and the appeal
Court after hearing the appeal passes an order, the order
of the original Court ceases to exist and is merged in the
order of the appeal Court and although the appeal Court
may merely confirm the order of the trial Court, the order
that stands and is operative is not the order of the trial
Court but the order of the appeal Court.
98. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Natvarlal Punjabhai v.
Dadubhai Manubhai71, laid down that the English doctrine of merger,
while it might have influenced certain judicial pronouncements in our
country, it essentially has no relevance to a Hindu widow’s estate.
99. In State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd.72, another three-Judge
Bench observed that the application of the doctrine of merger depends
on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and
the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or
revisional jurisdiction. It was observed thus:
5. […] But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of
rigid and universal application and it cannot be said
that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior
Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in
an appeal on revision, there is a fusion of merger of two
orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the appellate
or revisional order and scope of the appeal or revision
contemplated by the particular statute.
100. The question arising for decision before a Constitution Bench of
five-Judges of this Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v.
East India Commercial Co. Ltd. and others73 was whether the
order of the original authority merged in the order of the Appellate
Authority even where the Appellate Authority merely dismissed the
appeal without any modification of the order of the original authority.
Answering the question posed before it, the Bench observed
thus:

71 (1953) 2 SCC 489
72 [1967] 1 SCR 732
73 [1963] 2 SCR 563
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4. [..] It is obvious that when an appeal is made, the
Appellate Authority can do one of three things, namely, (i)
it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it may modify
that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and
thus confirm the order without any modification. It is not
disputed that in the first two cases where the order of the
original authority is either reversed or modified it is the
order of the Appellate Authority which is the operative order
and if the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ to
the Appellate Authority it cannot issue a writ to the original
authority. The question therefore is whether there is any
difference between these two cases and the third case
where the Appellate Authority dismisses the appeal and
thus confirms the order of the original authority. It seems
to us that on principle it is difficult to draw a distinction
between the first two kinds of orders passed by the
Appellate Authority and the third kind of order passed by
it. In all these three cases after the Appellate Authority has
disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of
the Appellate Authority whether it has reversed the original
order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate
order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative
order as an appellate order of reversal or modification.
(emphasis ours)

101. At the turn of this century, the decision in Kunhayammed v. State
of Kerala74 was rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court.
Since this decision stands out as a guiding light wherein this Court
summarized the law on the doctrine of merger and appears to be
the sheet anchor of the claim of Reddy, it would be apt to examine
the decision closely.
102. The question that arose for decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was
whether upon dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136
of the Constitution of India carried from an order of the High Court,
a review petition would still be maintainable before such Court. The
decision begins with the following words:

74 (2000) 6 SCC 359
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1. A question of frequent recurrence and of some
significance involving the legal implications and the impact
of an order rejecting a petition seeking grant of special
leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India has arisen for decision in this appeal.
The coordinate Bench had the occasion to examine the doctrine of
merger in great depth. Briefly, what was held is this. If special leave
were not granted (either by an unreasoned or a reasoned order)
and the petition dismissed, the order under challenge would not
merge in the order of dismissal. However, if upon grant of leave the
Court dismissed an appeal in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
notwithstanding that the order is unreasoned, the doctrine would
apply resulting in merger of the order under challenge in the order
dismissing the appeal. In paragraph 7 the Court noted that the
doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a
doctrine statutorily recognized and that it is a common law doctrine
founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice
delivery system. Paragraph 12 of the decision has aptly captured
the logic underlying the doctrine of merger. It was observed thus:
12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that
there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders
governing the same subject-matter at a given point of
time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court,
tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available
under the law before a superior forum then, though the
decree or order under challenge continues to be effective
and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy.
Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it
either way — whether the decree or order under appeal
is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the
decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority
which is the final, binding and operative decree or order
wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court,
tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is
not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have
been laid shall have to be kept in view.”
(emphasis ours)
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The Bench then proceeded to sum up its conclusions thus:
42. ‘To merge’ means to sink or disappear in something
else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined
or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the
absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater,
whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is
not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to
involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus
Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)

* * *
44. To sum up, our conclusions are:
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against
an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior
forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put
in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate
forum merges in the decision by the superior forum
and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative
and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage
is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to
file an appeal. The second stage commences if and
when the leave to appeal is granted and the special
leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of
universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the
nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum
and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid
or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the
applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should
be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the
order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the
Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify
or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed
against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and
not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
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disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The
doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the
former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may
be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either
case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand
substituted in place of the order under challenge.
All that it means is that the Court was not inclined
to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal
being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking
order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of
leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly,
the statement of law contained in the order is a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly,
other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated
in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme
Court which would bind the parties thereto and also
the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country.
But, this does not amount to saying that the order
of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood
merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting
the special leave petition or that the order of the
Supreme Court is the only order binding as res
judicata in subsequent proceedings between the
parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been
invoked the order passed in appeal would attract
the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal,
modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition
seeking leave to appeal having been converted into
an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction
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of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost
thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of
Order 47 CPC.
(emphasis ours)

103. A subsequent three-Judge Bench in Khoday Distilleries Limited v.
Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited,
Kollegal75 succinctly summarized what was held in Kunhayammed
(supra) in the following words:
20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where
orders of different nature were passed and dealt with these
judgments by classifying them in the following categories:
(i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition—without
reasons—no res judicata, no merger.
(ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking
or reasoned order—no merger, but rule of discipline and
Article 141 attracted.
(iii) Leave granted—dismissal without reasons—merger
results.
104. It is discernible from the aforesaid decisions that although the doctrine
of merger has its roots in common law principles, it has firmly been
integrated within the contours of Indian jurisprudence.
105. Having discussed the law on the doctrine of merger, we must
acknowledge that with rules come with exceptions. The doctrine of
merger does not apply universally or without limit. There are certain
decisions of this Court which, in the exceptional situations before it,
declined to apply the doctrine of merger. It would be appropriate to
notice the same now.
106. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v.
Vijai International Udyog76 emphasized that the doctrine of merger
finds no application where the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”
is applicable. It was observed thus:

75 (2019) 4 SCC 376
76 (1984) 4 SCC 543
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4. On the facts of the case, we do not accept the view of
the High Court that the doctrine of merger applied. Both the
assessee and the Commissioner had a statutory right of
appeal to the Tribunal against the decision of the Assistant
Commissioner and in exercise of that right two separate
appeals had been filed. On account of the mistake of the
Tribunal in not clubbing the two appeals the statutory
right of appeal of one party could not be negatived. It is a
well-settled proposition of law that no party should suffer
on account of the mistake of the Court or the Tribunal.
That apart in a situation like this, the doctrine of merger
has no application and the High Court was in error in
throwing out the Commissioner’s appeal by applying the
doctrine of merger.
107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra)
laid down fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while
observing thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as
well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court
of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in
favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the
courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case
where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but
after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording
reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to
which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the
doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed
by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the
judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not
open to any party to the judgment to approach any court
or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception
of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained
by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it
is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in
consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and
cannot be allowed to stand.
(emphasis ours)
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108. In MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar77, a two-Judge Bench held that
the doctrine of merger does not apply when the higher court has
not adjudicated the issues on merits, and the controversy between
the parties has not been looked into. In applying this doctrine to the
specifics of the case, the Court had the occasion to observe:
39. The issue of merger has no bearing in the facts and
circumstances of the present petitions, since, the issue that
was decided by the High Court in the earlier batch of writ
petitions and the issue that was raised and considered in
the subsequent public interest litigation is entirely different.
Secondly, in our view, the principles of res judicata are
also not attracted since the issue raised and considered
in the subsequent public interest litigation had not been
raised and considered in the earlier round of litigation.
109. The decision rendered by another Bench of two Judges of this
Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks
Ltd.78 is also worth consideration because it deals with a situation
different from those considered by this Court in the aforementioned
decisions. It was held thus:
21. The Tribunal obviously failed to notice this distinction
and proceeded to apply the doctrine of merger rather
mechanically. It failed to take into consideration a situation
where an order may be partly in favour and partly against
a party in which event the part that goes in favour of the
party can be separately assailed by them in appeal filed
before the appellate court or authority but dismissal on
merits or otherwise of any such appeal against a part only
of the order will not foreclose the right of the party who is
aggrieved by the other part of this order. If the doctrine of
merger were to be applied in a pedantic or wooden manner
it would lead to anomalous results inasmuch as a party
who has lost in part can by getting his appeal dismissed
claim that the opposite party who may be aggrieved by
another part of the very same order cannot assail its
correctness no matter the appeal earlier disposed of by

77 (2010) 11 SCC 374
78 (2010) 11 SCC 153
1438 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the court or authority had not examined the correctness
of that part of the order.
110. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that when an appeal
is limited to a specific part of the judgment and order of the first-
instance court, the merger occurs only to that extent, leaving the rest
intact and available for future consideration. The extent of merger is
determined by the subject matter of the appeal. The merger can only
operate on issues which were the subject-matter of the appellate
court’s judgment and order and cannot have any application to issues
which are not being taken on appeal by either party or which had
not been touched upon by the appellate court.
111. What happens in situations where an appeal is limited to a specific
portion of the judgment of the first-instance court or where the issues
decided by the court therein remain unaddressed in the appellate
court’s judgment: can it still be asserted that the entire original
judgment of the first-instance court ceases to exist upon merging
with the appellate court’s judgment?
112. In S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N.79, a Bench of two Judges
laid down that it is only the operative part of an original judgment
that merges in the judgment of the appellate forum and not the
whole of the judgment. The relevant paragraph of the decision is
extracted hereunder:
10. Firstly, the doctrine of merger. Though loosely an
expression merger of judgment, order or decision of a
court or forum into the judgment, order or decision of a
superior forum is often employed, as a general rule the
judgment or order having been dealt with by a superior
forum and having resulted in confirmation, reversal or
modification, what merges is the operative part i.e. the
mandate or decree issued by the court which may have
been expressed in a positive or negative form. For example,
take a case where the subordinate forum passes an order
and the same, having been dealt with by a superior forum,
is confirmed for reasons different from the one assigned
by the subordinate forum, what would merge in the order

79 (2002) 8 SCC 361
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of the superior forum is the operative part of the order and
not the reasoning of the subordinate forum; otherwise there
would be an apparent contradiction. However, in certain
cases, the reasons for decision can also be said to have
merged in the order of the superior court if the superior
court has, while formulating its own judgment or order,
either adopted or reiterated the reasoning, or recorded
an express approval of the reasoning, incorporated in the
judgment or order of the subordinate forum.
113. It is clear that what gets merged is the operative part of the
original judgment and order, not its entirety, unless the appellate
court adopts, reiterates the reasoning, or expressly approves the
reasoning contained in the first-instance court’s judgment and order.
Put differently, a ‘declaration of law’ by the appellate court regarding
the issues before the first-instance court is necessary, which can
only be inferred from a detailed, analytical order rather than a mere
dismissal seeking closure of the case without clear discussion or
analysis. Therefore, it becomes imperative to discern whether the
appellate court’s judgment and order indeed ‘declares’ the law on
the issues presented before the first-instance court.
114. At the cost of repetition, we may note that placing heavy reliance on
Kunhayammed (supra) learned senior counsel for Reddy argued
that the impugned order of the High Court having merged with the
decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), the former ceases to exist, and
it is the latter which subsists, remains operative, and is capable of
enforcement in the eye of the law.
115. Reverting to Kunhayammed (supra), we bear in mind what the
coordinate Bench expressed in paragraphs 12 and 44(iii) extracted
supra. While wholeheartedly concurring with the law laid down in
Kunhayammed (supra), we also notice that Kunhayammed (supra),
on its own terms, has recognized that the doctrine of merger has
limited application; hence, the same decision does carve out an
exception requiring every matter coming before the courts, where
the point of merger is raised, to be decided on case-to-case basis.
116. There can be no doubt that a review petition before the court which
passed the decree/order would be barred by reason of application
of the doctrine of merger if despite dismissal of a civil appeal by this
Court, be it by a reasoned or an unreasoned order, the appellant
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chooses to approach the court (whose decree/order was impugned)
once again with a review petition. Notably, the issue that has
engaged our attention in this appeal did not arise for decision in
Kunhayammed (supra).
117. We preface our discussion on the next point by reiterating that a
party to the proceedings affected by a judgment/order may appeal
as of right within the prescribed period of limitation, if such a right is
created by a statute. However, insofar as a stranger, i.e., a non-party
to the proceedings is concerned, if an appeal from the judgment/order
is allowed, he too can appeal provided a leave/permission is granted
by the appellate court. Law is well-settled that much is not required
to obtain leave/permission. If a stranger, dissatisfied with a judgment/
order, can make out even a prima facie case that he, being bound
by such judgment/order, is aggrieved by it or prejudicially affected
by it, there could arise little reason for declining leave/permission.
We may usefully refer to the decisions in Jatan Kumar Golcha v.
Golcha Properties (P) Ltd.80 and State of Punjab v. Amar Singh81
in this behalf. Precisely for this reason, the two-Judge Bench (cor.
Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ.) granted permission to Vishnu
to appeal against the impugned order.
118. Without reading and understanding the ratio laid down in
Kunhayammed (supra) in light of the issue that was decided by it
and blindly placing reliance on such ratio, as if it were a one-size-
fits-all situations, could produce a result which may not be what
the interest of justice of a given case would demand. A couple of
situations can be conceived of where the principle of merger, as
enunciated and in the manner understood as well as applied, could
bring about undesirable and pernicious results.
119. One of the situations, akin to the present case, could be where the
judgment and order of a high court upon a challenge being laid before
this Court is upheld in the course of disposal of a civil appeal by
way of its dismissal. As a result of merger of the operative directions
contained in the order of the high court in the appellate order of this
Court, it is such appellate order which would partake the character
of the only operative order. Now, if the order of the high court

80 (1970) 3 SCC 573
81 (1974) 2 SCC 70
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prejudicially affects a third party or even has the effect of binding
such party but such party was deliberately not included in the array
of respondents and, in fact, it is proved that he was unaware of the
proceedings before the high court or this Court, the remedy of such
affected party to appeal against the order of the high court with the
permission of this Court as and when he derives knowledge of the
same would not be available if the contention sought to be raised
on behalf of Reddy, based on the merger doctrine, is accepted. The
affected party would, thus, be disabled from applying for a review
before the High Court per Kunhayammed (supra), its order having
merged in this Court’s order. No doubt, remedy by way of review
followed by a curative petition is made available before this Court
by the SC Rules, 2013 but the same are not as wide as the remedy
of appeal. Even in cases of such remedies, the party approaching
this Court cannot urge, as a matter of right, that he be heard before
an order is passed. The contention that Reddy has urged based on
the merger doctrine, if accepted, might lead to highly unjust and
inequitable consequences which, in cases, could be irreversible.
120. Let us consider another situation. This Court by enactments made by
the Parliament exercises appellate jurisdiction over orders passed by
several Tribunals. Suppose, one respondent in an original proceeding
before a Tribunal considers itself aggrieved by an order passed by
it and carries it in an appeal before this Court, which is dismissed
by a Bench of two Judges in exercise of appellate jurisdiction vide a
reasoned order without notice to the respondents on the first day it
is listed. However, while such appeal was pending before this Court,
another respondent in the original proceeding before the Tribunal is
also desirous of carrying the same order in appeal but, for sufficient
cause, is unable to appeal readily. By the time such respondent upon
completion of all formalities presents its appeal and the same comes
up for consideration before a Bench of this Court, whatever be the
strength of the Bench, the respondent in the appeal being the successful
applicant before the Tribunal and before this Court too brings to its
notice that the appeal presented first in point of time has been listed
and dismissed by a Bench of two Judges of this Court. Should the
appellant (in the appeal, which was filed later) be told off at the gates
on the sole ground that the order under appeal has ceased to be the
operative order, having merged with the appellate order of this Court?
If the situation unfolds to be such where the Bench of greater strength
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is inclined to admit the appeal disagreeing with the view of the Bench
of two Judges, can it be said that the said Bench would be disabled
from exercising their appellate jurisdiction since, per the doctrine of
merger, the order under appeal does not exist? The answers to the
aforesaid questions, in our considered opinion, cannot but be in the
negative. A right of hearing that accompanies every proceeding decided
publicly, unless such hearing is barred, cannot be cast aside for no
better reason than that of a merger having occurred.
121. There is one other exception to the doctrine of merger. Nowadays,
it is not a rarity to find that petitions involving similar, though not
identical, issues are clubbed together and disposed of by a common
judgment and order. If such a judgment and order is unsuccessfully
challenged before a superior court by one of the petitioners to the
proceedings, and such a challenge fails, the doctrine of merger
may not apply when another set of petitioners challenges the same
(common) judgement and order; if the second set of petitioners are
able to demonstrate that the case run by them is not identical (though
bearing resemblance) with the proceedings already decided, it would
still be open for the superior court to entertain the challenge and rule
in a manner different from the earlier proceedings.
122. Thus, the application of the doctrine of merger, in every case, should
be accompanied by an awareness of its limitations and should not
be wielded to close avenues for addressing genuine concerns.
Prioritizing justice and fairness should supersede an absolute
insistence on finality. While the latter is commendable, the former
is superior. These doctrines, even though are grounded in sound
and justifiable public policy arguments, yet, do not limit the powers
of the courts in cases where larger public interest is at stake. They
have been adapted to accommodate exceptions and qualifications,
leaving room for acknowledging special circumstances, particularly
in matters of public significance.
123. On a conspectus of the authorities, we are inclined to the view that
the doctrine of merger may not have any application in all cases of
cognate civil appeals being carried from the same order (obviously at
the instance of a party different from the appellant who approached
this Court first in point of time), if it is convincingly demonstrated that
(i) his right of appeal should not be foreclosed because of the very
rare or special circumstance(s) that is/are projected before the court;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1443

Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

or (ii) his appeal raises an issue of seminal public importance, which
was not available to be raised by the appellant who approached this
Court in its appellate jurisdiction in the earlier round of litigation,
and also that such issue in the greater public interest requires a
resolution by this Court; or (iii) since an act of court ought to prejudice
none, refusal to interfere by this Court would invariably result in
offending the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit; or (iv) the
earlier appellate decision is vitiated because of fraud having been
practiced on this Court by a party in whose favour the ruling had
been made, as in this case; or (v) that public interest would be put to
extreme jeopardy by reason of irretrievable consequences ensuing,
if interference which is otherwise found to be warranted in law were
declined solely based on the doctrine of merger.
124. Having noted that fraud is an exception to the doctrine of merger
and considering that the impugned order of the High Court and the
decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra) have been found by
us to be vitiated by fraud, the argument by learned senior counsel for
Reddy as regards the non-maintainability of the present proceedings
based on the merger doctrine is of no significance.

Procedure, If An Impediment To Exercise Jurisdiction
125. Procedural law is a sentinel of non-arbitrariness; it not only provides
a safeguard against the individual vagaries of a judge but also
establishes a structured framework for litigants to approach the legal
system for redressal of their issues. However, procedural law cannot
foresee all situations that may arise. Procedure must facilitate justice,
not detract from it. In special cases, the letter of procedural law
must yield to the ends of justice. Courts are, of course, duty-bound
to apply procedural law in its entirety, save where such application
would result in manifest absurdity.
126. The contention advanced by learned senior counsel for Reddy is
that the procedure undertaken by the Registry and the Division
Bench of this Court violates the SC Rules, 2013. We are in complete
disagreement with such a proposition since the provisions of the SC
Rules, 2013, highlighted by learned senior counsel for Reddy, are
applicable in the course of normal action. Once fraud, on the face of
the record, is proved, the procedural law laid down by the SC Rules,
2013 must support the actualisation of justice, not the continued
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perpetuation of wrongs. We quite agree with the contention of learned
senior counsel for Vishnu that Order LV, Rule 6 of the SC Rules,
2013 specifically recognises the inherent powers of this Court in the
exercise of jurisdiction to secure justice. When the Court has been
the victim of fraud, it’s hands cannot be tied down by procedural
laws in a manner to defeat the interests and rights of other parties.
127. In the case of State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari82, this Court with
reference to Rule 3 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules
and Orders, Vol. 5, Chap. 1-A held:
8. …This omission or default is only a breach which
can be characterised as an irregularity to be corrected
by condonation on application by the party fulfilling the
condition within a time allowed by the court. We must
always remember that processual law is not to be a tyrant
but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It
has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions
are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a
resistant in the administration of justice. Where the non-
compliance, tho’ procedural, will thwart fair hearing or
prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory.
But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without
injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone
a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After
all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end product
on technicalities. Viewed in this perspective, even what is
regarded as mandatory traditionally may, perhaps, have to
be moderated into wholesome directions to be complied
with in time or in extended time… .
128. In M.V. “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez83, this Court in a case
regarding Rule 4 of Chapter XXII of the Calcutta High Court Rules,
1914, as applicable to the Original Side, held that:
18. Rules of procedure are not by themselves an end
but the means to achieve the ends of justice. Rules of
procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and are not
hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction of

82 (1976) 1 SCC 719
83 (1989) 4 SCC 671
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Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents
its miscarriage by enabling the court to do justice in myriad
situations, all of which cannot be envisaged, acting within
the limits of the permissible construction, must be preferred
to that which is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. The
reason is obvious. Procedure is meant to subserve and not
rule the cause of justice. Where the outcome and fairness
of the procedure adopted is not doubted and the essentials
of the prescribed procedure have been followed, there is no
reason to discard the result simply because certain details
which have not prejudicially affected the result have been
inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In our view, this
appears to be the pragmatic approach which needs to be
adopted while construing a purely procedural provision.
Otherwise, rules of procedure will become the mistress
instead of remaining the handmaid of justice, contrary to
the role attributed to it in our legal system.
129. We have no hesitation to hold that a similar interpretation can be
applied to the SC Rules, 2013.
130. The contention of Reddy under consideration can also be dealt with
by applying the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. No act of
Court should harm a party being the foremost principle in the mind
of any Court, it would be a travesty of justice if such court, feeling
bound by the shackles of technicalities, were to decline interference
to set things right despite arriving at a definitive conclusion of being
tricked by fraud; and, it is a fallacy to urge such a contention before
the Supreme Court, which has vast and pervasive powers to remedy
any wrong that might have occasioned to a litigant owing to sharp
and fraudulent practices of another litigant, more particularly in a
case of proven fraud.
131. This contention of Reddy, therefore, must fail owing to our satisfaction
of the impugned order and the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra)
having been vitiated by fraud.

C. Vishnu pursuing the civil appeal as well as the review petition
and application for modification/recall, simultaneously

132. That Vishnu has spared no effort to explore every option has been
noticed by us above.
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133. An appeal against a decree or order, passed or made by an inferior
court, before a superior court and a review of the same decree/order
before the court which passed/made it cannot simultaneously be
pursued by the same party. The logic behind it is that there cannot be
a parallel challenge to the same decree or order by the same party
before two different fora – that is, in the courts of appellate jurisdiction
and original jurisdiction. On the very terms of Section 114 read with
Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, such a course of action is not permissible.
134. However, there is an absence of a two-pronged assail in two different
proceedings by Vishnu to the same decree or order: whereas the
civil appeal is directed against the impugned order, a petition has
subsequently been filed by Vishnu for review of the decision in Reddy
Veerana (supra) [which had the occasion to modify the impugned
order]. Therefore, neither Section 114 nor Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC
would create a legal bar for entertaining the two proceedings [appeal
and review] that have been initiated by Vishnu.
135. Nevertheless, it does seem to us to be a well thought out endeavour
on the part of Vishnu to file the petition for review even after he had
carried the impugned order in an independent appeal before this Court.
Uncertainty was looming large and Vishnu, not content to rest on his
oars by simply appealing to the conscience of this Court, also sought
a review to remedy the wrong caused to him by Reddy. If indeed the
appeal against the impugned order were to fail on the ground that
the same had merged in the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), as
argued by Reddy, or even if the same appeal were to succeed and
the impugned order set aside, Vishnu would have very little to salvage
since the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) would still hold the field.
Filing of the review by Vishnu, thus, appears to have been intended
to ensure that he is either not non-suited or that even after achieving
success in appeal, he is not left in the lurch. However, we are of the
considered opinion that even if Vishnu had not applied for a review
- as a logical corollary of the aforesaid discussions - the decision in
Reddy Veerana (supra) too having been obtained by Reddy by playing
fraud, has to be erased from the records being a nullity.
136. Turning to the order under appeal declining registration of the
petition for review, which has been directed to be tagged with these
proceedings and also requires simultaneous disposal, we find that
the petition was marked as defective. The grounds based whereon
the Registrar declined registration have been perused.
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Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

137. The occasion has now arisen for considering the grounds urged
in support of the appeal against the Registrar’s order. Apart from
an objection that appropriate quantum of court fees has not been
deposited, which Vishnu has disputed, the Registrar noted certain
technical defects concerning array of parties and the like. The same
are certainly curable defects. We, therefore, find it necessary to allow
the appeal by requiring the Registry to notify the additional quantum
of court fees payable by Vishnu, which has not been notified to him,
as well as grant liberty to Vishnu to cure the other technical defects
within a fortnight from this date. It is only upon curing of such defects
that the petition for review shall be treated to be in order.
138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by
Reddy, the doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned
order is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this
Court in Reddy Veerana (supra). For reasons already discussed,
the civil appeal has to be allowed and the impugned order set aside.
139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would
follow that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra),
upholding the same, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will
also be a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of our inherent
powers.
140. Furthermore, based on the aforesaid discussion, we are also inclined
to allow the application (MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No.
3636/2022) for recall of the order dated 30th January, 2023 whereby
this Court directed Vishnu to approach the court under Section 30
of the 1894 Act for appropriate relief.

D. Forum Shopping
141. The contention that Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping is
premised on the fact that he instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 on
7th August, 2020 before the trial court claiming that the compromise
decree dated 17th November, 2006 was null and void and, therefore,
it is contended that the present proceedings are instituted to bypass
the jurisdiction of the trial court.
142. This contention has been urged to be rejected. When the High Court
has already ruled in a proceeding that directly affects Vishnu’s right
and when such decision, on appeal, is replaced by the decision
of the higher court in Reddy Veerana (supra), Vishnu invariably
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was left with no other option but to approach this Court by way of
these proceedings. After the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra),
it is obvious that no court, far less the trial court, would venture to
make any order having the effect of upsetting what this Court had
directed rendering Vishnu’s endeavour to approach any other court
useless before first attempting to have the order operating against
him in Reddy Veerana (supra) vacated/recalled.
143. Pertinently, we wish to point out that considering the long-standing
set of disputes between the trio, it would have been appropriate if the
High Court were urged to implead those third parties whose rights
could specifically be affected. However, the High Court proceeded
unaware of the fact that there was one other party (read Vishnu) who
was claiming joint ownership and had even instituted a suit to have
the decree obtained by Reddy declared void. Now, in view of the order
that we propose to pass, we hope and trust that all the necessary
parties would be brought on record and extended the opportunity to
place their respective versions to facilitate an appropriate decision
to be rendered to terminate the present lis by a just and proper
redetermination of the compensation payable to the rightful claimant(s).

E. Conclusion
144. In the wake of the unbecoming conduct of the trio, we do not feel
bound by the nature of relief claimed by Vishnu. We, therefore,
consider it appropriate to order/direct as under:
i. the impugned order of the High Court dated 28th October, 2021
passed in WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of
Uttar Pradesh & ors.] stands set aside, since fraud has vitiated
the entire proceedings;
ii. as a corollary to the above, the judgment and order dated 5th
May, 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra) (which too was obtained
by playing fraud) is declared to be a nullity and stands recalled
in exercise of our inherent powers;
iii. the order dated 30th January, 2023 passed by this Court in MA
255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022 is recalled, also in exercise
of our inherent powers;
iv. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& ors.] is remanded in its entirety to the High Court;
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Vishu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

v. as a consequence of (iv) supra, WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will stand
revived and restored on the file of the High Court with direction
to implead Vishnu Vardhan and T. Sudhakar as additional
respondents;
vi. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will be decided afresh by the High Court
in accordance with law, upon hearing all interested parties;
vii. should any disputed question of fact arise for decision disabling
it to decide the same based on affidavit evidence, the High
Court may in its discretion permit the parties to lead oral and
documentary evidence regarding the claim for compensation
as well as re-determination and apportionment thereof amongst
the rightful claimants, as if it were exercising powers under
Section 54 of the 1894 Act.
viii. till such time a decision is given by the High Court, the interim
order dated 21st January 2025, whereby we allowed Reddy to
furnish securities through his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine
instead of cash deposit, shall continue meaning thereby that
the securities furnished by him in the form of title deeds of
immovable properties shall remain deposited with this Court and
shall be subject to and abide by further orders of the High Court;
ix. however, the interim order dated 3rd October, 2024 restraining
Reddy from entering into any agreement to sell and/or to create
third party rights in respect of the immovable assets owned by
him (except those for which security has been furnished), his
family and the companies created by him or his family members
shall remain in abeyance subject to his cooperating with the
High Court for early disposal of the writ petition;
x. in the event of non-cooperation from the side of Reddy, the
High Court may pass such restraining order as it may deem
fit and proper.
xi. having regard to the magnitude of fraud which we have detected
in course of consideration of these proceedings, we find it just
and proper to request the Chief Justice of the High Court to
preside over the Division Bench for finally deciding the writ
petition as early as possible, and subject to the convenience
of the Bench, preferably by the year end;
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xii. all questions on merits, other than those decided vide
this judgment, including re-determination of fair and just
compensation for the acquired land and apportionment thereof,
are kept open for being urged before the High Court;
xiii. having regard to the track record of the trio, the possibility of a
compromise cannot be totally ruled out and if they file terms of
settlement, we hope and trust that the High Court will carefully
examine such terms to ensure that public interest is not hindered
in its acceptance; and
xiv. pending suits/proceedings, if any before any judicial fora /
administrative authority, shall be taken to its logical conclusion
in accordance with law.
145. The civil appeal (CA 7777 of 2023), the appeal against the order of
the Registrar (MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition Diary No.
33040/ 2023), and the application for recall of the order dated 30th
January, 2023 (MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022)
are allowed and shall stand disposed of on the above terms together
with all other connected applications. The writ petition [WP (C) 673
of 2023] is, however, dismissed.
146. As indicated in paragraph 137, Vishnu shall be at liberty to cure the
defects upon due communication of the additional court fees to be
put in by him for making the petition for review in order. Thereafter,
the petition for review (Dy. No. 33040/2023) shall be registered,
appropriately numbered, and shown to have been disposed of by
this order. Should Vishnu fail to cure the defects, the petition shall
stand dismissed as infructuous.
147. SMC (C) No. 3/2024 will be heard separately.
148. In view of the remand ordered by us, we observe that the parties
shall bear their own costs.

Result of the case: Matters disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain