VINOD KUMARversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                       [2015] 1 S.C.R. 328


A                        VINOD KUMAR
                                v.
                      STATE OF HARYANA
               (Criminal Appeal No.1401 of 2008)
                       JANUARY 08, 2015
B
            [DIPAK MISRA AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 3631109/364A - Kidnapping for
  ransom - Allegations that appellant-domestic servant working
C in the house of PW-2, along with the co-accused, kidnapped
  minor son of PW-2 for ransom - Trial of appellant and the
  co-accused u/ss. 3631109/364A - Acquittal by the trial court,
  however High Court passed order of conviction and sentence
  against the appellant - Interference with the order of High
o Court - Held: Not called for - Acquittal of co-accused would
  not affect the case of appellant-accused - Kidnapped boy
  was recovered from the appellant - PW-3 categorically
  deposed that he had seen the child with the appellant - Even
  though there were certain discrepancies in the evidence of
E PW-3, his version could not be ignored - These a_spects
  weigh quite heavily against the accused - Also the
  discrepancies pointed out by the trial court were minor in
  nature.

        Dismissing ·the appeal, the Court
F
       HELD: 1.1. After analyzing the evidence and arriving
  at the conclusion that 'JG' could not have been
  convicted, for there was no evidence on record, he has
  proceeded to scrutinize the evidence against the
G appellant. One of the facets for arriving at the conclusion
  that accused could not be found guilty as the case set
  forth by the prosecution against 'JG' has no legs to
  stand upon, is absolutely unacceptable. It was the case


H                             328
      VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                 329


of the prosecution that 'JG' had abetted in the crime as A
he had instigated accused to kidnap the child. There is
no reason how his acquittal would affect the case of
accused. The High Court rightly discarded the said
reasoning of the trial judge. [Para 18] [342-D-G]
                                                            B
     1.2. The trial judge found discrepancies with regard
to the handing of letter by 'S' to 'M'; the discrepancies
relating to the place and time pertaining to various
aspects stated by witnesses and the identity of the
accused at the time of arrest. The discrepancies which C
have been noted are absolutely minor. The High Court
correctly ob"served that the minor discrepancies like who
met whom, at what time and who was dropped and at
whose place and at what time, etc. have been given
unnecessary emphasis. It is well settled in law that minor
                                                            0
discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of
the case or not going to the root of the matter could not
result in rejection of the evidence as a whole. The opinion
expressed by the High Court that the trial judge has
really given undue emphasis on the discrepancies which
are minor in nature is concurred with. The hypertechnical E
approach of the trial judge has correctly not been
accepted by the High Court. [Para 19, 20] [342-G-H; 343-
A-B, E; 344-A]

    1.3. As regards the ignoring of the letters on the basis F
of the plea advanced by the accused, the trial judge
delved into the facet in a slightly peculiar manner. Even
assuming that it was a plea in the statement rec9rded
under Section 313 CrPC that he had written the Jetters
being pressurized by the police, the said stand does not G
deserve to be accepted on two grounds, that he had not
made that allegation when the letters were shown to him
by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, PW-11, and in
fact he had admitted the correctness of the letters and
that in the cross-examination of the witnesses barring a H
    330      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A   bald question to PW-12, nothing has been put with regard
    to the letters. It is apt to be stated here that the Additional
    Chief Judicial Magistrate was examined as PW-11 by the
    prosecution and has unequivocally proven the fact that
    the letters were produced before him and the accused-
8   appellant had identified the letters and admitted his
    signature. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-
    examination. Similarly, there has been really no c.ross-
    examination of any of the witnesses that the letters were
    written under pressure of police. In the instant case, in
c   the absence of cross-examination of the witness, barring
    a bald suggestion to PW-12, the appellant was the author
    of the letters and the same were not written under any
    pressure. [Paras 21, 23, 24] [344-B-C; 346-E-F; 348-D-E]

          1.4. It is important that kidnapped boy was recovered
D   at railway station. The accused did not explain how the
    child could be brought to Delhi. PW-3 categorically
    deposed that he had seen the child with the accused. The
    trial judge noted certain discrepancies in the evidence of
    PW-3 but without any justifiable reason. The trial judge
E   really niggled on unimportant and unnecessary details.
    It is quite natural on the part of PW-3 to pose a question
    to accused as he was slightly anxious to see a domestic
    help taking a child. This is inherent in human nature and,
    therefore, the version of PW-3 could not have been
F   ignored. These aspects, weigh quite heavily against the
    accused. The judgment of reversal by the High Court is
    absolutely defensible and does not warrant any
    interference. [Para 25 and 26] [348-F-H; 349-A]

G       Jadunath Singh v. State of UP (1971) 3 SCC 577;
    Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra
    1972 (2) SCR 622 : (1972) 1 SCC 107; Shivaji Sahabrao
    Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1974 (1) SCR" 489: (1973)
    2 SCC 793; State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9
    SCC 291; Anil Kumar v. State of UP. 2004 (4) Suppl.
H
      VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                  331


SCR 449 : (2004) 13 SCC 257; Girja Prasad v. State of MP.    A
2007 (9) SCR 483 : (2007) 7 SCC 625; S. Ganesan v. Rama
Raghuraman 2011 (1) SCR 27 : (2011) 2 SCC 83;
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 (2 ) SCR 630 :
(2007) 4 SCC 415; State of U. P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1
SCC 505; Rammi v. State of M.P. 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1 :      B
(1999) 8 SCC 649; Appabhai V. State ofGujarat(1988) Supp
SCC 241; State of UP. v. Nahar Singh 1998 (1) SCR 948:
(1998) 3 sec 561 - referred to.

                    Case Law Reference:
                                                             c
    (1971) 3 sec 577            Referred to       Para 13
    1972 (2) SCR 622            Referred to       Para 14
    1974 (1) SCR 489            Referred to       Para 14
    (2005) 9 sec 291            Referred to       Para 14    D

    2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 449 Referred to           Para 14
    2007 (9) SCR 483            Referred to       Para 14
    2011 (1) SCR 27             Referred to       Para 14
                                                             E
    2007 (2) SCR 630            Referred to       Para 15
    (1985) 1 sec 505            Referred to       Para 19
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1       Referred to       Para 19
    (1988) Supp sec 241         Referred to       Para 19    F

    1998 (1) SCR 948            Referred to       Para 24

    CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1401 of 2008.
                                                             G
    From the Judgment and Order dated 07-07-2008 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 245-DBA/98.

    Rajeev Singh, Vijyalaxmi for the appellant.              H
    332       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A         Vikas Sharma, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed
  against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
B recorded by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
  Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 245-DB of 1998 whereby
  the Division Bench has reversed the decision rendered by the
  learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Jind wherein the learned
  trial Judge had acquitted the appellant and the co-accused,
C Joginder of the charges leveled against him under Sections 363/
  109/364-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short).

          2. The facts which are requisite to be stated for disposal
    of the appeal are that Jaivir Singh, informant, PW-1, was
0   residing jointly along with his two brothers at village lkkas. His
    younger brother, Jagbir Singh, was an employee at Railway
    Police. The accused-appellant, Vinod Kumar, a resident of
    Bijwasan, had come to the village of PW-1 in the month of May,
    1996 and worked as a domestic help in the house of Jagbir
E   Singh. Jagbir Singh had four children and he had employed two
    servants one of whom was the present appellant. After working
    for four months in the house of Jagbir Singh, Vinod Kumar, as
    the prosecution story unfurls, kidnapped Anand, the 3 Y2 year
    old son of Jagbir Singh and Smt. Santosh, PW-2, on
    24.09.1996. He was seen along with Anand by Harpal, PW-3,
F   who had enquired from Vinod Kumar where he was proceeding
    with the child to which the reply was that he had to purchase
    shoes for Anand and medicine for himself from Jind. The
    mother, PW-2, searched for the child but did not find him, but
    found a letter, Exhibit P3, which was addressed to her father-
G   in-law, Manphul. The said letter was written by Vinod informing
    that he was taking Anand with him and would only release him
    on payment of ransom of Rs.1 lakh. She immediately brought
    the letter to the notice of her father-in-law who sent Jaivir to the
    police station and Jaivir, in turn, lodged an FIR. After the
H   criminal law was set in motion, the Investigating Officer
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       333
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
proceeded to village lkkas, where the house of Jagbir Singh          A
is situate, prepared .the site plan, seized two other letters,
Exhibits P1 and P2, written by Vined, vide Memorandum
Exhibit PB which was attested by Santosh, PW-2, and her
father-in-law, Manphul. Thereafter, the investigating team, went
to village Bijwasan in search of Vined Kumar but did not find        B
him in the village. Thereafter, Jaivir informed the Investigating
Officer that Vined Kumar had appeared in some examination
at Village Beri. From the teachers of the school they came to
know that Vined Kumar was a student of the said school but
had not attended the school for the last seven months. They also     c
came to know that father's name of Vined Kumar was one Om
Prakash, who is a resident of Village Dhansa. As the
prosecution story further undrapes, the investigating team
proceeded to village Dhansa and photograph of Vined Kumar
was shown by Om Parkash and the said photograph was that
                                                                     0
of the appellant who was employed by Jagbir as a servant. On
the next day, SHO Police Station, Jind, PW-13, along with other
members of the investigating team came to know that Anand
had been recovered from the custody of Vined Kumar. The
accused-appellant was formally arrested on 26.9.1996.
 Eventually, he was produced before the learned Additional           E
Chief Judicial Magistrate, PW-11, Jind along with the letters and
 before the learned Magistrate, he admitted that the letters were
written by him and, accordingly, his statement was recorded by
the learned Magistrate. The Investigating Officer, after recording
the statements of other witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and         F
 completing the formalities, laid the chargesheet under Section
 364-A read with Section 109 IPC against both the accused
 persons, namely, Vined Kumar and Joginder before the learned
 Magistrate, who in turn, committed the matter to the Court of
 Session.                                                            G

     3. Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.

     4. The prosecution, to substantiate its case, examined 13
                                                                     H
    334       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A   witnesses. The principal witnesses are Jaivir Singh, PW-1, who
    had lodged the FIR; Smt. Santosh, PW-2, the mother of Anand;
    Harpal, PW-3, who had seen the accused taking Anand in a
    three-wheeler towards Jind; Mahipal, the Head Constable,
    GRP, PW-5, who had recovered Anand from the :Custody of
B   Vinod at Old Delhi railway station and had arrested the accused;
    Sri Dharam Pal, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind, PW-
    11, before whom the accused had made the statement that he
    had written the letters; Datta Ram, ASI, Investigating Officer,
    PW-12. The other witnesses, namely, Baljeet, Shakti, Rampa!,
c   Raisingh, Devanand, Balwant Singh and SHO, P.S. Jind PWs-
    4,6,7,8,9, 10 and 13 respectively who are basically formal
    witnesses.

         5. The accused-appellant, in his statement under Section
    313 CrPC took the plea that he was falsely implicated in the
D   crime as he had expressed his unwillingness to work in the
    house of Jagbir Singh and demanded his salary. It was his
    further stand that the employer had refused to make payment
    and involved him in the false case. Explaining the letters it was
    his plea that his signatures were obtained forcibly and the letters
E   were got written by him under the pressure of police. However,
    the defence chose not to adduce any evidence.

          6. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence
    brought on record, came to hold that the prosecution had not
F   been able to establish any case against the accused Joginder
    inasmuch as his name was not mentioned in the FIR and none
    of the witnesses had implicated him and from the disclosure
    statement of accused Vinod Kumar, nothing was revealed which
    could be considered against Joginder under Section 27 of the
G   Indian Evidence Act, and accordingly acquitted him. As far as
    the present appellant is concerned, the learned trial Judge found
    that though the accused Vinod Kumar had worked in the house
    of the in-laws of the brother of PW-1 for some time and on his
    recommendation he had come to work in the house of the
    husband of PW-2 and alleged to have worked there for four
H
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF' HARYANA                      335
               {OIPAK MISRA, J.]
months, yet nobody had bothered to find out his/parentage; that A
from the evidence of PW-4 and 5, it was difficult to come to a
definite conclusion that Anand was recovered from the custody
of accused Vinod Kumar; that as regards time of kidnapping
of Anand and registration of the case, the evidence of PWs 1,
3 and 12 are discrepant and, therefore, their testimony could B
not be given credence to; that there was discrepancy with
regard to the name of the father of the accused, for at some
places he had been described as son of Suraj Bhan whereas
he is actually son of Om Prakash; that the letters, Exhibit P1 to
P3, which were the foundation of the case of the prosecution,       c
could not be placed reliance upon inasmuch as had there been
any truth in the said letters, the police could have waited at the
relevant place till that time which was mentioned for the purpose
of collection of ransom and further the investigating agency had
not taken any steps to effect the arrest of the accused at the
                                                                     0
place given in the letters; that there was doubt with regard to
the existence of letters prior to 24.9.1996 i.e. the date of lodging
of the FIR; that the plea of the accused that the letters were got
written from him by the police under pressure created a dent
in the prosecution version and that apart it was difficult to give
credence to the letters when it is appreciated in the backdrop E
of the evidence in toto; that there was material discrepancy in
the statements of PWs 1, 2 and 12 regarding bringing back of
Anand from Delhi to lkkas; that the PWs 1 and 4 had deposed
about the facts in their own manner without bothering about the
actual facts of the case and they are interested witnesses; and F
that the statements of PWs 4 and 5 were liable to be
disbelieved as they had stated different particulars of the person
from whom Anand was recovered. Being of this view, the
learned trial Judge acquitted both the accused persons.
                                                                    G
     7. The prosecution, being dissatisfied with the said
judgment of acquittal, sought leave to appeal before the High
Court. The application for leave against Joginder was declined
as there was no evidence whatsoever against him and, the
prayer for grant of leave was restricted to Vinod Kumar.            H
    336      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A         8. It was contended before the High Court by the
    prosecution that Anand was seen in the company of the
    accused Vinod Kumar while going towards Jind in a three-
    wheeler; that there was no warrant or justification to discard the
    letters Exhibit P1 to P3, which were recovered by the police
B   and written by the accused; that the plea advanced that the
    letters were got written from him by police under pressure was
    nowhere suggested to any of the witnesses; that the learned
    trial Judge had given undue emphasis relating to the name of
    the father of the appellant while there is material on record to
c   show that he had disclosed his father's name as Suraj Bhan,
    resident of Bijwasan; that the discrepancies which had been
    highlighted by the trial court were minor in nature and could not
    have been considered to discard the otherwise irreproachable
    testimony of the witnesses; and that the appreciation of the
    evidence on record was basically fallacious and, therefore, the
0
    view expressed could not be remotely treated as a plausible
    one.
        9. The contentions put forth by the prosecution before the
    High Court was controverted by the accused-respondent on the
E   bedrock of reasons ascribed by the trial Judge.

        10. The High Court, as we notice, has scrutinized the
  evidence on record in detail and come to hold that Vinod Kumar
  was seen by Harpal Singh, PW-3, who had made queries from
F him as to where he was going with the grandson of Manphul;
  that on 24.9.1996 along with the complaint a letter was
  produced before the police which gave rise to the lodgment of
  the formal FIR; that the recovery of the boy Anand from the
  custody of Vinod Kumar at Old Delhi railway station had been
G fully proven by the prosecution; that acquittal of Joginder could
  not be a factor to be taken into consideration for recording
  acquittal of Vinod Kumar; that the trial court had given undue
  emphasis on the name of the -father of the accused Vi nod
  Kumar, for there is evidence on record to show that he himself
  had stated before the witnesses that he is son of Suraj Bhan;
H
        VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                        337
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

that there is nothing on record to disbelieve the writing in Exhibit   A
P1 to P3 on the ground that they have been written at the
instance .of Joginder or under the police pressure. On the basis
of aforesaid findings, the High Court has opined that the view
E;lXpressed by the learned trial Judge is absolutely untenable,
and, in fact, based upon total erroneous appreciation of facts         B
and certain conjectures and accordingly has dislodged the
judgment of acquittal.

     11. We have heard Mr. f3ajiv Singh, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel for the            C
respondent. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant
that while overturning the judgment of acquittal and recording
a conviction, it is the obligation of the High Court to give
adequate reasons and to meet -every aspect but in the
impugned judgment there is no diScussion for reversing the
same and, therefore, it warrants interference by this Court. It is     D
contended by him that the High Court has erroneously, in a
cryptic manner, observed that the-Oiscrepancies are minor in
nature, though they really cast a doubt in the prosecution version
which has been appositely appreciated by the learned trial
Judge. Learned counsel would contend that the High Court has           E
erroneously noted that the accused has not stated a word that
the letters were got written from him by Joginder or the letters
were got written by police under pressure, for there is a definite
stand in the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that
the letters were written under pressure by the police. It is further   F
submission that it is a case where the appellant should have
been extended the benefit of doubt regard being had to the
discrepancies pertaining to time and place and the plea taken
in the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC and the
discrepancies with regard to the recovery of kidnapped boy.            G

     12. Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
State, per contra, would contend that the discrepancies pointed
out by the learned trial Judge are absolutely minor in nature and
under no circumstances, can discredit the testimony of the
                                                                       H
    338        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A witnesses. It is put forth by him that the plea of the accused that
  the letters were written under the pressure by police deserves
  to be rejected because the defence had really not asked any
  question to the witnesses relating to the letters except a bald
  suggestion given to PW-12. Learned counsel would contend
B that though the said aspect has been slightly erroneously
  understood by the High Court, but that would not make the
  judgment of conviction fallible. Additionally, it is submitted by
  him that the prosecution has proven to the hilt that the accused-
  appellant was arrested in Delhi and put in Tihar jail and from
c his custody the kidnapped boy was recovered. Learned counsel
  would further urge that the High Court has rightly interfered with
  the judgm_~nJ _of a~quittal and, therefore, there is no justification
  to dislodge the view expressed by the appellate court.

        13. Before we dwell upon the factual score whether the
D prosecution has proven the case to warrant a conviction, we
  think it apt to recapitulate the principles relating to the
  jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding the appeal against
  acquittal. in this context, reproducing a passage from Jadunath
  Singh v. State of U.P1 would be profitable:
E
          "This Court has consistently taken the view that in an appeal
          against acquittal the High Court has full power to review
          at large all the evidence and to reach the conclusion that
          upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be
F         reversed. This power of the appellate court in an appeal
          against acquittal was formulated by the Judicial
          Committee of the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. King
          Emperoi2 and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor3. These two
          decisions have been consistently referred to in the
          judgments of this Court as laying down the true scope of
G
          the power of an appellate court in hearing criminal appeals

    1.   (1971) 3 sec 577.
    2.   AIR 1934 PC 227.
H 3.     AIR 1945PC151.
         VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       339
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      (see Surajpal Singh v. State4 and Sanwat Singh v. State          A
      of Rajasthan 5 )."

    14. Similar view has been expressed in Damodarprasad
Chandrikaprasad V. State of Maharashtra 6 , Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade V. State of Maharashtra 7 , State of Karnataka V. K.
                                                                       8
Gopalakrishna 8 , Anil Kumar V. State of U. P. 9 , Girja Prasad
V. State of M.P1°. and S. Ganesan V. Rama Raghuraman 11 •

     15. In this regard, we may fruitfully remind ourselves the
principles culled out in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 12 :
                                                                       c
      "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
      following general principles regarding powers of the
      appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an
      order of acquittal emerge:

      (1) An appellate court has full power to review,                 D
      reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
      order of acquittal is founded.

      (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
      limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power   E
      and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
      its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

      (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
      compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very        F

4.   AIR 1952 SC 52.
5.   AIR 1961 SC 715.
6.   (1972) 1 sec 107.
7.   (1973) 2 sec 793.
                                                                       G
8.   (2005) 9 sec 291.
9.   (2004) 13 sec 257.
1o. (2007) 7 sec 625.
11. (2011) 2 sec 83.
12. (2007) 4 sec 415.                                                  H
    340       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A         strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring
          mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
          of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
          phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of
          language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
B         court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
          the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
          conclusion.

          (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
          case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
c         the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
          available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
          jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
          innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
          of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,
0         the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
          reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

          (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
          of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
E         disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

          16. On the bedrock of aforesaid settled principles, it is our
    obligation to scrutinize the judgment of the High Court whether
    it withstands close scrutiny within the parameters stated
    hereinabove or a conviction has been recorded solely because
F   a different view can be taken. At the very outset, we are
    obligated to state that the learned counsel for the parties, with
    lot of pains, have taken us through the evidence on record. On
    a scrutiny of the evidence, we find that the appellant was
    working as a servant in the house of husband of PW-2,
G   Santosh, who was the first to notice that her son Anand, a 3 1h
    year old boy, was missing. She had also found the letter
    regarding kidnapping of Anand and demand of ransom by the
    accused and had shown it to her father-in-law, Manphul. Jaivir,
    PW-1, had gone to the police station wherein he had submitted
H   an application Ex. PA annexing the letter on the basis of which
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       341
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the FIR was lodged. The Investigating Officer, Data Ram, PW- A
12 had proceeded to the house of Santosh wherefrom he had
recovered two letters, Exhibit P1 and P2. They were kept at
different places in the house. The letters were seized in
presence of two persons, namely, Manphul and Santosh.
Thereafter, he had proceeded to the village Bijwasan where he B
came to know that Vinod Kumar did not belong to that village.
Being told by Jaivir that Vinod Kumar had appeared in some
examination from the school at Beri, the Investigating Officer
had gone to the school where he learnt that one Vinod Kumar
was studying there and had remain.ed absent for last seven c
months. On further investigation it was found that the accused
was son of Om Prakash who had shown the photograph of
Vinod Kumar that matched with the identity of the man working
in the house of the husband of Santosh. While the investigation
was proceeding in this way, Vinod Kumar was apprehended D
by Mahipal, PW-5, the Head Constable in GRP, along with
Anand. He was arrested and sent to Tihar jail. It is in the
evidence of PW-12 that on 26.9.1996 he had moved
application Ex. PH/1 before the learned Magistrate for issuance
of warrant of production of accused Vinod and vide order Ex.
 PH/2 the ACJM Jind being the concerned Magistrate had E
ordered for issuance of production warrant of accused Vined
with direction to execute the warrant upto 30.9.96. It is also in
 his testimony that he took the warrant, Ex. PH/3, to the
 Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, Delhi and sought the custody
 of accused Vinod Kumar, but he was informed by the jail F
 authorities that they would not hand over the custody of accused
Vinod to him without the formal order of Chief Metropolitan
 Magistrate, Delhi. Thereafter he moved an application before
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi who passed the order,
 Ex. PH/5, allowing him to take the custody of accused Vinod G
 from the jail whereafter he could bring Vinod jail to Jind and
 formally arrested him on 27.9.96. The High Court has
 appreciated this aspect with proper scrutiny and clarity.

     17. It is apt to note here that the High Court has taken note   H
    342       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A   of four aspects, namely, (i) that the accused was working as a
    servant in the house of Jagbir, husband of Santosh, and had
    himself stated to be son of Suraj Bhan, resident of Bijwasan
    and that his photograph was shown by Om Prakash; (ii) that
    the letters written to the parents of Anand have duly been proven
B   by the prosecution and the plea that the letters were written
    under police pressure was not acceptable; (iii) that the
    discrepancies which had been highlighted by the learned trial
    Judge are minor and on that score the reliable evidence of the
    witnesses could not have been thrown overboard; and (iv) that
c   acquittal of Joginder, other co-accused, could not have any
    impact on the role played by Vinod Kumar.

         18. It is imperative to state here that the learned trial Judge
    has posed two questions, namely, whether accused Joginder
    abetted accused Vinod Kumar to kidnap Anand, a 3 Yi years
D   old boy of Jagbir Singh for ransom and whether accused Vinod
    Kumar kidnapped Anand for ransom and wrote letters Ex P1
    to P3 on having been abetted by accused Joginder. After
    analyzing the evidence and arriving at the conclusion that
    Joginder could not have been convicted, for there was no
E   evidence on record, he has proceeded to scrutinize the
    evidence against the appellant. One of the facets for arriving
    at the conclusion that Vinod Kumar could not be found guilty
    as the case set forth by the prosecution against Joginder has
    no legs to stand upon, is absolutely unacceptable. It was the
F   case of the prosecution that Joginder had abetted in the crime
    as he had instigated Vinod Kumar to kidnap the child. We
    perceive no reason how his acquittal would affect the case of
    Vinod Kumar. The High Court has rightly discarded the said
    reasoning of the learned trial Judge.
G        19. The next facet relates to the discrepancies in the
    evidence of the witnesses. The learned trial Judge has found
    discrepancies with regard to the handing of letter by Santosh
    to Manphul; the discrepancies relating to the place and time
    pertaining to various aspects stated by witnesses and the
H   identity of the accused at the time of arrest. The discrepancies
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       343
               [DIPAK MISRA,.J.]
which have been noted are absolutely minor. The High Court A
has correctly observed that the minor discrepancies like who
met whom, at what time and who was dropped and at whose
place and at what time, etc. have been given unnecessary
emphasis. It is well settled in law that minor discrepancies on
trivial matters not touching the core of the case or not going to B
the root of the matter could not result in rejection of the evidence
as a whole. It is also well accepted principle that no true
witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant
details, but the Court should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible c
with the credibility of his ve~sion that it would be justified in
jettisoning his evidence. It is expected of the Courts to ignore
the discrepancies which do not shed the basic version of the
prosecution, for the Court has to call into aid its vast experience
of men and matters in different cases to evaluate the entire
                                                                     0
material on record. [See State of U.P. V. M.K. Anthony1 3 ,
Rammi v. State of M.P. 14 and Appabhai V. State of Gujarat15 ]

      20. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles,
we are inclined to concur with the. opinion expressed by the
High Court that the learned trial Judge has really given undue E
emphasis on the discrepancies which are minor ~n nature. To
elaborate, emphasis has been laid on the fact that the arrest
memo indicates Vinod Kumar son of Suraj Bhan. The learned
trial Judge has failed to appreciate that Vinod Kumar has been
describing himself as son of Suraj Bhan. There is no dispute F
with regard to the fact that he was found along with boy Anand.
There is no dispute with regard to his identity or the fact that
he was working in the house of the husband of Santosh. It has
also been brought in evidence that Harpal, PW-3, had seen him
taking Anand and on a query being made, he answered that G
he was taking the child to Jind to buy shoes for the boy and

13. (1985) 1sec 505.
14. (1999) 8 sec 649.
15. (1988) Supp sec 241.                                            H
    344      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A   medicine for himself. That apart, Vinod Kumar has not taken
    the plea that he was not employed by Jagbir. Thus, the
    hypertechnical approach of the learned trial Judge has correctly
    not been accepted by the High Court.

          21. The next aspect which is required to be scrutinised is
8
    whether the letters vide Exhibit P1 to P3 are to be ignored on
    the basis of the plea advanced by the accused. The learned
    trial Judge h~,,S delved into this facet in a slightly peculiar
    manner. Hir teflpOning is to the effect that a perusal of the
    letters, Ex. ~1 to P3, go to show that the accused was to
C   receive the amount of ransom at Rohtak near"the post office
    and the bus stand on 26.9.96 early in the morning and hence,
    had there been any truth in these letters the poilce must have
    waited till the time mentioned in the letters and must have made
    arrangement for the arrest of the accused at the place
D   mentioned in the letters; that in those circumstances there was
    no necessity to run immediately for the arrest of the accused
    particularly in the circumstances when the correct address of
    the accused were not there with the complainant or the police.
    Exception has been taken to the action of the investigating
E   agency not taking any steps to effect the arrest of the accused
    at the place given in the letters and on that bedrock, a
    conclusion has been arrived at that the letters were not in
    existence on 24.9.96. That apart, it has weighed in his mind
    that there was no necessity to write three letters at the same
F   time and, therefore, reliance on the letters was an afterthought.
    He has also obseNed that the bringing of such type of letters
    into existence is not impossible for the police and hence, as
    the accused had taken the stand that the said letters were got
    written from him by the police under pressure, no much reliance
G   could be placed on the letters.

          2i To appreciate the aforesaid reasoning, it is first
    necessary to understand the plea of the accused. He has stated
    in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that these
    letters were written under the pressure of police. When he was
H
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                      345
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

produced for the first time before the Additional Chief Judicial   A
Magistrate, PW-11, he had admitted his signatures. It has come
in evidence of the said witness that he had showed the letters
to the accused who has admitted before him that the letters
were written by him. Letters were read over and explained to
him and he had admitted the correctness. The accused had not       B
stated before the learned ACJM that the letters were got written
from him by the police under pressure. Keeping that in view,
his statement under Section 313 CrPC should be appreciated.
In question no.2 and the answer thereto are to the following
effect:                                                            C

    "Q.No.2 That while leaving lkkas for Jind, you left letters
    Ex. P1 to Ex. P3 in the house of Jabir. You addressed
    those letters to Jagbir and Manphul that you had kidnapped
    Anand for ransom. If they wanted to get release Anand,
    they were asked to pay a sum of Rs. One lac on 26.9.96         0
    in between 2 to 4 p.m. at a place situate near post office
    near bus stand Rohtak.

    Ans.: It is incorrect".
                                                                   E
     Question No.9 and the reply given in that regard are as
follows:

    "Q.No.9 That on 28.3.96 in police station Sadar, Jind you
    were interrogated in the presence of witnesses by PW-12
    and you made disclosure statement Ex.PC leading to the         F
    involvement of your co-accused Joginder in the case. You
    informed the police that accused Joginder instigated you
    to kidnap Anand and got written letters Ex. P1 to Ex. P3
    from you and then you kidnapped Anand and took him to
    Rohtak for ransom. You also admitted the contents of Ex.       G
    P1 to Ex. P3 and signed your disclosure statement Ex.PC.

     Ans. It is incorrect. I never made disclosure statement
     Ex.PC and never admitted the contents of Ex. P1 & P2.
     My signatures were obtained forcibly and these letters        H
    346        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 1 S.C.R.


A         were got written from me under pressure by the police".

        23. We have referred to the statement in detail as the High
  Court in the impugned judgment has observed that when
  examined under Section 313 CrPC the accused did not state
  a word that the letters were got written from him by Joginder
8
  or the letters were got written by police under pressure. Such
  an observation is in consonance with the answer to question
  no.2. The other answer makes a slight departure, for the
  question that was put to him was with regard to the disclosure
  statement and the letters have been written at the instance of
c Joginder. Be that as it may, even assuming that it was a plea
  in the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC that he had
  written the letters being pressurized by the police, the said
  stand does not deserve to be accepted on two grounds,
  namely, i) he had not made that allegation when the letters were
D shown to him by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, PW-
  11, and in fact he had admitted the correctness of the letters
  and ii) that in the cross-examination of the witnesses barring a
  bald question to PW-12, nothing has been put with regard to
  the letters. It is apt to be stated here that the Additional Chief
E Judicial Magistrate has been examined as PW-11 by the
  prosecution and has unequivocally proven the fact that the letters
  were produced before him and the accused-appellant had
  identified the letters and admitted his signature. Nothing has
  been elicited in the cross-examination. Similarly, there has been
F really no cross-examination of any of the witnesses that the
  letters were written under pressure of police.

       24. In this context, we may usefully refer to the authority in
  State of UP. V. Nahar Singh 16 , wherein the Court has dealt
G with the effect of absence of cross-examination. True it is, the
  factual matrix was different therein, but the observations are
  salient. In the said case, it has been held:



H   16. (1998) 3 sec 561
       VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                       347
               [OIPAK MISRA, J.]
    13 ....... In the absence of cross-examination on the            A
    explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained
    unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High
    Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable
    right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence
    by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is            B
    enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing
    a witness to be questioned:

           ( 1)   to test his veracity,

           (2)    to discover who he is and what is his position     C
                  in life, or

            (3)   to shake his credit by injuring his character,
                  although the answer to such questions might
                  tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him     0
                  or might expose or tend directly or indirectly
                  to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.

    14. The oft-quoted observation of Lord Herschell, L.C. in
    Browne v. Ounn 17 clearly elucidates the principle underlying
    those provisions. It reads thus:                                 E

                  "I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to
                  be absolutely essential to the proper conduct
                  of a cause, where it is intended to suggest
                  that a witness is not speaking the truth on a      F
                  particular point, to direct his attention to the
                  fact by some questions put in cross-
                  examination showing that that imputation is
                  intended to be made, and not to take his
                  evidence and pass it by as a matter                G
                  altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is
                  impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he



17. (1893)6R67.                                                      H
    348      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015) 1 S.C.R.


A                      might have been able to do if such questions
                       had been put to him, the circumstances
                       which, it is suggested, indicate that the story
                       he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that
                       he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords,
B                      I have always understood that if you intend to
                       impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he
                       is in the box, to give an opportunity of
                       making any explanation which is open to him;
                       and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule
                       of professional practice in the conduct of a
c
                       case, but it is essential to fair play and fair
                       dealing with witnesses."

         Be it stated in the said case, this Court did not approve
    the conclusion of the High Court that the explanation for the
D   delay was not at all convincing and the said view was expressed
    as there was no cross-examination. In the instant case, in the
    absence of cross-examination of the witness, barring a bald
    suggestion to PW-12, we are inclined to hold that the appellant
    was the author of the letters and the same were not written
E   under any pressure.

          25. Apart from what we have stated hereinabove, it is also
    important that kidnapped boy was recovered at railway station.
    The accused has not explained how the child could be brought
    to Delhi. Harpal has categorically deposed that he had seen
F
    Anand with Vinod Kumar. The learned trial Judge has noted
    certain discrepancies in the evidence of Harpal, but without any
    justifiable reason. The learned trial Judge has really niggled on
    unimportant and unnecessary details. It is quite natural on the
    part of Harpal to pose a question to Vinod Kumar as he was
G   slightly anxious to see a domestic help taking a child. This is
    inherent in human nature and, therefore, the version of Harpal
    could not have been ignored. These aspects, in our view, weigh
    quite heavily against the accused.

H
        VINOD KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA                   349
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     26. Tested from the aforesaid angles, we are disposed to     A
think that the judgment of reversal by the High Court is
absolutely defensible and does not warrant any interference.
Resultantly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands
dismissed.
                                                                  B
Nidhi Jain                                    Appeal dismissed.