VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR.versusSEESH RAM SAINI & ORS.

                 [2025] 10 S.C.R. 66 : 2025 INSC 1095

                      Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr.
                                 v.
                        Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 11740 of 2025)
                             10 September 2025
           [Pankaj Mithal* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the
       High Court holding that prima facie cognizable offences are made
       out for investigation against the appellant-officers of the CBI, and
       directing the Delhi Police to register a case.

                                   Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – Registration of
       FIR upon receiving information about cognizable offence –
       Writ petitions seeking directions for registration of FIR
       against appellants- officers on deputation to CBI alleging
       commission of offences u/ss.506, 341, 342, 166, and ss.218,
       463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B IPC – Single Judge of the High
       Court rejecting the conclusion reached by the CBI’s enquiry
       officer that no offence was made out and that the allegations
       of abuse and coercion were unsubstantiated, held that prima
       facie cognizable offences made out for investigation against
       the officers, directed the Delhi Police to register a case, and
       to get the matter investigated by the Special Cell – Appeals
       thereagainst, dismissed by the Division Bench – Interference:
       Held: Not appropriate to interfere with the impugned judgment and
       order of the High Court in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
       u/Art.136 – Report of the CBI at best is a preliminary enquiry report
       submitted before the registration of the FIR – However, such an
       enquiry is not ordinarily contemplated in law before registration of
       FIR, and hence is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to oust
       the power of the Constitutional Court to record its own conclusion
       about commission of a cognizable offence, if any, on the material
       or the allegations in the complaints – Genuineness or credibility
       of the information is not the condition precedent for registration of
       an FIR – If the Constitutional Court has exercised its discretion in

* Author
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                               67

        Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


     entertaining the petitions and directing for the registration of the FIR
     against the two officers, on being satisfied that the commission of a
     cognizable offence is prima facie made out against them, no good
     reason to interfere with such discretion – Opinion expressed by the
     High Court in regard to commission of the cognizable offences is
     only a prima facie opinion and has to be treated as such, so as not
     to affect the discretion of the I.O., subsequent to the investigation –
     Registration of the FIR against the two officers not likely to cause
     any prejudice to them – They will have the right to participate in the
     investigation to establish that they have not committed any offence,
     as alleged – It would however, not be a prudent exercise at this stage
     to scuttle the registration of the FIR or the investigation, when the
     High Court in exercise of its constitutional powers had opined that
     prima facie, a cognizable offence is made out against the officers,
     that too upon elaborate consideration of the preliminary inquiry
     report of CBI – It would be dichotomy of justice if such offence is
     allowed to go uninvestigated particularly when there is involvement
     of the officers on deputation to CBI – Justice must not only be done,
     but must also be seen to be done – It is high time that sometimes
     those who investigate must also be investigated to keep alive the
     faith of the public at large in the system – Investigation would be
     conducted by the Delhi Police itself but by an officer not below
     the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police – I.O. may consider
     inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI during the investigation
     by him, but not to treat it as conclusive – I.O. would conduct the
     investigation without being influenced by any finding or observation
     made by the High Court or this Court and conclude the same as
     expeditiously as possible. [Paras 28, 32-41]

                               Case Law Cited
     Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat [2025] 4 SCR
     32 : (2025) 4 SCC 818; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [2007] 12
     SCR 1100 : (2008) 2 SCC 409; Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of
     Delhi) [2006] 2 SCR 403 : (2006) 2 SCC 677; Anurag Bhatnagar
     & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., 2025 INSC 895; Lalita
     Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. [2013] 14 SCR
     713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution
     of India.
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                              List of Keywords
      Cognizable offences; Investigation; Officers of the CBI; Delhi Police
      to register a case; Registration of FIR upon receiving information
      about cognizable offence; Registration of FIR; Investigation by
      the Special Cell; Report of the CBI; Preliminary enquiry report;
      Constitutional Court; Closure report; Filing of chargesheet.

                             Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11740 of 2025
      From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2019 of the High Court
      of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 1194 of 2006
      With:
      Civil Appeal No(s). 11742, 11743, and 11741 of 2025

                          Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellants:
      Ranjit Kumar, Kirtiman Singh, Sr. Advs., R. Chandrachud, Waize
      Ali Noor, Ms. Vidhi Jain, Minal Kumar Sharma, Mrinal Sharma,
      Mrinal Kumar Sharma, Zillur Rahman, D. Venkta Krishna.
      Advs. for the Respondents:
      Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Suryaprakash V. Raju, A.S.G.,
      Dhruv Mehta, Yashraj Singh Deora, Ms. R. Bala, Sr. Advs.,
      Ms. Anupama, P. N. Puri, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Mukesh Kumar
      Maroria, Kanu Agarwal, Udai Khanna, Sughosh Sunramanyam,
      Ms. Balaji Srinivasan, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Annam Venkatesh.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

      Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.    Delay condoned.
2.    Leave granted.
3.    Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, Mr. S. V. Raju,
      learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned
      senior counsel for the parties.
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                          69

            Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


4.     The cases are quite simple but have a chequered history, involving
       the appellants, who are two officers of the Central Bureau of
       Investigation1. One is Vinod Kumar Pandey, the then Inspector of
       CBI, and the other is Neeraj Kumar, the then Joint Director of CBI.
5.     The two petitions being Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 675 of 2001 and Writ
       Petition (Crl.) No.738 of 2001 under Article 226 of the Constitution of
       India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure2, 1973
       came to be filed by one Vijay Aggarwal and other by one Sheesh
       Ram Saini respectively, seeking directions for registration of First
       Information Report3 against the above two officers on deputation
       to the CBI, namely, Vinod Kumar Pandey and Neeraj Kumar for
       committing offences under Sections 506, 341, 342 and 166, and
       Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B of the Indian Penal
       Code4, 1860, as alleged in the writ petitions respectively.
6.     The aforesaid two writ petitions were decided by the Single Judge
       of the High Court on 26.06.2006 but by separate order(s) passed in
       identical terms. Both the petitions were partly allowed and directions
       were issued to the Delhi Police to register a case on the basis of
       the allegations contained in the complaint dated 05.07.2001 lodged
       by Sheesh Ram Saini with PS Lodhi Colony and complaint dated
       23.02.2004 addressed to Commissioner of Police, Delhi by Vijay
       Aggarwal respectively, and to get the matter investigated by the
       Special Cell of the Delhi Police by an Officer not below the rank of
       Assistant Commissioner of Police, uninfluenced by the findings and
       the observations contained in the Inquiry Report dated 26.04.2005
       conducted by the Joint Director, CBI.
7.     In short, the writ petitions were partly allowed with the direction to
       register the FIR with the finding that prima facie cognizable offences
       are made out for investigation against the appellant-officers.
8.     Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment(s) and order(s) of the High
       Court dated 26.06.2006, both the officers of the CBI preferred
       separate Letters Patent Appeal(s)5 before the Division Bench of the


1    Hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’
2    Hereinafter referred to as’Cr.P.C.’
3    In short ‘FIR’
4    In short ‘IPC’
5    Hereinafter referred to as ‘LPA’
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      High Court. The said LPAs were dismissed on 13.03.2019 on the
      ground of maintainability.
9.    Out of the present four appeals, two appeals [D.No.10495 of 2019
      and D.No.10508 of 2019] are against the order(s) of the learned
      Single Judge dated 26.06.2006 partly allowing the petitions, and
      other two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and S.L.P.(C) No.
      7897 of 2019] are against the order of the Division Bench of the High
      Court dated 13.03.2019 dismissing the LPAs as not maintainable.
10. We had made it clear to the parties in the very beginning that we
    would not enter into the question of maintainability of the LPAs so
    as to adjudicate the appeals arising out of their dismissal for the
    reason that we would consider the correctness of the judgment and
    order(s) dated 26.06.2006 on merits as would have been done in
    the LPAs by the Division Bench. The counsel for the parties agreed
    and proceeded to advance arguments accordingly on merits.
11. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to delay of more than
    12 years in challenging the judgment and order(s) of the Single
    Judge dated 26.06.2006.
12. The said delay has been explained taking the ground that the
    appellants were bona fide pursuing their LPAs before the Division
    Bench of the High Court and once they realized that the LPAs are
    not maintainable and they have been dismissed as not maintainable,
    they decided to challenge the judgment and order(s) passed by the
    learned Single Judge before the Supreme Court.
13. In view of the above explanation, though technically, pursuing the
    LPAs and the time spent thereon may not be a very good cause to
    condone the delay but since there is no willful or deliberate delay or
    any default on part of the appellants in assailing the judgment and
    order(s) of the Single Judge dated 26.06.2006 rather they were all
    thoroughly vigilant of their rights, we have ignored the delay and have
    heard the parties on merits, more particularly, on the correctness of
    the judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge.
14. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants, argued
    that the information/complaint submitted by Sheesh Ram Saini and
    by Vijay Kumar Aggarwal does not make out a cognizable offence
    for enabling the Court to direct for the registration of the FIR. The
    High Court could not have directed for the registration of the FIR
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                         71

            Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


      as the procedure laid down by the various decisions of this Court
      was not followed before approaching the High Court. Secondly, the
      High Court could not have recorded a finding of commission of a
      cognizable offence which leaves nothing for the Investigating Officer6
      to opine on after the completion of the investigation, except to submit
      a chargesheet. He further argued that in the so-called preliminary
      inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI, it has been reported that
      no cognizable offence is made out for the purpose of investigation,
      therefore, it was not open for the High Court to have substituted its
      own finding and to direct for the registration of the FIR.
15. He emphasized that even if for the sake of argument it is accepted
    that a case for investigation is made out against Vinod Kumar
    Pandey, there is no averment or iota of material to rope in Neeraj
    Kumar, the other officer.
16. A further submission has been made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned
    senior counsel for the appellants, that the High Court manifestly erred
    in directing the investigation to be conducted by the Special Cell of
    the Delhi Police, which ordinarily investigates the matters relating to
    terrorism. The High Court also committed an error in directing the
    exclusion of preliminary inquiry report dated 26.04.2005 of the Joint
    Director, CBI from consideration during the investigation.
17. Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondents,
    pressed an application for the impleadment of the CBI contending
    that as the preliminary inquiry was conducted by an officer of the
    CBI and the case involves allegations against the officers of the
    CBI, therefore, the CBI is a proper party so as to defend the inquiry
    report and its officers.
18. On merits, he submitted that the complaints do not make out any
    cognizable offence and are barred by Section 197 Cr.P.C., as whatever
    acts have been performed by the officers, they were in discharge
    of their official duties. The complaints are also hit by Section 140 of
    the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and are barred by limitation.
19. Admittedly, the CBI was a party in the writ petitions before the High
    Court and had not chosen to assail the impugned order(s), meaning
    thereby that the CBI never felt aggrieved by the said order(s). The


6   In short ‘I.O.’
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                          Supreme Court Reports


      CBI, even if impleaded, would be added as the respondent or a
      proforma respondent. It is well recognized in law that a respondent
      or a proforma respondent may support the judgment impugned but
      cannot assail the same in his capacity as a respondent. The CBI has
      not independently challenged the aforesaid order(s) of the High Court.
20. Moreover, the CBI is not the party actually aggrieved by the direction
    given by the High Court for the registration of the FIR against the
    two officers. It is the officers who are aggrieved in their personal
    capacity and not the institution to which they are on deputation. It is,
    therefore, for the officers to defend themselves by taking appropriate
    legal remedies and the CBI has nothing to do with it. This apart, the
    report of the CBI is not under challenge, therefore, the contention
    that CBI has to support the report of its officer is not appreciable.
    Accordingly, we do not deem it necessary to permit impleadment
    of the CBI and to consider any objections as raised by the learned
    Additional Solicitor General.
21. The plain reading of the impugned judgment and order(s) of the
    Single Judge of the High Court dated 26.06.2006 reveals that the
    officers of the CBI in the dock have committed irregularities, if not
    illegality in discharge of their official duties and are prima facie guilty
    of the commission of the offences as alleged. This is clearly reflected
    from the averments contained in the complaints and the petitions.
    Both the officers have acted in connivance, and it is alleged that
    one of the officers, Vinod Kumar Pandey, had acted at the behest
    of the Senior Officer, Neeraj Kumar. The question whether Vinod
    Kumar Pandey acted on the advice or behest of Neeraj Kumar or
    whether they were in connivance, is a matter of fact which has to
    be investigated.
22. The Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 738
    of 2001, upon consideration of the material on record including
    the inquiry report dated 26.04.2005 of the Joint Director of CBI,
    found that cognizable offences were prima facie made out against
    the officers of the CBI i.e. the appellants. The allegation that the
    documents were seized on 26.04.2000 without preparation of the
    seizure memo stood substantiated even in the inquiry report, which
    recorded that the memo of seizure was prepared only on 27.04.2000
    and not at the time of seizure on 26.04.2000. The Court disagreed
    with the explanation that the documents were taken for scrutiny
    on 26.04.2000 noting that such a version was contrary both to the
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                         73

          Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


     records and the findings of the inquiry itself. The Single Judge also
     refused to accept that it was a procedural irregularity and held that
     the preparation of seizure memo in the facts and circumstances of
     the case was not in accordance with the CBI Crime Manual and
     attracted penal provisions of Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and
     120-B IPC.
23. The High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.675 of 2001, preferred by
    Vijay Aggarwal, observed that V.K. Pandey had summoned Vijay
    Aggarwal on 07.06.2001 and 11.06.2001 in clear derogation of a
    bail order dated 27.11.2000 passed by the Special Judge, which
    prima facie indicated a mala fide and malicious exercise of authority.
24. The Court held that the allegations of abuse, intimidation, and threats,
    including use of vulgar language to coerce Vijay Aggarwal to ensure
    withdrawal of his brother’s complaint against Neeraj Kumar, were
    serious and not unfounded. The Court observed that such conduct
    was grave in nature and prima facie disclosed the commission of
    cognizable offences under IPC.
25. The High Court rejected the conclusion reached by the CBI’s enquiry
    officer that no offence was made out and that the allegations of
    abuse and coercion were unsubstantiated. It was observed that the
    correctness or veracity of the allegations could not have been gone
    into at the stage of a preliminary enquiry and that such allegations,
    being serious in nature, could not be brushed aside lightly. The Court
    clarified that Vijay Aggarwal’s failure to file objections to the enquiry
    report could not amount to acceptance of its findings.
26. The Writ Court emphasized that CBI officers, being public servants,
    cannot claim immunity if they knowingly prepare false or incorrect
    records during the course of seizure or abuse their official position.
    Such acts on their part are serious acts and are not capable of being
    ignored and therefore, investigation in the matter is necessary.
27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat,7 this Court,
    in a very recent judgment held, that where the allegations pertain
    to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding
    public office, such actions fall squarely within category of cognizable
    offences and therefore, they are to be inquired into, and holding


7   (2025) 4 SCC 818
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                           Supreme Court Reports


       of any preliminary inquiry before the registration of the FIR is not
       necessary. If the information provided to the police or the preliminary
       report discloses a commission of a cognizable offence, the police
       is duty bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register an FIR without
       any delay.
28. The report of the CBI at best is a preliminary enquiry report submitted
    before the registration of the FIR. However, such an enquiry is not
    ordinarily contemplated in law before registration of FIR, and hence
    is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to oust the power of the
    Constitutional Court to record its own conclusion about commission
    of a cognizable offence, if any, on the material or the allegations in
    the complaints.
29. Undoubtedly, the High Court(s) should discourage writ petitions or
    petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. where alternative remedies are
    available. Nonetheless, as observed even in Sakiri Vasu v. State of
    U.P.,8 it is equally true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar
    for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction or the inherent jurisdiction
    of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section
    482 Cr.P.C.
30. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)9, the Court denounced
    the dismissal of the petition seeking registration of the FIR, solely on
    the ground of alternative remedy, and held that ground of alternative
    remedy would not be a substitute in law for refusing to register a
    case when the complaint of the citizen makes it a cognizable offence.
31. In a recent landmark decision, Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State
    (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.10, this Court held that although the complainant
    approached the Court, in that case the Magistrate, without exhausting
    the alternative remedies available, it was a mere procedural irregularity
    and not illegality, as the Court was competent to order registration
    of the FIR. It was further observed that when information disclosing
    commission of cognizable offence is conveyed to the police, they
    cannot refuse to register the FIR.
32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie
    cognizable offence is made out, the police is not required to go


8     (2008) 2 SCC 409
9     (2006) 2 SCC 677
10    2025 INSC 895
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        Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


     into the genuineness and credibility of the said information. It has
     been so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari (Supra) that
     the genuineness or credibility of the information is not the condition
     precedent for registration of an FIR.
33. The complainants Sheesh Ram Saini and Vijay Kumar Aggarwal
    have approached the police authorities by means of complaints dated
    05.07.2001 and 23.02.2004 to get the matter investigated, but as
    no action was purportedly taken thereof rather it is alleged that the
    police authorities expressed reluctance to entertain the complaints as
    it would not be proper on part of the police to investigate against the
    officers of the CBI, the complainants approached the Constitutional
    Court for necessary action.
34. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court has exercised its discretion in
    entertaining the petitions and directing for the registration of the FIR
    against the two officers, on being satisfied that the commission of
    a cognizable offence is prima facie made out against them, we see
    no good reason to interfere with such discretion. At best, as argued
    by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants, we
    can say that the opinion expressed by the High Court in regard to
    commission of the cognizable offences is only a prima facie opinion
    and has to be treated as such, so as not to affect the discretion of
    the I.O., subsequent to the investigation.
35. The registration of the FIR against the two officers is not likely to
    cause any prejudice to them. They will have the right to participate
    in the investigation to establish that they have not committed any
    offence, as alleged. Thereupon, the I.O. on consideration of the
    material collected during investigation, may submit a closure report
    or file the chargesheet. In the event, a closure report is filed and
    accepted by the Magistrate, the appellants will have no grievance.
    On the other hand, in the event, a charge sheet is submitted, the
    appellants will have an opportunity to assail the same before the
    appropriate forum.
36. It would however, not be a prudent exercise at this stage to scuttle
    the registration of the FIR or the investigation, when the High Court
    in exercise of its constitutional powers had opined that prima facie,
    a cognizable offence is made out against the two officers, that too
    upon elaborate consideration of the preliminary inquiry report of the
    Joint Director of CBI.
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37. It is trite to point out that the offence is alleged to have been committed
    in the year 2000 and till date the matter had not been allowed to be
    investigated. It would be dichotomy of justice if such an offence is
    allowed to go uninvestigated particularly when there is involvement
    of the officers on deputation to CBI. It is cardinal in law that justice
    must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. It is high
    time that sometimes those who investigate must also be investigated
    to keep alive the faith of the public at large in the system.
38. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not consider
    it appropriate to interfere with the impugned judgment and order(s)
    of the High Court in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under
    Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
39. However, we make it clear that since the Special Cell of the Delhi
    Police is supposed to investigate the matters concerning terrorism,
    upon registration of the FIR in the case at hand, the investigation
    would be conducted by the Delhi Police itself but by an officer not
    below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police.
40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita Kumari vs.
    Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.11, and reiterated thereafter
    to the effect that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section
    154 Cr.P.C. if the information discloses commission of a cognizable
    offence and no preliminary inquiry before FIR is permissible in such
    a situation; however, if the information received does not disclose
    a cognizable offence but indicates necessity of an inquiry being
    conducted, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain
    facts disclosing cognizable offence, if any. Thus, treating the inquiry
    conducted by the Joint Director, CBI as a preliminary inquiry, we
    permit the same to be looked into, if necessary, by the I.O. during
    the investigation by him, but not to treat it as conclusive. The I.O.
    would conduct the investigation strictly in accordance with law without
    being influenced by any finding or observation made by the High
    Court in the impugned order(s) or by this Court hereinabove and
    shall conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably
    within three months as the matter is quite old.
41. The appellants are directed to join the investigation and to cooperate
    with the I.O. by appearing before him, as and when called upon.


11    (2014) 2 SCC 1
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           Vinod Kumar Pandey & Anr. v. Seesh Ram Saini & Ors.


     In the event they join the investigation and appear before the I.O.
     regularly, no coercive steps shall be taken against them, including that
     of arrest, until and unless the I.O. records satisfaction that custodial
     interrogation at any stage is necessary.
42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and S.L.P.(C) No.
    7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the above terms and the two
    appeals [D.No.10495 of 2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are partly
    allowed by modifying the judgment and orders of the High Court
    dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above.
43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain