VIJAYA BANKversusSHYAMAL KUMAR LODH

                     [2010] 7 S.C.R. 569
                                             \.


                        VIJAYA BANK                                 A
                                   v.
                  SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH
               (Civil Appeal No. 4211 of 2007)
                        JULY 06, 2010
                                                                    B
         !G.S. SINGHVI AND C.K. PRASAD, JJ.]

     Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:

     s.'33C(2) - Subsistence allowance - Application for            c
suspension/subsistence allowance filed under s.33C(2) before
the Labour Court, Dibrugarh constituted under s. 7 of the Act
- Employer situated within the local limits of its jurisdiction -
Jurisdiction of Labour Court, Dibrugarh to decide the dispute
- Held: Labour Court, Dibrugarh is not specifi-ed by the            D
appropriate government i.e. Central Government for
adjudication of the disputes under s.33C(2), however dispute
can be entertained in view of s.10A(2) of 1946 Act- Industrial
Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 - s. 1OA(2).

     s.33C(2) - Expression 'labour court' - Includes Court          E
constituted under any law relating to investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.

      Jurisdiction: Incorrect label of the application and
  mentioning wrong.provision neither confers jurisdiction ·nor      F
. denudes the Court of its jurisdiction.

     Interpretation of statutes:

      Explanation appended to a section - Object of - Held:
Is to explain the meaning of the words contained in the section     G
- lndi.J.$trial Disputes Act, 1947 - s.33C(2).

    Meaningful construction - Legislature never waste its
words or says anything in vain - Construction rejecting the
                               569                                  H
    570      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [201 OJ 7 S.C.R.

A words of a statute not to be resorted to, excepting for
    compelling reasons.

       The question which arose for consideration in these
  appeals was whether the Labour Court, Dibrugarh
  constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of
8
  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had jurisdiction to
  entertain the application filed by the respondent-
  employE~e of appellant bank for an award of suspension/
  subsistence allowance filed under Section 33(2) of the
C Act.
          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. From a plain reading of Section 33C(2)
  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is evident that
0 money due to a workman has to be decided by such
  Labour Court "as may be specified in this behalf by the.
  appropriate Government." Explanation appended to
  Section 33C of the Act provides to include any Court
  constituted under any law relating to investigation and
E settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State as
  Labour Court. The underlying object behind inserting
  explanation seems to be varying qualification prescribed
  for appointment of Presiding Officers of Labour Court by
  different State enactments. The Parliament took note
  of the fact while inserting explanation that there ~re
F different kinds of Labour Courts constituted under
  Industrial Disputes Act and State Acts and a question
  may arise whether a Labour Court constituted under
  Acts, Central or State could entertain a claim made under
  Section 33C(2) of the Act. [Para 12) (580-F-H; 581-A-B)
G
      1.2. An explanation is appended ordinarily to a
  section to explain the meaning of words contained in that
  section. In view of the explanation appended to Section
  33C of the Act, Labour Court shall include any Court
H constituted under any law relating to investigation and
     VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                 571


settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State. It   A
widens the choice of appropriate Government and it can
specify not only the Labour Courts constituted under
Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but such
other Courts constituted under any other law relating to
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in        s
force in any State. [Para 13] (581-B-E]

     1.3. The power to adjudicate money claim is to be
decided by the Labour Court "as may be specified in this
behalf by the appropriate Government". Every word used
by the Legislature carries meaning and therefore effort C
has 'to be made t~ give meaning to each and every word
used by it. A construction brushing aside words in a
Statute is not a sound principle of construction. The
Court avoids a construction, if reasonably permissible on
the language, which renders an expression or part of the D ·
Statute devoid of any meaning or application.
Legislature never waste its words or says c;tnything in
vain and a construction rejecting the words of a Statute
is not resorted to, excepting for compelling reasons.
There does not exist any reason, much less compelling E
reason to adopt a construction, which renders the words
"as may be specified in this behalf" used in Section
33C(2) of the Act as red.undant. These words have to be
given full meaning. These words in no uncertain terms
indicate that there has to be specification by the F
appropriate Government that a particular court shall have
jurisdiction to decide money claim under Section 33C(2)
of the Act and it is that court alone which shall have the
jurisdiction. Appropriate Government can specify the
court or courts by general or special order in its G
discretion. In the present case, there is nothing on record
to show that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been
specified by the appropriate Government, i.e., Central
Government for adjudication of the disputes under
Section 33C(2) of the Act. [Para 14] [581-F-H; 582-A-C]     H
    572     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A       Treogi Nath and others v. Indian Iron and Steel Co.Ltd.
    and others AIR 1968 SC 205, relied on.
         2. From a plain rea('.ling of the Section 10A(2) of the
    Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 it is
    evident that the Labour Court constituted under the
8
    Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the local limits of
    whose jurisdiction the establishment is situated, has
    jurisdiction to decide any dispute regarding subsistence
    allowance. In the present case, dispute pertains to
    subsistence allowance and the Labour Court where the
c   Workman had brought the action has been constituted
    under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
    further the appellant bank is situated within the local
    limits of its jurisdiction. The workman had, though,
    chosen to file application under Section 33C(2) of the
D   Industrial Disputes Act but that shall not denude
    jurisdiction to the Labour Court, if it otherwise possesses
    jurisdiction. Incorrect label of the application and
    mentioning wrong provision neither confers jurisdiction
    nor denudes the Court of its jurisdiction. Relief sought
E   for, if falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, it can not
    be thrown out on the ground of its erroneous label or
    wrong mentioning of provision. In the present case the
    Labour Court, Dibrugarh satisfies all the requirements to
    decide the dispute raised by the employee before it. [Para
F   16) [583-F-H; 584-A-B]
                         Case Law Reference:
          AIR 1968 SC 205         relied on          Paras 8, 14
G       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    4211 of 2007.
        From the Judgment & Order dated 10.01.2007 of the High
    Court of Gauhati in Writ Appeal No. 381 of 2001.

H
     VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                      573


                               WITH                                 A

C.A. No. 4212 of 2007.

    Jagat Arora, Rajiv Nanda, Rajat Arora for the Appellant.

    A.K. Panda, Somnath Mukherjee for the Respondent.               8

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     C.K. PRASAD, J. 1. These appeals, by grant of leave
arise out of a common judgment of the Division Bench of the
Gauhati High Court dated 10th January, 2007 in Writ appeal          c
No.381 of 2001 and Writ Appeal No.11 of 2002, whereby it had
set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 22nd
August, 2001 and 24th August, 2001 passed in Civil Rule
No.3735 of 1995 and Civil Rule No.2771 of 1997 respectively.
                                                                    D   '-
    2. Facts lie in a narrow compass :-

     Shyamal Kumar Lodh-respondent herein is an employee
of the appellant~Vijaya Bank. It is a Nationalised Bank. The
employee filed application before the Labour Court, Dibrugarti
                                                                    E
constituted by the State Government under Section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for an award computing his
suspension/subsistence allowance under Section 33C(2) of the
Act.

      3. It is not in dispute that the appropriate Government in    F
relation to an e!llployee is the Central Government and the
employee had filed the application before the Labour Court
constituted by the State Government. It is further not in dispute
that the Labour Court before whom the employee had filed the
application has not been specified by the Central Government.       G
On the application so filed the Labour Court issued notice to
the appellant-employer. The appellant appeared before the
Labour Court and questioned its jurisdiction to adjudicate the
dispute on the ground that the said Court...having not been
specified by the Central Government under Section 33C(2) of         H
    574      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it had no jurisdiction to entertain
  the application.

        4. The Labour Court by its order dated 19th August, 1995
  over-ruled that objection and held that its jurisdiction to
B adjudicate the dispute is not ousted. Employer aggrieved by
  the aforesaid order dated 19th August, 1995 preferred writ
  application which was registered as Civil Rule No. 3735 of
  1995. A learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court by
  its judgment dated 22nd August, 1995 passed in Civil Rule
C No.3735 of 1995 upheld its contention and while doing so
  observed as follows :

          "As the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was not specified by
          the appropriate Government they have no jurisdiction to
          issue notice to the Petitioner in both the cases."
D
       5. During the pendency of the proceeding before the
  Labour Court, the employee filed application seeking
  enhancement of the subsistence allowance and the Labour
  Court by order dated 17th Ocober, 1996 directed the employer
E to deposit recurring subsistence allowance in Court. Employee
  had also preferred writ petition against the aforementioned
  order dated 17th0ctober, 1996 which was registered as Civil
  Rule No. 2771 of 1996.Following its earlier judgment dated
  22nd August 1995 passed in Civil Rule No. 3735 of 1995, the
  learned Single Judge by its order dated 24th August, 2001
F allowed the writ petition and quashed the aforesaid order
  dated 17.10.1996.

       6. Employee, aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the
  Single Judge, preferred separate appeals, which were
G registered as Writ Appeal No. 381 of 2001 and Writ Appeal
  No. 11 of 2002. Both the appeals were heard together and a
  Division Bench of the High Court by its common judgment
  dated 10th January, 2007 allowed the appeals and set aside
  both the orders of the Single Judge. While doing so it
H concurred with the Single Judge that as the Labour Court at
      VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                        575
                [C.K. PRASAD, J.]
Dibrugarh has not been specified by the Central Government,            A
it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition preferred by the
employee. However, on its finding that claim of subsistence
allowance falls within Section 10A(2) of the Industrial
Employment(Standing Order) Act, and the Branch of the Bank
where the employee was working, fell within the limits of              B
jurisdiction of Labour Court in question, it shall have jurisdiction
to decide the claim. While doing so, it observed as follows :

            "In the instant case, the Labour Court at Dibrugarh
     has not been 'specified' by the Central Government for the
     said purpose and accordfngly, we are unable to agree with         C
     the first submission advanced by the learned counsel for
     the appellant that the Labourpourt at Dibrugarh would have
     jurisdiction to entertain 'the application filed by the
     Appellant only on the basis of the provisions under the Act.
      ,                                                                D
           -However, the provisions of the Standing Orders Act
     appear to indicate that a Labour Court constituted under
     the 1947 Act, whether by the State Government or Central
     Government, would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim
     of subsistence allowance payable to a workman on an E
     application made to such Labour Court by the concerned
     workman. The provisions of Section 1OA(2) of the
     Standing Orders Act is a special provision incorporated ·
     only for adjudicating on claim relating to payment of
     subsistence allowance.                                    F
            Having regard to the special provision under Section
     1OA(2) of the Standing Orders Act, we feel that the Labour
     Court of Dibrugarn, although constituted by the State
     Government, would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim
     for subsistence allowance even in respect of employees            G
     under a nationalized banks. It is not specified in Section
     1OA(2) of the Standing Orders Act that the Labour Court
     constituted under the 1947 Act has to be a Labour Court
     constituted by an appropriate Government. It is also not
     stipulated that the appropriate Government has to 'specify'       H
    576      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 7 S.C.R'.


A         suc:h a Labour Court for entertaining on application under
          Section 1OA(2) of the Standing Orders Act. The only
          requirement for assumption of jurisdiction by a Labour
          Court under Section 1OA(2) of the Standing Orders Act is
          that the Labour Court has to be one, which has been
B         constituted under the 194 7 Act and the concerned
          establishment must be functioning within the local limits of
          the jurisdiction of such Labour Court.

                 Having noted the provisions as above, we are of the
          view that the entertainment of the application by the Labour
c         Court at Dibrugarh was proper in respect of the claim for
          subsistence allowance put forward by the Appellant, we
          hold that with regard to the claim for subsistence allowance
          put forward by the Appellant against the Respondent bank,
          the Labour Court at Dibrugarh has jurisdiction. We
D         accordingly declare that the Labour Court at Dibrugarh was
          competent and had jurisdiction to entertain the claim for
          subsistence allowance put forward by the Appellant. The
          impugned decision of the learned Single Judge to the
          contrary is accordingly interfered with."
E
        7. Employer is assailing this common order in t'1ese
    appeals.

       8. Mr. Jagat Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf
  of the appellant submits that in view of clear and unambiguous
F language employed in Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
  Act, the money due to an employee can be adjudicated by a
  Labour Court specified by the appropriate Government. He
  points out that the appropriate Government admittedly is the
  Central Government and it having not specified the Labour
G Court where the employee had brought the action, it had no
  jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the claim of the
  employee. In support of the submission reliance has been
  placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Treogi Nath
  and others vs. Indian Iron and Steel Co.Ltd. and others (AIR
H 1968 SC 205) and our attention has been drawn to the
     VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                       577
               [C.K. PRASAD, J.]
following passage from paragraph 4 of the judgment which             A
reads as follows:

    "The language of S.33-C(2) itself makes it clear that the
    appropriate Government has to specify the Labour Court
    which is to discharge the functions under this sub-section.      B
    The use of the expression "specified in this behalf' is
    significant. The words "in this behalf' must be given their
    full import and effect. They clearly indicate that there must
    be a specification by the appropriate Government that a
    particular Court is to discharge the function under S.33-
    C(2) and, thereupon, it is that court alone which will have      C
    jurisdiction to proceed under that provision. The mere fact
    that a Labour Court has been constituted under S. 7(1) of
    the Act for the purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes
    as well as for performing other functions that may be
    assigned to it under the Act does not mean that that Court       D
     is automatically specified as the Court for the purpose of
    exercising jurisdiction under S.33-C(2) of the Act. S.33-
     C(2) confers jurisdiction only on those Labour Courts which
     are specified in this behalf, i.e., such Labour Courts which
    are specifically designated by the State Government for the      E
     purpose of co111puting the money value of the benefit
    claimed by a workman."

     9. Mr. A.K. Panda, learned Senior Counsel, however,
appearing on behalf of the employee-respondent submits that F
in view of the explanation appended to Section 33C of the
Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court includes any Court
constituted under any law relating to investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State and the
Labour Court before which employee laid his claim has been G
constituted for investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes, it will have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the
money claim of the employee.

     10. Before we advert to the rival submissions it is expedient
to go into the legislative history of the enactment in question.     H




                                                               \
    578      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as originally enacted did not
  provide for any remedy to individual employee to enforce his
  existing rights and only way to enforce the existing rights was
  to raise an industrial dispute. The legislature inserted Section
  20 in the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 19SO
8 (since repealed) which provided for the recovery of the money
  due from the employer under an award or decision. Further, by
  the Industrial Disputes (Amendment). Act, 19S3 the legislature
  inserted Chapter 5A to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and
  for the recovery of money due to an employee from his
C employer Section 2S-I was enacted. The aforesaid insertion
  confined to the dues under Chapter SA of the Act only but did
  not apply to moneys or benefits due under any award,
  settlement or any other provision of the Act. Taking note of the
  aforesaid lacunae the legislature passed the Industrial Disputes
  (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 19S6. This
D Act repealed the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
  19SO as also Section 2S-1 in Chapter SA of the Industrial
  Disputes Act, 1947 and inserted Section 33C in the later Act.
  Section 33C as inserted by Amending Act, 1956 made
  provision for recovery of money due to an employee from his
E employer not only under the provision of Chapter SA but also
  under settlement and awards. However, it did not prescribe any
  period of limitation and further only the workman entitled to a
  money or benefit himself could make an application. With a view
  to obviate this lacuna Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes
F Act, 1947 was recast by Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes
  (Amendment) Act, 1964(Act 36 of 1964). Section 33C of the
   Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as stood before the amendment
  by Act 36 of 1964 read as follows:

G         "Section 33C. Recovery of Money Due from an Employer
          - (1) Whey any money is due to a workman from an
          employer under a settlement or an award or, under the
          provisions of chapter SA, the workman may, without
          prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an
          application to the appropriate government for the recovery
H
     VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                        579
               [C.K. PRASAD, J.]
    of the money due to him, and if, the appropriate                  A
    government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall
    issue a certificate for that amount to the collector, who shall
    proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an
    arrear of land revenue.
                                                                      B
     (2)    Where any workman is entitled to receive from the
            employer, any benefit which is capable of being
            computed in terms of money, the amount at which
            such benefit should be computed may, subject to
            any rules that may be made under this Act, be             C
            determined by such labour court as may be
            specified in this behalf by the appropriate
            government and the amount so determined may be
            recovered as provided for in sub-section (1 ).

     (3)    For the purpose of computing the money value of           D
            a benefit, the labour court may, if it so thinks fit,
            appoint a CC'mmissioner who shall, after taking such
            evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to
            the labour court and the labour court shall determine
            the amount after considering the report of the            E
            commissioner and other circumstances of the
            case."

     11, Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, as
amended by Section 23 of the Amendment Act 36 of 1964
made substantial changes in law with which we are not                 F
concerned in the present appeals, except explanation inserted
in Section 33C, the effect whereof shall be considered in this
judgment. Section 33C(2) and (S) of Industrial Disputes Act,
as it stands today read as follows :
                                                                      G
    "33C. Recovery of money due from an employer -

    (1)    xxx xxx xxx xxx
    (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the
    employer any money or any benefit which is capable of             H
    580      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A         being computed in terms of money and if the question
          arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount
          at which such benefit should be computed, then the
          question may, subject to any rules that may be made under
          this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be
B         specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government.

          (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx

          (4) xxx xxx xxx xxx

c         (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer
          are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit
          capable of being computed in terms of money, then
          subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a
          single application for the recovery of the amount due may
          bE~ made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such
D
          workmen.

          Explanation.-ln this section "Labour Court" includes any
          court constituted under any law relating to investigation and
          settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State."
E
       12. From a plain reading of Section 33C(2) it is evident
  that money due to a workman has to be decided by such
  Labour Court "as may be specified in this behalf by the
  appropriate Government." Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes
F Act, 194 7 inter alia confers power to the appropriate
  Government for constitution of one or more Labour courts for
  the adjudication of industrial disputes. It also prescribes
  qualification for appointment as Presiding Officer of a Labour
  Court. Explanation appended to Section 33C of the Act
G provides to include any Court constituted under any law relating
  to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force
  in any State as Labour Court. The underlying object behind
  inserting explanation seems to be varying qualification
  prescribed for appointment of Presiding Officers of Labour
  Court by different State enactments. The Parliament took note
H
      VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                    581
                [C.K. PRASAD, J.]
of the fact while inserting explanation that there are different   A
kinds of Labour Courts constituted under Industrial Disputes
Act and State Acts       and a question may arise whether a
Labour. Court constituted under Acts, Central or State could
entertain a claim made under Section 33C(2) of the Act.

     13. An explanation is appended ordinarily to a section to B
explain the meaning of words contained in that section. In view
of the explanation aforesaid Labour Court shall· include any
Court constituted under any law relating to investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State. Money
due to an employee under Section 33C(2) is to be decided by C
"Labour Court as may be specified. in this behalf by the
appropriate Government". Therefore, the expression "Labour
Court" in Section 33C(2) has to be given\ an extended meaning
so as to include Court constituted undElr any law relating to
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any D
State. It widens the choice of appropriate Government and it
can specify not only the Labour Courts consJituted under
Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but such other
Courts constituted under any other law relating to investigation
and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.        E
                                /


       14. But this does not end the controversy. The power to
  adjudicate money claim is to the Labour Court "as may be
  specified in this behalf by the appropriate Governmenf. Every
 word used by the Legislature carries meaning and therefore F
  effort has to be made to give meaning to each and every word
  used by it. A construction brushing aside words in a Statute
  is not a sound principle of construction. The Court avoids a
, construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which
  renders an expression or part of the Statute devoid of any
  meaning or application. Legislature never waste Its words or G
  says anything in vain and a construction rejecting the words of
  a Statute is not resorted to, exceptin_g for compelling reasons.
  There does not exist any reason, much less compelling reason
  to adopt a construction, which renders the words "as may be
  specified in this behalf used in Section 33C(2) of the Act as H
    582       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 7 S.C.R.


A redundant. These words have to be given full meaning. These
  words in no uncertain terms indicate that there has to be
  specification by the appropriate Government that a particular
  court shall have jurisdiction to decide money claim under
  Section 33C(2) of the Act and it is that court alone which shall
B have the jurisdiction. Appropriate Government can specify the
  court or courts by general or special order in its discretion. In
  the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the
  Labour Court at Dibrugarh has been specified by the
  appropriate Government, i.e., Central Government for
c adjudication of the disputes under Section 33C(2) of the
  Industrial Disputes Act. This question in our opinion has
  squarely been answered by this Court in the case of Treogi
  Natf'1 (Supra). True it is that rendering this decision, this Court
  did not consider the explanation appended to Section 33C of
  the Act, as the lis pertained to period earlier to amendment but
0
  in view of what we have said above, excepting the widening
  of choice pertaining to Courts, explanation does not dispense
  with the requirement of specification of court by appropriate
  Government.
              -
E        15. Having said so the next question which falls for
    determination is as to whether Labour Court at Dibrugarh could
    have entertained the application under Section 10-A of
    Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Section
    1OA of the Act reads as follows:
F
          "10-A. Payment of subsistence allowance.- (1) Where
          any workman is suspended by the employer pending
          investigation or inquiry into complaints or charges of
          misconduct against him, the employer shall pay to such
          workman subsistence allowance-
G
                (a) at the rate of fifty per cent of the wages which
          workman was entitled to immediately preceding the date
          of such suspension, for the first ninety days of suspension;
          and
H
     VIJAYA BANK v. SHYAMAL KUMAR LODH                       583
               [C.K. PRASAD, J.]

          (b) at the rate of seventy-five per cent of such wages A
    for the remaining period of suspension if the delay in the
    completion of disciplinary proceedings against such
    workman is not directly attributable to the conduct of such
    workman.
                                                                    B
           (2) If any dispute arises regarding the subsistence
    allowance payable to a workman under sub-section (1), the
    workman or the employer concerned may refer the dispute
    to the Labour Court, constituted under the Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), within the local limits of C
    whose jurisdiction the in.dustrial establishment wherein
    such workman is employed is situate and the Labour Court
    to which the dispute is so referred shall, after giving the
    parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the dispute
    and such decision shall be final and binding on the parties.
                                                                    D
            (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
    foregoing provisions of this section, where provisions·
     relating to payment of subsistence allowance under any
     other law for the time being in force in any State are more
     beneficial than the provisions of this section, the provisions E
     of such other law shall be applicable to the payment of
     subsistence allowance in that State."

     16. From a .plain reading of the Section 1OA(2) of the
aforesaid .Act it is evident that the Labour Court constituted
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the local limits F
of whose jurisdiction the establishment is situated, has
jurisdiction to decide any dispute regarding subsistence
allowance. Here in the present case undisputedly dispute
pertains to subsistence allowance and the Labour Coui't where
the workman had brought the action has been constituted under G
Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and further the
appellant bank is situated within the local limits of its jurisdiction.
The workman had, though, cbq_s_en to file application under
Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act but that in our
opinion shall not denude jurisdiction to the Labour Court, if it l/i
    584      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 7 S.C.R.

A otherwise1 possesses jurisdiction. Incorrect label of the
  application and mentioning wrong provision neither confers
  jurisdiction nor denudes the Court of its jurisdiction. Relief
  sought for, if falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, it can not
  be thrown out on the ground of its erroneous label or wrong
B mentioning of provision. In the present case the Labour Court,
  Dibrugarh satisfies all the requirements to decide the dispute
  raised by the employee before it.

       17. As the matter is pending before Labour Court since
C long, it shall make endeavour to finally decide the dispute Within
  6 months from today. Appellant as also respondent are directed
  to appear before the Labour Court, within four weeks from
  today.

      18. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with cost,
D quantified at Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the
  respondent.

    D.G.                                        Appeals dismissed.