VANKAMAMIDL VENKATA SUBBA RAOversusCHATLAPALLI SEETHARAMARATNA RANGANAYAKAMMA

A                 VANKAMAMIDl VENKATA SUBBA RAO
                                v.
                   CHATLAPALLISEETHARAMARATNA
                         RANGANA YAKAMMA

                                   APRIL 2, 1997
B
                 [K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, .JJ.]

          Hindu Succession Act, 1956 :

C          Section 14-Applicability of-V executed a will in favour of wife R and
    gift deed in favour of daughter C-V died leaving behind his widow, minor
    son and daughte1~Suit for pmtition filed by widow--<:ompromise decree
    passed in suit-Decree passed before coming into force of the Succession
    Act-Subsequent to the coming into force of Succession Act the appellant-son
    executed a gift deed jointly with his mother infavour of a third party-In this
D   deed widow acknowledged that she had a limited life interest in the propelties
    under the Compromise Decree-After abolition of Estates the husband of
    respondent-daughter filed claim for Ryotwmi Patta-Negativing the claim of
    appellant-son the Settlement Officer granted Patta in favour of the husband
    of respondcnt-daughter-171e appellate Autholity set aside the order of Settle-
E   ment Officer and granted Patt a in favour of appellant-son and his
    mothe1~Appellant's mother executed a will in favour of respon-
    dent-Daughter bequeathing prope1ty obtained under compromise-Suit filed
    by respondent-daughter for possession of prope1ties under Will dismissed by
    Tlial Cowt--{)11 appeal suit decreed by High Cowt-Appeal before Supreme
    Cowt-Held if the light by a Hindu woman under any instnunent is in
F   recognition of pre-existing right, the limited light though presclibed under the
    instmment, gets enlarged into an absolute 1ight by operation of Section 14 (1)
    of the .Act--{)n the other hand, if a 1ight is acquired for the first time under
    the document, then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted and, therefore,
    the right acquired under the instnunent by operation of sub-section (2) of
G   Section 14 does not get enlarged.-Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act
    and not sub-section ( 1) of Section 14 stands attracted.

         C. Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors. v. Idol of S1i Swaminathaswami
    171imkoil & Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 525, referred to.                                   -

H         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section 9.
                                       530
    V ANKAMAMIDI VENKATA SUBBA RAO v. C.S. RANGANAYAKAMMA                 531

        Civil Cowt-Jurisdiction of-When stands excluded-Andhra Pradesh A
(Andhra Areas) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwmi) Act,
1948-Grant of Patta by Settlement Office,......Held Act extinguishes the pre-ex-
isting right, creates new 1ights and requires T1ibunals to enquire into the rival
claims and a fom! of appeal has been provided against the order of the
primmy authority-171ereby the 1ight-and remedy made conclusive under the B
Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act-171ereby, by neces-
sary implication, the jwisdiction of the Civil Cowt stands excluded.

        Vattiche1ukwi Village Panchayat v. Noli Venkatarama Deekshithulu &
Ors., [1991] Supp. 2 SCC 288, referred to.

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 711 of                   C
1986.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 20.3.85 of tl{e Andhra Pradesh
High Court in A. No. 543 of 1977.
                                                                                 D
        C. Sitramiah, G. Prabhakar and G. Narasimhulu for the Appellant.

        A. Subba Rao and K. Ram Kumar for the Respondent.

        The following Order of the Court was delivered :
                                                                                 E
     This appeal by special leave arises frr .1 the judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, made on 20.3.1985 in Appeal
No. 543 of 1977.

      The admitted facts are that one V. Satyanarayana had executed a will
dated December 1, 1950 bequeathing 2.66 acres of wet land in favour of           F
his wife Smt. Raghavamma and also another gift deed bequeathing lands
in favour of his daughter Smt. Seethramratna Ranganayakamma, the
respondent herein. He died on December 2, 1950 leaving behind him his
widow Raghavamma, his minor son, the appellant herein and his daughter
the respondent. Subsequently, his widow Raghavamma filed OS No. 182/53
in the Sub-Court, Tanali for partition of all the properties into equal shares   G
between herself and the appellant. Therein a compromise was effected and
a decree in terms thereof under Ex. A-11 was passed on July 13, 1955.
Under the compromise decree, the property bequeathed in favour of the
respondent, Ranganayakamma was affirmed. The properties sold by the
appellant to the third party also was affirmed. The balance property was         H
    532                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A .partitioned in equal shares of 6.5 acres with a right of reversion to the
  appellant on the demise of Raghavam~a. Subsequently, on April 25, 1959,
  the appellant had executed another gift deed to an extent of 1.50 acres of
  land in favour of third party jointly with his mother wherein she acknow-
  ledged that the property had by Raghavamma under compromise decree
  under Ex. A-11 was conferred with a limited interest in terms thereof.
B Thereby, she had acknowledged that she had a life interest in the proper-
  ties ha<l under the compromise decree. Equally, the appellant had executed
  another gift deed to an extent of 1.97 acres bequeathing under Ex.A-4 in
  favour of his mother to enjoy the property during her life time as limited
  owner. She accepted, acted on and enjoyed for life. This was also pursuant
C to the compromise decree under Ex.A-11. Therein also she had acknow-
  ledged that she had life interest in the compromise decree under Ex.A-11.
  After the estate was abolished under the AP (AA) Estate (Abolition and
  Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, the 'Abolition Act'), the
  claim under Section 15 of the Act was filed. Thereunder, the husband of
D the respondent laid the claim for Ryotwari patta. The Settlement Officer
  negatived the claim of the appellant and granted patta in favour of Krish-
  namurty, namely, the husband of the respondent. On appeal, in TAS No.
  84/61 dated December 3, 1962, the appellate authority set aside the order
  and granted joint patta in favour of appellant No. 1 and his mother
  Raghavamma. On her demise on April 7, 1973, the appellant filed an
E aprlication an<l patta to the entire extent was granted exclusively in favour
  of the first appellant.

          Raghavamma had executed a will in favour of the respondent be-
    queathing the property obtained under Ex.A-11. In furtherance thereof, the
    respondent filed OS No. 94/73 for possession of the properties under the
F
    will <lated July 6, 1972. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, it
    was decreed. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

        The only question that arises for consideration 1s: whether
  Raghavamma, the mother of first respondent and the appellant had a
G limited estate under the compromise decree under Ex.A-11 attracting
  sub-section (2) of Section 14 or the same w~s enlarged into an absolute
  estate by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
  Act, 1956 (for short, the 'Act'). The High Court proceeded on the premise
  that Raghavamma being a widow of Satyanarayana ha<l a right to partition
H under Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and, therefore, when
    VANKAMAMIDI VENKATA SlJBBA RAO v. C.S. RANGANAYAKAMMA                 533

she had a right to file a suit for partitien of the property acquired by her     A
under Ex.A-11, compromise decree, is in recognition of her pre-existing
right to maintenance which was enlarged into an absolute estate. There-
fore, by operation of sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the right
was enlarged into an absolute estate.

       The question is : whether the view taken by the High Court is correct B
in law? Shri C. Sitramiah, learned senior counsel appearing for the appel-
lant contends that by virtue of the settlement deeds, Ex. B-3 and A-4 dated
April 25, 1959 executed by the first appellant jointly with his mother,
Raghavamma in favour of third party and Raghavamma being a signatory
to the document, had acknowledged that she had only life interest in terms C
of the compromise decree, Ex.A-11 which recites that she has life interest
and on her demise the property would revert back to the first appellant, the
will executed by her is neither valid nor binds the appellant. In that view of
the mat'ler and in the light of the patta granted by the Settlement Officer
under Section 15 of the Act, the view taken by the High Court is not correct D
and the suit itself is not maintainable. The right under Section 14(2) will be
only restricted right and, therefore, she has no right to will away the
property had by her under Ex.A-11 in favour of the respondent.


       Mr. A. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on
the other hand, contends that the compromise decree is dated July 30,            E
1955, i.e. anterior to the coming into force of the Succession Act. It is only
in recognition of her pre-existing right, though her husband had executed
a will under which he had bequeathed 2.66 acres for her life towards
maintenance which will she did not accept. On the other hand, in assertion
of her right as a widow's estate in her husband's property, she filed the suit   p
for partition of the property in two equal shares between herself and her
son, the appellant herein. Therein, the compromise decree was effected
under Ex.A-11. The compromise reiteractes her pre-existing right to main-
tenance. Therefore, this is not a right acquired for the first time under
Ex.A-11. It is only in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance.
Therefore, the properties given to her under Ex.A-11 enlarged into an            G
absolute right by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. The gift deeds Ex.
B-3 and A-4 executed on April 25, 1959 between Raghavamma, the mother
of the respondent, and the first appellant must be understood in the light
of the mutual affection they had at that time. Therefore, though there is a
recital that she had only life interest in the property had under the            H
    534                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A compromise decree, that does not stand in her way to will away the
    properties during her life time in favour of her daughter-the respondent.
    Therefore, absolute right she had under Section 14(1) cannot be defeated
    by her accepting Exs. B-3 and A- 4. It is also contended that since her right
    under the will was required to he established, the first respondent was not
B   required to approach the Settlement Authorities laying her claim for patta.

          Under these circumstances, the patta granted under Section 15 of
    the Abolition Act does not stand in the way of the civil Court's going into
    that question.

C         In view of the respective contentions, the question that arises for
    consideration is: whether the compromise decree, Ex. A-11, is only in
    recognition of pre-existing right or whether Raghavamma had enlarged her
    limited right?

          It is well settled legal position that if the right by a Hindu women
D   under any instrument is in recognition of pre-existing right, the limited right
    though prescribed under the instrument, gets enlarged into an absolute
    right by operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. On the other hand, if a right
    is acquired for the first time under the document, then sub-section (2) of
    Section 14 gets attracted and, therefore, the right acquired under the
E   instrument by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 14 does not get
    enlarged.

          This controversy was considered by this Court in a recent judgment
    rendered in C. Masilamani Muda/iar & Ors. v. Idol of Sli Swaminatlzaswami
    Thintkoil & Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 525. In paragraph 27, this Court, after
F   consideration of the entire case law, has held as under :



                                                                                      -
             "As held by this Court, if the acquisition of the property attracts
             sub-section (1) of Section 14, sub-section (2) does not come into
             play. If the acquisition is for the first time, without any vestige of
             pre-existing right under the instrument, document or device etc.,
G            then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-section (2)
             being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe
             out the operation of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14
             independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition
             of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be under-
H            stood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restric-
\

        VANKAMAMIDIVENKATASUBBARAOv. C.S.RANGANAYAKAMMA                     535

            tion upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an A
            instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act had
            come into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts and
            circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female
            acquired or possessed the property in recognition· of her pre-
            existing right or she gets the rights for the first time under the B
            instrument without any vestige of pre-existing right. If the answer
            is in the positive, sub-section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus
            construed, both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given
            their full play without rendering either as otiose or aids as menas
            of avoidance."
                                                                                  c
          Shri C. Sitaramiah, learned senior counsel, has placed reliance on
    this paragraph and contends that since she had acknowledged her limited
    right under compromise decree, Ex.A-11, she acquired only limited right
    for the first time under the compromise decree and, therefore, sub-section
    (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. On the other hand, Mr. A. Subba Rao, D
    learned counsel contends that this ratio squarely applies to the facts in this
    case. There also a compromise decree was executed. Thereunder, the right
    was given enlarging the limited estate of a widow into an absolute estate
    attracting section 14 (1) of the Act and, therefore, the ratio is in his favour.

         In view of the respective contentions, the question is: what right       E
    Raghavamma acquired under the document - Ex.A-117 Ex.A-11 expressly
    mentions as under :

            "The plaintiff gets the property marked in blue pencil in the plan
            attached hereto and on her death the same shall devolve on the        F
            Ist defendant (first appellant) and that Ist defendant do get the
            residuary properties shown in the plan hereto. (more fully
            described in the compromise petition)."

           It is true, as rightly contended by Mr. Subba Rao, that a compromise
    decree was passed in July, 1955; it was in recognition of her pre-existing    G
    right. But how she has understood her limited right gets reflected in
    subsequent documents to which she was admittedly a party and dealt with
    after the Act came into force pursuant to the compromise decree.

         Raghavamma, the mother of the first respondent and the first appel-      H
    536                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A !ant had executed a sale deed, Ex. B-3 in favour of the third party alienating
    1.50 acres of land had under the compromise decree. Therein she has
    specifically stated that she had a life interest in terms of the compromise
    decree, Ex. A-11. Similarly, a gift deed was executed in favour of
    Raghavamma by the first appellant in respect of 1.90 acres of land. There-
    under also, she had acknowledged not only the limited estate had under
B
    the compromise decree but also her limited right under Ex. 4 for enjoyment
    during her life time and the possession given as per the compromise
    decree. Thus, it conld be seen that after the Act had come into force, in
    1959 she had acknowledged in Ex. A-3 and A-4 that what she obtained
    under the compromise decree, Ex. A-11, was a limited right with the
C   provision that the property would revert to her son, the first appellant.
    Thus it could be seen that she had admitted that she had only limited right
    acquired for the first time under the compromise decree. Thereby, sub-sec-
    tion (2) of Section 14 of the Act and not sub-section (1) of Section 14
    stands attracted. That apart, even the Settlement Officer has passed an
D   order granting ryotwari patta under Section 15 of the Abolition Act which
    became final.

         This Court in Vattic/zemkuri Village Panchayat v. N01i Vakatarama
                                                                                     -
    Deekshithulu & Ors. [1991] Supp 2 SCC 288, after considering the entire
  case law, had held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the
E correctness of the patta granted by the Settlement Authorities. Under
  Section 9, CPC, the Courts shall, subject to the provisions contained
  therein, have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits
  cognizance of which is either expressly or impliedly barred. When a legal
  right is infringed, a suit would lie unless there is a bar against entertainment
p of such civil suit and the civil Court would take cognizance of it. Therefore,
  the normal rule of law is that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits
  of civil nature except those of which cognizance is either expressly or by
  necessary implication excluded. The Rule of construction being that every
  presumption would be made in favour of the existence of a right and
  remedy in a democratic set up governed by rule of law and jurisdiction of
G the Civil Courts is assumed. The exclusion would, therefore, normally be
  an exception. Courts generally construe the provisions strictly when juris-
  diction of the civil courts is claimed to be excluded. However, in the
  development of civil adjudication of civil disputes, due to pendency of
  adjudication and abnormal delay at hierachical stages, statues intervence
H and provide alternative mode of resolution of disputes with less expensive
    VANKAMAMIDIVENKATASUBBA RAOv. C.S. RANGANAYAKAMMA                        537

but expeditious disposal. It is settled legal position that if a Tribunal with       A
limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction and decide for itself the
dispute conclusively, in such a situation, it is the Court that is required to
decide whether the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction has correctly as-
sumed jurisdiction and decided the dispute within its limits. It is also
equally settled that when jurisdiction is conferred on a Tribunal, the Courts
                                                                                     B
examine whether the essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed
and decided by the Tribunals leaving the decision on merits to the
Tribunal. It is also equally settled legal position that where a statue gives
finality to the orders of the special Tribunal, the civil court's jurisdiction
must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the
civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does             c
not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not
been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity
with the fundamental Principles of judicial procedure. Where there is an
express bar of jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of
the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies           D
provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of
the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the
remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment
becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the
latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability   E
and provides procedure for the determination of the right or liability and
further lays dmvn that all questions about the said right or liability shall be
determined by the Tribunal so constituted and whether remedies is nor-
mally associated with the action in civil Courts or prescribed by the statutes
or not. Therefore, each case requires examination whether the statute
provides right and remedies and whether the scheme of the Act is that the            F
procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction
of the civil Court in respect thereof. After the advent of independence, the
land reforms was one of the policies of the Government abolishing fudal
system of land tenures and confonnent of the Ryotwari patta on the tiller
of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish pre-existing rights and        G
create new rights under the Act. The Act confers jurisdiction on the
Tribunals in matters relating thereto and hierarchy or appeal/revisions are
provided thereunder giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. There-
by, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to take
cognizance of the suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws           H
    538                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decisions of the Tribunal
    but also ensuring expetitious, inexpensive and simple procedure for dis-
    posal of the matters by the Tribunal and make the Ryotwari patta granted
    to the tiller of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil
    procedure, the jurisdiction of the trial of the civil suits in relation to the
    matters covered under the Acts being time consuming and tardy the lack
B
    of his financial support or otherwise incapacity in defending or working the
    rights in the civil courts and by hierarchy of appeals defeat justice. Ob-
    viously, therefore, the civil suits hy necessary implication stands excluded
    unless the fundamental principles, of procedure are not followed by the
    Tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act
C   concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the
    Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of
    appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority.
    Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given
    finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implica-
D   tion, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands excluded.

          Thus, it could be seen that the civil Court cannot unsettle the patta
    which has become final in the decree now passed pursuant to the declara-
    tion.

E         We are of the view that the Division Bench is not right in granting
    the decree for the properties gifted to her under the will dated 16.7.1972.

             The appeal is accordingly allowed. But, in the circumstances, 1vithout
    costs.

    T.N.A.                                                        Appeal allowed.
F