VAIBHAVversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                  [2025] 7 S.C.R. 407 : 2025 INSC 800

                                Vaibhav
                                    v.
                        The State of Maharashtra
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of 2012)
                                 04 June 2025
       [B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       In a case based on circumstantial evidence where there were
       missing links in the chain of circumstances, whether the finding of
       the High Court regarding the conviction of the appellant for offences
       u/ss.302, 201 r/w s.34, Penal Code, 1860 and s.5 r/w s.25(1)(a),
       Arms Act, 1959 was sustainable in light of the evidence on record.

                                   Headnotes†
       Circumstantial evidence – Missing links in the chain of
       circumstances – Accidental gunshot injury – Appellant was
       convicted u/ss.302, 201 r/w s.34, Penal Code, 1860 and s.5
       r/w 25(1)(a), Arms Act, 1959 for the murder of his friend –
       Defence of the appellant that the deceased had accidentally
       shot himself with the pistol belonging to the appellant’s father:
       Held: The present is a case of an accidental gunshot injury and the
       possibility of a homicidal death is very weak in the present case –
       Imprints on the pistol had not been matched with the appellant
       and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the trigger was pulled
       by the appellant – Courts below failed to examine whether the
       defence of the appellant that the deceased on finding the service
       pistol of the appellant’s father, got curious, picked it up, started
       looking into it with one eye from a close distance and accidentally
       pressed the trigger, was a probable defence or not – The theory
       put across by the appellant is fairly probable and is supported by
       medical evidence including the examination of the bullet injury and
       trajectory – Contrarily, the conclusion drawn by the Courts below
       is not supported by medical evidence and is not consistent with
       the bullet injury and trajectory – The subsequent conduct of the
       appellant of removing the dead body and concealment of articles
       was a natural result of fear of his father and was consistent with the


* Author
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       theory of accidental death – A young boy in first year of college, with
       no criminal background and with no motive in sight, would certainly
       have become scared on seeing that his friend has accidentally shot
       himself in the living room of his house with the pistol belonging to
       his father – In a case purely based on circumstantial evidence, the
       chain of circumstances must be complete and consistent with the
       conclusion of guilt only and must not support a contrary finding –
       Circumstantial evidence on record is not consistent and leaves a
       reasonable possibility of an alternate outcome of innocence of the
       appellant – High Court erred in arriving at the finding of guilt and
       upholding the judgment of Trial Court – Appellant acquitted for
       offences u/s.302, IPC and s.5 r/w s.25(1)(a), Arms Act – However,
       conviction u/s.201, IPC is sustained and he is sentenced for the
       period already undergone. [Paras 18, 20, 22, 26, 27, 29]

       Evidence Act, 1872 – s.8 – Subsequent conduct – Case
       based on circumstantial Evidence – Evidentiary burden – To
       be discharged by the prosecution vis-à-vis the accused –
       Appellant was convicted for the murder of his friend – Defence
       of the appellant that the deceased had accidentally shot
       himself in the living room of the appellant’s house with the
       pistol belonging to appellant’s father – Courts below relied on
       subsequent conduct of the appellant like removal of the dead
       body, concealment of articles and drew adverse inference:
       Held: Primary burden is on the prosecution and it is only if the
       prosecution succeeds in discharging its burden beyond reasonable
       doubt that the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the
       evidence against him or to present a defence – Prosecution’s
       version suffered from inherent inconsistencies and doubts, and
       thus, the inability of the appellant to explain certain circumstances
       could not be made the basis to relieve the prosecution from
       discharging its primary burden – Undoubtedly, in a case based on
       circumstantial evidence, facts indicating subsequent conduct are
       relevant facts u/s.8, Evidence Act – Equally, the inconsistencies
       in the version of the appellant are also relevant however, the
       occasion to examine the version/defence of the appellant could
       have arisen only if the prosecution had succeeded in discharging
       its primary burden beyond reasonable doubt – The inability of an
       accused to offer plausible explanation on certain aspects would
       not automatically absolve the prosecution of its evidentiary burden,
       which must be discharged first and beyond doubt – Evidence Act,
       1872 – s.8. [Para 21]
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                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     Gunshot cases – Nature of death whether suicidal, accidental
     or homicidal not ascertainable from direct evidence – Factors
     to be examined by the Court, stated. [Para 19]

     Circumstantial evidence – Motive, relevance of – Accidental
     gunshot injury – Absence of motive – Appellant was convicted
     for the murder of his friend – Defence of the appellant that the
     deceased had accidentally shot himself in the living room of
     the appellant’s house with the pistol belonging to appellant’s
     father:
     Held: In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive is
     relevant – However, it is not conclusive of the matter – But a
     complete absence of motive may weigh in favour of the accused –
     Testimonies of prosecution witnesses revealed that the appellant
     and the deceased were friends and there was no ill-will between
     them – Even the father of the deceased testified to that effect –
     In cases purely based on circumstantial evidence, the absence
     of motive could raise serious questions and might even render
     the chain of evidence as doubtful because the presence of
     motive explains the circumstantial evidence – For instance, in
     the facts of the present case, any evidence of enmity between
     the appellant and the deceased would have made suspicious
     the act of the appellant of taking the deceased to his home
     prior to his death – However, since the evidence suggests that
     they were friends, the fact that the appellant brought him home
     could not be termed as per-se incriminating – Therefore, motive
     explains the circumstances on record and enables the Court to
     draw better inference in a case based on circumstantial evidence.
     [Paras 23, 25]

                             Case Law Cited
     Anwar Ali & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2020] 9 SCR 878 :
     (2020) 10 SCC 166; Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra
     [2021] 2 SCR 617 : (2021) 5 SCC 626; Nandu Singh v. State of
     Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh), Criminal Appeal No. 285
     of 2022 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Arms Act, 1959; Evidence Act, 1872.
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                               List of Keywords
       Accidental gunshot injury; Accidental death; Circumstantial
       evidence; Bullet injury and trajectory; Service pistol; Homicidal
       death; Removal of the dead body; Concealment of articles; Burden
       beyond reasonable doubt; Preponderance of probabilities; Absence
       of motive; Subsequent conduct; Chain of evidence; Inconsistencies
       in the chain of circumstances; Cleaning up the crime scene;
       Disappearance of evidence; Mere suspicion, no matter how grave,
       cannot take the place of proof; No direct evidence; Alternate
       outcome; Innocence.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       1643 of 2012
       From the Judgment and Order dated 13.06.2012 of the High Court
       of Bombay at Nagpur in CRLA No. 57 of 2012

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Vipin Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Satyajit A. Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Ananya
       Thapliyal, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Sachin Singh, Ms. Anagha S.
       Desai.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla,
       Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.     This is a tale of two friends, Vaibhav and Mangesh, who were
       studying at Bagla Homeopathy Medical College, Arvat Chandrapur,
       Maharashtra. They were students of first year and often used to
       commute together on their two-wheelers. On the fateful day of
       16.09.2010, both friends left the college together on the scooter
       belonging to Mangesh, had tea at the tea stall of PW-3 and arrived
       at Vaibhav’s house in the afternoon. When Mangesh’s father/PW-1
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        411

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     discovered late in the evening that his son had not reached home,
     he tried to find out and eventually lodged a missing report. The
     next day, on 17.09.2010, the dead body of Mangesh was found and
     accordingly, the present criminal case came to be registered against
     unknown persons.
2.   Investigation commenced and a supplementary statement of
     PW-1 was recorded wherein he raised suspicion against Vaibhav,
     Mangesh’s friend, classmate, scooter partner and appellant before
     us in the present appeal. Upon investigation, the police prepared
     the chargesheet wherein the appellant was alleged to have caused
     death of deceased Mangesh by shooting him by the gun belonging
     to the appellant’s father/PW-12.
3.   Upon trial, the Trial Court found that the appellant had killed Mangesh
     using the service gun belonging to his father when he came to
     drop him after college. Thereafter, the appellant called his friends
     Vishal and Akash (juvenile at the time of incident) for helping him
     in the disposal of the dead body. The appellant was found guilty for
     the commission of the offences under Sections 302, 201 read with
     Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as “IPC”
     for brevity) and Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act, 1959. His
     friend Vishal was also found guilty for the commission of the offence
     under Section 201 read with Section 34 of IPC. Both the convicts
     had preferred separate appeals before the Bombay High Court and
     both the appeals came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment,
     wherein the conviction of the appellant was upheld and Vishal was
     acquitted for want of evidence. The present appeal assails the said
     impugned judgment dated 13.06.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal
     No. 57/2012.

     IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
4.   While upholding the conviction of the appellant, the High Court
     appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
     acknowledged that the case is based on circumstantial evidence as
     no direct evidence of the alleged act could be found. After examining
     the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the High Court observed
     that the material against the accused could be summed up as follows:
           “17. The material evidence adduced by the prosecution
           an admitted by the defence which are necessary for the
           decision of this appeal are enumerated thus:-
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       (a) PW12 Khushal Tijare, father of the deceased, is a
       Police Officer to whom the 9mm pistol was entrusted
       along with 30 rounds.
       (b) The accused and the deceased were known to each
       other.
       (c) On 16.9.2010, PW12 Khushalrao had kept the pistol
       under the mattress in his bedroom.
       (d) A1 and the deceased had been to the house of A1.
       On 16.9.2010 after 3 p.m. nobody was at home.
       (e) A1 called upon his father telephonically and demanded
       the keys of the rear door which leads to the abandoned
       quarter.
       (f) PW12 informed A1 that the keys were behind the wall.
       (g) On 16.9.2010, the deceased was lastly seen in the
       company of the accused as admitted by him.
       (h) On 16.9.2010 after 8 p.m., PW1 was searching for his
       son and in the course of searching visited the house of
       A1 to inquire about Mangesh and that A1 informed PW1
       that he had lastly seen Mangesh at 4 p.m.
       (i) A1 visited the house of PW1 at 10 p.m. on 16.9.2010 and
       inquired about Mangesh. He returned home. His parents
       were at home. However, he did not disclose anything.
       (j) On 17.9.2010, A1 visited the house of PW1 i.e. father
       of Mangesh at 9 a.m. Thereafter he revisited the house
       of PW1 with four friends and assured PW1 that they
       would search for Mangesh and made PW1 believe that
       Mangesh was alive.
       (k) After the dead body was noticed in the courtyard
       behind the residential house of A1 and was being removed
       from the spot, A1 accompanied the Police still pretending
       ignorance about cause of death of Mangesh.
       (l) The admission of A1 that his acquaintance with the
       deceased was just one month prior to the incident.
       (m) The admission of A1 as a defence witness that when
       he went to change his clothes in his room, Mangesh was
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                           413

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


           sitting on the bed in the living room, A1 heard the noise of
           firearm and came in the living room and found Mangesh
           lying on the ground with the pistol in his hand and that
           pistol was of his father.
           (n) The admission of defence witness A1 that as soon as
           he saw Mangesh lying on the ground with the pistol, his
           first reaction was that he took the pistol and kept under
           the mattress of the bed i.e. the place where it was left by
           his father. Yet he has stated that he had no knowledge
           as to where his father had left the pistol. This contention
           cannot be believed.
           (o) The admission of A1 that out of fear he removed the
           dead body from the living room and took it to the courtyard
           on the rear side of his house, that he cleaned the floor
           due to fear.
           (p) The admission of A1 that when he had gone to change
           his clothes, Mangesh had not left the living room. Therefore,
           Mangesh had no access to the bed room and location of
           the pistol from beneath the mattress within a span of few
           minutes.
           (q) The fact that although there was memorandum of
           recovery of clothes and it was not followed by a seizure,
           coupled with the statement of A1 that he had given it to
           the Police but they said that it was not required. The act of
           the accused disposing the cartridge at a particular place,
           showing the place to the Police, attempting to search the
           bullet at that place and yet not finding it.
           (r) The explanation of PW12 below Exh.83 which is denied
           in the cross-examination of PW12.
           (s) The sanction order issued by the District Magistrate
           for prosecuting the accused showing that the weapon of
           assault was used in the offence.”
5.   The High Court laid great emphasis on the fact that after the death
     of Mangesh, the appellant had tried to stifle the investigation by
     removing evidence. It observed thus:
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            “20. The fact that the accused attempted to stifle the
            investigation is relevant under Section 8 of the Indian
            Evidence Act. The fact of fear as deposed by A1, accepted
            by the accused is relevant.”
6.     On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment, it could be seen that
       the High Court has heavily relied upon Section 8 of the Indian Evidence
       Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred as “Evidence Act”) to draw inferences
       from the subsequent conduct of the appellant, especially removal of
       the dead body, concealment of clothes, visits by the accused to the
       residence of PW-1 pretending to enquire about the deceased etc.
       As regards the causal link between the appellant and the alleged
       act, the High Court observed that the link was established as the 9
       mm pistol belonging to the father of the appellant had caused the
       death of the appellant. The following para is indicative of the same:
            “23. …In the present case, the accused has himself
            admitted the weapon to be the service pistol of his father
            and that it was in the hand of deceased when he first
            saw him. The prosecution has led cogent and convincing
            evidence to prove that Mangesh had sustained the bullet
            injury with the same 9mm pistol. There is no ambiguity of
            the identity or description of weapon. The link evidence
            between the crime and the accused is established beyond
            reasonable doubt and by the admission of the accused
            himself and his father.”
7.     The appellant had taken two primary defenses before the High
       Court – impossibility of homicidal death in light of the trajectory of the
       bullet and report of PW-9 which pointed towards accidental death.
       Both the contentions were turned down in the impugned judgment
       assigning different reasons. While rejecting the former contention,
       the High Court again adverted to the subsequent conduct of the
       appellant and observed thus:
            “22. The learned counsel for the accused also pleaded that
            it appears from the evidence that the bullet was fired from
            a close range of 15cm would show that it is accidental. He
            has argued that there was no blackening around the eye.
            The direction in which the bullet had travelled through the
            eye to the occipital region would show that it is a case
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                            415

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


           of accidental firing. The counsel has further argued that
           falsity of defence or giving a false explanation does not
           provide an additional link and cannot be made a ground
           for conviction. In the present case, it is not the falsity of
           defence which is being considered and, therefore, we
           have referred to Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act.
           The accused had prepared a good ground and given false
           explanation or rather made up a new story at the threshold
           i.e. even prior to investigation, at the time of investigation
           and, therefore, his conduct indicates the act of guilty mind.”
8.   On the second aspect, the High Court observed that it was not
     obligatory for PW-9 to have given her opinion regarding the cause of
     death, as the cause of death was well known and was “admitted by
     the accused on oath”. The relevant part of the impugned judgment
     reads thus:
           “28. The learned counsel has heavily relied upon the
           deposition of PW9 wherein it is stated that she cannot
           say as to whether the death is accidental or homicidal. We
           have already discussed that it is not obligatory on the part
           of the Doctor to give the cause of death when the cause
           is known and is established by the cogent and convincing
           evidence and moreover admitted by the accused on oath.”

     THE CHALLENGE
9.   Taking exception to the impugned judgment, Ld. Counsel on behalf of
     the appellant submits that the High Court did not examine the grounds
     taken by the appellant. It is submitted that as per the evidence of
     PW-9, the trajectory of the bullet was such that it had exited from
     the downward portion of the skull of the deceased and then hit the
     ventilator above the door. It is submitted that such a trajectory was
     only possible in case of a suicidal death and not homicidal. It is
     further submitted that the courts below have erred in not appreciating
     the testimony of PW-9, who had clearly deposed that she could not
     ascertain the cause of death and could not tell with certainty whether
     the death was suicidal or homicidal.
10. Relying upon medical jurisprudence, it is further submitted that in
    cases of accidental injuries by fire arm, bullet is hit from a close
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       distance. Further, in such cases, the injury is often singular. It is
       submitted that in the present case, both the elements of accidental
       death are present and the Courts below erred in not appreciating so.
11. As regards the conduct of the appellant after the incident, it is
    submitted that the appellant has categorically deposed that the
    death of Mangesh was caused by his father’s pistol at his residence.
    He has also deposed that as he heard the gunshot, he came out
    and saw the dead body of Mangesh lying in pool of blood. He got
    scared of his father and tried to clean up the scene and in doing so,
    he removed the dead body of the deceased and cleaned the blood
    by using phenyl. It is further submitted that there was no motive
    for the appellant to have caused the death of Mangesh and the
    relationship between the appellant and the deceased was friendly.
    To buttress this submission, it is submitted that in a case based on
    circumstantial evidence, absence of motive is a crucial fact which
    renders the prosecution case doubtful.
12. It is further submitted that the Courts below had placed undue burden
    upon the appellant to offer explanation for certain circumstances and
    his subsequent conduct. It is contended that it was for the prosecution
    to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and mere inability of the
    appellant to explain certain aspects could not be read against him to
    arrive at a finding of guilt. Lastly, it is submitted that in a case based
    on circumstantial evidence, if two views are possible, the Court must
    lean in favour of the view favourable to the accused.

       DISCUSSION
13. We have carefully considered the grounds of appeal, respective
    submissions advanced at Bar and have heard both sides at length.
    We may now consider the principal issue whether the finding of the
    High Court regarding the conviction of the appellant is sustainable
    in light of the evidence on record.
14. In the factual matrix of the present case, it could be observed at the
    outset that certain facts stand duly admitted. We may first consider
    such facts. The cause of death of the deceased is undisputed, as it is
    admitted that the deceased was shot by the service pistol belonging to
    PW-12, the father of the appellant. Although, the investigating officer
    did not obtain any ballistic report to ascertain the nexus between
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         417

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     the bullet injury and the service pistol of PW-12, however, it could
     be seen from the record that the nexus has not been questioned by
     the defence. In fact, both the appellant and PW-12 have admitted
     that the bullet was shot from the pistol of PW-12 which was lying in
     the house. Furthermore, PW-11 has also confirmed that when the
     service pistol was re-deposited by PW-12, one bullet was missing
     from the sanctioned number of bullets.
15. Going further, it is also admitted that the appellant had indeed
    removed the dead body of the deceased and had cleaned up the
    scene of crime. It is also a matter of record that the discoveries
    made under Section 27 of Evidence Act were not challenged by
    the appellant as the appellant had admitted that various articles
    belonging to himself and the deceased, and connected with the
    alleged incident, were discovered in furtherance of his disclosures.
    All these aspects, however, assume greater relevance for the offence
    under Section 201 IPC. Insofar as the offences under Section 302
    IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act are concerned, the prosecution
    case leaves us wanting for answers. No doubt, the deceased was
    shot by the pistol belonging to the father of the appellant and in the
    house of the appellant, but the pertinent question that craves for an
    answer is – who pulled the trigger? Despite two rounds of litigation,
    the question is yet to find an answer.
16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, answers to such questions
    are not found on the face of the record. Rather, the truth is found
    concealed in the layers of incriminating and exonerating facts, and
    the Court is required to arrive at a judicial finding on the basis of the
    best possible inference which could be drawn from a comprehensive
    analysis of the chain of circumstances in a case. As per the record
    and the analysis carried out by the Courts below, the circumstances
    weighing against the accused could briefly be summarized as:
     i.     The presence of deceased at the house of the appellant prior
            to and at the time of incident;
     ii.    Admitted removal of dead body of the deceased by the appellant;
     iii.   Admitted removal, concealment and subsequent discovery of
            various articles as per the disclosure made by the appellant;
     iv.    Fatal gunshot by the pistol lying in the house of the appellant;
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       v.    Subsequent conduct of the appellant in trying to show concern
             to the father of the deceased despite knowing about the death;
       vi.   Failure of the appellant to explain certain circumstances such as
             the manner in which the pistol fell in the hands of the deceased,
             how was it re-concealed etc.
17. Having observed the incriminating circumstances, we may now
    advert to the circumstances which leave missing links in the chain
    of the prosecution. Such instances include the doubt expressed by
    PW-9 regarding the nature of death, trajectory of bullet, possibility
    of accidental injury etc. The case of the appellant is that a proper
    appreciation of the exonerating circumstances would make the
    version of the prosecution highly improbable and doubtful. We may
    now examine the same by first considering the version of PW-9.
    Notably, PW-9 has deposed regarding the trajectory of the bullet as it
    entered and exited the skull of the deceased. PW-9 had also annexed
    a diagram of the trajectory, which revealed that the bullet entered
    through the eye of the deceased and exited from the lower part of
    the skull from the back. It would have been possible to reconcile this
    trajectory with the version of homicidal death. However, questions
    arise when the journey of the bullet is analyzed after it exited from
    the lower part of the skull. For, after taking an exit from the lower
    skull, the bullet hit against a ventilator which was installed above the
    door of the living room. Admittedly, the ventilator was installed at a
    height significantly higher than the height of the deceased, thereby
    meaning that the bullet travelled upwards after it left the skull of the
    deceased. The version of the prosecution is simply that the appellant
    shot the deceased in the eye and there has been no effort to prove
    the directions of entry or exit or to explain the inward or outward
    journey of the bullet. The prosecution version remains acceptable
    only till the point of entry of the bullet through the eye, but it starts
    becoming cloudy when the upward trajectory of the bullet is analyzed
    further, as discussed above.
18. In usual course of things, such trajectory of the bullet could have
    been possible only if the deceased was sitting and looking downwards
    towards the barrel of the pistol from a close distance. It was only
    then that the bullet could have hit the ventilator despite exiting from
    the lower part of the skull. In fact, this is precisely the defence of the
    appellant - that the deceased, on finding the service pistol of PW-12,
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        419

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     got curious, picked it up, started looking into it with one eye from a
     close distance and accidentally pressed the trigger. The probability
     of the version put across by the appellant is on the higher side as
     compared to the version put across by the prosecution, which simply
     does not give any explanation for the trajectory of the bullet.
19. In gunshot cases wherein the nature of death – suicidal, accidental
    or homicidal – is not ascertainable from direct evidence, multiple
    factors are taken into account for arriving at a conclusion. Such
    factors include, but are not limited to, the point of entrance, the size
    of wound, direction of wound, position of wound, possible distance
    of gunshot, number of wounds, position of weapon, trajectory of
    bullet after entering into the human body, position of exit wound
    (if bullet has exited), direction of exit wound, direction of the bullet
    after exit, distance travelled by the bullet after exit, nature of final
    impact on surface (if any) etc. All such factors, to the extent of their
    applicability to the facts of the case, need to be examined by the
    Court before arriving at a judicial finding of fact. Undoubtedly, no
    such analysis could be found in the impugned judgment. The High
    Court merely brushed aside the defence of the appellant by referring
    to the subsequent conduct of the appellant and by raising adverse
    inference on that basis.
20. Similarly, the inconclusive opinion of PW-9 regarding the death being
    homicidal or suicidal/accidental was also a relevant fact. No doubt,
    PW-9 was not bound to give a conclusive opinion as observed by
    the High Court, however, it ought to have been examined whether
    the failure to do so had a bearing on the judicial determination of
    the real cause of death. The nature of death ought to have been
    examined in light of the surrounding circumstances discussed
    above, which weigh against the possibility of a homicidal death. The
    appellant has also placed reliance on medical jurisprudence regarding
    the nature of injuries in accidental or suicidal gunshot cases. More
    often than not, in accidental gunshot cases, the injury is found to
    be singular and inflicted from a close range. The present case ticks
    the boxes of an accidental gunshot injury, both in theory and in fact.
    Contrarily, the aforesaid discussion indicates that the possibility of
    a homicidal death is very weak in the present case. It must also be
    kept in mind that the imprints on the pistol have not been matched
    with the appellant and therefore, no direct nexus exists to conclude
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       that the trigger was pulled by the appellant. On this aspect as well,
       we may note with dismay that the High Court rejected the defence
       of the appellant by simply observing that the homicidal death of the
       deceased was ‘admitted’ by the appellant on oath. There is no such
       admission qua the nature of death. Contrarily, the appellant had
       deposed on oath that the death was ‘accidental’, a version that he
       has carried consistently up to this Court.
21. Having said so, we may now examine what weighed with the High
    Court to arrive at the finding of guilt of the appellant. On a careful
    reading of the impugned judgment, one would unmistakably note that
    the subsequent conduct of the appellant in indulging in destruction
    of evidence weighed heavily against him in the mind of the Court.
    The inability of the appellant to explain certain aspects also weighed
    against him. Undoubtedly, in a case based on circumstantial evidence,
    facts indicating subsequent conduct are relevant facts under Section
    8 of the Evidence Act. Equally, the inconsistencies in the version of
    the appellant are also relevant. However, the occasion to examine
    the version/defence of the appellant could have arisen only if the
    prosecution had succeeded in discharging its primary burden beyond
    reasonable doubt. In criminal jurisprudence, it is a time-tested
    proposition that the primary burden falls upon the shoulders of the
    prosecution and it is only if the prosecution succeeds in discharging
    its burden beyond reasonable doubt that the burden shifts upon
    the accused to explain the evidence against him or to present a
    defence. In the present case, the version of the prosecution suffers
    from inherent inconsistencies and doubts, as discussed above, and
    in such a scenario, the inability of the appellant to explain certain
    circumstances could not be made the basis to relieve the prosecution
    from discharging its primary burden. The High Court fell in a grave
    error in doing so, as it placed greater reliance on the loopholes in
    the appellant’s version without first determining whether the chain of
    circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution was complete
    or not. Pertinently, the inability of an accused to offer plausible
    explanation on certain aspects would not automatically absolve the
    prosecution of its evidentiary burden, which must be discharged first
    and beyond doubt.
22. In law, there is a significant difference in the evidentiary burden
    to be discharged by the prosecution and the accused. Whereas,
    the former is expected to discharge its burden beyond reasonable
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         421

                        Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     doubt, the latter is only required to prove a defence on the anvil of
     preponderance of probabilities. If the accused leads defence evidence
     in the course of a criminal trial, the same ought to be tested as
     probable or improbable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
     The present case, we are afraid, reveals that the defence taken by
     the accused since the beginning of the case was not tested by the
     Trial Court and the High Court. Despite a specific defence taken
     by the appellant before both the Courts, the Courts simply did not
     examine the same in the manner required by law. The probability of
     the version put across by the appellant ought to have been tested
     against the circumstantial theory of the prosecution. In other words,
     it was incumbent upon the Courts below to have examined whether
     the defence taken by the appellant was a probable defence or not.
     The failure to do so has certainly resulted into a failure of justice
     and it is sufficient to reopen the evidence in the instant appeal, as
     we have done.
23. We may now come to the next aspect of the case i.e. absence of
    motive and consequence thereof. It is trite law that in a case based
    on circumstantial evidence, motive is relevant. However, it is not
    conclusive of the matter. There is no rule of law that the absence
    of motive would ipso facto dismember the chain of evidence and
    would lead to automatic acquittal of the accused. It is so because
    the weight of other evidence needs to be seen and if the remaining
    evidence is sufficient to prove guilt, motive may not hold relevance.
    But a complete absence of motive is certainly a circumstance
    which may weigh in favour of the accused. During appreciation of
    evidence wherein favourable and unfavourable circumstances are
    sifted and weighed against each other, this circumstance ought to
    be incorporated as one leaning in favour of the accused. In Anwar
    Ali & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh1, this Court analyzed the
    position of law thus:
            “24. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the
            accused that in the present case the prosecution has
            failed to establish and prove the motive and therefore the
            accused deserves acquittal is concerned, it is true that
            the absence of proving the motive cannot be a ground to


1   (2020) 10 SCC 166
422                                                               [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                                 Supreme Court Reports


             reject the prosection case. It is also true and as held by
             this Court Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar2 that if
             motive is proved that would supply a link in the chain of
             circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof cannot be
             a ground to reject the prosecution case. However, at the
             same time, as observed by this Court in Babu3, absence
             of motive in a case depending on circumstantial evidence
             is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. In paras
             25 and 26, it is observed and held as under:
                    “25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal4, this Court
                    examined the importance of motive in cases of
                    circumstantial evidence and observed : (SCC
                    pp. 87-88, paras 38-39)
                        ‘38. ... the motive is a thing which is
                        primarily known to the accused themselves
                        and it is not possible for the prosecution
                        to explain what actually promoted or ex-
                        cited them to commit the particular crime.
                        39. The motive may be considered as
                        a circumstance which is relevant for
                        assessing the evidence but if the evidence
                        is clear and unambiguous and the circum-
                        stances prove the guilt of the accused, the
                        same is not weakened even if the motive is
                        not a very strong one. It is also settled law
                        that the motive loses all its importance in a
                        case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses
                        is available, because even if there may
                        be a very strong motive for the accused
                        persons to commit a particular crime,
                        they cannot be convicted if the evidence
                        of eye- witnesses is not convincing. In
                        the same way, even if there may not be
                        an apparent motive but if the evidence of


2   (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 80
3   Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189
4   (2008) 16 SCC 73
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                          423

                        Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


                        the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the
                        absence or inadequacy of motive cannot
                        stand in the way of conviction.’
                    26. This Court has also held that the absence
                    of motive in a case depending on circumstantial
                    evidence is a factor that weighs in favour of the
                    accused. (Vide Pannayar v. State of T.N.5)”
24. In the subsequent decision in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of
    Maharashtra6, this Court relied upon the decision in Anwar Ali and
    observed as under:-
             “27. Though in a case of direct evidence, motive would
             not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence,
             motive plays an important link to complete the chain of
             circumstances. The motive......”
     More recently, in Nandu Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (now
     Chhattisgarh)7, the position was reiterated by this Court in the
     following words:
             “10. In a case based on substantial evidence, motive
             assumes great significance. It is not as if motive alone
             becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by
             the prosecution and in its absence the case of Prosecution
             must be discarded. But, at the same time, complete
             absence of motive assumes a different complexion and
             such absence definitely weighs in favour of the accused.”
25. Thus, a complete absence of motive, although not conclusive, is a
    relevant factor which weighs in favour of the accused. No doubt,
    the final effect of such absence on the outcome of the case shall
    depend upon the quality and weight of surrounding evidence. In the
    present case, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses have invariably
    revealed that the appellant and the deceased were friends and there
    was no ill-will between them. Even the father of the deceased has
    testified to that effect. The relevance of motive in a case of homicide
    has been a subject of prolonged discussion. Ordinarily, in cases


5   (2009) 9 SCC 152
6   (2021) 5 SCC 626
7   Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 2022
424                                                          [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       involving direct evidence of the commission of crime, motive has little
       role to play as presence or absence of motive is immaterial if the
       commission of the crime stands proved through other evidence. Even
       otherwise, motiveless crimes are not unknown to the society. However,
       in cases purely based on circumstantial evidence, the absence of
       motive could raise serious questions and might even render the chain
       of evidence as doubtful. It is so because the presence of motive does
       the job of explaining the circumstantial evidence. For instance, in
       the facts of the present case, any evidence of enmity between the
       appellant and the deceased would have made suspicious the act of
       the appellant of taking the deceased to his home prior to his death.
       However, since the evidence suggests that they were friends, the
       fact that the appellant brought him home could not be termed as
       per-se incriminating. Therefore, motive explains the circumstances
       on record and enables the Court to draw better inference in a case
       based on circumstantial evidence.
26. As regards the subsequent conduct of the appellant, before parting,
    we may also note that the same was consistent with the theory of
    accidental death. That his act of removal of the dead body and
    concealment of articles was a result of fear of his father - is quite
    natural. A young boy studying in first year of college, with no criminal
    background and with no motive in sight, would certainly have become
    scared on seeing that his friend has accidentally shot himself in the
    living room of his house with the pistol belonging to his father and is
    lying in a pool of blood. The subsequent conduct of cleaning up the
    scene and restoring the living room in its original shape, although
    punishable in law, does not become so unnatural that it could be
    made the basis to convict him for the commission of murder without
    additional evidence to that effect. More so, when such conclusion is
    not consistent with the surrounding evidence on record, especially
    medical evidence, as discussed above.
27. No doubt, the subsequent acts of cleaning up the crime scene and
    making false enquiries amount to disappearance of evidence and
    raise grave suspicion against the appellant. However, mere suspicion,
    no matter how grave, cannot take the place of proof in a criminal
    trial. The suspicion ought to have been substantiated by undeniable,
    reliable, unequivocal, consistent and credible circumstantial evidence,
    which does not leave the probability of any other theory. In the present
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         425

                    Vaibhav v. The State of Maharashtra


     case, the theory put across by the appellant is fairly probable and is
     supported by medical evidence including the examination of the bullet
     injury and trajectory. Contrarily, the conclusion drawn by the Courts
     below is not supported by medical evidence and is not consistent
     with the bullet injury and trajectory, as discussed above. We have
     come far since our acknowledgement that in a case purely based
     on circumstantial evidence, it must be established that the chain of
     circumstances is complete. Such chain must be consistent with the
     conclusion of guilt only and must not support a contrary finding. The
     rigid principles underlying an examination based on circumstantial
     evidence are based on the premise that the very act of arriving at
     a finding of guilt on the basis of inferences must be performed with
     great caution and margin of error must be kept at a minimum. Having
     said so, we may also observe that naturally, there could be some
     inconsistencies in the chain of circumstances in the natural course of
     things and mere presence of inconsistencies does not automatically
     demolish the case of the prosecution. However, the prosecution
     must be able to explain the inconsistencies to the satisfaction of the
     Court. For, the ultimate test is the judicial satisfaction of the Court.
     In the present case, the counter probabilities and inconsistencies in
     the chain of circumstances have not been explained.
28. Momentarily, even if it is believed that the view taken by the Courts
    below is a possible view, it ought to have been examined whether
    a reasonable counter view was possible in the case. It is a time-
    tested proposition of law that when a Court is faced with a situation
    wherein two different views appear to be reasonably possible, the
    matter is to be decided in favour of the accused. The benefit of a
    counter possibility goes to the accused in such cases.
29. In light of the foregoing discussion, we hereby conclude that the High
    Court has erred in arriving at the finding of guilt and in upholding
    the verdict of the Trial Court. The circumstantial evidence on record
    is not consistent and leaves a reasonable possibility of an alternate
    outcome i.e. of innocence of the appellant on the charges of murder
    and illegal usage of fire arm. Accordingly, the impugned order and
    judgment are partially set aside to the extent of conviction of the
    appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 IPC and
    Section 5 read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. Consequently, the appellant
    is acquitted for the offences under Section 302 of IPC and Section 5
426                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       read with 25(1)(a) of Arms Act. His conviction under Section 201 IPC
       is sustained and he is sentenced for the period already undergone
       by him, for reasons discussed above.
30. The captioned appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
    Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey